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OMB CONTROL NUMBER: 0704-0553

Expiration Date: 04/30/2019

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For brevity, some questions ask for very brief judgments on what are complex issues: We ask that you make your best overall judgment and not dwell too much on the nuance of each question.

1. 1	Did	the	2014	QDR	get	the	strategy	right	at	the	time	of	publication?
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Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	N/A

2. Does the 2014 QDR strategy remains valid today?

Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	N/A

3. Does the QDR's emphasis on each of the following remains valid today? *

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	N/A
Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region to preserve peace and stability in the region						
Maintaining a strong commitment to security and stability in Europe and the Middle East						
Sustaining a global approach to countering violent extremists and terrorist threats, with an emphasis on the Middle East and Africa						
Continuing to protect and prioritize key investments in technology while our forces overall grow smaller and leaner						
Invigorating efforts to build innovative partnerships and strengthen key alliances and partnerships						

4. Does the 2014 QDR's emphasis on the following Joint Force characteristics remain valid today? *

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	N/A
Smaller but more capable future force						
Prioritizing modernization and readiness						
Emphasizing high-end challenges (A2/AD)						
Force-sizing guidelines (steady-state ability to defend homeland, deter aggressors, and conduct global CT; wartime ability to support simultaneous defeat/deny demands)?						

5. Is the QDR 2014 being effectively implemented?

Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	N/A

6. Have each of the following aspects of the 2014 QDR been successfully implemented? *

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	N/A
Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region to preserve peace and stability in the region						
Maintaining a strong commitment to security and stability in Europe and the Middle East						
Sustaining a global approach to countering violent extremists and terrorist threats, with an emphasis on the Middle East and Africa						
Continuing to protect and prioritize key investments in technology while our forces overall grow smaller and leaner						
Invigorating efforts to build innovative partnerships and strengthen key alliances and partnerships						

7. Are the following capability areas under	er-emphasized, appropriately	y emphasized, or	over-emphasized in	the Defense	Strategy, wl	hen considering	today's
security environment? *							

	Under Emphasized	*	Appropriately Emphasized	-	Over Emphasized	N/A
Cyber						
CT and Special Operations						
ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance)						
Missile Defense						
Nuclear Deterrence						
Precision Strike						
Space						

Is there another capability area that is under-emphasized?

8. Are the primary missions under-emphasized, appropriately emphasized, or over-emphasized in the Defense Strategy, when considering today's security environment? *

	Under Emphasized	*	Appropriately Emphasized	-	Over Emphasized	N/A
Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare						
Deter and Defeat Aggression						
Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges						
Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction						
Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space						
Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent						
Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities						
Provide a Stabilizing Presence abroad						
Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations						
Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations						

9. Please rank the following future challenges in the order you feel any future Defense Strategy must address? (most important, second most important, third most important, fourth most important, least important)

	China	Iran	North Korea	Russia	Terrorism, especially ISIL
Most Important					
Second Most Important					
Third Most Important					
Fourth Most Important					
Least Important					

10. Should each of the following be a priority in the next Defense Strategy?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	N/A
Protect the Homeland						
Project Power and Win Decisively in Overlapping Timeframes						
Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges						
Maintain Security Commitments in Europe & Middle East						
Counter Global Terrorism						

Ts	there	anvthing	else	that	should	he	а	priority?	

11. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements: \star

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	N/A
"Resourcing will limit the Joint Force's ability to implement the 2014 QDR strategy."						
"Bureaucratic processes will limit the Joint Force's ability to implement the 2014 QDR strategy."						
"The Joint Force's ability to implement the 2014 QDR strategy will be limited by political will."						
"The Joint Force's ability to implement the 2014 QDR strategy will be limited by a perceived U.S. credibility gap."						

Are t	here :	additional	limitations	you	would	like	to	add?
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12. To what extent do you agree with the following articulations of the U.S. level of ambition that should underpins the next strategy?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	N/A
The U.S. should remain the world's pre-eminent superpower						
The U.S. should retain a relative comparative advantage to every nation						
The U.S. should allow Russia and China their spheres of influence						
The U.S. should pull back its global presence and engagement and focus resource domestically						

- 13. What changes to the size/shape/readiness of the U.S joint force would you recommend to better deliver the strategy?
- 14. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements: \star

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	N/A
The QDR was clear on its prioritization						
It is possible for an unclassified strategy to be useful						

15A. Grand Strategy is inevitably underpinning by planning assumptions, which may not be universally agreed. To what extent do you agree with the assumptions below? *

	Strongl y Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongl Y Disagree	N/A
Economic power is the foundation of state power so America must preserve national security without compromising the economy						
The first priority of national security is to protect the U.S. homeland and the American people from enemies foreign and domestic						
The U.S. prefers to act in concert with allies, even though doing so introduces collective action and coordination challenges. However, the U.S. reserves the right to act unilaterally - and invests its resources to be capable of doing so						
U.S. prosperity depends on an open economic order characterized by free access to the global commons, relatively low trade barriers, the sanctity of contract, and peaceful competition among private businesses						
There should never be a military power greater than the United States						
The United States can afford military primacy. The fiscal constraints we face are the result of choices that could, if necessary, be reversed - choices involving tax rates and entitlement spending						
Conventional wars between Great Powers are obsolete and things of the past						
There is little danger of real counter-hegemonic balancing against the United States, because the United States provides important public goods, and because potential balancers fear each other more than they fear the United States						
U.S. allies are the richest, most capable countries in the world (after the United States). Most U.S. allies are now net security exporters in the post-Cold War world						
The United Nations (especially the Security Council) is the primary provider of international legitimacy, especially for use of force and international interventions						
The U.S. provides public goods (e.g. security of global commons) because it is costlier to not provide them. If the U.S. did not provide those goods, they either wouldn't be provided at all, or would be provided by actors whose don't share our interests						