

**INFORMATION COLLECTION
SUPPORTING JUSTIFICATION
FRA Safety Advisory 2015-03
OMB No. 2130-NEW**

Summary of Submission

- This submission is a new collection of information requesting **Emergency processing** and prompt approval by OMB for the collection of information associated with the FRA Safety Advisory 2015-03 titled Operational and Signal Modifications for Compliance with Maximum Authorized Passenger Train Speeds and Other Speed Restrictions, which was published in the **Federal Register** on June 12, 2015. See 80 FR 33585.
- FRA is requesting **Emergency processing** approval seven (7) days after publication of the required **Federal Register** Notice on **July 7, 2015**, See 80 FR 38799, because FRA cannot reasonably comply with normal clearance procedures on account of use of normal clearance procedures is reasonably likely to disrupt the collection of information. Additionally, in light of the recent Amtrak overspeed derailment that occurred on May 12 at Frankford Junction, Philadelphia, FRA believes safety is an issue. The FRA Safety Advisory took effect immediately upon issuance. FRA cannot wait the normal 90- to 180-day period for routine Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review and approval. Under the FRA Safety Advisory, the agency stresses to passenger railroads and railroads that host passenger service and their employees the importance of compliance with Federal regulations and relevant railroad operating rules governing applicable passenger train speed limits. The associated collection of information involves affected railroads surveying their entire systems, or the portions on which passenger service is operated, and identifying main train locations where there is a reduction of more than 20 mph from the approach speed to a curve or bridge and the maximum authorized operating speed for passenger trains at that curve or bridge (identified locations). It also involves installation of additional signage alerting engineers and conductors of the maximum authorized passenger train speed throughout the passenger railroad's system or the portions on which passenger service is operated, with particular emphasis on additional signage at the identified locations. FRA is, therefore, requesting OMB approval of this collection of information within the above stipulated timeframe.
- The total number of burden hours **requested** for this collection of information is **2,217 hours**.
- Total number of **responses requested** for this information collection is **5,880**.

- ******The answer to question **number 12** itemizes the hourly burden associated with each requirement of this rule (See pp. 10-12)

1. Circumstances that make collection of the information necessary.

The overall safety of railroad operations has improved in recent years. However, two fatal passenger train accidents in the last 18 months in which serious overspeed events occurred highlight the need to ensure train speed limit compliance, as mandated by existing Federal railroad safety regulations and railroad operating rules.

On Tuesday, May 12, 2015, Amtrak passenger train 188 (Train 188) was traveling timetable east (northbound) from Washington, D.C., to New York City. Aboard the train were five Amtrak crew members, three Amtrak employees, and 250 passengers. Train 188 consisted of a locomotive in the lead and seven passenger cars trailing. Shortly after 9:20 p.m., the train derailed while traveling through a curve at Frankford Junction in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. As a result of the accident, eight persons were killed, and a significant number of persons were seriously injured.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has taken the lead role conducting the investigation of this accident under its legal authority. 49 U.S.C. 1101 *et seq.*; 49 CFR 831.2(b). As is customary, FRA is participating in the NTSB's investigation and also investigating the accident under its own authority. While NTSB has not yet issued any formal findings, the information released to date indicates that train speed was a factor in the derailment. As Train 188 approached the curve from the west, it traveled over a straightaway with a maximum authorized passenger train speed of 80 mph. The maximum authorized passenger train speed for the curve was 50 mph. NTSB determined that the train was traveling approximately 106 mph within the curve's 50-mph speed restriction, exceeding the maximum authorized speed on the straightaway by 26 mph, and 56 mph over railroad's maximum authorized speed for the curve.^a

In response to the derailment, FRA issued Emergency Order No. 31 (EO 31; 80 FR 30534, May 28, 2015). EO 31 requires Amtrak to take the following actions to ensure the safe operation of passenger trains on the Northeast Corridor:^b

- Immediately implement code changes to Amtrak's Automatic Train Control (ATC) System to enforce the passenger train speed limit ahead of the curve at Frankford Junction in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania where the fatal derailment occurred.
- Survey its Northeast Corridor system and identify each main track curve where there is a reduction of more than 20 mph from the maximum authorized approach speed to that

^a FRA regulations provide, in part, that it is unlawful to "[o]perate a train or locomotive at a speed which exceeds the maximum authorized limit by at least 10 miles per hour." 49 CFR 240.305(a)(2).

^b EO 31's requirements will not apply where Amtrak's Positive Train Control System (Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES)) is already in use on the Northeast Corridor. Among other features, ACSES enforces civil speed restrictions that are in place at locations such as curves and bridges.

curve for passenger trains, and provide a list of each curve location to FRA within 5 days after EO 31 was issued.

- Submit an action plan for FRA approval within 20 days identifying modifications to its ATC System (or other signal systems) that Amtrak will make to enable warning and enforcement of applicable passenger train speeds at the identified curves. If such modifications would interfere with the timely implementation of a Positive Train Control (PTC) system or are not otherwise feasible, Amtrak's plan must describe alternative procedures that it will adopt at the identified curves to ensure compliance with applicable passenger train speed limits. Amtrak's plan must contain milestones and target dates for completion of action plan items.

Within 30 days of issuance of the Order, Amtrak must begin to install additional wayside signage alerting engineers and conductors of the maximum authorized passenger train speed throughout its Northeast Corridor system, with particular emphasis on additional signage at the curve locations where significant speed reductions occur. Amtrak must identify the locations where it intends to install the additional wayside speed limit signs in its action plan, and must notify FRA when installation of the signs is completed.

In addition to the recent Amtrak passenger train derailment discussed above, in December 2013 a New York State Metropolitan Transportation Authority Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company (Metro-North) train derailed as it approached the Spuyten Duyvil Station in Bronx, New York. The train traveled over a straightaway with a maximum authorized passenger train speed of 70 mph before reaching a sharp curve in the track with a maximum authorized speed of 30 mph. NTSB's investigation of the Metro-North accident determined the train was traveling approximately 82 mph as it entered the curve's 30-mph speed restriction before derailling. That derailment resulted in four fatalities and at least 61 persons being injured. The Metro-North accident is similar to the recent Amtrak accident in that it involved a serious overspeed event in a sharp curve in the track. As a result of the derailment, FRA issued Emergency Order No. 29 (78 FR 75442, Dec. 11, 2013) requiring Metro-North to take certain actions to control passenger train speeds. FRA also issued Safety Advisory 2013-08, which recommended that all railroads in the United States:

- (1) Review the circumstances of the December 1, 2013, Spuyten Duyvil derailment with each of their operating employees.
- (2) Provide instruction to their employees during training classes and safety briefings on the importance of compliance with maximum authorized train speed limits and other speed restrictions. This training should include discussion of the railroad's absolute speed limits, speed restrictions based on physical characteristics, temporary speed restrictions, and any other restrictions commonly encountered.
- (3) Remind their employees that Federal railroad safety regulation, at 49 CFR 240.305(a)(2) and 242.403(e)(2), prohibits the operation of a locomotive or train at a speed which

exceeds the maximum authorized speed by at least 10 mph.

(4) Evaluate quarterly and 6-month reviews of operational testing data as required by 49 CFR 217.9. A railroad should consider increasing the frequency of operational testing where its reviews show any non-compliance with maximum authorized train speeds. A significant number of operational tests should be conducted on trains that are required to reduce speed by more than 20 mph from the maximum authorized train speed. Operational tests should use the reliable methods available, such as reviewing locomotive event recorder data and testing by radar to verify compliance with maximum authorized speeds.

(5) Reinforce the importance of communication between train crewmembers located in the controlling locomotive, particularly during safety critical periods when multiple tasks are occurring (e.g., copying mandatory directives, closely approaching or passing fixed signals and/or cab signals at a reduced speed, approaching locations where the train's movement authority is being restricted, during radio conversations with other employees or job briefings about track characteristics) and during extended periods of inactivity.

FRA recognizes that passenger rail transportation is generally extremely safe. However, these two recent accidents, which both involved overspeed events and resulted in numerous passenger fatalities, highlight the need to remain vigilant in ensuring employee compliance with operational speed limits and restrictions for passenger trains. As required by 49 U.S.C. 20157, railroads operating scheduled intercity and commuter passenger service in this country are required to implement PTC Systems by December 31, 2015. By statute, a PTC system must be designed to prevent the type of overspeed events that occurred in the derailments discussed above, as well as train-to-train collisions, incursions into roadway work zone limits, and the movement of a train over a switch left in the wrong position. Amtrak has indicated that it intends to meet the statutory deadline to install PTC on the Northeast Corridor. FRA understands that other passenger railroads in this country have concerns about their ability to meet the December 31, 2015 deadline to install PTC. FRA intends to enforce the December 31, 2015 deadline to ensure that PTC is in use as quickly, safely, and efficiently as possible.

Until PTC is in use across the passenger railroad systems in this country, and due to the significant safety concerns presented by the two accidents described above, FRA believes all passenger railroads and railroads that host passenger service need to evaluate their systems and take immediate actions to prevent future catastrophic overspeed events from occurring.

Some railroads have ATC or cab signal systems^c that may be modified to prevent overspeed events at critical locations such as curves, bridges, and stations, similar to what FRA required of Amtrak at the May 12, 2015 derailment location in EO 31. Where such signal system modifications are appropriate and would not interfere with the timely implementation of PTC^d, FRA recommends that railroads make such modifications after identifying critical main track locations. Where such modifications to the signal system to slow trains at critical locations are not viable or would interfere with PTC implementation (or on railroads where no cab signal or ATC system is installed or operative), FRA encourages railroads to take other operational actions to prevent overspeed events, such as requiring additional qualified employees to occupy the controlling locomotive of a train to identify and communicate the applicable passenger train speed limits and restrictions, or by requiring additional crew communications regarding applicable passenger train speed limits and restrictions.

FRA will continue to focus on ensuring passenger railroad compliance with maximum authorized train speeds and relevant temporary and permanent speed restrictions in the coming months, including stepped up enforcement actions. These actions will include, but will not be limited to, on-board inspections, radar speed monitoring at locations of significant permanent or temporary speed restrictions, monitoring of railroad officers who conduct operational tests, and comprehensive reviews of a railroad's implementation of their operational tests and inspection program.

In sum, FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2015-03 to stress to passenger railroads and railroads that host passenger service and their employees the importance of compliance with Federal regulations and applicable railroad rules governing applicable passenger train speed limits. This safety advisory makes recommendations to these railroads to ensure that compliance with applicable passenger train speed limits is addressed by appropriate railroad operating policies and procedures and signal systems.

2. How, by whom, and for what purpose the information is to be used.

This is a new collection of information. The proposed collection of information will be used by FRA to ensure that affected passenger railroads and railroads that host passenger service pass along to their operating employees information concerning the circumstances relating to the fatal May 12, 2015, Philadelphia overspeed derailment. As CNN noted in its account of the accident, Amtrak Northeast Regional 188 derailed at Frankford Junction just outside Philadelphia, PA, sending seven (7) cars careening off the tracks.

^c FRA regulations require that “[p]rior to December 31, 2015, where any train is permitted to operate at a speed of 80 or more miles per hour, an automatic cab signal, automatic train stop, or automatic train control system complying with the provisions of this part [part 236] shall be installed, unless an FRA approved PTC system meeting the requirements of this part [part 236] for the subject speed and other operating conditions, is installed.” 49 CFR 236.0(d)(1).

^d FRA recommends that railroads consult with FRA if they believe a modification would interfere with PTC implementation.

At least, four cars toppled over, and some cars were smashed like aluminum cans. At least, seven (7) people died and more than 200 were sent to area hospitals. Amtrak 188 was traveling at 106 mph – more than twice the authorized curve speed of 50 mph. Affected railroads will review these circumstances with their operational employees by means of bulletins. These bulletins will alert locomotive engineers not only of the circumstances of the May 12 accident, but will also highlight the importance of following railroad operational rules and train speed limits throughout the railroad's entire system.

The proposed collection of information will also be used by FRA to ensure that affected passenger railroads and railroads that host passenger service complete the recommended survey of their entire systems or the portions on which passenger service is operated, and identify main track locations where there is a reduction of more than 20 mph from the approach speed to a curve or bridge and the maximum authorized operating speed for passenger trains at that curve or bridge (identified locations). In light of the May 12 Frankford Junction overspeed derailment as well as other similar accidents over the last several years both here in the United States and abroad (Spain), it is essential for railroad safety that locations with potential for high risk of an overspeed derailment be systematically identified and cataloged. This information will then be used by railroads to disseminate to their operational employees to ensure that these employees (locomotive engineers and conductors) are highly aware of appropriate train speed limits and follow all posted signs and operational rules at these locations.

For railroads not utilizing an ATC, cab signal, or other signal system capable of providing warning and enforcement of applicable passenger train speed limits, constant communications between the locomotive engineer and an additional qualified and designated crewmember in the body of the train will be used to provide additional notice or warning of applicable train speeds at main track locations identified in the railroad's survey where there is a reduction of more than 20 mph from the approach speed to a curve or bridge and the maximum authorized operating speed for passenger trains at that curve or bridge. These communications will serve as redundancy so that locomotive engineers reduce train speed coming in to these identified locations that present high risk for an overspeed derailment.

Finally, under Safety Advisory 2015-03, passenger railroads and railroads that host passenger service are required to install additional wayside signs alerting engineers and conductors of the maximum authorized speed throughout the passenger railroad's system or the portions of its system in which passenger service is operated, with particular emphasis on additional signage at the identified locations. These signs will provide a visible and immediate reminder for train engineers and conductors to follow posted/authorized speed limits and reduce speed coming into these identified potentially high risk locations. FRA track inspectors will physically go out and visit various locations where signs will be situated to confirm that they have indeed been placed at these sites with the necessary information on the approach speed limit, the speed limit, and the resume speed limit.

In sum, this collection of information serves as another mechanism to help FRA further enhance rail safety and achieve the DOT's main mission of the reliable, safe, efficient movement of people and goods for a strong and prosperous America now and in the future.

3. **Extent of automated information collection.**

Over the years, FRA has consistently and strongly endorsed the use of the latest information technology, wherever feasible, to reduce burden on respondents and increase efficiency. FRA expects that railroad bulletins, surveys/lists, and communications between railroad employees will be completed electronically (on computers, via radio). Signs must be posted at identified locations. Therefore, FRA believes that 49% of responses will be completed electronically.

4. **Efforts to identify duplication.**

The proposed collection of information is new and pertains to a critical FRA Safety Advisory that the agency issued regarding the great importance of passenger railroad operating employees service (locomotive engineers and conductors) and operating employees that work for railroads that host passenger following their railroads' operating rules and authorized/appropriate train speed limits, particularly at the identified locations in the recommended. Therefore, the information collected is unique and not currently available.

This information to our knowledge is not duplicated anywhere.

5. **Efforts to minimize the burden on small businesses.**

There are approximately 28 railroads that will be impacted by this FRA Safety Advisory and associated collection of information. The burden is fairly minimal involving a total of 2,217 hours and 5,880 responses. Thus, 18 of the entities are either large commuter/passenger railroads (e.g., LIRR, NJT, MBTA, SEPTA, CALTRAIN, METROLINK), OR medium sized operations. Thus, based on the above, FRA firmly asserts that the proposed collection of information will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

6. **Impact of less frequent collection of information.**

If this information is not collected or collected less frequently, rail safety in this country will be considerably jeopardized. Specifically, without this collection of information, there will invariably be more train accidents/train derailments like the one near Philadelphia, PA, that occurred recently because locomotive engineers and train conductors were not fully aware of the circumstances of this accident and the significant risk of overspeed derailments involved at such locations. Without the recommended

communication from passenger service railroads and railroads that host passenger service to their operating employees in the form of railroad bulletins informing these employees of the circumstance of the May 12, 2015, derailment at Frankford Junction near Philadelphia, PA, these employees would not have a heightened attention and regard for scrupulously following authorized/appropriate train speeds while traveling through this location and similar locations throughout this country.

Without the recommended survey of their entire systems or the portions on which passenger service is operated and identifying main track locations where there is a reduction of more than 20 mph from the approach speed to a curve or bridge and the maximum authorized operating speed for passenger trains at that curve or bridge (identified locations), passenger railroads and railroads that host passenger would not know the places that present a potentially high risk for an overspeed train derailment. With the locations identified through the completed survey, affected railroads will have an accurate and current list to disseminate to their operating employees of locations that present similar dangers for overspeed derailment like the one that occurred at Frankford Junction. Operating employees too can then know these locations and ensure that they follow authorized/appropriate train speed limits for such locations.

Without the recommended constant communications between the locomotive engineer and an additional qualified and designated crewmember in the body of the train for railroads not utilizing an ATC, cab signal, or other signal system capable of providing warning and enforcement of applicable passenger train speed limits, there would not be a measure of redundancy providing additional notice or warning of applicable train speeds at main track locations identified in the railroad's survey where there is a reduction of more than 20 mph from the approach speed to a curve or bridge and the maximum authorized operating for passenger trains at that curve or bridge. Without these communications between train crew members, there would be less assurance that locomotive engineers will reduce train speed coming in to these identified locations that present high risk for an overspeed derailment. More accidents and corresponding injuries, fatalities, and property damage similar to those experienced at Frankford Junction accident would be a high price to pay in place of this common sense and necessary recommendation.

Finally, without the installation of additional wayside signs alerting engineers and conductors of the maximum authorized speed throughout the passenger railroad's system or the portions of its system in which passenger service is operated, with particular emphasis on additional signage at the identified locations, there would not be a visible and immediate reminder for train engineers and conductors to follow authorized/appropriate speed limits and reduce speed coming into identified potentially high risk locations. The posted signs will convey important information on the approach speed limit, the speed limit, and the resume speed limit to maintain safe train operations.

In sum, this proposed collection of information is essential and aids FRA and DOT in their critical primary missions of promoting transportation/rail safety and moving hazardous materials throughout the country in a safe, reliable, and environmentally sound manner.

7. **Special circumstances.**

All information collection requirements relating to the Joint Safety Advisory are in compliance with this section.

8. **Compliance with 5 CFR 1320.8.**

In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 and 5 CFR 1320 (§1320.13), FRA is publishing a notice in the **Federal Register** on July 7, 2015, (see 80 FR 38799), requesting Emergency Processing of the proposed collection of information associated with FRA Safety Advisory 2015-03, which was published in the **Federal Register** on June 12, 2015. See 80 FR 33585.

FRA has determined that it cannot reasonably comply with normal clearance procedures on account of use of normal clearance procedures is reasonably likely to disrupt the collection of information. Additionally, in light of the recent Amtrak overspeed derailment that occurred on May 12 at Frankford Junction, Philadelphia, FRA believes safety is an issue. The FRA Safety Advisory took effect immediately upon issuance. FRA cannot wait the normal 90- to 180-day period for routine Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review and approval. Under the FRA Safety Advisory, the agency stresses to passenger railroads and railroads that host passenger service and their employees the importance of compliance with Federal regulations and relevant railroad operating rules governing applicable passenger train speed limits. The associated collection of information involves affected railroads surveying their entire systems, or the portions on which passenger service is operated, and identifying main train locations where there is a reduction of more than 20 mph from the approach speed to a curve or bridge and the maximum authorized operating speed for passenger trains at that curve or bridge (identified locations). It also involves installation of additional signage alerting engineers and conductors of the maximum authorized passenger train speed throughout the passenger railroad's system or the portions on which passenger service is operated, with particular emphasis on additional signage at the identified locations. FRA is, therefore, requesting OMB approval of this collection of information within seven (7) days after publication of the required Notice in the **Federal Register**.

Upon OMB approval of its emergency clearance request, FRA will follow the normal clearance procedures for the information collection associated with this agency Safety Advisory.

9. Payments or gifts to respondents.

There are no monetary payments or gifts made to respondents regarding the proposed information collection requirements resulting from this emergency order.

10. Assurance of confidentiality.

No assurances of confidentiality are being made by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA).

Information collected is not of a private nature.

11. Justification for any questions of a sensitive nature.

There are no questions of a sensitive or private nature involving the proposed collection of information associated with this FRA Safety Advisory.

12. Estimate of burden hours for information collected.

Note: FRA estimates that approximately 28 railroads that provide passenger service or host passenger service will be affected by this Safety Advisory.

FRA Safety Advisory 2015-03

FRA recommends that passenger railroads and railroads that host passenger service do each of the following:

(1) Review and implement the recommendations made in FRA Safety Advisory 2013-08, which are discussed above.

Railroads are already doing this or have already done this. Consequently, there is no additional burden associated with this provision.

(2) Review the circumstances of the fatal May 12, 2015, Philadelphia derailment with their operating employees.

All 28 railroads will comply with this provision by sending communications to their operating employees concerning the circumstances of the fatal May 12, 2015, derailment at Frankford Junction. This railroad communication will take the form of bulletins. Thus, approximately 28 bulletins will be issued under this provision. It is estimated that it will take approximately eight (8) hours to complete each survey under the above provision. Total annual burden for this requirement is 224 hours.

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|-----------------------------|--------------|
| Respondent Universe: | 28 Railroads |
| Burden time per response: | 8 hours |
| Frequency of Response: | One-time |
| Annual number of Responses: | 28 bulletins |
| Annual Burden: | 224 hours |

Calculation: 28 bulletins x 8 hrs. = 224 hours

(3) Survey their entire systems, or the portions on which passenger service is operated, and identify main track locations where there is a reduction of more than 20 mph from the approach speed to a curve or bridge and the maximum authorized operating speed for passenger trains at that curve or bridge (identified locations).

FRA estimates that approximately 28 surveys/lists will be completed identifying main track locations where there is a reduction of more than 20 mph from the approach speed to a curve or bridge and the maximum authorized operating speed for passenger trains at that curve or bridge (identified locations). It is estimated that it will take approximately 40 hours to complete each survey under the above provision. Total annual burden for this requirement is 1,120 hours.

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|-----------------------------|------------------|
| Respondent Universe: | 28 Railroads |
| Burden time per response: | 40 hours |
| Frequency of Response: | One-time |
| Annual number of Responses: | 28 surveys/lists |
| Annual Burden: | 1,120 hours |

Calculation: 28 surveys/lists x 40 hrs. = 1,120 hours

(4) If the railroad utilizes an ATC, cab signal, or other signal system capable of providing warning and enforcement of applicable passenger train speed limits, make modifications to those systems where appropriate to ensure compliance with applicable speed limits at the identified locations. If the railroad is required to implement PTC at the identified locations, implement these recommended signal system changes in the interim.

(5) If the railroad does not utilize an ATC, cab signal, or other signal system capable of providing warning and enforcement of applicable passenger train speed limits (or if a signal system modification would interfere with the implementation of PTC or is otherwise not viable) all passenger train movements at the identified locations be made with a second qualified crew member in the cab of the controlling locomotive, or with constant communication between the locomotive engineer and an additional qualified and designated crewmember in the body of the train. If the railroad is required to implement PTC at the identified locations, implement these recommended changes in the interim.

For each of the 28 affected railroads, FRA estimates that approximately 100 communications (a total of 2,800 communications) will take place at the identified locations between locomotive engineers and an additional qualified and designated crewmember in the body of the train under the above provision. It is estimated that each communication will take approximately two (2) minutes to complete each communication. Total annual burden for this requirement is 93 hours.

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|-----------------------------|----------------------|
| Respondent Universe: | 28 Railroads |
| Burden time per response: | 2 minutes |
| Frequency of Response: | On occasion |
| Annual number of Responses: | 2,800 communications |
| Annual Burden: | 93 hours |

Calculation: 2,800 communications x 2 min. = 93 hours

(6) Install additional wayside signage alerting engineers and conductors of the maximum authorized passenger train speed throughout the passenger railroad’s system or the portions of its system in which passenger service is operated, with particular emphasis on additional signage at the identified locations.

FRA estimates that each of the 28 affected railroads will have approximately 18 locations where wayside signs will be installed under the above provision. Thus, 504 locations will need to have three signs put up in each direction or six (6) signs at each location or a total of 3,024 signs. It is estimated that it will take approximately 15.4839 minutes to install each sign. Total annual burden for this requirement is 780 hours.

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|-----------------------------|--------------------------|
| Respondent Universe: | 28 Railroads |
| Burden time per response: | 15.4839 minutes per sign |
| Frequency of Response: | One-time |
| Annual number of Responses: | 3,024 wayside signs |
| Annual Burden: | 780 hours |

Calculation: 3,024 wayside signs x 15.4839 min. p/sign = 780 hours

Total annual burden for this entire information collection is 2,217 hours (224 + 1,120 + 93 + 780).

13. Estimate of total annual costs to respondents.

There is a cost to passenger railroads and railroads that host passenger service related to this collection of information besides the burden hours detailed in the answer to question

number 12 above. That cost involves the manufacture and placement of the estimated 3,024 wayside signs detailed above.

In its Electronic Notification System (ENS) Final Rule paperwork package and in the paperwork package for Emergency Order No. 31, FRA estimated the general cost per sign to be \$15.

COST

3,024 wayside signs x \$15 = **\$45,360**

In addition to material costs for signage, there are labor costs associated with the signage installations. As noted above in the answer to question number 12, FRA estimates for each wayside sign, the industry would expend 15 minutes in labor resources to install it (a total of 48 hours). FRA finds that the signage labor cost to be **\$48,439**. [**Calculation** = 3,024 wayside signs x 15.4839 min. per sign x \$62.07 hourly rate for maintenance of way and structures employees x 75% overhead costs = **\$48,439**].

FRA acknowledges that in addition to purchasing the actual signage, railroads and railroads that host passenger service will also need to purchase a post to satisfy the wayside sign requirement. FRA estimates that affected railroads will need to supply a separate post to adequately comply with this requirement. Therefore, approximately 3,024 posts will be required along affected railroads' system. Assuming a post cost estimate of \$25, FRA estimates a total cost of **\$75,600**. [**Calculation** = 3,024 sign posts x \$25 = **\$75,600**]

TOTAL COST = \$169,399

14. Estimate of Cost to Federal Government.

There is no additional cost to the Federal Government to examine the required records because they must be supplied to FRA personnel in the course of their routine duties while conducting regulatory compliance audits.

15. Explanation of program changes and adjustments.

These are new information collection requirements. By definition, this entire submission is a **program change**. As stated in the Summary provided on page 1 of this document, the total number of hours that FRA is requesting by OMB for this Emergency Processing submission is **2,217 hours** and the total number of **responses** requested is **5,880**.

Further, as noted in the Summary on page 1, upon OMB's Emergency Clearance for 180 days, FRA will initiate necessary steps to obtain regular Clearance of this proposed information collection.

As noted above, the additional cost to respondents besides the burden hours detailed in the answer to question number 12 above amounts to **\$169,399**. This cost relates to the signage provision and the purchase and installation of wayside signs at the identified locations. Since this is a new collection of information, this additional cost is also, by definition, a **program change**.

16. Publication of results of data collection.

FRA does not have any plans to publish the results of this collection of information.

17. Approval for not displaying the expiration date for OMB approval.

Once OMB approval is received, FRA will publish the approval number for these information collection requirements in the Federal Register, and will take necessary steps to obtain a regular OMB Clearance.

18. Exception to certification statement.

No exceptions are taken at this time.

Meeting Department of Transportation (DOT) Strategic Goals

This information collection supports the top DOT strategic goal, namely transportation safety. Without this collection of information, rail safety in this country will be considerably jeopardized. Specifically, without this collection of information, there will invariably be more train accidents/train derailments like the one near Philadelphia, PA, that occurred recently because locomotive engineers and train conductors were not fully aware of the circumstances of this accident and the significant risk of overspeed derailments involved at such locations. Without the recommended communication from passenger service railroads and railroads that host passenger service to their operating employees in the form of railroad bulletins informing these employees of the circumstance of the May 12, 2015, derailment at Frankford Junction near Philadelphia, PA, these employees would not have a heightened attention and regard for scrupulously following authorized/appropriate train speeds while traveling through this location and similar locations throughout this country.

Without the recommended survey of their entire systems or the portions on which passenger service is operated and identifying main track locations where there is a reduction of more than 20 mph from the approach speed to a curve or bridge and the maximum authorized operating speed for passenger trains at that curve or bridge (identified locations), passenger railroads and railroads that host passenger would not know the places that present a potentially high risk for an overspeed train derailment. With the locations identified through the completed survey, affected railroads will have an accurate and current list to disseminate to their operating employees of locations that present similar dangers for overspeed derailment like the one that occurred at Frankford Junction. Operating employees too can then know these locations and ensure that they follow authorized/appropriate train speed limits for such locations.

Without the recommended constant communications between the locomotive engineer and an additional qualified and designated crewmember in the body of the train for railroads not utilizing an ATC, cab signal, or other signal system capable of providing warning and enforcement of applicable passenger train speed limits, there would not be a measure of redundancy providing additional notice or warning of applicable train speeds at main track locations identified in the railroad's survey where there is a reduction of more than 20 mph from the approach speed to a curve or bridge and the maximum authorized operating for passenger trains at that curve or bridge. Without these communications between train crew members, there would be less assurance that locomotive engineers will reduce train speed coming in to these identified locations that present high risk for an overspeed derailment. More accidents and corresponding injuries, fatalities, and property damage similar to those experienced at Frankford

Junction accident would be a high price to pay in place of this common sense and necessary recommendation.

Finally, without the installation of additional wayside signs alerting engineers and conductors of the maximum authorized speed throughout the passenger railroad's system or the portions of its system in which passenger service is operated, with particular emphasis on additional signage at the identified locations, there would not be a visible and immediate reminder for train engineers and conductors to follow authorized/appropriate speed limits and reduce speed coming into identified potentially high risk locations. The posted signs will convey important information on the approach speed limit, the speed limit, and the resume speed limit to maintain safe train operations.

In sum, this proposed collection of information is essential and aids FRA and DOT in their critical primary missions of promoting transportation/rail safety and moving people and goods throughout the country in a safe, reliable, and environmentally sound manner.

In this information collection and indeed in all its other information collection activities, FRA seeks to do its utmost to fulfill DOT Strategic Goals and to be an integral part of One DOT.