



Public Comment on 2024 Election Administration and Voting Survey

(EAC-2026-0001)

March 16, 2026

ATTN: EAVS
Election Assistance Commission
633 3rd St NW
Suite 200
Washington, DC 20001

We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments on the 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS). The Center for Election Innovation & Research (CEIR) is committed to supporting election officials with practical analysis and informing the public about how elections work through rigorous research of election policy and data. EAVS and the accompanying Policy Survey are critical sources of information in this research.

The Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) is a singular and essential source for understanding elections within and between states. Notably, it is the most comprehensive source of election information that is standardized to permit comparisons across jurisdictions at the state and local level. However, this crucial function is limited when responses do not provide adequate context for meaningful analysis. Even worse, the important transparency that EAVS provides can cause perfectly explainable data patterns to take on a life of their own when they lack proper context.

The CEIR Research team is grateful for this opportunity to support the proper interpretation and analysis of EAVS data and policy responses. To that end, we offer the following list of suggestions to promote more precision, standardization, and proper context in future iterations of EAVS and the Policy Survey. These suggestions are offered to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected, increasing transparency, consistent understanding, and ease of use. Additionally, these suggestions are offered in the spirit of reducing the overall burden of information collection on responding election officials, by reducing the need for researchers to follow-up with individual states to clarify details of their submissions.



Election Administration Policy Survey

Suggestion 1: Require states to describe changes to election policy and implementation between survey years

We recommend requiring responding states to indicate whether their response to the policy survey represents a change in policy from the state's previous submission. In addition, we recommend requiring states to describe changes to policy implementation in practice. This information helps contextualize the data jurisdictions submit and allows for more accurate and nuanced policy analysis.

These changes would greatly improve ease of interpretation for responses across years and help clarify whether a change in a state's response to EAVS across years reflects a difference in question interpretation or an actual change in election policy.

This approach might entail adapting a question format from former statutory overviews for future iterations of the Election Administration Policy Survey Instrument.

As an example, one of Washington, D.C.'s responses from the 2014 statutory overview survey is included below:

B7. Does your state currently use the Internet in any way to facilitate voter registration? If yes, please describe how your state allows voters to use the Internet in the registration process (e.g., entire registration completed online; completed online but then must be printed, signed, and mailed by voter, etc.).

 No Change Since 2012 X **Changed Since 2012**

2012 Response:

[Begin response to above question (B7) below this line.]

YES. A voter can fill out an application to register to vote on-line but the voter must print, sign and mail the application to the agency in order for the registration to be valid.

The Board has also developed a mobile app, called Vote4DC, that allows users with a smartphone or mobile tablet to register fully online by signing the screen of their device.

The response indicates that online voter registration was implemented in Washington, D.C. after 2012 and describes the form of online voter registration in place. The form of online voter registration may provide relevant context when analyzing registration rates. The substantive information also allows us to conduct more in-depth analysis of state policies, which can help inform state officials that are considering implementing or changing their policies.



Suggestion 2: Require text entries alongside responses that include an “Other” selection

To ensure meaningful interpretation of “Other” responses, we recommend requiring responding states to use the accompanying text entry field whenever “Other” is selected.

In the 2024 Election Administration and Policy survey, many questions provide an “Other” option followed by “please describe” or “please specify” .¹ However, in the data, Policy Survey Version 2.0 (released February 12, 2026), a couple responses that included “Other” selections did not have text in this corresponding field, indicating that this field was not required to submit a survey response.

The 2026 Election Administration and Policy survey instrument draft retains many of these “Other” options followed by “please describe” or “please specify” but does not indicate whether this will be a required field.

Interpreting responses that include a “Other” option is currently dependent on this voluntary text submission. Without these qualitative explanations, it is impossible to know whether states are interpreting questions comparably without conducting further additional outreach that undermines the value of EAVS and increases burdens on election officials.

Election Administration and Voting Survey

Suggestion 1: Require text entries alongside responses categorized as “Other”

To ensure meaningful interpretation of values submitted within any given “Other” category, we recommend requiring respondents to use the accompanying text entry field whenever “Other” is selected. This means that any submission that includes values (other than “0”; “Does not apply”; or “Data not available”) in “Other” categories would not be considered complete without a corresponding text response.

In the 2024 EAVS survey instrument, questions with “Other” categories (A1d, A3g-A3i, A9f-A9n, A10g-A10i, A11l-A11n, A12i-A12k) collect information on observations that do not fall within

¹ Q4a, Q5a-i, Q6, Q7, Q8, Q8a, Q9a, Q10, Q11b, Q12a, Q15, Q17, Q18a, Q19, Q21, Q22a, Q26a, Q27e, Q28a, Q28c, Q31, Q32, Q32a, Q32c, Q32d, Q33, Q33a, Q33b, Q36a, Q36b, Q36c, Q37b, Q38, Q40, Q41, Q42, Q46a, Q46d, Q48, Q48a, Q49, Q49a, Q49b, Q51a, Q51b, Q51c



the preceding specified categories. These questions are currently accompanied by text field that respondents *may* use to explain the meaning of “Other” in the context of their state or locality. The section entitled “Instructions for Completing the 2024 Election Administration and Voting Survey” includes the following text:

4. Please attempt to record data according to the categories as they are defined in the question. If your local jurisdiction uses a different data classification scheme (for instance, your jurisdiction collects data in such a way that combines two or more categories listed in a question), then you can use the space for “Other” to provide numbers and details for these categories. If you report information in the “Other” field, please use the comment box to provide an explanation for the answer.

However, in the 2024 EAVS Datasets Version 1.0 (released June 30, 2025), a few jurisdiction responses that included “Other” selections did not have text in this corresponding field, indicating that this field was not required to submit a survey response.

Proper interpretation of values submitted under a given “Other” category entirely depends on this voluntary text submission explaining the reason for using this “Other” category. Text entries respondents provide alongside “Other” responses are necessary to analyze the corresponding values. Without these qualitative explanations, it is impossible to know whether jurisdictions (within a given state or across different ones) are interpreting questions comparably without conducting further additional outreach that undermines the value of EAVS and increases burdens on election officials.

Suggestion 2: Distinguish “registration forms” from “registration transactions” in questions A3-A9.

For questions about list maintenance procedures, we recommend further clarification of the terms used in questions about list maintenance to ensure uniform interpretation of the requested value categories, restore the ability to compare values across years, and maximize internal consistency of data. This may include returning to the use of the term “*registration forms*” (as was done in the 2022 EAVS and prior surveys). The switch to “*registration transactions*” in the 2024 EAVS Survey (retained in the proposed 2026 survey) engendered some responses that appear to include back-end list maintenance procedures, limiting comparisons across years. We respectfully request that steps are taken to clarify the difference for responding election officials and, if necessary, that questions about each type of record interaction are asked separately.

In the 2026 EAVS survey instrument draft, questions A3-A9 collect the number of registration transactions processed within the 2-year period between elections. The definition that accompanies this section is included below:



- **Transaction:** Any change to a voter’s registration record, including:
 - Adding a new voter
 - Updating details like name, contact info, or address
 - Removing someone who is no longer eligible to vote
 - When a voter moves to a new jurisdiction

This definition includes “removing someone who is no longer eligible,” which is a topic already included in the Voter Registration List Maintenance section of the 2026 survey instrument draft (A12a-A12k). This double-coverage of the removals – as well as the ambiguity of defining a term based on an inexhaustive list of what it includes – is likely to create confusion for responding election officials and anyone analyzing the resulting data.

The definition of “registration transactions” in the 2026 draft appears to be a condensed version of the definition provided in the 2024 EAVS survey instrument, included below:

For EAVS, a registration transaction is defined as a unit of work performed to a voter registration record within a voter registration database. Transactions may involve adding a new registration record, updating the record of an existing registered voter (such as updating the voter’s name, contact information, or address), or removing a record if the individual is no longer an eligible voter. Multiple transactions may be performed on one voter registration record during the period between the close of registration for the 2022 general election and the close of registration for the 2024 general election. In addition, when a voter moves between jurisdictions, it may trigger registration transactions in the jurisdiction that the voter was previously registered as well as in the jurisdiction that the voter is newly registered.

These definitions can be interpreted as including both (1) registration applications or other forms that require an interaction with an existing or potential registrant and (2) back-end list maintenance procedures, multiple of which may be performed on a single record without any voter interaction. Our analyses of 2024 EAVS data suggests that different states did indeed interpret this definition differently, limiting the ability to make meaningful comparisons or analysis of this data.

The use of this term in 2024 was a change from prior years, further limiting comparison. The definition that accompanies the comparable section of the 2022 EAVS survey instrument (Questions A3-A7) is included below:

These questions ask about the number of registration forms processed in your jurisdiction from the close of registration for the November 2020 general election through the close of registration for the November 2022 general election. For example, a state with a voter registration deadline of 15 days before Election Day should include all forms received 14 days before the 2020 Election Day through 15 days before the 2022 Election Day. In states with SDR or Election Day registration, all registrations received after the close of the polls on Election Day in 2020 until the close of the polls on Election Day 2022 should be included in your answers.



This definition can be interpreted as *only* including registration applications or other forms that result from an interaction with an existing or potential registrant. A similar interpretation can be drawn from previous iterations of the survey instrument back until at least 2016.

The 2024 definition of “*registration transactions*” did not map cleanly onto the given subcategories (A3b-A3f, reproduced below). For example, it is possible that a list maintenance operation to change a record from “active” to “inactive” does not fall clearly within one of the given subcategories because it does not result in a change to the individual’s identifying information within a record. This forced the use of “Other” options (A3g-A3h), which are not standardized across submissions.

<p>A3b. <u>New valid registrations (excluding pre-registrations of people under the age of 18):</u></p> <p>All successful registration transactions that were not invalidated or rejected and did not duplicate or modify a previously existing registration in the jurisdiction.</p>
<p>A3c. <u>New valid pre-registrations of people under the age of 18:</u></p> <p>Individuals who registered under a pre-registration program and were not yet eligible to vote in the 2024 general election under your state’s law. When a pre-registered individual becomes eligible to vote, this transaction should be reported in A3b. Invalid pre-registrations should be reported in A3f.</p>
<p>A3d. <u>Duplicates of existing valid registrations:</u></p> <p>Registration transactions submitted by persons already registered to vote at the same address, under the same name and personal information (e.g., date of birth, social security number, driver’s license), and with the same political party (where applicable).</p>
<p>A3e. <u>Updates to existing valid registrations:</u></p> <p>Registration transactions that modified or edited voter information for individuals with a current, valid registration in the jurisdiction. Examples of updates include a change to the individual’s name, contact information, address (either within the same jurisdiction or an address change that crossed jurisdiction borders), or political party (where applicable).</p>
<p>A3f. <u>Invalid or rejected transactions (other than duplicates):</u></p> <p>Transactions that did not meet the requirements of eligibility because they were not completed properly, or the individual was not eligible to register to vote in your jurisdiction.</p>

This issue is addressed in the 2026 survey instrument draft by adding clarifying language to question A3e, included below:

A3e. Updates to existing valid registrations:

Of the total in A3a, how many transactions were updates to voter registration records for people who were already registered in your jurisdiction?

Examples of updates include:

- A change to a person’s name, contact details, or address
- A change to their political party
- Any update to the voter’s status, including if it was changed to cancelled or inactive

This new wording of question A3e includes examples of “updates to existing valid registrations” that are meaningful updates to voter information originating from voters themselves (first two bullets) or back-end list maintenance updates (last bullet). This makes it impossible to separately identify the number of voter-driven updates or to compare this value to results from before 2024.


Additionally, the current definition of “*registration transactions*” does not map cleanly onto the given registration sources (A4a-A4k). A record flag or activity status recategorization may come from sources such as NCOA, SSDI, ERIC or other interstate data sharing, SAVE, or another source other than the state agencies listed. This also forces the use of “Other” options (A4i-A4n), which are not standardized across submissions.

The challenges of mapping the current definition of “*registration transactions*” onto existing source and result sub-categories (A4-A9) could be addressed by adding a category (row) to the question matrix for any source of list maintenance information (NCOA, SSDI, interstate data sharing, SAVE, etc.).

Suggestion 3: Request states provide the date on which the data report was generated to satisfy a given question and/or section

We recommend that questions in “Section A: Voter Registration” include an additional field for the corresponding date on which the value was generated. This change would provide valuable context for comparisons between jurisdictions and reduce the possibility for misinterpretation.

Data submitted to EAVS is often compared to public data, published by jurisdictions on their websites. Some values, such as “total votes,” are officially certified or generally static and should be identical between EAVS and other sources such as state websites. However, values in “Section A: Voter Registration” are dynamic and change from one day to the next. For example, the number of total registered voters changes over time as people move, die, become eligible to vote, or experience other life changes that cause them to be added to or removed from the voter list. For this value and others like it in Section A, it is important to know exactly when data is generated for the EAVS submission.



The inclusion of dates alongside values in Section A would also confirm whether subcategory values for a given set of questions were calculated on the same date. If this were not the case, it would explain small discrepancies that sometimes exist between the total value submitted for a section and the sum value across subcategories. The inclusion of a date would thus contextualize the built-in logic checks of EAVS and improve confidence in the quality of the data overall.

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-0002
Comment from Langelier, Gerry

Submitter Information

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General Comment

The best thing you could do for those trying to guide and/or administer elections where the resources for "early in person" voting get traded off against "mailed-out ballot voting" is the following:

1. Make sure the instructions state clearly you want the data for those two models submitted separately. Some states clearly aggregate them into an "absentee" bucket. That doesn't help either policy makers nor administrators plan how they allocate money, and also doesn't educate states about how other states do things differently (for better or worse).

For mailed-out ballot voting, please get states to separate ballots returned by mail versus those returned by secure drop boxes (I think you did this in 2024, successfully - thank you).

What you could add, especially in light of the recent Supreme Court decision, is to have states differentiate between mailed-out ballots that were returned by Election Day, and those that were postmarked by Election Day, but received after but still within whatever the state deems an acceptable number of days.(obviously for those states that allow for "postmarked by" deadlines.)

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-0003
Comment from lewis, jeffrey g

Submitter Information

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General Comment

Allowing an "Honor System for Voter ID" opens our elections up from fraud.
An Illegal Emigrant here in Washington State had voted 4 times, the person was challenged in court and the Judge ruled NOT Guilty.
This is what legal citizens across the USA are up against (by the millions).
Thousands of Mail in Ballots sent to addresses like (laundry mat, vacant lot, Walmart, etc.) in almost every State.
Election Ballot Counting Machines allowing software manipulation both onsite and offsite (via internal WiFi and or Cell Modems).
This list goes on and on.
Legal discovery is being made now almost every week and evidence being make to millions of legal citizens.
Illegal votes dilute the legal citizens voting pool.
Please consider changing the system and get on the right side of history as millions upon millions are watching this unfold.
They are taking notes.
Thank you,
Jeff Lewis

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-0004
Comment from Anonymous

Submitter Information

Name: Anonymous Anonymous

General Comment

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EAC-2026-0001

OMB Pending

Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Title: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Notification of Statement of Policy for Direct Final Rule and immediate affect upon review, under the Acts of Congress and the Constitution of the United States.

I am requesting Approval and an Exemption for the Application for appointment to the Administration of the Executive Branch, under the United States Election Assistance Commission and the Office of Management and Budget and the Director, under the enactment of the Help America Vote Act of 2002, on my behalf and Presidential Executive Orders, to all for civilian employee engagement of contracts, agreements, judicial review and voting rights for National Security and National Defense on behalf of the United States, under all agencies of the Federal Government's implementation plan and strategy. Effective 01/23/2026

This is my Final Decision and Opinion for Rule Making Policy for Direct Final Rule Enforcement of the Department of Transportation and Defense' Operating Administration for immediate effect and Agency Action upon receipt and notification from the President of the United States. Thank you

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

As of: 3/10/26, 2:34 PM
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Docket: EAC-2026-0001
2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-0005
Comment from Glynn, Earl

Submitter Information

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General Comment

Much of the information in the EAC EAVS report is not available without formal open records requests in the states, which can be time consuming and costly. The EAC EAVS requirements should be modified to mandate states publish, maintain, and update the equivalent of the EAC EAVS information for all jurisdictions in the state on a state website, so it's not necessary to wait two years to get an update from the EAC. The mandated state updates should be made on at least a semiannual basis. Why should it be so difficult to get updated versions of this information?

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-0006
Comment from Anonymous

Submitter Information

Name: Anonymous Anonymous

General Comment

This may not be the correct forum for my comment, but I will let you decide what to do with it: I am very concerned that the Trump administration will have a hand in all of this and will set election rules that limit voters' rights. I would like know if there are strong restrictions in place to prevent this. If I may say so, free state-run elections are sacrosanct and, while I can appreciate the standardization of voting/election "mechanics", I abhor the thought that obstacles might be put in place soon that would limit eligible citizens' right to vote. I am also concerned about the Electoral College and how it might be manipulated to skew voting results. I hope these comments can be of some value as a reflection of those who do not know that they could have a voice in Federal Regulations in the decision-making process--if this is indeed true.

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

As of: 3/10/26, 2:36 PM
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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-0007
Comment from Anonymous

Submitter Information

Name: Anonymous Anonymous

General Comment

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EAC-2026-0001

Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey
Notification of Requirement

I am requesting Approval and for an Exception for the Mail Voter Registration Application, on my behalf and as Federally Recognized Tribe Member, and request the Enactments of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, the REAL ID Act of 2005, the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Social Security Act as established enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, to allow for documentary proof that I am a Citizen of the United States, upon the requirements after the date of the SAVE Act, under Oath by my written statement of judicial form of affirmation by reference of incorporation in the States of the United States by association by import. Effective 02/14/2026

I am requesting the Secretary of Homeland Security to utilize the System for Verification of Immigration status on my behalf, and to a Certificate of Citizenship on my behalf, as verified by the System for the confirmation and verification that I am a United States Citizen, and will provide all necessary documentation for my request for correction required to Register to Vote in an Election for Federal Office in the State subject to the requirements in the Administration of the Executive Branch. This will allow for the required time-line for the administration to notify all of the relevant parties responsible, the notification to the Election Assistance Commission, and the Election Officials of my naturalization confirmation, per this written statement of my request, to allow documentation to be provided in accordance with the timeline defined by the Laws for compliance and provide other than as evidence proceeding or immigration proceeding brought against an applicant who did not knowingly commit perjury or any other offense by the actions of other individuals.

This is my Decision for my Final Opinion to allow for the Agency Actions and duties, for the National Security Council for protected confidential publication by reference of incorporation by approvals of the Office of Veterans Affairs Liaison, the Directors of the Federal Register and the Office of Management and Budget, for the Safety and Security for A Special Government Employee of the Federal Government of the United States,

under the Acts of Congress and Congressional Authority. Thank you for continued support for Our Mission.

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-0008
Comment from Roggenkamp, Marilyn

Submitter Information

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General Comment

In the state of Washington, using the February 1, 2026 Voter Rolls there are 5,088,272 Active voters, 408,750 InActive voters, a total: of 5,497,023 voters

1. The number of Washington voters who are listed as Status=Inactive, Registered to Vote date prior to 11/2022 and LastVoted Prior to 11/2022 are 112,432 voters with last voted dates going back to 1992.

2. The number of Washington voters who are listed as Status=Inactive, Registered to Vote date prior to 11/2022 and have never voted are 88,012 voters

For a total of 200,444 voters

3. The number of Washington voters who are listed as Status=Active, Registered to Vote date prior to 11/2022 and have never voted are 640,782 voters

The reason for these 200,444 voters still being no the rolls, is a state law that states

1) The county auditor shall return an inactive voter to active voter status if, prior to the passage of two federal general elections, the voter:

(a) Notifies the auditor of a change of address;

This notification is assumed to happen if the voter happens to change their address or name at the DMV or one of the state agencies who are allowed to take voter registrations and presses a button that says they want to register to vote.. This would cause the registration to go to the auditor who “may” view this as a new registration and would “reset” the clock on the 2 General elections.

These numbers show that the laws in the state of Washington invalidate the intent of the federal law. My request is that we get a separate count of Inactive voters who have not voted in the last 2 general elections whether they updated their registration information or not as well as what the state is currently reporting of all Inactive votes.

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-0009
Comment from Toppi, Grace

Submitter Information

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General Comment

Advocate for the SAVE ACT to keep voter rolls well-maintained and having registered US Citizens only.

In the EAVS:

Require states' reporting to include "Inactive" voters clearly, side-by-side, with "Active" voters to show the true registration rate and user-friendliness. Clear percentages and totals of "Inactives" and "Actives" are necessary for a complete analysis of the total voter population.

Require states to report by county only and provide tools for mapping cities to counties where needed.

Require states to include VERIFIED full legal name, citizenship, country of birth, and full date of birth; EAC to track compliance.

Require states to report HOW they detect and remove duplicate voter names; Since not all states use ERIC report what system they are using to cross-check with other states such as the US Postal Service CASS verification system.

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

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Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-0010
Comment from Anonymous

Submitter Information

Name: Anonymous Anonymous

General Comment

PROPIN CONFIDENTIAL
EAC-2026-0001

Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

I Vote to Approve the enactment Help America Vote Act of 2002 for the provisions of the Act, and to make sure valid voting is in compliance with the Constitution of the United States.

This is my Final Decision to Vote for the Act and the Senate House 69 Representation, if approved and appropriate to do so. Thank you!

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

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Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-0011
Comment from Glynn, Earl

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General Comment

EAC should push for greater transparency in Help American Vote Verification (HAVV) reporting provided by the SSA by including HAVV-related stats in the EAVS report by jurisdiction.

The SSA's "Help America Vote Verification Transactions by State" page shows count statistics by week by state.

Sometimes these count statistics can indicate significant problems, and possible wrongdoing, but there is no way to get additional information via FOIA from SSA, or from state open records requests. There's no way to get any data breakdown smaller than a state from SSA.

Example: During the week of March 23, 2024 the HAVV data show Kansas had 1067 total transactions with 835 matches -- so 232 or 21.7% did not match that week.

But of those 835 matches, the HAVV data show 447 were "Single Match Deceased", which indicates 53.5% of the matches were possibly deceased. Should such a high deceased match percentage trigger some additional investigation?

Why that week, and where cannot be known with the current system. Is this high rate of deceased in the matches to Social Security records observed statewide, or only at specific Kansas locations?

EAC EAVS should be modified to require each jurisdiction to report the cumulative HAVV count statistics as reported by SSA's online page. That way apparent problems can be associated with specific jurisdictions, and possibly problem causes can be discovered.

In addition, other voter registration data related to DMVs should be captured by jurisdiction whenever possible, such as the number of driver license matches that fail validation and do not become voters, or SSN-4 validation failures through HAVV should be documented.

SSA should be criticized for “hiding” behind a nonprofit in its processing of HAVV data, which seems to block all possible FOIA requests.

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-0012
Comment from Glynn, Earl

Submitter Information

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General Comment

The 2024 EAC EAVS Excel file had 6461 rows with 535 columns.

This size of the Excel file is needlessly beyond the skill level of many casual users, especially when only short, cryptic column names are in the file.

The codebook was excellent with both short variable names and more useful and mnemonic longer labels.

I suggest two changes:

- Use the mnemonic, descriptive labels for column names in the released Excel version instead of the cryptic variable names. Technical folks can programmatically change back to the short names if they are so inclined. Non-technical users have no easy way to change the cryptic names provided to the more useful labels.
- Split the 535 columns in to the A, B, C, D, E, F subsets of variables. Provide a single key in all these six splits so compound joins are not needed to connect them back together if desired.

Many states have many columns that are missing or constant, which provides no useful information. Provide a table like below that shows the number of jurisdictions (usually counties) by state and the number of columns after removal of columns with missing or constant data.

Attachments

2024-EAVS-Jurisdictions-and-Reduced-Columns

State	Jurisdictions	Columns
ALABAMA	67	70
ALASKA	1	
AMERICAN SAMOA	1	
ARIZONA	15	442
ARKANSAS	75	497
CALIFORNIA	58	430
COLORADO	64	254
CONNECTICUT	169	134
DELAWARE	3	185
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	1	
FLORIDA	67	469
GEORGIA	159	169
GUAM	1	
HAWAII	5	373
IDAHO	44	194
ILLINOIS	108	434
INDIANA	92	275
IOWA	99	72
KANSAS	105	325
KENTUCKY	120	228
LOUISIANA	64	190
MAINE	497	493
MARYLAND	24	216
MASSACHUSETTS	351	240
MICHIGAN	83	178
MINNESOTA	87	205
MISSISSIPPI	82	151
MISSOURI	116	220
MONTANA	56	228
NEBRASKA	93	258
NEVADA	17	340
NEW HAMPSHIRE	320	194
NEW JERSEY	21	222
NEW MEXICO	33	218
NEW YORK	62	236
NORTH CAROLINA	100	234
NORTH DAKOTA	53	115
NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS	1	
OHIO	88	499
OKLAHOMA	77	208
OREGON	36	139
PENNSYLVANIA	67	254
PUERTO RICO	1	
RHODE ISLAND	39	164
SOUTH CAROLINA	46	136
SOUTH DAKOTA	66	398
TENNESSEE	95	267
TEXAS	254	378
U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS	1	
UTAH	29	405
VERMONT	247	144
VIRGINIA	133	235
WASHINGTON	39	216
WEST VIRGINIA	55	274
WISCONSIN	1851	266
WYOMING	23	200
TOTAL	6461	

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

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Docket: EAC-2026-0001
2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-0013
Comment from Vieira , Sara

Submitter Information

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RI,
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General Comment

A focus area for reporting needs to have stringent guidelines on how states are interpreting UOCAVA voting. In Rhode Island, UOCAVA voting can occur via fax/email or mail in voting. There is no data to compare 2020 to 2024, however, the number of UOCAVA voters increased from 3,084 in 2020 to 3,561 in 2024 (when comparing a presidential election). Based on 2024 data, the people who voted UOCAVA in RI as military service members was 228 and overseas citizens (never resided) was 3,333! Even more alarming in 2022, the number of overseas citizens versus military voting is notable: 795 overall UOCAVA voters but only 56 were military. The rest of the voters were overseas citizens- 739! In RI, there is no way to verify how many of these voters who are 'never resided' as residents of RI or a citizen of the US (with the exception of a box to check). There are no safeguards for overseas citizens with a notary or witness to verify this information is true as citizens of the United States and a citizen of RI. When submitting a 'ballot' via email or fax, there is no security or privacy of the vote as that ballot has to be interpreted by staff at the RI BOE. There was no oversight provided for this process in 2024 (as in poll watching to provide parity and impartial observation) of this process. This process was completed without oversight, the ballots were transferred to the SOS without oversight and then brought back to the BOE without oversight. UOCAVA ballots were counted up to a week after the 2024 election. A small municipality's vote was changed a week after the November election by UOCAVA voting. A recommendation would be to provide stricter guidelines regarding UOCAVA voting. Separating and protecting the military vote from overseas citizens is a start. All votes from overseas citizens need to provide citizenship status (if a person is overseas a passport should be provided- this is an easy way to provide oversight on this problem of verification).

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-0014
Comment from Vermeers, Richard

Submitter Information

Name: Richard Vermeers
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General Comment

Please see my comments in the attached file.

Attachments

EAC-2026-001 Comments

Please see my comments on specific questions below.

Proposed additions to Question 6:

1. Does your state offer a voter's pledge that the registrant is a United States citizen in the primary language of the registrant, clearly stating the legal penalties for violating the pledge?

2. Does your state require the registrant to sign a document written in their primary language which attests to their US citizenship?

Note that current practices in Washington State of pointing to a sign that contains the voter's pledge is ineffective. When non-citizens are investigated for voter fraud, they simply say that they did not understand the voter's pledge. This negates the ability to prosecute or even charge the registrant with fraud. It has led to a large volume of illegal registrants being added to the voter rolls.

3. Does your state automatically update the status of voter registration from inactive to active for address updates or other changes such as a last name change due to marriage, etc.?

Note that this practice in Washington State subverts the process of removing those who have not voted in two federal elections.

Question 7:

Please see above comments for Question 6. If the registrant does not understand the voter's pledge and is not required to specifically attest to the citizenship question, they cannot be held accountable for committing voter fraud.

Proposed added question Question 16:

Does your State have a legal requirement for the Office of Vital Statistics to report deaths to the Secretary of State?

Note, Washington State has a process in place, but there is no legal requirement for Coroners to utilize the system.

Proposed added Question 23e:

Does your state allow forwarding of ballots to new addresses using the USPS Standard Forward Mail & Change of Address or Extended Mail Forwarding Options?

Note: The practice of forwarding mail opens the door for voting in incorrect jurisdictions within the state as well as voting in multiple states.

Proposed added Question 25e. Does your state allow curing by telephone?

Proposed added Question 25f. Does your state allow curing by any electronic means, including cell phone apps?

Proposed added Question 25f. What proof of identity is required?

Note, the practice of telephone or electronic curing creates a wide open door for caregivers to vote a person's ballot if they also have access to their SSN or driver's license number. It makes signature verification useless for a person requiring a caregiver.

UOCAVA Voting added question

Does your state distinguish between Military and Non-Military UOCAVA Voters?

Note: The fact that non-military voters can register and submit a ballot without documented proof of citizenship leaves a wide open door for enemies of the United States to vote in US elections. If they lie in attesting to citizenship, who will investigate and how will prosecutions be conducted?

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Docket: EAC-2026-0001
2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0014
Comment from Kufert, Robert

Submitter Information

Name: Robert Kufert
Address:
Panama City Beach, FL, 32413
Email: kufert@yahoo.com

General Comment

Your request is for Voter registration; overseas and military voting (UOCAVA) & voting by mail (VBM) comments. Like most Americans, I advocate for passing the SAVE Act which would address registration. UOCAVA was primarily for military & their families, yet that group now represents only a small fraction of UOCAVA votes. Folks outside the US who claim to be over 65 or disabled are not required to provide ID. The domestic address they provide is not verified to be residential or associated with them or their family. This control lack makes UOCAVA fertile ground for fraud. While there are US Citizens living abroad who have never lived in the US, even they should have domestic residential addresses associated with their family in the past. Requiring proof of citizenship from all UOCAVA voters and requiring SOEs (Supervisors of Elections) to verify their domestic address is residential and either is or was associated with them or their family would go a long way toward implementing needed controls to insure UOCAVA voters are citizens. VBM needed controls include reconciliation report, enhanced VBM processing center & ballot intake, ballot storage & USB storage security, requiring the same level of ID for VBM as is required for in-person voting, requiring bi-partisan (one Dem & one Rep) election worker everywhere VBM ballots are handled, enhanced signature verification to catch machine copies and limited VBM counted ballots to those received by poll close on Election Day. No state should be mailing VBM ballots to all voters. VBM should be by request & limited to those unable to vote in-person due to illness, confinement or being out of town throughout the early voting to Election Day period. Adding these needed controls would go a long way toward insuring our elections are honest and secure.

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0015
Comment from North Carolina Election Integrity Team

Submitter Information

Email: jane.bilello@gmail.com
Organization: North Carolina Election Integrity Team

General Comment

1. The dataset spreadsheet is not user-friendly. Consider expanding the codebook descriptions and incorporating them as column headers in the Excel dataset, using color coding and macros that allow users to expand/collapse detailed explanations aligned with the corresponding EAVS survey questions.

Recommend the addition of the following columns:

- a) A new column showing the number of voter registrations accepted, denied or removed due to non-citizenship and how this was determined.
- b) A new column showing the number of voter registrations in which a driver's license was not provided by the registrant.
- c) A new column showing the number of voter registrations accepted or denied in which the driver's license provided by the registrant was a "no-match" against the Motor Vehicle database.
- d) A new column showing the number of voter registrations accepted or denied in which the last four of the Social Security number (or full SSN in States which require it) was omitted from the voter registration.
- e) A new column showing the number of voter registrations accepted or denied in which the last four of the Social Security number, first and last name and birthdate were a "no-match" on the SSA HAVV application.
- f) A new column showing the number of voter registrations accepted or denied in which the registrant marked the box "I do not have a Driver's License or a Social Security Number".

Correction needed for North Carolina, the columns A4d - (Registrations received through automatic registration

program) and A4e - (Registrations received through Motor Vehicle offices that issue driver's licenses excluding automatic registration programs) are incorrect. They should be reversed. The same applies for A5-A9(d-e). There isn't any AVR program in NC currently. The DMV sends voter registrations to the State/Counties for review only if the voter requests to be registered.

Suggest not removing the following columns:

A13A - Merged records. Required for transparency and indicates the number of duplicates being removed after registration. Significant numbers of these in NC due to SEIMS legal non-compliance. (32,306)

E2E, E2F, E2G - Reasons for rejecting a Provisional Ballot. NC has significant numbers of these and it is useful for reviewing policy consistency between counties.

I wondered if a question should be added to the Policy Survey:

Q. Is a matching driver's license or SSNL4 on the voter registration required to request an absentee ballot online?

The reason for this is because the Democracy Live portal (on NCSBE online ballot request website) does not validate the DL or SSNL4 - allows you to request a mail ballot using name, address and birthdate and populate any garbage number into the DL or SSNL4.

The ballot can then be requested for delivery to any address anywhere in the USA.

This is a high fraud risk. Democracy Live also is a portal for UOCAVA ballots.

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

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Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0016
Comment from Custer, Karen

Submitter Information

Name: Karen Custer
Address:
Panama City, FL, 32404
Email: KarenCusterFL@gmail.com
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General Comment

My comment is for Voter registration; overseas and military voting (UOCAVA) & voting by mail (VBM) comments. Like most Americans, I advocate for passing the SAVE Act which would address registration. UOCAVA was primarily for military & their families, yet that group now represents only a small fraction of UOCAVA votes. Folks outside the US who claim to be over 65 or disabled are not required to provide ID. The domestic address they provide is not verified to be residential or associated with them or their family. This control lack makes UOCAVA fertile ground for fraud. While there are US Citizens living abroad who have never lived in the US, even they should have domestic residential addresses associated with their family in the past. Requiring proof of citizenship from all UOCAVA voters and requiring SOEs (Supervisors of Elections) to verify their domestic address is residential and either is or was associated with them or their family would go a long way toward implementing needed controls to insure UOCAVA voters are citizens. VBM needed controls include reconciliation report, enhanced VBM processing center & ballot intake, ballot storage & USB storage security, requiring the same level of ID for VBM as is required for in-person voting, requiring bi-partisan (one Dem & one Rep) election worker everywhere VBM ballots are handled, enhanced signature verification to catch machine copies and limited VBM counted ballots to those received by poll close on Election Day. No state should be mailing VBM ballots to all voters. VBM should be by request & limited to those unable to vote in-person due to illness, confinement or being out of town throughout the early voting to Election Day period. Adding these needed controls would go a long way toward insuring our elections are honest and secure.

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

As of: 3/16/26, 9:12 AM
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Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0017
Comment from Crosby, Christina

Submitter Information

Name: Christina Crosby
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General Comment

Consider expanding the codebook descriptions and incorporating them as column headers in the Excel dataset, using color coding and macros that allow users to expand/collapse detailed explanations aligned with the corresponding EAVS survey questions.

Recommend the addition of the following columns:

- a) A new column showing the number of voter registrations accepted, denied or removed due to non-citizenship and how this was determined.
- b) A new column showing the number of voter registrations in which a driver's license was not provided by the registrant.
- c) A new column showing the number of voter registrations accepted or denied in which the driver's license provided by the registrant was a "no-match" against the Motor Vehicle database.
- d) A new column showing the number of voter registrations accepted or denied in which the last four of the Social Security number (or full SSN in States which require it) was omitted from the voter registration.
- e) A new column showing the number of voter registrations accepted or denied in which the last four of the Social Security number, first and last name and birthdate were a "no-match" on the SSA HAVV application.
- f) A new column showing the number of voter registrations accepted or denied in which the registrant marked the box "I do not have a Driver's License or a Social Security Number".

Correction needed for North Carolina, the columns A4d - (Registrations received through automatic registration program) and A4e - (Registrations received through Motor Vehicle offices that issue driver's licenses excluding automatic registration programs) are incorrect. They should be reversed. The same applies for A5-A9(d-e). There isn't any AVR program in NC currently. The DMV sends voter registrations to the State/Counties for review only if the voter requests to be registered.

Suggest not removing the following columns:

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I wondered if a question should be added to the Policy Survey:

Q. Is a matching driver's license or SSNL4 on the voter registration required to request an absentee ballot online?

The reason for this is because the Democracy Live portal (on NCSBE online ballot request website) does not validate the DL or SSNL4 - allows you to request a mail ballot using name, address and birthdate and populate any garbage number into the DL or SSNL4.

The ballot can then be requested for delivery to any address anywhere in the USA.

This is a high fraud risk. Democracy Live also is a portal for UOCAVA ballots.

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0018
Comment from Anonymous

Submitter Information

Name: Anonymous Anonymous

General Comment

The Save America Act looks good on the surface however I'm concerned that if it requires voters to provide a birth certificate or passport both cost money and aren't easily accessible. Perhaps a Social Security card would be a better option.

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

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Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0019
Comment from Miller, Teresa

Submitter Information

Name: Teresa Miller
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General Comment

To the Election Assistance Commission:

I am writing as a Florida resident to provide public comment regarding Voter Registration, UOCAVA procedures, and Vote-by-Mail (VBM) controls. Like many Americans, I strongly advocate for passing the SAVE Act to address fundamental registration security.

UOCAVA was primarily intended to protect the voting rights of our military members and their families. However, overseas civilian voters now represent a significant portion of UOCAVA ballots, and I urge the EAC to provide stringent guidelines restricting UOCAVA registration to military personnel, or at least severely tightening the requirements for overseas civilians. In 2020, despite massive repatriation efforts during the pandemic, the number of UOCAVA voters increased by 389,000 nationally. In Florida alone, there were 116,364 UOCAVA voters in 2020.

A major vulnerability is the current requirement structure for overseas civilian voters.

Organizations promoting overseas voting explicitly note that a Florida State identification card is not needed to use their voter registration platforms.

Voters can request ballots claiming they have never lived in the United States, without needing an association with the state address used to register.

To verify all registered overseas and military voters are legitimate and verified voters, I recommend:

Requiring proof of citizenship for all UOCAVA voters.

Requiring Supervisors of Elections (SOEs) to verify that domestic addresses provided are residential and are (or were) associated with the voter or their family.

Attachments

one-pager UOCAVA Procedure Outline.docx

UOCAVA- Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)

Goal:

- To verify all registered overseas and military voters are legitimate and verified voters

Background:

Why are these vulnerable voters?

In 2020, Covid struck the world- study abroad stopped, Embassies were closed, and state departments brought citizens home- Yet the number of UOCAVA voters increased 389,000 nationally- some states more than others. In some of those states just a few hundred votes determined elections.

- [Dept of Justice- UOCAVA](#)
 - [Voter Registration and Absentee Ballot Request](#)
- Federal Voting Assistance Program- UOCAVA [Overview](#)

Resources:

- **Overseas Voting Vulnerabilities-**[VerifyVote.us](#)
- **Podcast** [with Clela Mitchel and Heather Honey](#) or [Rumble video same interview](#)
 - [Slides from Heather Honey's information](#)

Additional Information:

Organizations promoting UOCAVA voting: <https://www.votefromabroad.org/states/FL>

Florida

Florida voters abroad need to request a ballot each calendar year you'd like to vote in. [Click here](#) to start your ballot request now.

Check below for your delivery methods and deadlines, and to find your local election office contact information.

How to Send

Registration: Mail or Online Upload

(You must have a Florida State identification card to use Florida's online voter registration system. You do not need a state ID to use www.votefromabroad.org)

Ballot Request: Email or Fax or Mail


Ballot Return: Fax or Mail

Election Deadlines for Florida Voters Abroad

There are no upcoming elections scheduled for Florida.

Election Day	Registration	Ballot Request	Ballot Return
--------------	--------------	----------------	---------------

- [Democrats Abroad-](#)
- [Vote From Abroad](#)
[votefromabroad.org/states/FL](https://www.votefromabroad.org/states/FL)) Registration: Mail or Online Upload (You must have a Florida State identification card to use Florida's online voter registration system- You do not need a state ID to use [votefromabroad.org](http://www.votefromabroad.org). (Screenshot of website on right)
- [US Vote Foundation](#)- Again registration without identification- If you have already requested an absentee ballot but have not yet received it, you can still vote by using the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB).



Procedures:

1. Educate yourself on the

- a. Florida Statutes [101.6952](#) [Vote-by-mail ballots for absent uniformed services and overseas voters](#)
- b. [Federal Laws](#)(FVAP.gov) for UOCAVA

2. Questions to ask SOE:

Registration and Verification

- How do you verify voters in our county and that they are not duplicate voters?
- What is the process for uploading these voters into our county system?
- Is there a procedure for verifying these addresses in our county?
- Were any of the people previously registered in our county or state?

Tabulation and Transcribing

- What are the times and locations to participate in the transcribing process of the UOCAVA ballots?
- How can we verify signatures on ballots that are emailed?
- What is the process/transcribing or duplicating the UOCAVA ballots?
- What is the process for reconciling an email or fax vote with the duplicated ballot?
- How do you prevent an email or faxed ballot from being 'generated' multiple times?

Undeliverables:

- How do you catalog the undeliverable?
- Where are they stored?
- After the confirmation process, when do you remove the voter?

3. VBM Filters and Sorts

- a. Most recently registered voter- (Is there a pattern)
- b. Designee Request Name and Designee Request Pick-up- same people??
- c. Review addresses

4. Signature Match

- a. What was the source of the signature matches? (Is there a pattern?)
 - i. Dept of Transportation
 - ii. Registration
 - iii. Petition

5. Organize a list/spreadsheet of potential invalid voters based on data from filters

- a. Look up residential addresses... Are there multiple people registered at the same address?
 - i. Do they have the same last name?
 - ii. Is it possible to have that many people living the house or apartment?
 - iii. Check **property records** to see if the person still owns the property.
 1. They might be renting but worth checking.
 2. If they sold it when? When did the voter register?
- b. Compare VBM address
 - i. Is the same PO Box used for multiple people?
 - ii. Check the dates for requests and returns
- c. Check on social media to see if person has moved or additional information

6. Canvass voters' home address to verify which voters live at the address and/or any additional information.

- a. Have voter sign an affidavit if willing

7. Prepare a spreadsheet

- a. Submit to SOE and FL Dept of Elections along with affidavits
- b. Share discoveries with other counties
 - i. Compare results
 - ii. Verify voters aren't registered in other counties

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0020
Comment from Fenstermaker, J

Submitter Information

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NC,
Email: jmf27614@hotmail.com

General Comment

Suggestion to Improve EAVS Ease of Use for users.

Improve dataset clarity and usability by expanding codebook descriptions and incorporating them as column headers in Excel, with color coding and expand/collapse macros linked to corresponding EAVS survey questions.

The usability of the EAVS 2025 dataset could be greatly enhanced by adding clearer column labeling to include full codebook descriptions as headers, supported by color coding and expandable macros linked to the corresponding EAVS survey questions.

The current design is difficult for non-technical users to navigate, and although the EAVS Data interactive app is an improvement, it still lacks functionality and detail and does not provide an easy way to export the data into other formats.

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0021
Comment from Fenstermaker, J

Submitter Information

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General Comment

Suggested Additional Survey Questions for Voter Registration Verification by States:

A concerning percentage of unverified registrations are occurring and being accepted in North Carolina due to failed verification for Driver's License or the last four digits of the Social Security Number. The median rate of failure in the SSA HAVV database for Non-Matches of Social Security data in North Carolina in 2024 was 39.48% with a maximum weekly rate of 57.75%.

For this reason I recommend the following additions to the survey questions regarding voter registration verification:

- a. The number and status of voter registrations that were accepted, denied, or removed because the driver's license verification failed.
- b. The number and status of voter registrations that were accepted, denied, or removed because the last four digits of the Social Security number failed HAVV verification as a "no-match".

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0022
Comment from Fenstermaker, J

Submitter Information

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General Comment

Additional Survey Questions for Voter Registration Completion Details and Acceptance:

Since N.C. Gen. Stat. § 9-6.2 took effect in Aug 2024, there have been 22 voter registrations certified as removed due to non-citizenship from the North Carolina voter list. This number represents those registrants who declare non-citizenship when called for Jury Duty. Given the small number of those called for jury duty and the various ways they can avoid jury duty, the sample size is extremely small, but highlights the need to require transparency for non-citizens voting in U.S. Elections.

Additionally, Executive Order 14248, "Preserving and Protecting the Integrity of American Elections" signed on Mar 25, 2025, requires Documentary Proof of U.S. Citizenship for Federal Elections which further emphasizes the need to document any registrations of non-citizens.

For these reasons, I recommend adding the following survey questions:
The number of voter registrations that were accepted, denied, or removed due to non-citizenship, and the methods used to make these determinations.

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0023
Comment from Verified Voting

Submitter Information

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Organization: Verified Voting

General Comment

See attached file(s)

Attachments

Verified-Voting-2026-EAVS-PolicySurvey-Public-Comments



U.S. Election Assistance Commission
633 3rd Street NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20001
Attn: EAVS
Submitted electronically

March 13, 2026

Re: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey
Docket ID: EAC-2026-0001-0001

Dear U.S. Election Assistance Commissioners,

Verified Voting submits the following suggestions for the 2026 Election Administration Voting Survey (EAVS) and Election Administration Policy Survey drafts. As part of our work to promote the responsible use of technology in elections, Verified Voting tracks election systems in use in every U.S. election jurisdiction. As such, we recognize the significant changes in election technology since the passage of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002¹ and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA).² We therefore suggest the EAC consider the following changes and additions to the 2026 EAVS and Election Administration Policy Survey to increase the survey's clarity and overall utility.

2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Ballot Marking Devices Used by Some or All In-Person Voters: Verified Voting appreciates the adjustment to the response options in section F3–F8, clarifying the distinction between “In-precinct Election Day regular ballot marking and/or counting (**used by all voters**)” and “In-precinct accessible voting **primarily** for voters with disabilities.” As noted in our 2024 comments, we also suggest distinguishing equipment used during the early voting period by all in-person voters and equipment used primarily by voters with disabilities. This could be achieved by adding “regular” to the early voting response option (i.e., “In-person early voting **regular** ballot marking and/or counting (**used by all voters**)”) and by adding another response option (e.g., “In-person early voting accessible voting **primarily** for voters with disabilities”).

Ballot Marking Device/Tabulators: Ballot marking device/tabulators, which combine ballot marking and tabulation, are significantly distinct from ballot marking devices, which only mark ballots. We appreciate the proposed change in F2–F9 to include tabulators. However, we are

¹ 52 U.S.C. § 20901 *et seq.*

² 52 U.S.C. § 20301 *et seq.*

concerned that the addition of “tabulators” conflates standalone optical scanners with all-in-one BMD tabulators. We recommend the EAVS include a separate equipment category in section F2–F9 “Election Equipment Used” for ballot marking device/tabulators, rather than scanners/tabulators, to capture the number of jurisdictions utilizing this all-in-one equipment with greater precision. We also recommend a basic definition (e.g., “A ballot marking device/tabulator functions as both a ballot marking device and ballot tabulator.”) with possible additional context (e.g., “The voter’s selections are printed and tabulated by the same machine.”).

Tabulation of Ballot Marking Device Ballots: Ballot marking devices that encode voter selections into QR or bar codes for vote counting are distinct from ballot marking devices that serve only to mark a paper ballot, which is then tabulated in the same manner as a hand-marked paper ballot, or by using optical character recognition (OCR). We recommend adding column e to F4—“BMD Ballot Type”—with selections to capture the number of jurisdictions using BMDs that encode votes and those that do not. We offer sample phrasing here:

[] Not Encoded: The BMD prints a standard ballot or a vote summary card on which voter selections are recorded with human-readable marks (e.g., filled-in ovals or OCR text) that are used for tabulation.

[] Encoded: The BMD prints a vote summary card on which voter selections are encoded into barcodes, QR codes, or other machine-readable codes that are used for tabulation.

Voting System Versions: As in our comment on the 2024 drafts, Verified Voting encourages the EAVS to request voting system version information from election jurisdictions in addition to the make and model of each type of equipment used in section F2–F9 “Election Equipment Used.” Voting system version information indicates which election system hardware, firmware, and software a jurisdiction fields, how recently developed or updated the voting system is, and whether the system has been decertified. Prior to 2018, the EAVS included a space for respondents to record a “version” for each equipment type in the voting technologies section following the make and model of the voting equipment used.³ Verified Voting proposes that the 2026 EAVS include a column, which could be inserted between the current column b “Make/Model” and column c “Number deployed” for election jurisdictions to enter voting system version information.

Use of Electronic and Paper Poll Books: Verified Voting greatly appreciates the added opportunity for election jurisdictions to record the make, model, and quantity of electronic poll book systems used. Similar to our suggestion to include voting system versions for election equipment, we likewise suggest that a column for the electronic poll book version number be included.

³ See e.g., U.S. Election Assistance Commission, *2016 Election Administration & Voting Survey* 28–36 (2017) https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/28/2016_EAVS_Instrument.pdf.

2026 Election Administration Policy Survey

Reporting of Audit Results: The reporting of audit results is a crucial component to maximizing transparency and public trust in elections. As more jurisdictions implement and perform routine audits, it is highly beneficial to know whether a jurisdiction makes its results public and where these reports are housed. We suggest adding question Q48b to track results reporting across the states with the following sample phrasing: “For the November 2026 general election, does your state plan to make audit reports available to the public?” along with an additional question Q49c allowing jurisdictions to report where results can be accessed. “Please indicate all locations where these results will be made available:

Statewide election website

County election website

Other _____

Not publicly available

Domestic Civilian (non-UOCAVA) Voters: Verified Voting profoundly appreciates the incorporation of our previous suggestion to include a question regarding the method under which domestic civilian voters (non-UOCAVA) can return their ballots through an electronic format in Q30b to track the various methods by which states allow eligible voters to return their voted ballots. States continue to make changes to their laws and policies regarding who is eligible to return a voted ballot electronically, and while we recognize the benefits of allowing voters to receive blank ballots electronically, security experts have noted the dangers inherent in the electronic return of voted ballots.⁴

Verified Voting applauds the Election Assistance Commission’s ongoing efforts to collect and disseminate comprehensive information about election administration in the United States. We welcome the opportunity to offer suggestions to enhance the overall quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected and are available to discuss our suggestions further at any time. Thank you for considering our comments.

Respectfully submitted,
Mark Lindeman, Ph.D.
Policy & Strategy Director

⁴ See e.g., Verified Voting, *Casting Votes Safely: Examining Internet Voting’s Dangers and Highlighting Safer Alternatives* (2023) <https://verifiedvoting.org/publication/casting-votes-safely-oct-2023/>.

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0024
Comment from Jones, Ned

Submitter Information

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General Comment

Comment on Proposed Improvements to the Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

I appreciate the opportunity to comment on improvements to the Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS). The EAVS is the most comprehensive nationwide dataset on election administration in the United States, and continued improvements to the survey instrument and reporting process will enhance its value for election officials, policymakers, and researchers.

First, the EAC should strengthen standardization of key reporting definitions across jurisdictions. Terms such as “rejected absentee ballot,” “inactive voter,” and “provisional ballot counted” are sometimes interpreted differently by states and local jurisdictions. Establishing clearer definitions, decision rules, and reporting guidance would improve cross-state comparability and the reliability of national statistics derived from the survey.

Second, the EAC should prioritize the collection and publication of jurisdiction-level data in standardized, machine-readable formats. County- or local-level reporting provides important insight into variation in election administration practices and voter access. Standardized submission templates and formats such as CSV would improve transparency and reduce the need for extensive post-processing of data.

Third, the reporting process would benefit from expanded automated validation and reconciliation checks. Built-in logic tests that flag discrepancies—such as subtotals that do not reconcile with totals or ballot counts that exceed registration counts—would allow states to identify errors before submission and improve overall data integrity.

Fourth, the survey instrument should expand data collection related to absentee and mail ballot processing. Additional standardized fields describing undeliverable mail ballot statistics, rejection reasons, cure opportunities, verification procedures, and processing timelines would provide valuable insight into administrative processes that affect ballot acceptance.

Fifth, the EAC should consider adding optional but standardized reporting on polling place resources and voter wait times, including voters per polling place, voting stations per location, and estimated maximum wait times. Such information would help identify jurisdictions where resource allocation may affect voter access.

Sixth, the EAC should implement stable jurisdiction identifiers for local reporting units. Permanent identifiers would allow researchers and policymakers to track jurisdictions consistently across survey cycles even when naming conventions change or administrative boundaries are modified.

Seventh, the EAC should adopt clearer dataset versioning and revision documentation practices. Publishing versioned datasets along with revision logs would improve transparency and allow researchers to track updates or corrections made after initial publication.

Eighth, the survey would benefit from the inclusion of metadata describing how states collect and compile their EAVS submissions, including whether figures are derived from election management systems, aggregated local reports, or estimates. Such metadata would help users better assess data comparability and reliability.

Finally, the EAC should consider developing standardized data export templates that align with common election management systems used by state and local election offices. Allowing jurisdictions to generate EAVS submissions directly from existing administrative systems would reduce reporting burden, improve accuracy, and streamline the submission process.

The EAVS remains an essential public resource for understanding election administration nationwide. Continued improvements in standardization, transparency, and data quality will strengthen the survey's usefulness and support evidence-based policy decisions.

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0025
Comment from Shupe, Michael

Submitter Information

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General Comment

Comments for EAVS Survey

In general, provide more categories in your questions so that less data is entered under “Other”. See what people have put in the “Other” columns and add them to the categories.

Examples

- A12 – Voters Removed from Rolls
- Add: Removed non-citizen, Removed Not Legal Residence, Removed Fictitious Residence
- E2: Add: Voter Already Voted
- E3: Add: Voted after polls closed, Voter Ineligible

Use Freeze Pane to freeze spreadsheet row and column headers

Arrange spreadsheets for easy import into a relational database

- In code book and elsewhere,
- have a value in every column so each record is complete
- Question code column
- Question name column
- Option code column
- Option name column
- Option Value Type (String, Integer, ..)

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Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0026
Comment from Fenstermaker, J

Submitter Information

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General Comment

Additional Survey Questions for Voter Registration Completion Details and Acceptance:

The North Carolina Voter Registration Form contains ambiguity regarding whether a current and valid Driver's License (or State ID) is required. The last four digits of the Social Security number are intended to be used only when a Driver's License has not been issued. HAVA Complaint #8, filed on February 19, 2026, identified this issue and noted that the form has been out of compliance with HAVA requirements since 2009.

Permitting the Driver's License number and the last four digits of the Social Security number to be used interchangeably increases the risk of duplicate voter registrations—one using a Driver's License and another using the Social Security number. According to the 2024 EAVS report, duplicate registrations total 1,031,350, representing 27.3% of North Carolina's registrations, ranking the state third nationally.

According to the NCSBE Voter Registration list dated March 9, 2026, 552,967 post-HAVA registrants lack a Driver's License, and 16,853 report having neither a Driver's License nor a Social Security number.

To ensure greater transparency, I recommend adding the following survey questions:

- a. The number of voter registration applications submitted and accepted without a driver's license provided by the registrant.
- b. The number of voter registrations applications submitted and accepted where the last four digits of the Social Security number (or the full Social Security Number in states that require it) were not provided by the registrant.
- c. The number of voter registration applications approved or rejected in which the applicant lacked both a

driver's license and a Social Security number, along with the reasons and methods used to verify the applicant's identity.

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0027
Comment from Fenstermaker, J

Submitter Information

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General Comment

North Carolina does not currently have an Automatic Voter Registration (AVR) program. The N.C. Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) forwards voter registration details to state or county election boards only if the individual explicitly opts in. Therefore, the following columns for the 2024 EAVS data for North Carolina need to be corrected:

The columns A4d - A4e - (Registrations received through Motor Vehicle offices that issue driver's licenses excluding automatic registration programs) are incorrect. They should be reversed. The same applies for A5-A9(d-e).

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Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0028
Comment from CPAC Foundation Center for Regulatory Freedom

Submitter Information

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Organization: CPAC Foundation Center for Regulatory Freedom

General Comment

Attached are comments of the CPAC Foundation Center for Regulatory Freedom.

Attachments

CRF Comments EAC ICR Data Collection Survey FINAL 031526



515 KING STREET, ALEXANDRIA VA 22314

MEMORANDUM

To: Hon. Donald Palmer, Chairman, United States Election Assistance Commission
From: Andrew Langer, Director, Center for Regulatory Freedom, CPAC Foundation
Date: March 15, 2026
Re: Comments on the US Election Assistance Commission’s Information Collection Request, “Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey,” Docket # EAC-2026-0001, Fed. Reg. 2026-00303, Published January 12, 2026

Below are comments of the American Conservative Union Foundation's (d/b/a. Conservative Political Action Coalition Foundation) (hereinafter “CPAC Foundation”) Center for Regulatory Freedom (hereinafter “CRF”), in response to the US Election Assistance Commission’s Information Collection Request, “Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey,” Docket # EAC-2026-0001, Fed. Reg. 2026-00303, published January 12, 2026.

CRF is a project of the CPAC Foundation, a non-profit, non-partisan 501(c)(3) research and education foundation. Our mission is to inject a common-sense perspective into the regulatory process, to ensure that the risks and costs of regulations are fully based on sound scientific and economic evidence, and to ensure that the voices, interests, and freedoms of Americans, and especially of small businesses, are fully represented in the regulatory process and debates. Finally, we work to ensure that regulatory proposals address real problems, that the proposals serve to ameliorate those problems, and, perhaps most importantly, that those proposals do not, in fact, make public policy problems worse.

The Center for Regulatory Freedom (CRF) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the Election Assistance Commission’s proposed information collection for the 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS). The survey represents one of the federal

government's most important mechanisms for gathering nationwide data on the administration of federal elections, including voter registration processes, absentee and overseas voting, polling place operations, election technology, and other key components of election administration. Because the conduct of federal elections is highly decentralized and largely administered at the state and local level, reliable nationwide data about election administration practices is essential for policymakers, election officials, and the public.

At the outset, CRF recognizes that the proposed information collection imposes a measurable administrative burden on responding jurisdictions. The EAC estimates that the survey will require approximately 83 hours per response from state or territorial respondents, representing thousands of cumulative hours devoted to assembling and reporting the relevant information. For state and local election officials—many of whom operate with limited staff and limited administrative capacity—these requirements are not insignificant. Any federal information collection directed toward state and local governments should therefore be approached with care and with due regard for the practical realities of election administration.

At the same time, however, the purpose of the Paperwork Reduction Act is not merely to eliminate paperwork burdens; it is also to ensure that the federal government collects information that has practical utility and that supports sound policymaking. In the case of the Election Administration and Voting Survey, the information collected serves an unusually important function. The administration of elections is one of the foundational responsibilities of a democratic republic, and the legitimacy of representative government depends upon the public's confidence that elections are conducted fairly, accurately, and transparently. Reliable and verifiable data about how elections are administered is therefore not merely a bureaucratic exercise—it is a critical component of maintaining democratic legitimacy.

Public confidence in the integrity of elections has become an increasingly significant issue in American civic life. Surveys over the past decade have consistently shown that Americans' trust in governmental institutions has declined across the board. Election administration is not immune from this broader erosion of trust. In such an environment, transparent reporting and reliable data regarding the conduct of elections become even more important. When citizens question whether elections are administered consistently or fairly, the availability of credible nationwide information about registration systems, voting methods, ballot handling, and participation rates can help provide clarity and accountability.

The EAVS survey plays an important role in this process. By collecting standardized information from states and territories regarding a wide range of election administration activities—including voter registration systems, early voting practices, absentee and overseas voting, provisional ballots, and polling place operations—the survey creates one of the most comprehensive nationwide datasets on election administration currently available. This information supports the statutory responsibilities of the EAC under the Help America Vote Act and related statutes, while also informing research, public analysis, and policy evaluation across the election administration community.

In addition to supporting federal statutory responsibilities, the survey also contributes to a broader ecosystem of transparency surrounding elections. Scholars, journalists, policymakers, and election administrators regularly rely on EAVS data to evaluate trends in

voter participation, to examine how different administrative systems function in practice, and to identify areas where election administration can be improved. Without a centralized and standardized data collection effort such as the EAVS, the information necessary to conduct these analyses would be fragmented across thousands of local jurisdictions and often inaccessible to the public.

The survey also supports compliance with federal reporting obligations under statutes such as the National Voter Registration Act and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act. These statutes require the federal government to monitor and report on key aspects of election administration, including the transmission and return of absentee ballots for military and overseas voters. The EAVS provides a practical mechanism for assembling this information in a consistent and structured manner. By consolidating these reporting requirements within a single survey instrument, the EAC also reduces the need for multiple overlapping federal data collection processes.

While CRF recognizes that the administrative burden associated with the survey is real, the importance of the information being collected justifies maintaining a robust data collection framework. The legitimacy of election outcomes depends not only on the integrity of the processes themselves but also on the public's confidence that those processes are transparent and subject to oversight. Reliable nationwide data regarding how elections are conducted helps support both objectives.

Indeed, the perception of election integrity can be nearly as consequential as the underlying administrative practices themselves. Even when elections are administered properly, a lack of transparent and accessible information can allow speculation, misinformation, or misunderstanding to fill the void. In contrast, when comprehensive and verifiable data about election administration is available, policymakers and the public alike are better positioned to evaluate claims about the electoral process. Transparent reporting therefore serves as a stabilizing force within democratic institutions.

For this reason, CRF believes that the continued collection and publication of election administration data through the EAVS is more important today than ever before. The survey provides one of the few systematic sources of nationwide information regarding how federal elections are conducted in practice. In an era in which public confidence in institutions is often strained, maintaining credible and transparent sources of election administration data is essential.

That said, there may be opportunities to continue improving the clarity, accessibility, and usability of the data collected through the survey. As technology evolves, the EAC may wish to explore additional ways to streamline data submission, improve standardization of reporting formats, and enhance public access to the resulting datasets. These kinds of improvements could further strengthen the practical utility of the information being collected while also helping election administrators manage reporting responsibilities efficiently.

Ultimately, however, the core value of the Election Administration and Voting Survey lies in its ability to provide reliable nationwide information about how elections are conducted. Because election administration in the United States is decentralized across thousands of jurisdictions, the absence of a centralized data collection mechanism would leave

policymakers and the public with only fragmentary insights into how the electoral system functions as a whole.

For these reasons, while CRF acknowledges the administrative effort required to complete the survey, we believe that the benefits of maintaining a comprehensive and transparent national dataset on election administration substantially outweigh the associated reporting burden. The integrity of elections and the public's confidence in the electoral process are fundamental to the stability of our democratic institutions. Maintaining reliable information about how elections are administered is therefore an important public good, and the continued collection of this information through the EAVS represents a valuable contribution to that effort.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Andrew M. Langer". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "A" and "L".

Andrew M. Langer
Director
CPAC Foundation Center for Regulatory Freedom

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0029
Comment from Anonymous

Submitter Information

Name: Anonymous Anonymous

General Comment

Please restore clear voter registration reporting.
Transparency builds trust in elections.

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

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Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0030
Comment from Fenstermaker, J

Submitter Information

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General Comment

6. Consider keeping the following survey questions that were marked for removal for 2026:
- a. A13A refers to merged records, which are necessary for transparency because they show how many duplicate registrations are removed; North Carolina has a large number of these (32,306 in 2024) due to SEIMS' system failure to comply with legal requirements.
 - b. E2E, E2F, and E2G are codes indicating reasons for rejecting a provisional ballot, and North Carolina has a substantial number of such ballots, making them useful for assessing whether policies are applied consistently across counties.

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Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0031
Comment from Watkins, Lane

Submitter Information

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General Comment

Please institute the following policy and procedures to safeguard secure and honest elections:
UOCAVA Security:

- Make UOCAVA registration available to military members and their families only.
- Make documentary proof of citizenship mandatory for all UOCAVA voters.
- Require that Supervisors of Elections (SOEs) verify that domestic addresses provided are residential and associated with the voter or their family.

Vote by Mail (VBM):

- Prohibit no excuse Vote by Mail. Make it excuse only and specify acceptable excuses. The list of acceptable excuses needs to be limited to a very few.
- VBM should be by request only.
- Require the same photo ID for VBM as is required for in-person voting.
- VBM ballots must be received by close of poll on Election Day to be counted.
- Require documented chain of custody and reconciliation of VBM ballots received to ballot counted to ballot totals.
- Require parity of election workers (one Republican, one Democrat) in all election precincts and processing centers including VBM processing.
- Implement enhanced signature verification to prevent against fraud.

There is broad public support for these changes. See <https://www.teapartypatriots.org/save-america-act-poll/>

- John McLaughlin (McLaughlin & Associates) poll results commissioned by Tea Party Patriots Action, surveying 1,000 likely voters (fielded ~March 9, 2026) on election integrity and the SAVE America Act.
- Key findings show strong, broad support for citizenship and ID requirements ahead of 2026 midterms.
- Core Support Levels:
 - o Only U.S. citizens vote in federal elections: 84% agree (67% strongly).

- o Citizenship required to register: 77% agree (57% strongly).
- o Photo ID required to vote (including absentee/mail): 75% agree (55% strongly).
- o 95% already have valid photo ID; 89% could vote with citizenship proof at registration.
- o Photo ID reasonable vs. unfair barrier: 67% reasonable, 24% unfair.
- National/Federal Measures:
 - o Federal law for nationwide photo ID in federal elections: 72% agree (50% strongly).
 - SAVE America Act (requires citizenship proof to register, photo ID to vote, fixes loopholes, DHS voter roll checks):
 - o Senate should debate and pass: 65% agree.
 - o Urgent before 2026 midterms: 60% (Trump voters: 85%).
 - o States verify rolls vs. DHS records: 65% agree.
 - o Prefer real fight to pass vs. symbolic failed vote: 59% real fight.
 - o Election integrity worthy of serious debate: 71% agree.
 - o Support crosses independents, moderates, African Americans, Hispanics (often 70%+).

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0032
Comment from Pulcher, Dorothy R

Submitter Information

Name: Dorothy R Pulcher
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Wimauma, FL, 33598
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Phone: 6107500901

General Comment

Election Assistance Commission- UOCAVA Voting (Deadline 3/16/26- 11:59pm- EST)

To the Election Assistance Commission:

I am writing as a Florida resident to provide public comment on Voter Registration, UOCAVA, and Vote-by-Mail (VBM) procedures.

I strongly advocate for passing the SAVE Act to address fundamental registration security.

UOCAVA was primarily intended to protect the voting rights of military members and their families, yet overseas civilians now represent a massive portion of these voters. Despite repatriation efforts during the 2020 pandemic, UOCAVA voters increased by 389,000 nationally. In Florida alone, 116,364 UOCAVA ballots were cast in 2020.

This current system is highly vulnerable to fraud. Organizations promoting overseas voting explicitly note that a Florida State ID is not needed to use their registration platforms. Furthermore, voters can request ballots claiming they have never lived in the U.S., without needing an association with the state address used to register.

To ensure all registered voters are legitimate, I urge the EAC to implement the following controls:

UOCAVA Security:

Restrict UOCAVA registration to the military. Short of that, mandate proof of citizenship for all UOCAVA voters.

Require Supervisors of Elections (SOEs) to verify that domestic addresses provided are residential and

associated with the voter or their family.

VBM Security:

Require the same level of ID for VBM as is required for in-person voting.

Limit VBM counted ballots strictly to those received by poll close on Election Day.

Mandate reconciliation reports and enhance ballot intake, processing, and USB storage security.

Require bipartisan election workers (one Republican, one Democrat) everywhere VBM ballots are handled.

Implement enhanced signature verification to prevent the acceptance of machine copies.

End the practice of mailing VBM ballots to all voters; VBM should be by request only for those genuinely unable to vote in-person due to illness, confinement, or travel.

Implementing these needed controls will go a long way toward ensuring our elections are honest and secure.

Sincerely,

Dorothy R Pulcher

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

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Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0033
Comment from Holst, John

Submitter Information

Name: John Holst
Address:
Kernersville, NC, 27284

General Comment

The Constitution does not allow citizens of another country to enter the US and vote. They must show their loyalty by the process of becoming a US citizen first! We aren't naive that there is not sabotage going on against us by illegal voting.

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0034
Comment from TN Fair Elections

Submitter Information

Organization: TN Fair Elections

General Comment

The EAVS report should make voter registration data easy for the public to understand. Recent changes—such as separating inactive registrations into different files and removing clear column titles—make the data harder to review and reduce transparency.

Please restore side-by-side reporting of active and inactive registrations and ensure all data files include clear labels.

Ensure all spreadsheets include clear column titles and descriptions

- Standardize reporting by county whenever possible
- Clearly display combined registration totals so the full picture is visible

Thank you

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0035
Comment from American Association of People with Disabilities

Submitter Information

Email: akemerling@aapd.com
Organization: American Association of People with Disabilities

General Comment

Please find attached comments from American Association of People with Disabilities. The focus of our comments is on improving understanding of election policies that impact voters with disabilities.

Attachments

AAPD EAC 2026 EAVS Comments



March 16, 2026

Submitted via [regulations.gov](https://www.regulations.gov)

U.S. Election Assistance Commission
633 3rd Street NW
Suite 200, Washington, DC 20001

Re: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

The American Association of People with Disabilities and the undersigned organizations appreciate the opportunity to comment on the 2026 Election Administration Policy Survey. There are more than 40 million eligible voters with disabilities, and according to research from the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), disabled voters are three times more likely to face difficulties casting a ballot than nondisabled voters. The focus of our comments is on improving understanding of election policies that impact voters with disabilities.

First, we want to applaud the U.S. Election Assistance Commission for using plain language to write the instructions for the 2026 survey. Plain language will make the survey more accessible and improve the accuracy of results by ensuring it is interpreted correctly across states. We were also grateful to see changes made based on [our comments to the 2024 survey](#), including adding “Access Audits” to the list of audits in Q48.

There are more than 40.2 million eligible voters with disabilities in the U.S., representing nearly one-sixth of the total eligible voting population.¹ Research from the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has found that disabled voters are three times more likely to face difficulties casting a ballot than nondisabled voters.² The Election Administration Policy Survey presents an important opportunity for us to learn how disabled voters are impacted by state policies and procedures. As such, we suggest edits to the following questions to improve our understanding of election policy impacts on disabled voters:

¹ Schur, Lisa, and Douglas Kruse. 2024. “Projecting the Number of Eligible Voters with Disabilities in the November 2024 Elections.” https://smr.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/Documents/Centers/Program_Disability_Research/Disability_Electorate_Projections_Report_Oct2024.pdf.

² “Disability and Voting Accessibility in the 2022 Elections.” 2023. https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/EAC_2023_Rutgers_Report_FINAL.pdf.



Voter Registration and List Maintenance

Q17 addresses voter eligibility of people declared “mentally incompetent.” According to recent research from the Center for American Progress, the language around capacity to vote differs widely across states. The impact of guardianship or conservatorships on voting rights also varies widely, with at least seven states fully removing the right to vote from those placed under guardianship. Other states require a case by case determination on capacity to vote. Some states require people subject to guardianship to undergo a legal process to “demonstrate capacity” and restore their right to vote. This is a significant policy issue impacting more than 1.3 million adults.³ We recommend revising the question to better capture the specific policies of the state by adding a “select all that apply” answer structure.

Suggested revision Q17: In your state, does a court determination of mental incompetence or placement under guardianship affect a person’s eligibility to vote? (Select all that apply).

- A court finding of “mental incompetence,” “not of sound mind,” results in automatic loss of voting rights
- A court finding of mental incompetence may result in the loss of voting rights, but it must be specifically named in the court order
- Placement under full guardianship or conservatorship based on lack of capacity results in automatic loss of voting rights
- Placement under full guardianship conservatorship based on lack of capacity may result in loss of voting rights, but must be specifically named in the court order
- Voting rights are not affected by a finding of mental incompetence
- Voting rights are not affected by guardianship or conservatorship status
- Other (please describe): _____

Additionally, we recommend adding a subquestion to capture whether court findings or guardianship orders impacting voter eligibility are permanent.

Q17a. If voting rights can be lost due to court orders about mental incompetence or guardianship/conservatorship in your state, can those voting rights be restored?

³ National Council on Disability | Beyond Guardianship: Toward Alternatives That Promote Greater Self-Determination for People with Disabilities. (2018). Ncd.gov.
<https://www.ncd.gov/report/beyond-guardianship-toward-alternatives-that-promote-greater-self-determination-for-people-with-disabilities/>



- Yes, voting rights are automatically restored if the finding of incompetence is reversed or if guardianship/conservatorship is terminated
- Yes, but only if the individual petitions the court
- Yes, but restoration is up to individual court decisions and is not guaranteed
- No, voting rights cannot be restored after a finding of mental incompetence or placement under guardianship/conservatorship

Mail Voting

Q22-30 captures policies and procedures around voting by mail. In 2020, over half of disabled voters cast their ballot via mail.⁴ States that allow for easier access to vote by mail, such as permanent absentee voter lists and universal mail voting, saw voter turnout increases among disabled voters.⁵ Thus, accurate information around mail voting is crucial to understanding the experiences of disabled voters.

However, many states have enacted laws requiring photo identification to request a ballot to vote by mail, something many voters with disabilities do not have readily available.

After Q22, which addresses if an excuse is required to vote by mail, we recommend adding the question: “Will an ID be required to apply for mail (absentee) voting?” Additionally, we recommend including subquestion to ask in what format the ID is needed, i.e. ID information, such as the number from an unexpired license or state ID card, or a photo copy image of the front and back of an ID.

Q24 collects information on drop boxes. We recommend adding a subquestion to determine who is eligible to return a ballot to a drop box. Is the voter required to place their ballot in the drop box or can a person of their choosing assist them? For many people with disabilities, a drop box may not be accessible to them. People with disabilities have the right to receive assistance in all parts of the voting process, however, many states have set laws around who can assist voters and how many voters a person can assist. It is crucial to capture this information to best understand the landscape disabled voters face.

In-Person Voting

⁴ Schur, Lisa, and Douglas Kruse. “Fact sheet: Disability and Voter Turnout in the 2020 Elections.” https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/document_library/files/Fact_sheet_on_disability_and_voter_turnout_in_2020_0.pdf

⁵ “Disability and Voting Accessibility in the 2022 Elections.” 2023. https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/EAC_2023_Rutgers_Report_FINAL.pdf.



Q33c asks about what topics are included in poll worker training. Polling place accessibility continues to be a barrier to disabled voters. In 2024, local nonprofit Detroit Disability Power evaluated 294 polling places in Metro Detroit and found that only 13% were fully accessible.⁶ In Virginia, a survey by the disAbility Law Center of Virginia during the 2024 general election found that 10% of polling places lacked clear signage for curbside voting, 18% lacked accessible parking, only 78% had accessible voting machines, and of those, only 69% had poll workers trained to use them.⁷

If polling place accessibility is more explicitly covered in poll worker training and in polling place procedures, voting barriers can be prevented. We recommend adding “Procedures for setting up and checking polling place accessibility” to the list of topics. Including this topic would help encourage election administrators to improve preparation and training around polling place accessibility.

Q34 addresses curbside voting. The question defines curbside voting in the following way: “Curbside voting allows voters who are physically unable to enter their voting location to cast their ballot in-person outside the voting location.” We recommend improving the accuracy of this definition by removing the language “voters who are physically unable to enter their voting location” and instead using “eligible voters.” The corrected sentence would read: “Curbside voting allows **eligible** voters to cast their ballot in-person outside the voting location.” The language “physically unable” could be vague, misleading, and may not match all state laws or capture all reasons while a voter with a disability may need to vote curbside.

Additionally, we recommend including a question to capture information about how curbside voting is facilitated. We recommend including a “Select all that apply” list including the options:

- A phone number is posted outside the polling place for a voter to call and request curbside assistance
- A poll worker is stationed outside to monitor curbside voting requests
- A doorbell or call button is placed outside
- Curbside voting appointments can be scheduled in advance by calling the board of elections.

⁶ Blahovec, Sarah, Kenia Flores and Eric Welsby. “THE RIGHT TO A PRIVATE & INDEPENDENT BALLOT: Polling Site Accessibility for Michigan Voters with Disabilities during the 2024 Election.” 2025. https://7228410a-d453-4f78-8863-6b815edf0820.filesusr.com/ugd/03370b_8af87df34baa4309b0bf73d597b44f24.pdf

⁷ “Accessibility Gaps Found at Virginia Polling Places During 2024 Election.” 2025. <https://www.dlcv.org/voting-report-2025>



Voter Identification

States vary widely in the type of photo documentation they require and laws around this policy have changed a lot in recent years. We recommend adding a subquestion to Q49 using a “Select all that apply” format to ask what types of photo IDs are accepted.

Additional Recommendations

Finally, we recommend the addition of several new questions to improve information about voting for people with disabilities.

- **What are the policies and practices for voting from a congregate living setting (i.e. group home, nursing home, state operated developmental center, psychiatric hospital, etc.)?**
- **What are the policies and practices for voting options in times of emergency?**
For example, people who have experienced unexpected hospitalizations or who are experiencing a natural disaster.
- **What are the policies in your state around voter assistance, beyond the assistance provided by poll workers?**
The question should take into account, and collect information on, settings where the rules around voter assistance may differ, such as nursing homes.

Thank you for collecting this valuable information and for the opportunity to weigh in on the 2026 Election Administration Policy Survey. For more information, please contact Alexia Kemerling, akemerling@aapd.com.

Sincerely,

Access Ready
American Association of People with Disabilities
Association of Programs for Rural Independent Living (APRIL)
The Arc of the US
Center for Public Representation
Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund
National Disability Rights Network
Paralyzed Veterans of America

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Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0036
Comment from B, J

Submitter Information

Name: J B
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FL,
Email: juliebgps222@gmail.com

General Comment

Comments for EAC/2026/01/12/2026-00303

Regarding the EAVS, I believe it would be useful under the policy section to understand what the officials would want to change or have an opinion about.

1. Voter registration: Do you think that there should be proof of citizenship to register?
2. Voting: Do you think that a photo id should presented to vote for in-person voting.
3. Voting: Do you think there should be a copy of photo id presented for VBM?
4. UOCAVA: For non-military voters, should a passport id be required?
5. UOCAVA: For non-military voters, should passport ids be entered into a national database to ensure that no one is voting in more than one state?
6. VBM: Should VBM be limited to those unable to vote in-person, e.g. for illness, confinement, travel?
7. PROCESSING: Should votes be counted after election day? If yes, how long after election day and under what circumstances?
8. PROCESSING: Are you satisfied with ballot security? If not, what should be changed?

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Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0037
Comment from Empie, Joanne

Submitter Information

Name: Joanne Empie
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Raleigh, NC,
Email: joanne.empie@gmail.com

General Comment

1. Improve format to make it more user friendly - Clarify columns labeling and descriptions and make it easier to export.

2. Add Survey Questions
There are high %s of unverified registrations in NC and additional info needs to be collected to identify problems.

Is there lack of driver's license number verification? How many registrations with DL# missing were submitted, accepted, and rejected?

Is there a lack of Social Security number verification? How many registrations with SS# missing were submitted, accepted and rejected?

Were both driver's license and Social Security numbers missing? How many were submitted, accepted and rejected?

Reporting the number of noncitizens whose registrations were accepted, denied or removed and how were these identified would be valuable data.

Adding questions on these topics would identify problems.

Retaining these codes would be helpful.

A13A refers to merged records, which are necessary for transparency because they show how many duplicate

registrations are removed; North Carolina has a large number of these (32,306 in 2024) due to SEIMS' system failure to comply with legal requirements.

E2E, E2F, and E2G are codes indicating reasons for rejecting a provisional ballot, and North Carolina has a substantial number of such ballots, making them useful for assessing whether policies are applied consistently across counties.

3. Corrections needed for NC EAVS 2024 Data Regarding Automatic Registration

Since NC does not currently use Automatic Voter Registration (AVR), the following columns for the 2024 EAVS data for NC need to be corrected to show NC as Non AVR - columns A4d - A4e and A5-A9(d-e).

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Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0038
Comment from Democracy Defenders Fund

Submitter Information

Email: jonathan@democracydefenders.org
Organization: Democracy Defenders Fund

General Comment

See attached document

Attachments

EAC EAVS Comment.docx



March 16, 2026

Attn: EAVS
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
633 3rd Street NW, Ste 200
Washington, D.C. 20001

Submitted electronically via regulations.gov

Re: Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026
Election Administration and Voting Survey
Docket Number: EAC-2026-0001

Democracy Defenders Fund (DDF) writes to oppose certain proposed changes by the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) that would reduce critical data collection on election administration throughout the nation. These proposed changes would significantly diminish quantitative insights and remove qualitative information on State-run elections.¹ In short, DDF opposes any changes that weaken the reliability of impartial data from the EAC's Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) and Election Administration Policy Survey (Policy Survey).

Background

The EAVS and Policy Survey currently provide excellent windows into how localities administer their elections by collecting data on various metrics like the number of absentee ballots cast and counted or the number of in-person ballots cast on Election Day. These surveys support the EAC in its role “as a national clearing house and resource for the compilation of information and review of procedures with respect to the administration of Federal elections;” specifically curating the experiences of State and local governments in operating voting systems.² For elections administrators and researchers, these surveys are invaluable—they provide snapshots of national practices and yield comprehensive data that may not be available elsewhere.³ Some of the EAC's proposed revisions to the EAVS and Policy Survey would undercut the efficacy of its data collection process.

The EAC proposes to remove several data sources from the surveys:

- Response options for why registration confirmation notices are sent to voters
- The question that tracks the number of voter registration records linked or merged

¹ See [Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey](#), 91 Fed. Reg. 1179 (Jan. 12, 2026).

² See Help America Vote Act, 52 U.S.C. § 20922.

³ Jack Williams, [The Election Administration and Voting Survey](#), MIT election Data + Science Lab (Aug. 16, 2021).

- Response options for why UOCAVA ballots were undeliverable
- A response option that tracked UOCAVA ballots rejected because of postmark issues
- Response options about ballot drop box collection and security measures
- Response options for justified electronic voting within the U.S.

Unfortunately, the proposed changes, if adopted, would eliminate sources of quantitative data from the EAVS and remove sources of qualitative data from the Policy Survey. These changes, which would lead to less comprehensive data collection, equip advocates and election officials with less data to evaluate and improve upon current practices.

I. Removal of Key Quantitative Data Sources from the EAVS

The EAC cannot fulfill its obligation under HAVA to create responsive election guidelines, especially for debated practices, if the agency does not collect data that brings clarity to election administration issues.

A. Voter Registration

Section A of the EAVS focuses on voter registration, including how election officials track and verify changes to voter records. But proposed revisions would remove several response categories. These categories include why address confirmation notices are sent to voters, a tool administrators use to verify voter information and maintain updated voter registration rolls. For example, question “A11 Reason for Sending Confirmation Notice to Voters” currently lists 15 categorical responses covering explicit and general reasons, with four categories that invite open-ended responses.⁴ The response matrix also welcomes numerical responses. The EAC proposes removing three response options that collect information on the number of voters who requested removal from rolls, voters who moved out of state, and voters who were identified as having duplicate registration records.⁵ Removing these survey questions is concerning because of frequent problems nationally with how address confirmation notices are sent, received, and processed; particularly for voters who repeatedly relocate or reside on college campuses.⁶ The potential data losses will negatively impact election stakeholders who work to improve confirmation notice processes and voter registration experiences.

⁴ See [Draft of U.S. Election Assistance Commission 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey](#), 91 Fed. Reg. 1179, Dkt EAC-2026-0001 (Jan. 12, 2026) (EAVS Draft).

⁵ These are current responses A11d., A11h., and A11k., respectively. See *id.* and [What has Changed Between the 2026 Draft EAVS Surveys and 2024 Surveys](#), 91 Fed. Reg. 1179, Dkt EAC-2026-0001 (Jan. 12, 2026) (What Has Changed).

⁶ E.g. Kyle Ingram, [Are you one of 241,000 voters NC contacted about their registration? Here's why](#), The News & Observer (Feb. 20, 2026); Grace Benninghoff, [What are Voter Registration Acknowledgement Notices, and what should you do if you get one?](#), Portland Press Herald (Oct. 22, 2025); Press Release, [SEC Sends Notice to Voters: Verify Your Information for the Next Election](#), S.C. Election Comm'n (Apr. 7, 2025). See also LWV Staff, [“Use it or Lose it” Purges Threaten College Students' Right to Vote](#), LWV Blog (Sept. 5, 2025); Chauncey Alcorn, [AUC Students Fear Being Disenfranchised by Massive Voter Registration Purge](#), Capital B News (Apr. 7, 2025); Dallas Parker, [Alabama A&M and Oakwood University students concerned about voter status](#), WHNT19 News (Nov. 1, 2018).

The proposed changes would also remove the question “Voter Registration Records Merged or Linked” entirely.⁷ These numbers are important as they provide advocates and administrators metrics on individuals who are more likely to be purged, particularly those who married and changed their names, voters whose names were inadvertently misspelled due to clerical errors, voters with multiple surnames, and voters who share first and last names. For example, if two voter registration records belonging to two separate voters with the same or similarly spelled name are accidentally merged into one, that merge results in one of those two voters being accidentally purged as only one person will get to vote under the resulting registration. The question about merged and linked records gives insight into jurisdictions where there are higher instances of merged records and could help advocates who are studying purges investigate further. Thus, the EAC should not remove this question, in part or in its entirety, from the EAVS.

B. Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)

Section B of the EAVS tracks absentee voting for Americans living or serving overseas. The proposed revisions remove several response categories that currently help jurisdictions report when overseas ballots are returned as undeliverable through different transmission methods.⁸

The EAVS question about undeliverable UOCAVA ballots currently lists seven categorical responses.⁹ The EAC proposes to remove two of those responses for undeliverable faxes and other undelivered online transmissions.¹⁰ Many overseas and military voters use fax or online methods other than email to return absentee ballots.¹¹ Thirty-one States allow UOCAVA voters to electronically return their ballots, with fax and email the most common electronic option for ballot return. Some States allow voters to return their ballots through online portals and apps.¹² As of 2022, seven States only allowed UOCAVA ballot return via fax and often under limited conditions, despite the decreasing access to faxes generally for overseas military personnel.¹³

⁷ Question A13 and proposed removal A13a. The document *What has Changed between the 2026 Draft EAVS Surveys and 2024 Surveys* proposes to remove response option A13a “TOTAL number of voter registration records that were merged or linked with another record.” But cross-referencing the proposed revision with the text *Draft of U.S. Election Assistance Commission 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey*, instead shows the EAC would completely remove question A13 from the EAVS. Whether this discrepancy is a clerical error or intentional, the removed data source would complicate national discussion about voter list maintenance reform and registration. *Compare* What Has Changed, *supra*. note 5 *with* EAVS Draft, *supra*. note 4.

⁸ The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) and Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act (MOVE) regulate absentee voting for these citizens as they regularly have seen their ballots challenged, ballots delivered late to their overseas homes or elections offices, or not delivered at all. *See* [Brief: Voting for Military and Overseas Voters](#), Nat’l Conf. of State Legis. (updated Aug. 16, 2024); Hansi Lo Wang, [Overseas and military voting is challenged by Republicans](#), NPR (Oct. 20, 2024); Jackie Wheeler, [U.S. withdrawal from international postal union creates uncertainty for county election administrators](#), Nat’l Ass’n of Counties (Aug. 12, 2019).

⁹ Question B17. *See* EAVS Draft, *supra*. note 4 and What Has Changed, *supra*. note 5.

¹⁰ B17d and B17e. *See id.*

¹¹ *See generally* [UOCAVA Voting in US States](#), Fed. Voting Assist. Program (last accessed Mar. 11, 2026).

¹² *Id.*; [Military and Overseas Voters](#), *supra*. note 8.

¹³ Overseas Voting Initiative, [Access to and Usage of Faxing by Military & Overseas Voters](#), The Council for State Governments 4 (2022).

Consequently, it is important for advocates to track election administration problems involving fax machines or online portals.

The EAC's proposed revisions would also eliminate a response option for rejected UOCAVA ballots.¹⁴ This would remove the only section in the EAVS that collects the total number of UOCAVA ballots rejected for postmarks. The other response category generally asks for UOCAVA ballots received by election officials beyond the ballot receipt deadline.¹⁵ The data is particularly important because several populous States count overseas ballots received after Election Day.¹⁶ Without this critical information, the EAVS would lose a pivotal way to measure how mail administration issues affect overseas voter participation.

II. Eliminating Qualitative Data Sources from the Policy Survey

The EAC cannot fulfill its HAVA obligation to craft helpful election guidelines, especially on debated election innovations, if the agency fails to track the most relevant policies and practices in its Policy Survey. Responses to these questions provide high-level insight into how States and localities administer elections, while also allowing for comparison of States' policies and practices.

A. Drop Boxes

The EAC proposes to eliminate inquiries about ballot drop box policies, a recent election innovation authorized in about 24 States that permits voters to return absentee or mail-in ballots without relying on the U.S. Postal Service.¹⁷ Drop boxes also provide a secure way to deliver mail-in ballots for voters with disabilities, voters with heavy time constraints that prevent them from waiting in long lines, and voters with unreliable postal service. Currently, the Policy Survey asks whether drop boxes are provided, where, for how long, and what attendant security measures are in place.¹⁸ Eliminating questions about drop box collection frequency and drop box security measures, however, raises strong concerns. Drop box security became a pressing issue in the 2024 General Elections after boxes were intentionally targeted using incendiary devices, in one instance leading to hundreds of ballots being damaged or destroyed.¹⁹ Removing these questions would limit the public's understanding of the viability of drop boxes and may result in policy decisions made with insufficient information.²⁰

¹⁴ Question chart for B24-B27. See EAVS Draft, *supra*. note 4 and What Has Changed, *supra*. note 5.

¹⁵ EAVS Draft, *supra*. note 4.

¹⁶ See [Report: Voting Outside the Polling Place: Absentee, All-Mail and other voting at Home Options, Table 11: Receipt and Postmark Deadlines for Absentee/Mail Ballots](#), Nat'l Conf. of State Legis. (updated Dec. 24, 2025).

¹⁷ Eric Levenson & Natasha Chen, [Ballot drop boxes: How they work and how officials keep them secure](#), CNN (Oct. 30, 2024).

¹⁸ See [Draft of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission 2026 Policy Survey](#), 91 Fed. Reg. 1179, Dkt EAC-2026-0001 (Jan. 12, 2026) (Policy Survey Draft).

¹⁹ Chris Boyette, [What we know about the ballot boxes set on fire in Washington and Oregon](#), CNN (Oct. 30, 2024); Lisa Hagan, [Ballots set on fire in three states as Election Day approaches](#), NPR (Oct. 28, 2024).

²⁰ It's somewhat unclear if these questions were part of Question 24, as the EAC advisory document lists the removed items as Q27b and Q27d. However, Q27 concerns tracking ballots received after Election Day. Compare What Has Changed, *supra*. note 5 with Policy Survey Draft, *supra*. note 18.

B. Electronic Voting

The EAC would also remove response options regarding domestic electronic voting, an election innovation that States and localities use to accommodate extraordinary events. This qualitative data is critical to assess how States and localities have kept election processes going during natural disasters. Current responses to the question address categorical prohibition, disability accommodations, emergency accommodations, and unqualified permission to electronically vote.²¹ Specifically, the EAC would remove: “During an emergency situation (such as a natural disaster) that hinders normal in-person voting or mail voting” and “Voters may receive a ballot electronically for any circumstances.”²² By failing to collect this information moving forward, the EAC will hinder its own ability to help guide States and localities with election administration challenges during and after increasingly destructive hurricanes, tornados, wildfires, and other natural disasters.

III. Conclusion

The EAC must reassess its proposed changes to its EAVS and Policy Survey. The proposed changes make it more difficult for advocates and election administrators to gather quantitative and qualitative information that would help them run better elections. Therefore, the EAC should not adopt these proposed changes and instead focus on shepherding accessible, secure, and fair elections for all eligible voters.

/s/

Jonathan Barry-Blocker
Senior Policy Counsel
Democracy Defenders Fund

²¹ Q30. See Policy Survey Draft, *supra*. note 18.

²² Notably, materials included with the rule change misquoted the response option about emergency situations, leaving out the parenthetical phrase about natural disasters. It is unclear if this is a clerical error or intentional. Compare *id.* and What Has Changed, *supra*. note 5 with [2024 Election Administration Policy Survey](#), U.S. Election Assist. Comm’n (2024) (last accessed Mar. 13, 2026).

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Docket: EAC-2026-0001
2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0039
Comment from The John K MacIver Institute for Public Policy, Inc.

Submitter Information

Email: aolson@maciverinstitute.com
Organization: The John K MacIver Institute for Public Policy, Inc.

General Comment

Greater transparency, accuracy and verification in voter rolls is necessary as we work to gain confidence from voters in elections. My organization is one of many that works to review state election laws and educate eligible citizens so they will vote and participate in the election process to achieve fair outcomes.

Citizens have become very leery whether their precious one vote counts and won't be cancelled out by ineligible people voting and taking part in our democratic process. We need to address these issues and work to restore the confidence of the electorate.

The examples listed here are great starters. American Citizens need to know their government works for them by protecting their Constitutional rights.

- **Improve Data Accessibility:** Add column titles and descriptions to all Excel files. Standardize reporting by county (or "units" in states like Virginia), avoiding city-level breakdowns that require manual aggregation. Provide tools or guides for mapping cities to counties where needed.
- **Mandate Inclusion of Inactives:** Require reports to prominently feature combined active + inactive totals to reflect true registration rates. However, the inactive voters list should not be attached to the active voter rolls in such a way that can easily be manipulated.
- **Restore Side-by-Side Display:** Reinstate active and inactive columns in main charts for all states, with clear totals and percentages vs. CVAP.
- **Enhance Verification Standards:** Recommend federal guidelines for states to verify full legal names, dates of birth, and citizenship, with EAVS tracking compliance.
- **Address Over-Registration:** Include metrics for identifying and removing duplicates/movers (e.g., cross-state matching via address changes). Utilize CASS verification for all addresses on the voter rolls.
- **Support Broader Reforms:** Advocate for the SAVE Act and federal/state election law changes to enforce better roll maintenance.

Thank you for this comment period opportunity to voice our concern.

Attachments

image

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- **Restore Side-by-Side Display:** Reinstate active and inactive columns in main charts for all states, with clear totals and percentages vs. CVAP.
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- **Support Broader Reforms:** Advocate for the SAVE Act and federal/state election law changes to enforce better roll maintenance.

Thank you for this comment period opportunity to voice our concern.

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0040
Comment from Watts, Eileen

Submitter Information

Name: Eileen Watts
Address:
Powell, OH, 43065
Email: EWattsOhio@gmail.com

General Comment

Ohio supports passing the Save America Act to ensure that Only United States of America citizens Vote, that ALL voter registrations are verified & confirmed as eligible to vote.

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0041
Comment from Citizens for NJ Election Integrity, Inc.

Submitter Information

Email: mark.demo@citizens4njei.org
Organization: Citizens for NJ Election Integrity, Inc.

General Comment

Question 9a. need to add another question. Can a person register to vote if they don't have a SSN, a passport, a state issued drivers license or state issued identification card?

Question 11. Ask the state to report the number of people who registered and voted on the same day in the applicable federal election, regardless if the answer to question 11 is yes or no. the reason for this question is that NJ doesn't have same day voter registration, but they don't follow their own law and hundreds and sometimes thousands of voters register and vote on the same day, depending on turnout

Question 16: add a question asking the states to quantify the number of duplicate votes and invalid or rejected registrations, ask what causes them and in the case of duplicate voters, what the state is doing to minimize them

Question 18a: add a question asking about the voter status of voters sent confirmation notices. For example, are active votes ever sent confirmation notices?

Question 27d: add a question that asks how long is drop box video required to be retained?

Question 36c: add a question if the training includes emergency procedures if voting machine equipment (such as electronic poll books and tabulators) are unavailable

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0042
Comment from All Voting is Local

Submitter Information

Email: data@allvotingislocal.org
Organization: All Voting is Local

General Comment

See attached

Attachments

All Voting is Local Public Comment Docket EAC-2026-0001



MEMORANDUM

FOR: U.S. Election Assistance Commission
633 3rd Street NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20001

FROM: All Voting is Local

DATE: March 16, 2026

SUBJECT: Comment for the Election Assistance Commission regarding
the Notice, request for comment., Docket EAC-2026-0001

The Election Assistance Commission is soliciting public comment regarding the 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS).

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the 2026 EAVS survey. All Voting is Local (“All Voting”) is a nonpartisan organization that fights on the ground in eight states for free and fair elections. In a moment of unprecedented threat to our democracy, All Voting advocates state and local officials for policies and practices that ensure the American people choose their leaders, not the other way around. All Voting writes to provide comments on the docket EAC-2026-0001.

All Voting is Local submits this comment in support of the continued collection of election administration data via the EAVS survey in a manner that maximizes transparency around election administration and clarity on how voters interests are prioritized.

The EAVS survey provides vital information about how elections are administered nationwide. It is the most comprehensive source of detailed, specific data on elections in counties and cities across the United States and its territories. At All Voting, we regularly use EAVS data to understand how Americans vote and the election administration practices that facilitate voting. We rely on EAVS data to understand trends in registration and voting patterns over time and across counties. To this end, we support the continued collection and distribution of the EAVS survey. Specifically, we greatly support efforts to improve the quality, completeness, and timeliness of the data.

Summary

The EAVS survey is a unique and important data source. It provides necessary transparency into how elections are run across the country. The EAVS data paint a picture on how well elections might have been administered and the ways in which Americans are registering and casting their



votes. It provides data that enables organizations like ours to make informed, data-driven decisions that help us advocate on behalf of voters. We fully support the ongoing collection of the EAVS data and the changes to improve the quality and completeness of the dataset.

Sincerely,

All Voting is Local

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0043
Comment from Burke, Paul

Submitter Information

Name: Paul Burke
Address: United States,
Email: admin@VoteWell.net

General Comment

See attached file(s)

Attachments

2026EACcomments

EAVS Survey Instrument comments

<https://www.regulations.gov/document/EAC-2026-0001-0001>

Thank you for all the work on these survey instruments and your solicitation of public comments. We ask you to reconsider some of the changes being suggested. Some questions recommended for elimination should be continued because they collect data that helps identify areas needing improvement.

We also ask you to consider additions in order to collect data on current pressing election administration issues, such as internet voting and ballot secrecy. We appreciate the questions covering internet voting in the proposed 2026 EAVS policy survey such as: 29, 29a, 29b, 29c, 30, 30a, 30b. As more and more ballots are being returned over the internet, it is critical for the EAVS survey to collect information on their numbers.

Affiliations for identification only:

Paul Burke, admin@VoteWell.net
Neal McBurnett, independent auditor

Suggested Changes to EAVS

1. A11 - Reason for Sending Confirmation Notice to Voters.

We disagree with the suggested removal of:

Formerly, A11e. Voter requested to be removed from the registration rolls. **It is especially important to send confirmation notices for voters who have requested to be removed from the registration rolls in case a malicious actor is asking for these removals.**

Formerly, A11h. Voter surrendered their state driver's license and obtained a new license in a different state. **This is important to keep unless it is included in A11b: "all notices sent to voters who might have moved out of your jurisdiction, including those identified by National Change of Address (NCOA) reports or any other reason". Perhaps the change of license issue should be included in the new explanation of A11b.**

Formerly, A11k. Voter may have a duplicate voter registration record. **It is important to send confirmation notices for apparent duplicate voter registration records. The outcome of incorrectly kicking someone off the registration rolls is of much greater consequence than the expense of confirming the registration validity by notice.**

2. B11–B16. UOCAVA Ballots Returned by Voters: Mail, Email, Online, or Other Mode

B12. Mail: Of the total in B11a-c, how many were returned by voters by mail, using USPS or any private shipping services (e.g., FedEx, UPS, DHL), drop boxes or by hand. For instance, domestic military might use drop boxes.

3. C1. Mail Ballots Transmitted and Returned Number

There are security issues with returning ballots over the internet (ie by email, fax or portal). The more ballots that are returned through the internet, the larger the vulnerability. The number of ballots returned over the internet should be collected.

The instructions state: "These are ballots your office sent to voters by mail, email, fax, or other methods." Many states now electronically deliver many ballots through an online ballot delivery system. The instructions, to be clear, should be changed to say: "These ballots your office sent to voters by mail, electronically (email, fax, or an online ballot delivery system), or other methods."

C1a. Total mail ballots transmitted: How many mail ballots did your office send to voters for the November 2026 general election? Include: replacement and duplicate mail ballots. Do NOT include: • UOCAVA ballots • "in-person absentee ballots" that are tallied and reported with in-person election results.

Add: C1aa: How many of these ballots were transmitted electronically to the voter (by email, fax or portal)?

C1b. Returned by voters: Of the total the mailed ballots in C1a, how many were sent back by voters for counting? Include: all mail ballots returned to your office by the voter, regardless of whether the ballot was counted, challenged, or rejected. Do NOT include mail ballots that were surrendered, spoiled, or replaced/voided.

Add: C1bb: Of the electronically transmitted ballots in C1a, how many were sent back by mail by the voters for counting?

Add: C1bbb: Of the electronically transmitted ballots in C1a, how many were sent back electronically (by email, fax or portal) by the voters for counting?

It is important to be able to compare the return rate for ballots transmitted electronically to those transmitted by mail. Historically, the ballot return rate for electronically transmitted ballots to voters has been much lower than transmitted printed mailed ballots.

Formerly, C1e. Mail voters who voted in person with a provisional ballot. [REMOVED in 2026] This should not be removed. Collecting this information is important for understanding a cause of provisional ballot use. Provisional ballots are time consuming for the election officials to process, can be frustrating for voters, and may signal a problem in the process or malfeasance.

4. C9. Mail Ballots Rejected by Reason

Formerly, C9q. No ballot application on record [REMOVED in 2026] This question should not be removed. It is important to understand how the process may have broken down and whether people are trying to vote without the proper authority.

5. E2. Reason Provisional Ballot Was Issued

Understanding why provisional ballots were issued is key for identifying administrative problems or malfeasance. The proposed 2026 E2c combines the collection of various 2024 reasons:

“An election official determined the voter was not eligible to vote a regular ballot: Of the total in E1a, how many provisional ballots were issued because an election official (or poll worker) determined a “regular” ballot couldn’t be issued? For example, the voter was registered, but not at the correct address, the voter attempted to vote in the wrong precinct, or for another reason.”

Such consolidation is a bad idea.

We suggest retaining from 2024 EAVS:

E2e. Voter was not a resident of the precinct in which they were attempting to vote.

E2f. Voter’s registration was not updated with their current name or address.

E2g. Voter was issued a mail ballot but did not surrender the ballot to the poll workers when they came to vote in person.

6. E3. Reasons for Provisional Ballot Rejections

We disagree with the proposed 2026 merger of the 2024 “E3i. Ballot had a non-matching signature” and the 2024 “E3h. Ballot did not have a signature.”, to form 2026 EAVS’s “E3f. Ballot envelope was missing a signature, or the signature did not match the one on file.” Ballots without signatures and ballots with signature mismatches have different causes and need to be separately analyzed. Mismatched signatures could be a sign of malfeasance. Also, some states don’t have signature comparisons so have no mismatches.

7. Voter Participation and Election Technologies

This section collection information about the voting equipment used in polling locations but fails to collect information about voting systems used for internet returned ballots. A question should be added:

F5b. Internet returned ballots. (Equipment Type, a. In use in your jurisdiction b. Manufacturer/equipment name, Number deployed, Voting or election activities this equipment/counting method supported)

Comments on EAVS Policy Survey

1. Q15a. Which voters are sent confirmation notices? (Select all that apply.)

The 2026 policy survey should not eliminate these questions from the 2024 policy survey:

A registered voter who has requested to be removed.

A registered voter who may have a duplicate ...

Confirmation notices in these circumstances are important to detect malfeasance.

2. Add: Q22b. Do your absentee ballots delivered to voters have any unique numbers on them? (Unique numbers printed on ballots by voting systems after the ballots are cast do not apply to this question.) Having unique numbers on absentee ballots delivered to voters can jeopardize ballot secrecy, especially with the more frequent use of ballot images to help verify elections. The possible jeopardy of ballot secrecy is an extremely important issue as ballot secrecy is a cornerstone of all democracies.
3. Q25a. Which of the following types of mail ballot errors may be cured? (Select all that apply.)
 - Non-matching voter signature
 - our state does not require signature comparison for mailed ballots
4. Q28. The 2024 policy survey had options that should not be eliminated for when voters can receive their mailed ballots electronically:
 - During an emergency situation that hinders normal in-person voting or mail voting.
 - When a replacement ballot is needed.
 - Voters may receive a ballot electronically for any circumstance.
5. Add: Q30c. For each of the methods that your state allows domestic civilian (nonUOCAVA) voters to return their ballots electronically per Q30b, how does your state protect ballot secrecy so that no vote can be linked to the voter?
6. Q45a. Under what circumstances does your state use provisional ballots? (Select all that apply.)
 - Add: A voter has already requested an absentee ballot.
This is an important case in order to prevent double voting.

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0044
Comment from Bipartisan Policy Center

Submitter Information

Email: gklinefelter@bipartisanpolicy.org
Organization: Bipartisan Policy Center

General Comment

See attached comment from the Bipartisan Policy Center and MIT Election Data and Science Lab.

Attachments

BPC_MEDSL 2026 EAVS Public Comment

Public Comment on 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

[\(EAC-2026-0001-0001\)](#)

March 16, 2026

Attn: Election Administration and Voting Survey
Election Assistance Commission
633 3rd Street NW
Suite 200
Washington, DC 20001

We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments on the 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS). The [Bipartisan Policy Center Elections Project](#) and the [MIT Election Data + Science Lab](#) are committed to making election policy recommendations based on evidence and data, and EAVS and its companion Policy Survey are a crucial source of this data.

We welcome many of the proposed edits to this year's surveys. The instructions appear to be strongly improved, which should ease survey burden on respondents and result in more consistent and complete data. But we do find a few areas where surveys could be improved or clarified. Additionally, we made one suggestion in 2024 that remains unresolved, and we raise that suggestion here again (with a slight modification from what we previously suggested).

The suggestions contained herein are put forth by BPC's Elections Project and the MIT Election Data + Science Lab. They are endorsed by the following members of BPC's [Task Force on Elections](#), a geographically and politically diverse group of state and local election officials devoted to making meaningful improvements to United States elections.

- Jacqueline Beaudry, City Clerk, Ann Arbor, Michigan
- Tommy Gong, County Clerk, Lane County, Oregon
- Stuart Holmes, Director of Elections, State of Washington
- Debra Lee, County Clerk, Laramie County, Wyoming
- Brianna Lennon, County Clerk, Boone County, Missouri
- Nick Lima, Registrar/Director of Elections, City of Cranston, Rhode Island

Suggestion 1: Clarify question and response options about automatic voter registration.

Q6 of the Policy Survey asks, “**Does your state offer automatic voter registration for qualified individuals, or updates to existing voter registration records, during an interaction with a state government agency through any of these processes, either online or in person? (Select all that apply.)**” The wording of this question does not capture that, in some cases, key steps in automatic voter registration processes may occur *after* an interaction with a state government agency rather than during. In general, automatic voter registration refers to voter registration that occurs *as a result of* interacting with certain state government agencies.

We also find that some of the response options are worded in a confusing way that may be increasing survey burden and leading to inaccurate responses. *We therefore suggest that Q6 and response options be modified to read as follows:*

Q6. Does your state offer, **for qualified individuals**, automatic voter registration ~~for qualified individuals~~ (or updates to existing voter registration records), **during as a result of** an interaction with a state government agency through any of these processes, either online or in person? (Select all that apply.)

Additional context for your answers should be provided in the Comments box (e.g., if one method is provided for new registrations and another is provided for updates.)

- The option to register to vote is preselected, but the individual can choose to opt out of registration (or ~~using their information to~~ **to opt out of updating** ~~update~~ their voter registration record) during the interaction.
- The option to register to vote is not preselected, and** the individual cannot complete the interaction without selecting whether or not they wish to register to vote (or ~~to use their information~~ **update** their voter registration record).
- The individual is automatically registered to vote (or their **voter registration record is automatically updated**) ~~information is used to update their voter registration record, as a result of interacting with a designated state agency. The individual is not offered a chance to opt out of voter registration (or to opt out of updating their voter registration record) during the interaction but may instead opt out by responding~~ ~~unless they opt out in response~~ to a mailer that is sent to the individual after the interaction has concluded.
- Other (please describe):
- No automatic voter registration processes are ~~available~~ **used** in my state.

Q6 comments:

Suggestion 2: Modify possible response options regarding data sources used to identify potentially ineligible voters.

Q16 of the Policy Survey asks, “**What data sources are used to identify potentially ineligible voters on your state’s voter rolls? (Select all that apply.)**” We suggest two changes to account for recent changes in how states maintain their voter rolls.

One response is “Data from an interstate data-sharing compact (e.g., the Electronic Registration Information Center [ERIC]).” In recent years, some states have withdrawn from ERIC and developed alternative mechanisms for cross-checking voter rolls across state lines. These alternatives—such as Alabama’s AVID system—rely on [bilateral memoranda of understanding](#) directly between states rather than routing data through a centralized third-party organization. As a result, the existing response option does not capture the full range of interstate data-sharing arrangements that states now use. We recommend splitting the original response into two distinct options: one describing centralized interstate data-sharing organizations like ERIC, and one describing direct, state-administered bilateral agreements like AVID.

Additionally, some states have begun querying the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) system to identify and remove potentially ineligible noncitizen voters from their rolls. Because SAVE is a distinct federal data source not currently listed among Q16’s response options, we recommend adding it as a separate item.

We recommend that Q16 be modified to read as follows, replacing the original “data-sharing compact” item with two distinct response options and adding USCIS SAVE as a new option. We also recommend that some options be reworded and rearranged.

Q16. What data sources are used to identify potentially ineligible voters on your state’s voter rolls? (Select all that apply.)

- ~~Applications for mail ballots~~
- Canvassing (door-to-door verification)
- Data from credit bureaus (e.g., Equifax, Experian, or TransUnion)**
- ~~Data from an interstate data-sharing compact (e.g., the Electronic Registration Information Center [ERIC])~~
- Data from a centralized interstate data-sharing organization (e.g., the Electronic Registration Information Center [ERIC])**

- **Data from bilateral interstate agreements (e.g., memoranda of understanding)**
- Entities that maintain felony or prison records (e.g., state courts, state police, federal courts, pardons or paroles agencies)
- Entities that maintain records of individuals declared mentally incompetent
- **The Help America Vote Verification (HAVV) system**
- Jury questionnaires
- **Jury summons returned**
- Local/county office records
- **Mail ballot applications**
- Mail ballots that are returned as undeliverable
- Other mail from the election office (not ballots) that is returned as undeliverable
- Motor vehicles agencies (e.g., DMV)
- National Change of Address (NCOA) reports
- Newspaper death notices or obituaries
- Reports or notices from other states that a former resident has registered to vote
- Requests from voters for removal from the voter registration roll
- ~~Returned jury summons~~
- **USCIS Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) system**
- U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) death records
- **The State-to-State (S2S) Verification service**
- State vital statistics office death records
- State agencies that serve persons with disabilities
- State public assistance agencies
- State agencies that are not specified in the NVRA
- State tax filings

Other (e.g., military recruitment offices; please describe):

Suggestion 3: Count vote centers separately from other voting locations.

The proposed update asks respondents to report the number of voting locations, grouping vote centers and all other voting locations together. Disaggregating these types of voting locations would be useful to researchers and policymakers, especially those in states considering the adoption of vote centers. It would enable data users to identify which jurisdictions use vote centers and how many vote centers exist in these jurisdictions.

A simple way to accomplish this would be to preserve the D3-D4 table in the 2024 EAVS, but to substitute “vote centers” for “election offices.” A separate box could be used to contain question D2 (“Total number of physical voting locations”) as written in the 2026 EAVS. We also recommend making minor revisions to the instructions provided at the beginning of “D2-D4. Number of Voting Locations” in the 2026 EAVS.

We therefore recommend that D2 and D4 be modified as follows. (In the instructions below, green and red edits indicate changes relative to the 2026 EAVS. Edits to the table indicate changes relative to the 2024 EAVS.)

D2–D4. Number of Voting Locations

To answer these questions: **first** enter the total number of physical voting locations (including voting locations and vote centers) your jurisdiction used for the November 2026 general election (D2a). **Then indicate the number of physical voting locations that are not vote centers (D3b, D3c), and the number of physical voting locations that are vote centers (D4b, D4c).**

Additional instructions:

- ~~If your jurisdiction uses vote centers, count each vote center as a single voting location.~~
- **A vote center is a physical location where voters from multiple precincts may cast their ballots (i.e., voters may vote at a location that is not their assigned location based on their voter registration address).**
- If multiple precincts shared a single voting location, count that as a single voting location.
- If your jurisdiction used a mobile voting location that moved to different sites during early voting or on Election Day, count each mobile voting location only once, no matter how many sites it visited.
- If a location was used for both early voting and Election Day, report it in both D3 and D4.

● Check your numbers: The sum of D3 and D4 might not equal D2. That is ok.

Total Polling Places Voting Locations	Total	
D2a. Total number of physical polling places voting locations used for the 2024 general election: Each polling place voting location should be counted only once in this question, regardless of the number of voting days it was used for.		
D2 Comments:		
Category of Polling Place Voting Locations	D3. Election Day voting	D4. Early voting
b. Physical polling places voting locations other than election offices (e.g., libraries, schools, mobile voting location) vote centers		
c. Election offices Vote centers		
D3-D4 Comments:		

Suggestion 4: Collect more detailed information on ballot modality, including the number of ballots cast electronically in-person and remotely.

In [2024](#), we suggested that EAVS collect information on the number of electronic ballots transmitted, returned, and counted for voters not covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), mirroring the information that is currently being collected for UOCAVA voters only. The EAC did not adopt this suggestion for the 2024 cycle. We believe this information would still be valuable, as electronic ballot transmission for domestic civilian voters remains an important and underexamined dimension of election administration.

A more comprehensive approach to breaking down information by ballot modality may be warranted. In addition to tracking electronic ballots for non-UOCAVA voters, it would be useful to collect information on the number of ballots cast in person using ballot-marking devices, direct-recording electronic systems, and hand-marked paper ballots. The prevalence

of each ballot type has significant implications for election security and voter accessibility and is of practical relevance to litigators, policymakers, and legislators who may rely on EAVS data to inform legal arguments, policy decisions, and legislation. We encourage the EAC to consider whether EAVS might be restructured to treat ballot modality more comprehensively across all voter populations in a way that would minimize survey burden.

We recognize that a more comprehensive approach to ballot modality data collection may introduce redundancies with existing questions in Section C: Mail Voting, and that fully restructuring how EAVS treats ballot modality may not be feasible for the current cycle. We would nonetheless welcome the opportunity to work with the EAC to explore what such a redesign might look like.

Suggestion 5: Undo the removal of some questions and options or provide justification before the next public comment period.

For this year's surveys, the EAC proposes removing a number of questions that provide valuable information about American elections. While we are sympathetic to the goal of streamlining the surveys and decreasing survey burden on respondents, some of these removals would sacrifice meaningful insight without substantially reducing that burden.

In some cases, the EAC proposes removing closed-ended response options to questions. We are concerned that removing closed-ended options will lead to more respondents using the open-ended option, increasing survey burden and making it harder for researchers to use the data.

It is possible that some of these removals may be justifiable. If so, additional explanation would help us understand the rationale and evaluate the implications. *We therefore request that the EAC either undo the following changes listed in the EAC's "What Has Changed Since the 2024 EAVS & Policy Survey," or provide written justification for each removal before the next public comment period opens.*

- Removed 2024 EAVS's "A11e. Voter requested to be removed from the registration rolls.", "A11h. Voter surrendered their state driver's license and obtained a new license in a different state.", and "A11k. Voter may have a duplicate voter registration record."
- Removed 2024 EAVS's "A13a. TOTAL number of voter registration records that were merged or linked with another record"
- Removed 2024 EAVS's "C1e. Mail voters who voted in person with a provisional ballot"
- Removed 2024 EAVS's E2e-g "E2e. Voter was not a resident of the precinct in which they were attempting to vote.", "E2f. Voter's registration was not updated with their current name or address.", "E2g. Voter was issued a mail ballot but did not surrender the ballot to poll workers when they came to vote in person." in the Reasons for Casting Provisional Ballots question.

- Removed 2024 EAVS's "E3c. Voter was registered in the state but attempted to vote in the wrong jurisdiction" in the Reasons for Provisional Ballot Rejections question.
- Removed "E3i. Ballot had a non-matching signature" and merged with "E3h. Ballot did not have a signature.", to form 2026 EAVS's "E3f. Ballot envelope was missing a signature, or the signature did not match the one on file.", in the Reasons for Provisional Ballot Rejections question.
- Removed 2024 EAVS's "F1g. Voters who cast a mail ballot in a jurisdiction that conducts elections by mail and whose ballot was counted". Data from this question should be captured in 2026 EAVS's "F1d. Voters who cast a mail ballot and whose ballot was counted".
- Removed 2024 EAVS's "F2 Source of Data for Total Participation in the 2024 General Election"
- Updated Q15a: Added answer options for voters who may be deceased or voters who may have a duplicate record. Removed three 2024 Policy Survey options — "A registered voter who has requested to be removed..."; "A registered voter who has surrendered..."; and "A registered voter who may have a duplicate...". Answer options were rearranged to match the order of the items in A11a.
- Removed 2024 Policy Survey's Q17: Registration sources available in state
- Removed 2024 Policy Survey's Q21: What happens when duplicate registration records are identified
- Removed 2024 Policy Survey's Q27b on Drop box collection frequency
- Removed 2024 Policy Survey's Q27d on Drop box security measures
- Updated Q28: Removed three options: "During an emergency situation that hinders..."; "When a replacement ballot is needed"; and "Voters may receive a ballot electronically...".
- Updated Q30: Removed two options: "During an emergency situation that hinders normal in-person voting or mail voting" and "Voters may receive a ballot electronically for any circumstance".
- New question Q48a: Legal requirements for audits
- Removed 2024 Policy Survey's Q49a Post-election tabulation audits required
- Removed 2024 Policy Survey's Q49b Type of post-election tabulation audit

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Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0045
Comment from Center for Election Confidence, Inc.

Submitter Information

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Organization: Center for Election Confidence, Inc.

General Comment

See attached file.

Attachments

Comment to EAC in Response to RFC EAVS First Comment Period (Mar 16 2026)



Introduction

Center for Election Confidence, Inc. (“CEC”) is a non-profit organization recognized as a key “civil society group”¹ that promotes ethics, integrity, and professionalism in the electoral process. CEC works to ensure that all citizens can vote freely within an election system of reasonable procedures that promote election integrity, prevent vote dilution and disenfranchisement, and instill public confidence in election systems and outcomes.

CEC submits these comments to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (“EAC”) in response to its January 12, 2026, Notice and Request for Comment, *Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals; 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey*, Dkt. no. EAC-2026-0001-0001, 91 FR 7.

CEC’s interest in the 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) relates directly to the organization’s purpose of “advancing the role of ethics, integrity, and legal professionalism in the electoral process, including safeguarding the right of eligible voters to vote” by undertaking efforts that “increas[e] confidence in election results and election systems”.²

I. USPS Postmark Regulatory Change

CEC encourages the EAC to include in the 2026 EAVS questions relating to voting by mail statutes, policies and practices, including with respect to postmarking, to transmission and receipt deadlines, and to timely acceptance. This exercise of EAC’s clearinghouse responsibilities in light of unpredictable externalities would serve as a singular example of the importance of the EAVS and the information it collects to the sharing of information between the States and the subsequent “laboratory” testing and development of sound policy.³

On December 24, 2025, a new United States Postal Service (“USPS”) regulation (“2025 Rule”) went into effect that changed how and when the postal service applied postmarks to all relevant mail, including Election Mail.⁴ DMM 608.11. While the 2025 Rule was unwelcome, it was not a surprise but rather the continuation of a process long in motion at USPS to eschew its civil society responsibilities. For example, in 2022, the *Postal Bulletin* instructed that

Postal Service policy is for ***every completed ballot mailed by voters to receive a postmark***, and we instruct our employees throughout the country to adhere to that policy on return ballots. However, we acknowledge that there will always be rare occurrences where a mailpiece does not receive a legible postmark.⁵

Yet, by 2024, the language had changed significantly, and suddenly a new “long-standing policy” appeared:

It has been the long-standing policy of the Postal Service ***to try to ensure that every completed ballot mailed by voters receives a postmark***, whether the return ballot is mailed with postage pre-paid by election officials or with a stamp affixed by the

¹ Elena Patel, Brookings Institute (Dec. 30, 2025), <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/when-a-postmark-no-longer-tracks-mailing/>.

² *About CEC*, Center for Election Confidence, <https://electionconfidence.org/about/>.

³ See *New State Ice v. Liebmann*, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory”).

⁴ Elena Patel, *When a postmark no longer tracks mailing*, Brookings Institute (Dec. 30, 2025), <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/when-a-postmark-no-longer-tracks-mailing/>.

⁵ United States Postal Service, *Postal Bulletin 22596 5* (April 21, 2022) (emphases added).

voter. We instruct our employees throughout the country to adhere to that policy on return ballots. However, we acknowledge that there will always be rare occurrences where a mailpiece does not receive a legible postmark.⁶

Identifying what was to come, CEC submitted comments urging the USPS to abandon its plans for the 2025 Rule⁷ and

to preserve consistent postmarking practices for ballots and other time-sensitive mail, emphasizing that postmarks have long served as a trusted marker of whether voters met statutory deadlines. The organization warned that changes to postmarking practices would introduce uncertainty into election administration in jurisdictions that rely on postmarks to determine whether a ballot was timely cast.⁸

By the end of 2025, the use of postmarks as indicia of timely mailing for *any* process—not just voting by mail—was under serious strain. Meanwhile, the USPS demands that state legislatures amend election laws every session to account for the continued degradation of the postal system, including declining delivery standards⁹ and the 2025 Rule’s changes to postmarking requirements. Of course, all rational, good faith actors know that this demand is neither reasonable nor sustainable.

Indeed, election officials and voters are not the only classes of USPS users affected by these changes. But elections officials are better positioned than most to continue to adapt to these external variables because of the EAVS and the information it collects for the EAC’s clearinghouse.

II. Cybersecurity Protections

CEC encourages the EAC to include in the 2026 EAVS a suite of questions relating to cybersecurity planning, preparedness, and resources. Cybersecurity concerns are not new or novel, but the dangers of ransomware, data exfiltration or manipulation, and/or privilege escalation with respect to Internet-connected (non-voting) equipment continue to grow.

Cybersecurity incidents, in particular, have the power to cause voter distrust, panic, and confusion concerning the trustworthiness of the election process, including registration, voting, tabulating, certification, and any post-election legal process to confirm results.

⁶ United States Postal Service, Postal Bulletin 22642 6 (January 25, 2024) (emphases added).

⁷ *Comments before the United States Postal Service re: Proposed Rule 2025-15266 (90 FR 38716)*, Center for Election Confidence (Sept. 10, 2025), available at <https://electionconfidence.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Comment-to-USPS-Proposed-Rule-on-39-CFR-Part-111-09.10.25.pdf>.

⁸ See *supra* n. 4.

⁹ Michelle D. Christensen, *USPS Changes Postal Service Standards*, no. IN11776, Cong. Rsch. Svc. (Oct. 14, 2021) (highlighting decrease in USPS delivery service standards for First Class Mail from 1-3 days before September 30, 2021, and 1-5 days effective October 1, 2021. The Christensen article also cites a 2012 USPS Final Rule (77 FR 102) that ended overnight First Class Mail delivery and handling and drastically reduced the likelihood that other First Class Mail would be processed within two business days, both of which had previously been the norm for mailpieces sent within USPS intra-Sectional Center Facilities or between locations within 12 hours’ driving distance, respectively.

Center for Election Confidence, Inc.

March 16, 2026

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While any cybersecurity questions included in the 2026 EAVS must be crafted carefully in order to protect sensitive information, it is equally as important that both State officials and Congress have access to quality, trustworthy information with respect to the current status of these important defenses against bad actors, especially in light of recent changes to resource availability.

III. List Maintenance

Federal law requires regular maintenance of voter registration lists and public disclosure of such activities.¹⁰ However, the public availability of information concerning State list maintenance efforts remains inconsistent and irregular.

In addition to the questions proposed to be included as A10-A12, CEC encourages the EAC to include in the 2026 EAVS questions concerning state list maintenance efforts, including with respect to the total number of the following:¹¹

- (1) Registrants who were inactive according to the criteria described in subsection (d)(1)(b), Section 8 of the National Voter Registration Act;
- (2) Registrants who voted in at least one of the prior two consecutive general elections for Federal office;
- (3) Registrants removed from the list of official voters in the State pursuant to subsection (d)(1)(b), Section 8 of the National Voter Registration Act; and
- (4) Registrants who received a notice sent pursuant to subsection (d)(2), Section 8 of the National Voter Registration Act and responded.

Further, the EAC should include questions requesting information concerning the use of federal databases (identifying each database) and the inter-state exchange of voter registration information (listing each other state with which the responding state shares data, and what specific categories of information are exchanged), each for list maintenance activities.

The collection of this information would benefit State officials, Congress, and the public. State officials and Congress would benefit by virtue of quality, trustworthy information relevant for inter-governmental advocacy or legislative activity. The public would benefit by virtue of public disclosure in single, identified repository of NVRA-mandated information.

Conclusion

The Center for Election Confidence urges the EAC to include these suggested items in the 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey.

Respectfully submitted this 16th day of March 2026,

/s/ Caleb J. Hays
Chief Policy Counsel
Center for Election Confidence, Inc.

¹⁰ See, generally, National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 103 P.L. 31, 107 Stat. 77, *codified at* 52 U.S. §§ 20501-20511.

¹¹ See U.S. Rep. Rodney Davis, American Confidence in Elections (ACE) Act, H.R. 8528, 117th Cong. (2022) (includes U.S. Rep. Gary Palmer, H.R. 8221, 117th Cong. (2022)).

Comments before the U.S. Election Assistance Commission re: Notice and Request for Comment,
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals;
2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey, Dkt. no. EAC-2026-0001-0001, 91 FR 7.
Center for Election Confidence, Inc.
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Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0046
Comment from Anonymous

Submitter Information

Name: Anonymous Anonymous

General Comment

The EAVS 2024 Comprehensive Report is lacking critical information that likely is relevant to many or most states. If a state offers programs similar to an "Address Confidentiality Program" or a "Voter Confidentiality Program", they are forced to maintain two sets of books on registration records. The first set are registration records that they typically publish for transparent access by the public. The second set are registration records that they actively hide from the public. This situation eliminates any possibility of citizen audits of the complete set of registration records. It is time for the EAC to include questions about these two separate sets of books, and require each state to divulge at least counts for publicly reported and non-publicly reported (hidden) registration records down to the county level. Requesting that more detail be requested in the survey and the use of the "type of registration" question have options of ACP and VCP broken out separately from the "Other" category.

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Comment from Cruz, Victoria

Submitter Information

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General Comment

The EAC Election Administration and Voting Survey is a valuable tool for citizens as well as elections administrators and legislators. The scope of election administration policies and processes has expanding over the years, as evidenced in the length of the survey and the EAC Report generated. It is important that all the relevant questions are asked, answered and accurately summarized. I offer these comments about the Draft 2026 EAVS:

1. Voter Registration: Since the passage of the NVRA there has been massive expansion of states' voter rolls that has not been accompanied by the required intensity and consistency of states' voter list maintenance activities. President Biden's EO 14019 exacerbated the problem by expanding voter registration activities to more agencies and NGOs with little transparency. There was also massive illegal immigration into the US and confirmed instances of some of these agencies offering voter registration to border crossers.

The concern is that low propensity, low information "voters" are added to voter rolls, and this is reflected in the number of INACTIVE voters in the registration database. The EAVS and reports should make it imperative that these Inactive registrations continued to be counted and displayed as a subset of voter registrations so that all registrations can be displayed as a % of CVAP. In GA, inactive voters can vote at any time by in person or absentee/mail voting with minimal effort. Registration levels approaching or exceeding 100% of CVAP are of concern and inactive voters must be included in that calculation.

2. Voter List Maintenance: The EAC should address high percentages of inactive voter registrations as these suggest poor list maintenance activities. For instance, several large counties in GA retain as Inactive, voters who have filed permanent NCOA, some shown by citizens to have registered to and even voted in other states. These voters are no longer eligible to vote by GA law and by NVRA definition, yet these counties refuse to remove them. The EAC should weigh in on this in some way. These registrations are available for illegal voting, by the

registrant or another entity. In my own county in 2023, with only about 30,000 registered voters, I was able to find about 8 deceased persons registered to vote, one who had died in 2014. These were removed by my registrar, but one has to wonder how they were allowed to remain on the voter roll when I was able to find them so easily. List maintenance is not being taken seriously it seems.

3. I would add a category to Q8 in the 2026 Election Policy Survey about tools on the state election office website: Can voters cancel their voter registrations, a feature that was added to GA's My Voter Page in 2024.

4. With regard to voter registration system policies, you need to add a query about states that may be housing their voter registration database in the cloud, as GA does with their GRVIS system and Salesforce. Does this violate an EAC standard for voter registration databases?

5. I would also recommend adding questions that address the possibility of noncitizens being registered to vote. This is especially common in states that have Automatic Voter Registration and there should be a mechanism for reporting in the survey. More and more reports are surfacing, voluntarily or as a result of DOJ review of states' voter rolls. Noncitizens must be protected from the threat of deportation from inadvertent registration in this manner. DMV/DDS procedures may need to be examined more closely.

6. On a positive note, I appreciate the clearer instructions for each survey section, and the more detailed accounting of UOCAVA voters to separate military + dependents from Overseas civilians. Numbers of the latter have been exploding and may require states to institute more rigorous vetting than that which is rightly reserved for our military and their families. Overseas citizens don't face the same difficulties as active, deployed military and should prove their identities, overseas status, citizenship and residency in a state to request and vote by regular absentee ballot or through their US Embassy. The EAC should strongly consider amending the FPCA to require proof of citizenship, with or without passage of the Save America Act; it is un-American not to.

Thank you for your consideration of my comments.

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Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0048
Comment from Brooks, Joan

Submitter Information

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General Comment

Clarification is needed regarding submission of reporting information of voter registration AVR vs NO AVR within a state. North Carolina, as an example, does Not have AVR. The statistics for 2024 clearly show NC as having AVR and the % of voter registrations having occurred under AVR. Yet, NC has NO AVR. I understand there was a reporting change from 2022 to 2024. The change as made has resulted in inaccurate description of Voter Registration in NC and likewise the statistical information that is presented in the 2024 EAVS data and report is inaccurate. The 2022 EAVS was not structured as it is currently. demonstrated in the 2024 report The recommendation is made that the prior submission of information and data to specify an AVR State vs a NON AVR State be readopted to accurately reflect the correct status of Voter Registration within a State and likewise, an accurate representation of the data and statistics related to Voter Registration within a State.

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Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0049
Comment from America First Legal Foundation

Submitter Information

Email: FOIA@aflegal.org
Organization: America First Legal Foundation

General Comment

See attached.

Attachments

AFL's EAC EAVS Comment -2026-03-16

AFL's EAVS PS Comment -2026-03-16



March 16, 2026

Submitted Via <https://www.regulations.gov>

U.S. Election Assistance Commission
633 3rd Street NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20001
Attn: EAVS

Re: Comment on Proposed Revisions to the 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey and the Election Administration Policy Survey

America First Legal Foundation (“AFL”) respectfully submits this comment pursuant to the Election Assistance Commission’s (“EAC”) notice and request for public comment on the proposed 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (“EAVS”) and Election Administration Policy Survey (“Policy Survey”), published at 91 Fed. Reg. 1,179 (Jan. 12, 2026) (Docket ID: EAC-2026-0001).¹ The EAC’s proposed revisions² aim to “reduce reporting burden, improve data accuracy, and ensure the survey reflects the realities of modern election administration.”³ The proposed revisions remove, consolidate, and modify dozens of questions across both instruments.

The EAVS and Policy Survey are the federal government’s principal instruments for collecting standardized, quantitative, and qualitative data on how the nation’s elections are administered—data upon which Congress, state legislators, researchers, and the public rely to assess whether elections are conducted lawfully, transparently, and securely. The EAC’s proposed revisions help implement the laudable goal of reducing respondent burden, and AFL supports several of them. However, a number of the proposed deletions and consolidations would systematically degrade the quality and granularity of election-integrity data—trading away transparency for administrative convenience in ways that cannot be justified under the Paperwork Reduction Act’s standard of “practical utility.”⁴

¹ Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals; 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey, Docket ID: EAC-2026-0001, 91 Fed. Reg. 1179 (proposed Jan. 12, 2026).

² See U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, *Proposed 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) & Election Administration Policy Survey: What Has Changed Since the 2024 EAVS & Policy Survey 1* (2026) <https://perma.cc/MFJ7-6RU9> [hereinafter EAC Changes Summary].

³ *Id.* at 1.

⁴ 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(2)(A)(i).

For example, in the EAVS, the EAC proposes to eliminate several data fields tracking election-administration metrics, such as removing “[m]ail voters who voted in person with a provisional ballot,”⁵ and it merges others into broader categories that collapse previously distinct data points into single fields, such as the merging of signatures missing and signatures not matching the voter signature as reasons for signature errors.⁶ Also, in the Policy Survey, the EAC removes questions on topics including duplicate-registration handling, drop-box security protocols, and drop-box collection frequency, while adding new questions on subjects such as permanent absentee ballot duration.⁷

Specifically, AFL urges the EAC to: (1) abandon the proposed merger of provisional-ballot signature-verification categories in Section E3, which would eliminate the ability to distinguish between potential ballot fraud and voter procedural error; (2) restore Question C1e, which tracked mail voters who cast in-person provisional ballots—a critical metric for identifying ballot-delivery failures and duplicate-voting risks; (3) add new questions tracking the duration of inactive voter status, misprinted or defective ballots, and non-citizen voter registrations—three areas of growing public concern that the current survey wholly ignores; (4) retain and strengthen, rather than eliminate, Policy Survey questions on drop-box security protocols and collection frequency; and (5) retain the Policy Survey question on how jurisdictions handle duplicate voter registration records.

The EAC serves a vital national function, but only if the data it collects remains granular enough to reveal what jurisdictions are—and are not—doing to protect the integrity of federal elections.

STATEMENT OF INTEREST

AFL is a national 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization dedicated to promoting the rule of law, preventing executive overreach, and ensuring due process and equal protection under the Constitution. Election integrity is central to AFL’s mission.⁸ The EAVS and Policy Survey are indispensable election integrity tools, and AFL has a direct interest in ensuring these tools remain objective and thorough. AFL has previously submitted a petition for rulemaking to the EAC urging the Commission to require documentary proof of citizenship in connection with the federal voter registration form,⁹ and has maintained sustained engagement with EAC data-collection practices bearing on

⁵ See EAC Changes Summary, *supra* note 2, at 3.

⁶ *Id.*

⁷ *Id.* at 6.

⁸ *Priority: Election Integrity*, AM. FIRST LEGAL FOUND. <https://perma.cc/WZ82-Q6VQ>.

⁹ See AMERICA FIRST LEGAL FOUND., *Petition for Rulemaking to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission Regarding Documentary Proof of Citizenship* (2024), <https://perma.cc/V359-EU64> [hereinafter AFL Petition for Rulemaking] (documenting the risk that non-citizen voter registrations maintained for local elections may carry over to federal elections).

election integrity—bringing to this comment an institutional familiarity with the EAVS and the policy questions its data is designed to illuminate.

BACKGROUND

Under the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”), the EAC serves as a national clearinghouse for information on federal election administration.¹⁰ It fulfills this mandate through the biennial EAVS and Policy Survey, distributed to all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and all U.S. territories, for completion by state and local election officials.¹¹ These surveys serve the EAC’s biennial reporting obligations under the National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”)¹² and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (“UOCAVA”).¹³ The resulting publicly disseminated data is critical for policymakers, advocates, and the public to evaluate whether elections are administered lawfully and securely.¹⁴

While AFL does not dispute the EAC’s goals of reducing unnecessary burdens, we are concerned that many of the proposed revisions will degrade data quality by eliminating, combining, or rewriting survey questions that are essential for interested parties to identify vulnerabilities.¹⁵ The EAC should not sacrifice transparency for convenience.

The EAC estimates the 2026 collection will impose a burden of 83 hours per respondent, or 4,648 hours in aggregate. AFL does not dispute that estimate as applied to the existing instrument, but notes that the three new questions AFL proposes in Section II—tracking inactive-voter duration, misprinted ballots, and non-citizen voter registrations—would impose negligible marginal burden on respondents. Each proposed addition requests data that state and local election officials already compile in the ordinary course of administration. Voter registration systems inherently record the timestamp of a registrant’s transition to inactive status; election officials are already required under state law to document, remediate, and account for defective ballots; and jurisdictions that maintain non-citizen registrations for local elections do so pursuant to explicit legal authority that requires tracking those records separately. All three proposed additions can be designed as simple numerical-entry or yes/no fields

¹⁰ 52 U.S.C.A. § 20922; *see also* 91 Fed. Reg. 1,179 (describing the EAC’s obligation under HAVA to “serve as a national clearinghouse and resource for the compilation of information with respect to the administration of Federal elections.”).

¹¹ 91 Fed. Reg. 1,179.

¹² 52 U.S.C. § 20508(a)(3).

¹³ 52 U.S.C. § 20302(e); National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–20511); Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, Pub. L. No. 99-410, 100 Stat. 924 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301–20311); *see also* 91 Fed. Reg. 1,179.

¹⁴ *See* U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, *2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey 1* (2026) <https://perma.cc/8VHB-U8SM> [hereinafter 2026 EAVS].

¹⁵ *See generally* EAC Changes Summary, *supra* note 2, at 1–8 (cataloguing removals, consolidations, and modifications to both the EAVS and the Policy Survey).

requiring no new data-collection infrastructure. The marginal burden of each is, at most, a matter of minutes per jurisdiction—a negligible increment against an 83-hour baseline. Even if the EAC were to determine that the three additions add some marginal time, the practical utility of the resulting data—enabling Congress, state legislatures, and the public to evaluate list-maintenance compliance, ballot-printing integrity, and non-citizen registration risk—would far outweigh that increment under the PRA’s own standard.¹⁶ The far greater burden on the public interest lies in not collecting this data: once an election cycle passes without these questions, the data is unrecoverable.

AFL’s comments are organized to address the four criteria on which the EAC has invited public comment pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (“PRA”), 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(2)(A). Those PRA criteria are: “(a) Whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information shall have practical utility; (b) the accuracy of the agency’s estimate of the burden of the proposed information collection; (c) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and (d) ways to minimize the burden of the information collection on respondents, including through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology.”¹⁷ Where the EAC’s proposed revisions reduce the granularity or scope of data collection, AFL’s objections sound principally under criteria (a) and (c): the changes diminish the practical utility of the resulting data and degrade its quality. Where AFL recommends additions to the survey, the proposed questions are designed to enhance quality and utility under criterion (c) without materially increasing burden—the data requested is either already maintained by election jurisdictions in the ordinary course of administration or can be reported through simple numerical or yes/no fields that impose minimal incremental burden under criterion (d).

I. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO EAVS THAT THE EAC SHOULD ABANDON

In its effort to simplify the EAVS, the EAC proposes changes to two sections of the form. Both of these proposed changes should be abandoned.

The first is Section E, which addresses provisional ballots—ballots cast by voters whose eligibility cannot be confirmed at the polls on Election Day.¹⁸ Within Section E, Question E3 asks jurisdictions to report the specific reasons provisional ballots

¹⁶ See 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(2)(A)(i) (requiring consideration of “practical utility” alongside burden).

¹⁷ See 91 Fed. Reg. 1,179 (Jan. 12, 2026) (soliciting comment on whether “the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information shall have practical utility”; “the accuracy of the agency’s estimate of the burden of the proposed information collection”; “ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected”; and “ways to minimize the burden of the information collection on respondents, including through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology”); see also 44 U.S.C. §§ 3506(c)(2)(A)(i)–(iv).

¹⁸ EAC Changes Summary, *supra* note 2, at 3.

were rejected, broken down by categories such as voter registration status, voting in the wrong jurisdiction, or failure to provide required identification.¹⁹ The EAC seeks to merge two of these rejection-reason fields—one for non-matching signatures and another for missing signatures—into a single category. Non-matching signatures may indicate that someone other than the registered voter completed or submitted the ballot, raising the possibility of fraud or forgery. Missing signatures, by contrast, typically reflect voter error or procedural failure. These are fundamentally different phenomena with different policy implications and collapsing them into one field would eliminate the ability to distinguish between the two.

The second is section C of the EAVS, which addresses mail voting, including the number of ballots transmitted, returned, rejected, and counted.²⁰ Within Section C, question C1 asks jurisdictions to report mail-in voter participation across three categories: those who returned their ballots by mail, those who returned them in person, and those who ultimately voted through other means.²¹ The EAC proposes to remove Question C1e, which tracked the number of mail voters who abandoned their mail ballots and instead cast in-person provisional ballots. This data point is essential for identifying ballot-delivery failures and duplicate-voting risks in an era of rapidly expanding mail voting. Each of these proposed changes is addressed in turn below.

A. Merger of Signature-Verification Categories in Section E3 (Provisional Ballot Rejections)

In its effort to simplify the EAVS, the EAC seeks to merge two separate data fields within Section E3 into a single combined field. The EAC proposes to merge the former “E3i” (non-matching signature) and the former “E3h” (no signature) into a single field: “E3f. Ballot envelope was missing a signature, or the signature did not match the one on file.”²² The first merged data question is the former Question E3i, which required jurisdictions to report the number of provisional ballots rejected because the signature on the ballot envelope did not match the registered voter’s on-file signature.²³ The second merged data question is the former Question E3h, which required jurisdictions to report the number of provisional ballots rejected because the ballot envelope was missing a signature entirely.²⁴

AFL opposes this consolidation. A missing signature suggests voter error or procedural failure. A mismatched signature may indicate that someone other than the reg-

¹⁹ 2026 EAVS, *supra* note 14, at 46.

²⁰ *See id.* at 30–37.

²¹ *See id.* at 32.

²² EAC Changes Summary, *supra* note 2, at 3 (“Removed ‘E3i. Ballot had a non-matching signature’ and merged with ‘E3h. Ballot did not have a signature.’”); 2026 EAVS, *supra* note 14, at 46 (Question E3f).

²³ *See id.*

²⁴ *See id.*

istered voter completed or submitted the ballot. Merging these fields, each alone being significant, into one field unnecessarily obscures trends vital to assessing the integrity of the provisional ballot process. Further, such a consolidation prevents the identification of jurisdictions with elevated rates of potential fraud versus those needing voter education on signature requirements. The EAC should retain E3h and E3i as separate data fields because, under PRA criteria (a) and (c), merging these fields reduces the practical utility of the collected data and degrades its quality by eliminating the ability to distinguish between two operationally and legally distinct phenomena.

The EAC’s proposed consolidation is not only analytically unsound—it is unsupported by any data-driven justification the EAC has offered in the rulemaking record, and it breaks with how prior EAVS cycles have treated these categories. In prior cycles, the EAVS collected E3h (missing signature) and E3i (non-matching signature) as separate fields precisely because they measure distinct phenomena, and the EAC’s own published reporting has cited both signature-related rejection categories as meaningful data points. The EAC’s 2020 EAVS report, for example, found that non-matching signatures were the single most common reason mail ballots were rejected nationally—accounting for 32.8% of all mail-ballot rejections—while missing-signature rejections represented a categorically separate compliance failure of 12.1%.²⁵ These figures have appeared as distinct data points across multiple EAC biennial EAVS, confirming that the EAC itself has historically treated them as non-equivalent.²⁶

The EAC now proposes to merge them without identifying any instance in which the distinction proved meaningless, any data showing the categories track together across jurisdictions, or any other evidentiary basis for treating the two as equivalent. That silence in the rulemaking record weighs against the proposed change under basic principles of reasoned agency decision-making.²⁷ The proposed merger also places the United States out of step with the states that rely on the missing/non-

²⁵ U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, *Election Administration and Voting Survey 2020 Comprehensive Report*, 14 tbl.2 (Aug. 2021), <https://perma.cc/PY2T-TGLR> (reporting that of all mailed ballots rejected in the 2020 general election, 32.8% were rejected for a non-matching voter signature—the single most common rejection reason nationally—while 12.1% were rejected for a missing voter signature, confirming these as distinct and non-equivalent phenomena).

²⁶ See U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, *2022 Election Administration and Voting Survey* 37 (2022), <https://perma.cc/B979-YAYG>; U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, *2024 Election Administration and Voting Survey* 44 (2024), <https://perma.cc/W4YZ-NPX3> (each providing separate data fields for missing-signature and non-matching-signature rejections across prior survey cycles, confirming the EAC has historically treated these categories as distinct); see also U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, *2024 Election Administration Policy Survey* 20 (2024), <https://perma.cc/782F-3TH6> (listing Q28a categories for “Non-matching voter signature” and “Missing voter signature” as separate, independently selectable answer options in the EAC’s own 2024 Policy Survey on states’ ballot-cure programs, confirming the EAC’s history of recognizing the categories as legally and operationally distinct as recently as the prior survey cycle, directly contradicting the rationale for the proposed 2026 consolidation).

²⁷ See *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action”).

matching distinction for their own ballot-cure frameworks. The EAC’s proposal would cause federal data to obscure the very distinction that state legislatures and election administrators have recognized as legally and operationally significant, disabling future analysis of whether signature-based ballot rejections reflect fraud risks, procedural failures, or both.

B. Removal of Question C1e (Mail Voters Who Voted In Person with a Provisional Ballot)

The EAC proposes to remove the former “C1e,” which tracked the number of mail voters who cast in-person provisional ballots.²⁸

AFL opposes this removal. This data is essential for identifying ballot-delivery failures, duplicate-voting risks, and procedural weaknesses in mail-voting systems. When a mail-ballot recipient appears to vote in person, the explanation may range from non-receipt of the ballot to an attempted second vote. The reliability of mail voting and the vulnerability to duplicate voting cannot be fully evaluated without this data, especially as mail voting has expanded dramatically in recent election cycles. Without this data, neither EAC nor state policymakers can assess whether provisional-ballot cure processes for mail-ballot voters are functioning correctly. The EAC should preserve C1e because, under PRA criteria (a) and (c), Question C1e captures information directly necessary to evaluate the administration of mail-ballot and provisional-ballot programs and to detect duplicate-voting vulnerabilities—core functions of the EAVS—and its removal diminishes both the utility and the quality of the data collected.

II. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO EAVS THAT THE EAC SHOULD ADOPT

Section A of the EAVS addresses voter registration and list maintenance.²⁹ It requires jurisdictions to report data on the total number of registered voters, the number of active and inactive registrants on state voter rolls, and the reasons for removals from the rolls—including felony convictions, mental incapacity, death, failure to respond to confirmation mailings, and other causes.³⁰ These data fields are the primary mechanism through which the federal government tracks whether states are fulfilling their obligations under the NVRA to maintain accurate and current voter registration

²⁸ EAC Changes Summary, *supra* note 2, at 3 (“Removed 2024 EAVS’s ‘C1e. Mail voters who voted in person with a provisional ballot.’”).

²⁹ 2026 EAVS, *supra* note 14, at 2–16.

³⁰ *See id.*

lists.³¹ Despite the breadth of Section A, several important dimensions of voter-roll integrity are not captured by the current survey instrument.

The EAVS also lacks any questions addressing misprinted or defective ballots or non-citizen voter registration, two areas of increasing public concern that implicate both election security and voter confidence. AFL urges the EAC to add new questions for each of these areas, as discussed below.

A. Tracking the Duration of Inactive Voter Status on State Voter Rolls

Under 52 U.S.C. § 20507(d)(1)(B), a state may remove a registrant who has failed to respond to a confirmation notice and has not voted in the two most recent federal general elections since that notice. The EAVS tracks the number of inactive voters (A1c) and removals under this provision (A12e),³² but does not capture how long registrants have remained “inactive” while still on the rolls.³³

AFL urges the EAC to add a data field tracking the duration of inactive status. Bloated voter rolls undermine public confidence and create opportunities for fraud. AFL suggests that the EAC use the following question to elicit this date: “For each of the following periods, report the number of voter registration records currently classified as ‘inactive’ as of the date of this survey: (a) Less than 1 year; (b) 1–2 years; (c) 2–4 years; (d) 4–6 years; (e) More than 6 years.”

Duration data would reveal how diligently states fulfill their list-maintenance obligations under the NVRA.³⁴ A jurisdiction maintaining thousands of inactive registrations for years would raise serious questions about the adequacy of its practices. This addition implicates PRA criterion (c): capturing inactive-voter duration would substantially enhance the quality and utility of the data the EAVS collects on list-maintenance compliance, at minimal additional burden to respondents, who already track this information in their voter registration databases.

B. Tracking Misprinted or Defective Ballots

AFL urges the EAC to add a question to the EAVS regarding misprinted or defective ballots. The EAC’s obligation under HAVA to serve as a national clearinghouse for information on “the administration of Federal elections” is broad enough to encompass ballot production errors.³⁵ Ballot-printing defects directly affect whether votes

³¹ See 52 U.S.C. § 20507,

³² 2026 EAVS, *supra* note 14, at 3 (Question A1c), 15 (Question A12e).

³³ See *id.* §§ A1–A12 (containing no data field tracking the duration of inactive voter status).

³⁴ See 52 U.S.C. § 20507 (imposing voter-list-maintenance obligations on states under the NVRA).

³⁵ See 52 U.S.C. § 20922.

are accurately cast and counted—the core subject of the EAVS—and the survey’s current silence on this topic leaves a significant gap in the federal election-administration record.

The national significance of this data gap is illustrated by the November 2022 general election in Maricopa County, Arizona, where ballot-printing irregularities caused widespread tabulator malfunctions at voting locations on Election Day, forcing thousands of voters to cast provisional ballots or travel to alternate sites to have their ballots counted.³⁶ The resulting confusion generated substantial litigation and eroded public confidence in the administration of that election.³⁷ Maricopa County is not an isolated case: printing errors have been documented in multiple jurisdictions across multiple election cycles, yet the EAVS currently collects no data on the frequency of such errors, the number of voters affected, the remediation procedures employed, or the chain-of-custody controls applied to defective ballots. Without this data, neither the EAC nor the public can assess how common ballot-printing defects are, whether affected jurisdictions are responding adequately, or whether defective ballots are being properly voided and secured rather than counted or misused.

AFL recommends the EAC add the following question to the EAVS: “During the covered election period, did your jurisdiction experience any misprinted, defective, or reprinted ballots? If yes: (a) total number of defective ballots identified; (b) number of affected voters notified; (c) number of defective ballots voided and replaced; (d) describe how defective ballots were secured or destroyed.”

This addition addresses PRA criteria (a) and (c): data on ballot-printing defects is necessary for the EAC to fulfill its HAVA clearinghouse mandate and would materially enhance the quality and completeness of the EAVS. Because state and local election officials are already required under state law to document, remediate, and account for defective ballots, the relevant data exists in the ordinary course of election administration. Reporting it through the EAVS would impose minimal additional burden on respondents, consistent with PRA criterion (d)—the proposed question requires only that existing records be aggregated into four simple fields.

³⁶ See, e.g., MARICOPA COUNTY ELECTIONS DEP’T, *The Vote Center Model During the 2022 General Election* 4 (Nov. 27, 2022), <https://perma.cc/EUC2-YWY7> (documenting that 43 vote centers experienced intermittent printer issues, resulting in 16,724 ballots requiring central-count tabulation); see also Ruth V. McGregor, *Maricopa County 2022 General Election Ballot-on-Demand Printer Investigation Report* 10 (Apr. 10, 2023), <https://perma.cc/39PH-WCV6> (concluding that equipment failure in older printers, combined with heavier paper and longer ballots, caused widespread tabulator malfunctions at approximately 70 of 223 vote centers on Election Day); *Hamadeh v. Mayes*, No. S8015CV202201468 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 2022).

³⁷ See, e.g., *Mast v. Mayes*, No. 1 CA-CV 24-0442 A, 2024 WL 4603801 (Ariz. App. 1st Div. Oct. 29, 2024), as amended (Oct. 30, 2024).

C. Non-Citizen Voter Registration

AFL urges the EAC to add the following question: “(a) Does your jurisdiction maintain any voter registration records for persons who are not U.S. citizens? If yes: (b) Under what authority? (c) Total number of such records of aliens; (d) Total number of such records of U.S. nationals (please note that this is a separate category from that of a U.S. citizen under U.S. immigration and nationality law and mostly covers persons from American Samoa); (e) Are these registrations flagged to prevent participation in federal elections? If yes, describe the mechanism.”

It is a federal crime for aliens to vote in federal elections.³⁸ Yet certain states and localities permit alien voting in select local elections.³⁹ When aliens appear on voter rolls for any purpose, there is a well-documented risk that those registrations may carry over to federal elections through administrative error, database failures, or fraud.⁴⁰ States including Texas, Virginia, Ohio, and Alabama have identified and removed thousands of aliens from their rolls in recent years, many of whom had cast ballots.⁴¹ The EAC should collect data that enables the public and policymakers to better understand the extent of non-citizen inclusion on voter rolls. The proposed question would enhance the quality and utility of the EAVS under PRA criterion (c) and is necessary for the proper performance of the EAC’s election-integrity clearing-house function under criterion (a); election jurisdictions that maintain any voter rolls for non-citizen local elections already possess the underlying data so that the incremental reporting burden would be modest under criterion (d).

III. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO POLICY SURVEY THE EAC SHOULD SUPPORT

AFL commends the EAC for several Policy Survey revisions that improve data collection in areas of growing importance. Specifically:

- New Question Q23d (Duration of permanent mail/absentee ballot receipt).⁴² In many jurisdictions, permanent mail-ballot voters receive ballots indefinitely

³⁸ 18 U.S.C. § 611 (criminalizing voting by aliens in any election for President, Vice President, Presidential elector, Member of the Senate, or Member of the House of Representatives).

³⁹ *See, e.g.*, Cal. Educ. Code § 48985 (permitting non-citizen participation in certain school board elections); S.F., Cal., Charter § 13.111 (permitting non-citizen parents and guardians to vote in school board elections); Takoma Park, Md., City Charter § 601(a) (non-citizen residents permitted to vote in municipal elections).

⁴⁰ *See* AFL Petition for Rulemaking (documenting the risk that non-citizen voter registrations maintained for local elections may carry over to federal elections).

⁴¹ *See id.* at 3.

⁴² EAC Changes Summary, *supra* note 2, at 6 (“New Question Q23d on How long permanent absentee voters receive ballots.”); U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, 2026 Election Administration Policy Survey (2026) <https://perma.cc/V9HX-H4V9> [hereinafter 2026 Policy Survey].

with no subsequent eligibility verification, creating vulnerability to ballot harvesting and other abuses. Q23d will help policymakers evaluate whether these programs include adequate safeguards and sunset provisions.

- Updated Question Q26 (Postmark requirement for mail ballots).⁴³ Adding a checkbox for states to report that no postmark is required is an important improvement. Postmark requirements are directly linked to ensuring only ballots cast before Election Day are counted.
- New Questions Q38 and Q39 (UOCAVA voter eligibility).⁴⁴ These questions address a genuine ambiguity in the UOCAVA statute that current EAC guidance has left unresolved. UOCAVA extends absentee voting rights to U.S. citizens residing outside the country, but the statute does not expressly address two edge categories: citizens who have never resided in the United States—typically the U.S.-citizen children of Americans born or raised abroad—and citizens who are uncertain whether they intend to return.⁴⁵ Whether such individuals are eligible to vote in their parents’ last state of domicile, and under what conditions, has been handled inconsistently across states, and the EAC’s existing UOCAVA guidance does not resolve the question with finality. New Questions Q38 and Q39 will, for the first time, generate standardized national data on how states are resolving these eligibility determinations—data that is essential for Congress, FVAP, and the EAC itself to assess whether UOCAVA’s coverage is being applied uniformly and in a manner consistent with the statute’s purpose of ensuring that no U.S. citizen is disenfranchised solely by virtue of overseas residence.
- Updated Question Q45b (Calendar date for provisional ballot adjudication deadline).⁴⁶ Requiring a specific date rather than “X days after Election Day” promotes uniformity and timely certification.

AFL strongly supports these changes because they would enhance the quality and utility of the Policy Survey under PRA criterion (c) and are necessary for the proper performance of the EAC’s election-integrity clearinghouse function under PRA criterion (a).

⁴³ EAC Changes Summary, *supra* note 2, at 6 (“Updated Q26: Added checkbox to report that postmark is not required for these mail ballots”).

⁴⁴ *Id.* at 7 (“New question Q38: Election eligibility for UOCAVA voters who never resided in U.S.”; “New question Q39: Election eligibility for UOCAVA voters who are unsure of intent to return to U.S.”); 2026 Policy Survey, *supra* note 42 (Questions Q38–Q39).

⁴⁵ See 52 U.S.C. § 20310(5) (defining “overseas voter” by reference to residence “outside the United States” without addressing those who have never established U.S. residence).

⁴⁶ EAC Changes Summary, *supra* note 2, at 7 (“Updated Q45b: Answer options revised to have respondents report a calendar date.”).

IV. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO POLICY SURVEY THE EAC SHOULD OPPOSE

Unlike the EAVS, which collects quantitative data on election outcomes and voter registration statistics, the Policy Survey captures qualitative information about how states and jurisdictions administer elections, including their policies, procedures, and legal frameworks governing voter registration, mail voting, ballot security, and post-election processes.⁴⁷ The Policy Survey is a federal instrument that systematically documents the procedural safeguards jurisdictions employ to protect ballot integrity, making it an indispensable complement to the EAVS's numerical data. As discussed below, two of the EAC's proposed removals from the Policy Survey are particularly concerning because they would eliminate questions on how jurisdictions handle duplicate voter registrations and secure ballot drop boxes.⁴⁸

A. Removal of Question Q21 (Handling of Duplicate Registration Records)

The EAC proposes to remove Q21, which required states to explain how they handle duplicate voter registration records.⁴⁹

AFL strongly opposes this removal. Duplicate registrations are a well-known vulnerability because a voter registered in multiple jurisdictions may cast ballots in more than one place. The Pew Research Center found that approximately 24 million voter registrations nationwide were inaccurate or no longer valid in 2012, including approximately 2.75 million individuals registered in multiple states.⁵⁰ Removing this question is a significant step away from transparency. The NVRA imposes affirmative obligations on states to remove duplicate registrations,⁵¹ and without Q21, the federal government loses its primary mechanism for assessing state compliance with this mandate. Its removal implicates PRA criterion (a): a question on duplicate-registration procedures is necessary for the EAC to perform its statutory function of monitoring state NVRA compliance and has clear practical utility for policymakers and the public. It also implicates PRA criterion (c): Q21's removal degrades the Policy Survey's quality as a tool for evaluating state list-maintenance practices.

⁴⁷ See 2026 Policy Survey, *supra* note 42.

⁴⁸ See EAC Changes Summary, *supra* note 2, at 5–6.

⁴⁹ *Id.* at 5 (“Removed 2024 Policy Survey’s Q21: What happens when duplicate registration records are identified.”).

⁵⁰ PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, *Inaccurate, Costly, and Inefficient: Evidence That America’s Voter Registration System Needs an Upgrade* 1 (Feb. 2012) <https://perma.cc/GR3J-N3ME>.

⁵¹ 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4).

B. Removal and Reduction of Drop-Box Data (Q24b, Q27b, Q27d)

The EAC proposes to reduce or eliminate several drop-box questions: removing the availability-hours portion of Q24b, removing Q27b (collection frequency), and removing Q27d (security measures).

AFL strongly opposes each change. Drop boxes have become a high-volume ballot-return channel in jurisdictions across the country, and their security is a matter of paramount public concern. Although drop boxes are not addressed by name in HAVA, the NVRA, or UOCAVA, they fall squarely within the EAC’s statutory “clearing-house” authority and responsibility to collect information on the administration of federal elections.⁵² Ballot-return security—including the physical integrity, chain of custody, and monitoring protocols for any container into which a voter deposits a completed federal ballot—is unambiguously part of “the administration of Federal elections” that falls under the remit of the EAC’s Section 20922 authority.⁵³ The EAC, therefore, has not merely the authority but the affirmative obligation under HAVA to collect data on how jurisdictions are securing drop boxes. Removing Q24b, Q27b, and Q27d is inconsistent with that mandate.

Data on hours of access, collection frequency, and physical security measures are essential for assessing whether drop boxes are adequately protected against tampering, unauthorized access, and ballot harvesting. The EAC’s characterization of these questions as “high burden and low value”⁵⁴ fundamentally understates their importance and is unsupported by any data in the rulemaking record showing that election officials found these questions unduly burdensome or that the resulting data went unused. To the contrary, drop-box security data is among the most critical information the Policy Survey collects: it is the only standardized federal mechanism for documenting whether jurisdictions are deploying basic physical safeguards for one of the primary ballot-return channels in modern election administration.

Rather than merely restoring Q27d to its prior form, AFL urges the EAC to expand it. The prior question addressed security measures only in general terms. A more granular question would generate data of significantly greater analytical and oversight value.

AFL recommends Q27d be restored and revised to ask specifically whether each jurisdiction’s drop boxes are secured by: (a) surveillance cameras monitoring the drop

⁵² 52 U.S.C. § 20922.

⁵³ *Id.*

⁵⁴ *Inaccurate, Costly, and Inefficient: Evidence That America’s Voter Registration System Needs an Upgrade*, *supra* note 54 at 1 (describing the rationale for removals as targeting “[q]uestions and answer categories identified as high burden and low value”).

box during all hours of availability; (b) tamper-evident seals on the ballot compartment; (c) law enforcement or security patrols; and (d) bipartisan chain-of-custody logs documenting each collection.

These four elements represent established best practices in drop-box administration and directly address the security concerns that have generated public controversy over drop-box use in recent election cycles. Collecting this data would allow the EAC, Congress, State legislators, and the public to assess for the first time whether jurisdictions deploying drop boxes are doing so with adequate safeguards—or whether those boxes represent an unsecured gap in ballot-return integrity. The EAC should restore Q24b and Q27b in full and adopt an expanded version of Q27d along the lines proposed above. Restoring and strengthening these drop-box questions would enhance the quality and utility of the Policy Survey under PRA criterion (c) and is necessary for the proper performance of the EAC’s election-integrity clearinghouse function under PRA criterion (a).

V. CONCLUSION

The EAVS and Policy Survey are among the federal government’s most important tools for ensuring transparency and integrity in election administration. With a federal election occurring in November 2026, the data collected through the 2026 EAVS will be among the first to reflect post-2024 administrative practices; the value of the data depends entirely on whether it captures the granular information needed to evaluate those practices.

AFL appreciates the EAC’s modernization efforts but is concerned that several proposed revisions would reduce transparency and eliminate data fields critical for identifying electoral vulnerabilities. Reducing burden cannot override the need to maintain robust, granular data collection.

AFL urges the EAC to: (1) retain separate signature-verification categories in Section E3; (2) restore question C1e on mail voters who vote in person with a provisional ballot; (3) add new questions on the duration of inactive voter status, misprinted ballots, and non-citizen voter registrations; (4) adopt the Policy Survey improvements in Part III; and (5) restore the drop-box security and duplicate-registration questions in Part IV.

Dated: March 16, 2026

Respectfully Submitted,

James Rogers
Trey Donathan
America First Legal Foundation



March 16, 2026

Submitted Via <https://www.regulations.gov>

U.S. Election Assistance Commission
633 3rd Street NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20001
Attn: EAVS

Re: Comment on Proposed Revisions to the 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey and the Election Administration Policy Survey

America First Legal Foundation (“AFL”) respectfully submits this comment pursuant to the Election Assistance Commission’s (“EAC”) notice and request for public comment on the proposed 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (“EAVS”) and Election Administration Policy Survey (“Policy Survey”), published at 91 Fed. Reg. 1,179 (Jan. 12, 2026) (Docket ID: EAC-2026-0001).¹ The EAC’s proposed revisions² aim to “reduce reporting burden, improve data accuracy, and ensure the survey reflects the realities of modern election administration.”³ The proposed revisions remove, consolidate, and modify dozens of questions across both instruments.

The EAVS and Policy Survey are the federal government’s principal instruments for collecting standardized, quantitative, and qualitative data on how the nation’s elections are administered—data upon which Congress, state legislators, researchers, and the public rely to assess whether elections are conducted lawfully, transparently, and securely. The EAC’s proposed revisions help implement the laudable goal of reducing respondent burden, and AFL supports several of them. However, a number of the proposed deletions and consolidations would systematically degrade the quality and granularity of election-integrity data—trading away transparency for administrative convenience in ways that cannot be justified under the Paperwork Reduction Act’s standard of “practical utility.”⁴

¹ Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals; 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey, Docket ID: EAC-2026-0001, 91 Fed. Reg. 1179 (proposed Jan. 12, 2026).

² See U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, *Proposed 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) & Election Administration Policy Survey: What Has Changed Since the 2024 EAVS & Policy Survey* (2026) <https://perma.cc/MFJ7-6RU9> [hereinafter EAC Changes Summary].

³ *Id.* at 1.

⁴ 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(2)(A)(i).

For example, in the EAVS, the EAC proposes to eliminate several data fields tracking election-administration metrics, such as removing “[m]ail voters who voted in person with a provisional ballot,”⁵ and it merges others into broader categories that collapse previously distinct data points into single fields, such as the merging of signatures missing and signatures not matching the voter signature as reasons for signature errors.⁶ Also, in the Policy Survey, the EAC removes questions on topics including duplicate-registration handling, drop-box security protocols, and drop-box collection frequency, while adding new questions on subjects such as permanent absentee ballot duration.⁷

Specifically, AFL urges the EAC to: (1) abandon the proposed merger of provisional-ballot signature-verification categories in Section E3, which would eliminate the ability to distinguish between potential ballot fraud and voter procedural error; (2) restore Question C1e, which tracked mail voters who cast in-person provisional ballots—a critical metric for identifying ballot-delivery failures and duplicate-voting risks; (3) add new questions tracking the duration of inactive voter status, misprinted or defective ballots, and non-citizen voter registrations—three areas of growing public concern that the current survey wholly ignores; (4) retain and strengthen, rather than eliminate, Policy Survey questions on drop-box security protocols and collection frequency; and (5) retain the Policy Survey question on how jurisdictions handle duplicate voter registration records.

The EAC serves a vital national function, but only if the data it collects remains granular enough to reveal what jurisdictions are—and are not—doing to protect the integrity of federal elections.

STATEMENT OF INTEREST

AFL is a national 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization dedicated to promoting the rule of law, preventing executive overreach, and ensuring due process and equal protection under the Constitution. Election integrity is central to AFL’s mission.⁸ The EAVS and Policy Survey are indispensable election integrity tools, and AFL has a direct interest in ensuring these tools remain objective and thorough. AFL has previously submitted a petition for rulemaking to the EAC urging the Commission to require documentary proof of citizenship in connection with the federal voter registration form,⁹ and has maintained sustained engagement with EAC data-collection practices bearing on

⁵ See EAC Changes Summary, *supra* note 2, at 3.

⁶ *Id.*

⁷ *Id.* at 6.

⁸ *Priority: Election Integrity*, AM. FIRST LEGAL FOUND. <https://perma.cc/WZ82-Q6VQ>.

⁹ See AMERICA FIRST LEGAL FOUND., *Petition for Rulemaking to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission Regarding Documentary Proof of Citizenship* (2024), <https://perma.cc/V359-EU64> [hereinafter AFL Petition for Rulemaking] (documenting the risk that non-citizen voter registrations maintained for local elections may carry over to federal elections).

election integrity—bringing to this comment an institutional familiarity with the EAVS and the policy questions its data is designed to illuminate.

BACKGROUND

Under the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”), the EAC serves as a national clearinghouse for information on federal election administration.¹⁰ It fulfills this mandate through the biennial EAVS and Policy Survey, distributed to all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and all U.S. territories, for completion by state and local election officials.¹¹ These surveys serve the EAC’s biennial reporting obligations under the National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”)¹² and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (“UOCAVA”).¹³ The resulting publicly disseminated data is critical for policymakers, advocates, and the public to evaluate whether elections are administered lawfully and securely.¹⁴

While AFL does not dispute the EAC’s goals of reducing unnecessary burdens, we are concerned that many of the proposed revisions will degrade data quality by eliminating, combining, or rewriting survey questions that are essential for interested parties to identify vulnerabilities.¹⁵ The EAC should not sacrifice transparency for convenience.

The EAC estimates the 2026 collection will impose a burden of 83 hours per respondent, or 4,648 hours in aggregate. AFL does not dispute that estimate as applied to the existing instrument, but notes that the three new questions AFL proposes in Section II—tracking inactive-voter duration, misprinted ballots, and non-citizen voter registrations—would impose negligible marginal burden on respondents. Each proposed addition requests data that state and local election officials already compile in the ordinary course of administration. Voter registration systems inherently record the timestamp of a registrant’s transition to inactive status; election officials are already required under state law to document, remediate, and account for defective ballots; and jurisdictions that maintain non-citizen registrations for local elections do so pursuant to explicit legal authority that requires tracking those records separately. All three proposed additions can be designed as simple numerical-entry or yes/no fields

¹⁰ 52 U.S.C.A. § 20922; *see also* 91 Fed. Reg. 1,179 (describing the EAC’s obligation under HAVA to “serve as a national clearinghouse and resource for the compilation of information with respect to the administration of Federal elections.”).

¹¹ 91 Fed. Reg. 1,179.

¹² 52 U.S.C. § 20508(a)(3).

¹³ 52 U.S.C. § 20302(e); National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–20511); Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, Pub. L. No. 99-410, 100 Stat. 924 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301–20311); *see also* 91 Fed. Reg. 1,179.

¹⁴ *See* U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, *2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey 1* (2026) <https://perma.cc/8VHB-U8SM> [hereinafter 2026 EAVS].

¹⁵ *See generally* EAC Changes Summary, *supra* note 2, at 1–8 (cataloguing removals, consolidations, and modifications to both the EAVS and the Policy Survey).

requiring no new data-collection infrastructure. The marginal burden of each is, at most, a matter of minutes per jurisdiction—a negligible increment against an 83-hour baseline. Even if the EAC were to determine that the three additions add some marginal time, the practical utility of the resulting data—enabling Congress, state legislatures, and the public to evaluate list-maintenance compliance, ballot-printing integrity, and non-citizen registration risk—would far outweigh that increment under the PRA’s own standard.¹⁶ The far greater burden on the public interest lies in not collecting this data: once an election cycle passes without these questions, the data is unrecoverable.

AFL’s comments are organized to address the four criteria on which the EAC has invited public comment pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (“PRA”), 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(2)(A). Those PRA criteria are: “(a) Whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information shall have practical utility; (b) the accuracy of the agency’s estimate of the burden of the proposed information collection; (c) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and (d) ways to minimize the burden of the information collection on respondents, including through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology.”¹⁷ Where the EAC’s proposed revisions reduce the granularity or scope of data collection, AFL’s objections sound principally under criteria (a) and (c): the changes diminish the practical utility of the resulting data and degrade its quality. Where AFL recommends additions to the survey, the proposed questions are designed to enhance quality and utility under criterion (c) without materially increasing burden—the data requested is either already maintained by election jurisdictions in the ordinary course of administration or can be reported through simple numerical or yes/no fields that impose minimal incremental burden under criterion (d).

I. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO EAVS THAT THE EAC SHOULD ABANDON

In its effort to simplify the EAVS, the EAC proposes changes to two sections of the form. Both of these proposed changes should be abandoned.

The first is Section E, which addresses provisional ballots—ballots cast by voters whose eligibility cannot be confirmed at the polls on Election Day.¹⁸ Within Section E, Question E3 asks jurisdictions to report the specific reasons provisional ballots

¹⁶ See 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(2)(A)(i) (requiring consideration of “practical utility” alongside burden).

¹⁷ See 91 Fed. Reg. 1,179 (Jan. 12, 2026) (soliciting comment on whether “the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information shall have practical utility”; “the accuracy of the agency’s estimate of the burden of the proposed information collection”; “ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected”; and “ways to minimize the burden of the information collection on respondents, including through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology”); see also 44 U.S.C. §§ 3506(c)(2)(A)(i)–(iv).

¹⁸ EAC Changes Summary, *supra* note 2, at 3.

were rejected, broken down by categories such as voter registration status, voting in the wrong jurisdiction, or failure to provide required identification.¹⁹ The EAC seeks to merge two of these rejection-reason fields—one for non-matching signatures and another for missing signatures—into a single category. Non-matching signatures may indicate that someone other than the registered voter completed or submitted the ballot, raising the possibility of fraud or forgery. Missing signatures, by contrast, typically reflect voter error or procedural failure. These are fundamentally different phenomena with different policy implications and collapsing them into one field would eliminate the ability to distinguish between the two.

The second is section C of the EAVS, which addresses mail voting, including the number of ballots transmitted, returned, rejected, and counted.²⁰ Within Section C, question C1 asks jurisdictions to report mail-in voter participation across three categories: those who returned their ballots by mail, those who returned them in person, and those who ultimately voted through other means.²¹ The EAC proposes to remove Question C1e, which tracked the number of mail voters who abandoned their mail ballots and instead cast in-person provisional ballots. This data point is essential for identifying ballot-delivery failures and duplicate-voting risks in an era of rapidly expanding mail voting. Each of these proposed changes is addressed in turn below.

A. Merger of Signature-Verification Categories in Section E3 (Provisional Ballot Rejections)

In its effort to simplify the EAVS, the EAC seeks to merge two separate data fields within Section E3 into a single combined field. The EAC proposes to merge the former “E3i” (non-matching signature) and the former “E3h” (no signature) into a single field: “E3f. Ballot envelope was missing a signature, or the signature did not match the one on file.”²² The first merged data question is the former Question E3i, which required jurisdictions to report the number of provisional ballots rejected because the signature on the ballot envelope did not match the registered voter’s on-file signature.²³ The second merged data question is the former Question E3h, which required jurisdictions to report the number of provisional ballots rejected because the ballot envelope was missing a signature entirely.²⁴

AFL opposes this consolidation. A missing signature suggests voter error or procedural failure. A mismatched signature may indicate that someone other than the reg-

¹⁹ 2026 EAVS, *supra* note 14, at 46.

²⁰ *See id.* at 30–37.

²¹ *See id.* at 32.

²² EAC Changes Summary, *supra* note 2, at 3 (“Removed ‘E3i. Ballot had a non-matching signature’ and merged with ‘E3h. Ballot did not have a signature.’”); 2026 EAVS, *supra* note 14, at 46 (Question E3f).

²³ *See id.*

²⁴ *See id.*

istered voter completed or submitted the ballot. Merging these fields, each alone being significant, into one field unnecessarily obscures trends vital to assessing the integrity of the provisional ballot process. Further, such a consolidation prevents the identification of jurisdictions with elevated rates of potential fraud versus those needing voter education on signature requirements. The EAC should retain E3h and E3i as separate data fields because, under PRA criteria (a) and (c), merging these fields reduces the practical utility of the collected data and degrades its quality by eliminating the ability to distinguish between two operationally and legally distinct phenomena.

The EAC’s proposed consolidation is not only analytically unsound—it is unsupported by any data-driven justification the EAC has offered in the rulemaking record, and it breaks with how prior EAVS cycles have treated these categories. In prior cycles, the EAVS collected E3h (missing signature) and E3i (non-matching signature) as separate fields precisely because they measure distinct phenomena, and the EAC’s own published reporting has cited both signature-related rejection categories as meaningful data points. The EAC’s 2020 EAVS report, for example, found that non-matching signatures were the single most common reason mail ballots were rejected nationally—accounting for 32.8% of all mail-ballot rejections—while missing-signature rejections represented a categorically separate compliance failure of 12.1%.²⁵ These figures have appeared as distinct data points across multiple EAC biennial EAVS, confirming that the EAC itself has historically treated them as non-equivalent.²⁶

The EAC now proposes to merge them without identifying any instance in which the distinction proved meaningless, any data showing the categories track together across jurisdictions, or any other evidentiary basis for treating the two as equivalent. That silence in the rulemaking record weighs against the proposed change under basic principles of reasoned agency decision-making.²⁷ The proposed merger also places the United States out of step with the states that rely on the missing/non-

²⁵ U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, *Election Administration and Voting Survey 2020 Comprehensive Report*, 14 tbl.2 (Aug. 2021), <https://perma.cc/PY2T-TGLR> (reporting that of all mailed ballots rejected in the 2020 general election, 32.8% were rejected for a non-matching voter signature—the single most common rejection reason nationally—while 12.1% were rejected for a missing voter signature, confirming these as distinct and non-equivalent phenomena).

²⁶ See U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, *2022 Election Administration and Voting Survey* 37 (2022), <https://perma.cc/B979-YAYG>; U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, *2024 Election Administration and Voting Survey* 44 (2024), <https://perma.cc/W4YZ-NPX3> (each providing separate data fields for missing-signature and non-matching-signature rejections across prior survey cycles, confirming the EAC has historically treated these categories as distinct); see also U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, *2024 Election Administration Policy Survey* 20 (2024), <https://perma.cc/782F-3TH6> (listing Q28a categories for “Non-matching voter signature” and “Missing voter signature” as separate, independently selectable answer options in the EAC’s own 2024 Policy Survey on states’ ballot-cure programs, confirming the EAC’s history of recognizing the categories as legally and operationally distinct as recently as the prior survey cycle, directly contradicting the rationale for the proposed 2026 consolidation).

²⁷ See *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action”).

matching distinction for their own ballot-cure frameworks. The EAC’s proposal would cause federal data to obscure the very distinction that state legislatures and election administrators have recognized as legally and operationally significant, disabling future analysis of whether signature-based ballot rejections reflect fraud risks, procedural failures, or both.

B. Removal of Question C1e (Mail Voters Who Voted In Person with a Provisional Ballot)

The EAC proposes to remove the former “C1e,” which tracked the number of mail voters who cast in-person provisional ballots.²⁸

AFL opposes this removal. This data is essential for identifying ballot-delivery failures, duplicate-voting risks, and procedural weaknesses in mail-voting systems. When a mail-ballot recipient appears to vote in person, the explanation may range from non-receipt of the ballot to an attempted second vote. The reliability of mail voting and the vulnerability to duplicate voting cannot be fully evaluated without this data, especially as mail voting has expanded dramatically in recent election cycles. Without this data, neither EAC nor state policymakers can assess whether provisional-ballot cure processes for mail-ballot voters are functioning correctly. The EAC should preserve C1e because, under PRA criteria (a) and (c), Question C1e captures information directly necessary to evaluate the administration of mail-ballot and provisional-ballot programs and to detect duplicate-voting vulnerabilities—core functions of the EAVS—and its removal diminishes both the utility and the quality of the data collected.

II. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO EAVS THAT THE EAC SHOULD ADOPT

Section A of the EAVS addresses voter registration and list maintenance.²⁹ It requires jurisdictions to report data on the total number of registered voters, the number of active and inactive registrants on state voter rolls, and the reasons for removals from the rolls—including felony convictions, mental incapacity, death, failure to respond to confirmation mailings, and other causes.³⁰ These data fields are the primary mechanism through which the federal government tracks whether states are fulfilling their obligations under the NVRA to maintain accurate and current voter registration

²⁸ EAC Changes Summary, *supra* note 2, at 3 (“Removed 2024 EAVS’s ‘C1e. Mail voters who voted in person with a provisional ballot.’”).

²⁹ 2026 EAVS, *supra* note 14, at 2–16.

³⁰ *See id.*

lists.³¹ Despite the breadth of Section A, several important dimensions of voter-roll integrity are not captured by the current survey instrument.

The EAVS also lacks any questions addressing misprinted or defective ballots or non-citizen voter registration, two areas of increasing public concern that implicate both election security and voter confidence. AFL urges the EAC to add new questions for each of these areas, as discussed below.

A. Tracking the Duration of Inactive Voter Status on State Voter Rolls

Under 52 U.S.C. § 20507(d)(1)(B), a state may remove a registrant who has failed to respond to a confirmation notice and has not voted in the two most recent federal general elections since that notice. The EAVS tracks the number of inactive voters (A1c) and removals under this provision (A12e),³² but does not capture how long registrants have remained “inactive” while still on the rolls.³³

AFL urges the EAC to add a data field tracking the duration of inactive status. Bloated voter rolls undermine public confidence and create opportunities for fraud. AFL suggests that the EAC use the following question to elicit this date: “For each of the following periods, report the number of voter registration records currently classified as ‘inactive’ as of the date of this survey: (a) Less than 1 year; (b) 1–2 years; (c) 2–4 years; (d) 4–6 years; (e) More than 6 years.”

Duration data would reveal how diligently states fulfill their list-maintenance obligations under the NVRA.³⁴ A jurisdiction maintaining thousands of inactive registrations for years would raise serious questions about the adequacy of its practices. This addition implicates PRA criterion (c): capturing inactive-voter duration would substantially enhance the quality and utility of the data the EAVS collects on list-maintenance compliance, at minimal additional burden to respondents, who already track this information in their voter registration databases.

B. Tracking Misprinted or Defective Ballots

AFL urges the EAC to add a question to the EAVS regarding misprinted or defective ballots. The EAC’s obligation under HAVA to serve as a national clearinghouse for information on “the administration of Federal elections” is broad enough to encompass ballot production errors.³⁵ Ballot-printing defects directly affect whether votes

³¹ See 52 U.S.C. § 20507,

³² 2026 EAVS, *supra* note 14, at 3 (Question A1c), 15 (Question A12e).

³³ See *id.* §§ A1–A12 (containing no data field tracking the duration of inactive voter status).

³⁴ See 52 U.S.C. § 20507 (imposing voter-list-maintenance obligations on states under the NVRA).

³⁵ See 52 U.S.C. § 20922.

are accurately cast and counted—the core subject of the EAVS—and the survey’s current silence on this topic leaves a significant gap in the federal election-administration record.

The national significance of this data gap is illustrated by the November 2022 general election in Maricopa County, Arizona, where ballot-printing irregularities caused widespread tabulator malfunctions at voting locations on Election Day, forcing thousands of voters to cast provisional ballots or travel to alternate sites to have their ballots counted.³⁶ The resulting confusion generated substantial litigation and eroded public confidence in the administration of that election.³⁷ Maricopa County is not an isolated case: printing errors have been documented in multiple jurisdictions across multiple election cycles, yet the EAVS currently collects no data on the frequency of such errors, the number of voters affected, the remediation procedures employed, or the chain-of-custody controls applied to defective ballots. Without this data, neither the EAC nor the public can assess how common ballot-printing defects are, whether affected jurisdictions are responding adequately, or whether defective ballots are being properly voided and secured rather than counted or misused.

AFL recommends the EAC add the following question to the EAVS: “During the covered election period, did your jurisdiction experience any misprinted, defective, or reprinted ballots? If yes: (a) total number of defective ballots identified; (b) number of affected voters notified; (c) number of defective ballots voided and replaced; (d) describe how defective ballots were secured or destroyed.”

This addition addresses PRA criteria (a) and (c): data on ballot-printing defects is necessary for the EAC to fulfill its HAVA clearinghouse mandate and would materially enhance the quality and completeness of the EAVS. Because state and local election officials are already required under state law to document, remediate, and account for defective ballots, the relevant data exists in the ordinary course of election administration. Reporting it through the EAVS would impose minimal additional burden on respondents, consistent with PRA criterion (d)—the proposed question requires only that existing records be aggregated into four simple fields.

³⁶ See, e.g., MARICOPA COUNTY ELECTIONS DEP’T, *The Vote Center Model During the 2022 General Election* 4 (Nov. 27, 2022), <https://perma.cc/EUC2-YWY7> (documenting that 43 vote centers experienced intermittent printer issues, resulting in 16,724 ballots requiring central-count tabulation); see also Ruth V. McGregor, *Maricopa County 2022 General Election Ballot-on-Demand Printer Investigation Report* 10 (Apr. 10, 2023), <https://perma.cc/39PH-WCV6> (concluding that equipment failure in older printers, combined with heavier paper and longer ballots, caused widespread tabulator malfunctions at approximately 70 of 223 vote centers on Election Day); *Hamadeh v. Mayes*, No. S8015CV202201468 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 2022).

³⁷ See, e.g., *Mast v. Mayes*, No. 1 CA-CV 24-0442 A, 2024 WL 4603801 (Ariz. App. 1st Div. Oct. 29, 2024), as amended (Oct. 30, 2024).

C. Non-Citizen Voter Registration

AFL urges the EAC to add the following question: “(a) Does your jurisdiction maintain any voter registration records for persons who are not U.S. citizens? If yes: (b) Under what authority? (c) Total number of such records of aliens; (d) Total number of such records of U.S. nationals (please note that this is a separate category from that of a U.S. citizen under U.S. immigration and nationality law and mostly covers persons from American Samoa); (e) Are these registrations flagged to prevent participation in federal elections? If yes, describe the mechanism.”

It is a federal crime for aliens to vote in federal elections.³⁸ Yet certain states and localities permit alien voting in select local elections.³⁹ When aliens appear on voter rolls for any purpose, there is a well-documented risk that those registrations may carry over to federal elections through administrative error, database failures, or fraud.⁴⁰ States including Texas, Virginia, Ohio, and Alabama have identified and removed thousands of aliens from their rolls in recent years, many of whom had cast ballots.⁴¹ The EAC should collect data that enables the public and policymakers to better understand the extent of non-citizen inclusion on voter rolls. The proposed question would enhance the quality and utility of the EAVS under PRA criterion (c) and is necessary for the proper performance of the EAC’s election-integrity clearing-house function under criterion (a); election jurisdictions that maintain any voter rolls for non-citizen local elections already possess the underlying data so that the incremental reporting burden would be modest under criterion (d).

III. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO POLICY SURVEY THE EAC SHOULD SUPPORT

AFL commends the EAC for several Policy Survey revisions that improve data collection in areas of growing importance. Specifically:

- New Question Q23d (Duration of permanent mail/absentee ballot receipt).⁴² In many jurisdictions, permanent mail-ballot voters receive ballots indefinitely

³⁸ 18 U.S.C. § 611 (criminalizing voting by aliens in any election for President, Vice President, Presidential elector, Member of the Senate, or Member of the House of Representatives).

³⁹ *See, e.g.*, Cal. Educ. Code § 48985 (permitting non-citizen participation in certain school board elections); S.F., Cal., Charter § 13.111 (permitting non-citizen parents and guardians to vote in school board elections); Takoma Park, Md., City Charter § 601(a) (non-citizen residents permitted to vote in municipal elections).

⁴⁰ *See* AFL Petition for Rulemaking (documenting the risk that non-citizen voter registrations maintained for local elections may carry over to federal elections).

⁴¹ *See id.* at 3.

⁴² EAC Changes Summary, *supra* note 2, at 6 (“New Question Q23d on How long permanent absentee voters receive ballots.”); U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, 2026 Election Administration Policy Survey (2026) <https://perma.cc/V9HX-H4V9> [hereinafter 2026 Policy Survey].

with no subsequent eligibility verification, creating vulnerability to ballot harvesting and other abuses. Q23d will help policymakers evaluate whether these programs include adequate safeguards and sunset provisions.

- Updated Question Q26 (Postmark requirement for mail ballots).⁴³ Adding a checkbox for states to report that no postmark is required is an important improvement. Postmark requirements are directly linked to ensuring only ballots cast before Election Day are counted.
- New Questions Q38 and Q39 (UOCAVA voter eligibility).⁴⁴ These questions address a genuine ambiguity in the UOCAVA statute that current EAC guidance has left unresolved. UOCAVA extends absentee voting rights to U.S. citizens residing outside the country, but the statute does not expressly address two edge categories: citizens who have never resided in the United States—typically the U.S.-citizen children of Americans born or raised abroad—and citizens who are uncertain whether they intend to return.⁴⁵ Whether such individuals are eligible to vote in their parents’ last state of domicile, and under what conditions, has been handled inconsistently across states, and the EAC’s existing UOCAVA guidance does not resolve the question with finality. New Questions Q38 and Q39 will, for the first time, generate standardized national data on how states are resolving these eligibility determinations—data that is essential for Congress, FVAP, and the EAC itself to assess whether UOCAVA’s coverage is being applied uniformly and in a manner consistent with the statute’s purpose of ensuring that no U.S. citizen is disenfranchised solely by virtue of overseas residence.
- Updated Question Q45b (Calendar date for provisional ballot adjudication deadline).⁴⁶ Requiring a specific date rather than “X days after Election Day” promotes uniformity and timely certification.

AFL strongly supports these changes because they would enhance the quality and utility of the Policy Survey under PRA criterion (c) and are necessary for the proper performance of the EAC’s election-integrity clearinghouse function under PRA criterion (a).

⁴³ EAC Changes Summary, *supra* note 2, at 6 (“Updated Q26: Added checkbox to report that postmark is not required for these mail ballots”).

⁴⁴ *Id.* at 7 (“New question Q38: Election eligibility for UOCAVA voters who never resided in U.S.”; “New question Q39: Election eligibility for UOCAVA voters who are unsure of intent to return to U.S.”); 2026 Policy Survey, *supra* note 42 (Questions Q38–Q39).

⁴⁵ See 52 U.S.C. § 20310(5) (defining “overseas voter” by reference to residence “outside the United States” without addressing those who have never established U.S. residence).

⁴⁶ EAC Changes Summary, *supra* note 2, at 7 (“Updated Q45b: Answer options revised to have respondents report a calendar date.”).

IV. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO POLICY SURVEY THE EAC SHOULD OPPOSE

Unlike the EAVS, which collects quantitative data on election outcomes and voter registration statistics, the Policy Survey captures qualitative information about how states and jurisdictions administer elections, including their policies, procedures, and legal frameworks governing voter registration, mail voting, ballot security, and post-election processes.⁴⁷ The Policy Survey is a federal instrument that systematically documents the procedural safeguards jurisdictions employ to protect ballot integrity, making it an indispensable complement to the EAVS's numerical data. As discussed below, two of the EAC's proposed removals from the Policy Survey are particularly concerning because they would eliminate questions on how jurisdictions handle duplicate voter registrations and secure ballot drop boxes.⁴⁸

A. Removal of Question Q21 (Handling of Duplicate Registration Records)

The EAC proposes to remove Q21, which required states to explain how they handle duplicate voter registration records.⁴⁹

AFL strongly opposes this removal. Duplicate registrations are a well-known vulnerability because a voter registered in multiple jurisdictions may cast ballots in more than one place. The Pew Research Center found that approximately 24 million voter registrations nationwide were inaccurate or no longer valid in 2012, including approximately 2.75 million individuals registered in multiple states.⁵⁰ Removing this question is a significant step away from transparency. The NVRA imposes affirmative obligations on states to remove duplicate registrations,⁵¹ and without Q21, the federal government loses its primary mechanism for assessing state compliance with this mandate. Its removal implicates PRA criterion (a): a question on duplicate-registration procedures is necessary for the EAC to perform its statutory function of monitoring state NVRA compliance and has clear practical utility for policymakers and the public. It also implicates PRA criterion (c): Q21's removal degrades the Policy Survey's quality as a tool for evaluating state list-maintenance practices.

⁴⁷ See 2026 Policy Survey, *supra* note 42.

⁴⁸ See EAC Changes Summary, *supra* note 2, at 5–6.

⁴⁹ *Id.* at 5 (“Removed 2024 Policy Survey’s Q21: What happens when duplicate registration records are identified.”).

⁵⁰ PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, *Inaccurate, Costly, and Inefficient: Evidence That America’s Voter Registration System Needs an Upgrade* 1 (Feb. 2012) <https://perma.cc/GR3J-N3ME>.

⁵¹ 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4).

B. Removal and Reduction of Drop-Box Data (Q24b, Q27b, Q27d)

The EAC proposes to reduce or eliminate several drop-box questions: removing the availability-hours portion of Q24b, removing Q27b (collection frequency), and removing Q27d (security measures).

AFL strongly opposes each change. Drop boxes have become a high-volume ballot-return channel in jurisdictions across the country, and their security is a matter of paramount public concern. Although drop boxes are not addressed by name in HAVA, the NVRA, or UOCAVA, they fall squarely within the EAC’s statutory “clearing-house” authority and responsibility to collect information on the administration of federal elections.⁵² Ballot-return security—including the physical integrity, chain of custody, and monitoring protocols for any container into which a voter deposits a completed federal ballot—is unambiguously part of “the administration of Federal elections” that falls under the remit of the EAC’s Section 20922 authority.⁵³ The EAC, therefore, has not merely the authority but the affirmative obligation under HAVA to collect data on how jurisdictions are securing drop boxes. Removing Q24b, Q27b, and Q27d is inconsistent with that mandate.

Data on hours of access, collection frequency, and physical security measures are essential for assessing whether drop boxes are adequately protected against tampering, unauthorized access, and ballot harvesting. The EAC’s characterization of these questions as “high burden and low value”⁵⁴ fundamentally understates their importance and is unsupported by any data in the rulemaking record showing that election officials found these questions unduly burdensome or that the resulting data went unused. To the contrary, drop-box security data is among the most critical information the Policy Survey collects: it is the only standardized federal mechanism for documenting whether jurisdictions are deploying basic physical safeguards for one of the primary ballot-return channels in modern election administration.

Rather than merely restoring Q27d to its prior form, AFL urges the EAC to expand it. The prior question addressed security measures only in general terms. A more granular question would generate data of significantly greater analytical and oversight value.

AFL recommends Q27d be restored and revised to ask specifically whether each jurisdiction’s drop boxes are secured by: (a) surveillance cameras monitoring the drop

⁵² 52 U.S.C. § 20922.

⁵³ *Id.*

⁵⁴ *Inaccurate, Costly, and Inefficient: Evidence That America’s Voter Registration System Needs an Upgrade*, *supra* note 54 at 1 (describing the rationale for removals as targeting “[q]uestions and answer categories identified as high burden and low value”).

box during all hours of availability; (b) tamper-evident seals on the ballot compartment; (c) law enforcement or security patrols; and (d) bipartisan chain-of-custody logs documenting each collection.

These four elements represent established best practices in drop-box administration and directly address the security concerns that have generated public controversy over drop-box use in recent election cycles. Collecting this data would allow the EAC, Congress, State legislators, and the public to assess for the first time whether jurisdictions deploying drop boxes are doing so with adequate safeguards—or whether those boxes represent an unsecured gap in ballot-return integrity. The EAC should restore Q24b and Q27b in full and adopt an expanded version of Q27d along the lines proposed above. Restoring and strengthening these drop-box questions would enhance the quality and utility of the Policy Survey under PRA criterion (c) and is necessary for the proper performance of the EAC’s election-integrity clearinghouse function under PRA criterion (a).

V. CONCLUSION

The EAVS and Policy Survey are among the federal government’s most important tools for ensuring transparency and integrity in election administration. With a federal election occurring in November 2026, the data collected through the 2026 EAVS will be among the first to reflect post-2024 administrative practices; the value of the data depends entirely on whether it captures the granular information needed to evaluate those practices.

AFL appreciates the EAC’s modernization efforts but is concerned that several proposed revisions would reduce transparency and eliminate data fields critical for identifying electoral vulnerabilities. Reducing burden cannot override the need to maintain robust, granular data collection.

AFL urges the EAC to: (1) retain separate signature-verification categories in Section E3; (2) restore question C1e on mail voters who vote in person with a provisional ballot; (3) add new questions on the duration of inactive voter status, misprinted ballots, and non-citizen voter registrations; (4) adopt the Policy Survey improvements in Part III; and (5) restore the drop-box security and duplicate-registration questions in Part IV.

Dated: March 16, 2026

Respectfully Submitted,

James Rogers
Trey Donathan
America First Legal Foundation

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

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2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Comment On: EAC-2026-0001-0001
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey

Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0050
Comment from BROOKS, JOAN

Submitter Information

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General Comment

In the EAVS interactive, show the ACTUAL numbers of UOCAVA Overseas Citizens and UOCAVA Military Ballots in addition to the percentages currently shown. I know we can do the math via the percentages of the total numbers given, but for clarification, the actual numbers indicated within the display is requested for each category of UOCAVA Voters and Ballots.

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

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Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0051
Comment from BROOKS, JOAN

Submitter Information

Name: JOAN BROOKS
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General Comment

Add an additional question regarding Drop Boxes for the delivery of mail in ballots: Are the Drop Boxes within your State monitored? If, yes, by what mechanism? Camera surveillance? In person surveillance? GPS monitoring? Police surveillance? Other?

Also of interest regarding Drop Boxes: Are the Drop Boxes included in the Chain of Custody requirements in your State and /or Precincts, Localities, Municipalities, etc?

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

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Document: EAC-2026-0001-DRAFT-0052
Comment from SUBMITTED FOR OMB OIRA AND OIG REVIEW ON MARCH 16, 2026 BY OBELISK TECH SYSTEMS INC.

Submitter Information

Email: savetheamericancommunities@gmail.com
Organization: SUBMITTED FOR OMB OIRA AND OIG REVIEW ON MARCH 16, 2026 BY OBELISK TECH SYSTEMS INC.

General Comment

EAC-2026-0001 — paste this in the comment box, attach all 5 EAC files:

EAC-2026-0001 | OMB 3265-0006 | James Hunter Poole, CEO, Obelisk Tech Systems | CAGE: 9S0L8 | HUBZone | ITAR-Registered | CMMC L2 | Thomasville, Thomas County, Georgia | Thomas County Republican Party Chairman

ZERO BURDEN ESTIMATE DISCLOSED — PRA NONCOMPLIANCE: The 2026 EAVS Policy Survey covers 11 policy domains across 40+ pages with hundreds of questions — yet EAC has disclosed no respondent burden estimate. Realistic per-state completion burden: 55–110 hours of election director and policy staff time. At 56 states and territories = 3,080–6,160 total undisclosed burden hours. At \$40–80/hr state government labor = \$123,200–\$492,800 in state taxpayer costs per cycle — zero disclosed.

TECHNOLOGY FAILURE: A federal survey of election technology administered via static PDF with no pre-population, no API integration with state election management systems, and no NCSL database cross-referencing is indefensible. Pre-population from prior EAVS data and NCSL would reduce burden 60–80% for states with stable election law.

DUPLICATION: DOJ (VRA compliance), FEC, Census Bureau (CVAP), and DoD/FVAP (UOCAVA) all collect overlapping election data from the same state election offices. No crosswalk conducted. PRA prohibits duplicative collection.

CYBERSECURITY RISK: EAVS security-related questions — election technology certifications, audit procedures, cybersecurity practices — create a comprehensive map of state election security gaps. As an ITAR-registered cybersecurity firm, Obelisk Tech Systems warns that this data, if compromised, is a high-value foreign intelligence target. Security-sensitive responses must be classified or sensitivity-designated with access controls — not published as public record.

ELECTION TIMING: Survey administered during pre-election operational peak — the worst possible time for accurate, comprehensive responses. Should be moved to post-election period.

GEORGIA STANDING: As Thomas County Republican Party Chairman with direct election administration involvement, the submitter has first-hand standing. Thomas County participates in Georgia's EMS, SB 202 framework, and risk-limiting audit program — all covered by EAVS survey domains.

STATUTORY AUTHORITY: EAC's HAVA Section 241 research authority must be demonstrated for each survey section — particularly voter ID, criminal convictions, and list maintenance domains that are subject to active state legislative and judicial controversy.

OIRA REFERRAL: Federal election data fragmentation across EAC, DOJ, FEC, Census, and FVAP requires cross-agency architecture review. Five documents attached.

Attachments

EAC_C1_Burden_Lifecycle

EAC_C2_Methodology_Cost_Economic

EAC_C3_Duplication_Authority_Utility

EAC_C4_Technology_Security_COTS

EAC_C5_SmallState_Pattern_Records

EAC-2026-0001 | Comment 1 of 5 — Burden Hours & Lifecycle

Docket No.: EAC-2026-0001 | OMB Control Number: 3265-0006

Re: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) — Policy Survey

Agency: U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Submitted: March 16, 2026

Submitted by:

James Hunter Poole, Executive Chairman & CEO, Obelisk Tech Systems Inc.

CAGE: 9S0L8 | UEI: U34MSJ6A6413 | HUBZone-Certified Small Business | ITAR-Registered Defense Contractor

CMMC Level 2 Self-Assessed | BIS SNAP-R CIN: S745686 | SEC EDGAR CIK: 0002090527

Thomasville, Thomas County, Georgia | Thomas County Republican Party Chairman

14-Patent Portfolio: Cybersecurity, Quantum Communications, Autonomous Systems

Obelisk Tech Systems Inc. submits these comments as a HUBZone-certified ITAR-registered defense technology small business headquartered in Thomas County, Georgia, whose CEO serves as Thomas County Republican Party Chairman. We submit from the dual perspective of a cybersecurity technology firm with direct expertise in election security infrastructure and a local Republican Party official with direct standing in the administration of federal elections in Georgia. These comments address substantive PRA deficiencies in the EAVS Policy Survey across 20 attack vectors.

I. Burden Hours — Massive Scope, Zero Burden Estimate Disclosed

The EAC's 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey Policy Survey covers: Voter Registration and List Maintenance, Election Technology, Mail Voting, In-Person Voting, UOCAVA Voting, Provisional Voting, Election Certification, Recounts, Audits, Voter Identification, and Criminal Convictions — 11 substantive policy domains spanning the entire federal election administration framework. The survey instrument runs to approximately 40 pages with hundreds of individual questions, comment fields, and policy documentation requirements. EAC has not disclosed any respondent burden estimate in the uploaded survey instrument — a PRA violation. At a minimum, state-level survey completion by election directors requires: initial survey review and routing to appropriate agency staff (1–2 hrs), research and verification of state statutory and regulatory citations for each question domain (4–8 hrs per domain x 11 domains = 44–88 hrs), draft response coordination across election office, legal counsel, and agency leadership (3–6 hrs), legal review of public-comment responses (2–4 hrs), and final submission and documentation (1–2 hrs). Total realistic state-level burden: 55–110 hours per state. At 50 states plus territories = 2,750–5,500 total burden hours for this survey cycle — entirely undisclosed.

- EAC has disclosed zero burden estimate for a 40-page, 11-domain federal election policy survey — direct PRA noncompliance
- State election directors report this as one of the most time-intensive federal survey obligations they face
- OMB must require EAC to disclose a complete burden estimate before approving the 2026 EAVS

II. Lifecycle Burden — Biennial Cycle With Ongoing State Compliance Obligations

The EAVS is a biennial survey — administered every two years in conjunction with federal general elections. Beyond the survey completion burden, state election offices face ongoing lifecycle

obligations: maintaining records of prior EAVS responses for consistency and audit purposes, monitoring statutory and regulatory changes that affect EAVS response accuracy, coordinating with county election officials on local data that feeds state-level responses, and responding to EAC follow-up inquiries for data validation and clarification. These ongoing obligations represent significant annual staff time entirely absent from any EAC burden estimate.

Requested: EAC must disclose complete per-state burden estimate including all 11 survey domains; disclose biennial inter-survey maintenance burden; produce Regulatory Flexibility Act analysis for small state and territorial election offices.

EAC-2026-0001 | Comment 2 of 5 — Methodology, Cost Reality & Economic Impact

Docket No.: EAC-2026-0001 | OMB Control Number: 3265-0006

Re: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) — Policy Survey

Agency: U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Submitted: March 16, 2026

Submitted by:

James Hunter Poole, Executive Chairman & CEO, Obelisk Tech Systems Inc.

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III. Methodology Flaws — No Pilot Validation, No Domain-Level Burden Breakdown

EAC's survey instrument contains no burden disclosure at all — making methodology assessment impossible. The questions range from simple binary yes/no policy questions (low burden) to complex multi-part questions requiring statutory citations, percentage calculations, and multi-year trend data (high burden). A question asking whether a state has automatic voter registration is categorically different in burden from a question requiring a state to document its entire provisional ballot adjudication process with supporting legal citations. EAC must produce a domain-by-domain burden estimate reflecting the actual complexity variance across the 11 survey sections, not a single undifferentiated average applied to all questions uniformly.

- Voter ID policy section: low burden — policy is well-documented
- Voter registration list maintenance section: high burden — requires pulling registration database statistics, cross-system reconciliation, and multi-year comparison data
- Election technology section: high burden for states undergoing equipment certification cycles — requires detailed system documentation
- Recount and audit section: requires post-election data compilation that may not be available until months after the survey period opens

IV. Cost Reality — State Election Office Staff Time

State election directors and their staff are government employees — their time has a definable cost to state taxpayers. At a GS-14 equivalent for a state chief election officer (\$55–80/hour) and GS-12 for policy analysts (\$35–55/hour), a realistic 55–110 hour per-state completion burden represents \$2,475–\$8,800 in state government labor cost per state. Across 50 states and 6 territories = \$139,425–\$492,800 in total state election administration labor cost for one EAVS cycle. This cost is

borne by state and local governments and ultimately by state taxpayers — entirely excluded from EAC's "no cost to respondents" claim.

V. Economic Impact at Scale — Election Administration Capacity Diversion

State election offices operate with constrained staffing. The EAVS Policy Survey is administered in the lead-up to the 2026 federal general election — precisely when state election staff are managing the highest operational demands of the election cycle: voter registration list maintenance, poll worker training, equipment certification, mail ballot processing, and candidate filing. A 55–110 hour per-state survey burden imposed during the pre-election operational peak diverts election administration capacity from direct election integrity functions to federal survey compliance. EAC should administer the policy survey during the post-election period — not during the pre-election operational peak.

Requested: EAC must produce domain-by-domain burden estimate; disclose survey timing rationale; evaluate post-election administration timing to reduce operational drag.

EAC-2026-0001 | Comment 3 of 5 — Duplication, Statutory Authority & Practical Utility

Docket No.: EAC-2026-0001 | OMB Control Number: 3265-0006

Re: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) — Policy Survey

Agency: U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Submitted: March 16, 2026

Submitted by:

James Hunter Poole, Executive Chairman & CEO, Obelisk Tech Systems Inc.

CAGE: 9S0L8 | UEI: U34MSJ6A6413 | HUBZone-Certified Small Business | ITAR-Registered Defense Contractor

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VI. Practical Utility — Survey Scope Exceeds Data-Driven Policy Function

The EAVS Policy Survey covers 11 policy domains with hundreds of individual questions. EAC does not disclose: which specific questions drive specific policy recommendations or EAC guidance documents, what percentage of questions contribute to the EAVS Comprehensive Report versus general background context, whether all survey sections have been used in published EAC research outputs, or whether any questions have been included in multiple EAVS cycles without ever informing a published policy output. Under the PRA, each data element must have defined practical utility. A survey of this scope and burden requires EAC to publish a question-by-question utility justification demonstrating that each field contributes to a specific, identifiable policy output.

- EAC must publish a data element utility matrix mapping each survey section to specific policy outputs
- Questions that have not informed published EAC research products in prior cycles should be removed

VII. Duplication — State Election Data Already in Public Records and Existing Federal Systems

Much of the EAVS Policy Survey data is publicly available in existing sources: state statutes and administrative codes (publicly available), state election regulations (published in state administrative registers), National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) election law databases, Ballotpedia state election law tracking, and EAC's own prior EAVS Comprehensive Reports. EAC has not demonstrated why it cannot pre-populate the Policy Survey from these existing public data sources and ask states only to verify and correct pre-populated responses — dramatically reducing survey burden while improving data accuracy.

- NCSL election law database tracks state-by-state election policy in real time — EAC pre-population from NCSL would eliminate much of the research burden
- EAC's own prior EAVS data could pre-populate most fields for states whose policies have not changed
- A change-only survey asking states to confirm or update prior responses would reduce burden by an estimated 60–80%

VIII. Cross-Agency Duplication — DOJ, FEC, Census, and State Reporting Overlap

State election offices report overlapping data to multiple federal agencies: Department of Justice (Section 203 and Section 5 VRA compliance data), Federal Election Commission (campaign finance and election administration data), U.S. Census Bureau (CVAP data and demographic election statistics), and Department of Defense/FVAP (UOCAVA program data). EAC has not conducted a crosswalk against these parallel federal reporting requirements to identify duplicative collection. A state reporting UOCAVA data to both EAC and FVAP is submitting overlapping information through separate federal channels.

IX. Statutory Authority — HAVA Scope and Survey Expansion

EAC's statutory authority derives from the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20901 et seq.). HAVA Section 241 authorizes EAC to conduct studies of election administration issues. The EAVS Policy Survey's scope — covering voter ID, criminal conviction voting rights, election audits, and list maintenance methodology — extends substantially into areas of active state legislative and judicial controversy. EAC must demonstrate that each survey section is within its HAVA Section 241 research authority and does not constitute unauthorized federal interference in state election administration policy.

Requested: EAC must conduct NCSL/prior EAVS pre-population pilot; conduct DOJ/FEC/Census crosswalk; publish HAVA statutory authority matrix for each survey section.

EAC-2026-0001 | Comment 4 of 5 — Technology, Security & COTS

Docket No.: EAC-2026-0001 | OMB Control Number: 3265-0006

Re: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) — Policy Survey

Agency: U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Submitted: March 16, 2026

Submitted by:

James Hunter Poole, Executive Chairman & CEO, Obelisk Tech Systems Inc.

CAGE: 9S0L8 | UEI: U34MSJ6A6413 | HUBZone-Certified Small Business | ITAR-Registered Defense Contractor

CMMC Level 2 Self-Assessed | BIS SNAP-R CIN: S745686 | SEC EDGAR CIK: 0002090527

Thomasville, Thomas County, Georgia | Thomas County Republican Party Chairman

14-Patent Portfolio: Cybersecurity, Quantum Communications, Autonomous Systems

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X. Technology Failure — Static PDF Survey for 2026 Federal Election Administration

The 2026 EAVS Policy Survey is a static PDF form requiring manual completion by state election offices — no pre-population from prior EAVS data, no integration with state election management systems, no automated validation of responses against known statutory databases, and no API-based data submission pathway. A federal survey of election technology administered using a paper PDF form is a technology failure that contradicts EAC's mission to promote election administration modernization. EAC should implement a digital survey portal with: pre-population from prior EAVS data, NCSL database cross-referencing, automated validation of statutory citations, and structured data submission enabling machine-readable analysis.

- EAC cannot credibly promote election technology modernization while administering its own survey via static PDF
- Pre-population from prior EAVS would reduce completion burden by 60–80% for states with stable election law
- Automated statutory citation validation would improve data quality while reducing state staff verification burden

XI. Cybersecurity and Data Security — Election Data Security Architecture Not Disclosed

The EAVS Policy Survey collects detailed information about state election technology systems, security procedures, audit processes, and vulnerability remediation activities. This information — in aggregate — constitutes a detailed map of election administration security practices across all 50 states. EAC has not disclosed: the cybersecurity architecture for EAVS data collection and storage, encryption standards for survey transmission, access controls governing who can query detailed state-level security practice data, classification or sensitivity designation for security-related responses, or breach notification protocols if EAVS data is compromised. As an ITAR-registered cybersecurity firm, Obelisk Tech Systems notes that a comprehensive database of election security

practices, if compromised, would constitute a high-value intelligence target for foreign adversaries seeking to identify exploitable gaps in U.S. election infrastructure.

- Detailed state election security practice data collected by EAVS should be classified or sensitivity-designated
- EAC must disclose cybersecurity architecture for EAVS data collection and storage before renewing this collection
- Access controls limiting who can query state-level election security practice data must be published

XII. Interoperability — EAVS Disconnected from State Election Management Systems

State election management systems (EMS) — used to manage voter rolls, ballot production, results reporting, and post-election auditing — contain structured electronic data directly relevant to EAVS quantitative and policy questions. EAC has not established API integration standards enabling state EMS to generate EAVS-compatible reports automatically. A state using a modern EMS should be able to auto-generate EAVS responses from system data rather than manually compiling statistics from multiple disconnected state systems.

XIII. COTS Solution — Pre-Populated Digital EAVS Portal

EAC should modernize the EAVS through: (1) A digital portal pre-populated from prior EAVS data, NCSL databases, and state statutory tracking systems — asking states only to verify, update, or correct pre-populated content; (2) API integration standards for state EMS enabling automated quantitative data submission; (3) Structured response formats enabling machine-readable analysis without manual data entry by EAC staff. U.S. election technology and civic data firms are capable of delivering this solution under existing GSA procurement pathways.

Requested: EAC must modernize to a pre-populated digital portal; publish cybersecurity architecture for EAVS data; establish EMS API integration standards; classify security-sensitive response data.

EAC-2026-0001 | Comment 5 of 5 — Small State Impact, Quality, Drag, Pattern & Recordkeeping

Docket No.: EAC-2026-0001 | OMB Control Number: 3265-0006

Re: 2026 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) — Policy Survey

Agency: U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Submitted: March 16, 2026

Submitted by:

James Hunter Poole, Executive Chairman & CEO, Obelisk Tech Systems Inc.

CAGE: 9S0L8 | UEI: U34MSJ6A6413 | HUBZone-Certified Small Business | ITAR-Registered Defense Contractor

CMMC Level 2 Self-Assessed | BIS SNAP-R CIN: S745686 | SEC EDGAR CIK: 0002090527

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XIV. Small State and Territorial Disproportionate Impact

The EAVS Policy Survey imposes identical burden on all 50 states plus 6 territories regardless of election office size. A state with a 3-person election office faces the same 11-domain survey as California's large election administration infrastructure. For small state and territorial election offices — including those in U.S. territories with limited administrative capacity — a 55–110 hour EAVS completion burden may represent weeks of director-level time. EAC must produce a Regulatory Flexibility Act analysis specifically addressing the disproportionate burden on small state and territorial election offices.

XV. Barrier to Entry — Survey Complexity Reduces Data Quality

The EAVS Policy Survey's complexity creates a perverse data quality effect: states with larger election offices and dedicated policy staff produce comprehensive, well-researched responses, while smaller states with limited capacity produce less complete, potentially less accurate responses — creating a systematic quality gap between large and small state data that biases EAC's comparative analysis. The survey's complexity functions as a de facto barrier to high-quality participation from smaller jurisdictions.

XVI. Election Security Data Quality Risk

The EAVS security-related questions — covering election technology certifications, audit procedures, and cybersecurity practices — may produce intentionally vague or incomplete responses from states concerned about publicly disclosing security vulnerabilities. A state that identifies a gap in its election technology security will rationally avoid disclosing it in a public-record federal survey. This produces systematic under-disclosure of security vulnerabilities in EAVS data — exactly the opposite of what sound election security policy analysis requires. EAC should

establish a protected submission channel for security-sensitive responses with appropriate access controls and sensitivity designations.

XVII. Operational Drag — Pre-Election Survey Administration Timing

Administering the EAVS Policy Survey in the months before the 2026 federal general election imposes its highest burden precisely when state election offices are managing peak operational demands. Georgia election officials — including Thomas County Republican Party operations coordinated with state GOP election integrity efforts — face the highest survey burden at the moment of greatest operational pressure. EAC should administer the policy survey in the post-election period (December 2026–February 2027) when election office staff can devote appropriate time and attention to accurate, comprehensive responses.

XVIII. Georgia Election Administration Specific Standing

As Thomas County Republican Party Chairman and a technology professional with expertise in election cybersecurity, the submitter has direct standing in Georgia's election administration framework. Thomas County participates in Georgia's statewide election management system (GEMS/PollPad/ExpressPoll infrastructure), is subject to Georgia's SB 202 election law provisions, and participates in post-election audits under Georgia's risk-limiting audit program. Each of these aspects of Georgia election administration is covered by EAVS Policy Survey questions — making Obelisk Tech Systems and its principal directly affected respondents in the broadest sense.

XIX. Multi-Agency Pattern — Federal Election Data Fragmentation

This comment is part of a cross-agency regulatory engagement by Obelisk Tech Systems. Federal election data collection is fragmented across EAC (EAVS), DOJ (VRA compliance), FEC (election administration data), Census Bureau (CVAP and demographic data), DoD/FVAP (UOCAVA), and CISA (election security). State election offices face cumulative reporting burden across all these agencies with no cross-agency integration. OIRA should require these agencies to develop a unified federal election data architecture with a single state-facing reporting interface, reducing duplicative burden while improving cross-agency analytical capability.

XX. Recordkeeping — State Documentation for EAVS Compliance

States maintaining EAVS response accuracy must retain: prior EAVS responses for consistency verification, statutory and regulatory change logs affecting EAVS responses, supporting documentation for statistical data in quantitative sections, and EAC correspondence regarding response verification and clarification. These ongoing recordkeeping obligations — required to be estimated and disclosed under 44 U.S.C. 3502(2) — are absent from EAC's survey instrument and must be included in any PRA burden disclosure.

Final Requested OMB Action: EAC must: (1) disclose complete per-state burden estimate before OMB approval; (2) modernize to pre-populated digital portal with NCSL/prior EAVS integration; (3) conduct DOJ/FEC/Census data crosswalk; (4) publish cybersecurity architecture for EAVS data; (5) establish sensitivity designation for election security responses; (6) shift policy survey timing to post-election period; (7) produce RFA analysis for small state and territorial election offices; (8) disclose standalone recordkeeping burden estimate. OIRA referral recommended for cross-agency federal election data architecture review.