Burden Statement

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The information you provide will be used for statistical purposes only. In accordance with the BTS confidentiality statute (49 U.S.C. 6307) and the Confidential Information Protection provisions of Title V, Subtitle A, Public Law 107-347, your responses will be kept confidential and will not be disclosed in identifiable form to anyone other than BTS employees or BTS agents such as telephone interviewers. In accordance with these confidentiality statutes, only statistical and non-identifying data will be made publicly available through aggregate reports. By law, every BTS employee and BTS agent has taken an oath of confidentiality and is subject to a jail term of up to 5 years, a fine of up to \$250,000, or both if he or she discloses ANY identifiable information about the respondent or reporting company or operator. BTS will not release to the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, Department of Interior, or any other public or private entity any information that might reveal the identity of individuals or company/operator names mentioned in near-miss reports.

SPPE (Safety and Pollution Prevention Equipment) Failure Notification Form

(Please submit the information listed below)

Operator Data
Date of Failure
Operator Company Name (Operators will select their BSEE operator number from a drop down list that BSEE will provide)
Complex ID / Structure Number// (Operators will select their Complex ID and Structure Number from a drop down list that BSEE will provide)
API Well Number, if applicable
Company Name Submitting Form, if different than the Operator
Type of Company Submitting Form <i>(select one)</i> Production Contractor Other, Specify
SPPE Details
Equipment manufacturer Model Serial Number Working pressure Nominal size
Provide a narrative describing any redress history for the SPPE that failed:
Please provide the date and a narrative description of the last SPPE test.
Date
Narrative:

III. What was the Certification Status of the Failed SPPE (select one)

□ Newly Installed; certified SPPE pursuant to ANSI/API Spec Q1

□ Newly Installed; certified SPPE pursuant to Another Quality Assurance Program

□ Previously certified under ANSI/ASME SPPE-1

□ Non-Certified SPPE

IV. Was the SPPE previously repaired, remanufactured or subject to hot work offsite? Yes No

V. What type of tree was associated with the SPPE that failed? (select one)

Dry Tree

Subsea Tree

VI. Which SPPE component failed? (select all that apply)

- □ Valve Body
- \Box Actuator
- □ Flow coupling (required for surface- or subsurface-controlled SSSV)
- Safety Lock
- □ Landing Nipple
- Direct hydraulic control system
- Electro-hydraulic control umbilical
- Flange
- □ Ring joints
- \square Ball
- □ Flapper
- □Temperature Safety Element (TSE)
- Emergency Shutdown (ESD) System

VII. SPPE Type

What was the type of SPPE that failed? (select one)

- □ Surface Safety Valve (SSV)
- □ Boarding Shutdown Valve (BSDV)
- Underwater Safety Valve (USV)
- □ Surface controlled SCSSV
- □ Subsurface controlled SSCSV

VIII. SSSV Details

What was the type of SSSV that failed? (select one) □ Tubing retrievable

- □ Wireline retrievable
- □ Through flowline (TFL)
- □ SCSSV retrievable
- □ SSCSV retrievable

Was the SSSV formerly a pump through type tubing plug?

Yes
No

If the SSSV that failed was Subsurface Controlled (SSCSV), what type was it? (select one)

- □ Velocity-type SSCSV
- □ Tubing-pressure-type SSCSV

What was the service class of the SSSV that failed? (select one)

- $\hfill\square$ Class 1 only standard service
- \square Class 2 sandy service
- \square Class 1 and 2
- □ Class 3 stress cracking
- □ Class 3s (sulfide stress and chlorides in a sour environment)
- □ Class 3c (sulfide stress and chlorides in a non-sour environment)
- Class 4 mass loss corrosion service

X. BDSVs, SSVs, and USVs

What was the service class of the BDSV/SSV/USV? (select one)

- Class I: performance level requirement intended for use on wells that do not exhibit the detrimental effects of sand erosion.
- Class II: performance requirement level intended of use if a substance such as sand could be expected to cause an SSV/USV valve failure

If the SPPE that failed was a BSDV, which type was it? (select one)

- □ Automatic
- \square Manual BSDV

X. SPPE Design Criteria

Was the SPPE designed for High Pressure High Temperature (HPHT) conditions?

Yes
No

Please specify the most extreme exposure conditions for which the SPPE was designed to function? Design Pressure _____ psi Design Temperature _____ degrees F

Design Flow Rate ______ (number) Flow rate units _____ per _____ Other Design Environmental Conditions

Well data (Provide the information below, as applicable)			
What was the type of well associated with the SPPE failure? (select one) Production Injection Well 			
Was the well shut in at the time of failure? □ Yes □ No			
What was the last Well Test Rate? BOE/day			
What was the date of the last Well Test?			
What were the Environmental Conditions <i>(check all that apply)</i> Sand, Specify percentage% H2S 			
🗆 Other, Specify			
_ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •			
Pressures and temperatures			

- □ Activated during normal well operations
- $\hfill\square$ Activated in response to an ESD
- $\hfill\square$ Activated during emergency weather or other emergency conditions
 - Specify the nature of the emergency: _____
- □ Activated during a process upset
- Activated in response to the detection of a high or a low pressure condition by a PSHL sensor located upstream of the BSDV
- □ Activated when the gas lift system introduced gas into the system
- Activated during a leakage test

XIII. Description of the failure

Provide a narrative description of the failure to include, **but not limited to**:

- as much information as possible on the operating conditions that existed at the time of the malfunction or failure
- an accurate a description as possible of the malfunction or failure

• any operating history of the SPPE leading up to the malfunction or failure (e.g. field repair, modifications made to the SPPE, etc.)

XIV. Specify how many cycles or hours were completed since the last preventative maintenance. (If the SPPE was newly installed, specify how many cycles or hours were completed since the SPPE was installed).

_____number of cycles **or** ______number of hours

XV.Provide a narrative describing the general configuration of the SPPE and hydrocarbon flow path.

XVI. What factors contributed to the failure? (select all that apply)

- Improper Design
- □ SPPE erroneously thought to be certified but was not
- □ Inadequate requalification/verification testing
- □ Installation was incompatible with specific design elements like subsea trees and related equipment, tubing hangers, etc.
- □ Improper Use
- □ Operating conditions out of range of device
- Mechanical failure leak
- □ Mechanical failure -- sand cut erosion
- □ Mechanical failure Corrosion (chemical H2S orCO2)
- □ Mechanical failure -- Corrosion (atmosphere)
- □ Valve seat degradation
- $\hfill\square$ Failed to open
- $\hfill\square$ Failed to close
- □ Failed to contain hydrocarbons
- □ Failure to meet required closure timing (consider both isolation and bleed time when deciding)
- Electrical power failure

- Hydraulic power failure
- □ Incorrect assembly
- □ Valve damaged during assembly/disassembly
- Improper maintenance
- Improper repair
- □ Shipping damage
- Damage related to lifting or material handling
- $\hfill\square$ Storm damage
- Collision damage
- □ Damage related to a seismic event
- Applied hydraulic pressure through wellhead seal assembly required to maintain surfacecontrolled SSSV in the open position exceeds MRWP of the wellhead by more than a minimum required amount
- Other, Specify _____

XVII.Preliminary Root Cause (select all that apply)

Human Error, Personnel Skills or Knowledge
Human Error, Quality of Task Planning and Preparation
Human Error, individual or group decision-making
Human Error, quality of task execution
Human Error, quality of hazard mitigation
Human Error, communication
Maintenance plan and procedure
Manufacturing defect
Design issue
Wear and tear
Other, Specify _______

XVIII.Is a formal Root Cause and Failure Analysis recommended? Yes No

XIX.Corrective Action

What corrective action was taken related to the SPPE failure? (select all that apply)

- Adjust
- Check
- □ Inspection
- □ Modify
- Overhaul
- 🗆 Refit
- □ Remanufacturer
- 🗆 Repair

Replace
 Service

□ Other, Specify _____

Where was the corrective action accomplished? (select one)

Contractor's facility

Manufacturer's facility

 $\hfill\square$ On location

 $\hfill\square$ Operator's facility

If the corrective action was accomplished on location, who conducted the corrective action? *(select one)*

 $\square \ Operator$

 $\hfill\square$ Contractor

Manufacturer

XX.Was the failure associated with an HSE Incident: Que Yes Que No

If Yes, what was the type of incident? (select all that apply)

One or More Fatalities

 $\hfill\square$ Injury to 5 or more persons in a single incident

□ Tier 1 Process Safety Event (API 754/IOGP 456)

□ Loss of Well Control

□ \$1 million direct cost from damage of loss of facility/vessel/equipment

□ Oil in the water >= 10,000 gallons (238 bbls)

□ Tier 2 Process safety event (API 754/IOGP 456)

□ Collisions that result in property or equipment damage > \$25,000

□ Incident involving crane or personnel/material handling operations

□ Loss of Station-keeping

Gas release (H2S and Other) that result in process or equipment shutdown

□ Muster for evacuation

Structural Damage

□ Spill < 10,000 gallons (238 bbls)

Other, Specify _____

Appendix

List of Acronyms and References				
The Act	Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act			
AIV	alternate isolation valve			
ANSI	American National Standards Institute			
API	American Petroleum Institute			
APM	Application for Permit to Modify			
ASME	American Society of Mechanical Engineers			
BAST	Best available and safest technology			
BOEM	Bureau of Ocean Energy Management			
BOPs	Blowout Preventers			
BSDV	Boarding shutdown valves			
BSEE	Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement			
CSU	column-stabilized-unit			
CVA	certified verification agent			
DOI	Department of the Interior			
DPP	Development and Production Plan			
DWOP	Deepwater Operations Plan			
E.O.	Executive Order			
ESD	emergency shutdown			
FPS	floating production systems			
FPSO	floating production, storage, and offloading facility			
FSV	flow safety valves			
GLIV	gas-lift isolation valve			
GOM	Gulf of Mexico			
H ₂ S	hydrogen sulfide			
HP	high pressure			
HPHT	high pressure high temperature			
INCs	Incidents of noncompliance			
ISO	International Organization for Standardization			
IVA	Independent verification agent			
LP	low pressure			
LSH	level safety high			
MAWP	Maximum allowable working pressure			
MMS	Minerals Management Service			
MOAs	Memoranda of Agreement			
MODU	mobile offshore drilling unit			
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding			
NAE	National Academy of Engineering			
NPRM	Notice of Proposed Rulemaking			
NTL	Notices to Lessees and Operators			
NTTAA	National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act			
OESC	Ocean Energy Safety Advisory Committee			
OFR	Office of the Federal Register			
OIRA	Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs			
OMB	Office of Management and Budget			
OCS	Outer Continental Shelf			
OCSLA	Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act			
P&ID	piping and instrumentation diagram			

PE	Professional Engineer
PLC	programmable logic controller
PRA	Paperwork Reduction Act
PSH	pressure safety high
PSHL	pressure safety high and low
psi	Pounds per square inch
psia	pounds per square inch absolute
psig	pounds per square inch gauge
PSL	pressure safety low
PSV	pressure safety valve
RFA	Regulatory Flexibility Act
RP	Recommended Practice
SBA	Small Business Administration
SBREFA	Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
SAFD	safety analysis flow diagram
SDV	shutdown valve
Secretary	Secretary of the Interior
SEMS	Safety and Environmental Management Systems
SIL	safety integrity level
SWRI	Southwest Research Institute
Spec.	Specification
SPPE	Safety and Pollution Prevention Equipment
SSSV	Subsurface safety valve
SSV	surface safety valve
TLPs	tension-leg platforms
TSE	temperature safety element
TSH	temperature safety high
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
USV	Underwater safety valve
VRU	vapor recovery unit
WI	water injection
WISDV	water injection shutdown valve
WIV	water injection valve