

INFORMATION COLLECTION SUPPORTING STATEMENT

Secure Flight Program OMB Control Number 1652-0046 EXP. 03/31/2016

1. Explain the circumstances that make the collection of information necessary. Identify any legal or administrative requirements that necessitate the collection. Attach a copy of the appropriate section of each statute and regulation mandating or authorizing the collection of information. (Annotate the CFR parts/sections affected.)

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) established this information collection in accordance with Sec. 4012(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Pub. L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, Dec. 17, 2004), which requires the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA to assume from aircraft operators the function of conducting pre-flight comparisons of airline passenger information to the Federal Government's watch lists. TSA developed the Secure Flight program to implement this Congressional mandate.

Under the Secure Flight program, TSA receives passenger and non-traveler information from certain U.S. aircraft operators and foreign air carriers (collectively, "covered aircraft operators") for covered flights.¹ After receiving the information, TSA conducts passenger prescreening, including watch list matching. TSA matches identifying information of aviation passengers and certain non-travelers against the watch list maintained by the Federal Government in a consistent and accurate manner, while minimizing false matches and protecting personally identifiable information. TSA also requires covered aircraft operators to transmit information on non-traveling individuals seeking authorization to enter a United States (U.S.) airport sterile area for watch list matching purposes.

In addition to watch list matching, the Secure Flight passenger prescreening process includes the use of risk-based, intelligence-driven screening rules to identify passengers and non-traveling individuals who require either enhanced screening or are eligible for expedited screening. The risk-based, intelligence-driven screening rules incorporate frequent flyer code word (FFCW) and risk-based assessments generated by aircraft operators using data in their existing Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening Systems (CAPPS). The FFCW and CAPPS assessments are used in risk-based analysis of Secure Flight and other prescreening data that produce a boarding pass printing result for each passenger. The primary result of the implementation of Secure Flight risk assessment rules is the identification of more passengers who are eligible for expedited screening in airports with TSA Pre✓[®] lanes.

Secure Flight will include as a supplementary data element the FFCW for use in conjunction with Secure Flight Passenger Data (SFPD). Secure Flight will collect a FFCW from participating aircraft operators for the purpose of verifying that a passenger is a Frequent Flyer program member eligible for expedited screening (subject to random enhanced screening protocols). The FFCW is not the same as a Frequent Flyer number or the name of

¹ "Covered flights" means flights operated by covered U.S. aircraft operators under 49 CFR 1544.101(a) and flights to, from, and overflying the United States operated by covered foreign air carriers.

the aircraft operator. It is a separate and unique identifier assigned by TSA to each participating aircraft operator.

CAPPS was created by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in 1999 “to exclude from the additional security measures the great majority of passengers who are very unlikely to present any threat and, conversely, to identify passengers to whom heightened security measures should be applied.”² The FAA implemented CAPPS pursuant to its general authority to prescribe regulations “to protect passengers and property on an aircraft operating in air transportation or intrastate air transportation against an act of criminal violence or aircraft piracy.”³ Using FAA-set evaluation criteria to determine a passenger’s security risk, CAPPS was used by aircraft operators in their reservation systems to analyze passenger name records (PNR)⁴ and other information associated with flight reservations to assist in determining a passenger’s security risk prior to boarding.

TSA was created in 2001 with the enactment of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)⁵ and assumed responsibility for the CAPPS program from the FAA.⁶ Like the FAA, TSA does not receive the underlying CAPPS data.

Notwithstanding the incorporation of risk-based, intelligence driven rules, and the use of risk-based assessments using CAPPS data, passengers who are a match to a watch list will continue to receive appropriate enhanced screening. For all other passengers, the Secure Flight passenger prescreening computer system will conduct risk-based analysis of passenger data using, among other data: 1) the SFPD, including known traveler numbers (KTNs) that TSA already receives from aircraft operators pursuant to Secure Flight regulations; 2) the risk assessments based on CAPPS data; 3) frequent flyer FFCWs that aircraft operators submit to TSA; 4) lists of low-risk passengers provided by both federal and non-federal entities who are eligible for expedited screening and 5) other prescreening data available to TSA. The Secure Flight risk-based analysis will determine whether passengers will receive expedited, standard, or enhanced screening, and the results will be indicated on the passenger’s boarding pass.

For passengers, covered aircraft operators must transmit SFPD for each passenger consisting of the passenger’s full name, date of birth, gender, and, to the extent available, Redress

² See FAA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Security of Checked Baggage on Flights Within the United States, 64 FR 19220, 19221 (April 19, 1999).

³ See 49 U.S.C. § 44903(b).

⁴ A PNR is a record that contains detailed information about an individual’s travel on a particular flight, including information provided by the individual when making the flight reservation. Although the content of PNRs varies by aircraft operator, PNRs may include, among other information, passenger name, reservation date, travel agency or agent, travel itinerary information, form of payment, flight number, and seating location. In contrast, Secure Flight receives SFPD, which is a limited subset of PNR data.

⁵ Pub.L. 107–71, 115 STAT. 597 (Nov. 19, 2001).

⁶ In section 136 of ATSA (codified at 49 U.S.C. 44903(j)(2)(C)), Congress directed that aircraft operators use CAPPS or any successor system to screen all aircraft passengers, not just those who are checking bags. See also TSA Notice of rulemaking status, Security of Checked Baggage on Flights Within the United States; Certification of Screening Companies, 67 FR 67382, 67383 (Nov. 5, 2002). In addition, ATSA continued in effect all “orders, determinations, rules, [and] regulations” of the FAA “until modified, terminated, superseded, set aside, or revoked in accordance with law by the [TSA Administrator], any other authorized official, a court of competent jurisdiction, or operation of law.” See ATSA, section 141(b). ATSA also explicitly recognized the continuance of CAPPS when it exempted CAPPS from the requirement that the screening of passengers and property before boarding flights originating in the United States be carried out by a Federal Government employee. See 49 USC 44901(a).

Number or known traveler number, information from the passenger's passport (full name, passport number, country of issuance, and expiration date), as well as certain non-personally identifiable information used to manage messages, including itinerary information. The non-personally identifiable information is necessary to allow TSA to effectively prioritize watch list matching efforts and communicate with the covered aircraft operator.

In the vast majority of cases, this information is sufficient to eliminate the possibility that the passenger is a person on a Federal Government watch list. In the event that TSA is unable to distinguish the passenger from an individual on a watch list with the information initially transmitted, TSA requests that the covered aircraft operator provide additional information, such as a physical description, to continue the watch list screening process.

For non-traveling individuals that an airport operator or aircraft operator seeks to authorize to enter a sterile area for a purpose approved by TSA, the airport or aircraft operator must transmit the full name, date of birth, gender, and TSA Redress Number or known traveler number, if available, as well as the airport code for the airport sterile area the non-traveling individual seeks to enter.

Section 4012(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 also requires TSA to establish a process by which operators of private charters over 12,500 pounds or lessors of those aircraft may request use of TSA's advanced passenger prescreening system to conduct watch list matching of passengers and lessors. Therefore, TSA added operators of private charters over 12,500 pounds into a pilot program (Twelve-Five and Private Charter Pilot Program) to the population of carriers from whom TSA will collect passenger reservation data similar to what has been described above. The pilot, which included six Twelve-Five and Private Charter participants, concluded. Currently, six Twelve-Five and Private Charter operators are authorized to participate in the Secure Flight program.

In 2011, TSA also proposed the use of Secure Flight under another pilot program, the Airport Access Authorization to Commercial Establishments Beyond the Screening Checkpoint (AAACE Program). The airport operators under this program were approved to use Secure Flight watch list matching resources to determine whether to allow non-traveling individuals to proceed through the screening checkpoint to access an airport's sterile area to patronize commercial establishments beyond the screening checkpoint. The AAACE Program was limited to registered overnight guests at three hotels located on airport property at the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport, Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport, and Pittsburgh International Airport. The Secure Flight Program vets all participants against the No Fly and Selectee Lists, as well as other watch lists. All participants are subjected to the same watch list vetting, identity verification, and screening requirements as passengers boarding commercial airline flights. The pilot has concluded and the program has been renamed the Airport Sterile Area Access Pass Program, which is implemented under the modified Airport Security Program. It is anticipated that participation in the new Airport Sterile Access Pass Program may grow in the future.

2. Indicate how, by whom, and for what purpose the information is to be used. Except for a new collection, indicate the actual use the agency has made of the information received from the current collection.

Secure Flight is currently designed to receive SFPD, CAPPs assessments, and FFCW data through either the DHS router or the electronic Secure Flight web application (eSF) from covered aircraft operators and airport operator participants with compatible systems.

TSA uses the information to enhance the security of air travel and support the Federal Government's counterterrorism efforts by enabling TSA to conduct passenger prescreening through the Secure Flight program. The Secure Flight program identifies individuals who warrant further scrutiny prior to entering an airport sterile area or boarding an aircraft, who warrant denial of boarding or access to an airport sterile area on security grounds or who have been identified as eligible for expedited screening. To identify those individuals, TSA compares their identifying data to information about individuals identified on the watch list and to intelligence-driven rules as part of risk-based analysis.

TSA requires individuals seeking a reservation on a covered flight or authorization to enter a U.S. airport's sterile area to provide their full names as they appear on their Verifying Identity Document (VID),⁷ their dates of birth, and their gender. TSA prohibits covered aircraft operators from issuing either a boarding pass to a passenger on a covered flight or an authorization form to enter a sterile area to a non-traveler who does not provide a full name, date of birth, and gender.

Many names do not indicate gender, because they can be used by either gender. Additionally, names not derived from the Latin alphabet, when transliterated into English, often do not denote gender. Providing information on gender reduces the number of false positive watch list matches and otherwise improves passenger identification because the information will distinguish persons who have the same or similar names but who are of different gender. Date of birth is also helpful in identity verification, including in distinguishing a passenger from an individual on the watch list with the same or similar name, thereby reducing the number of false positive watch list matches, or better identifying passengers with KTNs who have the same name as those without KTNs.

Individuals who have used the redress process provided by DHS are assigned a unique Redress Number and may use it while making a reservation. Individuals who are a member of a known traveler program are assigned a unique Known Traveler number by the program provider and may use it while making reservations to identify themselves as eligible for expedited screening. Passport information also assists TSA analysts in resolving possible false positive matches and makes the passenger prescreening process more accurate. Covered aircraft operators are not required by TSA to request passport information from passengers, and TSA recognizes that this information will not be available for all passengers. However, covered aircraft operators must transmit this information to TSA if it was previously collected during the normal course of business and stored in a passenger profile. Covered aircraft operators participating in the TSA Pre✓[®] program also may transmit to TSA FFCWs and the risk-based assessments generated by aircraft operators using data in their

⁷ A VID is an identification document that has been issued by a U.S. Federal, State, or tribal government that: (1) contains the individual's full name, photo, and date of birth; and (2) has not expired. The VID may also be an unexpired passport issued by a foreign government.

existing CAPPs. Finally, TSA also receives in Secure Flight certain non-personally identifiable information, including itinerary information, in order to effectively prioritize watch list matching efforts, communicate with the covered aircraft operator, and facilitate an operational response, if necessary, to an individual who is on the Federal Government watch list.

For the Twelve-Five and Private Charter participants, TSA collects the same information for the same purposes as described above. Twelve-Five and Private Charter operators who have the technical capability to submit SFPD through either the DHS router or the e-Secure Flight web application are participating in the program.

Under the Airport Sterile Area Access Pass Program, Secure Flight collects SFPD and other data from those non-traveling individuals seeking to access commercial establishments beyond the screening checkpoint.

In support of TSA Pre✓[®], TSA implemented expedited screening of known or low risk travelers. Federal and non-federal entities provide TSA with lists of eligible low risk individuals to be used as part of Secure Flight processes. Secure Flight identifies individuals who should receive low-risk screening and transmits the appropriate boarding pass printing result to the aircraft carriers.

Use of the information is governed by stringent privacy protections, including data security mechanisms and limitations on use, strict firewalls, and data access limitations.

3. ***Describe whether, and to what extent, the collection of information involves the use of automated, electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms of information technology, e.g., permitting electronic submission of responses, and the basis for the decision for adopting this means of collection. Also describe any consideration of using information technology to reduce burden. [Effective 03/22/01, your response must SPECIFICALLY reference the Government Paperwork Elimination Act (GPEA), which addresses electronic filing and recordkeeping, and what you are doing to adhere to it. You must explain how you will provide a fully electronic reporting option by October 2003, or an explanation of why this is not practicable.***

Consistent with the Government Paperwork Elimination Act, TSA is using technology to reduce the burden of this collection. Aircraft operators currently covered by a security program submitting information to Secure Flight submit data required under this collection entirely through electronic means. Covered aircraft operators submit passenger information to TSA electronically through the transmission system developed by TSA and the covered aircraft operators or through a web-based application for transmitting the passenger information. Covered aircraft operators also submit the registration information via email. There is no standard method in which TSA requires the information to be submitted.

The above applies also to the Twelve-Five and Private Charter population and the Airport Sterile Area Access Pass Program population.

4. Describe efforts to identify duplication. Show specifically why any similar information already available cannot be used or modified for use for the purpose(s) described in Item 2 above.

The information in passenger reservation data maintained by covered aircraft operators is the primary source of recorded information about the more than two million passenger enplanements on covered flights each day. The passenger reservation data are a unique source of passenger and flight information and serve as the best information source for use in screening airline passengers against Federal watch lists and low-risk passenger lists on an operational and real-time basis. Consequently, there is no available substitute for passenger reservation data in carrying out the passenger prescreening process.

Similarly, information about non-traveling individuals that is collected by covered aircraft operators and may, at a future date, be collected by airport operators is a unique source of information about non-traveling individuals who seek authorization to enter a sterile area.

The same caveats apply to the Twelve-Five and Private Charter Program population and the Airport Sterile Area Access Pass Program population.

5. If the collection of information has a significant impact on a substantial number of small businesses or other small entities (Item 5 of the Paperwork Reduction Act submission form), describe the methods used to minimize burden.

Domestic U.S. airlines with fewer than 1,500 employees are defined as small businesses, and 24 of the affected U.S. airlines meet this definition. Those airlines may deem this impact to be significant for them. However, TSA has reduced the impact to those airlines by providing (eSF), a web-based alternative data submission mechanism.

The above applies also to the Twelve-Five and Private Charter population and the Airport Sterile Area Access Pass Program population.

6. Describe the consequence to Federal program or policy activities if the collection is not conducted or is conducted less frequently, as well as any technical or legal obstacles to reducing burden.

TSA is collecting this information because TSA must assume the responsibility from the private sector for pre-flight screening of passengers and certain non-traveling individuals against the Federal Government watch list, as required by section 4012(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. Congress also required the consolidation of the aviation passenger watch list matching function within one agency of the Federal Government. If TSA were not to conduct this information collection, it would not be compliant with the Congressional mandate to assume operation of watch list matching from aircraft operators.

In section 136 of ATSA (codified at [49 U.S.C. 44903\(j\)\(2\)\(C\)](#)), Congress directed that aircraft operators use CAPPs or any successor system to screen *all* aircraft passengers, not just those who are checking bags. *See also* TSA Notice of rulemaking status, Security of Checked Baggage on Flights Within the United States; Certification of Screening

Companies, [67 FR 67382](#), 67383 (Nov. 5, 2002). In addition, ATSA continued in effect all “orders, determinations, rules, [and] regulations” of the FAA “until modified, terminated, superseded, set aside, or revoked in accordance with law by the [TSA Administrator], any other authorized official, a court of competent jurisdiction, or operation of law.” See ATSA, section 141(b). ATSA also explicitly recognized the continuance of CAPPs when it exempted CAPPs from the requirement that the screening of passengers and property before boarding flights originating in the United States be carried out by a Federal Government employee. See [49 U.S.C. 44901\(a\)](#). TSA is collecting the risk assessment result based on CAPPs data and FFCW as part of ongoing efforts to enhance aviation security by identifying appropriate security screening for aviation travelers. If TSA ceased conducting this collection, its ability to enhance analysis of a passenger’s security risk and thereby make better informed passenger risk decisions would be limited.

Collecting information from the Twelve-Five and Private Charter Program participants, as well as the Airport Sterile Area Access Pass Program participants is important to TSA and the aviation industry, as it is part of TSA’s effort to maintain and improve the watch list matching function for Twelve-Five, Private Charter, and other general aviation operators who may access Secure Flight in the future.

With regard to technical and legal obstacles to reducing burden, TSA believes that because collection of information from covered aircraft operators calls for electronic transmission of information from a source that is already collecting this information, the burden has been reduced as much as possible. TSA has taken reasonable steps to ensure that the collection is the least burdensome necessary to achieve program objectives.

7. Explain any special circumstances that require the collection to be conducted in a manner inconsistent with the general information collection guidelines in 5 CFR 1320.5(d)(2).

Covered aircraft operators provide air transport to more than two million passenger enplanements per day, and covered aircraft operators accept reservations for transport on a continuous basis. Therefore, in order to be effective as a security measure, watch list matching of passengers and other risk assessments are carried out on a near real-time basis. Collection of passenger information from respondents less frequently than on a daily basis would not allow TSA to complete watch list matching and other passenger prescreening prior to a passenger’s arrival at an airport security checkpoint. TSA collects information from respondents on at least a daily basis, if not more frequently, in order to take into account new or changed reservations for air travel.

For the Twelve-Five, Private Charter Program and the Airport Sterile Area Access Pass Program participants, it is necessary to collect a passenger’s and/or a non-travelling individual’s information from respondents on a near real-time basis to complete watch list matching and other prescreening of every passenger or non-traveling individual prior to access to the aircraft.

There are no other known special circumstances requiring other collection requirements listed above that apply to the Secure Flight program.

- 8. Describe efforts to consult persons outside the agency to obtain their views on the availability of data, frequency of collection, the clarity of instructions and recordkeeping, disclosure, or reporting format (if any), and on the data elements to be recorded, disclosed, or reported. If applicable, provide a copy and identify the date and page number of publication in the Federal Register of the agency's notice, required by 5 CFR 1320.8(d) soliciting comments on the information collection prior to submission to OMB. Summarize public comments received in response to that notice and describe actions taken by the agency in response to these comments. Specifically address comments received on cost and hour burden.**

TSA originally provided notice of this information collection in its Secure Flight Final Rule, published in the Federal Register on October 28, 2008 (72 FR 48356). As required by 5 CFR 1320.8(d), TSA published a 60-day notice to seek approval of a revised information collection in the Federal Register. See 80 FR 6097 (February 4, 2015). Additionally, TSA published a 30-day notice in the Federal Register. See 80 FR 79067 (December 18, 2015). TSA received no comments in response to this notice.

- 9. Explain any decision to provide any payment or gift to respondents, other than remuneration of contractors or grantees.**

No payment or gift is provided to respondents.

- 10. Describe any assurance of confidentiality provided to respondents and the basis for the assurance in statute, regulation, or agency policy.**

No specific assurances of confidentiality are provided to respondents. Information provided by respondent aircraft operators is protected from disclosure to the extent appropriate under applicable provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act of 1974, and, as applicable, 49 U.S.C. 114(r), as implemented by 49 CFR part 1520, which limits the disclosure of Sensitive Security Information. Data are collected and transmitted in accordance with the Privacy Act System of Records Notice published for the Secure Flight program: Secure Flight Records DHS/TSA019. See 80 FR 233 (January 5, 2015).

- 11. Provide additional justification for any questions of sensitive nature, such as sexual behavior and attitudes, religious beliefs, and other matters that are commonly considered private.**

The collection does not include any questions of a sensitive nature.

- 12. Provide estimates of hour burden of the collection of information.**

Covered Aircraft Operator Hour Burden Estimates:

TSA requires covered aircraft operators to submit passenger information for covered flights and certain non-traveling individuals to TSA for the purpose of passenger prescreening, including watch list matching. This information includes data elements that are already a

part of the routine collection by the covered aircraft operators (*i.e.*, name, date of birth, gender, Redress Number, Known Traveler Number, and itinerary information), as well as the additional information required by Secure Flight regulations at 49 CFR part 1560.

With this revision, TSA has determined that covered aircraft operators' transmission of the FFCW and CAPPs assessments does not increase the transaction time, which remains no more than 25 seconds per transaction to collect. Information required to generate the FFCW and CAPPs assessment is available within covered airport operators' reservation systems. No additional information is collected from the traveling individuals. Among the 282 covered Secure Flight carriers (of which 20 are new carriers), TSA estimates approximately 97,617,844 annual responses. These responses will require an annual hour burden of 677,902 hours (97,617,844 responses x 0.00694⁸ hours per response).

In addition to the current Secure Flight covered aircraft operators, a time burden will be incurred by Twelve-Five and Private Charter carriers that are currently approved to collect and transmit information to TSA as well as the approved Airport Sterile Area Access Pass Program participants. For the approved volunteer Twelve-Five and Private Charter carriers, TSA estimates that the annual hour burden for this activity, based on 10 Twelve-Five and Private Charter carriers, is 0.881944 hours (127 responses x 0.00694 hours per response). For Airport Sterile Area Access Pass Program participants, TSA estimates that the annual hour burden for this activity is 347 hours (50,000⁹ responses x 0.00694 hours per response). For non-federal low risk traveler list providers, TSA estimates that the annual hour burden is 45 hours (30 average annual responses x 1.5 hours per response).

TSA estimates a total average annual hour burden of 678,295 hours (677,902 + 0.881944 + 347 + 45) for this information collection request.

Calculations:

Respondents

Covered Secure Flight carriers = 282

Twelve-Five and Private Charter carriers per year in the (passenger prescreening) program = 10

Airport Operators (hotels) under the Airport Sterile Area Access Pass Program = 10

Non-Federal Low-Risk Traveler List Providers = 10

TOTAL = 312 respondents

Hourly Burden

Covered Secure Flight carriers (282) = 677,902 annual hours

Twelve-Five and Private Charter carriers (10) = 0.881944 annual hours

⁸ (0.00694 hours = 25 seconds ÷ 3600 seconds/ hour).

⁹ TSA estimates that approximately 14 non-traveling individuals will request access to the sterile area each day per airport for a total of approximately 5,000 transactions per airport operator. For 10 airport operators, the total transactions are ~50,000.

Airport Operators (hotels) under the Airport Sterile Area Access Pass Program (10 hotels) = 347 annual hours

Non-Federal Low-Risk Traveler List Providers (10) = 45 annual hours

TOTAL = 678,295 hours

Information Collection	Average Annual Respondents	Average Annual Responses	Hour Burden per response	Total Annual Hour Burden
Secure Flight Cutover Carriers	282	97,617,844	0.00694	677,902
Twelve-Five and Private Charter carriers	10	127	0.00694	0.881944
AAACE Program	10	50,000	0.00694	347
Non-Federal Low Risk Traveler List Providers	10	30	1.5	45
Total	312	97,668,001		678,295

Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding

The cost associated with submitting information to TSA are built into system costs and is covered under annual cost burden to the respondents as provided in the response to Q13. As such, there is no opportunity cost associated with the time burdens discussed above to the aircraft operators for the submission of passenger information to TSA for Covered Secure Flight Carriers, Twelve-five and Private Charter carriers, or AAACE Program.

Although most of the collections from aircraft operators and carriers are collected through an automated system, the responses provided from Non-Federal Low Risk Traveler Providers are not. Thus, TSA estimates an estimated annual hour burden cost to respondents for purposes of this ICR.

TSA assumes that a Non-Federal Low-Risk Traveler Provider will spend about 1.5 hours per year per response. Based on historical data, TSA assumes a total of three responses per respondent will occur annually, resulting in a total of 45 hours annually (10 respondents x 3 responses x 1.5 hours per response). TSA calculates the annual cost for non-federal low-risk traveler list providers by multiplying this time burden by the list provider's annual compensation rate of \$61.30¹⁰. TSA then multiplies this times the total number of existing non-federal low-risk traveler list providers to estimate an annual hour burden cost of \$2,758.54 (45 total hours for non-federal low-risk traveler list providers x \$61.30).

¹⁰ TSA estimates that a list provider (based on a fully loaded J band average hourly compensation rate) spends 1.5 hours per year per response (generation, maintenance, sharing, and reconciliation) for a total for 45 hours. Staff completing this task average \$61.30 per hour.

13. Provide an estimate of the total annual cost burden to respondents or recordkeepers resulting from the collection of information.

TSA estimates¹¹ the total annual cost burden to respondents or record-keepers to be \$4,641,674. This includes new startup costs totaling \$49,820 for 20 new Secure Flight carriers and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs totaling \$4,591,854 for existing carriers. The breakdown of estimated startup costs and O&M costs for the respondents can be found below.

The breakdown of the new startup cost is:

20 – New covered Secure Flight carriers forecasted per year¹² = \$2,491 x 20 new SF carriers* = \$49,820

Total annualized capital startup cost = \$49,820

The breakdown of the estimated O&M cost for the respondents or record-keepers is:

262 – Covered Secure Flight carriers:

Cost per covered carrier calculation based on the 2011 costs for the 211 participating carriers at that time. Calculations were then adjusted to reflect per carrier costs for current year. Present value costs to calculate current forecasted burden:

\$3,365,664 (Year 2011 O&M costs) divided by 211 (Year 2011 carriers) = \$15,951.
\$15,951 adjusts to \$17,430¹³ to account for present value.

\$17,430 present value O&M x 262 current covered Secure Flight carriers (Year 2015 carriers) = \$4,566,660

10 – Twelve-Five and Private Charter carriers:

TSA estimates the 2015 O&M cost for people and technology to be \$6,190,200 and \$1,015,739, respectively, for Twelve Five and Private Charter carriers. The total estimated O&M cost is \$7,205,939.¹⁴

To determine the cost per Twelve-Five and Private Charter carriers approved to participate, TSA divided the total O&M cost of \$7,205,939 by the total number of carriers eligible to participate, which is 3,011:¹⁵

$\$7,205,939 / 3,011 = \$2,393$

$\$2,393 \times 10$ (Twelve-Five and Private Charter carriers approved) = \$23,932

¹¹* denotes projected population during the duration of this ICR

TSA used government costs to calculate the estimated O&M cost for the respondents or recordkeepers.

¹² Estimate of all Secure Flight carriers from TSA Secure Flight program Subject Matter Expert(s) SME based on previous yearly averages.

¹³ O&M cost per carrier for cutover carriers adjusted for inflation at 3 percent per year.

¹⁴ This estimate is based on historical government contract costs that TSA assumes are similar to industry costs for people and technology to operate the Secure Flight program.

¹⁵ 3,011 is total number of carriers that will be required to participate (1,132 Twelve-Five Carriers and 1,879 Large Aircraft Security Program carriers).

10 – Airport operators under the Airport Sterile Area Access Pass Program:

Cost per Airport Sterile Area Access Pass Program airport operators:

To determine the cost per Airport Sterile Area Access Pass Program participant, TSA estimates that each airport operator participating in the program will need three eSF licenses that cost \$42.08 per license.¹⁶ The cost of the eSF license (\$42.08) is multiplied by the number of required licenses per airport, which is three¹⁷, for a total cost of \$126.24 per airport operator.

$\$42.08$ (per eSF license) x 3 licenses per airport = $\$126.24$

$\$126.24$ x 10 airport operators = $\$1,262.40$

Total annual cost (O&M) = $\$4,566,660 + \$23,932 + \$1,262 = \$4,591,854$

¹⁶ TSA Secure Flight Program price estimate based on average cost.

¹⁷ TSA Secure Flight Program SME estimate.

14. Provide estimates of annualized cost to the Federal Government. Also, provide a description of the method used to estimate cost, and other expenses that would not have been incurred without this collection of information.

The costs to the Federal Government for the Secure Flight program are described in the chart below. The cost estimation took into account the need to obtain, format, and compare passenger and non-traveler information against data maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center and against low-risk passenger lists.

	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017
Payroll Cost and Benefits (Federal Pay)	\$36,481.00	\$36,850.00	\$37,598.00
Secure Flight Management and Admin. Contracts (Non System Ops. & SW/HW)	\$4,931.72	\$5,039.60	\$5,135.35
Secure Flight System Enhancement and Sustainment Contracts	\$33,205.90	\$33,757.30	\$34,536.38
Secure Flight IT Operations and Maintenance Support Contracts	\$10,519.90	\$10,911.55	\$10,980.73
Information and Technology Infrastructure Contracts	\$21,822.85	\$22,237.49	\$22,660.00
TOTAL	\$106,961.37	\$108,795.94	\$110,910.46

15. Explain the reasons for any program changes or adjustments reported in Items 13 or 14 of the OMB Form 83-I.

This revision reflects additional aircraft operators that have migrated to Secure Flight as covered carriers. The total number of covered Secure Flight carriers has grown from 163 in 2008 to 211 in 2011, and from 211 in 2011 to 262 covered carriers in 2015.¹⁸ Going forward, TSA also anticipates 15–20 new covered aircraft operators to cutover to Secure Flight annually. This revision also covers the transmission of the CAPPs assessment and FFCW to TSA as part of Secure Flight risk assessment, as well as lists of low-risk passengers who are eligible for expedited screening that are received from non-federal entities.

In the effort to further develop passenger prescreening solutions and implementation plans for a population of Twelve-Five, Private Charter, and other general aviation operators who may access Secure Flight in the future, TSA planned to collect written survey data from the community to understand their current operating capabilities. TSA did not implement the planned survey and does not have plans to implement the survey at this time.

16. For collections of information whose results will be published, outline plans for tabulation and publication. Address any complex analytical techniques that will be used. Provide the time schedule for the entire project, including beginning and ending dates of the collection of information, completion of report, publication dates, and other actions.

¹⁸ As of June 1, 2015.

The results of the proposed collection are not published.

17. If seeking approval to not display the expiration date for OMB approval of the information collection, explain the reasons that display would be inappropriate.

TSA is seeking approval not to display the OMB control number and expiration date for the data transmission by covered aircraft operators of passenger information to TSA. As this collection is an automatic transmission of the passenger data to TSA's system and does not use a collection instrument, display would be inappropriate.

18. Explain each exception to the certification statement identified in Item 19, "Certification for Paperwork Reduction Act Submissions," of OMB Form 83-I.

No exceptions are claimed.