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Title 49 - Transportation

Subtitle B - Other Regulations Relating to Transportation

Chapter II - Federal Railroad Administration, Department of Transportation

Part 236 Rules, Standards, and Instructions Governing the Installation, Inspection, Maintenance, and Repair of Signal and Train Control Systems, Devices, and Appliances

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PART 236 - RULES, STANDARDS, AND INSTRUCTIONS GOVERNING THE INSTALLATION, INSPECTION, MAINTENANCE, AND REPAIR OF SIGNAL AND TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS, DEVICES, AND APPLIANCES

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20107, 20133, 20141, 20157, 20301-20303, 20306, 20501-20505, 20701-20703, 21301-21302, 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2461 note; and 49 CFR 1.89.

Source: 33 FR 19684, Dec. 25, 1968, unless otherwise noted.

§ 236.0 Applicability, minimum requirements, and penalties.

- (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, this part applies to all railroads and any person as defined in paragraph (f) of this section.
- (b) This part does not apply to -
 - (1) A railroad that operates only on track inside an installation that is not part of the general railroad system of transportation; or
 - (2) Rapid transit operations in an urban area that are not connected to the general railroad system of transportation.

(c)

- (1) Prior to January 17, 2012, where a passenger train is operated at a speed of 60 or more miles per hour, or a freight train is operated at a speed of 50 or more miles per hour -
 - (i) A block signal system complying with the provisions of this part shall be installed; or
 - (ii) A manual block system shall be placed permanently in effect that shall conform to the following conditions:
 - (A) A passenger train shall not be admitted to a block occupied by another train except when absolutely necessary and then only by operating at restricted speed;
 - (B) No train shall be admitted to a block occupied by a passenger train except when absolutely necessary and then only by operating at restricted speed;
 - (C) No train shall be admitted to a block occupied by an opposing train except when absolutely necessary and then only while one train is stopped and the other is operating at restricted speed; and
 - (D) A freight train, including a work train, may be authorized to follow a freight train, including a work train, into a block and then only when the following train is operating at restricted speed.
- (2) On and after January 17, 2012, where a passenger train is permitted to operate at a speed of 60 or more miles per hour, or a freight train is permitted to operate at a speed of 50 or more miles per hour, a block signal system complying with the provisions of this part shall be installed, unless an FRA approved PTC system meeting the requirements of this part for the subject speed and other operating conditions is installed.

(d)

- (1) Prior to December 31, 2015, where any train is permitted to operate at a speed of 80 or more miles per hour, an automatic cab signal, automatic train stop, or automatic train control system complying with the provisions of this part shall be installed, unless an FRA approved PTC system meeting the requirements of this part for the subject speed and other operating conditions, is installed.
- (2) On and after December 31, 2015, where any train is permitted to operate at a speed of 80 or more miles per hour, a PTC system complying with the provisions of subpart I shall be installed and operational, unless FRA approval to continue to operate with an automatic cab signal, automatic train stop, or automatic train control system complying with the provisions of this part has been justified to, and approved by, the Associate Administrator.
- (3) Subpart H of this part sets forth requirements for voluntary installation of PTC systems, and subpart I of this part sets forth requirements for mandated installation of PTC systems, each under conditions specified in their respective subpart.

(e) Nothing in this section authorizes the discontinuance of a block signal system, interlocking, traffic control system, automatic cab signal, automatic train stop or automatic train control system, or PTC system, without approval by the FRA under part 235 of this title. However, a railroad may apply for approval of discontinuance or material modification of a signal or train control system in connection with a request for approval of a Positive Train Control Development Plan (PTCDP) or Positive Train Control Safety Plan (PTCSP) as provided in subpart I of this part.

- (f) Any person (an entity of any type covered under 1 U.S.C. 1, including but not limited to the following: a railroad; a manager, supervisor, official, or other employee or agent of a railroad; any owner, manufacturer, lessor, or lessee of railroad equipment, track, or facilities; any independent contractor providing goods or services to a railroad; and any employee of such owner, manufacturer, lessor, lessee, or independent contractor) who violates any requirement of this part or causes the violation of any such requirement is subject to a civil penalty of at least \$976 and not more than \$31,928 per violation, except that: Penalties may be assessed against individuals only for willful violations, and, where a grossly negligent violation or a pattern of repeated violations has created an imminent hazard of death or injury to persons, or has caused death or injury, a penalty not to exceed \$127,712 per violation may be assessed. Each day a violation continues shall constitute a separate offense. See FRA's website at www.fra.dot.gov for a statement of agency civil penalty policy.
- (g) A person may also be subject to criminal penalties for knowingly and wilfully making a false entry in a record or report required to be made under this part, filing a false record or report, or violating any of the provisions of 49 U.S.C. 21311.
- (h) The requirements of subpart H of this part apply to safety-critical processor-based signal and train control systems, including subsystems and components thereof, developed under the terms and conditions of that subpart.

[49 FR 3382, Jan. 26, 1984, as amended at 53 FR 52936, Dec. 29, 1988; 63 FR 11624, Mar. 10, 1998; 69 FR 30595, May 28, 2004; 70 FR 11095, Mar. 7, 2005; 72 FR 51198, Sept. 6, 2007; 73 FR 79704, Dec. 30, 2008; 75 FR 2698, Jan. 15, 2010; 77 FR 24422, Apr. 24, 2012; 79 FR 49715, Aug. 22, 2014; 81 FR 43112, July 1, 2016; 82 FR 16134, Apr. 3, 2017; 83 FR 60749, Nov. 27, 2018; 84 FR 23736, May 23, 2019; 84 FR 37075, July 31, 2019; 86 FR 1759, Jan. 11, 2021; 86 FR 23255, May 3, 2021; 87 FR 15869, Mar. 21, 2022]

Subpart A - Rules and Instructions: All Systems

GENERAL

§ 236.1 Plans, where kept.

As required for maintenance, plans shall be kept at all interlockings, automatic signals and controlled points. Plans shall be legible and correct.

[49 FR 3382, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.2 Grounds.

- (a) **General.** Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each circuit, the functioning of which affects the safety of train operations, shall be kept free of any ground or combination of grounds having a current flow of 75 percent or more of the value necessary to retain a permissive state of a safety appliance.
- (b) **Exception.** Paragraph (a) of this section does not apply to the following:
 - (1) Circuits that include any track rail;
 - (2) The common return wires of single-wire, single-break, and signal control circuits using a grounded common;
 - (3) Circuitry internal to microprocessor-based appliances;

- (4) Circuitry internal to semiconductor-based memory; or
- (5) Alternating current power distribution circuits that are grounded in the interest of safety.

[79 FR 49715, Aug. 22, 2014]

§ 236.3 Locking of signal apparatus housings.

Signal apparatus housings shall be secured against unauthorized entry.

[49 FR 3382, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.4 Interference with normal functioning of device.

The normal functioning of any device shall not be interfered with in testing or otherwise without first taking measures to provide for safety of train operation which depends on normal functioning of such device.

[49 FR 3382, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.5 Design of control circuits on closed circuit principle.

All control circuits the functioning of which affects safety of train operation shall be designed on the closed circuit principle, except circuits for roadway equipment of intermittent automatic train stop system.

§ 236.6 Hand-operated switch equipped with switch circuit controller.

Hand-operated switch equipped with switch circuit controller connected to the point, or with facing-point lock and circuit controller, shall be so maintained that when point is open one-fourth inch or more on facing-point switch and three-eighths inch or more on trailing-point switch, track or control circuits will be opened or shunted or both, and if equipped with facing-point lock with circuit controller, switch cannot be locked. On such hand-operated switch, switch circuit controllers, facing-point locks, switch-and-lock movements, and their connections shall be securely fastened in place, and contacts maintained with an opening of not less than one-sixteenth inch when open.

§ 236.7 Circuit controller operated by switch-and-lock movement.

Circuit controller operated by switch-and-lock movement shall be maintained so that normally open contacts will remain closed and normally closed contacts will remain open until the switch is locked.

§ 236.8 Operating characteristics of electromagnetic, electronic, or electrical apparatus.

Signal apparatus, the functioning of which affects the safety of train operation, shall be maintained in accordance with the limits within which the device is designed to operate.

[49 FR 3382, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.9 Selection of circuits through indicating or annunciating instruments.

Signal control and electric locking circuits shall not be selected through the contacts of instruments designed primarily for indicating or annunciating purposes in which an indicating element attached to the armature is arranged so that it can in itself cause improper operation of the armature.

§ 236.10 Electric locks, force drop type; where required.

Electric locks on new installations and new electric locks applied to existing installations shall be of the forced drop type.

§ 236.11 Adjustment, repair, or replacement of component.

When any component of a signal system, the proper functioning of which is essential to the safety of train operation, fails to perform its intended signaling function or is not in correspondence with known operating conditions, the cause shall be determined and the faulty component adjusted, repaired or replaced without undue delay.

[49 FR 3382, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.12 Spring switch signal protection; where required.

Signal protection shall be provided for facing and trailing movements through spring switch within interlocking limits and through spring switch installed in automatic block signal, train stop, train control or cab signal territory where train movements over the switch are made at a speed exceeding 20 miles per hour, except that signal protection shall be required only with the current of traffic on track signaled for movement in only one direction.

Note:

Does not apply to spring switch installed prior to October 1, 1950 in automatic block signal, automatic train stop, or automatic train control territory.

[49 FR 3383, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.13 Spring switch; selection of signal control circuits through circuit controller.

The control circuits of signals governing facing movements over a main track spring switch shall be selected through the contacts of a switch circuit controller, or through the contacts of relay repeating the position of such circuit controller, which, when normally closed switch point is open one-fourth inch or more, will cause such signals to display their most restrictive aspects, except that where a separate aspect is displayed for facing movements over the switch in the reverse position the signal shall display its most restrictive aspect when the switch points are open one-fourth inch or more from either the normal or reverse position.

§ 236.14 Spring switch signal protection; requirements.

- (a) The indication of signal governing movements from siding to main track with the current of traffic on track signaled for movements in only one direction through a spring switch in automatic block signal territory shall be not less restrictive than "Proceed at Restricted Speed" when the block, into which movements are governed by the signal, is occupied, and shall be "Stop" when the main track is occupied by a train approaching the switch within at least 1,500 feet in approach of the approach signal located stopping distance from the main track signal governing trailing movements over switch, except that the indication may be caused to be less restrictive if approach or time locking is used.

- (b) The indication of signal governing movements against the current of traffic from the reverse main of main tracks to a single track, or signal governing movements from a siding to a main track signaled for movements in either direction, through a spring switch, in automatic block signal territory, shall be not less restrictive than "Proceed at Restricted Speed" when the block, into which movements are governed by the signal, is occupied by a preceding train, and shall be "Stop" when the block on the single track into which the signal governs is occupied by an opposing train.
- (c) The indication of signal governing movements against the current of traffic from the reverse main of main tracks to a single track or signal governing movements from a siding to a main track signaled for movements in either direction through a spring switch in automatic block signal territory shall be "Stop" when the normal direction main track of the double track or the single track signaled for movements in both directions is occupied by a train approaching the switch within at least 1,500 feet in approach of the approach signal located stopping distance from the main track signal governing trailing movements over switch, except that indication may be caused to be less restrictive if approach or time locking is used.

§ 236.15 Timetable instructions.

Automatic block, traffic control, train stop, train control, cab signal, and positive train control territory shall be designated in timetable instructions.

[79 FR 49715, Aug. 22, 2014]

§ 236.16 Electric lock, main track releasing circuit.

When an electric lock releasing circuit is provided on the main track to permit a train or an engine to diverge from the main track without time delay, the circuit shall be of such length to permit occupancy of the circuit to be seen by a crew member stationed at the switch. When the releasing circuit extends into the fouling circuit, a train or engine on the siding shall be prevented from occupying the releasing circuit by a derail either pipe-connected to switch point or equipped with an independently operated electric lock.

[49 FR 3383, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.17 Pipe for operating connections, requirements.

- (a) Steel or wrought-iron pipe one inch or larger, or members of equal strength, shall be used for operating connections for switches, derails, movable-point frogs, facing-point locks, rail-locking devices of movable bridge protected by interlocking, and mechanically operated signals, except up-and-down rod which may be three-fourths inch pipe or solid rod. Pipe shall be fully screwed into coupling and both ends of each pipe shall be riveted to pipe plug with 2 rivets.
- (b) Pipeline shall not be out of alignment sufficiently to interfere with proper operation, shall be properly compensated for temperature changes, and supported on carriers spaced not more than 8 feet apart on tangent and curve of less than 2° and not more than 7 feet apart on curve of 2° or more. With lever in any position, couplings in pipe line shall not foul carriers.

[49 FR 3383, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.18 Software management control plan.

- (a) Within 6 months of June 6, 2005, each railroad shall develop and adopt a software management control plan for its signal and train control systems. A railroad commencing operations after June 6, 2005, shall adopt a software management control plan for its signal and train control systems prior to commencing operations.
- (b) Within 30 months of the completion of the software management control plan, each railroad shall have fully implemented such plan.
- (c) For purposes of this section, "software management control plan" means a plan designed to ensure that the proper and intended software version for each specific site and location is documented (mapped) and maintained through the life-cycle of the system. The plan must further describe how the proper software configuration is to be identified and confirmed in the event of replacement, modification, or disarrangement of any part of the system.

[70 FR 11095, Mar. 7, 2005]

ROADWAY SIGNALS AND CAB SIGNALS

§ 236.21 Location of roadway signals.

Each roadway signal shall be positioned and aligned so that its aspects can be clearly associated with the track it governs.

[49 FR 3383, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.22 Semaphore signal arm; clearance to other objects.

At least one-half inch clearance shall be provided between semaphore signal arm, and any object that may interfere with its operation.

§ 236.23 Aspects and indications.

- (a) Aspects shall be shown by the position of semaphore blades, color of lights, position of lights, flashing of lights, or any combination thereof. They may be qualified by marker plate, number plate, letter plate, marker light, shape and color of semaphore blades or any combination thereof, subject to the following conditions:
 - (1) Night aspects of roadway signals, except qualifying appurtenances, shall be shown by lights; day aspects by lights or semaphore arms. A single white light shall not be used.
 - (2) Reflector lenses or buttons or other devices which depend for visibility upon reflected light from an external source shall not be used hereafter in night aspects, except qualifying appurtenances.
- (b) The aspects of cab signals shall be shown by lights or by illuminated letters or numbers.
- (c) Each aspect displayed by a signal shall be identified by a name and shall indicate action to be taken. Only one name and indication shall apply to those aspects indicating the same action to be taken; the same aspect shall not be used with any other name and indication.
- (d) The fundamental indications of signal aspects shall conform to the following:

- (1) A red light, a series of horizontal lights or a semaphore blade in a horizontal position shall be used to indicate stop.
 - (2) A yellow light, a lunar light, or a series of lights or a semaphore blade in the upper or lower quadrant at an angle of approximately 45 degrees to the vertical, shall be used to indicate that speed is to be restricted and stop may be required.
 - (3) A green light, a series of vertical lights, or a semaphore blade in a vertical position in the upper quadrant or 60° or 90° in the lower quadrant shall be used to indicate proceed at authorized speed.
- (e) The names, indications, and aspects of roadway and cab signals shall be defined in the carrier's Operating Rule Book or Special Instructions. Modifications shall be filed with the FRA within thirty days after such modifications become effective.
- (f) The absence of a qualifying appurtenance, the failure of a lamp in a light signal, or a false restrictive position of an arm of a semaphore signal shall not cause the display of a less restrictive aspect than intended.

[33 FR 19684, Dec. 25, 1968, as amended at 49 FR 3383, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.24 Spacing of roadway signals.

Each roadway signal shall be located with respect to the next signal or signals in advance which govern train movements in the same direction so that the indication of a signal displaying a restrictive aspect can be complied with by means of a brake application, other than an emergency application, initiated at such signal, either by stopping at the signal where a stop is required, or by a reduction in speed to the rate prescribed by the next signal in advance where reduced speed is required.

§ 236.25 [Reserved]

§ 236.26 Buffing device, maintenance.

Buffing device shall be maintained so as not to cause the signal to display a less restrictive aspect than intended.

TRACK CIRCUITS

§ 236.51 Track circuit requirements.

Track relay controlling home signals shall be in deenergized position, or device that functions as a track relay controlling home signals shall be in its most restrictive state, and the track circuit of an automatic train stop, train control, or cab signal system shall be deenergized in the rear of the point where any of the following conditions exist:

- (a) When a rail is broken or a rail or switch-frog is removed except when a rail is broken or removed in the shunt fouling circuit of a turnout or crossover, provided, however, that shunt fouling circuit may not be used in a turnout through which permissible speed is greater than 45 miles per hour. It shall not be a violation of this requirement if a track circuit is energized:
 - (1) When a break occurs between the end of rail and track circuit connector; within the limits of rail-joint bond, appliance or other protective device, which provides a bypath for the electric current, or
 - (2) As result of leakage current or foreign current in the rear of a point where a break occurs.

- (b) When a train, locomotive, or car occupies any part of a track circuit, including fouling section of turnout except turnouts of hand-operated main track crossover. It shall not be a violation of this requirement where the presence of sand, rust, dirt, grease, or other foreign matter prevents effective shunting, except that where such conditions are known to exist adequate measures to safeguard train operation must be taken.
- (c) Where switch shunting circuit is used:
 - (1) Switch point is not closed in normal position.
 - (2) A switch is not locked where facing-point lock with circuit controller is used.
 - (3) An independently operated fouling-point derail equipped with switch circuit controller is not in derailing position.

[33 FR 19684, Dec. 25, 1968, as amended at 49 FR 3383, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.52 Relayed cut-section.

Where relayed cut-section is used in territory where noncoded direct-current track circuits are in use the energy circuit to the adjoining track shall be open and the track circuit shunted when the track relay at such cut-section is in deenergized position.

§ 236.53 Track circuit feed at grade crossing.

At grade crossing with an electric railroad where foreign current is present, the electric energy for noncoded direct current track circuit shall feed away from the crossing.

§ 236.54 Minimum length of track circuit.

When a track circuit shorter than maximum inner wheelbase of any locomotive or car operated over such track circuit is used for control of signaling facilities, other means shall be used to provide the equivalent of track circuit protection.

[49 FR 3383, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.55 Dead section; maximum length.

Where dead section exceeds 35 feet, a special circuit shall be installed. Where shortest outer wheelbase of a locomotive operating over such dead section is less than 35 feet, the maximum length of the dead section shall not exceed the length of the outer wheelbase of such locomotive unless special circuit is used.

[49 FR 3383, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.56 Shunting sensitivity.

Each track circuit controlling home signal or approach locking shall be so maintained that track relay is in deenergized position, or device that functions as a track relay shall be in its most restrictive state if, when track circuit is dry, a shunt of 0.06 ohm resistance is connected across the track rails of the circuit, including fouling sections of turnouts.

[49 FR 3383, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.57 Shunt and fouling wires.

- (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, shunt wires and fouling wires hereafter installed or replaced shall consist of at least two discrete conductors, and each shall be of sufficient conductivity and maintained in such condition that the track relay will be in deenergized position, or device that functions as a track relay will be in its most restrictive state, when the circuit is shunted.
- (b) This rule does not apply to shunt wires where track or control circuit is opened by the switch circuit controller.

[49 FR 3383, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.58 Turnout, fouling section.

Rail joints within the fouling section shall be bonded, and fouling section shall extend at least to a point where sufficient tract centers and allowance for maximum car overhang and width will prevent interference with train, locomotive, or car movement on the adjacent track.

[49 FR 3383, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.59 Insulated rail joints.

Insulated rail joints shall be maintained in condition to prevent sufficient track circuit current from flowing between the rails separated by the insulation to cause a failure of any track circuit involved.

§ 236.60 Switch shunting circuit; use restricted.

Switch shunting circuit shall not be hereafter installed, except where tract or control circuit is opened by the circuit controller.

[49 FR 3384, Jan. 26, 1984]

WIRES AND CABLES

§ 236.71 Signal wires on pole line and aerial cable.

Signal wire on pole line shall be securely tied in on insulator properly fastened to crossarm or bracket supported by pole or other support. Signal wire shall not interfere with, or be interfered by, other wires on the pole line. Aerial cable shall be supported by messenger.

[49 FR 3384, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.72 [Reserved]

§ 236.73 Open-wire transmission line; clearance to other circuits.

Open-wire transmission line operating at voltage of 750 volts or more shall be placed not less than 4 feet above the nearest crossarm carrying signal or communication circuits.

§ 236.74 Protection of insulated wire; splice in underground wire.

Insulated wire shall be protected from mechanical injury. The insulation shall not be punctured for test purposes. Splice in underground wire shall have insulation resistance at least equal to the wire spliced.

§ 236.75 [Reserved]

§ 236.76 Tagging of wires and interference of wires or tags with signal apparatus.

Each wire shall be tagged or otherwise so marked that it can be identified at each terminal. Tags and other marks of identification shall be made of insulating material and so arranged that tags and wires do not interfere with moving parts of apparatus.

[49 FR 3384, Jan. 26, 1984]

INSPECTIONS AND TESTS; ALL SYSTEMS

§ 236.101 Purpose of inspection and tests; removal from service of relay or device failing to meet test requirements.

The following inspections and tests shall be made in accordance with specifications of the carrier, subject to approval of the FRA, to determine if the apparatus and/or equipment is maintained in condition to perform its intended function. Electronic device, relay, or other electromagnetic device which fails to meet the requirements of specified tests shall be removed from service, and shall not be restored to service until its operating characteristics are in accordance with the limits within which such device or relay is designed to operate.

[49 FR 3384, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.102 Semaphore or searchlight signal mechanism.

- (a) Semaphore signal mechanism shall be inspected at least once every six months, and tests of the operating characteristics of all parts shall be made at least once every two years.
- (b) Searchlight signal mechanism shall be inspected, and the mechanical movement shall be observed while operating the mechanism to all positions, at least once every six months. Tests of the operating characteristics shall be made at least once every two years.

[49 FR 3384, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.103 Switch circuit controller or point detector.

Switch circuit controller, circuit controller, or point detector operated by hand-operated switch or by power-operated or mechanically-operated switch-and-lock movement shall be inspected and tested at least once every three months.

[49 FR 3384, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.104 Shunt fouling circuit.

Shunt fouling circuit shall be inspected and tested at least once every three months.

§ 236.105 Electric lock.

Electric lock, except forced-drop type, shall be tested at least once every two years.

§ 236.106 Relays.

Each relay, the functioning of which affects the safety of train operations, shall be tested at least once every four years except:

- (a) Alternating current centrifugal type relay shall be tested at least once every 12 months;
- (b) Alternating current vane type relay and direct current polar type relay shall be tested at least once every 2 years; and
- (c) Relay with soft iron magnetic structure shall be tested at least once every 2 years.

[49 FR 3384, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.107 Ground tests.

- (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, a test for grounds on each energy bus furnishing power to circuits, the functioning of which affects the safety of train operation, shall be made when such energy bus is placed in service, and shall be made at least once every three months thereafter.
- (b) The provisions of this rule shall not apply to track circuit wires, common return wires of grounded common single-break circuits, or alternating current power distribution circuits grounded in the interest of safety.

[49 FR 3384, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.108 Insulation resistance tests, wires in trunking and cables.

- (a) Insulation resistance of wires and cables, except wires connected directly to track rails, shall be tested when wires, cables, and insulation are dry. Insulation resistance tests shall be made between all conductors and ground, and between conductors in each multiple conductor cable, and between conductors in trunking, when wires or cables are installed and at least once every ten years thereafter.
- (b) When insulation resistance of wire or cable is found to be less than 500,000 ohms, prompt action shall be taken to repair or replace the defective wire or cable and until such defective wire or cable is replaced, insulation resistance test shall be made annually.
- (c) In no case shall a circuit be permitted to function on a conductor having an insulation resistance to ground or between conductors of less than 200,000 ohms during the period required for repair or replacement.

[49 FR 3384, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.109 Time releases, timing relays and timing devices.

Time releases, timing relays and timing devices shall be tested at least once every twelve months. The timing shall be maintained at not less than 90 percent of the predetermined time interval, which shall be shown on the plans or marked on the time release, timing relay, or timing device.

[49 FR 3384, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.110 Results of tests.

- (a) Results of tests made in compliance with §§ 236.102 to 236.109, inclusive; 236.376 to 236.387, inclusive; 236.576; 236.577; 236.586 to 236.589, inclusive; and 236.917(a) must be recorded on preprinted forms provided by the railroad or by electronic means, subject to approval by the FRA Associate Administrator for Safety. These records must show the name of the railroad, place and date, equipment tested, results of tests, repairs, replacements, adjustments made, and condition in which the apparatus was left. Each record must be:
 - (1) Signed by the employee making the test, or electronically coded or identified by number of the automated test equipment (where applicable);
 - (2) Unless otherwise noted, filed in the office of a supervisory official having jurisdiction; and
 - (3) Available for inspection and replication by FRA and FRA-certified State inspectors.
- (b) Results of tests made in compliance with § 236.587 must be retained for 92 days.
- (c) Results of tests made in compliance with § 236.917(a) must be retained as follows:
 - (1) Results of tests that pertain to installation or modification must be retained for the life-cycle of the equipment tested and may be kept in any office designated by the railroad; and
 - (2) Results of periodic tests required for maintenance or repair of the equipment tested must be retained until the next record is filed but in no case less than one year.
- (d) Results of all other tests listed in this section must be retained until the next record is filed but in no case less than one year.
- (e) Electronic or automated tracking systems used to meet the requirements contained in paragraph (a) of this section must be capable of being reviewed and monitored by FRA at any time to ensure the integrity of the system. FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety may prohibit or revoke a railroad's authority to utilize an electronic or automated tracking system in lieu of preprinted forms if FRA finds that the electronic or automated tracking system is not properly secured, is inaccessible to FRA, FRA-certified State inspectors, or railroad employees requiring access to discharge their assigned duties, or fails to adequately track and monitor the equipment. The Associate Administrator for Safety will provide the affected railroad with a written statement of the basis for his or her decision prohibiting or revoking the railroad from utilizing an electronic or automated tracking system.

[70 FR 11095, Mar. 7, 2005]

Subpart B - Automatic Block Signal Systems

STANDARDS

§ 236.201 Track-circuit control of signals.

The control circuits for home signal aspects with indications more favorable than "proceed at restricted speed" shall be controlled automatically by track circuits extending through the entire block.

§ 236.202 Signal governing movements over hand-operated switch.

Signal governing movements over hand-operated switch in the facing direction shall display its most restrictive aspect when the points are open one-fourth inch or more and, in the trailing direction, three-eighths inch or more, except that where a separate aspect is displayed for facing movements over the switch in the normal and in the reverse position, the signal shall display its most restrictive aspect when the switch points are open one-fourth inch or more from either the normal or reverse position.

§ 236.203 Hand operated crossover between main tracks; protection.

At hand-operated crossover between main tracks, protection shall be provided by one of the following:

- (a) An arrangement of one or more track circuits and switch circuit controllers,
- (b) Facing point locks on both switches of the crossover, with both locks operated by a single lever, or
- (c) Electric locking of the switches of the crossover. Signals governing movements over either switch shall display their most restrictive aspect when any of the following conditions exist:
 - (1) Where protection is provided by one or more track circuits and switch circuit controllers, and either switch is open or the crossover is occupied by a train, locomotive or car in such a manner as to foul the main track. It shall not be a violation of this requirement where the presence of sand, rust, dirt, grease or other foreign matter on the rail prevents effective shunting;
 - (2) Where facing point locks with a single lever are provided, and either switch is unlocked;
 - (3) Where the switches are electrically locked, before the electric locking releases.

§ 236.204 Track signaled for movements in both directions, requirements.

On track signaled for movements in both directions, a train shall cause one or more opposing signals immediately ahead of it to display the most restrictive aspect, the indication of which shall be not more favorable than "proceed at restricted speed." Signals shall be so arranged and controlled that if opposing trains can simultaneously pass signals displaying proceed aspects and the next signal in advance of each such signal then displays an aspect requiring a stop, or its most restrictive aspect, the distance between opposing signals displaying such aspects shall be not less than the aggregate of the stopping distances for movements in each direction. Where such opposing signals are spaced stopping distance apart for movements in one direction only, signals arranged to display restrictive aspects shall be provided in approach to at least one of the signals. Where such opposing signals are spaced less than stopping distance apart for movements in one direction, signals arranged to display restrictive aspects shall be provided in approach to both such signals. In absolute permissive block signaling, when a train passes a head block signal, it shall cause the opposing head block signal to display an aspect with an indication not more favorable than "stop."

[33 FR 19684, Dec. 25, 1968, as amended at 49 FR 3384, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.205 Signal control circuits; requirements.

The circuits shall be so installed that each signal governing train movements into a block will display its most restrictive aspect when any of the following conditions obtain within the block:

- (a) Occupancy by a train, locomotive, or car,
- (b) When points of a switch are not closed in proper position,

- (c) When an independently operated fouling point derail equipped with switch circuit controller is not in derailing position,
- (d) When a track relay is in de-energized position or a device which functions as a track relay is in its most restrictive state; or when signal control circuit is deenergized.

[33 FR 19684, Dec. 25, 1968, as amended at 49 FR 3385, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.206 Battery or power supply with respect to relay; location.

The battery or power supply for each signal control relay circuit, where an open-wire circuit or a common return circuit is used, shall be located at the end of the circuit farthest from the relay.

§ 236.207 Electric lock on hand-operated switch; control.

Electric lock on hand-operated switch shall be controlled so that it cannot be unlocked until control circuits of signals governing movements over such switch have been opened. Approach or time locking shall be provided.

[49 FR 3385, Jan. 26, 1984]

Subpart C - Interlocking

STANDARDS

§ 236.301 Where signals shall be provided.

Signals shall be provided to govern train movements into and through interlocking limits, except that a signal shall not be required to govern movements over a hand-operated switch into interlocking limits if the switch is provided with an electric lock and a derail at the clearance point, either pipe-connected to the switch or independently locked, electrically. Electric locks installed under this rule must conform to the time and approach locking requirements of Rule 314 (without reference to the 20-mile exceptions), and those of either Rule 760 or Rule 768, as may be appropriate.

§ 236.302 Track circuits and route locking.

Track circuits and route locking shall be provided and shall be effective when the first pair of wheels of a locomotive or a car passes a point not more than 13 feet in advance of the signal governing its movement, measured from the center of the mast, or if there is no mast, from the center of the signal.

[49 FR 3385, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.303 Control circuits for signals, selection through circuit controller operated by switch points or by switch locking mechanism.

The control circuit for each aspect with indication more favorable than "proceed at restricted speed" of power operated signal governing movements over switches, movable-point frogs and derails shall be selected through circuit controller operated directly by switch points or by switch locking mechanism, or through relay controlled by such circuit controller, for each switch, movable-point frog, and derail in the routes governed by such signal. Circuits shall be arranged so that such signal can display an aspect more favorable than "proceed at restricted speed," only when each switch, movable-point frog, and derail in the route is in proper position.

§ 236.304 Mechanical locking or same protection effected by circuits.

Mechanical locking, or the same protection effected by means of circuits, shall be provided.

§ 236.305 Approach or time locking.

Approach or time locking shall be provided in connection with signals displaying aspects with indications more favorable than "proceed at restricted speed."

§ 236.306 Facing point lock or switch-and-lock movement.

Facing point lock or switch-and-lock movement shall be provided for mechanically operated switch, movable-point frog, or split-point derail.

§ 236.307 Indication locking.

Indication locking shall be provided for operative approach signals of the semaphore type, power-operated home signals, power-operated switches, movable-point frogs and derails, and for all approach signals except light signals, all aspects of which are controlled by polar or coded track circuits or line circuits so arranged that a single fault will not permit a more favorable aspect than intended to be displayed.

[49 FR 3385, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.308 Mechanical or electric locking or electric circuits; requisites.

Mechanical or electric locking or electric circuits shall be installed to prevent signals from displaying aspects which permit conflicting movements except that opposing signals may display an aspect indicating proceed at restricted speed at the same time on a track used for switching movements only, by one train at a time. Manual interlocking in service as of the date of this part at which opposing signals on the same track are permitted simultaneously to display aspects authorizing conflicting movements when interlocking is unattended, may be continued, provided that simultaneous train movements in opposite directions on the same track between stations on either side of the interlocking are not permitted.

Note:

Relief from the requirement of this section will be granted upon an adequate showing by an individual carrier to allow opposing signals on the same track simultaneously to display aspects to proceed through an interlocking which is unattended, provided that train movements in opposite directions on the same track between stations on either site of the interlocking are not permitted at the same time.

§ 236.309 Loss of shunt protection; where required.

- (a) A loss of shunt of 5 seconds or less shall not permit an established route to be changed at an automatic interlocking.
- (b) A loss of shunt of 5 seconds or less shall not permit the release of the route locking circuit of each power-operated switch hereafter installed.

[49 FR 3385, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.310 Signal governing approach to home signal.

A signal shall be provided on main track to govern the approach with the current of traffic to any home signal except where the home signal is the first signal encountered when leaving yards or stations and authorized speed approaching such signal is not higher than slow speed. When authorized speed between home signals on route governed is 20 miles per hour or less, an inoperative signal displaying an aspect indicating "approach next signal prepared to stop" may be used to govern the approach to the home signal.

§ 236.311 Signal control circuits, selection through track relays or devices functioning as track relays and through signal mechanism contacts and time releases at automatic interlocking.

- (a) The control circuits for aspects with indications more favorable than "proceed at restricted speed" shall be selected through track relays, or through devices that function as track relays, for all track circuits in the route governed.
- (b) At automatic interlocking, signal control circuits shall be selected
 - (1) through track relays, or devices that function as track relays, for all track circuits in the route governed and in all conflicting routes within the interlocking;
 - (2) through signal mechanism contacts or relay contacts closed when signals for such conflicting routes display "stop" aspects; and
 - (3) through normal contacts of time releases, time element relays, or timing devices for such conflicting routes, or contacts of relays repeating the normal position or normal state of such time releases, time element relays, or timing devices.

[49 FR 3385, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.312 Movable bridge, interlocking of signal appliances with bridge devices.

When movable bridge is protected by interlocking the signal appliances shall be so interlocked with bridge devices that before a signal governing movements over the bridge can display an aspect to proceed the bridge must be locked and the track alined, with the bridge locking members within one inch of their proper positions and with the track rail on the movable span within three-eighths inch of correct surface and alinement with rail seating device on bridge abutment or fixed span. Emergency bypass switches and devices shall be locked or sealed.

[33 FR 19684, Dec. 25, 1968, as amended at 49 FR 3385, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.313 [Reserved]

§ 236.314 Electric lock for hand-operated switch or derail.

Electric lock shall be provided for each hand-operated switch or derail within interlocking limits, except where train movements are made at not exceeding 20 miles per hour. At manually operated interlocking it shall be controlled by operator of the machine and shall be unlocked only after signals governing movements over such switch or derail display aspects indicating stop. Approach or time locking shall be provided.

RULES AND INSTRUCTIONS

§ 236.326 Mechanical locking removed or disarranged; requirement for permitting train movements through interlocking.

When mechanical locking of interlocking machine is being changed or is removed from the machine, or locking becomes disarranged or broken, unless protection equivalent to mechanical locking is provided by electric locking or electric circuits, train movements through the interlocking shall not be permitted until each switch, movable-point frog or derail in the route is spiked, clamped or blocked in proper position so that it cannot be moved by its controlling lever, and then train movements shall not exceed restricted speed until the interlocking is restored to normal operation. It will not be necessary to comply with this requirement at interlockings where protection is in service in accordance with section 303, provided that the signal controls are arranged so that the signals cannot display an aspect the indication of which is less restrictive than "proceed at restricted speed."

§ 236.327 Switch, movable-point frog or split-point derail.

Switch, movable-point frog, or split-point derail equipped with lock rod shall be maintained so that it can not be locked when the point is open three-eighths inch or more.

[49 FR 3385, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.328 Plunger of facing-point lock.

Plunger of lever operated facing-point lock shall have at least 8-inch stroke. When lock lever is in unlocked position the end of the plunger shall clear the lock rod not more than one inch.

§ 236.329 Bolt lock.

Bolt lock shall be so maintained that signal governing movements over switch or derail and displaying an aspect indicating stop cannot be operated to display a less restrictive aspect while derail is in derailing position, or when switch point is open one-half inch or more.

§ 236.330 Locking dog of switch-and-lock movement.

Locking dog of switch-and-lock movement shall extend through lock rod one-half inch or more in either normal or reverse position.

§§ 236.331-236.333 [Reserved]

§ 236.334 Point detector.

Point detector shall be maintained so that when switch mechanism is locked in normal or reverse position, contacts cannot be opened by manually applying force at the closed switch point. Point detector circuit controller shall be maintained so that the contacts will not assume the position corresponding to switch point closure if the switch point is prevented by an obstruction, from closing to within one-fourth inch where latch-out device is not used, and to within three-eighths inch where latch-out device is used.

§ 236.335 Dogs, stops and trunnions of mechanical locking.

Driving pieces, dogs, stops and trunnions shall be rigidly secured to locking bars. Swing dogs shall have full and free movement. Top plates shall be maintained securely in place.

§ 236.336 Locking bed.

The various parts of the locking bed, locking bed supports, and tappet stop rail shall be rigidly secured in place and aligned to permit free operation of locking.

§ 236.337 Locking faces of mechanical locking; fit.

Locking faces shall fit squarely against each other with a minimum engagement when locked of at least one-half the designed locking face.

§ 236.338 Mechanical locking required in accordance with locking sheet and dog chart.

Mechanical locking shall be in accordance with locking sheet and dog chart currently in effect.

§ 236.339 Mechanical locking, maintenance requirements.

Locking and connections shall be maintained so that, when a lever or latch is mechanically locked the following will be prevented:

(a) *Mechanical machine* -

- (1) *Latch-operated locking.* Raising lever latch block so that bottom thereof is within three-eighths inch of top of quadrant.
- (2) *Lever-operated locking.* Moving lever latch block more than three-eighths inch on top of quadrant.

(b) *Electromechanical machine* -

- (1) *Lever moving in horizontal plane.* Moving lever more than five-sixteenths inch when in normal position or more than nine-sixteenths inch when in reverse position.
- (2) *Lever moving in arc.* Moving lever more than 5 degrees.

(c) *Power machine* -

- (1) *Latch-operated locking.* Raising lever latch block so that bottom thereof is within seven thirty-seconds inch of top of quadrant.
- (2) *Lever moving in horizontal plane.* Moving lever more than five-sixteenths inch when in normal position or more than nine-sixteenths inch when in reverse position.
- (3) *Lever moving in arc.* Moving lever more than 5 degrees.

§ 236.340 Electromechanical interlocking machine; locking between electrical and mechanical levers.

In electro-mechanical interlocking machine, locking between electric and mechanical levers shall be maintained so that mechanical lever cannot be operated except when released by electric lever.

§ 236.341 Latch shoes, rocker links, and quadrants.

Latch shoes, rocker links, and quadrants of Saxby and farmer machines shall be maintained so that locking will not release if a downward force not exceeding a man's weight is exerted on the rocker while the lever is in the mid-stroke position.

§ 236.342 Switch circuit controller.

Switch circuit controller connected at the point to switch, derail, or movable-point frog, shall be maintained so that its contacts will not be in position corresponding to switch point closure when switch point is open one-fourth inch or more.

INSPECTION AND TESTS

§ 236.376 Mechanical locking.

Mechanical locking in interlocking machine shall be tested when new locking is installed; and thereafter when change in locking is made, or locking becomes disarranged, or tested at least once every two years, whichever shall occur first.

[49 FR 3385, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.377 Approach locking.

Approach locking shall be tested when placed in service and thereafter when modified, disarranged, or at least once every two years, whichever shall occur first.

[49 FR 3385, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.378 Time locking.

Time locking shall be tested when placed in service and thereafter when modified, disarranged, or at least once every two years, whichever shall occur first.

[49 FR 3385, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.379 Route locking.

Route locking or other type of switch locking shall be tested when placed in service and thereafter when modified, disarranged, or at least once every two years, whichever shall occur first.

[49 FR 3385, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.380 Indication locking.

Indication locking shall be tested when placed in service and thereafter when modified, disarranged, or at least once every two years, whichever shall occur first.

[49 FR 3385, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.381 Traffic locking.

Traffic locking shall be tested when placed in service and thereafter when modified, disarranged, or at least once every two years, whichever shall occur first.

[49 FR 3385, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.382 Switch obstruction test.

Switch obstruction test of lock rod of each power-operated switch and lock rod of each hand-operated switch equipped with switch-and-lock-movement shall be made when lock rod is placed in service or changed out, but not less than once each month.

[49 FR 3385, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.383 Valve locks, valves, and valve magnets.

Valve locks on valves of the non-cut-off type shall be tested at least once every three months, and valves and valve magnets shall be tested at least once every year.

[49 FR 3385, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.384 Cross protection.

Cross protection shall be tested at least once every six months.

[49 FR 3385, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.385 [Reserved]

§ 236.386 Restoring feature on power switches.

Restoring feature on power switches shall be tested at least once every three months.

§ 236.387 Movable bridge locking.

Movable bridge locking shall be tested at least once a year.

Subpart D - Traffic Control Systems

STANDARDS

§ 236.401 Automatic block signal system and interlocking standards applicable to traffic control systems.

The standards prescribed in §§ 236.201, to 236.203, inclusive, §§ 236.205, 236.206, 236.303, 236.307 and 236.309 to 236.311, inclusive, shall apply to traffic control systems.

[49 FR 3385, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.402 Signals controlled by track circuits and control operator.

The control circuits for home signal aspects with indications more favorable than "proceed at restricted speed" shall be controlled by track circuits extending through entire block. Also in addition, at controlled point they may be controlled by control operator, and, at manually operated interlocking, they shall be controlled manually in cooperation with control operator.

§ 236.403 Signals at controlled point.

Signals at controlled point shall be so interconnected that aspects to proceed cannot be displayed simultaneously for conflicting movements, except that opposing signals may display an aspect indicating "proceed at restricted speed" at the same time on a track used for switching movements only, by one train at a time.

[49 FR 3386, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.404 Signals at adjacent control points.

Signals at adjacent controlled points shall be so interconnected that aspects to proceed on tracks signaled for movements at greater than restricted speed cannot be displayed simultaneously for conflicting movements.

§ 236.405 Track signaled for movements in both directions, change of direction of traffic.

On track signaled for movements in both directions, occupancy of the track between opposing signals at adjacent controlled points shall prevent changing the direction of traffic from that which obtained at the time the track became occupied, except that when a train having left one controlled point reaches a section of track immediately adjacent to the next controlled point at which switching is to be performed, an aspect permitting movement at not exceeding restricted speed may be displayed into the occupied block.

§ 236.406 [Reserved]

§ 236.407 Approach or time locking; where required.

Approach or time locking shall be provided for all controlled signals where route or direction of traffic can be changed.

[49 FR 3386, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.408 Route locking.

Route locking shall be provided where switches are power-operated. Route locking shall be effective when the first pair of wheels of a locomotive or car passes a point not more than 13 feet in advance of the signal governing its movement, measured from the center of the signal mast or, if there is no mast, from the center of the signal.

[49 FR 3386, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.409 [Reserved]

§ 236.410 Locking, hand-operated switch; requirements.

- (a) Each hand-operated switch in main track shall be locked either electrically or mechanically in normal position, except:
 - (1) Where train speeds over the switch do not exceed 20 miles per hour;
 - (2) Where trains are not permitted to clear the main track;
 - (3) Where a signal is provided to govern train movements from the auxiliary track to the signaled track;or

- (4) On a signaled siding without intermediate signals where the maximum authorized speed on the siding does not exceed 30 miles per hour.
- (b) Approach or time locking shall be provided and locking may be released either automatically, or by the control operator, but only after the control circuits of signals governing movement in either direction over the switch and which display aspects with indications more favorable than "proceed at restricted speed" have been opened directly or by shunting of track circuit.
- (c) Where a signal is used in lieu of electric or mechanical lock to govern movements from auxiliary track to signaled track, the signal shall not display an aspect to proceed until after the control circuits of signals governing movement on main track in either direction over the switch have been opened, and either the approach locking circuits to the switch are unoccupied or a predetermined time interval has expired.

Note:

Railroads shall bring all hand-operated switches that are not electrically or mechanically locked and that do not conform to the requirements of this section on the effective date of this part into conformity with this section in accordance with the following schedule:

Not less than 33% during calendar year 1984.

Not less than 66% during calendar year 1985.

The remainder during calendar year 1986.

[33 FR 19684, Dec. 25, 1968, as amended at 49 FR 3386, Jan. 26, 1984; 75 FR 2699, Jan. 15, 2010]

RULES AND INSTRUCTIONS

§ 236.426 Interlocking rules and instructions applicable to traffic control systems.

The rules and instructions prescribed in §§ 236.327 and 236.328, § 236.330 to § 236.334, inclusive, and § 236.342 shall apply to traffic control systems.

INSPECTION AND TESTS

§ 236.476 Interlocking inspections and tests applicable to traffic control systems.

The inspections and tests prescribed in §§ 236.377 to 236.380, inclusive, and §§ 236.382, 236.383, and 236.386 shall apply to traffic control systems.

[49 FR 3386, Jan. 26, 1984]

Subpart E - Automatic Train Stop, Train Control and Cab Signal Systems

STANDARDS

§ 236.501 Forestalling device and speed control.

- (a) An automatic train stop system may include a device by means of which the automatic application of the brakes can be forestalled.
- (b) Automatic train control system shall include one or more of the following features:
 - (1) Low-speed restriction, requiring the train to proceed under slow speed after it has either been stopped by an automatic application of the brakes, or under control of the engineman, its speed has been reduced to slow speed, until the apparatus is automatically restored to normal because the condition which caused the restriction no longer affects the movement of the train.
 - (2) Medium-speed restriction, requiring the train to proceed under medium speed after passing a signal displaying an approach aspect or when approaching a signal requiring a stop, or a stop indication point, in order to prevent an automatic application of the brakes.

Note:

Relief from the requirements of paragraphs (b) (1) and (2) of this section will be granted, insofar as speed limits fixed by definitions of Slow and Medium speeds are concerned, upon an adequate showing by an individual carrier where automatic train control systems now in service enforce speed restrictions higher than those required by definitions in §§ 236.700 to 236.838 inclusive.

- (3) Maximum-speed restriction, effecting an automatic brake application whenever the predetermined maximum speed limit is exceeded.

§ 236.502 Automatic brake application, initiation by restrictive block conditions stopping distance in advance.

An automatic train-stop or train-control system shall operate to initiate an automatic brake application at least stopping distance from the entrance to a block, wherein any condition described in § 236.205 obtains, and at each main track signal requiring a reduction in speed.

§ 236.503 Automatic brake application; initiation when predetermined rate of speed exceeded.

An automatic train control system shall operate to initiate an automatic brake application when the speed of the train exceeds the predetermined rate as required by the setting of the speed control mechanism.

§ 236.504 Operation interconnected with automatic block-signal system.

- (a) A continuous inductive automatic train stop or train control system shall operate in connection with an automatic block signal system and shall be so interconnected with the signal system as to perform its intended function in event of failure of the engineer to acknowledge or obey a restrictive wayside signal or a more restrictive cab signal.
- (b) An intermittent inductive automatic train stop system shall operate in connection with an automatic block signal system and shall be so interconnected with the signal system that the failure of the engineer to acknowledge a restrictive wayside signal will cause the intermittent inductive automatic train stop system to perform its intended function.

[49 FR 3386, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.505 Proper operative relation between parts along roadway and parts on locomotive.

Proper operative relation between the parts along the roadway and the parts on the locomotive shall obtain under all conditions of speed, weather, wear, oscillation, and shock.

§ 236.506 Release of brakes after automatic application.

The automatic train stop or train control apparatus shall prevent release of the brakes after automatic application until a reset device has been operated, or the speed of the train has been reduced to a predetermined rate, or the condition that caused the brake application no longer affects the movement of the train. If reset device is used it shall be arranged so that the brakes cannot be released until the train has been stopped, or it shall be located so that it cannot be operated by engineman without leaving his accustomed position in the cab.

§ 236.507 Brake application; full service.

The automatic train stop or train control apparatus shall, when operated, cause a full service application of the brakes.

§ 236.508 Interference with application of brakes by means of brake valve.

The automatic train stop, train control, or cab signal apparatus shall be so arranged as not to interfere with the application of the brakes by means of the brake valve and not to impair the efficiency of the brake system.

[49 FR 3386, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.509 Two or more locomotives coupled.

The automatic train stop, train control or cab signal apparatus shall be arranged so that when two or more locomotives are coupled, or a pushing or helping locomotive is used, it can be made operative only on the locomotive from which the brakes are controlled.

§ 236.510 [Reserved]

§ 236.511 Cab signals controlled in accordance with block conditions stopping distance in advance.

The automatic cab signal system shall be arranged so that cab signals will be continuously controlled in accordance with conditions described in § 236.205 that obtain at least stopping distance in advance.

§ 236.512 Cab signal indication when locomotive enters block where restrictive conditions obtain.

The automatic cab signal system shall be arranged so that when a locomotive enters or is within a block, wherein any condition described in § 236.205 obtains, the cab signals shall indicate "Proceed at Restricted Speed."

§ 236.513 Audible indicator.

- (a) The automatic cab signal system shall be so arranged that when the cab signal changes to display a more restrictive aspect, an audible indicator will sound continuously until silenced by manual operation of an acknowledging device.

- (b) The audible cab indicator of automatic cab signal, automatic train stop, or automatic train control system shall have a distinctive sound and be clearly audible throughout the cab under all operating conditions.

[49 FR 3386, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.514 Interconnection of cab signal system with roadway signal system.

The automatic cab signal system shall be interconnected with the roadway-signal system so that the cab signal indication will not authorize operation of the train at a speed higher than that authorized by the indication of the roadway signal that governed the movement of a train into a block except when conditions affecting movement of trains in the block change after the train passes the signal.

§ 236.515 Visibility of cab signals.

The cab signals shall be plainly visible to member or members of the locomotive crew from their stations in the cab.

[49 FR 3386, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.516 Power supply.

Automatic cab signal, train stop, or train control device hereafter installed shall operate from a separate or isolated power supply.

[49 FR 3386, Jan. 26, 1984]

RULES AND INSTRUCTIONS; ROADWAY

§ 236.526 Roadway element not functioning properly.

When a roadway element except track circuit of automatic train stop, train control or cab signal system is not functioning as intended, the signal associated with such roadway element shall be caused manually to display its most restrictive aspect until such element has been restored to normal operative condition.

§ 236.527 Roadway element insulation resistance.

Insulation resistance between roadway inductor and ground shall be maintained at not less than 10,000 ohms.

[49 FR 3386, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.528 Restrictive condition resulting from open hand-operated switch; requirement.

When a facing point hand-operated switch is open one-fourth inch or more, a trailing point hand-operated switch three-eighths inch or more, or hand-operated switch is not locked where facing point lock with circuit controller is used, the resultant restrictive condition of an automatic train stop or train control device of the continuous type or the resultant restrictive cab signal indication of an automatic cab signal device on an approaching locomotive shall be maintained to within 300 feet of the points of the switch.

§ 236.529 Roadway element inductor; height and distance from rail.

Inductor of the inert roadway element type shall be maintained with the inductor pole faces at a height above the plane of the tops of the rails, and with its inner edge at a horizontal distance from the gage side of the nearest running rail, in accordance with specifications of the carrier.

[49 FR 3386, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.530 [Reserved]

§ 236.531 Trip arm; height and distance from rail.

Trip arm of automatic train stop device when in the stop position shall be maintained at a height above the plane of the tops of the rails, and at a horizontal distance from its center line to gage side of the nearest running rail, in accordance with specifications of the carrier.

[49 FR 3386, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.532 Strap iron inductor; use restricted.

No railroad shall use strap iron inductor or other roadway element with characteristics differing from its standard type on track where speed higher than restricted speed is permitted.

[49 FR 3386, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.533 [Reserved]

§ 236.534 Entrance to equipped territory; requirements.

Where trains are not required to stop at the entrance to equipped territory, except when leaving yards and stations and speed until entering equipped territory does not exceed restricted speed, the automatic train stop, train control, or cab signal device shall be operative at least stopping distance from the entrance to such territory except where the approach thereto is governed by automatic approach signal.

RULES AND INSTRUCTIONS; LOCOMOTIVES

§ 236.551 Power supply voltage; requirement.

The voltage of power supply shall be maintained within 10 percent of rated voltage.

§ 236.552 Insulation resistance; requirement.

When periodic test prescribed in § 236.588 is performed, insulation resistance between wiring and ground of continuous inductive automatic cab signal system, automatic train control system, or automatic train stop system shall be not less than one megohm, and that of an intermittent inductive automatic train stop system, not less than 250,000 ohms. Insulation resistance values between periodic tests shall be not less than 250,000 ohms for a continuous inductive automatic cab signal system, automatic train control system, or automatic train stop system, and 20,000 ohms for an intermittent inductive automatic train stop system.

[49 FR 3387, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.553 Seal, where required.

Seal shall be maintained on any device other than brake-pipe cut-out cock (double-heading cock), by means of which the operation of the pneumatic portion of automatic train-stop or train-control apparatus can be cut out.

§ 236.554 Rate of pressure reduction; equalizing reservoir or brake pipe.

The equalizing-reservoir pressure or brake-pipe pressure reduction during an automatic brake application shall be at a rate not less than that which results from a manual service application.

§ 236.555 Repaired or rewound receiver coil.

Receiver coil which has been repaired or rewound shall have the same operating characteristics which it possessed originally or as currently specified for new equipment.

§ 236.556 Adjustment of relay.

Change in adjustment of relay shall be made only in a shop equipped for that purpose except when receiver coils, electro-pneumatic valve, or other essential part of the equipment is replaced. Irregularities in power-supply voltage or other variable factors in the circuit shall not be compensated for by adjustment of the relay.

§ 236.557 Receiver; location with respect to rail.

- (a) Receiver of intermittent inductive automatic train stop device of the inert roadway element type shall be maintained with bottom of the receiver at a height above the plane of the tops of the rails, and with its outer edge at a horizontal distance from the gage side of the nearest rail, in accordance with specifications of the carrier.
- (b) Receiver of continuous inductive automatic cab signal, train stop, or train control device of locomotive equipped with onboard test equipment, shall be maintained with the bottom of the receiver at a height above the plane of the tops of the rails, and with its outer edge at a horizontal distance from the gage side of the nearest rail, in accordance with specifications of the carrier.

[49 FR 3387, Jan. 26, 1984]

§§ 236.558-236.559 [Reserved]

§ 236.560 Contact element, mechanical trip type; location with respect to rail.

Contact element of automatic train stop device of the mechanical trip type shall be maintained at a height above the plane of the tops of the rails, and at a horizontal distance from the gage side of the rail, in accordance with specifications of the carrier.

[49 FR 3387, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.561 [Reserved]

§ 236.562 Minimum rail current required.

The minimum rail current required to restore the locomotive equipment of continuous inductive automatic train stop or train control device to normal condition or to obtain a proceed indication of automatic cab signal device (pick-up) shall be in accordance with specifications of the carrier.

[49 FR 3387, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.563 Delay time.

Delay time of automatic train stop or train control system shall not exceed 8 seconds and the spacing of signals to meet the requirements of § 236.24 shall take into consideration the delay time.

§ 236.564 Acknowledging time.

Acknowledging time of intermittent automatic train-stop device shall be not more than 30 seconds.

§ 236.565 Provision made for preventing operation of pneumatic brake-applying apparatus by double-heading cock; requirement.

Where provision is made for preventing the operation of the pneumatic brake-applying apparatus of an automatic train stop or train control device when the double-heading cock is placed in double-heading position, the automatic train stop or train control device shall not be cut out before communication is closed between the engineman's automatic brake valve and the brake pipe, when operating double-heading cock toward double-heading position.

§ 236.566 Locomotive of each train operating in train stop, train control or cab signal territory; equipped.

The locomotive from which brakes are controlled, of each train operating in automatic train stop, train control, or cab signal territory shall be equipped with apparatus responsive to the roadway equipment installed on all or any part of the route traversed, and such apparatus shall be in operative condition.

§ 236.567 Restrictions imposed when device fails and/or is cut out en route.

- (a) Except as provided in subparts H or I of this part, where an automatic train stop, train control, or cab signal device fails and/or is cut out en route, the train on which the device is inoperative may proceed to the next available point of communication where report must be made to a designated officer, at speeds not to exceed the following:
 - (1) If no block signal system is in operation, restricted speed; or
 - (2) If a block signal system is in operation, according to signal indication but not to exceed 40 miles per hour.
- (b) Upon completion and communication of the report required by paragraph (a) of this section, a train may continue to a point where an absolute block can be established in advance of the train at speeds not to exceed the following:
 - (1) If no block signal system is in operation, restricted speed; or
 - (2) If a block signal system is in operation, according to signal indication but not to exceed 40 miles per hour.

- (c) Upon reaching the location where an absolute block has been established in advance of the train, as referenced in paragraph (b) of this section, the train may proceed at speeds not to exceed the following:
 - (1) If no block signal system is in operation and the train is a passenger train, 59 miles per hour;
 - (2) If no block signal system is in operation and the train is a freight train, 49 miles per hour; and
 - (3) If a block signal system is in operation, 79 miles per hour.

[79 FR 49715, Aug. 22, 2014]

§ 236.568 Difference between speeds authorized by roadway signal and cab signal; action required.

If for any reason a cab signal authorizes a speed different from that authorized by a roadway signal, when a train enters the block governed by such roadway signal, the lower speed shall not be exceeded.

INSPECTION AND TESTS; ROADWAY

§ 236.576 Roadway element.

Roadway elements, except track circuits, including those for test purposes, shall be gaged monthly for height and alinement, and shall be tested at least every 6 months.

§ 236.577 Test, acknowledgement, and cut-in circuits.

Test, acknowledgement, and cut-in circuits shall be tested at least once every twelve months.

[49 FR 3387, Jan. 26, 1984]

INSPECTION AND TESTS; LOCOMOTIVE

§ 236.586 Daily or after trip test.

- (a) Except where tests prescribed by § 236.588 are performed at intervals of not more than 2 months, each locomotive equipped with an automatic cab signal or train stop or train control device operating in equipped territory shall be inspected for damage to the equipment and tested at least once each calendar day or within 24 hours before departure upon each trip.
- (b) Each equipped locomotive shall be tested to determine the locomotive equipment is responsive to the wayside equipment and shall be cycled to determine the device functions as intended.
- (c) Each locomotive equipped with intermittent inductive automatic train stop or non-coded continuous inductive automatic train stop or non-coded continuous inductive automatic train control device shall be tested to determine that the pickup of the device is within specified limits.

[49 FR 3387, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.587 Departure test.

- (a) The automatic train stop, train control, or cab signal apparatus on each locomotive, except a locomotive or a multiple-unit car equipped with mechanical trip stop, shall be tested using one of the following methods:
 - (1) Operation over track elements;
 - (2) Operation over test circuit;
 - (3) Use of portable test equipment; or
 - (4) Use of onboard test device.
- (b) The test shall be made on departure of the locomotive from its initial terminal unless that apparatus will be cut out between the initial terminal and the equipped territory. If the apparatus is cut out between the initial terminal and the equipped territory the test shall be made prior to entering equipped territory.
- (c) If a locomotive makes more than one trip in any 24-hour period, only one departure test is required in such 24-hour period.
- (d)
 - (1) Whoever performs the test shall certify in writing that such test was properly performed. The certification and the test results shall be posted in the cab of the locomotive and a copy of the certification and test results left at the test location for filing in the office of the supervisory official having jurisdiction.
 - (2) If it is impractical to leave a copy of the certification and test results at the location of the test, the test results shall be transmitted to either
 - (i) the dispatcher or
 - (ii) one other designated individual at each location, who shall keep a written record of the test results and the name of the person performing the test. These records shall be retained for at least 92 days.

[49 FR 3387, Jan. 26, 1984, as amended at 53 FR 37313, Sept. 26, 1988]

Effective Date Note: At 49 FR 3387, Jan. 26, 1984, § 236.587 was revised. This section contains information collection and recordkeeping requirements and will not become effective until approval has been given by the Office of Management and Budget.

§ 236.588 Periodic test.

Except as provided in § 236.586, periodic test of the automatic train stop, train control, or cab signal apparatus shall be made at least once every 92 days, and on multiple-unit cars as specified by the carrier, subject to approval by the FRA.

[49 FR 3387, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.589 Relays.

- (a) Each relay shall be removed from service, subjected to thorough test, necessary repairs and adjustments made, and shall not be replaced in service unless its operating characteristics are in accordance with the limits within which such relay is designed to operate, as follows:
 - (1) Master or primary relays of torque type depending on spring tension to return contacts to deenergized position in noncoded continuous inductive automatic train stop or train control system, at least once every two years; and
 - (2) All other relays, at least once every six years.
- (b) [Reserved]

[49 FR 3387, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.590 Pneumatic apparatus.

Automatic train stop, train control, or cab signal pneumatic apparatus shall be inspected, cleaned, and the results of such inspection recorded as provided by § 229.29(a). When a locomotive with automatic train stop, train control, or cab signal pneumatic apparatus receives out-of-use credit pursuant to § 229.33, the automatic train stop, train control, or cab signal apparatus shall be tested in accordance with § 236.588 prior to the locomotive being placed in service.

[61 FR 33873, July 1, 1996]

Subpart F - Dragging Equipment and Slide Detectors and Other Similar Protective Devices

STANDARDS

§ 236.601 Signals controlled by devices; location.

Signals controlled by devices used to provide protection against unusual contingencies, such as landslides, dragging equipment, burned bridges or trestles and washouts shall be located so that stopping distance will be provided between the signal and the point where it is necessary to stop the train.

Subpart G - Definitions

§ 236.700 Definitions.

For the purpose of these rules, standards, and instructions, the following definitions will apply.

§ 236.701 Application, brake; full service.

An application of the brakes resulting from a continuous or a split reduction in brake pipe pressure at a service rate until maximum brake cylinder pressure is developed. As applied to an automatic or electro-pneumatic brake with speed governor control, an application other than emergency which develops the maximum brake cylinder pressure, as determined by the design of the brake equipment for the speed at which the train is operating.

§ 236.702 Arm, semaphore.

The part of a semaphore signal displaying an aspect. It consists of a blade fastened to a spectacle.

§ 236.703 Aspect.

The appearance of a roadway signal conveying an indication as viewed from the direction of an approaching train; the appearance of a cab signal conveying an indication as viewed by an observer in the cab.

§ 236.704 [Reserved]

§ 236.705 Bar, locking.

A bar in an interlocking machine to which the locking dogs are attached.

§ 236.706 Bed, locking.

That part of an interlocking machine that contains or holds the tappets, locking bars, crosslocking, dogs and other apparatus used to interlock the levers.

§ 236.707 Blade, semaphore.

The extended part of a semaphore arm which shows the position of the arm.

§ 236.708 Block.

A length of track of defined limits, the use of which by trains is governed by block signals, cab signals, or both.

§ 236.709 Block, absolute.

A block in which no train is permitted to enter while it is occupied by another train.

§ 236.710 Block, latch.

The lower extremity of a latch rod which engages with a square shoulder of the segment or quadrant to hold the lever in position.

§ 236.711 Bond, rail joint.

A metallic connection attached to adjoining rails to insure electrical conductivity.

§ 236.712 Brake pipe.

A pipe running from the engineman's brake valve through the train, used for the transmission of air under pressure to charge and actuate the automatic brake equipment and charge the reservoirs of the electro-pneumatic brake equipment on each vehicle of the train.

§ 236.713 Bridge, movable.

That section of a structure bridging a navigable waterway so designed that it may be displaced to permit passage of traffic on the waterway.

§ 236.714 Cab.

The compartment of a locomotive from which the propelling power and power brakes of the train are manually controlled.

§§ 236.715-236.716 [Reserved]

§ 236.717 Characteristics, operating.

The measure of electrical values at which electrical or electronic apparatus operate (e.g., drop-away, pick-up, maximum and minimum current, and working value).

[49 FR 3387, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.718 Chart, dog.

A diagrammatic representation of the mechanical locking of an interlocking machine, used as a working plan in making up, assembling and fitting the locking.

§ 236.719 Circuit, acknowledgment.

A circuit consisting of wire or other conducting material installed between the track rails at each signal in territory where an automatic train stop system or cab signal system of the continuous inductive type with 2-indication cab signals is in service, to enforce acknowledgement by the engineman at each signal displaying an aspect requiring a stop.

§ 236.720 Circuit, common return.

A term applied where one wire is used for the return of more than one electric circuit.

§ 236.721 Circuit, control.

An electrical circuit between a source of electric energy and a device which it operates.

§ 236.722 Circuit, cut-in.

A roadway circuit at the entrance to automatic train stop, train control or cab signal territory by means of which locomotive equipment of the continuous inductive type is actuated so as to be in operative condition.

§ 236.723 Circuit, double wire; line.

An electric circuit not employing a common return wire; a circuit formed by individual wires throughout.

§ 236.724 Circuit, shunt fouling.

The track circuit in the fouling section of a turnout, connected in multiple with the track circuit in the main track.

§ 236.725 Circuit, switch shunting.

A shunting circuit which is closed through contacts of a switch circuit controller.

§ 236.726 Circuit, track.

An electrical circuit of which the rails of the track form a part.

§ 236.727 Circuit, track; coded.

A track circuit in which the energy is varied or interrupted periodically.

§ 236.728 Circuit, trap.

A term applied to a circuit used where it is desirable to provide a track circuit but where it is impracticable to maintain a track circuit.

§ 236.729 Cock, double heading.

A manually operated valve by means of which the control of brake operation is transferred to the leading locomotive.

§ 236.730 Coil, receiver.

Concentric layers of insulated wire wound around the core of a receiver of an automatic train stop, train control or cab signal device on a locomotive.

§ 236.731 Controller, circuit.

A device for opening and closing electric circuits.

§ 236.732 Controller, circuit; switch.

A device for opening and closing electric circuits, operated by a rod connected to a switch, derail or movable-point frog.

§ 236.733 Current, foreign.

A term applied to stray electric currents which may affect a signaling system, but which are not a part of the system.

§ 236.734 Current of traffic.

The movement of trains on a specified track in a designated direction.

§ 236.735 Current, leakage.

A stray electric current of relatively small value which flows through or across the surface of insulation when a voltage is impressed across the insulation.

§ 236.736 Cut-section.

A location other than a signal location where two adjoining track circuits end within a block.

§ 236.737 Cut-section, relayed.

A cut-section where the energy for one track circuit is supplied through front contacts or through front and polar contacts of the track relay for the adjoining track circuit.

§ 236.738 Detector, point.

A circuit controller which is part of the switch operating mechanism and operated by a rod connected to a switch, derail or movable point frog to indicate that the point is within a specified distance of the stock rail.

§ 236.739 Device, acknowledging.

A manually operated electric switch or pneumatic valve by means of which, on a locomotive equipped with an automatic train stop or train control device, an automatic brake application can be forestalled, or by means of which, on a locomotive equipped with an automatic cab signal device, the sounding of the cab indicator can be silenced.

§ 236.740 Device, reset.

A device whereby the brakes may be released after an automatic train control brake application.

§ 236.741 Distance, stopping.

The maximum distance on any portion of any railroad which any train operating on such portion of railroad at its maximum authorized speed, will travel during a full service application of the brakes, between the point where such application is initiated and the point where the train comes to a stop.

§ 236.742 Dog, locking.

A steel block attached to a locking bar or tappet of an interlocking machine, by means of which locking between levers is accomplished.

§ 236.743 Dog, swing.

A locking dog mounted in such a manner that it is free to rotate on a trunnion which is riveted to a locking bar.

Cross Reference:

Element, contact. See receiver, § 236.788.

§ 236.744 Element, roadway.

That portion of the roadway apparatus of automatic train stop, train control, or cab signal system, such as electric circuit, inductor, or trip arm to which the locomotive apparatus of such system is directly responsive.

[49 FR 3387, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.745 Face, locking.

The locking surface of a locking dog, tappet or cross locking of an interlocking machine.

§ 236.746 Feature, restoring.

An arrangement on an electro-pneumatic switch by means of which power is applied to restore the switch movement to full normal or to full reverse position, before the driving bar creeps sufficiently to unlock the switch, with control level in normal or reverse position.

[49 FR 3388, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.747 Forestall.

As applied to an automatic train stop or train control device, to prevent an automatic brake application by operation of an acknowledging device or by manual control of the speed of the train.

§ 236.748 [Reserved]

§ 236.749 Indication.

The information conveyed by the aspect of a signal.

Cross Reference:

Inductor, see § 236.744.

§ 236.750 Interlocking, automatic.

An arrangement of signals, with or without other signal appliances, which functions through the exercise of inherent powers as distinguished from those whose functions are controlled manually, and which are so interconnected by means of electric circuits that their movements must succeed each other in proper sequence, train movements over all routes being governed by signal indication.

§ 236.751 Interlocking, manual.

An arrangement of signals and signal appliances operated from an interlocking machine and so interconnected by means of mechanical and/or electric locking that their movements must succeed each other in proper sequence, train movements over all routes being governed by signal indication.

§ 236.752 Joint, rail, insulated.

A joint in which electrical insulation is provided between adjoining rails.

§ 236.753 Limits, interlocking.

The tracks between the opposing home signals of an interlocking.

§ 236.754 Line, open wire.

An overhead wire line consisting of single conductors as opposed to multiple-conductor cables.

§ 236.755 Link, rocker.

That portion of an interlocking machine which transmits motion between the latch and the universal link.

§ 236.756 Lock, bolt.

A mechanical lock so arranged that if a switch, derail or movable-point frog is not in the proper position for a train movement, the signal governing that movement cannot display an aspect to proceed; and that will prevent a movement of the switch, derail or movable-point frog unless the signal displays its most restrictive aspect.

§ 236.757 Lock, electric.

A device to prevent or restrict the movement of a lever, a switch or a movable bridge, unless the locking member is withdrawn by an electrical device, such as an electromagnet, solenoid or motor.

§ 236.758 Lock, electric, forced drop.

An electric lock in which the locking member is mechanically forced down to the locked position.

§ 236.759 Lock, facing point.

A mechanical lock for a switch, derail, or movable-point frog, comprising a plunger stand and a plunger which engages a lock rod attached to the switch point to lock the operated unit.

§ 236.760 Locking, approach.

Electric locking effective while a train is approaching, within a specified distance, a signal displaying an aspect to proceed, and which prevents, until after the expiration of a predetermined time interval after such signal has been caused to display its most restrictive aspect, the movement of any interlocked or electrically locked switch, movable-point frog, or derail in the route governed by the signal, and which prevents an aspect to proceed from being displayed for any conflicting route.

§ 236.761 Locking, electric.

The combination of one or more electric locks and controlling circuits by means of which levers of an interlocking machine, or switches or other units operated in connection with signaling and interlocking, are secured against operation under certain conditions.

§ 236.762 Locking, indication.

Electric locking which prevents manipulation of levers that would result in an unsafe condition for a train movement if a signal, switch, or other operative unit fails to make a movement corresponding to that of its controlling lever, or which directly prevents the operation of a signal, switch, or other operative unit, in case another unit which should operate first fails to make the required movement.

§ 236.763 Locking, latch operated.

The mechanical locking of an interlocking machine which is actuated by means of the lever latch.

§ 236.764 Locking, lever operated.

The mechanical locking of an interlocking machine which is actuated by means of the lever.

§ 236.765 Locking, mechanical.

An arrangement of locking bars, dogs, tappets, cross locking and other apparatus by means of which interlocking is effected between the levers of an interlocking machine and so interconnected that their movements must succeed each other in a predetermined order.

§ 236.766 Locking, movable bridge.

The rail locks, bridge locks, bolt locks, circuit controllers, and electric locks used in providing interlocking protection at a movable bridge.

§ 236.767 Locking, route.

Electric locking, effective when a train passes a signal displaying an aspect for it to proceed, which prevents the movement of any switch, movable-point frog, or derail in advance of the train within the route entered. It may be so arranged that as a train clears a track section of the route, the locking affecting that section is released.

§ 236.768 Locking, time.

A method of locking, either mechanical or electrical, which, after a signal has been caused to display an aspect to proceed, prevents, until after the expiration of a predetermined time interval after such signal has been caused to display its most restrictive aspect, the operation of any interlocked or electrically locked switch, movable-point frog, or derail in the route governed by that signal, and which prevents an aspect to proceed from being displayed for any conflicting route.

§ 236.769 Locking, traffic.

Electric locking which prevents the manipulation of levers or other devices for changing the direction of traffic on a section of track while that section is occupied or while a signal displays an aspect for a movement to proceed into that section.

§ 236.770 Locomotive.

A self-propelled unit of equipment which can be used in train service.

§ 236.771 Machine, control.

An assemblage of manually operated devices for controlling the functions of a traffic control system; it may include a track diagram with indication lights.

§ 236.772 Machine, interlocking.

An assemblage of manually operated levers or other devices for the control of signals, switches or other units.

Cross Reference:

Magnet, track, see [§ 236.744](#).

§ 236.773 Movements, conflicting.

Movements over conflicting routes.

§ 236.774 Movement, facing.

The movement of a train over the points of a switch which face in a direction opposite to that in which the train is moving.

§ 236.775 Movement, switch-and-lock.

A device, the complete operation of which performs the three functions of unlocking, operating and locking a switch, movable-point frog or derail.

§ 236.776 Movement, trailing.

The movement of a train over the points of a switch which face in the direction in which the train is moving.

§ 236.777 Operator, control.

An employee assigned to operate the control machine of a traffic control system.

§ 236.778 Piece, driving.

A crank secured to a locking shaft by means of which horizontal movement is imparted to a longitudinal locking bar.

§ 236.779 Plate, top.

A metal plate secured to a locking bracket to prevent the cross locking from being forced out of the bracket.

§ 236.780 Plunger, facing point lock.

That part of a facing point lock which secures the lock rod to the plunger stand when the switch is locked.

§ 236.781 [Reserved]

§ 236.782 Point, controlled.

A location where signals and/or other functions of a traffic control system are controlled from the control machine.

§ 236.783 Point, stop-indication.

As applied to an automatic train stop or train control system without the use of roadway signals, a point where a signal displaying an aspect requiring a stop would be located.

§ 236.784 Position, deenergized.

The position assumed by the moving member of an electromagnetic device when the device is deprived of its operating current.

§ 236.785 Position, false restrictive.

A position of a semaphore arm that is more restrictive than it should be.

§ 236.786 Principle, closed circuit.

The principle of circuit design where a normally energized electric circuit which, on being interrupted or deenergized, will cause the controlled function to assume its most restrictive condition.

§ 236.787 Protection, cross.

An arrangement to prevent the improper operation of a signal, switch, movable-point frog, or derail as the result of a cross in electrical circuits.

Cross Reference:

Ramp, see § 236.744.

§ 236.787a Railroad.

Railroad means any form of non-highway ground transportation that runs on rails or electromagnetic guideways and any entity providing such transportation, including -

- (a) Commuter or other short-haul railroad passenger service in a metropolitan or suburban area and commuter railroad service that was operated by the Consolidated Rail Corporation on January 1, 1979; and
- (b) High speed ground transportation systems that connect metropolitan areas, without regard to whether those systems use new technologies not associated with traditional railroads; but does not include rapid transit operations in an urban area that are not connected to the general railroad system of transportation.

[70 FR 11095, Mar. 7, 2005]

§ 236.788 Receiver.

A device on a locomotive, so placed that it is in position to be influenced inductively or actuated by an automatic train stop, train control or cab signal roadway element.

§ 236.789 Relay, timing.

A relay which will not close its front contacts or open its back contacts, or both, until the expiration of a definite time intervals after the relay has been energized.

§ 236.790 Release, time.

A device used to prevent the operation of an operative unit until after the expiration of a predetermined time interval after the device has been actuated.

§ 236.791 Release, value.

The electrical value at which the movable member of an electromagnetic device will move to its deenergized portion.

§ 236.792 Reservoir, equalizing.

An air reservoir connected with and adding volume to the top portion of the equalizing piston chamber of the automatic brake valve, to provide uniform service reductions in brake pipe pressure regardless of the length of the train.

Cross Reference:

Rocker, see § 236.755.

§ 236.793 Rod, lock.

A rod, attached to the front rod or lug of a switch, movable-point frog or derail, through which a locking plunger may extend when the switch points or derail are in the normal or reverse position.

§ 236.794 Rod, up-and-down.

A rod used for connecting the semaphore arm to the operating mechanism of a signal.

§ 236.795 Route.

The course or way which is, or is to be, traveled.

§ 236.796 Routes, conflicting.

Two or more routes, opposing, converging or intersecting, over which movements cannot be made simultaneously without possibility of collision.

§ 236.797 Route, interlocked.

A route within interlocking limits.

§ 236.798 Section, dead.

A section of track, either within a track circuit or between two track circuits, the rails of which are not part of a track circuit.

§ 236.799 Section, fouling.

The section of track between the switch points and the clearance point in a turnout.

§ 236.800 Sheet, locking.

A description in tabular form of the locking operations in an interlocking machine.

§ 236.801 Shoe, latch.

The casting by means of which the latch rod and the latch block are held to a lever of a mechanical interlocking machine.

§ 236.802 Shunt.

A by-path in an electrical circuit.

§ 236.802a Siding.

An auxiliary track for meeting or passing trains.

§ 236.803 Signal, approach.

A roadway signal used to govern the approach to another signal and if operative so controlled that its indication furnishes advance information of the indication of the next signal.

§ 236.804 Signal, block.

A roadway signal operated either automatically or manually at the entrance to a block.

§ 236.805 Signal, cab.

A signal located in engineman's compartment or cab, indicating a condition affecting the movement of a train and used in conjunction with interlocking signals and in conjunction with or in lieu of block signals.

§ 236.806 Signal, home.

A roadway signal at the entrance to a route or block to govern trains in entering and using that route or block.

§ 236.807 Signal, interlocking.

A roadway signal which governs movements into or within interlocking limits.

§ 236.808 Signals, opposing.

Roadway signals which govern movements in opposite directions on the same track.

§ 236.809 Signal, slotted mechanical.

A mechanically operated signal with an electromagnetic device inserted in its operating connection to provide a means of controlling the signal electrically, as well as mechanically.

§ 236.810 Spectacle, semaphore arm.

That part of a semaphore arm which holds the roundels and to which the blade is fastened.

§ 236.811 Speed, medium.

A speed not exceeding 40 miles per hour.

§ 236.812 Speed, restricted.

A speed that will permit stopping within one-half the range of vision, but not exceeding 20 miles per hour.

[49 FR 3388, Jan. 26, 1984]

49 CFR 236.812 (enhanced display)

§ 236.813 Speed, slow.

A speed not exceeding 20 miles per hour.

§ 236.813a State, most restrictive.

The mode of an electric or electronic device that is equivalent to a track relay in its deenergized position.

[49 FR 3388, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.814 Station, control.

The place where the control machine of a traffic control system is located.

§ 236.815 Stop.

As applied to mechanical locking, a device secured to a locking bar to limit its movement.

§ 236.816 Superiority of trains.

The precedence conferred upon one train over other trains by train order or by reason of its class or the direction of its movement.

§ 236.817 Switch, electro-pneumatic.

A switch operated by an electro-pneumatic switch-and-lock movement.

§ 236.818 Switch, facing point.

A switch, the points of which face traffic approaching in the direction for which the track is signaled.

§ 236.819 Switch, hand operated.

A non-interlocked switch which can only be operated manually.

§ 236.820 Switch, interlocked.

A switch within the interlocking limits the control of which is interlocked with other functions of the interlocking.

§ 236.820a Switch, power-operated.

A switch operated by an electrically, hydraulically, or pneumatically driven switch-and-lock movement.

[49 FR 3388, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.821 Switch, sectionalizing.

A switch for disconnecting a section of a power line from the source of energy.

§ 236.822 Switch, spring.

A switch equipped with a spring device which forces the points to their original position after being trailed through and holds them under spring compression.

§ 236.823 Switch, trailing point.

A switch, the points of which face away from traffic approaching in the direction for which the track is signaled.

§ 236.824 System, automatic block signal.

A block signal system wherein the use of each block is governed by an automatic block signal, cab signal, or both.

§ 236.825 System, automatic train control.

A system so arranged that its operation will automatically result in the following:

- (a) A full service application of the brakes which will continue either until the train is brought to a stop, or, under control of the engineman, its speed is reduced to a predetermined rate.
- (b) When operating under a speed restriction, an application of the brakes when the speed of the train exceeds the predetermined rate and which will continue until the speed is reduced to that rate.

§ 236.826 System, automatic train stop.

A system so arranged that its operation will automatically result in the application of the brakes until the train has been brought to a stop.

§ 236.827 System, block signal.

A method of governing the movement of trains into or within one or more blocks by block signals or cab signals.

§ 236.828 System, traffic control.

A block signal system under which train movements are authorized by block signals whose indications supersede the superiority of trains for both opposing and following movements on the same track.

§ 236.829 Terminal, initial.

The starting point of a locomotive for a trip.

§ 236.830 Time, acknowledging.

As applied to an intermittent automatic train stop system, a predetermined time within which an automatic brake application may be forestalled by means of the acknowledging device.

§ 236.831 Time, delay.

As applied to an automatic train stop or train control system, the time which elapses after the onboard apparatus detects a more restrictive indication until the brakes start to apply.

[49 FR 3388, Jan. 26, 1984]

§ 236.831a Track, main.

A track, other than auxiliary track, extending through yards and between stations, upon which trains are operated by timetable or train orders, or both, or the use of which is governed by block signals.

§ 236.832 Train.

A locomotive or more than one locomotive coupled, with or without cars.

§ 236.833 Train, opposing.

A train, the movement of which is in a direction opposite to and toward another train on the same track.

§ 236.834 Trip.

A movement of a locomotive over all or any portion of automatic train stop, train control or cab signal territory between the terminals for that locomotive; a movement in one direction.

Cross Reference:

Trip-arm, see § 236.744.

§ 236.835 Trunking.

A casing used to protect electrical conductors.

§ 236.836 Trunnion.

A cylindrical projection supporting a revolving part.

§ 236.837 Valve, electro-pneumatic.

A valve electrically operated which, when operated, will permit or prevent passage of air.

§ 236.838 Wire, shunt.

A wire forming part of a shunt circuit.

Subpart H - Standards for Processor-Based Signal and Train Control Systems

Source: 70 FR 11095, Mar. 7, 2005, unless otherwise noted.

§ 236.901 Purpose and scope.

- (a) *What is the purpose of this subpart?* The purpose of this subpart is to promote the safe operation of processor-based signal and train control systems, subsystems, and components that are safety-critical products, as defined in § 236.903, and to facilitate the development of those products.
- (b) *What topics does it cover?* This subpart prescribes minimum, performance-based safety standards for safety-critical products, including requirements to ensure that the development, installation, implementation, inspection, testing, operation, maintenance, repair, and modification of those products

will achieve and maintain an acceptable level of safety. This subpart also prescribes standards to ensure that personnel working with safety-critical products receive appropriate training. Each railroad may prescribe additional or more stringent rules, and other special instructions, that are not inconsistent with this subpart.

(c) **What other rules apply?**

- (1) This subpart does not exempt a railroad from compliance with the requirements of subparts A through G of this part, except to the extent a PSP explains to FRA Associate Administrator for Safety's satisfaction the following:
 - (i) How the objectives of any such requirements are met by the product;
 - (ii) Why the objectives of any such requirements are not relevant to the product; or
 - (iii) How the requirement is satisfied using alternative means. (See § 236.907(a)(14)).
- (2) Products subject to this subpart are also subject to applicable requirements of parts 233, 234 and 235 of this chapter. See § 234.275 of this chapter with respect to use of this subpart to qualify certain products for use within highway-rail grade crossing warning systems.
- (3) Information required to be submitted by this subpart that a submitter deems to be trade secrets, or commercial or financial information that is privileged or confidential under Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4), shall be so labeled in accordance with the provisions of § 209.11 of this chapter. FRA handles information so labeled in accordance with the provisions of § 209.11 of this chapter.

§ 236.903 Definitions.

As used in this subpart -

Associate Administrator for Safety means the Associate Administrator for Safety, FRA, or that person's delegate as designated in writing.

Component means an element, device, or appliance (including those whose nature is electrical, mechanical, hardware, or software) that is part of a system or subsystem.

Configuration management control plan means a plan designed to ensure that the proper and intended product configuration, including the hardware components and software version, is documented and maintained through the life-cycle of the products in use.

Employer means a railroad, or contractor to a railroad, that directly engages or compensates individuals to perform the duties specified in § 236.921 (a).

Executive software means software common to all installations of a given product. It generally is used to schedule the execution of the site-specific application programs, run timers, read inputs, drive outputs, perform self-diagnostics, access and check memory, and monitor the execution of the application software to detect unsolicited changes in outputs.

FRA means the Federal Railroad Administration.

Full automatic operation means that mode of an automatic train control system capable of operating without external human influence, in which the locomotive engineer/operator may act as a passive system monitor, in addition to an active system controller.

Hazard means an existing or potential condition that can result in an accident.

High degree of confidence, as applied to the highest level of aggregation, means there exists credible safety analysis supporting the conclusion that the likelihood of the proposed condition associated with the new product being less safe than the previous condition is very small.

Human factors refers to a body of knowledge about human limitations, human abilities, and other human characteristics, such as behavior and motivation, that must be considered in product design.

Human-machine interface (HMI) means the interrelated set of controls and displays that allows humans to interact with the machine.

Initialization refers to the startup process when it is determined that a product has all required data input and the product is prepared to function as intended.

Mandatory directive has the meaning set forth in § 220.5 of this chapter.

Materials handling refers to explicit instructions for handling safety-critical components established to comply with procedures specified in the PSP.

Mean Time to Hazardous Event (MTTHE) means the average or expected time that a subsystem or component will operate prior to the occurrence of an unsafe failure.

New or next-generation train control system means a train control system using technologies not in use in revenue service at the time of PSP submission or without established histories of safe practice.

Petition for approval means a petition to FRA for approval to use a product on a railroad as described in its PSP. The petition for approval is to contain information that is relevant to determining the safety of the resulting system; relevant to determining compliance with this part; and relevant to determining the safety of the product, including a complete copy of the product's PSP and supporting safety analysis.

Predefined change means any post-implementation modification to the use of a product that is provided for in the PSP (see § 236.907(b)).

Previous Condition refers to the estimated risk inherent in the portion of the existing method of operation that is relevant to the change under analysis (including the elements of any existing signal or train control system relevant to the review of the product).

Processor-based, as used in this subpart, means dependent on a digital processor for its proper functioning.

Product means a processor-based signal or train control system, subsystem, or component.

Product Safety Plan (or PSP) refers to a formal document which describes in detail all of the safety aspects of the product, including but not limited to procedures for its development, installation, implementation, operation, maintenance, repair, inspection, testing and modification, as well as analyses supporting its safety claims, as described in § 236.907.

Railroad Safety Program Plan (or RSPP) refers to a formal document which describes a railroad's strategy for addressing safety hazards associated with operation of products under this subpart and its program for execution of such strategy through the use of PSP requirements, as described in § 236.905.

Revision control means a chain of custody regimen designed to positively identify safety-critical components and spare equipment availability, including repair/replacement tracking in accordance with procedures outlined in the PSP.

Risk means the expected probability of occurrence for an individual accident event (probability) multiplied by the severity of the expected consequences associated with the accident (severity).

Risk assessment means the process of determining, either quantitatively or qualitatively, the measure of risk associated with use of the product under all intended operating conditions or the previous condition.

Safety-critical, as applied to a function, a system, or any portion thereof, means the correct performance of which is essential to safety of personnel or equipment, or both; or the incorrect performance of which could cause a hazardous condition, or allow a hazardous condition which was intended to be prevented by the function or system to exist.

Subsystem means a defined portion of a system.

System refers to a signal or train control system and includes all subsystems and components thereof, as the context requires.

System Safety Precedence means the order of precedence in which methods used to eliminate or control identified hazards within a system are implemented.

Validation means the process of determining whether a product's design requirements fulfill its intended design objectives during its development and life-cycle. The goal of the validation process is to determine "whether the correct product was built."

Verification means the process of determining whether the results of a given phase of the development cycle fulfill the validated requirements established at the start of that phase. The goal of the verification process is to determine "whether the product was built correctly."

§ 236.905 Railroad Safety Program Plan (RSPP).

- (a) **What is the purpose of an RSPP?** A railroad subject to this subpart shall develop an RSPP, subject to FRA approval, that serves as its principal safety document for all safety-critical products. The RSPP must establish the minimum PSP requirements that will govern the development and implementation of all products subject to this subpart, consistent with the provisions contained in § 236.907.
- (b) **What subject areas must the RSPP address?** The railroad's RSPP must address, at a minimum, the following subject areas:
 - (1) **Requirements and concepts.** The RSPP must require a description of the preliminary safety analysis, including:
 - (i) A complete description of methods used to evaluate a system's behavioral characteristics;
 - (ii) A complete description of risk assessment procedures;
 - (iii) The system safety precedence followed; and
 - (iv) The identification of the safety assessment process.
 - (2) **Design for verification and validation.** The RSPP must require the identification of verification and validation methods for the preliminary safety analysis, initial development process, and future incremental changes, including standards to be used in the verification and validation process, consistent with appendix C to this part. The RSPP must require that references to any non-published standards be included in the PSP.
 - (3) **Design for human factors.** The RSPP must require a description of the process used during product development to identify human factors issues and develop design requirements which address those issues.

(4) **Configuration management control plan.** The RSPP must specify requirements for configuration management for all products to which this subpart applies.

(c) **How are RSPP's approved?**

(1) Each railroad shall submit a petition for approval of an RSPP to the Associate Administrator for Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Mail Stop 25, Washington, DC 20590. The petition must contain a copy of the proposed RSPP, and the name, title, address, and telephone number of the railroad's primary contact person for review of the petition.

(2) Normally within 180 days of receipt of a petition for approval of an RSPP, FRA:

(i) Grants the petition, if FRA finds that the petition complies with applicable requirements of this subpart, attaching any special conditions to the approval of the petition as necessary to carry out the requirements of this subpart;

(ii) Denies the petition, setting forth reasons for denial; or

(iii) Requests additional information.

(3) If no action is taken on the petition within 180 days, the petition remains pending for decision. The petitioner is encouraged to contact FRA for information concerning its status.

(4) FRA may reopen consideration of any previously-approved petition for cause, providing reasons for such action.

(d) **How are RSPP's modified?**

(1) Railroads shall obtain FRA approval for any modification to their RSPP which affects a safety-critical requirement of a PSP. Other modifications do not require FRA approval.

(2) Petitions for FRA approval of RSPP modifications are subject to the same procedures as petitions for initial RSPP approval, as specified in paragraph (c) of this section. In addition, such petitions must identify the proposed modification(s) to be made, the reason for the modification(s), and the effect of the modification(s) on safety.

[70 FR 11095, Mar. 7, 2005, as amended at 74 FR 25174, May 27, 2009]

§ 236.907 Product Safety Plan (PSP).

(a) **What must a PSP contain?** The PSP must include the following:

(1) A complete description of the product, including a list of all product components and their physical relationship in the subsystem or system;

(2) A description of the railroad operation or categories of operations on which the product is designed to be used, including train movement density, gross tonnage, passenger train movement density, hazardous materials volume, railroad operating rules, and operating speeds;

(3) An operational concepts document, including a complete description of the product functionality and information flows;

(4) A safety requirements document, including a list with complete descriptions of all functions which the product performs to enhance or preserve safety;

(5) A document describing the manner in which product architecture satisfies safety requirements;

- (6) A hazard log consisting of a comprehensive description of all safety-relevant hazards to be addressed during the life cycle of the product, including maximum threshold limits for each hazard (for unidentified hazards, the threshold shall be exceeded at one occurrence);
- (7) A risk assessment, as prescribed in § 236.909 and appendix B to this part;
- (8) A hazard mitigation analysis, including a complete and comprehensive description of all hazards to be addressed in the system design and development, mitigation techniques used, and system safety precedence followed, as prescribed by the applicable RSPP;
- (9) A complete description of the safety assessment and verification and validation processes applied to the product and the results of these processes, describing how subject areas covered in appendix C to this part are either: addressed directly, addressed using other safety criteria, or not applicable;
- (10) A complete description of the safety assurance concepts used in the product design, including an explanation of the design principles and assumptions;
- (11) A human factors analysis, including a complete description of all human-machine interfaces, a complete description of all functions performed by humans in connection with the product to enhance or preserve safety, and an analysis in accordance with appendix E to this part or in accordance with other criteria if demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Associate Administrator for Safety to be equally suitable;
- (12) A complete description of the specific training of railroad and contractor employees and supervisors necessary to ensure the safe and proper installation, implementation, operation, maintenance, repair, inspection, testing, and modification of the product;
- (13) A complete description of the specific procedures and test equipment necessary to ensure the safe and proper installation, implementation, operation, maintenance, repair, inspection, testing, and modification of the product. These procedures, including calibration requirements, shall be consistent with or explain deviations from the equipment manufacturer's recommendations;
- (14) An analysis of the applicability of the requirements of subparts A through G of this part to the product that may no longer apply or are satisfied by the product using an alternative method, and a complete explanation of the manner in which those requirements are otherwise fulfilled (see § 234.275 of this chapter and § 236.901(c));
- (15) A complete description of the necessary security measures for the product over its life-cycle;
- (16) A complete description of each warning to be placed in the Operations and Maintenance Manual identified in § 236.919, and of all warning labels required to be placed on equipment as necessary to ensure safety;
- (17) A complete description of all initial implementation testing procedures necessary to establish that safety-functional requirements are met and safety-critical hazards are appropriately mitigated;
- (18) A complete description of:
 - (i) All post-implementation testing (validation) and monitoring procedures, including the intervals necessary to establish that safety-functional requirements, safety-critical hazard mitigation processes, and safety-critical tolerances are not compromised over time, through use, or after maintenance (repair, replacement, adjustment) is performed; and

(ii) Each record necessary to ensure the safety of the system that is associated with periodic maintenance, inspections, tests, repairs, replacements, adjustments, and the system's resulting conditions, including records of component failures resulting in safety-relevant hazards (see § 236.917(e)(3));

(19) A complete description of any safety-critical assumptions regarding availability of the product, and a complete description of all backup methods of operation; and

(20) A complete description of all incremental and predefined changes (see paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section).

(b) What requirements apply to predefined changes?

(1) Predefined changes are not considered design modifications requiring an entirely new safety verification process, a revised PSP, and an informational filing or petition for approval in accordance with § 236.915. However, the risk assessment for the product must demonstrate that operation of the product, as modified by any predefined change, satisfies the minimum performance standard.

(2) The PSP must identify configuration/revision control measures designed to ensure that safety-functional requirements and safety-critical hazard mitigation processes are not compromised as a result of any such change. (Software changes involving safety functional requirements or safety critical hazard mitigation processes for components in use are also addressed in paragraph (c) of this section.)

(c) What requirements apply to other product changes?

(1) Incremental changes are planned product version changes described in the initial PSP where slightly different specifications are used to allow the gradual enhancement of the product's capabilities. Incremental changes shall require verification and validation to the extent the changes involve safety-critical functions.

(2) Changes classified as maintenance require validation.

(d) What are the responsibilities of the railroad and product supplier regarding communication of hazards?

(1) The PSP shall specify all contractual arrangements with hardware and software suppliers for immediate notification of any and all safety critical software upgrades, patches, or revisions for their processor-based system, sub-system, or component, and the reasons for such changes from the suppliers, whether or not the railroad has experienced a failure of that safety-critical system, sub-system, or component.

(2) The PSP shall specify the railroad's procedures for action upon notification of a safety-critical upgrade, patch, or revision for this processor-based system, sub-system, or component, and until the upgrade, patch, or revision has been installed; and such action shall be consistent with the criterion set forth in § 236.915(d) as if the failure had occurred on that railroad.

(3) The PSP must identify configuration/revision control measures designed to ensure that safety-functional requirements and safety-critical hazard mitigation processes are not compromised as a result of any such change, and that any such change can be audited.

(4) Product suppliers entering into contractual arrangements for product support described in a PSP must promptly report any safety-relevant failures and previously unidentified hazards to each railroad using the product.

§ 236.909 Minimum performance standard.

- (a) **What is the minimum performance standard for products covered by this subpart?** The safety analysis included in the railroad's PSP must establish with a high degree of confidence that introduction of the product will not result in risk that exceeds the previous condition. The railroad shall determine, prior to filing its petition for approval or informational filing, that this standard has been met and shall make available the necessary analyses and documentation as provided in this subpart.
- (b) **How does FRA determine whether the PSP requirements for products covered by subpart H have been met?** With respect to any FRA review of a PSP, the Associate Administrator for Safety independently determines whether the railroad's safety case establishes with a high degree of confidence that introduction of the product will not result in risk that exceeds the previous condition. In evaluating the sufficiency of the railroad's case for the product, the Associate Administrator for Safety considers, as applicable, the factors pertinent to evaluation of risk assessments, listed in § 236.913(g)(2).
- (c) **What is the scope of a full risk assessment required by this section?** A full risk assessment performed under this subpart must address the safety risks affected by the introduction, modification, replacement, or enhancement of a product. This includes risks associated with the previous condition which are no longer present as a result of the change, new risks not present in the previous condition, and risks neither newly created nor eliminated whose nature (probability of occurrence or severity) is nonetheless affected by the change.
- (d) **What is an abbreviated risk assessment, and when may it be used?**
- (1) An abbreviated risk assessment may be used in lieu of a full risk assessment to show compliance with the performance standard if:
- (i) No new hazards are introduced as a result of the change;
 - (ii) Severity of each hazard associated with the previous condition does not increase from the previous condition; and
 - (iii) Exposure to such hazards does not change from the previous condition.
- (2) An abbreviated risk assessment supports the finding required by paragraph (a) of this section if it establishes that the resulting MTTHE for the proposed product is greater than or equal to the MTTHE for the system, component or method performing the same function in the previous condition. This determination must be supported by credible safety analysis sufficient to persuade the Associate Administrator for Safety that the likelihood of the new product's MTTHE being less than the MTTHE for the system, component, or method performing the same function in the previous condition is very small.
- (3) Alternatively, an abbreviated risk assessment supports the finding required by paragraph (a) of this section if:
- (i) The probability of failure for each hazard of the product is equal to or less the corresponding recommended Specific Quantitative Hazard Probability Ratings classified as more favorable than "undesirable" by AREMA Manual Part 17.3.5 (Recommended Procedure for Hazard Identification and Management of Vital Electronic/Software-Based Equipment Used in Signal and Train Control Applications), or - in the case of a hazard classified as undesirable - the Associate Administrator for Safety concurs that mitigation of the hazard within the framework of the electronic system is not practical and the railroad proposes reasonable steps to undertake other mitigation. The Director of the Federal Register approves the incorporation by

reference of the entire AREMA Communications and Signal Manual, Volume 4, Section 17 - Quality Principles (2005) in this section in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. You may obtain a copy of the incorporated standard from American Railway Engineering and Maintenance of Way Association, 8201 Corporation Drive, Suite 1125, Landover, MD 20785-2230. You may inspect a copy of the incorporated standard at the Federal Railroad Administration, Docket Clerk, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html;

(ii) The product is developed in accordance with:

- (A) AREMA Manual Part 17.3.1 (Communications and Signal Manual of Recommended Practices, Recommended Safety Assurance Program for Electronic/Software Based Products Used in Vital Signal Applications);
- (B) AREMA Manual Part 17.3.3 (Communications and Signal Manual of Recommended Practices, Recommended Practice for Hardware Analysis for Vital Electronic/Software-Based Equipment Used in Signal and Train Control Applications);
- (C) AREMA Manual Part 17.3.5 (Communications and Signal Manual of Recommended Practices, Recommended Practice for Hazard Identification and Management of Vital Electronic/Software-Based Equipment Used in Signal and Train Control Applications);
- (D) Appendix C of this subpart; and

(iii) Analysis supporting the PSP suggests no credible reason for believing that the product will be less safe than the previous condition.

(e) **How are safety and risk measured for the full risk assessment?** Risk assessment techniques, including both qualitative and quantitative methods, are recognized as providing credible and useful results for purposes of this section if they apply the following principles:

- (1) Safety levels must be measured using competent risk assessment methods and must be expressed as the total residual risk in the system over its expected life-cycle after implementation of all mitigating measures described in the PSP. The total risk assessment must have a supporting sensitivity analysis. The analysis must confirm that the risk metrics of the system are not negatively affected by sensitivity analysis input parameters including, for example, component failure rates, human factor error rates, and variations in train traffic affecting exposure. In this context, "negatively affected" means that the final residual risk metric does not exceed that of the base case or that which has been otherwise established through MTTHE target. The sensitivity analysis must document the sensitivity to worst case failure scenarios. Appendix B to this part provides criteria for acceptable risk assessment methods. Other methods may be acceptable if demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Associate Administrator for Safety to be equally suitable.
- (2) For the previous condition and for the life-cycle of the product, risk levels must be expressed in units of consequences per unit of exposure.
 - (i) In all cases exposure must be expressed as total train miles traveled per year over the relevant railroad infrastructure. Consequences must identify the total cost, including fatalities, injuries, property damage, and other incidental costs, such as potential consequences of hazardous materials involvement, resulting from preventable accidents associated with the function(s) performed by the system.

- (ii) In those cases where there is passenger traffic, a second risk metric must be calculated, using passenger-miles traveled per year as the exposure, and total societal costs of passenger injuries and fatalities, resulting from preventable accidents associated with the function(s) performed by the system, as the consequences.
- (3) If the description of railroad operations for the product required by § 236.907(a)(2) involves changes to the physical or operating conditions on the railroad prior to or within the expected life cycle of the product subject to review under this subpart, the previous condition shall be adjusted to reflect the lower risk associated with systems needed to maintain safety and performance at higher speeds or traffic volumes. In particular, the previous condition must be adjusted for assumed implementation of systems necessary to support higher train speeds as specified in § 236.0, as well as other changes required to support projected increases in train operations. The following specific requirements apply:
- (i) If the current method of operation would not be adequate under § 236.0 for the proposed operations, then the adjusted previous condition must include a system as required under § 236.0, applied as follows:
 - (A) The minimum system where a passenger train is operated at a speed of 60 or more miles per hour, or a freight train is operated at a speed of 50 or more miles per hour, shall be a traffic control system;
 - (B) The minimum system where a train is operated at a speed of 80 or more miles per hour, but not more than 110 miles per hour, shall be an automatic cab signal system with automatic train control; and
 - (C) The minimum system where a train is operated at a speed of more than 110 miles per hour shall be a system determined by the Associate Administrator for Safety to provide an equivalent level of safety to systems required or authorized by FRA for comparable operations.
 - (ii) If the current method of operation would be adequate under § 236.0 for the proposed operations, but the current system is not at least as safe as a traffic control system, then the adjusted previous condition must include a traffic control system in the event of any change that results in:
 - (A) An annual average daily train density of more than twelve trains per day; or
 - (B) An increase in the annual average daily density of passenger trains of more than four trains per day.
 - (iii) Paragraph (e)(3)(ii)(A) of this section shall apply in all situations where train volume will exceed more than 20 trains per day but shall not apply to situations where train volume will exceed 12 trains per day but not exceed 20 trains per day, if in its PSP the railroad makes a showing sufficient to establish, in the judgment of the Associate Administrator for Safety, that the current method of operation is adequate for a specified volume of traffic in excess of 12 trains per day, but not more than 20 trains per day, without material delay in the movement of trains over the territory and without unreasonable expenditures to expedite those movements when compared with the expense of installing and maintaining a traffic control system.
- (4) In the case review of a PSP that has been consolidated with a proceeding pursuant to part 235 of this subchapter (see § 236.911(b)), the base case shall be determined as follows:

- (i) If FRA determines that discontinuance or modification of the system should be granted without regard to whether the product is installed on the territory, then the base case shall be the conditions that would obtain on the territory following the discontinuance or modification.

Note:

This is an instance in which the base case is posited as greater risk than the actual (unadjusted) previous condition because the railroad would have obtained relief from the requirement to maintain the existing signal or train control system even if no new product had been proffered.

- (ii) If FRA determines that discontinuance or modification of the system should be denied without regard to whether the product is installed on the territory, then the base case shall remain the previous condition (unadjusted).
- (iii) If, after consideration of the application and review of the PSP, FRA determines that neither paragraph (e)(4)(i) nor paragraph (e)(4)(ii) of this section should apply, FRA will establish a base case that is consistent with safety and in the public interest.

[70 FR 11095, Mar. 7, 2005, as amended at 74 FR 25174, May 27, 2009; 75 FR 2699, Jan. 15, 2010]

§ 236.911 Exclusions.

- (a) **Does this subpart apply to existing systems?** The requirements of this subpart do not apply to products in service as of June 6, 2005. Railroads may continue to implement and use these products and components from these existing products.
- (b) **How will transition cases be handled?** Products designed in accordance with subparts A through G of this part which are not in service but are developed or are in the developmental stage prior to March 7, 2005, may be excluded upon notification to FRA by June 6, 2005, if placed in service by March 7, 2008. Railroads may continue to implement and use these products and components from these existing products. A railroad may at any time elect to have products that are excluded made subject to this subpart by submitting a PSP as prescribed in § 236.913 and otherwise complying with this subpart.
- (c) **How are office systems handled?** The requirements of this subpart do not apply to existing office systems and future deployments of existing office system technology. However, a subsystem or component of an office system must comply with the requirements of this subpart if it performs safety-critical functions within, or affects the safety performance of, a new or next-generation train control system. For purposes of this section, "office system" means a centralized computer-aided train-dispatching system or centralized traffic control board.
- (d) **How are modifications to excluded products handled?** Changes or modifications to products otherwise excluded from the requirements of this subpart by this section are not excluded from the requirements of this subpart if they result in a degradation of safety or a material increase in safety-critical functionality.
- (e) **What other rules apply to excluded products?** Products excluded by this section from the requirements of this subpart remain subject to subparts A through G of this part as applicable.

§ 236.913 Filing and approval of PSPs.

- (a) **Under what circumstances must a PSP be prepared?** A PSP must be prepared for each product covered by this subpart. A joint PSP must be prepared when:

- (1) The territory on which a product covered by this subpart is normally subject to joint operations, or is operated upon by more than one railroad; and
 - (2) The PSP involves a change in method of operation.
- (b) ***Under what circumstances must a railroad submit a petition for approval for a PSP or PSP amendment, and when may a railroad submit an informational filing?*** Depending on the nature of the proposed product or change, the railroad shall submit either an informational filing or a petition for approval. Submission of a petition for approval is required for PSPs or PSP amendments concerning installation of new or next-generation train control systems. All other actions that result in the creation of a PSP or PSP amendment require an informational filing and are handled according to the procedures outlined in paragraph (c) of this section. Applications for discontinuance and material modification of signal and train control systems remain governed by parts 235 and 211 of this chapter; and petitions subject to this section may be consolidated with any relevant application for administrative handling.
- (c) ***What are the procedures for informational filings?*** The following procedures apply to PSPs and PSP amendments which do not require submission of a petition for approval, but rather require an informational filing:
- (1) Not less than 180 days prior to planned use of the product in revenue service as described in the PSP or PSP amendment, the railroad shall submit an informational filing to the Associate Administrator for Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Mail Stop 25, Washington, DC 20590. The informational filing must provide a summary description of the PSP or PSP amendment, including the intended use of the product, and specify the location where the documentation as described in § 236.917(a)(1) is maintained.
 - (2) Within 60 days of receipt of the informational filing, FRA:
 - (i) Acknowledges receipt of the filing;
 - (ii) Acknowledges receipt of the informational filing and requests further information; or
 - (iii) Acknowledges receipt of the filing and notifies the railroad, for good cause, that the filing will be considered as a petition for approval as set forth in paragraph (d) of this section, and requests such further information as may be required to initiate action on the petition for approval. Examples of good cause, any one of which is sufficient, include: the PSP describes a product with unique architectural concepts; the PSP describes a product that uses design or safety assurance concepts considered outside existing accepted practices (see appendix C); and the PSP describes a locomotive-borne product that commingles safety-critical train control processing functions with locomotive operational functions. In addition, good cause includes any instance where the PSP or PSP amendment does not appear to support its safety claim of satisfaction of the performance standard, after FRA has requested further information as provided in paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of this section.
- (d) ***What procedures apply to petitions for approval?*** The following procedures apply to PSPs and PSP amendments which require submission of a petition for approval:
- (1) ***Petitions for approval involving prior FRA consultation.***
 - (i) The railroad may file a Notice of Product Development with the Associate Administrator for Safety not less than 30 days prior to the end of the system design review phase of product development and 180 days prior to planned implementation, inviting FRA to participate in the design review process and receive periodic briefings and updates as needed to follow the

course of product development. At a minimum, the Notice of Product Development must contain a summary description of the product to be developed and a brief description of goals for improved safety.

- (ii) Within 15 days of receipt of the Notice of Product Development, the Associate Administrator for Safety either acknowledges receipt or acknowledges receipt and requests more information.
- (iii) If FRA concludes that the Notice of Product Development contains sufficient information, the Associate Administrator for Safety determines the extent and nature of the assessment and review necessary for final product approval. FRA may convene a technical consultation as necessary to discuss issues related to the design and planned development of the product.
- (iv) Within 60 days of receiving the Notice of Product Development, the Associate Administrator for Safety provides a letter of preliminary review with detailed findings, including whether the design concepts of the proposed product comply with the requirements of this subpart, whether design modifications are necessary to meet the requirements of this subpart, and the extent and nature of the safety analysis necessary to comply with this subpart.
- (v) Not less than 60 days prior to use of the product in revenue service, the railroad shall file with the Associate Administrator for Safety a petition for final approval.
- (vi) Within 30 days of receipt of the petition for final approval, the Associate Administrator for Safety either acknowledges receipt or acknowledges receipt and requests more information. Whenever possible, FRA acts on the petition for final approval within 60 days of its filing by either granting it or denying it. If FRA neither grants nor denies the petition for approval within 60 days, FRA advises the petitioner of the projected time for decision and conducts any further consultations or inquiries necessary to decide the matter.

(2) **Other petitions for approval.** The following procedures apply to petitions for approval of PSPs which do not involve prior FRA consultation as described in paragraph (d)(1) of this section.

- (i) Not less than 180 days prior to use of a product in revenue service, the railroad shall file with the Associate Administrator for Safety a petition for approval.
- (ii) Within 60 days of receipt of the petition for approval, FRA either acknowledges receipt, or acknowledges receipt and requests more information.
- (iii) Whenever possible, considering the scope, complexity, and novelty of the product or change, FRA acts on the petition for approval within 180 days of its filing by either granting it or denying it. If FRA neither grants nor denies the petition for approval within 180 days, it remains pending, and FRA provides the petitioner with a statement of reasons why the petition has not yet been approved.

(e) **What role do product users play in the process of safety review?**

- (1) FRA will publish in the FEDERAL REGISTER periodically a topic list including docket numbers for informational filings and a petition summary including docket numbers for petitions for approval.
- (2) Interested parties may submit to FRA information and views pertinent to FRA's consideration of an informational filing or petition for approval. FRA considers comments to the extent practicable within the periods set forth in this section. In a proceeding consolidated with a proceeding under part 235 of this chapter, FRA considers all comments received.

(f) *Is it necessary to complete field testing prior to filing the petition for approval?* A railroad may file a petition for approval prior to completion of field testing of the product. The petition for approval should additionally include information sufficient for FRA to arrange monitoring of the tests. The Associate Administrator for Safety may approve a petition for approval contingent upon successful completion of the test program contained in the PSP or hold the petition for approval pending completion of the tests.

(g) *How are PSPs approved?*

(1) The Associate Administrator for Safety grants approval of a PSP when:

- (i) The petition for approval has been properly filed and contains the information required in § 236.907;
- (ii) FRA has determined that the PSP complies with the railroad's approved RSPP and applicable requirements of this subpart; and
- (iii) The risk assessment supporting the PSP demonstrates that the proposed product satisfies the minimum performance standard stated in § 236.909.

(2) The Associate Administrator for Safety considers the following applicable factors when evaluating the risk assessment:

- (i) The extent to which recognized standards have been utilized in product design and in the relevant safety analysis;
- (ii) The availability of quantitative data, including calculations of statistical confidence levels using accepted methods, associated with risk estimates;
- (iii) The complexity of the product and the extent to which it will incorporate or deviate from design practices associated with previously established histories of safe operation;
- (iv) The degree of rigor and precision associated with the safety analyses, including the comprehensiveness of the qualitative analyses, and the extent to which any quantitative results realistically reflect appropriate sensitivity cases;
- (v) The extent to which validation of the product has included experiments and tests to identify uncovered faults in the operation of the product;
- (vi) The extent to which identified faults are effectively addressed;
- (vii) Whether the risk assessment for the previous condition was conducted using the same methodology as that for operation under the proposed condition; and
- (viii) If an independent third-party assessment is required or is performed at the election of the supplier or railroad, the extent to which the results of the assessment are favorable.

(3) The Associate Administrator for Safety also considers when assessing PSPs the safety requirements for the product within the context of the proposed method of operations, including:

- (i) The degree to which the product is relied upon as the primary safety system for train operations; and
- (ii) The degree to which the product is overlaid upon and its operation is demonstrated to be independent of safety-relevant rules, practices and systems that will remain in place following the change under review.

- (4) As necessary to ensure compliance with this subpart and with the RSPP, FRA may attach special conditions to the approval of the petition.
 - (5) Following the approval of a petition, FRA may reopen consideration of the petition for cause. Cause for reopening a petition includes such circumstances as a credible allegation of error or fraud, assumptions determined to be invalid as a result of in-service experience, or one or more unsafe events calling into question the safety analysis underlying the approval.
- (h) ***Under what circumstances may a third-party assessment be required, and by whom may it be conducted?***
- (1) The PSP must be supported by an independent third party assessment of the product when FRA concludes it is necessary based upon consideration of the following factors:
 - (i) Those factors listed in paragraphs (g)(2)(i) through (g)(2)(vii) of this section;
 - (ii) The sufficiency of the assessment or audit previously conducted at the election of a supplier or railroad; and
 - (iii) Whether applicable requirements of subparts A through G of this part are satisfied.
 - (2) As used in this section, “independent third party” means a technically competent entity responsible to and compensated by the railroad (or an association on behalf of one or more railroads) that is independent of the supplier of the product. An entity that is owned or controlled by the supplier, that is under common ownership or control with the supplier, or that is otherwise involved in the development of the product is not considered “independent” within the meaning of this section. FRA may maintain a roster of recognized technically competent entities as a service to railroads selecting reviewers under this section; however, a railroad is not limited to entities currently listed on any such roster.
 - (3) The third-party assessment must, at a minimum, consist of the activities and result in production of documentation meeting the requirements of Appendix D to this part. However, when requiring an assessment pursuant to this section, FRA specifies any requirements in Appendix D to this part which the agency has determined are not relevant to its concerns and, therefore, need not be included in the assessment. The railroad shall make the final assessment report available to FRA upon request.
- (i) ***How may a PSP be amended?*** A railroad may submit an amendment to a PSP at any time in the same manner as the initial PSP. Notwithstanding the otherwise applicable requirements found in this section and § 236.915, changes affecting the safety-critical functionality of a product may be made prior to the submission and approval of the PSP amendment as necessary in order to mitigate risk.
- (j) ***How may field testing be conducted prior to PSP approval?***
- (1) Field testing of a product may be conducted prior to the approval of a PSP by the submission of an informational filing by a railroad. The FRA will arrange to monitor the tests based on the information provided in the filing, which must include:
 - (i) A complete description of the product;
 - (ii) An operational concepts document;
 - (iii) A complete description of the specific test procedures, including the measures that will be taken to protect trains and on-track equipment;

- (iv) An analysis of the applicability of the requirements of subparts A through G of this part to the product that will not apply during testing;
 - (v) The date testing will begin;
 - (vi) The location of the testing; and
 - (vii) A description of any effect the testing will have on the current method of operation.
- (2) FRA may impose such additional conditions on this testing as may be necessary for the safety of train operations. Exemptions from regulations other than those contained in this part must be requested through waiver procedures in part 211 of this chapter.

[70 FR 11095, Mar. 7, 2005, as amended at 70 FR 72385, Dec. 5, 2005; 74 FR 25174, May 27, 2009]

§ 236.915 Implementation and operation.

(a) *When may a product be placed or retained in service?*

- (1) Except as stated in paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) of this section, a railroad may operate in revenue service any product 180 days after filing with FRA the informational filing for that product. The FRA filing date can be found in FRA's acknowledgment letter referred to in § 236.913(c)(2).
- (2) Except as stated in paragraph (a)(3) of this section, if FRA approval is required for a product, the railroad shall not operate the product in revenue service until after the Associate Administrator for Safety has approved the petition for approval for that product pursuant to § 236.913.
- (3) If after product implementation FRA elects, for cause, to treat the informational filing for the product as a petition for approval, the product may remain in use if otherwise consistent with the applicable law and regulations. FRA may impose special conditions for use of the product during the period of review for cause.

(b) *How does the PSP relate to operation of the product?* Each railroad shall comply with all provisions in the PSP for each product it uses and shall operate within the scope of initial operational assumptions and predefined changes identified by the PSP. Railroads may at any time submit an amended PSP according to the procedures outlined in § 236.913.

(c) *What precautions must be taken prior to interference with the normal functioning of a product?* The normal functioning of any safety-critical product must not be interfered with in testing or otherwise without first taking measures to provide for safe movement of trains, locomotives, roadway workers and on-track equipment that depend on normal functioning of such product.

(d) *What actions must be taken immediately upon failure of a safety-critical component?* When any safety-critical product component fails to perform its intended function, the cause must be determined and the faulty component adjusted, repaired, or replaced without undue delay. Until repair of such essential components are completed, a railroad shall take appropriate action as specified in the PSP. See also §§ 236.907(d), 236.917(b).

§ 236.917 Retention of records.

(a) *What life-cycle and maintenance records must be maintained?*

- (1) The railroad shall maintain at a designated office on the railroad:

- (i) For the life-cycle of the product, adequate documentation to demonstrate that the PSP meets the safety requirements of the railroad's RSPP and applicable standards in this subpart, including the risk assessment; and
 - (ii) An Operations and Maintenance Manual, pursuant to § 236.919; and
 - (iii) Training records pursuant to § 236.923(b).
- (2) Results of inspections and tests specified in the PSP must be recorded as prescribed in § 236.110.
 - (3) Contractors of the railroad shall maintain at a designated office training records pursuant to § 236.923(b).
- (b) **What actions must the railroad take in the event of occurrence of a safety-relevant hazard?** After the product is placed in service, the railroad shall maintain a database of all safety-relevant hazards as set forth in the PSP and those that had not been previously identified in the PSP. If the frequency of the safety-relevant hazards exceeds the threshold set forth in the PSP (see § 236.907(a)(6)), then the railroad shall:
- (1) Report the inconsistency in writing (by mail, facsimile, e-mail, or hand delivery to the Director, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Mail Stop 25, Washington, DC 20590, within 15 days of discovery. Documents that are hand delivered must not be enclosed in an envelope;
 - (2) Take prompt countermeasures to reduce the frequency of the safety-relevant hazard(s) below the threshold set forth in the PSP; and
 - (3) Provide a final report to the FRA Director, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, on the results of the analysis and countermeasures taken to reduce the frequency of the safety-relevant hazard(s) below the threshold set forth in the PSP when the problem is resolved.

[70 FR 11095, Mar. 7, 2005, as amended at 74 FR 25174, May 27, 2009]

§ 236.919 Operations and Maintenance Manual.

- (a) The railroad shall catalog and maintain all documents as specified in the PSP for the installation, maintenance, repair, modification, inspection, and testing of the product and have them in one Operations and Maintenance Manual, readily available to persons required to perform such tasks and for inspection by FRA and FRA-certified State inspectors.
- (b) Plans required for proper maintenance, repair, inspection, and testing of safety-critical products must be adequate in detail and must be made available for inspection by FRA and FRA-certified State inspectors where such products are deployed or maintained. They must identify all software versions, revisions, and revision dates. Plans must be legible and correct.
- (c) Hardware, software, and firmware revisions must be documented in the Operations and Maintenance Manual according to the railroad's configuration management control plan and any additional configuration/revision control measures specified in the PSP.
- (d) Safety-critical components, including spare equipment, must be positively identified, handled, replaced, and repaired in accordance with the procedures specified in the PSP.

§ 236.921 Training and qualification program, general.

- (a) *When is training necessary and who must be trained?* Employers shall establish and implement training and qualification programs for products subject to this subpart. These programs must meet the minimum requirements set forth in the PSP and in §§ 236.923 through 236.929 as appropriate, for the following personnel:
- (1) Persons whose duties include installing, maintaining, repairing, modifying, inspecting, and testing safety-critical elements of the railroad's products, including central office, wayside, or onboard subsystems;
 - (2) Persons who dispatch train operations (issue or communicate any mandatory directive that is executed or enforced, or is intended to be executed or enforced, by a train control system subject to this subpart);
 - (3) Persons who operate trains or serve as a train or engine crew member subject to instruction and testing under part 217 of this chapter, on a train operating in territory where a train control system subject to this subpart is in use;
 - (4) Roadway workers whose duties require them to know and understand how a train control system affects their safety and how to avoid interfering with its proper functioning; and
 - (5) The direct supervisors of persons listed in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(4) of this section.
- (b) *What competencies are required?* The employer's program must provide training for persons who perform the functions described in paragraph (a) of this section to ensure that they have the necessary knowledge and skills to effectively complete their duties related to processor-based signal and train control equipment.

§ 236.923 Task analysis and basic requirements.

- (a) *How must training be structured and delivered?* As part of the program required by § 236.921, the employer shall, at a minimum:
- (1) Identify the specific goals of the training program with regard to the target population (craft, experience level, scope of work, etc.), task(s), and desired success rate;
 - (2) Based on a formal task analysis, identify the installation, maintenance, repair, modification, inspection, testing, and operating tasks that must be performed on a railroad's products. This includes the development of failure scenarios and the actions expected under such scenarios;
 - (3) Develop written procedures for the performance of the tasks identified;
 - (4) Identify the additional knowledge, skills, and abilities above those required for basic job performance necessary to perform each task;
 - (5) Develop a training curriculum that includes classroom, simulator, computer-based, hands-on, or other formally structured training designed to impart the knowledge, skills, and abilities identified as necessary to perform each task;
 - (6) Prior to assignment of related tasks, require all persons mentioned in § 236.921(a) to successfully complete a training curriculum and pass an examination that covers the product and appropriate rules and tasks for which they are responsible (however, such persons may perform such tasks under the direct onsite supervision of a qualified person prior to completing such training and passing the examination);

- (7) Require periodic refresher training at intervals specified in the PSP that includes classroom, simulator, computer-based, hands-on, or other formally structured training and testing, except with respect to basic skills for which proficiency is known to remain high as a result of frequent repetition of the task; and
 - (8) Conduct regular and periodic evaluations of the effectiveness of the training program specified in § 236.923(a)(1) verifying the adequacy of the training material and its validity with respect to current railroads products and operations.
- (b) **What training records are required?** Employers shall retain records which designate persons who are qualified under this section until new designations are recorded or for at least one year after such persons leave applicable service. These records shall be kept in a designated location and be available for inspection and replication by FRA and FRA-certified State inspectors.

§ 236.925 Training specific to control office personnel.

Any person responsible for issuing or communicating mandatory directives in territory where products are or will be in use must be trained in the following areas, as applicable:

- (a) Instructions concerning the interface between the computer-aided dispatching system and the train control system, with respect to the safe movement of trains and other on-track equipment;
- (b) Railroad operating rules applicable to the train control system, including provision for movement and protection of roadway workers, unequipped trains, trains with failed or cut-out train control onboard systems, and other on-track equipment; and
- (c) Instructions concerning control of trains and other on-track equipment in case the train control system fails, including periodic practical exercises or simulations, and operational testing under part 217 of this chapter to ensure the continued capability of the personnel to provide for safe operations under the alternative method of operation.

§ 236.927 Training specific to locomotive engineers and other operating personnel.

- (a) **What elements apply to operating personnel?** Training provided under this subpart for any locomotive engineer or other person who participates in the operation of a train in train control territory must be defined in the PSP and the following elements must be addressed:
- (1) Familiarization with train control equipment onboard the locomotive and the functioning of that equipment as part of the system and in relation to other onboard systems under that person's control;
 - (2) Any actions required of the onboard personnel to enable, or enter data to, the system, such as consist data, and the role of that function in the safe operation of the train;
 - (3) Sequencing of interventions by the system, including pre-enforcement notification, enforcement notification, penalty application initiation and post-penalty application procedures;
 - (4) Railroad operating rules applicable to the train control system, including provisions for movement and protection of any unequipped trains, or trains with failed or cut-out train control onboard systems and other on-track equipment;
 - (5) Means to detect deviations from proper functioning of onboard train control equipment and instructions regarding the actions to be taken with respect to control of the train and notification of designated railroad personnel; and

- (6) Information needed to prevent unintentional interference with the proper functioning of onboard train control equipment.
- (b) **How must locomotive engineer training be conducted?** Training required under this subpart for a locomotive engineer, together with required records, must be integrated into the program of training required by part 240 of this chapter.
- (c) **What requirements apply to full automatic operation?** The following special requirements apply in the event a train control system is used to effect full automatic operation of the train:
 - (1) The PSP must identify all safety hazards to be mitigated by the locomotive engineer.
 - (2) The PSP must address and describe the training required with provisions for the maintenance of skills proficiency. As a minimum, the training program must:
 - (i) As described in § 236.923(a)(2), develop failure scenarios which incorporate the safety hazards identified in the PSP, including the return of train operations to a fully manual mode;
 - (ii) Provide training, consistent with § 236.923(a), for safe train operations under all failure scenarios and identified safety hazards that affect train operations;
 - (iii) Provide training, consistent with § 236.923(a), for safe train operations under manual control; and
 - (iv) Consistent with § 236.923(a), ensure maintenance of manual train operating skills by requiring manual starting and stopping of the train for an appropriate number of trips and by one or more of the following methods:
 - (A) Manual operation of a train for a 4-hour work period;
 - (B) Simulated manual operation of a train for a minimum of 4 hours in a Type I simulator as required; or
 - (C) Other means as determined following consultation between the railroad and designated representatives of the affected employees and approved by the FRA. The PSP must designate the appropriate frequency when manual operation, starting, and stopping must be conducted, and the appropriate frequency of simulated manual operation.

§ 236.929 Training specific to roadway workers.

- (a) **How is training for roadway workers to be coordinated with part 214?** Training required under this subpart for a roadway worker must be integrated into the program of instruction required under part 214, subpart C of this chapter ("Roadway Worker Protection"), consistent with task analysis requirements of § 236.923. This training must provide instruction for roadway workers who provide protection for themselves or roadway work groups.
- (b) **What subject areas must roadway worker training include?**
 - (1) Instruction for roadway workers must ensure an understanding of the role of processor-based signal and train control equipment in establishing protection for roadway workers and their equipment.
 - (2) Instruction for roadway workers must ensure recognition of processor-based signal and train control equipment on the wayside and an understanding of how to avoid interference with its proper functioning.

- (3) Instructions concerning the recognition of system failures and the provision of alternative methods of on-track safety in case the train control system fails, including periodic practical exercises or simulations and operational testing under part 217 of this chapter to ensure the continued capability of roadway workers to be free from the danger of being struck by a moving train or other on-track equipment.

Subpart I - Positive Train Control Systems

Source: 75 FR 2699, Jan. 15, 2010, unless otherwise noted.

§ 236.1001 Purpose and scope.

- (a) This subpart prescribes minimum, performance-based safety standards for PTC systems required by 49 U.S.C. 20157, this subpart, or an FRA order, including requirements to ensure that the development, functionality, architecture, installation, implementation, inspection, testing, operation, maintenance, repair, and modification of those PTC systems will achieve and maintain an acceptable level of safety. This subpart also prescribes standards to ensure that personnel working with, and affected by, safety-critical PTC system related products receive appropriate training and testing.
- (b) Each railroad may prescribe additional or more stringent rules, and other special instructions, that are not inconsistent with this subpart.
- (c) This subpart does not exempt a railroad from compliance with any requirement of subparts A through H of this part or parts 233, 234, and 235 of this chapter, unless:
 - (1) It is otherwise explicitly excepted by this subpart; or
 - (2) The applicable PTCS, as defined under § 236.1003 and approved by FRA under § 236.1015, provides for such an exception per § 236.1013.

§ 236.1003 Definitions.

- (a) Definitions contained in subparts G and H of this part apply equally to this subpart.
- (b) The following definitions apply to terms used only in this subpart unless otherwise stated:

After-arrival mandatory directive means an authority to occupy a track which is issued to a train that is not effective and not to be acted upon until after the arrival and passing of a train, or trains, specifically identified in the authority.

Associate Administrator means the FRA Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety/Chief Safety Officer.

Class I railroad means a railroad which in the last year for which revenues were reported exceeded the threshold established under regulations of the Surface Transportation Board (49 CFR part 1201.1-1 (2008)).

Cleartext means the un-encrypted text in its original, human readable, form. It is the input of an encryption or encipher process, and the output of an decryption or decipher process.

Controlling locomotive means *Locomotive, controlling*, as defined in § 232.5 of this chapter.

Cut out means any disabling of a PTC system, subsystem, or component en route (including when the PTC system cuts out on its own or a person cuts out the system with authorization), unless the cut out was necessary to exit PTC-governed territory and enter non-PTC territory.

Host railroad means a railroad that has effective operating control over a segment of track.

Initialization failure means any instance when a PTC system fails to activate on a locomotive or train, unless the PTC system successfully activates during a subsequent attempt in the same location or before entering PTC-governed territory. For the types of PTC systems that do not initialize by design, a failed departure test is considered an initialization failure for purposes of the reporting requirement under § 236.1029(h), unless the PTC system successfully passes the departure test during a subsequent attempt in the same location or before entering PTC-governed territory.

Interoperability means the ability of a controlling locomotive to communicate with and respond to the PTC railroad's positive train control system, including uninterrupted movements over property boundaries.

Limited operations means operations on main line track that have limited or no freight operations and are approved to be excluded from this subpart's PTC system implementation and operation requirements in accordance with § 236.1019(c);

Main line means, except as provided in § 236.1019 or where all trains are limited to restricted speed within a yard or terminal area or on auxiliary or industry tracks, a segment or route of railroad tracks:

- (1) Of a Class I railroad, as documented in current timetables filed by the Class I railroad with the FRA under § 217.7 of this title, over which 5,000,000 or more gross tons of railroad traffic is transported annually; or
- (2) Used for regularly scheduled intercity or commuter rail passenger service, as defined in 49 U.S.C. 24102, or both. Tourist, scenic, historic, or excursion operations as defined in part 238 of this chapter are not considered intercity or commuter passenger service for purposes of this part.

Main line track exclusion addendum ("MTEA") means the document submitted under §§ 236.1011 and 236.1019 requesting to designate track as other than main line.

Malfunction means any instance when a PTC system, subsystem, or component fails to perform the functions mandated under 49 U.S.C. 20157(i)(5), this subpart, or the applicable host railroad's PTCSP.

Medium speed means, *Speed, medium*, as defined in subpart G of this part.

NPI means a Notice of Product Intent ("NPI") as further described in § 236.1013.

PIH materials means materials poisonous by inhalation, as defined in §§ 171.8, 173.115, and 173.132 of this title.

PTC means positive train control as further described in § 236.1005.

PTCDP means a PTC Development Plan as further described in § 236.1013.

PTCIP means a PTC Implementation Plan as required under 49 U.S.C. 20157 and further described in § 236.1011.

PTCPVL means a PTC Product Vendor List as further described in § 236.1023.

PTCSP means a PTC Safety Plan as further described in § 236.1015.

PTC railroad means each Class I railroad and each entity providing regularly scheduled intercity or commuter rail passenger transportation required to implement or operate a PTC system.

PTC System Certification means certification as required under 49 U.S.C. 20157 and further described in §§ 236.1009 and 236.1015.

Request for Amendment ("RFA") means a request for an amendment of a plan or system made by a PTC railroad in accordance with § 236.1021.

Request for Expedited Certification ("REC") means, as further described in § 236.1031, a request by a railroad to receive expedited consideration for PTC System Certification.

Restricted speed means, *Speed, restricted*, as defined in subpart G of this part.

Safe State means a system state that, when the system fails, cannot cause death, injury, occupational illness, or damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment.

Segment of track means any part of the railroad where a train operates.

Temporal separation means that passenger and freight operations do not operate on any segment of shared track during the same period and as further defined under § 236.1019 and the process or processes in place to assure that result.

Tenant railroad means a railroad, other than a host railroad, operating on track upon which a PTC system is required.

Track segment means segment of track.

Type Approval means a number assigned to a particular PTC system indicating FRA agreement that the PTC system could fulfill the requirements of this subpart.

Train means one or more locomotives, coupled with or without cars.

[75 FR 2699, Jan. 15, 2010, as amended at 77 FR 28305, May 14, 2012; 79 FR 49716, Aug. 22, 2014; 86 FR 40180, July 27, 2021]

§ 236.1005 Requirements for Positive Train Control systems.

(a) **PTC system requirements.** Each PTC system required to be installed under this subpart shall:

(1) Reliably and functionally prevent:

(i) Train-to-train collisions - including collisions between trains operating over rail-to-rail at-grade crossings in accordance with the following risk-based table or alternative arrangements providing an equivalent level of safety as specified in an FRA approved PTCSPP:

Crossing type	Max. speed	Protection required
(A) Interlocking - one or more PTC routes intersecting with one or more non-PTC routes	≤40 miles per hour	Interlocking signal arrangement in accordance with the requirements of subparts A-G of this part and PTC enforced stop on PTC routes.
(B) Interlocking - one or more PTC routes intersecting with one or	>40 miles per hour	Interlocking signal arrangement in accordance with the requirements of subparts A-G of this part, PTC enforced stop on all PTC routes, and either the use of other than full PTC technology that provides positive stop enforcement or a split-point derail incorporated into the signal system accompanied by 20 miles per hour maximum allowable speed on the approach of any intersecting non-PTC route.

Crossing type	Max. speed	Protection required
more non-PTC routes		
(C) Interlocking - all PTC routes intersecting	Any speed	Interlocking signal arrangements in accordance with the requirements of <u>subparts A-G of this part</u> , and PTC enforced stop on all routes.

- (ii) Overspeed derailments, including derailments related to railroad civil engineering speed restrictions, slow orders, and excessive speeds over switches and through turnouts;
- (iii) Incursions into established work zone limits without first receiving appropriate authority and verification from the dispatcher or roadway worker in charge, as applicable and in accordance with part 214 of this chapter; and
- (iv) The movement of a train through a main line switch in the improper position as further described in paragraph (e) of this section.

(2) Include safety-critical integration of all authorities and indications of a wayside or cab signal system, or other similar appliance, method, device, or system of equivalent safety, in a manner by which the PTC system shall provide associated warning and enforcement to the extent, and except as, described and justified in the FRA approved PTCDP or PTCSP, as applicable;

(3) As applicable, perform the additional functions specified in this subpart;

(4) Provide an appropriate warning or enforcement when:

- (i) A derail or switch protecting access to the main line required by § 236.1007, or otherwise provided for in the applicable PTCSP, is not in its derailing or protecting position, respectively;
- (ii) A mandatory directive is issued associated with a highway-rail grade crossing warning system malfunction as required by §§ 234.105, 234.106, or 234.107;
- (iii) An after-arrival mandatory directive has been issued and the train or trains to be waited on has not yet passed the location of the receiving train;
- (iv) Any movable bridge within the route ahead is not in a position to allow permissive indication for a train movement pursuant to § 236.312; and
- (v) A hazard detector integrated into the PTC system that is required by paragraph (c) of this section, or otherwise provided for in the applicable PTCSP, detects an unsafe condition or transmits an alarm; and

(5) Limit the speed of passenger and freight trains to 59 miles per hour and 49 miles per hour, respectively, in areas without broken rail detection or equivalent safeguards.

(b) ***PTC system installation*** -

(1) ***Lines required to be equipped***. Except as otherwise provided in this subpart, each Class I railroad and each railroad providing or hosting intercity or commuter passenger service shall progressively equip its lines as provided in its approved PTCIP such that a PTC system certified under § 236.1015 is installed and operated by the host railroad on each:

- (i) Main line over which is transported any quantity of material poisonous by inhalation (PIH), including anhydrous ammonia, as defined in §§ 171.8, 173.115 and 173.132 of this title;
 - (ii) Main line used for regularly provided intercity or commuter passenger service, except as provided in § 236.1019; and
 - (iii) Additional line of railroad as required by the applicable FRA approved PTCIP, this subpart, or an FRA order requiring installation of a PTC system by that date.
- (2) **Initial baseline identification of lines.** For the purposes of paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section, the baseline information necessary to determine whether a Class I railroad's track segment shall be equipped with a PTC system shall be determined and reported as follows:
- (i) The traffic density threshold of 5 million gross tons shall be based upon calendar year 2008 gross tonnage, except to the extent that traffic may fall below 5 million gross tons for two consecutive calendar years and a PTCIP or an RFA reflecting this change is filed and approved under paragraph (b)(4) of this section and, if applicable, § 236.1021.
 - (ii) The presence or absence of any quantity of PIH hazardous materials shall be determined by whether one or more cars containing such product(s) was transported over the track segment in calendar year 2008 or prior to the filing of the PTCIP, except to the extent that the PTCIP or RFA justifies, under paragraph (b)(4) of this section, removal of the subject track segment from the PTCIP listing of lines to be equipped.
- (3) **Addition of track segments.** To the extent increases in freight rail traffic occur subsequent to calendar year 2008 that might affect the requirement to install a PTC system on any line not yet equipped, the railroad shall seek to amend its PTCIP by promptly filing an RFA in accordance with § 236.1021. The following criteria apply:
- (i) If rail traffic exceeds 5 million gross tons in any year after 2008, the tonnage shall be calculated for the preceding two calendar years and if the total tonnage for those two calendar years exceeds 10 million gross tons, a PTCIP or its amendment is required.
 - (ii) If PIH traffic is carried on a track segment as a result of a request for rail service or rerouting warranted under part 172 of this title, and if the line carries in excess of 5 million gross tons of rail traffic as determined under this paragraph, a PTCIP or its amendment is required. This does not apply when temporary rerouting is authorized in accordance with paragraph (g) of this section.
 - (iii) Once a railroad is notified by FRA that its RFA filed in accordance with this paragraph has been approved, the railroad shall equip the line with the applicable PTC system by December 31, 2015, or within 24 months, whichever is later.
- (4) **Exclusion or removal of track segments from PTC baseline -**
- (i) **Routing changes.** In a PTCIP or an RFA, a railroad may request review of the requirement to install PTC on a track segment where a PTC system is otherwise required by this section, but has not yet been installed, based upon changes in rail traffic such as reductions in total traffic volume to a level below 5 million gross tons annually, cessation of passenger service or the approval of an MTEA, or the cessation of PIH materials traffic. Any such request shall be accompanied by estimated traffic projections for the next 5 years (e.g., as a result of planned rerouting, coordinations, or location of new business on the line).

- (ii) FRA will approve the exclusion requested pursuant to paragraph (b)(4)(i) of this section if the railroad establishes that, as of December 31, 2015:
 - (A) No passenger service will be present on the involved track segment or the passenger service will be subject to an MTEA approved in accordance with 49 CFR 236.1019; and
 - (B) No PIH traffic will be present on the involved track segment or the gross tonnage on the involved track segment will decline to below 5 million gross tons annually as computed over a 2-year period.
- (iii) ***Freight lines with de minimis risk not used for regularly provided intercity or commuter rail passenger service.***
 - (A) In a PTCIP or an RFA, a railroad may request review of the requirement to install a PTC system on a track segment where a PTC system is otherwise required by this section, but has not yet been installed, based upon the presence of a minimal quantity of PIH materials traffic. Any such request shall be accompanied by estimated traffic projections for the next 5 years (e.g., as a result of planned rerouting, coordination, or location of new business on the line). Where the request involves prior or planned rerouting of PIH materials traffic, the railroad must provide the information and analysis identified in paragraph (b)(4)(i) of this section. The submission shall also include a full description of potential safety hazards on the segment of track and fully describe train operations over the line. This paragraph does not apply to line segments used for commuter rail or intercity rail passenger service.
 - (B) Absent special circumstances related to specific hazards presented by operations on the line segment, FRA will approve a request for relief under this paragraph for a rail line segment that meets all of the following criteria:
 - (1) That carries less than 15 million gross tons annually;
 - (2) That does not have a heavy grade as "heavy grade" is defined in § 232.407 of this chapter for any train operating over the track segment;
 - (3) Where the railroad adopts and complies with an operating rule requiring the crew of any train approaching working limits established under part 214 of this chapter to notify the roadway worker in charge of the train's approach at least 2 miles in advance of the working limits or, if the train crew does not have advance knowledge of the working limits, as soon as practical;
 - (4) That carries fewer than 100 cars containing PIH materials per year, excluding those cars containing only a residue, as defined in § 171.8 of this title, of PIH materials;
 - (5) That carries 2 or fewer trains per day carrying any quantity of PIH materials;
 - (6) Where trains carrying any quantity of PIH materials operate at speeds not to exceed 40 miles per hour; and
 - (7) Where any train transporting a car containing any quantity of PIH materials is operated with a vacant block ahead of and behind the train.

- (C) FRA may, in its discretion, approve other track segments not used for regularly provided intercity or commuter passenger service that have posed an equivalent or lesser level of risk of a PTC-preventable accident or PIH materials release as those track segments covered by paragraph (b)(4)(iii)(B) of this section, where such other track segments are similar to those covered by paragraph (b)(4)(iii)(B) of this section.
 - (D) Failure to submit sufficient information will result in the denial of any request under this paragraph (b)(4)(ii). If the request is granted, on and after the date the line would have otherwise been required to be equipped under the schedule contained in the PTCIP and approved by FRA, operations on the line shall be conducted in accordance with any conditions attached to the grant, including implementation of proposed mitigations as applicable.
- (5) **Line sales.** FRA does not approve removal of a line from the PTCIP exclusively based upon a representation that a track segment will be abandoned or sold to another railroad. In the event a track segment is approved for abandonment or transfer by the Surface Transportation Board, FRA will review at the request of the transferring and acquiring railroads whether the requirement to install PTC on the line should be removed given all of the circumstances, including expected traffic and hazardous materials levels, reservation of trackage or haulage rights by the transferring railroad, routing analysis under part 172 of this chapter, commercial and real property arrangements affecting the transferring and acquiring railroads post-transfer, and such other factors as may be relevant to continue safe operations on the line. If FRA denies the request, the acquiring railroad shall install the PTC system on the schedule provided in the transferring railroad's PTCIP, without regard to whether it is a Class I railroad.
- (6) **New rail passenger service.** No new intercity or commuter rail passenger service shall commence after December 31, 2020, until a PTC system certified under this subpart has been installed and made operative.
- (7) **Implementation deadlines.**
- (i) Each railroad must complete full implementation of its PTC system by December 31, 2018.
 - (ii) A railroad is excepted from paragraph (b)(7)(i) of this section and must complete full implementation of its PTC system by December 31, 2020, or the date specified in its approved alternative schedule and sequence, whichever is earlier, only if the railroad:
 - (A) Installs all PTC hardware and acquires all spectrum necessary to implement its PTC system by December 31, 2018;
 - (B) Submits an alternative schedule and sequence providing for implementation of positive train control system as soon as practicable, but not later than December 31, 2020;
 - (C) Notifies the Associate Administrator in writing that it is prepared for review of its alternative schedule and sequence under 49 U.S.C. 20157(a)(3)(B); and
 - (D) Receives FRA approval of its alternative schedule and sequence.
 - (iii) If a railroad meets the criteria in paragraph (b)(7)(ii) of this section, the railroad must adhere to its approved alternative schedule and sequence and any of its subsequently approved amendments or required modifications.

(c) **Hazard detectors.**

- (1) All hazard detectors integrated into a signal or train control system on or after October 16, 2008, shall be integrated into PTC systems required by this subpart; and their warnings shall be appropriately and timely enforced as described in the applicable PTCS.
- (2) The applicable PTCS must provide for receipt and presentation to the locomotive engineer and other train crew members of warnings from any additional hazard detectors using the PTC data network, onboard displays, and audible alerts. If the PTCS so provides, the action to be taken by the system and by the crew members shall be specified.
- (3) The PTCDP (as applicable) and PTCS for any new service described in § 236.1007 to be conducted above 90 miles per hour shall include a hazard analysis describing the hazards relevant to the specific route(s) in question (e.g., potential for track obstruction due to events such as falling rock or undermining of the track structure due to high water or displacement of a bridge over navigable waters), the basis for decisions concerning hazard detectors provided, and the manner in which such additional hazard detectors will be interfaced with the PTC system.

(d) **Event recorders.**

- (1) Each lead locomotive, as defined in part 229, of a train equipped and operating with a PTC system required by this subpart must be equipped with an operative event recorder, which shall:
 - (i) Record safety-critical train control data routed to the locomotive engineer's display that the engineer is required to comply with;
 - (ii) Specifically include text messages conveying mandatory directives, maximum authorized speeds, PTC system brake warnings, PTC system brake enforcements, and the state of the PTC system (e.g., cut in, cut out, active, or failed); and
 - (iii) Include examples of how the captured data will be displayed during playback along with the format, content, and data retention duration requirements specified in the PTCS submitted and approved pursuant to this paragraph. If such train control data can be calibrated against other data required by this part, it may, at the election of the railroad, be retained in a separate memory module.
- (2) Each lead locomotive, as defined in part 229, manufactured and in service after October 1, 2009, that is equipped and operating with a PTC system required by this subpart, shall be equipped with an event recorder memory module meeting the crash hardening requirements of § 229.135 of this chapter.
- (3) Nothing in this subpart excepts compliance with any of the event recorder requirements contained in § 229.135 of this chapter.

(e) **Switch position.** The following requirements apply with respect to determining proper switch position under this section. When a main line switch position is unknown or improperly aligned for a train's route in advance of the train's movement, the PTC system will provide warning of the condition associated with the following enforcement:

- (1) A PTC system shall enforce restricted speed over any switch:
 - (i) Where train movements are made with the benefit of the indications of a wayside or cab signal system or other similar appliance, method, device, or system of equivalent safety proposed to FRA and approved by the Associate Administrator in accordance with this part; and

- (ii) Where wayside or cab signal system or other similar appliance, method, device, or system of equivalent safety, requires the train to be operated at restricted speed.
- (2) A PTC system shall enforce a positive stop short of any main line switch, and any switch on a siding where the allowable speed is in excess of 20 miles per hour, if movement of the train over the switch:
 - (i) Is made without the benefit of the indications of a wayside or cab signal system or other similar appliance, method, device, or system of equivalent safety proposed to FRA and approved by the Associate Administrator in accordance with this part; or
 - (ii) Would create an unacceptable risk. Unacceptable risk includes conditions when traversing the switch, even at low speeds, could result in direct conflict with the movement of another train (including a hand-operated crossover between main tracks, a hand-operated crossover between a main track and an adjoining siding or auxiliary track, or a hand-operated switch providing access to another subdivision or branch line, etc.).
- (3) A PTC system required by this subpart shall be designed, installed, and maintained to perform the switch position detection and enforcement described in paragraphs (e)(1) and (e)(2) of this section, except as provided for and justified in the applicable, FRA approved PTCDP or PTCSP.
- (4) The control circuit or electronic equivalent for all movement authorities over any switches, movable-point frogs, or derails shall be selected through circuit controller or functionally equivalent device operated directly by the switch points, derail, or by switch locking mechanism, or through relay or electronic device controlled by such circuit controller or functionally equivalent device, for each switch, movable-point frog, or derail in the route governed. Circuits or electronic equivalent shall be arranged so that any movement authorities less restrictive than those prescribed in paragraphs (e)(1) and (e)(2) of this section can only be provided when each switch, movable-point frog, or derail in the route governed is in proper position, and shall be in accordance with subparts A through G of this part, unless it is otherwise provided in a PTCSP approved under this subpart.
- (f) **Train-to-train collision.** A PTC system shall be considered to be configured to prevent train-to-train collisions within the meaning of paragraph (a) of this section if trains are required to be operated at restricted speed and if the onboard PTC equipment enforces the upper limits of the railroad's restricted speed rule (15 or 20 miles per hour). This application applies to:
 - (1) Operating conditions under which trains are required by signal indication or operating rule to:
 - (i) Stop before continuing; or
 - (ii) Reduce speed to restricted speed and continue at restricted speed until encountering a more favorable indication or as provided by operating rule.
 - (2) Operation of trains within the limits of a joint mandatory directive.
- (g) **Temporary rerouting.** A train equipped with a PTC system as required by this subpart may be temporarily rerouted onto a track not equipped with a PTC system and a train not equipped with a PTC system may be temporarily rerouted onto a track equipped with a PTC system as required by this subpart in the following circumstances:
 - (1) **Emergencies.** In the event of an emergency - including conditions such as derailment, flood, fire, tornado, hurricane, earthquake, or other similar circumstance outside of the railroad's control - that would prevent usage of the regularly used track if:

- (i) The rerouting is applicable only until the emergency condition ceases to exist and for no more than 14 consecutive calendar days, unless otherwise extended by approval of the Associate Administrator;
 - (ii) The railroad provides written or telephonic notification to the applicable Regional Administrator of the information listed in paragraph (i) of this section within one business day of the beginning of the rerouting made in accordance with this paragraph; and
 - (iii) The conditions contained in paragraph (j) of this section are followed.
- (2) **Planned maintenance.** In the event of planned maintenance that would prevent usage of the regularly used track if:
- (i) The maintenance period does not exceed 30 days;
 - (ii) A request is filed with the applicable Regional Administrator in accordance with paragraph (i) of this section no less than 10 business days prior to the planned rerouting; and
 - (iii) The conditions contained in paragraph (j) of this section are followed.
- (h) **Rerouting requests.**
- (1) For the purposes of paragraph (g)(2) of this section, the rerouting request shall be self-executing unless the applicable Regional Administrator responds with a notice disapproving of the rerouting or providing instructions to allow rerouting. Such instructions may include providing additional information to the Regional Administrator or Associate Administrator prior to the commencement of rerouting. Once the Regional Administrator responds with a notice under this paragraph, no rerouting may occur until the Regional Administrator or Associate Administrator provides his or her approval.
 - (2) In the event the temporary rerouting described in paragraph (g)(2) of this section is to exceed 30 consecutive calendar days:
 - (i) The railroad shall provide a request in accordance with paragraphs (i) and (j) of this section with the Associate Administrator no less than 10 business days prior to the planned rerouting; and
 - (ii) The rerouting shall not commence until receipt of approval from the Associate Administrator.
- (i) **Content of rerouting request.** Each notice or request referenced in paragraph (g) and (h) of this section must indicate:
- (1) The dates that such temporary rerouting will occur;
 - (2) The number and types of trains that will be rerouted;
 - (3) The location of the affected tracks; and
 - (4) A description of the necessity for the temporary rerouting.
- (j) **Rerouting conditions.** Rerouting of operations under paragraph (g) of this section may occur under the following conditions:
- (1) Where a train not equipped with a PTC system is rerouted onto a track equipped with a PTC system, or a train not equipped with a PTC system that is compatible and functionally responsive to the PTC system utilized on the line to which the train is being rerouted, the train shall be operated in accordance with § 236.1029; or

- (2) Where any train is rerouted onto a track not equipped with a PTC system, the train shall be operated in accordance with the operating rules applicable to the line on which the train is rerouted.
- (k) **Rerouting cessation.** The applicable Regional Administrator may order a railroad to cease any rerouting provided under paragraph (g) or (h) of this section.

[75 FR 2699, Jan. 15, 2010, as amended at 75 FR 59117, Sept. 27, 2010; 77 FR 28305, May 14, 2012; 79 FR 49716, Aug. 22, 2014; 81 FR 10128, Feb. 29, 2016]

§ 236.1006 Equipping locomotives operating in PTC territory.

- (a) **General.** Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each locomotive, locomotive consist, or train on any track segment equipped with a PTC system shall be controlled by a locomotive equipped with an onboard PTC apparatus that is fully operative and functioning in accordance with the applicable PTCS approved under this subpart.
- (b) **Exceptions.**
 - (1) Each railroad required to install PTC shall include in its PTCIP specific goals for progressive implementation of onboard systems and deployment of PTC-equipped locomotives such that the safety benefits of PTC are achieved through incremental growth in the percentage of controlling locomotives operating on PTC lines that are equipped with operative PTC onboard equipment. The PTCIP shall include a brief but sufficient explanation of how those goals will be achieved, including assignment of responsibilities within the organization. The goals shall be expressed as the percentage of trains operating on PTC-equipped lines that are equipped with operative onboard PTC apparatus responsive to the wayside, expressed as an annualized (calendar year) percentage for the railroad as a whole.
 - (2) [Reserved]
 - (3) A train controlled by a locomotive with an onboard PTC apparatus that has failed en route is permitted to operate in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 20157(j) or § 236.1029, as applicable.
 - (4) A train operated by a Class II or Class III railroad, including a tourist or excursion railroad, and controlled by a locomotive not equipped with an onboard PTC apparatus is permitted to operate on a PTC-operated track segment:
 - (i) That either:
 - (A) Has no regularly scheduled intercity or commuter passenger rail traffic; or
 - (B) Has regularly scheduled intercity or commuter passenger rail traffic and the applicable PTCIP permits the operation of a train operated by a Class II or III railroad and controlled by a locomotive not equipped with an onboard PTC apparatus;
 - (ii) Where operations are restricted to four or less such unequipped trains per day, whereas a train conducting a “turn” operation (e.g., moving to a point of interchange to drop off or pick up cars and returning to the track owned by a Class II or III railroad) is considered two trains for this purpose; and
 - (iii) Where each movement shall either:
 - (A) Not exceed 20 miles in length; or

- (B) To the extent any movement exceeds 20 miles in length, such movement is not permitted without the controlling locomotive being equipped with an onboard PTC system after December 31, 2023, and each applicable Class II or III railroad shall report to FRA its progress in equipping each necessary locomotive with an onboard PTC apparatus to facilitate continuation of the movement. The progress reports shall be filed not later than December 31, 2020 and, if all necessary locomotives are not yet equipped, on December 31, 2022.
- (5) **Freight yard movements.** For the purpose of freight switching service or freight transfer train service, a locomotive, locomotive consist, or train may operate without onboard PTC apparatus installed or operational where an onboard PTC apparatus is otherwise required by this part only if all of the following six requirements and conditions are met:
- (i) The locomotive, locomotive consist, or train must be engaged in freight switching service or freight transfer train service, including yard, local, industrial, and hostling service, movements in connection with the assembling or disassembling of trains, and work trains;
 - (ii) The movement must originate either:
 - (A) In a yard; or
 - (B) Within 20 miles of a yard with the yard as the final destination point;
 - (iii) The locomotive, locomotive consist, or train shall not travel to a point in excess of 20 miles from its point of entry onto the PTC-equipped main line track;
 - (iv) The speed of the locomotive, locomotive consist, or train shall not exceed restricted speed, except if:
 - (A) No other locomotive, locomotive consist, or train is operating on any part of the route without an operational onboard PTC apparatus;
 - (B) No working limits are established under part 214 of this chapter on any part of the route; and
 - (C) Either an air brake test under part 232 of this chapter is performed, in which case the locomotive, locomotive consist, or train may proceed at a speed not to exceed 30 miles per hour; or an air brake test under part 232 of this chapter is not performed, in which case the locomotive, locomotive consist, or train may proceed at a speed not to exceed 20 miles per hour;
 - (v) The speed of the locomotive, locomotive consist, or train shall not exceed restricted speed on PTC-equipped track where the route terminates; and
 - (vi) The route of the locomotive or train is protected against conflicting operations by the PTC system and sufficient operating rules to protect against train-to-train collisions, as specified in the PTCSP.
 - (vii) FRA may, in its discretion, approve yard movement procedures other than the yard movement procedures in paragraphs (b)(5)(i) through (b)(5)(vi) of this section in a PTCSP or an RFA that provide an equivalent or greater level of safety as the requirements of paragraphs (b)(5)(i) through (b)(5)(vi) of this section, where such procedures are similar to those of paragraphs (b)(5)(i) through (b)(5)(vi) of this section.

- (viii) A locomotive, locomotive consist, or train with an operative onboard PTC apparatus may assist a locomotive, locomotive consist, or train operating without an operative onboard PTC apparatus for purposes such as locomotive malfunction, rescue of locomotive or cars, or to add or remove power, provided that such a movement is made at restricted speed.
- (c) When a train movement is conducted under the exceptions described in paragraph (b)(4) of this section, that movement shall be made in accordance with § 236.1029.
- (d) **Onboard PTC apparatus.**
 - (1) The onboard PTC apparatus shall be so arranged that each member of the crew assigned to perform duties in the locomotive can receive the same PTC information displayed in the same manner and execute any functions necessary to that crew member's duties. The locomotive engineer shall not be required to perform functions related to the PTC system while the train is moving that have the potential to distract the locomotive engineer from performance of other safety-critical duties.
 - (2) The onboard PTC apparatus may be distributed among multiple locomotives if such functionality is included with the applicable PTCS approved under this subpart. The controlling locomotive shall be equipped with a fully operative interface that complies with paragraph (d)(1) of this section and is consistent with appendix E of this part.

[75 FR 2699, Jan. 15, 2010, as amended at 79 FR 49716, Aug. 22, 2014; 81 FR 10129, Feb. 29, 2016]

§ 236.1007 Additional requirements for high-speed service.

- (a) A PTC railroad that conducts a passenger operation at or greater than 60 miles per hour or a freight operation at or greater than 50 miles per hour shall have installed a PTC system including or working in concert with technology that includes all of the safety-critical functional attributes of a block signal system meeting the requirements of this part, including appropriate fouling circuits and broken rail detection (or equivalent safeguards).
- (b) In addition to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section, a host railroad that conducts a freight or passenger operation at more than 90 miles per hour shall:
 - (1) Have an approved PTCS establishing that the system was designed and will be operated to meet the fail-safe operation criteria described in Appendix C to this part; and
 - (2) Prevent unauthorized or unintended entry onto the main line from any track not equipped with a PTC system compliant with this subpart by placement of split-point derails or equivalent means integrated into the PTC system; and
 - (3) Comply with § 236.1029(c).
- (c) In addition to the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, a host railroad that conducts a freight or passenger operation at more than 125 miles per hour shall have an approved PTCS accompanied by a document ("HSR-125") establishing that the system:
 - (1) Will be operated at a level of safety comparable to that achieved over the 5 year period prior to the submission of the PTCS by other train control systems that perform PTC functions required by this subpart, and which have been utilized on high-speed rail systems with similar technical and operational characteristics in the United States or in foreign service, provided that the use of foreign service data must be approved by the Associate Administrator before submittal of the PTCS; and

- (2) Has been designed to detect incursions into the right-of-way, including incidents involving motor vehicles diverting from adjacent roads and bridges, where conditions warrant.
- (d) A railroad providing existing high-speed passenger service may request in its PTCSPP that the Associate Administrator excuse compliance with one or more requirements of this section upon a showing that the subject service has been conducted with a high level of safety.

[75 FR 2699, Jan. 15, 2010, as amended at 83 FR 59218, Nov. 21, 2018]

§ 236.1009 Procedural requirements.

(a) *PTC Implementation Plan (PTCIP).*

- (1) By April 16, 2010, each host railroad that is required to implement and operate a PTC system in accordance with § 236.1005(b) shall develop and submit in accordance with § 236.1011(a) a PTCIP for implementing a PTC system required under § 236.1005. Filing of the PTCIP shall not exempt the required filings of an NPI, PTCSPP, PTCDD, or Type Approval.
- (2) After April 16, 2010, a host railroad shall file:
 - (i) A PTCIP if it becomes a host railroad of a main line track segment for which it is required to implement and operate a PTC system in accordance with § 236.1005(b); or
 - (ii) A request for amendment (“RFA”) of its current and approved PTCIP in accordance with § 236.1021 if it intends to:
 - (A) Initiate a new category of service (i.e., passenger or freight); or
 - (B) Add, subtract, or otherwise materially modify one or more lines of railroad for which installation of a PTC system is required.
- (3) The host and tenant railroad(s) shall jointly file a PTCIP that addresses shared track:
 - (i) If the host railroad is required to install and operate a PTC system on a segment of its track; and
 - (ii) If the tenant railroad that shares the same track segment would have been required to install a PTC system if the host railroad had not otherwise been required to do so.
- (4) If railroads required to file a joint PTCIP are unable to jointly file a PTCIP in accordance with paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(3) of this section, then each railroad shall:
 - (i) Separately file a PTCIP in accordance with paragraph (a)(1);
 - (ii) Notify the Associate Administrator that the subject railroads were unable to agree on a PTCIP to be jointly filed;
 - (iii) Provide the Associate Administrator with a comprehensive list of all issues not in agreement between the railroads that would prevent the subject railroads from jointly filing the PTCIP; and
 - (iv) Confer with the Associate Administrator to develop and submit a PTCIP mutually acceptable to all subject railroads.

- (5) Each railroad filing a PTCIP shall report annually, by March 31 of each year, and until its PTC system implementation is complete, its progress towards fulfilling the goals outlined in its PTCIP under this part, including progress towards PTC system installation pursuant to § 236.1005 and onboard PTC apparatus installation and use in PTC-equipped track segments pursuant to § 236.1006, as well as impediments to completion of each of the goals.
- (b) **Type Approval.** Each host railroad, individually or jointly with others such as a tenant railroad or system supplier, shall file prior to or simultaneously with the filing made in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section:
 - (1) An unmodified Type Approval previously issued by the Associate Administrator in accordance with § 236.1013 or § 236.1031(b) with its associated docket number;
 - (2) A PTCDP requesting a Type Approval for:
 - (i) A PTC system that does not have a Type Approval; or
 - (ii) A PTC system with a previously issued Type Approval that requires one or more variances;
 - (3) A PTCSPP subject to the conditions set forth in paragraph (c) of this section, with or without a Type Approval; or
 - (4) A document attesting that a Type Approval is not necessary since the host railroad has no territory for which a PTC system is required under this subpart.
- (c) **Notice of Product Intent (NPI).** A railroad may, in lieu of submitting a PTCDP, or referencing an already issued Type Approval, submit an NPI describing the functions of the proposed PTC system. If a railroad elects to file an NPI in lieu of a PTCDP or referencing an existing Type Approval with the PTCIP, and the PTCIP is otherwise acceptable to the Associate Administrator, the Associate Administrator may grant provisional approval of the PTCIP.
 - (1) A provisional approval of a PTCIP, unless otherwise extended by the Associate Administrator, is valid for a period of 270 days from the date of approval by the Associate Administrator.
 - (2) The railroad must submit an updated PTCIP with either a complete PTCDP as defined in § 236.1013(a), an updated PTCIP referencing an already approved Type Approval, or a full PTCSPP within 270 days after the "Provisional Approval."
 - (i) Within 90 days of receipt of an updated PTCIP that was submitted with an NPI, the Associate Administrator will approve or disapprove of the updated PTCIP and notify in writing the affected railroad. If the updated PTCIP is not approved, the notification will include the plan's deficiencies. Within 30 days of receipt of that notification, the railroad or other entity that submitted the plan shall correct all deficiencies and resubmit the plan in accordance with this section and § 236.1011, as applicable.
 - (ii) If an update to a "Provisionally Approved" PTCIP is not received by the Associate Administrator by the end of the period indicated in this paragraph, the "Provisional Approval" given to the PTCIP is automatically revoked. The revocation is retroactive to the date the original PTCIP and NPI were first submitted to the Associate Administrator.
- (d) **PTCSPP and PTC System Certification.** The following apply to each PTCSPP and PTC System Certification.

- (1) A PTC System Certification for a PTC system may be obtained by submitting an acceptable PTCSPP. If the PTC system is the subject of a Type Approval, the safety case elements contained in the PTCDP may be incorporated by reference into the PTCSPP, subject to finalization of the human factors analysis contained in the PTCDP.
- (2) Each PTCSPP requirement under § 236.1015 shall be supported by information and analysis sufficient to establish that the requirements of this subpart have been satisfied.
- (3) If the Associate Administrator finds that the PTCSPP and supporting documentation support a finding that the system complies with this part, the Associate Administrator may approve the PTCSPP. If the Associate Administrator approves the PTCSPP, the railroad shall receive PTC System Certification for the subject PTC system and shall implement the PTC system according to the PTCSPP.
- (4) A required PTC system shall not:
 - (i) Be used in service until it receives from FRA a PTC System Certification; and
 - (ii) Receive a PTC System Certification unless FRA receives and approves an applicable:
 - (A) PTCSPP; or
 - (B) Request for Expedited Certification (REC) as defined by § 236.1031(a).

(e) ***Plan contents.***

- (1) No PTCIP shall receive approval unless it complies with § 236.1011. No railroad shall receive a Type Approval or PTC System Certification unless the applicable PTCDP or PTCSPP, respectively, comply with §§ 236.1013 and 236.1015, respectively.
- (2) All materials filed in accordance with this subpart must be in the English language, or have been translated into English and attested as true and correct.
- (3) Each filing referenced in this section may include a request for full or partial confidentiality in accordance with § 209.11 of this chapter. If confidentiality is requested as to a portion of any applicable document, then in addition to the filing requirements under § 209.11 of this chapter, the person filing the document shall also file a copy of the original unredacted document, marked to indicate which portions are redacted in the document's confidential version without obscuring the original document's contents.

(f) ***Supporting documentation and information.***

- (1) Issuance of a Type Approval or PTC System Certification is contingent upon FRA's confidence in the implementation and operation of the subject PTC system. This confidence may be based on FRA-monitored field testing or an independent assessment performed in accordance with § 236.1035 or § 236.1017, respectively.
- (2) Upon request by FRA, the railroad requesting a Type Approval or PTC System Certification must engage in field testing or independent assessment performed in accordance with § 236.1035 or § 236.1017, respectively, to support the assertions made in any of the plans submitted under this subpart. These assertions include any of the plans' content requirements under this subpart.

(g) ***FRA conditions, reconsiderations, and modifications.***

- (1) As necessary to ensure safety, FRA may attach special conditions to approving a PTCIP or issuing a Type Approval or PTC System Certification.

- (2) After granting a Type Approval or PTC System Certification, FRA may reconsider the Type Approval or PTC System Certification upon revelation of any of the following factors concerning the contents of the PTCDP or PTCSP:
 - (i) Potential error or fraud;
 - (ii) Potentially invalidated assumptions determined as a result of in-service experience or one or more unsafe events calling into question the safety analysis supporting the approval.
- (3) During FRA's reconsideration in accordance with this paragraph, the PTC system may remain in use if otherwise consistent with the applicable law and regulations and FRA may impose special conditions for use of the PTC system.
- (4) After FRA's reconsideration in accordance with this paragraph, FRA may:
 - (i) Dismiss its reconsideration and continue to recognize the existing FRA approved Type Approval or PTC System Certification;
 - (ii) Allow continued operations under such conditions the Associate Administrator deems necessary to ensure safety; or
 - (iii) Revoke the Type Approval or PTC System Certification and direct the railroad to cease operations where PTC systems are required under this subpart.
- (h) **FRA access.** The Associate Administrator, or that person's designated representatives, shall be afforded reasonable access to monitor, test, and inspect processes, procedures, facilities, documents, records, design and testing materials, artifacts, training materials and programs, and any other information used in the design, development, manufacture, test, implementation, and operation of the system, as well as interview any personnel:
 - (1) Associated with a PTC system for which a Type Approval or PTC System Certification has been requested or provided; or
 - (2) To determine whether a railroad has been in compliance with this subpart.
- (i) **Foreign regulatory entity verification.** Information that has been certified under the auspices of a foreign regulatory entity recognized by the Associate Administrator may, at the Associate Administrator's sole discretion, be accepted as independently Verified and Validated and used to support each railroad's development of the PTCSP.
- (j) **Processing times for PTCDP and PTCSP.**
 - (1) Within 30 days of receipt of a PTCDP or PTCSP, the Associate Administrator will either acknowledge receipt or acknowledge receipt and request more information.
 - (2) To the extent practicable, considering the scope, complexity, and novelty of the product or change:
 - (i) FRA will approve, approve with conditions, or deny the PTCDP within 60 days of the date on which the PTCDP was filed;
 - (ii) FRA will approve, approve with conditions, or deny the PTCSP within 180 days of the date on which the PTCSP was filed;

- (iii) If FRA has not approved, approved with conditions, or denied the PTCIP or PTCSP within the 60-day or 180-day window, as applicable, FRA will provide the submitting party with a statement of reasons as to why the submission has not yet been acted upon and a projected deadline by which an approval or denial will be issued and any further consultations or inquiries will be resolved.

[75 FR 2699, Jan. 15, 2010, as amended at 79 FR 49717, Aug. 22, 2014; 81 FR 10129, Feb. 29, 2016]

§ 236.1011 PTC Implementation Plan content requirements.

- (a) **Contents.** A PTCIP filed pursuant to this subpart shall, at a minimum, describe:
 - (1) The functional requirements that the proposed system must meet;
 - (2) How the PTC railroad intends to comply with §§ 236.1009(c) and (d);
 - (3) How the PTC system will provide for interoperability of the system between the host and all tenant railroads on the track segments required to be equipped with PTC systems under this subpart and:
 - (i) Include relevant provisions of agreements, executed by all applicable railroads, in place to achieve interoperability;
 - (ii) List all methods used to obtain interoperability; and
 - (iii) Identify any railroads with respect to which interoperability agreements have not been achieved as of the time the plan is filed, the practical obstacles that were encountered that prevented resolution, and the further steps planned to overcome those obstacles;
 - (4) How, to the extent practical, the PTC system will be implemented to address areas of greater risk to the public and railroad employees before areas of lesser risk;
 - (5) The sequence and schedule in which track segments will be equipped and the basis for those decisions, and shall at a minimum address the following risk factors by track segment:
 - (i) Segment traffic characteristics such as typical annual passenger and freight train volume and volume of poison- or toxic-by-inhalation (PIH or TIH) shipments (loads, residue);
 - (ii) Segment operational characteristics such as current method of operation (including presence or absence of a block signal system), number of tracks, and maximum allowable train speeds, including planned modifications; and
 - (iii) Route attributes bearing on risk, including ruling grades and extreme curvature;
 - (6) The following information relating to rolling stock:
 - (i) What rolling stock will be equipped with PTC technology;
 - (ii) The schedule to equip that rolling stock by the applicable deadline under § 236.1005(b)(7);
 - (iii) All documents and information required by § 236.1006; and
 - (iv) Unless the tenant railroad is filing its own PTCIP, the host railroad's PTCIP shall:
 - (A) Attest that the host railroad has made a formal written request to each tenant railroad requesting identification of each item of rolling stock to be PTC system equipped and the date each will be equipped; and

- (B) Include each tenant railroad's response to the host railroad's written request made in accordance with paragraph (a)(6)(iv)(A) of this section;
 - (7) The number of wayside devices required for each track segment and the installation schedule to complete wayside equipment installation by the applicable deadline under § 236.1005(b)(7);
 - (8) Identification of each track segment on the railroad as mainline or non-mainline track. If the PTCIP includes an MTEA, as defined by § 236.1019, the PTCIP should identify the tracks included in the MTEA as main line track with a reference to the MTEA;
 - (9) To the extent the railroad determines that risk-based prioritization required by paragraph (a)(4) of this section is not practical, the basis for this determination; and
 - (10) The dates the associated PTCDP and PTCSP, as applicable, will be submitted to FRA in accordance with § 236.1009.
- (b) **Additional Class I railroad PTCIP requirements.** Each Class I railroad shall include:
- (1) In its PTCIP a strategy for full deployment of its PTC system, describing the criteria that it will apply in identifying additional rail lines on its own network, and rail lines of entities that it controls or engages in joint operations with, for which full or partial deployment of PTC technologies is appropriate, beyond those required to be equipped under this subpart. Such criteria shall include consideration of the policies established by 49 U.S.C. 20156 (railroad safety risk reduction program), and regulations issued thereunder, as well as non-safety business benefits that may accrue.
 - (2) In the Technology Implementation Plan of its Risk Reduction Program, when first required to be filed in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 20156 and any regulation promulgated thereunder, a specification of rail lines selected for full or partial deployment of PTC under the criteria identified in its PTCIP.
 - (3) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to create an expectation or requirement that additional rail lines beyond those required to be equipped by this subpart must be equipped or that such lines will be equipped during the period of primary implementation ending on the applicable deadline under § 236.1005(b)(7).
 - (4) As used in this paragraph, "partial implementation" of a PTC system refers to use, pursuant to subpart H of this part, of technology embedded in PTC systems that does not employ all of the functionalities required by this subpart.
- (c) **FRA review.** Within 90 days of receipt of a PTCIP, the Associate Administrator will approve or disapprove of the plan and notify in writing the affected railroad or other entity. If the PTCIP is not approved, the notification will include the plan's deficiencies. Within 30 days of receipt of that notification, the railroad or other entity that submitted the plan shall correct all deficiencies and resubmit the plan in accordance with § 236.1009 and paragraph (a) of this section, as applicable.
- (d) **Subpart H.** A railroad that elects to install a PTC system when not required to do so may elect to proceed under this subpart or under subpart H of this part.
- (e) Upon receipt of a PTCIP, NPI, PTCDP, or PTCSP, FRA posts on its public web site notice of receipt and reference to the public docket in which a copy of the filing has been placed. FRA may consider any public comment on each document to the extent practicable within the time allowed by law and without delaying implementation of PTC systems.
- (f) The PTCIP shall be maintained to reflect the railroad's most recent PTC deployment plans until all PTC system deployments required under this subpart are complete.

[75 FR 2699, Jan. 15, 2010, as amended at 75 FR 59117, Sept. 27, 2010; 81 FR 10129, Feb. 29, 2016]

§ 236.1013 PTC Development Plan and Notice of Product Intent content requirements and Type Approval.

- (a) For a PTC system to obtain a Type Approval from FRA, the PTCDP shall be filed in accordance with § 236.1009 and shall include:
 - (1) A complete description of the PTC system, including a list of all PTC system components and their physical relationships in the subsystem or system;
 - (2) A description of the railroad operation or categories of operations on which the PTC system is designed to be used, including train movement density (passenger, freight), operating speeds (including a thorough explanation of intended compliance with § 236.1007), track characteristics, and railroad operating rules;
 - (3) An operational concepts document, including a list with complete descriptions of all functions which the PTC system will perform to enhance or preserve safety;
 - (4) A document describing the manner in which the PTC system architecture satisfies safety requirements;
 - (5) A preliminary human factors analysis, including a complete description of all human-machine interfaces and the impact of interoperability requirements on the same;
 - (6) An analysis of the applicability to the PTC system of the requirements of subparts A through G of this part that may no longer apply or are satisfied by the PTC system using an alternative method, and a complete explanation of the manner in which those requirements are otherwise fulfilled;
 - (7) A prioritized service restoration and mitigation plan and a description of the necessary security measures for the system;
 - (8) A description of target safety levels (e.g., MTTHE for major subsystems as defined in subpart H of this part), including requirements for system availability and a description of all backup methods of operation and any critical assumptions associated with the target levels;
 - (9) A complete description of how the PTC system will enforce authorities and signal indications;
 - (10) A description of the deviation which may be proposed under § 236.1029(c), if applicable; and
 - (11) A complete description of how the PTC system will appropriately and timely enforce all integrated hazard detectors in accordance with § 236.1005(c)(3), if applicable.
- (b) If the Associate Administrator finds that the system described in the PTCDP would satisfy the requirements for PTC systems under this subpart and that the applicant has made a reasonable showing that a system built to the stated requirements would achieve the level of safety mandated for such a system under § 236.1015, the Associate Administrator may grant a numbered Type Approval for the system.
- (c) Each Type Approval shall be valid for a period of 5 years, subject to automatic and indefinite extension provided that at least one PTC System Certification using the subject PTC system has been issued within that period and not revoked.
- (d) The Associate Administrator may prescribe special conditions, amendments, and restrictions to any Type Approval as necessary for safety.

- (e) If submitted, an NPI must contain the following information:
 - (1) A description of the railroad operation or categories of operations on which the proposed PTC system is designed to be used, including train movement density (passenger, freight), operating speeds (including a thorough explanation of intended compliance with § 236.1007), track characteristics, and railroad operating rules;
 - (2) An operational concepts document, including a list with complete descriptions of all functions that the proposed PTC system will perform to enhance or preserve safety;
 - (3) A description of target safety levels (e.g., MTTHE for major subsystems as defined in subpart H of this part), including requirements for system availability and a description of all backup methods of operation and any critical assumptions associated with the target levels;
 - (4) A complete description of how the proposed PTC system will enforce authorities and signal indications; and
 - (5) A complete description of how the proposed PTC system will appropriately and timely enforce all integrated hazard detectors in accordance with § 236.1005(c)(3), if applicable.

§ 236.1015 PTC Safety Plan content requirements and PTC System Certification.

- (a) Before placing a PTC system required under this part in service, the host railroad must submit to FRA a PTCSPP and receive a PTC System Certification. If the Associate Administrator finds that the PTCSPP and supporting documentation support a finding that the system complies with this part, the Associate Administrator approves the PTCSPP and issues a PTC System Certification. Receipt of a PTC System Certification affirms that the PTC system has been reviewed and approved by FRA in accordance with, and meets the requirements of, this part.
- (b) A PTCSPP submitted under this subpart may reference and utilize in accordance with this subpart any Type Approval previously issued by the Associate Administrator to any railroad, provided that the railroad:
 - (1) Maintains a continually updated PTCPVL pursuant to § 236.1023;
 - (2) Shows that the supplier from which they are procuring the PTC system has established and can maintain a quality control system for PTC system design and manufacturing acceptable to the Associate Administrator. The quality control system must include the process for the product supplier or vendor to promptly and thoroughly report any safety-relevant failure and previously unidentified hazards to each railroad using the product; and
 - (3) Provides the applicable licensing information.
- (c) A PTCSPP submitted in accordance with this subpart shall:
 - (1) Include the FRA approved PTCDP or, if applicable, the FRA issued Type Approval;
 - (2)
 - (i) Specifically and rigorously document each variance, including the significance of each variance between the PTC system and its applicable operating conditions as described in the applicable PTCDP from that as described in the PTCSPP, and attest that there are no other such variances; or
 - (ii) Attest that there are no variances between the PTC system and its applicable operating conditions as described in the applicable PTCDP from that as described in the PTCSPP; and

- (3) Attest that the system was otherwise built in accordance with the applicable PTCDP and PTCSF and achieves the level of safety represented therein.
- (d) A PTCSF shall include the same information required for a PTCDP under § 236.1013(a). If a PTCDP has been filed and approved prior to filing of the PTCSF, the PTCSF may incorporate the PTCDP by reference, with the exception that a final human factors analysis shall be provided. The PTCSF shall contain the following additional elements:
 - (1) A hazard log consisting of a comprehensive description of all safety-relevant hazards not previously addressed by the vendor or supplier to be addressed during the life-cycle of the PTC system, including maximum threshold limits for each hazard (for unidentified hazards, the threshold shall be exceeded at one occurrence);
 - (2) A description of the safety assurance concepts that are to be used for system development, including an explanation of the design principles and assumptions;
 - (3) A risk assessment of the as-built PTC system described;
 - (4) A hazard mitigation analysis, including a complete and comprehensive description of each hazard and the mitigation techniques used;
 - (5) A complete description of the safety assessment and Verification and Validation processes applied to the PTC system, their results, and whether these processes address the safety principles described in Appendix C to this part directly, using other safety criteria, or not at all;
 - (6) A complete description of the railroad's training plan for railroad and contractor employees and supervisors necessary to ensure safe and proper installation, implementation, operation, maintenance, repair, inspection, testing, and modification of the PTC system;
 - (7) A complete description of the specific procedures and test equipment necessary to ensure the safe and proper installation, implementation, operation, maintenance, repair, inspection, testing, and modification of the PTC system on the railroad and establish safety-critical hazards are appropriately mitigated. These procedures, including calibration requirements, shall be consistent with or explain deviations from the equipment manufacturer's recommendations;
 - (8) A complete description of any additional warning to be placed in the Operations and Maintenance Manual in the same manner specified in § 236.919 and all warning labels to be placed on equipment as necessary to ensure safety;
 - (9) A complete description of the configuration or revision control measures designed to ensure that the railroad or its contractor does not adversely affect the safety-functional requirements and that safety-critical hazard mitigation processes are not compromised as a result of any such change;
 - (10) A complete description of all initial implementation testing procedures necessary to establish that safety-functional requirements are met and safety-critical hazards are appropriately mitigated;
 - (11) A complete description of all post-implementation testing (validation) and monitoring procedures, including the intervals necessary to establish that safety-functional requirements, safety-critical hazard mitigation processes, and safety-critical tolerances are not compromised over time, through use, or after maintenance (adjustment, repair, or replacement) is performed;

- (12) A complete description of each record necessary to ensure the safety of the system that is associated with periodic maintenance, inspections, tests, adjustments, repairs, or replacements, and the system's resulting conditions, including records of component failures resulting in safety-relevant hazards (see § 236.1037);
 - (13) A safety analysis to determine whether, when the system is in operation, any risk remains of an unintended incursion into a roadway work zone due to human error. If the analysis reveals any such risk, the PTCDP and PTCSP shall describe how that risk will be mitigated;
 - (14) A more detailed description of any alternative arrangements as already provided under § 236.1005(a)(1)(i).
 - (15) A complete description of how the PTC system will enforce authorities and signal indications, unless already completely provided for in the PTCDP;
 - (16) A description of how the PTCSP complies with § 236.1019(f), if applicable;
 - (17) A description of any deviation in operational requirements for en route failures as specified under § 236.1029(c), if applicable and unless already completely provided for in the PTCDP;
 - (18) A complete description of how the PTC system will appropriately and timely enforce all integrated hazard detectors in accordance with § 236.1005;
 - (19) An emergency and planned maintenance temporary rerouting plan indicating how operations on the subject PTC system will take advantage of the benefits provided under § 236.1005(g) through (k); and
 - (20) The documents and information required under §§ 236.1007 and 236.1033.
 - (21) A list of each location where a locomotive with a failed onboard PTC apparatus will be regularly be exchanged or repaired pursuant to § 236.1029(b)(6) and a list of each movement that could take place pursuant to § 236.1029(b)(6) if the movement potentially could exceed 500 miles.
- (e) The following additional requirements apply to:
- (1) **Non-vital overlay.** A PTC system proposed as an overlay on the existing method of operation and not built in accordance with the safety assurance principles set forth in appendix C of this part must, to the satisfaction of the Associate Administrator, be shown to:
 - (i) Reliably execute the functions set forth in § 236.1005;
 - (ii) Obtain at least 80 percent reduction of the risk associated with accidents preventable by the functions set forth in § 236.1005, when all effects of the change associated with the PTC system are taken into account. The supporting risk assessment shall evaluate all intended changes in railroad operations coincident with the introduction of the new system; and
 - (iii) Maintain a level of safety for each subsequent system modification that is equal to or greater than the level of safety for the previous PTC systems.
 - (2) **Vital overlay.** A PTC system proposed on a newly constructed track or as an overlay on the existing method of operation and built in accordance with the safety assurance principles set forth in appendix C of this part must, to the satisfaction of the Associate Administrator, be shown to:
 - (i) Reliably execute the functions set forth in § 236.1005; and

- (ii) Have sufficient documentation to demonstrate that the PTC system, as built, fulfills the safety assurance principles set forth in appendix C of this part. The supporting risk assessment may be abbreviated as that term is used in subpart H of this part.
- (3) **Stand-alone.** A PTC system proposed on a newly constructed track, an existing track for which no signal system exists, as a replacement for an existing signal or train control system, or otherwise to replace or materially modify the existing method of operation, shall:
 - (i) Reliably execute the functions required by § 236.1005 and be demonstrated to do so to FRA's satisfaction; and
 - (ii) Have a PTCSPP establishing, with a high degree of confidence, that the system will not introduce new hazards that have not been mitigated. The supporting risk assessment shall evaluate all intended changes in railroad operations in relation to the introduction of the new system and shall examine in detail the direct and indirect effects of all changes in the method of operations.
- (4) **Mixed systems.** If a PTC system combining overlay, stand-alone, vital, or non-vital characteristics is proposed, the railroad shall confer with the Associate Administrator regarding appropriate structuring of the safety case and analysis.
- (f) When determining whether the PTCSPP fulfills the requirements under paragraph (d) of this section, the Associate Administrator may consider all available evidence concerning the reliability and availability of the proposed system and any and all safety consequences of the proposed changes. In any case where the PTCSPP lacks adequate data regarding safety impacts of the proposed changes, the Associate Administrator may request the necessary data from the applicant. If the requested data is not provided, the Associate Administrator may find that potential hazards could or will arise.
- (g) If a PTCSPP applies to a system designed to replace an existing certified PTC system, the PTCSPP will be approved provided that the PTCSPP establishes with a high degree of confidence that the new system will provide a level of safety not less than the level of safety provided by the system to be replaced.
- (h) When reviewing the issue of the potential data errors (for example, errors arising from data supplied from other business systems needed to execute the braking algorithm, survey data needed for location determination, or mandatory directives issued through the computer-aided dispatching system), the PTCSPP must include a careful identification of each of the risks and a discussion of each applicable mitigation. In an appropriate case, such as a case in which the residual risk after mitigation is substantial or the underlying method of operation will be significantly altered, the Associate Administrator may require submission of a quantitative risk assessment addressing these potential errors.

[75 FR 2699, Jan. 15, 2010, as amended at 79 FR 49717, Aug. 22, 2014]

§ 236.1017 Independent third party Verification and Validation.

- (a) The PTCSPP must be supported by an independent third-party assessment when the Associate Administrator concludes that it is necessary based upon the criteria set forth in § 236.913, with the exception that consideration of the methodology used in the risk assessment (§ 236.913(g)(2)(vii)) shall apply only to the extent that a comparative risk assessment was required. To the extent practicable, FRA makes this determination not later than review of the PTCIP and the accompanying PTCDP or PTCSPP. If an independent assessment is required, the assessment may apply to the entire system or a designated portion of the system.

- (b) If a PTC system is to undergo an independent assessment in accordance with this section, the host railroad may submit to the Associate Administrator a written request that FRA confirm whether a particular entity would be considered an independent third party pursuant to this section. The request should include supporting information identified in paragraph (c) of this section. FRA may request further information to make a determination or provide its determination in writing.
- (c) As used in this section, "independent third party" means a technically competent entity responsible to and compensated by the railroad (or an association on behalf of one or more railroads) that is independent of the PTC system supplier and vendor. An entity that is owned or controlled by the supplier or vendor, that is under common ownership or control with the supplier or vendor, or that is otherwise involved in the development of the PTC system is not considered "independent" within the meaning of this section.
- (d) The independent third-party assessment shall, at a minimum, consist of the activities and result in the production of documentation meeting the requirements of Appendix F to this part, unless excepted by this part or by FRA order or waiver.
- (e) Information provided that has been certified under the auspices of a foreign railroad regulatory entity recognized by the Associate Administrator may, at the Associate Administrator's discretion, be accepted as having been independently verified.

§ 236.1019 Main line track exceptions.

- (a) **Scope and procedure.** This section pertains exclusively to exceptions from the rule that trackage over which scheduled intercity and commuter passenger service is provided is considered main line track requiring installation of a PTC system. One or more intercity or commuter passenger railroads, or freight railroads conducting joint passenger and freight operation over the same segment of track may file a main line track exclusion addendum ("MTEA") to its PTCIP requesting to designate track as not main line subject to the conditions set forth in paragraphs (b) or (c) of this section. No track shall be designated as yard or terminal unless it is identified in an MTEA that is part of an FRA approved PTCIP.
- (b) **Passenger terminal exception.** FRA will consider an exception in the case of trackage used exclusively as yard or terminal tracks by or in support of regularly scheduled intercity or commuter passenger service where the MTEA describes in detail the physical boundaries of the trackage in question, its use and characteristics (including track and signal charts) and all of the following apply:
 - (1) The maximum authorized speed for all movements is not greater than 20 miles per hour, and that maximum is enforced by any available onboard PTC equipment within the confines of the yard or terminal;
 - (2) Interlocking rules are in effect prohibiting reverse movements other than on signal indications without dispatcher permission; and
 - (3) Either of the following conditions exists:
 - (i) No freight operations are permitted; or
 - (ii) Freight operations are permitted but no passengers will be aboard passenger trains within the defined limits.
- (c) **Limited operations exception.** FRA will consider an exception in the case of a track segment used for limited operations (operating in accordance with § 236.0 of this part) under one of the following sets of conditions:

- (1) The trackage is used for limited operations by at least one passenger railroad subject to at least one of the following conditions:
 - (i) All trains are limited to restricted speed;
 - (ii) Temporal separation of passenger and other trains is maintained as provided in paragraph (e) of this section; or
 - (iii) Passenger service is operated under a risk mitigation plan submitted by all railroads involved in the joint operation and approved by FRA. The risk mitigation plan must be supported by a risk assessment establishing that the proposed mitigations will achieve a level of safety not less than the level of safety that would obtain if the operations were conducted under paragraph (c)(1) or (c)(2) of this section.
 - (2) Passenger service is operated on a segment of track of a freight railroad that is not a Class I railroad on which less than 15 million gross tons of freight traffic is transported annually and on which one of the following conditions applies:
 - (i) If the segment is unsignaled and no more than four regularly scheduled passenger trains are operated during a calendar day, or
 - (ii) If the segment is signaled (e.g., equipped with a traffic control system, automatic block signal system, or cab signal system) and no more than 12 regularly scheduled passenger trains are operated during a calendar day.
 - (3) Not more than four passenger trains per day are operated on a segment of track of a Class I freight railroad on which less than 15 million gross tons of freight traffic is transported annually.
- (d) A limited operations exception under paragraph (c) is subject to FRA review and approval. FRA may require a collision hazard analysis to identify hazards and may require that specific mitigations be undertaken. Operations under any such exception shall be conducted subject to the terms and conditions of the approval. Any main line track exclusion is subject to periodic review.
- (e) **Temporal separation.** As used in this section, temporal separation means that limited passenger and freight operations do not operate on any segment of shared track during the same period and also refers to the processes or physical arrangements, or both, in place to ensure that temporal separation is established and maintained at all times. The use of exclusive authorities under mandatory directives is not, by itself, sufficient to establish that temporal separation is achieved. Procedures to ensure temporal separation shall include verification checks between passenger and freight operations and effective physical means to positively ensure segregation of passenger and freight operations in accordance with this paragraph.
- (f) **PTCSP requirement.** No PTCSP - filed after the approval of a PTCIP with an MTEA - shall be approved by FRA unless it attests that no changes, except for those included in an FRA approved RFA, have been made to the information in the PTCIP and MTEA required by paragraph (b) or (c) of this section.
- (g) **Designation modifications.** If subsequent to approval of its PTCIP or PTCSP the railroad seeks to modify which track or tracks should be designated as main line or not main line, it shall request modification of its PTCIP or PTCSP, as applicable, in accordance with § 236.1021.

[75 FR 2699, Jan. 15, 2010, as amended at 75 FR 59117, Sept. 27, 2010]

§ 236.1020 [Reserved]

§ 236.1021 Discontinuances, material modifications, and amendments.

- (a) No changes, as defined by this section, to a PTCIP or PTCDP may be made unless:
 - (1) The railroad files a request for amendment (RFA) to the applicable PTCIP or PTCDP with the Associate Administrator; and
 - (2) The Associate Administrator approves the RFA.
- (b) After approval of an RFA in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section, the railroad shall immediately adopt and comply with the amendment.
- (c) In lieu of a separate filing under part 235 of this chapter, a railroad may request approval of a discontinuance or material modification of a signal or train control system by filing an RFA to its PTCIP or PTCDP with the Associate Administrator.
- (d) FRA will not approve an RFA to a PTCIP or PTCDP unless the request includes:
 - (1) The information listed in § 235.10 of this chapter and the railroad provides FRA upon request any additional information necessary to evaluate the RFA (see § 235.12), including:
 - (2) The proposed modifications;
 - (3) The reasons for each modification;
 - (4) The changes to the PTCIP or PTCDP, as applicable;
 - (5) Each modification's effect on PTC system safety;
 - (6) An approximate timetable for filing of the PTCDP, PTCSP, or both, if the amendment pertains to a PTCIP; and
- (e) If the RFA includes a request for approval of a discontinuance or material modification of a signal or train control system, FRA will publish a notice in the FEDERAL REGISTER of the application and will invite public comment in accordance with part 211 of this chapter.
- (f) When considering the RFA, FRA will review the issue of the discontinuance or material modification and determine whether granting the request is in the public interest and consistent with railroad safety, taking into consideration all changes in the method of operation and system functionalities, both within normal PTC system availability and in the case of a system failed state (unavailable), contemplated in conjunction with installation of the PTC system. The railroad submitting the RFA must, at FRA's request, perform field testing in accordance with § 236.1035 or engage in Verification and Validation in accordance with § 236.1017.
- (g) FRA may issue at its discretion a new Type Approval number for a PTC system modified under this section.
- (h) **Changes requiring filing of an RFA.** Except as provided by paragraph (i), an RFA shall be filed to request the following:
 - (1) Discontinuance of a PTC system, or other similar appliance or device;
 - (2) Decrease of the PTC system's limits (e.g., exclusion or removal of a PTC system on a track segment);
 - (3) Modification of a safety critical element of a PTC system; or

- (4) Modification of a PTC system that affects the safety critical functionality of any other PTC system with which it interoperates.
- (i) **Discontinuances not requiring the filing of an RFA.** It is not necessary to file an RFA for the following discontinuances:
 - (1) Removal of a PTC system from track approved for abandonment by formal proceeding;
 - (2) Removal of PTC devices used to provide protection against unusual contingencies such as landslide, burned bridge, high water, high and wide load, or tunnel protection when the unusual contingency no longer exists;
 - (3) Removal of the PTC devices that are used on a movable bridge that has been permanently closed by the formal approval of another government agency and is mechanically secured in the closed position for rail traffic; or
 - (4) Removal of the PTC system from service for a period not to exceed 6 months that is necessitated by catastrophic occurrence such as derailment, flood, fire, or hurricane, or earthquake.
 - (j) **Changes not requiring the filing of an RFA.** When the resultant change to the PTC system will comply with an approved PTCSP of this part, it is not necessary to file for approval to decrease the limits of a system when it involves the:
 - (1) Decrease of the limits of a PTC system when interlocked switches, derails, or movable-point frogs are not involved;
 - (2) Removal of an electric or mechanical lock, or signal used in lieu thereof, from hand-operated switch in a PTC system where train speed over such switch does not exceed 20 miles per hour, and use of those devices has not been part of the considerations for approval of a PTCSP; or
 - (3) Removal of an electric or mechanical lock, or signal used in lieu thereof, from a hand-operated switch in a PTC system where trains are not permitted to clear the main track at such switch and use of those devices has not been a part of the considerations for approval of a PTCSP.
 - (k) **Modifications not requiring the filing of an RFA.** When the resultant arrangement will comply with an approved PTCSP of this part, it is not necessary to file an application for approval of the following modifications:
 - (1) A modification that is required to comply with an order of the Federal Railroad Administration or any section of part 236 of this title;
 - (2) Installation of devices used to provide protection against unusual contingencies such as landslide, burned bridges, high water, high and wide loads, or dragging equipment;
 - (3) Elimination of existing track other than a second main track;
 - (4) Extension or shortening of a passing siding; or
 - (5) The temporary or permanent arrangement of existing systems necessitated by highway-rail grade separation construction. Temporary arrangements shall be removed within six months following completion of construction.
 - (l) Any RFA to a PTCSP or PTCDP pursuant to this section may be submitted jointly with other host railroads utilizing the same type of PTC system. However, only host railroads with the same PTC System Certification classification under § 236.1015(e) may jointly file an RFA to their PTCSPs. Any joint RFA to

multiple host railroads' PTCSPs must include the information required under paragraph (m) of this section. The joint RFA must also include the written confirmation and statement specified under paragraphs (m)(2)(iii) and (iv) of this section from each host railroad jointly filing the RFA.

- (m) No changes, as specified under paragraph (h)(3) or (4) of this section, may be made to an FRA-certified PTC system or an FRA-approved PTCSP unless the host railroad first complies with the following process:
 - (1) The host railroad revises its PTCSP to account for each proposed change to its PTC system and summarizes such changes in a chronological table of revisions at the beginning of its PTCSP;
 - (2) The host railroad electronically submits the following information in an RFA to the Director of FRA's Office of Railroad Systems and Technology:
 - (i) A summary of the proposed changes to any safety-critical elements of a PTC system, including a summary of how the changes to the PTC system would affect its safety-critical functionality, how any new hazards have been addressed and mitigated, whether each change is a planned change that was previously included in all required analysis under § 236.1015 or an unplanned change, and the reason for the proposed changes, including whether the changes are necessary to address or resolve an emergency or urgent issue;
 - (ii) Any associated software release notes;
 - (iii) A confirmation that the host railroad has notified any applicable tenant railroads of the proposed changes, any associated effect on the tenant railroads' operations, and any actions the tenant railroads must take in accordance with the configuration control measures set forth in the host railroad's PTCSP;
 - (iv) A statement from a qualified representative of the host railroad, verifying that the modified PTC system would meet all technical requirements under this subpart, provide an equivalent or greater level of safety than the existing PTC system, and not adversely impact interoperability with any tenant railroads; and
 - (v) Any other information that FRA requests; and
 - (3) A host railroad shall not make any changes, as specified under paragraph (h)(3) or (4) of this section, to its PTC system until the Director of FRA's Office of Railroad Systems and Technology approves the RFA.
 - (i) FRA will approve, approve with conditions, or deny the RFA within 45 days of the date on which the RFA was filed under paragraph (m)(2) of this section.
 - (ii) FRA reserves the right to notify a railroad that changes may proceed prior to the 45-day mark, including in an emergency or under other circumstances necessitating a railroad's immediate implementation of the proposed changes to its PTC system.
 - (iii) FRA may require a railroad to modify its RFA or its PTC system to the extent necessary to ensure safety or compliance with the requirements of this part.
 - (iv) Following any FRA denial of an RFA, each applicable railroad is prohibited from making the proposed changes to its PTC system until the railroad both sufficiently addresses FRA's questions, comments, and concerns and obtains FRA's approval. Consistent with paragraph (l) of this section, any host railroads utilizing the same type of PTC system, including the same certification classification under § 236.1015(e), may jointly submit information to address FRA's questions, comments, and concerns following any denial of an RFA under this section.

[75 FR 2699, Jan. 15, 2010, as amended at 86 FR 40180, July 27, 2021]

§ 236.1023 Errors and malfunctions.

- (a) Each railroad implementing a PTC system on its property shall establish and continually update a PTC Product Vendor List (PTCPVL) that includes all vendors and suppliers of each PTC system, subsystem, component, and associated product, and process in use system-wide. The PTCPVL shall be made available to FRA upon request.
- (b)
 - (1) The railroad shall specify within its PTCSP all contractual arrangements with hardware and software suppliers or vendors for immediate notification between the parties of any and all safety-critical software failures, upgrades, patches, or revisions, as well as any hardware repairs, replacements, or modifications for their PTC system, subsystems, or components.
 - (2) A vendor or supplier, on receipt of a report of any safety-critical failure to their product, shall promptly notify all other railroads that are using that product, whether or not the other railroads have experienced the reported failure of that safety-critical system, subsystem, or component.
 - (3) The notification from a supplier to any railroad shall include explanation from the supplier of the reasons for such notification, the circumstances associated with the failure, and any recommended mitigation actions to be taken pending determination of the root cause and final corrective actions.
- (c) The railroad shall:
 - (1) Specify the railroad's process and procedures in its PTCSP for action upon their receipt of notification of safety-critical failure, as well as receipt of a safety-critical upgrade, patch, revision, repair, replacement, or modification.
 - (2) Identify configuration/revision control measures in its PTCSP that are designed to ensure the safety-functional requirements and the safety-critical hazard mitigation processes are not compromised as a result of any change and that such a change can be audited.
- (d) The railroad shall provide to the applicable vendor or supplier the railroad's procedures for action upon notification of a safety-critical failure, upgrade, patch, or revision for the PTC system, subsystem, component, product, or process, and actions to be taken until the faulty system, subsystem, or component has been adjusted, repaired or replaced.
- (e) After the product is placed in service, the railroad shall maintain a database of all safety-relevant hazards as set forth in the PTCSP and those that had not previously been identified in the PTCSP. If the frequency of the safety-relevant hazard exceeds the thresholds set forth in the PTCSP, or has not been previously identified in the appropriate risk analysis, the railroad shall:
 - (1) Notify the applicable vendor or supplier and FRA of the failure, malfunction, or defective condition that decreased or eliminated the safety functionality;
 - (2) Keep the applicable vendor or supplier and FRA apprised on a continual basis of the status of any and all subsequent failures; and
 - (3) Take prompt counter measures to reduce or eliminate the frequency of the safety-relevant hazards below the threshold identified in the PTCSP.
- (f) Each notification to FRA required by this section shall:

- (1) Be made within 15 days after the vendor, supplier, or railroad discovers the failure, malfunction, or defective condition. However, a report that is due on a Saturday or a Sunday may be delivered on the following Monday and one that is due on a holiday may be delivered on the next business day;
 - (2) Be transmitted in a manner and form acceptable to the Associate Administrator and by the most expeditious method available; and
 - (3) Include as much available and applicable information as possible, including:
 - (i) PTC system name and model;
 - (ii) Identification of the part, component, or system involved, including the part number as applicable;
 - (iii) Nature of the failure, malfunctions, or defective condition;
 - (iv) Mitigation taken to ensure the safety of train operation, railroad employees, and the public; and
 - (v) The estimated time to correct the failure.
 - (4) In the event that all information required by paragraph (f)(3) of this section is not immediately available, the non-available information shall be forwarded to the Associate Administrator as soon as practicable in supplemental reports.
- (g) Whenever any investigation of an accident or service difficulty report shows that a PTC system or product is unsafe because of a manufacturing or design defect, the railroad and its vendor or supplier shall, upon request of the Associate Administrator, report to the Associate Administrator the results of its investigation and any action taken or proposed to correct that defect.
- (h) PTC system and product suppliers and vendors shall:
- (1) Promptly report any safety-relevant failures or defective conditions, previously unidentified hazards, and recommended mitigation actions in their PTC system, subsystem, or component to each railroad using the product; and
 - (2) Notify FRA of any safety-relevant failure, defective condition, or previously unidentified hazard discovered by the vendor or supplier and the identity of each affected and notified railroad.
- (i) The requirements of this section do not apply to failures, malfunctions, or defective conditions that:
- (1) Are caused by improper maintenance or improper usage; or
 - (2) Have been previously identified to the FRA, vendor or supplier, and applicable user railroads.
- (j) When any safety-critical PTC system, subsystem, or component fails to perform its intended function, the cause shall be determined and the faulty product adjusted, repaired, or replaced without undue delay. Until corrective action is completed, a railroad shall take appropriate action to ensure safety and reliability as specified within its PTCS.
- (k) Any railroad experiencing a failure of a system resulting in a more favorable aspect than intended or other condition hazardous to the movement of a train shall comply with the reporting requirements, including the making of a telephonic report of an accident or incident involving such failure, under part 233 of this chapter. Filing of one or more reports under part 233 of this chapter does not exempt a railroad, vendor, or supplier from the reporting requirements contained in this section.

§ 236.1025 [Reserved]

§ 236.1027 PTC system exclusions.

- (a) The requirements of this subpart apply to each office automation system that performs safety-critical functions within, or affects the safety performance of, the PTC system. For purposes of this section, "office automation system" means any centralized or distributed computer-based system that directly or indirectly controls the active movement of trains in a rail network.
- (b) Changes or modifications to PTC systems otherwise excluded from the requirements of this subpart by this section do not exclude those PTC systems from the requirements of this subpart if the changes or modifications result in a degradation of safety or a material decrease in safety-critical functionality.
- (c) Primary train control systems cannot be integrated with locomotive electronic systems unless the complete integrated systems:
 - (1) Have been shown to be designed on fail-safe principles;
 - (2) Have demonstrated to operate in a fail-safe mode;
 - (3) Have a manual fail-safe fallback and override to allow the locomotive to be brought to a safe stop in the event of any loss of electronic control; and
 - (4) Are included in the approved and applicable PTCDP and PTCSP.
- (d) PTC systems excluded by this section from the requirements of this subpart remain subject to subparts A through H of this part as applicable.

§ 236.1029 PTC system use and failures.

- (a) When any safety-critical PTC system component fails to perform its intended function, the cause must be determined and the faulty component adjusted, repaired, or replaced without undue delay. Until repair of such essential components is completed, a railroad shall take appropriate action as specified in its PTCSP.
- (b) **En route failures.** Except as provided in paragraphs (c) and (g) of this section, where a controlling locomotive that is operating in, or is to be operated within, a PTC-equipped track segment experiences PTC system failure or the PTC system is otherwise cut out while en route (i.e., after the train has departed its initial terminal), the train may only continue in accordance with all of the following:
 - (1) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(5) of this section, where no block signal system is in use, the train may proceed at a speed not to exceed 40 miles per hour; however, if the involved train is transporting one or more cars containing PIH materials, excluding those cars containing only a residue of PIH materials, the train may only proceed at a speed not to exceed 30 miles per hour.
 - (2) Where a block signal system is in place:
 - (i) A passenger train may proceed at a speed not to exceed 59 miles per hour;
 - (ii) A freight train transporting one or more cars containing PIH materials, excluding those cars containing only a residue of PIH materials, may proceed at a speed not to exceed 40 miles per hour; and
 - (iii) Any other freight train may proceed at a speed not to exceed 49 miles per hour.
 - (3) Where a cab signal system with an automatic train control system is in use, the train may proceed at a speed not to exceed 79 miles per hour.

- (4) A report of the failure or cut-out must be made to a designated railroad officer of the host railroad as soon as safe and practicable.
 - (5) Where the PTC system is the exclusive method of delivering mandatory directives, an absolute block must be established in advance of the train as soon as safe and practicable, and the train shall not exceed restricted speed until the absolute block in advance of the train is established.
 - (6) Where the failure or cut-out is a result of a defective onboard PTC apparatus, the train may continue no farther than the next forward designated location for the repair or exchange of onboard PTC apparatuses.
- (c) **Exception for alternative system failure procedure.** A railroad may submit for approval a PTCSP, an RFA, or an Order of Particular Applicability with an alternative system failure procedure other than that required by paragraph (b) of this section. FRA may, in its discretion, approve such an alternative system failure procedure if it provides similar requirements of, and an equivalent or greater level of safety as, the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section.
- (d) Each railroad shall comply with all provisions in the applicable PTCDP and PTCSP for each PTC system it uses and shall operate within the scope of initial operational assumptions and predefined changes identified.
- (e) The normal functioning of any safety-critical PTC system must not be interfered with in testing or otherwise without first taking measures to provide for the safe movement of trains, locomotives, roadway workers, and on-track equipment that depend on the normal functioning of the system.
- (f) [Reserved]
- (g) **Temporary exceptions.** From October 21, 2014 through the 24 months following the date of required PTC system implementation established by section 20157 of title 49 of the United States Code -
- (1) A railroad's PTCSP or Order of Particular Applicability may provide for compliance with the en route failure requirements of § 236.567 instead of paragraph (b) of this section where a controlling locomotive that is operating in, or is to be operated within, a PTC-equipped track segment experiences PTC system failure or the PTC system is otherwise cut out while en route;
 - (2) A train may proceed as prescribed under either paragraph (b) of this section or § 236.567 where the PTC system fails to initialize for any reason prior to the train's departure from its initial terminal; and
 - (3) A railroad's PTCSP may provide for the temporary disabling of PTC system service where necessary to perform PTC system repair or maintenance. In this paragraph (g)(3), "PTC system service" does not refer to the failure of the onboard PTC apparatus for a single locomotive, locomotive consist, or train.
 - (i) The PTCSP shall specify appropriate operating rules to apply when the PTC system is temporarily disabled in accordance with this paragraph (g)(3).
 - (ii) The railroad shall make reasonable efforts to schedule the temporary disabling of PTC system service for times posing the least risk to railroad safety.
 - (iii) The railroad shall provide notice to the FRA regional office having jurisdiction over that territory at least 7 days in advance of planned temporary disabling of PTC system service and contemporaneous notice for unplanned temporary disabling of PTC system service.
 - (iv) The PTC system that is temporarily disabled in accordance with this paragraph (g)(3) shall be placed back into service without undue delay.

(h) **Biannual Report of PTC System Performance.**

- (1) Each host railroad subject to 49 U.S.C. 20157 or this subpart shall electronically submit a Biannual Report of PTC System Performance on Form FRA F 6180.152, containing the following information for the applicable reporting period, separated by the host railroad, each applicable tenant railroad, and each PTC-governed track segment (e.g., territory, subdivision, district, main line, branch, or corridor), consistent with the railroad's PTC Implementation Plan:
 - (i) The total number of PTC system initialization failures, and subtotals identifying the number of initialization failures where the source or cause was the onboard subsystem, wayside subsystem, communications subsystem, back office subsystem, or a non-PTC component;
 - (ii) The total number of PTC system cut outs, and subtotals identifying the number of cut outs where the source or cause was the onboard subsystem, wayside subsystem, communications subsystem, back office subsystem, or a non-PTC component;
 - (iii) The total number of PTC system malfunctions, and subtotals identifying the number of malfunctions where the source or cause was the onboard subsystem, wayside subsystem, communications subsystem, back office subsystem, or a non-PTC component;
 - (iv) The total number of enforcements by the PTC system;
 - (v) The number of enforcements by the PTC system in which an accident or incident was prevented;
 - (vi) The number of scheduled attempts at initialization of the PTC system; and
 - (vii) The number of train miles governed by the PTC system.
- (2) A host railroad's Biannual Report of PTC System Performance (Form FRA F 6180.152) shall also include a summary of any actions the host railroad and its tenant railroads are taking to reduce the frequency and rate of initialization failures, cut outs, and malfunctions, such as any actions to correct or eliminate systemic issues and specific problems.
- (3) Each host railroad shall electronically submit a Biannual Report of PTC System Performance (Form FRA F 6180.152) to FRA by the following due dates: July 31 (covering the period from January 1 to June 30), and January 31 (covering the period from July 1 to December 31 of the prior calendar year).
- (4) Each tenant railroad that operates on a host railroad's PTC-governed main line(s), unless the tenant railroad is currently subject to an exception under § 236.1006(b)(4) or (5), shall submit the information required under paragraphs (h)(1) and (2) of this section to each applicable host railroad on a continuous basis.
- (5) Any railroad operating a PTC system classified under FRA Type Approval Nos. FRA-TA-2010-001 or FRA-TA-2013-003 must begin submitting the metric required under paragraph (h)(1)(iv) of this section not later than January 31, 2023.

[75 FR 2699, Jan. 15, 2010, as amended at 79 FR 49717, Aug. 22, 2014; 86 FR 40181, July 27, 2021]

§ 236.1031 Previously approved PTC systems.

- (a) Any PTC system fully implemented and operational prior to March 16, 2010, may receive PTC System Certification if the applicable PTC railroad, or one or more system suppliers and one or more PTC railroads, submits a Request for Expedited Certification (REC) letter to the Associate Administrator. The REC letter must do one of the following:
 - (1) Reference a product safety plan (PSP) approved by FRA under subpart H of this part and include a document fulfilling the requirements under §§ 236.1011 and 236.1013 not already included in the PSP;
 - (2) Attest that the PTC system has been approved by FRA and in operation for at least 5 years and has already received an assessment of Verification and Validation from an independent third party under part 236 or a waiver supporting such operation; or
 - (3) Attest that the PTC system is recognized under an Order issued prior to March 16, 2010.
- (b) If an REC letter conforms to paragraph (a)(1) of this section, the Associate Administrator, at his or her sole discretion, may also issue a new Type Approval for the PTC system.
- (c) In order to receive a Type Approval or PTC System Certification under paragraph (a) or (b) of this section, the PTC system must be shown to reliably execute the functionalities required by §§ 236.1005 and 236.1007 and otherwise conform to this subpart.
- (d) Previous approval or recognition of a train control system, together with an established service history, may, at the request of the PTC railroad, and consistent with available safety data, be credited toward satisfaction of the safety case requirements set forth in this part for the PTCS with respect to all functionalities and implementations contemplated by the approval or recognition.
- (e) To the extent that the PTC system proposed for implementation under this subpart is different in significant detail from the system previously approved or recognized, the changes shall be fully analyzed in the PTCDP or PTCS as would be the case absent prior approval or recognition.
- (f) As used in this section -
 - (1) **Approved** refers to approval of a Product Safety Plan under subpart H of this part.
 - (2) **Recognized** refers to official action permitting a system to be implemented for control of train operations under an FRA order or waiver, after review of safety case documentation for the implementation.
- (g) Upon receipt of an REC, FRA will consider all safety case information to the extent feasible and appropriate, given the specific facts before the agency. Nothing in this section limits re-use of any applicable safety case information by a party other than the party receiving:
 - (1) A prior approval or recognition referred to in this section; or
 - (2) A Type Approval or PTC System Certification under this subpart.

§ 236.1033 Communications and security requirements.

- (a) All wireless communications between the office, wayside, and onboard components in a PTC system shall provide cryptographic message integrity and authentication.
- (b) Cryptographic keys required under paragraph (a) of this section shall:

- (1) Use an algorithm approved by the National Institute of Standards (NIST) or a similarly recognized and FRA approved standards body;
- (2) Be distributed using manual or automated methods, or a combination of both; and
- (3) Be revoked:
 - (i) If compromised by unauthorized disclosure of the cleartext key; or
 - (ii) When the key algorithm reaches its lifespan as defined by the standards body responsible for approval of the algorithm.
- (c) The cleartext form of the cryptographic keys shall be protected from unauthorized disclosure, modification, or substitution, except during key entry when the cleartext keys and key components may be temporarily displayed to allow visual verification. When encrypted keys or key components are entered, the cryptographically protected cleartext key or key components shall not be displayed.
- (d) Access to cleartext keys shall be protected by a tamper resistant mechanism.
- (e) Each railroad electing to also provide cryptographic message confidentiality shall:
 - (1) Comply with the same requirements for message integrity and authentication under this section; and
 - (2) Only use keys meeting or exceeding the security strength required to protect the data as defined in the railroad's PTCSP and required under § 236.1013(a)(7).
- (f) Each railroad, or its vendor or supplier, shall have a prioritized service restoration and mitigation plan for scheduled and unscheduled interruptions of service. This plan shall be included in the PTCDP or PTCSP as required by §§ 236.1013 or 236.1015, as applicable, and made available to FRA upon request, without undue delay, for restoration of communication services that support PTC system services.
- (g) Each railroad may elect to impose more restrictive requirements than those in this section, consistent with interoperability requirements specified in the PTCSP for the system.

§ 236.1035 Field testing requirements.

- (a) Before any field testing of an uncertified PTC system, or a product of an uncertified PTC system, or any regression testing of a certified PTC system is conducted on the general rail system, the railroad requesting the testing must provide:
 - (1) A complete description of the PTC system;
 - (2) An operational concepts document;
 - (3) A complete description of the specific test procedures, including the measures that will be taken to protect trains and on-track equipment;
 - (4) An analysis of the applicability of the requirements of subparts A through G of this part to the PTC system that will not apply during testing;
 - (5) The date the proposed testing shall begin;
 - (6) The test locations; and
 - (7) The effect on the current method of operation the PTC system will or may have under test.
- (b) FRA may impose additional testing conditions that it believes may be necessary for the safety of train operations.

- (c) Relief from regulations other than from subparts A through G of this part that the railroad believes are necessary to support the field testing, must be requested in accordance with part 211 of this title.

§ 236.1037 Records retention.

- (a) Each railroad with a PTC system required to be installed under this subpart shall maintain at a designated office on the railroad:
 - (1) A current copy of each FRA approved Type Approval, if any, PTCDP, and PTCSF that it holds;
 - (2) Adequate documentation to demonstrate that the PTCSF and PTCDP meet the safety requirements of this subpart, including the risk assessment;
 - (3) An Operations and Maintenance Manual, pursuant to § 236.1039; and
 - (4) Training and testing records pursuant to § 236.1043(b).
- (b) Results of inspections and tests specified in the PTCSF and PTCDP must be recorded pursuant to § 236.110.
- (c) Each contractor providing services relating to the testing, maintenance, or operation of a PTC system required to be installed under this subpart shall maintain at a designated office training records required under § 236.1039(b).
- (d) After the PTC system is placed in service, the railroad shall maintain a database of all safety-relevant hazards as set forth in the PTCSF and PTCDP and those that had not been previously identified in either document. If the frequency of the safety-relevant hazards exceeds the threshold set forth in either of these documents, then the railroad shall:
 - (1) Report the inconsistency in writing by mail, facsimile, e-mail, or hand delivery to the Director, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Ave, SE, Mail Stop 25, Washington, DC 20590, within 15 days of discovery. Documents that are hand delivered must not be enclosed in an envelope;
 - (2) Take prompt countermeasures to reduce the frequency of each safety-relevant hazard to below the threshold set forth in the PTCSF and PTCDP; and
 - (3) Provide a final report when the inconsistency is resolved to the FRA Director, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, on the results of the analysis and countermeasures taken to reduce the frequency of the safety-relevant hazard(s) below the threshold set forth in the PTCSF and PTCDP.

§ 236.1039 Operations and Maintenance Manual.

- (a) The railroad shall catalog and maintain all documents as specified in the PTCDP and PTCSF for the installation, maintenance, repair, modification, inspection, and testing of the PTC system and have them in one Operations and Maintenance Manual, readily available to persons required to perform such tasks and for inspection by FRA and FRA-certified state inspectors.
- (b) Plans required for proper maintenance, repair, inspection, and testing of safety-critical PTC systems must be adequate in detail and must be made available for inspection by FRA and FRA-certified state inspectors where such PTC systems are deployed or maintained. They must identify all software versions, revisions, and revision dates. Plans must be legible and correct.
- (c) Hardware, software, and firmware revisions must be documented in the Operations and Maintenance Manual according to the railroad's configuration management control plan and any additional configuration/revision control measures specified in the PTCDP and PTCSF.

- (d) Safety-critical components, including spare equipment, must be positively identified, handled, replaced, and repaired in accordance with the procedures specified in the PTCDP and PTCSF.
- (e) Each railroad shall designate in its Operations and Maintenance Manual an appropriate railroad officer responsible for issues relating to scheduled interruptions of service contemplated by § 236.1029.

§ 236.1041 Training and qualification program, general.

- (a) **Training program for PTC personnel.** Employers shall establish and implement training and qualification programs for PTC systems subject to this subpart. These programs must meet the minimum requirements set forth in the PTCDP and PTCSF in §§ 236.1039 through 236.1045, as appropriate, for the following personnel:
 - (1) Persons whose duties include installing, maintaining, repairing, modifying, inspecting, and testing safety-critical elements of the railroad's PTC systems, including central office, wayside, or onboard subsystems;
 - (2) Persons who dispatch train operations (issue or communicate any mandatory directive that is executed or enforced, or is intended to be executed or enforced, by a train control system subject to this subpart);
 - (3) Persons who operate trains or serve as a train or engine crew member subject to instruction and testing under part 217 of this chapter, on a train operating in territory where a train control system subject to this subpart is in use;
 - (4) Roadway workers whose duties require them to know and understand how a train control system affects their safety and how to avoid interfering with its proper functioning; and
 - (5) The direct supervisors of persons listed in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(4) of this section.
- (b) **Competencies.** The employer's program must provide training for persons who perform the functions described in paragraph (a) of this section to ensure that they have the necessary knowledge and skills to effectively complete their duties related to operation and maintenance of the PTC system.

§ 236.1043 Task analysis and basic requirements.

- (a) **Training structure and delivery.** As part of the program required by § 236.1041, the employer shall, at a minimum:
 - (1) Identify the specific goals of the training program with regard to the target population (craft, experience level, scope of work, etc.), task(s), and desired success rate;
 - (2) Based on a formal task analysis, identify the installation, maintenance, repair, modification, inspection, testing, and operating tasks that must be performed on a railroad's PTC systems. This includes the development of failure scenarios and the actions expected under such scenarios;
 - (3) Develop written procedures for the performance of the tasks identified;
 - (4) Identify the additional knowledge, skills, and abilities above those required for basic job performance necessary to perform each task;
 - (5) Develop a training and evaluation curriculum that includes classroom, simulator, computer-based, hands-on, or other formally structured training designed to impart the knowledge, skills, and abilities identified as necessary to perform each task;

- (6) Prior to assignment of related tasks, require all persons mentioned in § 236.1041(a) to successfully complete a training curriculum and pass an examination that covers the PTC system and appropriate rules and tasks for which they are responsible (however, such persons may perform such tasks under the direct onsite supervision of a qualified person prior to completing such training and passing the examination);
 - (7) Require periodic refresher training and evaluation at intervals specified in the PTCDP and PTCSP that includes classroom, simulator, computer-based, hands-on, or other formally structured training and testing, except with respect to basic skills for which proficiency is known to remain high as a result of frequent repetition of the task; and
 - (8) Conduct regular and periodic evaluations of the effectiveness of the training program specified in § 236.1041(a)(1) verifying the adequacy of the training material and its validity with respect to current railroads PTC systems and operations.
- (b) **Training records.** Employers shall retain records which designate persons who are qualified under this section until new designations are recorded or for at least one year after such persons leave applicable service. These records shall be kept in a designated location and be available for inspection and replication by FRA and FRA-certified State inspectors

§ 236.1045 Training specific to office control personnel.

- (a) Any person responsible for issuing or communicating mandatory directives in territory where PTC systems are or will be in use shall be trained in the following areas, as applicable:
 - (1) Instructions concerning the interface between the computer-aided dispatching system and the train control system, with respect to the safe movement of trains and other on-track equipment;
 - (2) Railroad operating rules applicable to the train control system, including provision for movement and protection of roadway workers, unequipped trains, trains with failed or cut-out train control onboard systems, and other on-track equipment; and
 - (3) Instructions concerning control of trains and other on-track equipment in case the train control system fails, including periodic practical exercises or simulations, and operational testing under part 217 of this chapter to ensure the continued capability of the personnel to provide for safe operations under the alternative method of operation.
- (b) [Reserved]

§ 236.1047 Training specific to locomotive engineers and other operating personnel.

- (a) **Operating personnel.** Training provided under this subpart for any locomotive engineer or other person who participates in the operation of a train in train control territory shall be defined in the PTCDP as well as the PTCSP. The following elements shall be addressed:
 - (1) Familiarization with train control equipment onboard the locomotive and the functioning of that equipment as part of the system and in relation to other onboard systems under that person's control;
 - (2) Any actions required of the onboard personnel to enable, or enter data to, the system, such as consist data, and the role of that function in the safe operation of the train;
 - (3) Sequencing of interventions by the system, including pre-enforcement notification, enforcement notification, penalty application initiation and post-penalty application procedures;

- (4) Railroad operating rules and testing (part 217) applicable to the train control system, including provisions for movement and protection of any unequipped trains, or trains with failed or cut-out train control onboard systems and other on-track equipment;
 - (5) Means to detect deviations from proper functioning of onboard train control equipment and instructions regarding the actions to be taken with respect to control of the train and notification of designated railroad personnel; and
 - (6) Information needed to prevent unintentional interference with the proper functioning of onboard train control equipment.
- (b) **Locomotive engineer training.** Training required under this subpart for a locomotive engineer, together with required records, shall be integrated into the program of training required by part 240 of this chapter.
- (c) **Full automatic operation.** The following special requirements apply in the event a train control system is used to effect full automatic operation of the train:
- (1) The PTCDP and PTCSP shall identify all safety hazards to be mitigated by the locomotive engineer.
 - (2) The PTCDP and PTCSP shall address and describe the training required with provisions for the maintenance of skills proficiency. As a minimum, the training program must:
 - (i) As described in § 236.1043(a)(2), develop failure scenarios which incorporate the safety hazards identified in the PTCDP and PTCSP including the return of train operations to a fully manual mode;
 - (ii) Provide training, consistent with § 236.1047(a), for safe train operations under all failure scenarios and identified safety hazards that affect train operations;
 - (iii) Provide training, consistent with § 236.1047(a), for safe train operations under manual control; and
 - (iv) Consistent with § 236.1047(a), ensure maintenance of manual train operating skills by requiring manual starting and stopping of the train for an appropriate number of trips and by one or more of the following methods:
 - (A) Manual operation of a train for a 4-hour work period;
 - (B) Simulated manual operation of a train for a minimum of 4 hours in a Type I simulator as required; or
 - (C) Other means as determined following consultation between the railroad and designated representatives of the affected employees and approved by FRA. The PTCDP and PTCSP shall designate the appropriate frequency when manual operation, starting, and stopping must be conducted, and the appropriate frequency of simulated manual operation.
- (d) **Conductor training.** Training required under this subpart for a conductor, together with required records, shall be integrated into the program of training required under this chapter.

§ 236.1049 Training specific to roadway workers.

- (a) **Roadway worker training.** Training required under this subpart for a roadway worker shall be integrated into the program of instruction required under part 214, subpart C of this chapter ("Roadway Worker Protection"), consistent with task analysis requirements of § 236.1043. This training shall provide instruction for roadway workers who provide protection for themselves or roadway work groups.

(b) **Training subject areas.**

- (1) Instruction for roadway workers shall ensure an understanding of the role of processor-based signal and train control equipment in establishing protection for roadway workers and their equipment.
- (2) Instruction for all roadway workers working in territories where PTC is required under this subpart shall ensure recognition of processor-based signal and train control equipment on the wayside and an understanding of how to avoid interference with its proper functioning.
- (3) Instructions concerning the recognition of system failures and the provision of alternative methods of on-track safety in case the train control system fails, including periodic practical exercises or simulations and operational testing under part 217 of this chapter to ensure the continued capability of roadway workers to be free from the danger of being struck by a moving train or other on-track equipment.

Appendix A to Part 236 [Reserved]

Appendix B to Part 236 - Risk Assessment Criteria

The safety-critical performance of each product for which risk assessment is required under this part must be assessed in accordance with the following minimum criteria or other criteria if demonstrated to the Associate Administrator for Safety to be equally suitable:

- (a) **How are risk metrics to be expressed?** The risk metric for the proposed product must describe with a high degree of confidence the accumulated risk of a train control system that operates over the designated life-cycle of the product. Each risk metric for the proposed product must be expressed with an upper bound, as estimated with a sensitivity analysis, and the risk value selected must be demonstrated to have a high degree of confidence.
- (b) **How does the risk assessment handle interaction risks for interconnected subsystems/components?** The risk assessment of each safety-critical system (product) must account not only for the risks associated with each subsystem or component, but also for the risks associated with interactions (interfaces) between such subsystems.
- (c) **What is the main principle in computing risk for the previous and current conditions?** The risk for the previous condition must be computed using the same metrics as for the new system being proposed. A full risk assessment must consider the entire railroad environment where the product is being applied, and show all aspects of the previous condition that are affected by the installation of the product, considering all faults, operating errors, exposure scenarios, and consequences that are related as described in this part. For the full risk assessment, the total societal cost of the potential numbers of accidents assessed for both previous and new system conditions must be computed for comparison. An abbreviated risk assessment must, as a minimum, clearly compute the MTTHE for all of the hazardous events identified for both previous and current conditions. The comparison between MTTHE for both conditions is to determine whether the product implementation meets the safety criteria as required by subpart H or subpart I of this part as applicable.
- (d) **What major system characteristics must be included when relevant to risk assessment?** Each risk calculation must consider the total signaling and train control system and method of operation, as subjected to a list of hazards to be mitigated by the signaling and train control system. The methodology requirements must include the following major characteristics, when they are relevant to the product being considered:

- (1) Track plan infrastructure, switches, rail crossings at grade and highway-rail grade crossings as applicable;
 - (2) Train movement density for freight, work, and passenger trains where applicable and computed over a time span of not less than 12 months;
 - (3) Train movement operational rules, as enforced by the dispatcher, roadway worker/Employee in Charge, and train crew behaviors;
 - (4) Wayside subsystems and components;
 - (5) Onboard subsystems and components;
 - (6) Consist contents such as hazardous material, oversize loads; and
 - (7) Operating speeds if the provisions of part 236 cite additional requirements for certain type of train control systems to be used at such speeds for freight and passenger trains.
- (e) ***What other relevant parameters must be determined for the subsystems and components?*** In order to derive the frequency of hazardous events (or MTTHE) applicable for a product, subsystem or component included in the risk assessment, the railroad may use various techniques, such as reliability and availability calculations for subsystems and components, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) of the subsystems, and results of the application of safety design principles as noted in Appendix C to this part. The MTTHE is to be derived for both fail-safe and non-fail-safe subsystems or components. The lower bounds of the MTTF or MTBF determined from the system sensitivity analysis, which account for all necessary and well justified assumptions, may be used to represent the estimate of MTTHE for the associated non-fail-safe subsystem or component in the risk assessment.
- (f) ***How are processor-based subsystems/components assessed?***
- (1) An MTTHE value must be calculated for each processor-based subsystem or component, or both, indicating the safety-critical behavior of the integrated hardware/software subsystem or component, or both. The human factor impact must be included in the assessment, whenever applicable, to provide the integrated MTTHE value. The MTTHE calculation must consider the rates of failures caused by permanent, transient, and intermittent faults accounting for the fault coverage of the integrated hardware/software subsystem or component, phased-interval maintenance, and restoration of the detected failures.
 - (2) Software fault/failure analysis must be based on the assessment of the design and implementation of all safety-related software including the application code, its operating/executive program, COTS software, and associated device drivers, as well as historical performance data, analytical methods and experimental safety-critical performance testing performed on the subsystem or component. The software assessment process must demonstrate through repeatable predictive results that all software defects have been identified and corrected by process with a high degree of confidence.
- (g) ***How are non-processor-based subsystems/components assessed?***
- (1) The safety-critical behavior of all non-processor-based components, which are part of a processor-based system or subsystem, must be quantified with an MTTHE metric. The MTTHE assessment methodology must consider failures caused by permanent, transient, and intermittent faults, phase-interval maintenance and restoration of operation after failures and the effect of fault coverage of each non-processor-based subsystem or component.

- (2) MTTHE compliance verification and validation must be based on the assessment of the design for adequacy by a documented verification and validation process, historical performance data, analytical methods and experimental safety-critical performance testing performed on the subsystem or component. The non-processor-based quantification compliance must be demonstrated to have a high degree of confidence.
- (h) **What assumptions must be documented for risk assessment?**
- (1) The railroad shall document any assumptions regarding the derivation of risk metrics used. For example, for the full risk assessment, all assumptions made about each value of the parameters used in the calculation of total cost of accidents should be documented. For abbreviated risk assessment, all assumptions made for MTHHE derivation using existing reliability and availability data on the current system components should be documented. The railroad shall document these assumptions in such a form as to permit later comparisons with in-service experience.
 - (2) The railroad shall document any assumptions regarding human performance. The documentation shall be in such a form as to facilitate later comparisons with in-service experience.
 - (3) The railroad shall document any assumptions regarding software defects. These assumptions shall be in a form that permit the railroad to project the likelihood of detecting an in-service software defect. These assumptions shall be documented in such a form as to permit later comparisons with in-service experience.
 - (4) The railroad shall document all of the identified safety-critical fault paths to a mishap as predicted by the safety analysis methodology. The documentation shall be in such a form as to facilitate later comparisons with in-service faults.

[75 FR 2717, Jan. 15, 2010]

Appendix C to Part 236 - Safety Assurance Criteria and Processes

- (a) **What is the purpose of this appendix?** This appendix provides safety criteria and processes that the designer must use to develop and validate the product that meets safety requirements of this part. FRA uses the criteria and processes set forth in this appendix to evaluate the validity of safety targets and the results of system safety analyses provided in the RSPP, PSP, PTCIP, PTCDP, and PTCSPP documents as appropriate. An analysis performed under this appendix must:
- (1) Address each of the safety principles of paragraph (b) of this appendix, or explain why they are not relevant, and
 - (2) Employ a validation and verification process pursuant to paragraph (c) of this appendix.
- (b) **What safety principles must be followed during product development?** The designer shall address each of the following safety considerations principles when designing and demonstrating the safety of products covered by subpart H or I of this part. In the event that any of these principles are not followed, the PSP or PTCDP or PTCSPP shall state both the reason(s) for departure and the alternative(s) utilized to mitigate or eliminate the hazards associated with the design principle not followed.
- (1) **System safety under normal operating conditions.** The system (all its elements including hardware and software) must be designed to assure safe operation with no hazardous events under normal anticipated operating conditions with proper inputs and within the expected range of environmental conditions. All safety-critical functions must be performed properly under these normal conditions. The system shall operate safely even in the absence of prescribed operator actions or procedures.

The designer must identify and categorize all hazards that may lead to unsafe system operation. Hazards categorized as unacceptable, which are determined by hazard analysis, must be eliminated by design. Best effort shall also be made by the designer to eliminate by design the hazards categorized as undesirable. Those undesirable hazards that cannot be eliminated should be mitigated to the acceptable level as required by this part.

(2) **System safety under failures.**

- (i) It must be shown how the product is designed to eliminate or mitigate unsafe systematic failures - those conditions which can be attributed to human error that could occur at various stages throughout product development. This includes unsafe errors in the software due to human error in the software specification, design, or coding phases; human errors that could impact hardware design; unsafe conditions that could occur because of an improperly designed human-machine interface; installation and maintenance errors; and errors associated with making modifications.
- (ii) The product must be shown to operate safely under conditions of random hardware failures. This includes single hardware failures as well as multiple hardware failures that may occur at different times but remain undetected (latent) and react in combination with a subsequent failure at a later time to cause an unsafe operating situation. In instances involving a latent failure, a subsequent failure is similar to there being a single failure. In the event of a transient failure, and if so designed, the system should restart itself if it is safe to do so. Frequency of attempted restarts must be considered in the hazard analysis required by § 236.907(a)(8).
- (iii) There shall be no single point failures in the product that can result in hazards categorized as unacceptable or undesirable. Occurrence of credible single point failures that can result in hazards must be detected and the product must achieve a known safe state that eliminates the possibility of false activation of any physical appliance.
- (iv) If one non-self-revealing failure combined with a second failure can cause a hazard that is categorized as unacceptable or undesirable, then the second failure must be detected and the product must achieve a known safe state that eliminates the possibility of false activation of any physical appliance.
- (v) Another concern of multiple failures involves common mode failures in which two or more subsystems or components intended to compensate one another to perform the same function all fail by the same mode and result in unsafe conditions. This is of particular concern in instances in which two or more elements (hardware or software, or both) are used in combination to ensure safety. If a common mode failure exists, then any analysis performed under this appendix cannot rely on the assumption that failures are independent. Examples include: The use of redundancy in which two or more elements perform a given function in parallel and when one (hardware or software) element checks/monitors another element (of hardware or software) to help ensure its safe operation. Common mode failure relates to independence, which must be ensured in these instances. When dealing with the effects of hardware failure, the designer shall address the effects of the failure not only on other hardware, but also on the execution of the software, since hardware failures can greatly affect how the software operates.

(3) **Closed loop principle.** System design adhering to the closed loop principle requires that all conditions necessary for the existence of any permissive state or action be verified to be present before the permissive state or action can be initiated. Likewise the requisite conditions shall be verified to be continuously present for the permissive state or action to be maintained. This is in

contrast to allowing a permissive state or action to be initiated or maintained in the absence of detected failures. In addition, closed loop design requires that failure to perform a logical operation, or absence of a logical input, output or decision shall not cause an unsafe condition, i.e. system safety does not depend upon the occurrence of an action or logical decision.

- (4) **Safety assurance concepts.** The product design must include one or more of the following Safety Assurance Concepts as described in IEEE-1483 standard to ensure that failures are detected and the product is placed in a safe state. One or more different principles may be applied to each individual subsystem or component, depending on the safety design objectives of that part of the product.
- (i) **Design diversity and self-checking concept.** This concept requires that all critical functions be performed in diverse ways, using diverse software operations and/or diverse hardware channels, and that critical hardware be tested with Self-Checking routines. Permissive outputs are allowed only if the results of the diverse operations correspond, and the Self-Checking process reveals no failures in either execution of software or in any monitored input or output hardware. If the diverse operations do not agree or if the checking reveals critical failures, safety-critical functions and outputs must default to a known safe state.
 - (ii) **Checked redundancy concept.** The Checked Redundancy concept requires implementation of two or more identical, independent hardware units, each executing identical software and performing identical functions. A means is to be provided to periodically compare vital parameters and results of the independent redundant units, requiring agreement of all compared parameters to assert or maintain a permissive output. If the units do not agree, safety-critical functions and outputs must default to a known safe state.
 - (iii) **N-version programming concept.** This concept requires a processor-based product to use at least two software programs performing identical functions and executing concurrently in a cycle. The software programs must be written by independent teams, using different tools. The multiple independently written software programs comprise a redundant system, and may be executed either on separate hardware units (which may or may not be identical) or within one hardware unit. A means is to be provided to compare the results and output states of the multiple redundant software systems. If the system results do not agree, then the safety-critical functions and outputs must default to a known safe state.
 - (iv) **Numerical assurance concept.** This concept requires that the state of each vital parameter of the product or system be uniquely represented by a large encoded numerical value, such that permissive results are calculated by pseudo-randomly combining the representative numerical values of each of the critical constituent parameters of a permissive decision. Vital algorithms must be entirely represented by data structures containing numerical values with verified characteristics, and no vital decisions are to be made in the executing software, only by the numerical representations themselves. In the event of critical failures, the safety-critical functions and outputs must default to a known safe state.
 - (v) **Intrinsic fail-safe design concept.** Intrinsically fail-safe hardware circuits or systems are those that employ discrete mechanical and/or electrical components. The fail-safe operation for a product or subsystem designed using this principle concept requires a verification that the effect of every relevant failure mode of each component, and relevant combinations of component failure modes, be considered, analyzed, and documented. This is typically performed by a comprehensive failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) which must show no residual unmitigated failures. In the event of critical failures, the safety-critical functions and outputs must default to a known safe state.

- (5) **Human factor engineering principle.** The product design must sufficiently incorporate human factors engineering that is appropriate to the complexity of the product; the educational, mental, and physical capabilities of the intended operators and maintainers; the degree of required human interaction with the component; and the environment in which the product will be used.
- (6) **System safety under external influences.** The product must be shown to operate safely when subjected to different external influences, including:
 - (i) Electrical influences such as power supply anomalies/transients, abnormal/improper input conditions (e.g., outside of normal range inputs relative to amplitude and frequency, unusual combinations of inputs) including those related to a human operator, and others such as electromagnetic interference or electrostatic discharges, or both;
 - (ii) Mechanical influences such as vibration and shock; and
 - (iii) Climatic conditions such as temperature and humidity.
- (7) **System safety after modifications.** Safety must be ensured following modifications to the hardware or software, or both. All or some of the concerns identified in this paragraph may be applicable depending upon the nature and extent of the modifications. Such modifications must follow all of the concept, design, implementation and test processes and principles as documented in the PSP for the original product. Regression testing must be comprehensive and documented to include all scenarios which are affected by the change made, and the operating modes of the changed product during normal and failure state (fallback) operation.

(c) **What standards are acceptable for Verification and Validation?**

- (1) The standards employed for Verification or Validation, or both, of products subject to this subpart must be sufficient to support achievement of the applicable requirements of subpart H and subpart I of this part.
- (2) U.S. Department of Defense Military Standard (MIL-STD) 882C, "System Safety Program Requirements" (January 19, 1993), is recognized as providing appropriate risk analysis processes for incorporation into verification and validation standards.
- (3) The following standards designed for application to processor-based signal and train control systems are recognized as acceptable with respect to applicable elements of safety analysis required by subpart H and subpart I of this part. The latest versions of the standards listed below should be used unless otherwise provided.
 - (i) IEEE standards as follows:
 - (A) IEEE 1483-2000, Standard for the Verification of Vital Functions in Processor-Based Systems Used in Rail Transit Control.
 - (B) IEEE 1474.2-2003, Standard for user interface requirements in communications based train control (CBTC) systems.
 - (C) IEEE 1474.1-2004, Standard for Communications-Based Train Control (CBTC) Performance and Functional Requirements.
 - (ii) CENELEC Standards as follows:
 - (A) EN50129: 2003, Railway Applications: Communications, Signaling, and Processing Systems-Safety Related Electronic Systems for Signaling; and

- (B) EN50155:2001/A1:2002, Railway Applications: Electronic Equipment Used in Rolling Stock.
- (iii) ATCS Specification 200 Communications Systems Architecture.
- (iv) ATCS Specification 250 Message Formats.
- (v) AREMA 2009 Communications and Signal Manual of Recommended Practices, Part 16, Part 17, 21, and 23.
- (vi) Safety of High-Speed Ground Transportation Systems. Analytical Methodology for Safety Validation of Computer Controlled Subsystems. Volume II: Development of a Safety Validation Methodology. Final Report September 1995. Author: Jonathan F. Luedeke, Battelle. DOT/FRA/ORD-95/10.2.
- (vii) IEC 61508 (International Electrotechnical Commission), Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable/Electronic Safety (E/E/P/ES) Related Systems, Parts 1-7 as follows:
 - (A) IEC 61508-1 (1998-12) Part 1: General requirements and IEC 61508-1 Corr. (1999-05) Corrigendum 1 - Part 1: General Requirements.
 - (B) IEC 61508-2 (2000-05) Part 2: Requirements for electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems.
 - (C) IEC 61508-3 (1998-12) Part 3: Software requirements and IEC 61508-3 Corr. 1 (1999-04) Corrigendum 1 - Part 3: Software requirements.
 - (D) IEC 61508-4 (1998-12) Part 4: Definitions and abbreviations and IEC 61508-4 Corr. 1 (1999-04) Corrigendum 1 - Part 4: Definitions and abbreviations.
 - (E) IEC 61508-5 (1998-12) Part 5: Examples of methods for the determination of safety integrity levels and IEC 61508-5 Corr. 1 (1999-04) Corrigendum 1 - Part 5: Examples of methods for determination of safety integrity levels.
 - (F) IEC 61508-6 (2000-04) Part 6: Guidelines on the applications of IEC 61508-2 and -3.
 - (G) IEC 61508-7 (2000-03) Part 7: Overview of techniques and measures.
 - (H) IEC 62278: 2002, Railway Applications: Specification and Demonstration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS);
 - (I) IEC 62279: 2002 Railway Applications: Software for Railway Control and Protection Systems;
- (4) Use of unpublished standards, including proprietary standards, is authorized to the extent that such standards are shown to achieve the requirements of this part. However, any such standards shall be available for inspection and replication by FRA and for public examination in any public proceeding before the FRA to which they are relevant.
- (5) The various standards provided in this paragraph are for illustrative purposes only. Copies of these standards can be obtained in accordance with the following:
 - (i) U.S. government standards and technical publications may be obtained by contacting the federal National Technical Information Service, 5301 Shawnee Rd, Alexandria, VA 22312.
 - (ii) U.S. National Standards may be obtained by contacting the American National Standards Institute, 25 West 43rd Street, 4 Floor, New York, NY 10036.

- (iii) IEC Standards may be obtained by contacting the International Electrotechnical Commission, 3, rue de Varembé, P.O. Box 131 CH - 1211, GENEVA, 20, Switzerland.
- (iv) CENLEC Standards may be obtained by contacting any of one the national standards bodies that make up the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization.
- (v) IEEE standards may be obtained by contacting the IEEE Publications Office, 10662 Los Vaqueros Circle, P.O. Box 3014, Los Alamitos, CA 90720-1264.
- (vi) AREMA standards may be obtained from the American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way Association, 10003 Derekwood Lane, Suite 210, Lanham, MD 20706.

[75 FR 2718, Jan. 15, 2010]

Appendix D to Part 236 - Independent Review of Verification and Validation

- (a) This appendix provides minimum requirements for independent third-party assessment of product safety verification and validation pursuant to subpart H or subpart I of this part. The goal of this assessment is to provide an independent evaluation of the product manufacturer's utilization of safety design practices during the product's development and testing phases, as required by any mutually agreed upon controlling documents and standards and the applicable railroad's:
 - (1) Railroad Safety Program Plan (RSPP) and Product Safety Plan (PSP) for processor based systems developed under subpart H or,
 - (2) PTC Product Development Plan (PTCDP) and PTC Safety Plan (PTCSP) for PTC systems developed under subpart I.
- (b) The supplier may request advice and assistance of the reviewer concerning the actions identified in paragraphs (c) through (g) of this appendix. However, the reviewer shall not engage in any design efforts associated with the product, the products subsystems, or the products components, in order to preserve the reviewer's independence and maintain the supplier's proprietary right to the product.
- (c) The supplier shall provide the reviewer access to any and all documentation that the reviewer requests and attendance at any design review or walkthrough that the reviewer determines as necessary to complete and accomplish the third party assessment. The reviewer may be accompanied by representatives of FRA as necessary, in FRA's judgment, for FRA to monitor the assessment.
- (d) The reviewer shall evaluate the product with respect to safety and comment on the adequacy of the processes which the supplier applies to the design and development of the product. At a minimum, the reviewer shall compare the supplier processes with acceptable validation and verification methodology and employ any other such tests or comparisons if they have been agreed to previously with FRA. Based on these analyses, the reviewer shall identify and document any significant safety vulnerabilities which are not adequately mitigated by the supplier's (or user's) processes. Finally, the reviewer shall evaluate and document the adequacy of the railroad's
 - (1) RSPP, the PSP, and any other documents pertinent to a product being developed under subpart H of this part; or
 - (2) PTCDP and PTCSP for systems being developed under subpart I of this part.
- (e) The reviewer shall analyze the Hazard Log and/or any other hazard analysis documents for comprehensiveness and compliance with applicable railroad, vendor, supplier, industry, national, and international standards.

- (f) The reviewer shall analyze all Fault Tree Analyses (FTA), Failure Mode and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA), and other hazard analyses for completeness, correctness, and compliance with applicable railroad, vendor, supplier, industry, national and international standards.
- (g) The reviewer shall randomly select various safety-critical software, and hardware modules, if directed by FRA, for audit to verify whether the requirements of the applicable railroad, vendor, supplier, industry, national, and international standards were followed. The number of modules audited must be determined as a representative number sufficient to provide confidence that all unaudited modules were developed in compliance with the applicable railroad, vendor, supplier, industry, national, and international standards.
- (h) The reviewer shall evaluate and comment on the plan for installation and test procedures of the product for revenue service.
- (i) The reviewer shall prepare a final report of the assessment. The report shall be submitted to the railroad prior to the commencement of installation testing and contain at least the following information:
 - (1) Reviewer's evaluation of the adequacy of the PSP in the case of products developed under subpart H, or PTCSPP for products developed under subpart I of this part, including the supplier's MTTHE and risk estimates for the product, and the supplier's confidence interval in these estimates;
 - (2) Product vulnerabilities, potentially hazardous failure modes, or potentially hazardous operating circumstances which the reviewer felt were not adequately identified, tracked, mitigated, and corrected by either the vendor or supplier or the railroad;
 - (3) A clear statement of position for all parties involved for each product vulnerability cited by the reviewer;
 - (4) Identification of any documentation or information sought by the reviewer that was denied, incomplete, or inadequate;
 - (5) A listing of each applicable vendor, supplier, industry, national, or international standard, procedure or process which was not properly followed;
 - (6) Identification of the software verification and validation procedures, as well as the hardware verification validation procedures if deemed appropriate by FRA, for the product's safety-critical applications, and the reviewer's evaluation of the adequacy of these procedures;
 - (7) Methods employed by the product manufacturer to develop safety-critical software;
 - (8) If deemed applicable by FRA, the methods employed by the product manufacturer to develop safety-critical hardware by generally acceptable techniques;
 - (9) Method by which the supplier or railroad addresses comprehensiveness of the product design which considers the safety elements listed in paragraph (b) of appendix C to this part.

[75 FR 2720, Jan. 15, 2010]

Appendix E to Part 236 - Human-Machine Interface (HMI) Design

- (a) This appendix provides human factors design criteria applicable to both subpart H and subpart I of this part. HMI design criteria will minimize negative safety effects by causing designers to consider human factors in the development of HMIs. The product design should sufficiently incorporate human factors

engineering that is appropriate to the complexity of the product; the gender, educational, mental, and physical capabilities of the intended operators and maintainers; the degree of required human interaction with the component; and the environment in which the product will be used.

- (b) As used in this section, “designer” means anyone who specifies requirements for - or designs a system or subsystem, or both, for - a product subject to subpart H or subpart I of this part, and “operator” means any human who is intended to receive information from, provide information to, or perform repairs or maintenance on a safety-critical product subject to subpart H or I of this part.
- (c) Human factors issues the designers must consider with regard to the general function of a system include:
 - (1) **Reduced situational awareness and over-reliance.** HMI design must give an operator active functions to perform, feedback on the results of the operator's actions, and information on the automatic functions of the system as well as its performance. The operator must be “in-the-loop.” Designers must consider at a minimum the following methods of maintaining an active role for human operators:
 - (i) The system must require an operator to initiate action to operate the train and require an operator to remain “in-the-loop” for at least 30 minutes at a time;
 - (ii) The system must provide timely feedback to an operator regarding the system's automated actions, the reasons for such actions, and the effects of the operator's manual actions on the system;
 - (iii) The system must warn operators in advance when it requires an operator to take action;
 - (iv) HMI design must equalize an operator's workload; and
 - (v) HMI design must not distract from the operator's safety related duties.
 - (2) **Expectation of predictability and consistency in product behavior and communications.** HMI design must accommodate an operator's expectation of logical and consistent relationships between actions and results. Similar objects must behave consistently when an operator performs the same action upon them.
 - (3) **End user limited ability to process information.** HMI design must therefore minimize an operator's information processing load. To minimize information processing load, the designer must:
 - (i) Present integrated information that directly supports the variety and types of decisions that an operator makes;
 - (ii) Provide information in a format or representation that minimizes the time required to understand and act; and
 - (iii) Conduct utility tests of decision aids to establish clear benefits such as processing time saved or improved quality of decisions.
 - (4) **End user limited memory.** HMI design must therefore minimize an operator's information processing load.
 - (i) To minimize short-term memory load, the designer shall integrate data or information from multiple sources into a single format or representation (“chunking”) and design so that three or fewer “chunks” of information need to be remembered at any one time.

- (ii) To minimize long-term memory load, the designer shall design to support recognition memory, design memory aids to minimize the amount of information that must be recalled from unaided memory when making critical decisions, and promote active processing of the information.
- (d) Design systems that anticipate possible user errors and include capabilities to catch errors before they propagate through the system;
 - (1) Conduct cognitive task analyses prior to designing the system to better understand the information processing requirements of operators when making critical decisions; and
 - (2) Present information that accurately represents or predicts system states.
- (e) When creating displays and controls, the designer must consider user ergonomics and shall:
 - (1) Locate displays as close as possible to the controls that affect them;
 - (2) Locate displays and controls based on an operator's position;
 - (3) Arrange controls to minimize the need for the operator to change position;
 - (4) Arrange controls according to their expected order of use;
 - (5) Group similar controls together;
 - (6) Design for high stimulus-response compatibility (geometric and conceptual);
 - (7) Design safety-critical controls to require more than one positive action to activate (e.g., auto stick shift requires two movements to go into reverse);
 - (8) Design controls to allow easy recovery from error; and
 - (9) Design display and controls to reflect specific gender and physical limitations of the intended operators.
- (f) The designer shall also address information management. To that end, HMI design shall:
 - (1) Display information in a manner which emphasizes its relative importance;
 - (2) Comply with the ANSI/HFS 100-1988 standard;
 - (3) Utilize a display luminance that has a difference of at least 35cd/m² between the foreground and background (the displays should be capable of a minimum contrast 3:1 with 7:1 preferred, and controls should be provided to adjust the brightness level and contrast level);
 - (4) Display only the information necessary to the user;
 - (5) Where text is needed, use short, simple sentences or phrases with wording that an operator will understand and appropriate to the educational and cognitive capabilities of the intended operator;
 - (6) Use complete words where possible; where abbreviations are necessary, choose a commonly accepted abbreviation or consistent method and select commonly used terms and words that the operator will understand;
 - (7) Adopt a consistent format for all display screens by placing each design element in a consistent and specified location;
 - (8) Display critical information in the center of the operator's field of view by placing items that need to be found quickly in the upper left hand corner and items which are not time-critical in the lower right hand corner of the field of view;

- (9) Group items that belong together;
 - (10) Design all visual displays to meet human performance criteria under monochrome conditions and add color only if it will help the user in performing a task, and use color coding as a redundant coding technique;
 - (11) Limit the number of colors over a group of displays to no more than seven;
 - (12) Design warnings to match the level of risk or danger with the alerting nature of the signal; and
 - (13) With respect to information entry, avoid full QWERTY keyboards for data entry.
- (g) With respect to problem management, the HMI designer shall ensure that the:
- (1) HMI design must enhance an operator's situation awareness;
 - (2) HMI design must support response selection and scheduling; and
 - (3) HMI design must support contingency planning.
- (h) Ensure that electronics equipment radio frequency emissions are compliant with appropriate Federal Communications Commission regulations. The FCC rules and regulations are codified in Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).
- (1) Electronics equipment must have appropriate FCC Equipment Authorizations. The following documentation is applicable to obtaining FCC Equipment Authorization:
 - (i) OET Bulletin Number 61 (October, 1992 Supersedes May, 1987 issue) FCC Equipment Authorization Program for Radio Frequency Devices. This document provides an overview of the equipment authorization program to control radio interference from radio transmitters and certain other electronic products and an overview of how to obtain an equipment authorization.
 - (ii) OET Bulletin 63: (October 1993) Understanding The FCC Part 15 Regulations for Low Power, Non-Licensed Transmitters. This document provides a basic understanding of the FCC regulations for low power, unlicensed transmitters, and includes answers to some commonly-asked questions. This edition of the bulletin does not contain information concerning personal communication services (PCS) transmitters operating under Part 15, Subpart D of the rules.
 - (iii) 47 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 0 to 19. The FCC rules and regulations governing PCS transmitters may be found in 47 CFR, Parts 0 to 19.
 - (iv) OET Bulletin 62 (December 1993) Understanding The FCC Regulations for Computers and other Digital Devices. This document has been prepared to provide a basic understanding of the FCC regulations for digital (computing) devices, and includes answers to some commonly-asked questions.
 - (2) Designers must comply with FCC requirements for Maximum Permissible Exposure limits for field strength and power density for the transmitters operating at frequencies of 300 kHz to 100 GHz and specific absorption rate (SAR) limits for devices operating within close proximity to the body. The Commission's requirements are detailed in parts 1 and 2 of the FCC's Rules and Regulations (47 CFR 1.1307(b), 1.1310, 2.1091, 2.1093). The following documentation is applicable to demonstrating whether proposed or existing transmitting facilities, operations or devices comply with limits for human exposure to radiofrequency RF fields adopted by the FCC:
 - (i) OET Bulletin No. 65 (Edition 97-01, August 1997), "Evaluating Compliance With FCC Guidelines For Human Exposure To Radiofrequency Electromagnetic Fields",

- (ii) OET Bulletin No 65 Supplement A, (Edition 97-01, August 1997), OET Bulletin No 65 Supplement B (Edition 97-01, August 1997) and
 - (iii) OET Bulletin No 65 Supplement C (Edition 01-01, June 2001).
- (3) The bulletin and supplements offer guidelines and suggestions for evaluating compliance. However, they are not intended to establish mandatory procedures. Other methods and procedures may be acceptable if based on sound engineering practice.

[75 FR 2720, Feb. 15, 2010]

Appendix F to Part 236 - Minimum Requirements of FRA Directed Independent Third-Party Assessment of PTC System Safety Verification and Validation

- (a) This appendix provides minimum requirements for mandatory independent third-party assessment of PTC system safety verification and validation pursuant to subpart H or I of this part. The goal of this assessment is to provide an independent evaluation of the PTC system manufacturer's utilization of safety design practices during the PTC system's development and testing phases, as required by the applicable PSP, PTCDP, and PTCSF, the applicable requirements of subpart H or I of this part, and any other previously agreed-upon controlling documents or standards.
- (b) The supplier may request advice and assistance of the independent third-party reviewer concerning the actions identified in paragraphs (c) through (g) of this appendix. However, the reviewer should not engage in design efforts in order to preserve the reviewer's independence and maintain the supplier's proprietary right to the PTC system.
- (c) The supplier shall provide the reviewer access to any and all documentation that the reviewer requests and attendance at any design review or walkthrough that the reviewer determines as necessary to complete and accomplish the third party assessment. The reviewer may be accompanied by representatives of FRA as necessary, in FRA's judgment, for FRA to monitor the assessment.
- (d) The reviewer shall evaluate with respect to safety and comment on the adequacy of the processes which the supplier applies to the design and development of the PTC system. At a minimum, the reviewer shall evaluate the supplier design and development process regarding the use of an appropriate design methodology. The reviewer may use the comparison processes and test procedures that have been previously agreed to with FRA. Based on these analyses, the reviewer shall identify and document any significant safety vulnerabilities which are not adequately mitigated by the supplier's (or user's) processes. Finally, the reviewer shall evaluate the adequacy of the railroad's applicable PSP or PTCSF, and any other documents pertinent to the PTC system being assessed.
- (e) The reviewer shall analyze the Hazard Log and/or any other hazard analysis documents for comprehensiveness and compliance with railroad, vendor, supplier, industry, national, or international standards.
- (f) The reviewer shall analyze all Fault Tree Analyses (FTA), Failure Mode and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA), and other hazard analyses for completeness, correctness, and compliance with railroad, vendor, supplier, industry, national, or international standards.

- (g) The reviewer shall randomly select various safety-critical software modules, as well as safety-critical hardware components if required by FRA for audit to verify whether the railroad, vendor, supplier, industry, national, or international standards were followed. The number of modules audited must be determined as a representative number sufficient to provide confidence that all unaudited modules were developed in compliance with railroad, vendor, supplier, industry, national, or international standards
- (h) The reviewer shall evaluate and comment on the plan for installation and test procedures of the PTC system for revenue service.
- (i) The reviewer shall prepare a final report of the assessment. The report shall be submitted to the railroad prior to the commencement of installation testing and contain at least the following information:
 - (1) Reviewer's evaluation of the adequacy of the PSP or PTCSP including the supplier's MTTHE and risk estimates for the PTC system, and the supplier's confidence interval in these estimates;
 - (2) PTC system vulnerabilities, potentially hazardous failure modes, or potentially hazardous operating circumstances which the reviewer felt were not adequately identified, tracked or mitigated;
 - (3) A clear statement of position for all parties involved for each PTC system vulnerability cited by the reviewer;
 - (4) Identification of any documentation or information sought by the reviewer that was denied, incomplete, or inadequate;
 - (5) A listing of each applicable vendor, supplier, industry, national or international standard, process, or procedure which was not properly followed;
 - (6) Identification of the hardware and software verification and validation procedures for the PTC system's safety-critical applications, and the reviewer's evaluation of the adequacy of these procedures;
 - (7) Methods employed by PTC system manufacturer to develop safety-critical software; and
 - (8) If directed by FRA, methods employed by PTC system manufacturer to develop safety-critical hardware.

[75 FR 2721, Jan. 15, 2010]