United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 16, 2026

Dominic Mancini, Deputy Administrator
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

Dear Deputy Administrator Mancini,

The Department of State requests emergency processing of a proposed new information collection: the Visa Fraud Reporting Form, a public-facing online form hosted at travel.state.gov/reportvisafraud that will allow members of the public to report suspected visa fraud or misuse by individuals or organizations directly to the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA).

Under President Trump, the Department has revoked more than 175,000 visas, the majority following law enforcement encounters such as assault, DUI, theft, and drug crimes. These numbers show continuous vetting works, but only after an arrest or conviction is already on record, after harm is done. The Department has no dedicated public channel through which neighbors, coworkers, landlords, etc. can flag concerning behavior directly, unlike the FBI and DHS, which already run public tip lines for exactly this reason. That missing pathway is the known vulnerability this proposal addresses: a tip line would not replace continuous vetting, it would feed it.

The existing lack of a dedicated visa-fraud tip line has immediate national security consequences. The Immigration and Nationality Act renders inadmissible any alien who has procured, or sought to procure, a visa by fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact [INA § 212(a)(6)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)], and vests in the Secretary of State discretionary authority to revoke a visa at any time, including for this and other suspected ineligibilities [8 U.S.C. § 1201(i)]. That authority is only as effective as the information available to exercise it. Today, a member of the public who witnesses or has knowledge about visa fraud has no purpose-built way to get that information to the office with authority to act on it.

These consequences are immediate, not speculative. Every day that a credible fraud tip goes unreported or misdelivered, an alien who is statutorily inadmissible may continue to hold and use a validly-issued visa to enter or remain in the United States. The Secretary's revocation authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1201(i) is a real-time tool meant to close exactly that window, but it can only be exercised on information the Department actually receives. Where that information is delayed, lost, or misdirected, the window stays open, and an individual who is legally ineligible for a visa may continue to possess one. Therefore, the collection of such information is both needed immediately and essential to the mission of the agency. (5 C.F.R. 1320.13(a)(1)(i)-(ii)).

The Department has taken all practicable steps to consult with interested agencies and members of the public in order to minimize the burden of this collection. The Department currently relies on a manually monitored email inbox -- a stopgap that cannot manage a large amount of information and produces no structured, actionable intake. The Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) hosts a "crime tips" form on their public-facing website to accept tips in relation to prosecutable criminal activity, but it asks users to report only where they believe "a crime under Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) authorities occurred"—but Section 1201(i) requires no provable crime, only credible information indicating a ground of ineligibility. Members of the public who wish to report fraud will often suspect that their reportable knowledge does not reach a criminal threshold, and as such the DSS tipline is not appropriate. Compounding the problem, rather than centralizing intake, the DSS site directs the public outward to a patchwork of external destinations after which the Department has no visibility or ability to act.

The most comparable public-facing alternative, USCIS's Secure Tip Portal, is built for the Department of Homeland Security to contemplate criminal investigations and benefits adjudication, not visa-specific action. Tips submitted there are not immediately routed to the Department of State for revocation or other consular response. The result of the existent channels for reporting is that every day, credible fraud information is being scattered across systems the Department doesn't control, never reaches the office with authority to revoke the visa, and inadmissible aliens continue to hold and use valid visas in the interim. Every day this gap persists, credible fraud tips are being lost, delayed, or misdirected—and fraudulently obtained visas remain valid and in use.

This is precisely the gap Executive Order 14161, "Protecting the United States From Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats," directs the Department to close by reviewing visa programs to prevent misuse by hostile actors and restoring rigorous, uniform vetting. It is also central to Executive

Order 14165's mandate that federal agencies achieve operational control of U.S. borders. Standing up this form is not a discretionary process improvement. It is a direct implementation of the President's border security and visa integrity directives.

For the reasons discussed above, the Department cannot reasonably comply with normal clearance procedures under 5 CFR 1320.10 because "[t]he use of normal clearance procedures is reasonably likely to prevent or disrupt the collection of information." (5 C.F.R. 1320.13(a)(2)(iii)). Furthermore, there is a reasonable likelihood that public harm would result if it were to do so, and a known vulnerability that is actively being exploited by mala fide actors would remain open. (5 C.F.R. 1320.13(a)(2)(i)). The Department will follow this emergency request with a submission for standard 3-year approval under 5 CFR 1320.10.

Therefore, the Department of State requests emergency OMB approval for this collection by September 16, 2026.

Sincerely,

John Armstrong
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Bureau of Consular Affairs,
Department of State.