Nprm

Monday,
August 29, 2005

Part II

Department of the
Treasury
Internal Revenue Service
26 CFR Parts 1 and 301
Section 482: Methods To Determine
Taxable Income in Connection With a
Cost Sharing Arrangement; Proposed
Rules

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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 166 / Monday, August 29, 2005 / Proposed Rules
Paperwork Reduction Act

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Internal Revenue Service
26 CFR Parts 1 and 301
[REG–144615–02]
RIN 1545–BB26

Section 482: Methods To Determine
Taxable Income in Connection With a
Cost Sharing Arrangement
Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
Treasury.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
and notice of public hearing.
AGENCY:

SUMMARY: This document contains
proposed regulations that provide
guidance regarding methods under
section 482 to determine taxable income
in connection with a cost sharing
arrangement. These proposed
regulations potentially affect controlled
taxpayers within the meaning of section
482 that enter into cost sharing
arrangements as defined herein. This
document also provides a notice of
public hearing on these proposed
regulations.

Written or electronic comments
must be received November 28, 2005.
Requests to speak and outlines of topics
to be discussed at the public hearing
scheduled for November 16, 2005, at
10:00 a.m. must be received by October
26, 2005.
ADDRESSES: Send submissions to
CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG–144615–02), room
5203, Internal Revenue Service, P.O.
Box 7604, Ben Franklin Station,
Washington, DC 20044. Submissions
may be hand delivered Monday through
Friday between the hours of 8 a.m. and
4 p.m. to CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG–144615–
02), Courier’s desk, Internal Revenue
Service, 1111 Constitution Avenue,
NW., Washington, DC 20044, or sent
electronically, via the IRS Internet site
at www.irs.gov/regs or via the Federal
eRulemaking Portal at
www.regulations.gov (IRS and REG–
144615–02). The public hearing will be
held in the IRS Auditorium, Internal
Revenue Building, 1111 Constitution
Avenue, NW., Washington, DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Concerning the proposed regulations,
Jeffrey L. Parry or Christopher J. Bello,
(202) 435–5265; concerning submissions
of comments, the hearing, and/or to be
placed on the building access list to
attend the hearing, LaNita Van Dyke,
(202) 622–7180 (not toll-free numbers).
DATES:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

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The collections of information
contained in this notice of proposed
rulemaking have been submitted to the
Office of Management and Budget for
review in accordance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.C. 3507(d)).
An agency may not conduct or
sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a collection of information
unless the collection of information
displays a valid control number
assigned by the Office of Management
and Budget.
The collection of information
requirements are in proposed § 1.482–
7(b)(1)(iv)–(vii) and (k). Responses to
the collections of information are
required by the IRS to monitor
compliance of controlled taxpayers with
the provisions applicable to cost sharing
arrangements.
Estimated total annual reporting and/
or recordkeeping burden: 1250 hours.
Estimated average annual burden
hours per respondent and/or
recordkeeper: 2.5 hours.
Estimated number of respondents
and/or recordkeepers: 500.
Estimated frequency of responses:
Annually.
Comments on the collection of
information should be sent to the Office
of Management and Budget, Attn: Desk
Officer for the Department of the
Treasury, Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, Washington, DC
20503, with copies to the Internal
Revenue Service, Attn: IRS Reports
Clearance Officer,
SE:W:CAR:MP:T:T:SP, Washington, DC
20224. Comments on the collection of
information should be received by
October 28, 2005.
Comments are specifically requested
concerning:
Whether the proposed collection of
information is necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the IRS,
including whether the information will
have practical utility;
The accuracy of the estimated burden
associated with the proposed collection
of information (see below);
How the burden of complying with
the proposed collection of information
may be minimized, including through
the application of automated collection
techniques or other forms of
information-technology; and
Estimates of capital or start-up costs
and costs of operation, maintenance,
and purchase of services to provide
information.
Books or records relating to a
collection of information must be
retained as long as their contents may

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become material in the administration
of any internal revenue law. Generally,
tax returns and tax return information
are confidential, as required by 26
U.S.C. 6103.
Background
Section 482 of the Internal Revenue
Code generally provides that the
Secretary may allocate gross income,
deductions, credits, and allowances
between or among two or more
taxpayers that are owned or controlled
by the same interests in order to prevent
evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect
income of a controlled taxpayer. The
second sentence of section 482 added by
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 enunciates
the ‘‘commensurate with income’’
standard that in the case of any transfer
(or license) of intangible property
(within the meaning of section
936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to
such transfer or license shall be
commensurate with the income
attributable to the intangible. Public
Law 99–5143, 1231(e)(1), reprinted in
1986–3 C.B. (Vol. 1) 1, 479–80.
Comprehensive regulations under
section 482 were published in the
Federal Register (33 FR 5849) on April
16, 1968, and were revised and updated
by transfer pricing regulations in the
Federal Register (59 FR 34971, 60 FR
65553, 61 FR 21955, and 68 FR 51171)
on July 8, 1994, December 20, 1995,
May 13, 1996, and August 26, 2003,
respectively.
The 1968 regulations contained
guidance regarding the sharing of costs
and risks. See § 1.482–2A(d)(4). The
1968 regulations were replaced in 1996
by § 1.482–7 regarding the sharing of
costs and risks (the 1996 regulations
were further modified in 2003 with
respect to stock-based compensation).
Experience in the administration of
existing § 1.482–7 has demonstrated the
need for additional regulatory guidance
to improve compliance with, and
administration of, the cost sharing rules.
In particular, there is a need for
additional guidance regarding the
external contributions for which arm’s
length consideration must be provided
as a condition to entering into a cost
sharing arrangement. The consideration
for this type of external contributions is
referred to in the existing regulations as
the buy-in. Furthermore, additional
guidance is needed on methods for
valuing these external contributions.
The proposed regulations also provide
the opportunity to address other
technical and procedural issues that
have arisen in the course of the
administration of the cost sharing rules.

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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 166 / Monday, August 29, 2005 / Proposed Rules
Explanation of Provisions
A. Overview
Under a cost sharing arrangement,
related parties agree to share the costs
and risks of intangible development in
proportion to their reasonable
expectations of the extent to which they
will relatively benefit from their
separate exploitation of the developed
intangibles. The existing § 1.482–7
regulations and these proposed
regulations provide rules governing cost
sharing arrangements consistent with
the commensurate income standard
under the statute and the general arm’s
length standard under the section 482
regulations.
Comment letters and other
information available to the Treasury
Department and IRS have provided
limited information on third-party
arrangements that are asserted to be
similar to cost sharing arrangements.
Typically, in the context of discussion
concerning the current § 1.482–7
regulations, information has been
provided on certain arrangements
involving cost plus research and
development or government contracts,
which, while no doubt arm’s length
transactions, are not viewed by the
Treasury Department and IRS as
analogous to cost sharing arrangements.
Thus, in accordance with § 1.482–
1(b)(1), the task is to provide guidance
relative to cost sharing arrangements
regarding ‘‘the results that would have
been realized if uncontrolled taxpayers
had engaged in the same transaction
under the same circumstances.’’
(Emphasis added.) This guidance is
necessary because of the fundamental
differences in cost sharing arrangements
between related parties as compared to
any superficially similar arrangements
that are entered into between unrelated
parties. Such other arrangements
typically involve a materially different
division of costs, risks, and benefits
than in cost sharing arrangements under
the regulations. For example, other
arrangements may contemplate joint,
rather than separate, exploitation of
results, or may tie the division of actual
results to the magnitude of each party’s
contributions (for example, by way of
preferential returns). Those types of
arrangements are not analogous to a cost
sharing arrangement in which the
controlled participants divide
contributions in accordance with
reasonably anticipated benefits from
separate exploitation of the resulting
intangibles.
For purposes of determining the
results that would have been realized
under an arm’s length cost sharing
arrangement, the proposed regulations

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adopt as a fundamental concept an
investor model for addressing the
relationships and contributions of
controlled participants in a cost sharing
arrangement. Under this model, each
controlled participant may be viewed as
making an aggregate investment,
attributable to both cost contributions
(ongoing share of intangible
development costs) and external
contributions (the preexisting
advantages which the parties bring into
the arrangement), for purposes of
achieving an anticipated return
appropriate to the risks of the cost
sharing arrangement over the term of the
development and exploitation of the
intangibles resulting from the
arrangement. In particular, the investor
model frames the guidance in the
proposed regulations for valuing the
external contributions that parties at
arm’s length would not invest, along
with their ongoing cost contributions, in
the absence of an appropriate reward. In
this regard, valuations are not
appropriate if an investor would not
undertake to invest in the arrangement
because its total anticipated return is
less than the total anticipated return
that could have been achieved through
an alternative investment that is
realistically available to it.
The investor model is grounded in the
legislative history of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 which provided in pertinent
part as follows:
In revising section 482, the conferees do
not intend to preclude the use of certain bona
fide cost-sharing arrangements as an
appropriate method of allocating income
attributable to intangibles among related
parties, if and to the extent such agreements
are consistent with the purposes of this
provision that the income allocated among
the parties reasonably reflect the actual
economic activity undertaken by each. Under
such a bona fide cost-sharing arrangement,
the cost-sharer would be expected to bear its
portion of all research and development
costs, on successful as well as unsuccessful
products within an appropriate product area,
and the cost of research and development at
all relevant developmental stages would be
included. In order for cost-sharing
arrangements to produce results consistent
with the changes made by the Act to royalty
arrangements, it is envisioned that the
allocation of R&D cost-sharing arrangements
generally should be proportionate to profit as
determined before deduction for research and
development. In addition, to the extent, if
any, that one party is actually contributing
funds toward research and development at a
significantly earlier point in time than the
other, or is otherwise effectively putting its
funds at risk to a greater extent than the
other, it would be expected that an
appropriate return would be provided to such
party to reflect its investment.

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H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99–841 at II–638
(1986)(emphasis supplied).
There are special implications that are
derived from determining the arm’s
length compensation for external
contributions in line with the investor
model. In evaluating that arm’s length
compensation, it is appropriate,
consistent with the investor model, to
determine (1) what an investor would
pay at the outset of a cost sharing
arrangement for an opportunity to invest
in that arrangement, and (2) what a
participant with external contributions
would require as compensation at the
outset of a cost sharing arrangement to
allow an investor to join in the
investment. The appropriate ‘‘price’’ of
undertaking a risky investment is
typically determined at the time the
investment is undertaken, based on the
ex ante expectations of the investors.
Given the uncertainty about whether
and to what extent intangibles will be
successfully developed under a cost
sharing arrangement, ex post
interpretations of ex ante expectations
are inherently unreliable and
susceptible to abuse. Accordingly, an
important implication of determining
the arm’s length result under the
investor model, reflected in the
methods, is that compensation for
external contributions is analyzed and
valued ex ante. The ex ante perspective
is fundamental to achieving arm’s
length results.
Accordingly, the proposed regulations
provide guidance under section 482 that
would replace the existing regulations
under § 1.482–7 relating to cost sharing
arrangements. They revise § 1.482–7 in
light of the experience of both the IRS
and taxpayers with the existing
regulations. The proposed regulations
also restructure the format of the
existing regulations to be more
consistent with that of the 1994
regulations (for example, §§ 1.482–3 and
1.482–4) and to add organizational
clarity.
The proposed regulations begin by
specifying the transactions relevant to a
cost sharing arrangement. Importantly,
the proposed regulations acknowledge
that in a typical cost sharing
arrangement, at least one controlled
participant provides resources or
capabilities developed, maintained, or
acquired externally to the arrangement
that are reasonably anticipated to
contribute to the development of
intangibles under the arrangement,
namely what are referred to as external
contributions. Thus, the proposed
regulations integrate into the definition
of a cost sharing arrangement both ‘‘cost
sharing transactions’’ regarding the

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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 166 / Monday, August 29, 2005 / Proposed Rules

ongoing sharing of intangible
development costs as well as
‘‘preliminary or contemporaneous
transactions’’ by which the controlled
participants compensate each other for
their external contributions to the
arrangement (that is, what the existing
regulations refer to as the ‘‘buy-in’’). The
proposed regulations provide that
§ 1.482–7 only governs arrangements
that are within (or which the controlled
taxpayers reasonably concluded to be
within) the definition of a cost sharing
arrangement. Arrangements outside that
definition must be analyzed under the
other sections of the section 482
regulations to determine whether they
achieve arm’s length results.
The proposed regulations provide
supplemental guidance on the valuation
of the arm’s length amount to be
charged in a preliminary or
contemporaneous transaction. The
proposed regulations clarify that the
valuation of the rights associated with
the external contribution that is
compensated in a preliminary or
contemporaneous transaction cannot be
artificially limited by purported
conditions or restrictions. Rather, the
arm’s length compensation, and the
applicable method used to determine
that compensation, must reflect the type
of transaction and contractual terms of
a ‘‘reference transaction’’ by which the
benefit of exclusive and perpetual rights
in the relevant resources or capabilities
are provided. This compensation will be
determined by a method that will yield
a value for the obligation of any given
controlled participant that is consistent
with that participant’s share of the
combined value of the external
contribution to all controlled
participants.
The proposed regulations set forth
new specified methods and provide
rules for application of existing
specified methods, for purposes of
determining the arm’s length
compensation due with respect to
external contributions in preliminary or
contemporaneous transactions. The
proposed regulations also enunciate
general principles governing all
methods, specified and unspecified, for
these purposes.
The proposed regulations provide
guidance on allocations that the
Commissioner may make to more
clearly reflect arm’s length results for
the controlled taxpayers’ cost sharing
transactions and preliminary or
contemporaneous transactions. In
particular, building again on the
investor model, the proposed
regulations provide guidance on the
periodic adjustments that the
Commissioner may make in situations

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where the actually experienced results
of a controlled participant’s investment
attributable to cost contributions and
external contributions is widely
divergent from reasonable expectations
at the time of the investment.
Exceptions are provided, including one
under which the taxpayer may establish
that the differential is due to events
beyond its control that are extraordinary
and not reasonably anticipated
(including business growth that was not
reasonably anticipated). The proposed
regulations provide that periodic
adjustments may only be made by the
Commissioner.
Finally, the proposed regulations
include provisions to facilitate
administration of, and compliance with,
the cost sharing rules. These include
contractual provisions required for cost
sharing arrangements, documentation
that must be maintained (and produced
upon request by the IRS), accounting
requirements, and reporting
requirements. Transition rules are
provided for modified compliance in
the case of qualified cost sharing
arrangements under existing § 1.482–7,
as well as rules for terminating such
grandfather status. The proposed
regulations also make conforming and
other changes to provisions of the
current regulations under sections 482
and 6662 that are related to this
guidance.
B. Basic Rules Applicable to CSAs
1. General Rule—Proposed § 1.482–7(a)
Consistent with the rules governing
other controlled transactions (for
example, transfers of tangibles and
intangibles under existing §§ 1.482–3
and 1.482–4), proposed § 1.482–7(a)
provides that the arm’s length amount
charged in a controlled transaction
reasonably anticipated to contribute to
developing intangibles pursuant to a
cost sharing arrangement must be
determined under a method described
in the proposed regulations.
The controlled participants must
share intangible development costs of
the intangibles developed or to be
developed (the cost shared intangibles)
in cost sharing transactions in
proportion to their shares of reasonably
anticipated benefits (RAB shares) from
exploiting cost shared intangibles.
The controlled participants must also
compensate other controlled
participants for their external
contributions in preliminary or
contemporaneous transactions. The
arm’s length amount charged in a
preliminary or contemporaneous
transaction must be determined
pursuant to the method or methods

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under the other provision or provisions
of the section 482 regulations, as
supplemented by proposed § 1.482–7(g),
applicable to the reference transaction
reflected by the preliminary or
contemporaneous transaction. Such
method will yield a value for the
obligation of each obligor in the
preliminary or contemporaneous
transaction that is consistent with the
product of the combined value to all
controlled participants of the external
contribution that is the subject of the
preliminary or contemporaneous
transaction multiplied by the obligor’s
RAB share.
Contributions to developing the cost
shared intangibles made by a controlled
taxpayer that is not a controlled
participant in the cost sharing
arrangement must be determined
pursuant to § 1.482–4(f)(3)(iii)
(Allocations with respect to assistance
to the owner). Arm’s length
consideration for the transfer by a
controlled participant of an interest in a
cost shared intangible at any time
(whether during the term, or upon or
after the termination of a cost sharing
arrangement) must be determined under
the rules of §§ 1.482–1 and 1.482–5
through 1.482–6.
The proposed regulations provide that
if an arrangement comes within the
definition of a cost sharing arrangement,
it is subject to § 1.482–7 (see next
section of this Preamble for discussion
of the definition of a cost sharing
arrangement). Other arrangements that
are not cost sharing arrangements (or are
not treated as such) must be analyzed
under the other provisions of the section
482 regulations to determine whether
they achieve arm’s length results.
2. Definition of a CSA—Proposed
§ 1.482–7(b)
a. CSA Transactions in General
Under § 1.482–1(b)(1), a ‘‘controlled
transaction meets the arm’s length
standard if the results of the transaction
are consistent with the results that
would have been realized if
uncontrolled taxpayers had engaged in
the same transaction under the same
circumstances.’’ (Emphasis added.)
Thus, it is important to define with
reasonable precision the category of
arrangements treated as cost sharing
arrangements, their terms, and the
functions and risks assumed by the
participants in such arrangements. The
determination of what ‘‘would have
been’’ the arm’s length results of such
transactions is based on those
definitions.
Proposed § 1.482–7(b) identifies two
groups of transactions that are integral

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to a cost sharing arrangement—cost
sharing transactions and preliminary or
contemporaneous transactions. A cost
sharing transaction or CST is a
transaction in which the controlled
participants share the intangible
development costs of one or more cost
shared intangibles in proportion to their
respective shares of reasonably
anticipated benefits from their
individual exploitation of their interests
in the cost shared intangibles that they
obtain under the arrangement. CSTs
reflect the results that would have been
expected in a cost sharing agreement
between uncontrolled taxpayers that did
not bring any external contributions to
the arrangement. In other words, if
uncontrolled taxpayers started in a true
‘‘green field,’’ they would be expected to
agree to split ongoing costs of the
research in proportion to the relative
value of their respective reasonably
anticipated benefits from the
arrangement.
The proposed regulations are
premised in part, however, on the fact
that at least one controlled participant
typically provides external
contributions to a cost sharing
arrangement. Thus, the proposed
regulations integrate into the definition
of a cost sharing arrangement not only
the CSTs for the ongoing sharing of
intangible development costs, but also
the preliminary or contemporaneous
transactions or PCTs by which the
controlled participants compensate one
another for their respective external
contributions. The necessity of PCTs in
connection with cost sharing
arrangements was anticipated in the
legislative history of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986:
In addition, to the extent, if any, that one
party is actually contributing funds toward
research and development at a significantly
earlier point in time than the other, or is
otherwise effectively putting its funds at risk
to a greater extent than the other, it would
be expected that an appropriate return would
be provided to such party to reflect its
investment.

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99–841 at II–638
(1986).
b. Constituent Elements of a CSA—
Proposed § 1.482–7(b)(1)
The proposed regulations define a
cost sharing arrangement or CSA as a
contractual agreement to share the costs
of one or more intangibles that meet
three substantive and four
administrative requirements. The term
CSA, as defined, would replace the term
qualified cost sharing arrangement
employed in the existing regulations.
The substantive requirements are that
the controlled participants (1) divide all

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interests in cost shared intangibles on a
territorial basis, (2) enter into and effect
all CSTs and all PCTs, and (3) as a
result, individually own and exploit
their respective interests in the cost
shared intangibles without any further
obligation to compensate one another
for such interests. The administrative
requirements are that the controlled
participants substantially comply with
(1) the CSA contractual requirements,
(2) the CSA documentation
requirements, (3) the CSA accounting
requirements, and (4) the CSA reporting
requirements.
The Treasury Department and the IRS
recognize that a CSA, as defined,
represents one possible arrangement by
which parties may choose to share the
costs, risks, and benefits of intangible
development. Other arrangements,
however, may involve a materially
different division of costs, risks, and
benefits in contrast to a CSA. For
example, other arrangements may
contemplate joint, rather than separate,
exploitation of results, or may tie the
division of actual results to the
magnitude of each party’s contributions
(for example, by way of preferential
returns), rather than divide
contributions in accordance with
reasonably anticipated benefits from
separate exploitation. Given such
differences, the guidance under § 1.482–
7, as applicable to CSAs, is not
appropriate to evaluate what would
have been the arm’s length results of
these other arrangements that do not
constitute CSAs when they are
undertaken among controlled taxpayers.
In such cases the proposed regulations
direct taxpayers to guidance under other
provisions of the section 482 regulations
to determine whether such
arrangements achieve arm’s length
results.
c. External Contributions and PCTs—
Proposed § 1.482–7(b)(3)(i) Through (iv)
PCTs are the transactions by which
the controlled participants compensate
one another for their external
contributions to the CSA. External
contributions are any resources or
capabilities which one or more
controlled participants bring to a CSA
that were developed, maintained, or
acquired externally to the CSA (whether
prior to or during the course of the
CSA), and that are reasonably
anticipated to contribute to developing
cost shared intangibles. For example,
one controlled participant may have
promising in-process technology, or a
developed and successful first
generation technology, that may
reasonably be anticipated to provide a
platform for future generation

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51119

technology to be developed under the
CSA. As another example, one
controlled participant may have an
experienced research team that could
reasonably be anticipated to be
particularly suited to carrying out the
development contemplated under the
CSA. The proposed regulations exclude
land, depreciable tangible property, and
other resources acquired by intangible
development costs, since they are
compensated by CSTs. See discussion of
proposed § 1.482–7(d).
The Treasury Department and the IRS
believe that uncontrolled parties
entering into a long term commitment to
share intangible development costs
would require an agreement upfront that
all external contributions be made
available to the fullest extent for the full
period over which they are reasonably
anticipated to be needed. Accordingly,
the proposed regulations introduce the
concept of the reference transaction or
RT in order to ensure that compensation
for external contributions to the CSA
reflects the full economic value of
resources or capabilities that a
participant brings to the CSA. The RT is
a transaction providing the benefit of all
rights, exclusively and perpetually, in a
resource or capability described above,
apart from the rights to exploit an
existing intangible without further
development (see section of Preamble
below regarding § 1.482–7(c) (Make-orsell rights excluded)). The arm’s length
compensation pursuant to the PCT, and
the applicable method used to
determine such compensation, must
reflect the type of transaction and
contractual terms of the RT. The
controlled participants must enter into a
PCT as of the earliest date (whether on
or after the date the CSA is entered into)
on which the external contribution is
reasonably anticipated to contribute to
developing cost shared intangibles (the
date of a PCT). The controlled
participants are not required to actually
enter into the RT and the compensation
due from any controlled participant will
be limited to its RAB share of the total
value of the external contribution, the
scope of which is defined by the RT.
The concept of the RT was developed
in response to arguments that have been
encountered in the examination
experience of the IRS under the existing
regulations. In numerous situations
taxpayers have purported to convey
only limited availability of resources or
capabilities for purposes of the
intangible development activity (IDA)
under a CSA. An example is a shortterm license of an existing technology.
Under the existing regulations, such
cases may, of course, be examined to
assess whether the purported

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limitations conform to economic
substance and the parties’ conduct. See
§ 1.482–1(d)(3)(ii)(B) (Identifying
contractual terms). In addition, even if
the short-term license were respected,
the continued availability of the
contribution past the initial license term
would require new license terms to be
negotiated taking into account relevant
factors, such as whether the likelihood
of success of the IDA had materially
changed in the interim. The proposed
regulations address the problems in
administering such approaches more
directly by requiring an upfront
valuation of all external contributions
which would be much more difficult to
calculate if it involved the valuation of
a series of short-term licenses with
terms contingent on such interim
changes. Accordingly, the proposed
regulations assume a reference
transaction that does not allow for
contingencies based on the expiration of
short-term licenses that might require
further renegotiation of the
compensation for the external
contribution. No inference is intended
concerning the outcome of such
limitations under the existing
regulations.
Thus, for example, consider a CSA for
the development of future generations of
an existing technology owned by one
controlled participant. The PCT
compensation obligation of the other
controlled participant or participants
would be determined by reference to the
RT consisting of the transfer of all rights
to the existing technology apart from the
rights to exploit the existing technology
without further development (see
section of Preamble below regarding
§ 1.482–7(c) (Make-or-sell rights
excluded)). The rights transferred in the
RT would include the exclusive right to
use the technology for purposes of
research. They would also include the
right to exploit any resulting products
that incorporated the technology and
any resulting products the development
of which is otherwise assisted by the
technology. Moreover, the rights
transferred in the RT would cover a
term extending as long as the
exploitation of future generations of the
technology continued. The RT provides
the basis for selection and application of
the method used to value the
compensation owed under the PCT by
each other controlled participant. The
compensation obligation is limited to
each such other controlled participant’s
RAB share of the total value of the rights
in the existing technology that would
have been transferred in the RT.
Issues have arisen regarding whether
an existing research team in place
constitutes intangible property for

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which compensation is due, in addition
to sharing the ongoing compensation
and other costs of maintaining such
team, for purposes of the buy-in
provisions under the existing
regulations. The Treasury Department
and the IRS believe that the proper
arm’s length treatment is to include the
obligation to compensate such external
contributions of in-place research
capabilities in PCTs. At arm’s length, an
uncontrolled taxpayer seeking to invest
in a research project involving the
experienced in-place researchers would
require a commitment of the
experienced team in place for purposes
of the project, rather than assuming the
risks presented by an inexperienced
team. The Treasury Department and the
IRS believe that a contribution of such
an experienced team in place would
result in the contribution of intangible
property within the meaning of § 1.482–
4(b) and section 936(h)(3)(B).
The proposed regulations, however,
do not restrict the type of transaction
that may be the subject of the RT. An
RT may consist of the provision of
services as well as the transfer of
intangible property. For example, in the
case of an experienced research team in
place, therefore, the RT could be the
services agreement to commit the team
to the research project under the CSA.
Under the proposed regulations, the
controlled participants may designate
the type of transaction involved in the
RT, if different economically equivalent
types of RTs are possible with respect to
the relevant resource or capability. If the
controlled participants fail to make such
a designation, the Commissioner may do
so.
Exacting compensation for an external
contribution pursuant to a PCT is
distinguishable from charging for
another’s business opportunity. Any
taxpayer, controlled or uncontrolled, is
free to undertake the business
opportunity of trying to develop an
intangible on its own. In that case, the
taxpayer is bearing all costs and risks,
and has no obligation to compensate
anyone for taking free advantage of the
opportunity. Where, however, the
benefit of existing resources or
capabilities belonging to another are
desired that are reasonably anticipated
to contribute to the development effort,
then, at arm’s length, the supplier of
such resources or capabilities would not
contribute them absent appropriate
compensation.
d. Form of PCT Payment and Post
Formation Acquisitions—Proposed
§ 1.482–7(b)(3)(v) and (vi)
Under the proposed regulations, the
general rule is that the consideration

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owing pursuant to a PCT for an external
contribution, referred to as the PCT
Payments, may take the form of fixed
payments, payments contingent on the
exploitation of the cost shared
intangibles, or a combination of both.
The selected payment form must be
specified no later than the date of the
PCT. The payor of PCT Payments is
referred to as the PCT Payor, and the
payee is referred to as the PCT Payee.
In the case of resources or capabilities
developed, maintained, or acquired
prior to the time they are reasonably
concluded to contribute to developing
cost shared intangibles (for example,
resources or capabilities that predate the
CSA), the controlled participants have
the flexibility to structure PCT
Payments in any of the available forms,
subject to conforming to contractual
terms, economic substance, and the
parties’ conduct. See § 1.482–
1(d)(3)(ii)(B) (Identifying contractual
terms). A CSA generally contemplates
that the participants undertake costs
and risks in parallel and in proportion
to their RAB shares, but this result
cannot be achieved in the case of
external contributions that are the
product of previously incurred costs
and risks. So, for such resources or
capabilities, the proposed regulations
allow the controlled participants to
provide for the applicable payment form
by the date of the PCT.
A post formation acquisition (PFA) is
an external contribution representing
resources or capabilities acquired by a
controlled participant in an
uncontrolled transaction that takes
place after formation of the CSA and
that, as of the date of the acquisition, are
reasonably anticipated to contribute to
developing cost shared intangibles.
Resources or capabilities may be
acquired in a PFA either directly or
indirectly through the acquisition of an
interest in an entity or tier of entities.
The Treasury Department and the IRS
believe that the form of PCT Payments
for PFAs must be consistent with the
principle that allocations of cost and
risk among controlled participants after
a CSA has commenced should be in
proportion to their respective RAB
shares. Accordingly, the proposed
regulations provide that the
consideration under a PCT for a PFA
must follow the form of payment in the
uncontrolled transaction in which the
PFA was acquired. For example, if
subsequent to the formation of a CSA
one controlled participant makes a stock
acquisition of a target the assets of
which consist of resources and
capabilities reasonably anticipated as of
the date of the acquisition to contribute
to developing cost shared intangibles,

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the PCT Payment by each other
controlled participant must be in a lump
sum. To avoid the possibility that any
payments are inappropriately
characterized by the participants,
neither PCT Payments, nor cost sharing
payments, may be paid in shares of
stock in the payor.
e. Territorial Division of Interests—
Proposed § 1.482–7(b)(4)
Controlled participants in a CSA own
interests in the cost shared intangibles
and are able to exploit those intangibles
without any obligation to compensate
other participants (other than pursuant
to CSTs or PCTs). Controlled
participants must share intangible
development costs in proportion to their
reasonably anticipated benefits from
their individual exploitation of such
interests. Taxpayers have entered into
cost sharing arrangements in which the
controlled participants receive
nonexclusive, indivisible worldwide
interests in cost shared intangibles.
Taxpayers have taken the position
under the existing regulations that such
interests are susceptible to being
individually exploited, and that the
participants’ respective shares of
benefits from such exploitation are
susceptible to being reasonably
estimated.
The proposed regulations require that
controlled participants receive nonoverlapping territorial interests in the
cost shared intangibles that in the
aggregate utilize all the available
territories worldwide. The proposed
regulations also require that a controlled
participant be entitled to the perpetual
and exclusive right to cost shared
intangible profits of any other controlled
taxpayer in the same controlled group as
the participant from transactions with
uncontrolled taxpayers regarding
property or services for use,
consumption, or disposition within the
participant’s territory or territories. For
example, where one controlled
participant sells part of its output into
a territory belonging to another
controlled participant, the former must
pay the latter participant arm’s length
compensation to ensure that the
intangible profit on the sale is realized
by the latter participant. These
territoriality requirements facilitate the
ability to individually exploit, and
estimate the reasonably anticipated
benefits from individual exploitation of,
interests in cost shared intangibles. No
inference is intended as to the
permissibility of nonexclusive interests
under the existing regulations.
Comments are requested concerning
whether alternatives should be provided
to territorial division of interests in cost

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shared intangibles. Proposed
alternatives should further the goal of
dividing the universe of interests into
exclusive, non-overlapping segments to
promote measurability of anticipated
benefits and administrability both by
taxpayers and the IRS. Comments are
also requested about how to facilitate
attribution of sales to territories, or other
non-overlapping divisions of interests,
such as in the case of sales via
electronic commerce. Comments are
also requested on the division,
territorially or otherwise, of interests in
exploiting cost shared intangibles in
space.
f. CSAs in Substance or Form—
Proposed § 1.482–7(b)(5)
Pursuant to proposed § 1.482–
7(b)(5)(i), as under the existing
regulations, the Commissioner may,
consistently with § 1.482–1(d)(3)(ii)(B)
(Identifying contractual terms), apply
the § 1.482–7 rules to any arrangement
that in substance constitutes a CSA in
accordance with the three substantive
requirements enumerated in proposed
§ 1.482–7(b)(1)(i) through (iii),
notwithstanding a failure otherwise to
meet the § 1.482–7 requirements.
Provided a taxpayer has followed the
formal requirements enumerated in
proposed § 1.482–7(b)(1)(iv) through
(vii), the Commissioner must treat the
arrangement as a CSA if the taxpayer
reasonably concluded the arrangement
to be a CSA. The Commissioner may
also treat any other arrangement as a
CSA, if the taxpayer has followed such
formal requirements.
3. Exclusion of Make-or-Sell Rights—
Proposed § 1.482–7(c)
Disputes have arisen under the
existing regulations regarding the buy-in
related to a CSA to develop future
generations of an intangible that is being
exploited in its then current version by
the PCT Payee. For example, there may
be licenses of the current generation
intangible to uncontrolled taxpayers,
perhaps with certain rights to make
adaptations for their customers.
Taxpayers have asserted that a makeand-sell license of this type satisfies the
requirement for a buy-in in the CSA
under the current regulations. Such a
position misconstrues the existing
regulations, which focus the buy-in on
the availability of the pre-existing
intangibles ‘‘for purposes of research in
the intangible development area’’ under
the CSA. See § 1.482–7(g)(2).
The proposed regulations expressly
exclude from the scope of a CSA any
provision to the extent it relates to
exploiting an existing intangible
without further development, such as

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51121

the right to make or sell existing
products. The proposed regulations do,
however, allow the aggregate valuation
of controlled transactions relating to
make-or-sell rights with PCT Payments,
where such aggregate evaluation
provides a more reliable measure of an
arm’s length result than a separate
valuation of the transactions. See
proposed § 1.482–7(g)(2)(v).
4. Intangible Development Costs—
Proposed § 1.482–7(d)
The proposed regulations restate the
provisions defining intangible
development costs or IDCs that are
shared pursuant to CSTs under a CSA
to coordinate with the conceptual
framework of the proposed regulations
and with the stock-based compensation
provisions added in 2003.
As discussed, CSTs and PCTs are the
two major groupings of transactions
entered into pursuant to a CSA. In CSTs,
the controlled participants share all
ongoing costs of developing intangibles.
In contrast, in PCTs they compensate
one another for resources or capabilities
developed, maintained, or acquired
externally to the CSA (whether prior to
or during the course of the CSA). It is
necessary to define IDCs shared in CSTs
in a comprehensive manner that does
not overlap with the definition of
external contributions compensated in
PCTs.
The proposed regulations,
accordingly, define IDCs as all costs, in
cash or in kind (including stock-based
compensation), but excluding costs for
land and depreciable property, in the
ordinary course of business after the
formation of a CSA that, based on
analysis of the facts and circumstances,
are directly identified with, or are
reasonably allocable to, the IDA. The
IDA replaces the concept of the
intangible development area under the
existing regulations. The self-contained
IDC definition eliminates the need for
the cross-reference to operating
expenses as defined in § 1.482–5(d)(3) of
the existing regulations and thus
eliminates potential disputes over the
interaction of these sections.
The proposed regulations also avoid
overlapping definitions of IDCs and
external contributions. IDCs are limited
to costs in the ordinary course of
business incurred after the formation of
a CSA and that are directly identified
with, or reasonably allocable to, the
IDA. Thus, for example, the expected
value over and above ongoing
compensation and other costs of an
experienced research team would be
compensated by PCTs, but the ongoing
compensation and other costs of the
team attributable to the IDA would be

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IDCs shared in CSTs. Moreover, costs
for depreciable property, which under
section 197(f)(7) would include
amortization of any amortizable section
197 intangible, are carved out from
IDCs. Instead, to the extent such
intangibles are reasonably anticipated to
contribute to developing cost shared
intangibles, they would be compensated
in PCTs.
Land and depreciable tangible
property (for example, use of a
laboratory facility) would represent an
external contribution. The proposed
regulations, however, continue the
practical approach of the existing
regulations of treating the arm’s length
rental charge under § 1.482–2(c) (Use of
tangible property) for such land and
depreciable tangible property as IDCs,
since typically these items can be
readily valued.
In line with the direction in the 1986
legislative history to reflect ‘‘the actual
economic activity’’ undertaken pursuant
to a CSA, the proposed regulations
expressly provide that generally
accepted accounting principles or
federal income tax accounting rules may
provide a useful starting point, but will
not be conclusive regarding inclusion of
costs in IDCs. As under the existing
regulations, IDCs exclude interest
expense, foreign income taxes, and
domestic income taxes.
The balance of the proposed
regulations restate the existing
regulations with conforming changes in
light of the new terminology and
framework. Technical amendments
were made to the special transition rule
on time and manner of making the
election with respect to certain stockbased compensation and the
consistency rules for measurement and
timing with respect to such stock-based
compensation.
Except for such technical
amendments, these proposed
regulations incorporate the existing
provisions relating to the elective
method of measurement and timing
permitted with respect to certain
options on publicly traded stock.
However, the Treasury Department and
the IRS are considering extending
availability of the elective method to
other forms of publicly traded stockbased compensation. The Treasury
Department and the IRS request
comments on which forms of publicly
traded stock-based compensation
should be eligible for the elective
method.

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5. Reasonably Anticipated Benefits
Share (RAB Share)—Proposed § 1.482–
7(e)
Proposed § 1.482–7(e) restates existing
§ 1.482–7(f)(3)(i) through (iv)(A) with
some technical clarifications and
changes to conform to the new
terminology and framework. The
proposed regulations provide, as is
implicit in existing § 1.482–7(b)(3),
(e)(2), and (f)(3), that for purposes of
determining RAB shares at any given
time, reasonably anticipated benefits
must be estimated over the entire
period, past and future, of exploitation
of the cost shared intangibles, and must
reflect appropriate updates to take into
account the most current reliable data
regarding past and projected future
results as is available at such time.
6. Changes in Participation Under a
CSA—Proposed § 1.482–7(f)
Proposed § 1.482–7(f) replaces
existing § 1.482–7(g)(3) and (4), as well
as the third and fourth sentences of
existing § 1.482–7(g)(1). This provision
clarifies the application of the rules of
§ 1.482–7 in the event of a change in
participation under a CSA. A change in
participation includes the transfer
between controlled participants of all or
part of a participant’s territorial rights
coupled with the assumption by the
transferee of the associated obligations
under the CSA, the entry into a CSA of
a new controlled participant that
acquires any territorial rights and
associated obligations under the CSA,
and the withdrawal of a controlled
participant or other relinquishment or
abandonment of territorial rights and
associated obligations under the CSA. In
the event of a change in participation,
the transferee of the territorial rights and
associated obligations under the CSA
succeeds to the transferor’s prior history
under the CSA, including IDCs borne,
benefits derived, and compensation
expenditures pursuant to any PCTs. The
transferor must receive an arm’s length
amount of consideration from the
transferee under the rules of §§ 1.482–1
and 1.482–4 through 1.482–6.
Proposed § 1.482–7(e)(2)(i) provides
that in the case of transfers of cost
shared intangibles between controlled
participants, other than by way of a
change in participation described in
proposed § 1.482–7(f), the transferor’s
benefits for purposes of RAB share
determination are measured on a lookthrough basis with reference to the
transferee’s benefits, disregarding any
consideration paid by the transferee
(such as a royalty pursuant to a license
agreement).

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C. Supplemental Guidance on Methods
Applicable to PCTs
The Treasury Department and the IRS
recognize that taxpayers and the IRS
need additional guidance on the
appropriate methods for valuation of
external contributions to a CSA. A
typical challenge to valuing nonroutine
intangibles is the uncertainty as to the
profitability of their exploitation. In the
case of a CSA, however, there is also the
uncertainty whether and to what extent
any intangible will be successfully
developed under the CSA. Accordingly,
proposed § 1.482–7(g) provides
supplemental guidance on evaluating
external contributions compensated by
PCTs, including general principles for
specified and unspecified methods,
guidance on the application of existing
specified methods, and new specified
methods.
The investor model informs the
guidance on valuation. The guidance
generally aims at valuation of the
amount charged in a PCT such that a
controlled participant’s aggregate net
investment in a CSA attributable to cost
contributions and external contributions
may be expected to earn a return
appropriate to the riskiness of the CSA.
1. General Rule—Proposed § 1.482–
7(g)(1)
As discussed, PCTs are one of two
major categories of transactions (the
other being CSTs) entered into pursuant
to a CSA. In PCTs, the controlled
participants compensate one another for
their respective external contributions
that they bring into a CSA, that is, the
resources or capabilities they have
developed, maintained, or acquired
externally to (whether prior to or during
the course of) the CSA that are
reasonably anticipated to contribute to
developing cost shared intangibles.
Pursuant to § 1.482–1(b)(2), different
sections of the section 482 regulations
apply to different types of transactions,
such as transfers of tangible and
intangible property, services, loans or
advances, and rentals. The method or
methods most appropriate to the
calculation of arm’s length results for
controlled transactions in each category
must be selected. When interrelated
controlled transactions are of different
types, the participants, depending on
what produces the most reliable means
of measuring arm’s length results, may
either (1) apply different methods to the
different transactions or (2) aggregate
the transactions for valuation purposes.
See also § 1.482–1(f)(2)(i) and proposed
§ 1.482–7(g)(2)(v) regarding aggregation
of transactions.

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A key concept in valuing PCTs is the
RT. The RT is a transaction providing
the benefit of all rights, exclusively and
perpetually, in a resource or capability
that is the subject of the external
contribution, apart from the rights to
exploit an existing intangible without
further development. If in fact, the
resource or capability is reasonably
anticipated to contribute both to
developing or exploiting cost shared
intangibles and to other business
activities of a PCT Payee, the proposed
regulations provide that the otherwise
applicable value of the relevant PCT
Payments may need to be prorated
between the CSA and any other
business activities on a reasonable basis
that reflects the relative economic
values of the different business
activities.
For purposes of the selection of the
category of method applicable to a
controlled transaction pursuant to
§ 1.482–1(b)(2)(ii), proposed § 1.482–
7(b)(3)(iii) provides that the applicable
method used to determine the
compensation for a PCT shall reflect the
type of transaction of the RT. For
example, in the case of an external
contribution consisting of an in-process
intangible, the RT could be a transfer of
intangibles generally to be evaluated
pursuant to §§ 1.482–1 and 1.482–4
through 1.482–6. As a further example,
in the case of an external contribution
consisting of an experienced research
team in place, the RT could be the
provision of services generally to be
evaluated pursuant to § 1.482–2(b). If
different economically equivalent types
of RTs are possible with respect to the
relevant resource or capability, the
controlled participants may designate
the type of transaction involved in the
RT.
Proposed § 1.482–7(a)(2) provides that
the arm’s length amount charged in a
PCT must be determined pursuant to the
method or methods applicable to the RT
under the relevant provision or
provisions of the section 482 regulations
(as those methods are supplemented by
proposed § 1.482–7(g)). Such method
will yield a value for the obligation of
each obligor in the PCT (PCT Payor)
consistent with the product of the
combined value to all controlled
participants of the external contribution
that is the subject of the PCT multiplied
by the PCT Payor’s RAB share. Although
some specified and unspecified
methods may involve measuring PCT
Payments with reference to the value of
exploiting cost shared intangibles in one
or more controlled participants’
territories, the application of such
methods must still yield a value that is
consistent with the foregoing RAB share

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of the total value of the external
contribution to all controlled
participants.
Proposed § 1.482–7(g) sets forth new
specified methods for purposes of
determining the arm’s length
compensation due under a PCT, namely,
the income method, the acquisition
price method, and the market
capitalization method. The proposed
regulations also provide rules for
application of existing specified
methods, such as the comparable
uncontrolled transaction method and
the residual profit method. The
proposed regulations also enunciate
general principles governing all
methods, specified and unspecified, for
these purposes. Proposed § 1.482–7(g)(1)
provides that each method must be
applied in accordance with the
provisions of § 1.482–1, including the
best method rule of § 1.482–1(c), the
comparability analysis of § 1.482–1(d),
and the arm’s length range of § 1.482–
1(e), except as those provisions are
modified in § 1.482–7(g).
2. General Principles—Proposed
§ 1.482–7(g)(2)
a. In General—Proposed § 1.482–
7(g)(2)(i)
The proposed regulations provide
general principles for valuing PCT
Payments, applicable for both specified
and unspecified methods.
b. Valuation Consistent With Upfront
Contractual Terms and Risk
Allocations—Proposed § 1.482–
7(g)(2)(ii)
Existing § 1.482–1(d)(3)(ii) and (iii)
generally provide that contractual terms
and risk allocations are significant
factors in evaluating the most reliable
measure of arm’s length results. The
proposed regulations provide for
particular contractual terms and
allocations of risk with regard to PCTs
determined no later than the date of the
PCT. See, for example, proposed
§ 1.482–7(b)(1)(ii), (b)(3), and (k)(1).
Proposed § 1.482–7(g)(ii) accordingly
reiterates the requirement that any
method applied at any time for purposes
of valuing PCT Payments must be
consistent with the applicable
contractual terms and allocation of risk
under the CSA and proposed § 1.482–7
as of the date of a PCT, unless there has
been a change in such terms or
allocation made in return for arm’s
length consideration.
It may be particularly important to
maintain consistency with upfront
contractual terms and allocation of risk
for CSAs, since PCT Payments may
extend over a period of years. Thus, for

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example, PCT Payments may become
due in subsequent years when actual
economic results may have departed
from those reasonably anticipated as of
the date of the PCT. Subject to the
Commissioner’s ability to make periodic
adjustments (see proposed § 1.482–
7(i)(6)), the method for determining the
PCT Payments due in the subsequent
year must remain consistent with the
contractual terms and allocation of risks
as of the date of the PCT. Cost sharing
participants, like unrelated investors,
are held to the terms of their deal at the
outset of the investment. For example,
under the proposed income method,
this upfront contractual-risk consistency
principle is illustrated by the use of the
applicable rate on sales or profits
determined as of the date of the PCT.
Thus, while actual sales or profits may
depart from projections, the upfront risk
allocation continues to be respected by
use of the applicable rate determined as
of the date of the PCT. Note, while a
taxpayer may defend the amount of its
PCT Payment in a subsequent year as
arm’s length based on a different
method than that applied in earlier
years, it may only do so to the extent the
other method also satisfies the upfront
contractual-risk consistency principle.
Proposed § 1.482–7(b)(3)(vi) provides
that the form of payment for a PCT must
be specified no later than the date of the
PCT. The form of payment of a PCT, that
is, fixed and/or contingent payments,
involves an allocation of risk among the
controlled participants. In the case of
PCT Payments regarding a PFA, the
form of payment in the uncontrolled
acquisition must be followed. However,
in the case of other PCT Payments, the
taxpayer has flexibility in the choice of
form, subject to economic substance and
the parties’ conduct.
As the result of the upfront
contractual-risk consistency principle, it
will be possible for the taxpayer to
compute a present value, as of the date
of the PCT, of the total arm’s length
amount of all PCT Payments. Under the
CSA documentation requirements in
proposed § 1.482–7(k)(2)(ii)(J)(6) and
(k)(2)(iii)(B), the taxpayer is required to
maintain documentation of such upfront
valuation and produce it to the IRS
within 30 days of a request.
c. Projections—Proposed § 1.482–
7(g)(2)(iii)
Since PCT Payments often extend
over a period of years and may be
contingent on items (for example, sales,
costs, and operating profit) in such
future periods, the valuation method,
specified or unspecified, may rely on
projections of such items. The reliability
of the valuation method will in such

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cases depend on the reliability of such
projections. The proposed regulations
provide that, for these purposes,
projections that have been prepared for
non-tax purposes are generally more
reliable than projections that have been
prepared solely for purposes of PCT
Payment valuations.
d. Realistic Alternatives—Proposed
§ 1.482–7(g)(2)(iv)
Regardless of the method or methods
used, evaluation of the arm’s length
charge for a PCT should take into
account the general principle that
uncontrolled taxpayers dealing at arm’s
length would evaluate the terms of a
transaction, and would enter into a
particular transaction only if none of the
alternatives is preferable. See § 1.482–
1(d)(3)(iv)(H) (The alternatives
realistically available to the buyer and
seller). Based on that principle, PCT
valuations would not meet the foregoing
condition where, for any controlled
participant, the total anticipated value,
as of the date of the PCT, is less than
the total anticipated value that could
have been achieved through a
realistically available alternative
investment (whether it is an alternative
arrangement for the development of the
cost shared intangibles or an alternative
with a similar risk profile to the CSA).
In other words, a controlled participant,
like any rational investor, would not
enter into an investment when a better
alternative investment is available.
Examples are provided illustrating the
application of the realistic alternatives
principle in the CSA context.
e. Aggregation of Transactions—
Proposed § 1.482–7(g)(2)(v)
The proposed regulations provide that
multiple PCTs, or one or more PCTs and
one or more transactions not governed
by proposed § 1.482–7 (such as a makeor-sell license excluded from CSA
coverage by proposed § 1.482–7(c)), may
be aggregated for purposes of valuation,
subject to consideration of whether such
aggregate valuation yields a more
reliable measure of an arm’s length
result than would separate valuations.
See also § 1.482–1(f)(2)(i) (Aggregation
of transactions). For example, assume
the CSA involves a PCT for an external
contribution of an existing intangible for
purposes of developing future
generations of the intangible. Also
assume that there is a license to the
other controlled participants of makeand-sell rights with respect to the
current generation of the intangible. The
reliability of an aggregate analysis of the
PCT and the license will be affected by
the degree to which the relative current
exploitation benefits from the existing

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intangible of the controlled participants
may be expected to match up with the
RAB shares regarding exploitation of the
future generations of the intangible.
Though it will not generally be
necessary to allocate a reliable aggregate
arm’s length charge as between the
various transactions, in certain cases
such an allocation may be necessary, for
example, in applying the periodic
adjustment rules in proposed § 1.482–
7(i)(6).
f. Discount Rate—Proposed § 1.482–
7(g)(2)(vi)
Specified and unspecified methods
for valuing PCT Payments may involve
converting future or past monetary sums
into a present value as of the date of a
PCT. The proposed regulations
recognize that there may be different
risks and, hence, different discount rates
associated with different activities
undertaken by a taxpayer. Consistent
with the investor model, for items
relating to a CSA, the discount rate
employed should be that which most
appropriately reflects, as of the date of
the PCT, the risks of development and
exploitation of the intangibles
anticipated to result from the CSA. In
other words, this follows the approach
that unrelated investors would take to
making an ex ante evaluation of a
prospective investment. Namely, the
expected value of the investment would
equal the projected future cash flows
discounted using a discount rate that
appropriately reflects the anticipated
level of risk being undertaken.
The proposed regulations enumerate
several possibilities for choosing an
appropriate discount rate. Where there
are publicly traded entities that would
be comparables dedicated to similar
development and exploitation activities,
their weighted average cost of capital
(WACC) may provide a reliable basis for
derivation of an appropriate discount
rate. Or, if the taxpayer’s group’s
activities are dedicated to development
and exploitation of the contemplated
cost shared intangibles, then the
taxpayer’s own WACC may provide a
reliable basis for derivation of an
appropriate discount rate. In other
cases, depending upon the facts and
circumstances, a taxpayer’s internal
hurdle rate for investments having a
comparable risk profile may provide a
reliable basis for derivation of an
appropriate discount rate.
g. Accounting Principles—Proposed
§ 1.482–7(g)(2)(vii)
The proposed regulations provide
that, while allocations and valuations
for accounting purposes may provide a
useful starting point, they will not be

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determinative of PCT Payments to the
extent that the accounting treatment is
not consistent with economic value. For
example, with respect to an acquisition
of a target business consisting of wanted
assets (that are reasonably anticipated to
contribute to developing cost shared
intangibles) and of unwanted assets
(that will be abandoned immediately
after the acquisition), an allocation of a
portion of the acquisition price to the
abandoned assets done for accounting
purposes, under the proposed
regulations, would not prevent the
proper allocation of the entire
acquisition price, in line with economic
reality, to the wanted assets for
purposes of PCT Payment valuation.
Similarly, with respect to an acquisition
of a target business consisting only of an
in-process intangible and an
experienced research team in place, an
allocation of a portion of the acquisition
price to ‘‘goodwill’’ for accounting
purposes would not, under the
proposed regulations, prevent the
proper allocation of the entire
acquisition price, in line with the
economic reality, to the in-process
intangible and experienced research
team in place for purposes of PCT
Payment valuation. On the other hand,
if the target conducts an operating
business with exploitation already at an
advanced stage of the current generation
of the intangible to be further developed
under the CSA, then an accounting
allocation to goodwill may suggest the
need for further consideration of the
reliability of an acquisition price
method for valuing an external
contribution whose value excluded the
value of such existing goodwill.
h. Valuation Consistent With the
Investor Model—Proposed § 1.482–
7(g)(2)(viii)
As has been discussed, the proposed
regulations require that PCT valuations
be consistent with an investor model for
cost sharing. Under the investor model,
the amount charged in a PCT must be
consistent with the assumption that
each controlled participant is making a
net aggregate investment, as of the date
of a PCT, attributable to both external
contributions and cost contributions, for
purposes of achieving an anticipated
return appropriate to the risks of the
CSA over the entire term of
development and exploitation of the
intangibles resulting from the CSA.
The investor model is based on two
key principles regarding PCT
valuations. The first principle is that, ex
ante, the aggregate investment in an IDA
would be expected to yield a rate return
equal to the appropriate discount rate
for the CSA. If the anticipated rate of

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return exceeds the appropriate discount
rate for the CSA, either anticipated
profits have been overstated or the
amount of investment has been
understated. If the projections of IDCs
and profits are reliable, then the
implication could be that the portion of
the investment attributable to external
contributions has been undervalued.
Thus, a valuation method for PCTs is
less likely to be reliable if it results in
a rate of return to any controlled
participant’s aggregate investment that
is not equal to the appropriate discount
rate for the CSA.
The second principle is that, ex ante,
the appropriate return to the aggregate
investment in an IDA is measured over
the entire period of development and
exploitation of cost shared intangibles.
Included in this principle is the concept
that no part of the investment should be
viewed as separately earning a return
over a more limited period. As a general
matter, successful completion of each
step in a research program is a necessary
condition for the completion of the
program as a whole and its contribution
continues over the entire life of the
project. As an example, a project to
develop a new commercial aircraft
would not be considered successfully
completed if all parts of the aircraft had
been designed except the tail assembly.
Neither does the fact that the tail
assembly is completed last imply that
its usefulness in the manufacture and
sale of aircraft extends beyond the
usefulness of any components
completed earlier in the design process.
Each step of the project continues to
have value as long as the aircraft
continues to be built and used. For this
reason, each aspect of the research
program must be viewed as contributing
to the success of the program as a whole
(and not just its success for some
limited period of time). Thus, a
valuation method for PCTs is likely to
be less reliable if it assumes a useful life
for any contribution to the CSA that
does not extend through the entire
anticipated period of development and
exploitation.
The IRS has examined cases in which
CSAs were entered into to utilize
current generation intangibles as the
base or platform for future generation
intangibles, with buy-ins structured as
declining royalties over the limited
useful life of the current generation
intangible. The structure of these buyins effectively diminish the value of the
buy-in payments, such that the return to
a controlled participant making the
depressed buy-in payments has an
expected return significantly in excess
of the appropriate discount rate for the
CSA. Furthermore, a buy-in based on

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declining royalties over a shortened
useful life for the contributed
intangibles, on its face, is not consistent
with the principle that the return to the
aggregate investment in an IDA should
be measured over the entire period of
development and exploitation of cost
shared intangibles.
i. Coordination of Best Method Rule and
Form of Payment—Proposed § 1.482–
7(g)(2)(ix)
Any method for valuing the amount
charged in a PCT under the proposed
regulations, whether specified or
unspecified, will assume a particular
form of payment (method payment
form) for PCT Payments. For example,
as will be discussed, the proposed
income method assumes contingent
payments in the form of an applicable
rate on sales or profits, and the market
capitalization method assumes a lump
sum method payment form. Except for
PCT Payments in respect of PFAs, the
proposed regulations allow taxpayers to
convert the reasonably anticipated
present value, as of the date of the PCT,
of the total arm’s length amount of all
PCT Payments determined under the
method payment form into another form
of payment (specified payment form).
For purposes of the best method rule of
§ 1.482–1(c), the analysis among
competing methods will be undertaken
without regard to whether their method
payment forms corresponds to the
taxpayer’s specified payment form for
PCT Payments. A best method analysis
determines which valuation method is
most reliable from the perspective of
comparability, completeness and
accuracy of the data, and reliability of
the underlying assumptions. If the
method payment form of the best
method determined under this analysis
differs from the taxpayer’s specified
payment form, then the Commissioner
will effect a conversion of the best
method results into the specified
payment form on a reasonable basis,
giving due regard to the taxpayer’s
conversion basis if the taxpayer’s
method was determined to be the best
method as to its method payment form.
j. Coordination of the Valuations of
Prior and Subsequent PCTs—Proposed
§ 1.482–7(g)(2)(x)
Cases may arise where, after the date
of one PCT, another PCT is required for
other resources or capabilities of a
controlled participant which only as of
a subsequent date are reasonably
anticipated to contribute to the
development of cost shared intangibles
and therefore are external contributions
only as of such subsequent date. In such
cases where there are PCTs with

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different dates, coordination of the
valuations of the prior and subsequent
PCTs must be effected pursuant to a
method that provides the most reliable
measure of an arm’s length result.
In some instances the coordination
will be straightforward. As an example,
in the case of a subsequent PCT entered
into with respect to a PFA, the PCT
Payments are determined based on the
related acquisition, independent of any
prior PCT. For purposes of determining
PCT Payments under a prior PCT, the
proposed regulations provide that the
PCT Payments with respect to the
subsequent PCT in this case are treated
the same as unanticipated IDCs. A
divergence between actual IDCs and
IDCs anticipated on the date of a PCT
does not change the method for
determining PCT Payments with respect
to that PCT. Accordingly, unanticipated
payments under a subsequent PCT
entered into with respect to a PFA will
not affect the method for determining
PCT Payments in respect of a prior PCT.
The coordination in other cases will
depend on the facts and circumstances.
If the external contributions that were
the subjects of the respective prior and
subsequent PCTs were nonroutine
contributions, an approach which may
be appropriate would be to determine
PCT Payments both for the prior and
subsequent PCTs going forward from the
date of the subsequent PCT pursuant to
a residual profit split method, as
described in proposed § 1.482–7(g)(7).
Such application of the residual profit
split method would include as
nonroutine contributions all of the
following: the external contribution(s)
that were the subject of the prior PCT(s),
the external contribution that is the
subject of the subsequent PCT, and the
interests of the controlled participants
in the portion of cost shared intangibles
in process of development under the
CSA that does not reflect any external
contributions.
k. Proration of PCT Payments to the
Extent Allocable to Other Business
Activities—Proposed § 1.482–7(g)(2)(xi)
The proposed regulations provide that
the otherwise applicable value of PCT
Payments may need to be prorated
between the CSA and any other
business activities (other than current
make-or-sell activities) to which the
resource or capability that is the subject
of the PCT is reasonably anticipated to
contribute as of the date of the PCT. A
proration will only be necessary if the
method used for valuing the PCT
Payment includes the value of the
contribution of the resource or
capability to the other business
activities. For example, an application

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of the acquisition price method is based
on the full value of a resource or
capability and therefore includes the
value of any contributions to other
business activities, whereas the CUT
and CPM applications of the income
method are based only on the sales or
profits of exploiting cost shared
intangibles, and therefore do not
include any value of contributions to
other business activities. For purposes
of the best method rule under § 1.482–
1(c), the reliability of the analysis under
a method that requires proration is
reduced relative to the reliability of an
analysis under a method that does not
require proration. Any proration must
be done on a reasonable basis that
reflects the relative economic values of
the different business activities.
3. Comparable Uncontrolled
Transaction (CUT) Method—Proposed
§ 1.482–7(g)(3)
The comparable uncontrolled
transaction (CUT) method described in
§ 1.482–4(c), and the arm’s length
charge described in § 1.482–2(b)(3)(first
sentence) based on a comparable
uncontrolled transaction, may be
applied to evaluate whether the amount
charged in a PCT is arm’s length by
reference to the amount charged in a
comparable uncontrolled transaction.
When applied in the manner described
in § 1.482–4(c), or where a comparable
uncontrolled transaction provides the
most reliable measure of the arm’s
length charge described in § 1.482–
2(b)(3)(first sentence), the CUT method,
or the arm’s length charge in the
comparable uncontrolled transaction,
will typically yield an arm’s length total
value for the external contribution that
is the subject of the PCT. That value
must then be multiplied by each PCT
Payor’s respective RAB share in order to
determine the arm’s length PCT
Payment due from each PCT Payor. A
territorial CUT may also be reliably used
to the extent the value of the PCT
Payment under the territorial CUT is
consistent with the RAB share of the
worldwide external contribution value.
4. Income Method—Proposed § 1.482–
7(g)(4)
The income method, a new specified
method under the proposed regulations,
follows from the realistic alternatives
principle. The income method
determines PCT Payments in amounts
such that the present value, as of the
date of the PCT, to a controlled
participant of entering into a CSA
equals the present value of the PCT
Payee’s best realistic alternative.
The proposed regulations provide two
specific (but nonexclusive) applications

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of the income method, one based on the
comparable uncontrolled transaction
(CUT) method of § 1.482–4(c), and the
other based on the comparable profit
method (CPM) of § 1.482–5. These
applications may include certain
simplifying assumptions and are meant
to provide examples of possible
applications of the general income
method, not to exclude other possible
applications of this method. Both
applications compute the arm’s length
PCT Payment for each year as the
product of an applicable rate on sales or
profit. The applicable rate is equal to
the alternative rate less the cost
contribution adjustment. The alternative
rate represents the rate on sales or profit
which the PCT Payee could have earned
by exploiting cost shared intangibles in
the PCT Payor’s territory if the PCT
Payee alone had borne the risks and
costs of developing the cost share
intangibles. The CUT application
determines the alternative rate from the
perspective of a licensor as the royalty
rate it would have charged under a
license to exploit the cost shared
intangibles in the territory, based on
comparable third party license
arrangements. The CPM application
determines the alternative rate from the
perspective of a licensee as the royalty
rate it would have paid such that it
earned only a market return for its
routine contributions to the exploitation
of the cost shared intangibles, based on
comparable returns earned by
uncontrolled taxpayers engaged in
similar routine activities. The cost
contribution adjustment is the reduction
of the alternative rate to reflect the
anticipated costs and risks the PCT
Payor will take on by entering into the
CSA.
The income method is typically used
in cases where only one controlled
participant, namely the PCT Payee,
brings nonroutine contributions into the
CSA. In such circumstances, the other
controlled participant or participants,
that is, the PCT Payors, essentially only
commit to bearing their respective
shares of anticipated IDCs and bring
only routine contributions for purposes
of exploiting cost shared intangibles.
Under the investor model, what is
essentially a routine financing
investment by the PCT Payors in the
development of intangibles, represented
by bearing their share of anticipated
IDCs, would be expected to earn an ex
ante rate of return appropriate to the
risks associated with the CSA and
reflected in the discount rate. The cost
contribution adjustment effectively
represents the appropriate return to that
routine financing investment, as of the

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date of the PCT, expressed as a rate on
sales or profit.
The use of the applicable rate on sales
or profit, determined as of the date of
the PCT under the income method, also
reflects the principle of consistency
with the original contractual allocation
of risk. Thus, while actual sales may
depart from projections, the upfront risk
allocation continues to be respected by
use of the applicable rate determined as
of the date of the PCT.
Under the CUT and CPM applications
of the income method, any routine
contributions that are external
contributions (routine external
contributions) are treated similarly to
cost contributions.
The reliability of the income method
may decrease if more than one
controlled participant brings nonroutine
contributions into the CSA.
5. Acquisition Price Method—Proposed
§ 1.482–7(g)(5)
The acquisition price method is an
application of the CUT method pursuant
to § 1.482–4(c) and the arm’s length
charge pursuant to § 1.482–2(b)(3). This
method ordinarily applies only when
substantially all of the nonroutine
resources and capabilities of a recently
acquired target’s business constitute
external contributions, that is, they are
reasonably anticipated to contribute to
developing cost shared intangibles.
Thus, when these circumstances are
present, this method may be expected to
be appropriate for valuing PCT
Payments for PFAs.
Under the acquisition price method,
the arm’s length charge to each PCT
Payor is the product of the adjusted
acquisition price, multiplied by such
PCT Payor’s RAB share. The adjusted
acquisition price seeks to isolate that
portion of the acquisition price of the
target business attributable to the
external contributions. The adjusted
acquisition price is equal to the
acquisition price of the target, increased
by relevant liabilities, and decreased by
the value of tangible property
(separately accounted for under
proposed § 1.482–7(d)) and by the value
of any other resources and capabilities
not covered by PCTs. The reliability of
this method is reduced to the extent the
acquisition price must be adjusted to
take into account significant difficult-tovalue tangible property or resources or
capabilities of the target not covered by
a PCT.
6. Market Capitalization Method—
Proposed § 1.482–7(g)(6)
The market capitalization method is
also an application of the CUT method
pursuant to § 1.482–4(c) and the arm’s

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length charge pursuant to § 1.482–
2(b)(3). This method ordinarily applies
only when substantially all of the
nonroutine resources and capabilities of
the PCT Payee’s business constitute
external contributions, that is, they are
reasonably anticipated to contribute to
developing cost shared intangibles.
Under the market capitalization
method, the arm’s length charge to each
PCT Payor is the product of the adjusted
average market capitalization,
multiplied by such PCT Payor’s RAB
share. The adjusted average market
capitalization seeks to determine that
portion of the market capitalization of
the PCT Payee’s business attributable to
the external contributions. The adjusted
average market capitalization is equal to
the 60-day (ending on the date of the
PCT) average of the daily market
capitalizations of the PCT Payee,
increased by liabilities, and decreased
by the value of tangible property
separately accounted for under
proposed § 1.482–7(d) and by the value
of any other resources and capabilities
not covered by PCTs. The daily market
capitalization is calculated on each day
the PCT Payee’s stock is actively traded
as the total number of shares
outstanding multiplied by the stock’s
closing price on that day (as adjusted,
for example, for dividends, stock splits,
and restructurings to the extent such
adjustment can be done reliably). The
reliability of this method is reduced to
the extent the market capitalization
must be adjusted to take into account
significant difficult to value tangible
property or resources or capabilities of
the target not covered by a PCT. The
reliability of this method is also reduced
to the extent the facts and circumstances
demonstrate the likelihood of a material
divergence between the average market
capitalization of the PCT Payee and the
value of its resources and capabilities
for which reliable adjustments cannot
be made.
7. Residual Profit Split Method—
Proposed § 1.482–7(g)(7)
The proposed regulations provide
needed guidance on the proper
application of the residual profit split
method (RPSM) of § 1.482–6 in the
context of the development and
exploitation of intangibles pursuant to a
CSA. The guidance is necessary in order
to implement the general principles of
proposed § 1.482–7(g)(2), such as
consistency with the upfront contractual
terms and risk allocation under the CSA
and with the investor model. A
purported application of RPSM not in
accordance with this guidance would
constitute an unspecified method for

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purposes of the sections 482 and 6662(e)
and (h) regulations.
Under the proposed regulations, the
RPSM may not be applied where only
one controlled participant makes
significant nonroutine contributions to
the development and exploitation of
cost shared intangibles. (An RPSM in
such a situation would be logically
equivalent to the income method using
an applicable rate on profit, and is best
considered under that method.) The
RPSM divides operating profit or loss
before any expense or amortization on
account of IDCs, routine external
contributions, and nonroutine
contributions, from developing and
exploiting cost shared intangibles in a
controlled participant’s territory
(territorial operating profit or loss) in
three steps.
In the first step of the RPSM, each
controlled participant is allocated an
amount of income that is subtracted
from its territorial operating profit or
loss to provide a market return to its
routine contributions, other than cost
contributions (that is, a controlled
participant’s IDCs borne, gross of cost
sharing payments made, and net of cost
sharing payments received).
In the second step of the RPSM, each
controlled participant is allocated a
portion of the residual of its territorial
profit or loss, after the first step
allocation, attributable to its cost
contributions. The second step cost
contribution share is a fraction of such
residual operating profit or loss. The
numerator is the present value,
determined as of the date of the PCTs,
of the summation, over the entire period
of developing and exploiting cost shared
intangibles, of the total value of the
territorial owner’s total anticipated cost
contributions. The denominator of the
territorial owner’s cost contribution
fraction is the present value, determined
as of the date of the PCTs, of the
summation, over the same period, of the
territorial owner’s total anticipated
territorial operating profits, reduced by
a market return for routine contributions
(other than cost contributions) to the
relevant business activity in the
territory.
The cost contribution share under the
second step of the RPSM corresponds to
the cost contribution adjustment under
the income method. The cost
contribution share under the RPSM,
similar to the cost contribution
adjustment under the income method, is
a reflection of the investor model. What
is essentially a routine financing
investment in the development of
intangibles by the controlled
participants, represented by bearing
their share of anticipated IDCs, would

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be expected to earn a return appropriate
to the risks associated with the CSA.
The cost contribution share effectively
represents the appropriate return to that
financing investment, as of the date of
the PCTs, expressed as a share of
territorial operating profit or loss.
In the third step of the RPSM, the
residual territorial profit or loss
remaining after the first and second step
allocations is divided among all the
controlled participants based on the
relative value, as of the date of the PCTs,
of their nonroutine contributions. The
relative value of the nonroutine
contributions may be measured with
reference to external benchmarks that
reflect their fair market value, or with
reference to estimated capitalized
development costs as appropriately
grown or discounted so that all
contributions may be valued on a
comparable dollar base as of the date of
the PCTs.
Any amount of a controlled
participant’s territorial operating profit
that is allocated to another controlled
participant’s nonroutine external
contributions under the third step of the
RPSM represents the amount of the PCT
Payment due to that other controlled
participant for its external
contributions.
Under the RPSM, the determinations
as of the date of the PCT of the second
step cost contribution share and the
third step relative nonroutine
contribution values reflect the principle
of consistency with the original
contractual allocation of risk. Thus,
while actual territorial operating profit
or loss may depart from projections, the
upfront risk allocation continues to be
respected through the use of the cost
contribution shares and relative
nonroutine contribution values
determined as of the date of the PCTs.
In applying the RPSM, any routine
contributions that are external
contributions (routine external
contributions) are treated similarly to
cost contributions.
The proposed regulations set forth
comparability and reliability
considerations appropriate for
application of the RPSM in the CSA
context.
8. Unspecified Methods—Proposed
§ 1.482–7(g)(8)
The proposed regulations also provide
general rules applicable for methods not
specified in proposed § 1.482–7(g)(3)
through (7).
D. Coordination With the Arm’s Length
Standard—Proposed § 1.482–7(h)
Transactions in connection with a
CSA must produce results consistent

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with the arm’s length standard. The
proposed regulations, therefore, dispel
the misconception that cost sharing is a
safe harbor.
In accordance with § 1.482–1(b)(1),
the proposed regulations provide
guidance appropriate in the context of a
CSA regarding ‘‘the results that would
have been realized if uncontrolled
taxpayers had engaged in the same
transaction under the same
circumstances.’’ (Emphasis added.) In a
CSA where the resulting intangibles
may only be exploited in a controlled
participant’s territory, the arm’s length
result would require a participant to
bear IDCs only in proportion to the
expected relative values of its territory,
that is, in proportion to its respective
RAB shares. The same is true for PCTs.
Where a controlled participant brings
external contributions into the
arrangement, at arm’s length that
participant would only agree to make
the external contributions if it received
compensation from the other
participants for the anticipated benefits
to their respective territories attributable
to the external contributions.
Therefore, the proposed regulations
provide that a CSA, and the CSTs and
PCTs required in connection with a
CSA, produce results that are consistent
with an arm’s length result within the
meaning of § 1.482–1(b) if, and only if,
each controlled participant’s IDC share
equals its RAB share, and all other
requirements are satisfied, including
those with respect to PCT Payments.
The Treasury Department and IRS
recognize that a CSA, as defined,
represents only one possible
arrangement pursuant to which parties
may choose to share the costs, risks, and
benefits of intangible development.
Other arrangements, however, may
involve a different division of costs,
risks, and benefits than those arising
pursuant to a CSA. Given such
differences, the guidance under § 1.482–
7 is not appropriate to evaluate what
would have been arm’s length results of
those other arrangements when
undertaken among controlled taxpayers.
As discussed, in such cases the
proposed regulations instead would
point taxpayers to the guidance under
the other provisions of the section 482
regulations to determine whether such
arrangements achieve arm’s length
results.

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E. Allocations by the Commissioner in
Connection With CSAs—Proposed
§ 1.482–7(i)
1. Consolidation of Existing Allocation
Provisions—Proposed § 1.482–7(i)(1)
Through (4)
Proposed § 1.482–7(i) assembles in
one section, provisions regarding
allocations by the Commissioner that
currently are spread throughout existing
§ 1.482–7, with conforming changes to
reflect the terminology and framework
of the proposed regulations. Thus,
under § 1.482–7(i)(1), the Commissioner
is generally authorized to make
allocations to adjust the results of a
controlled transaction in connection
with a CSA so that the results are
consistent with an arm’s length result.
Under proposed § 1.482–7(i)(2), the
Commissioner may make appropriate
adjustments to CSTs to bring IDC shares
in line with RAB shares. Such
adjustments include adding or removing
costs from IDCs, allocating costs
between the IDA and other business
activities, improving the reliability of
the benefits measurement basis used or
the projections used to estimate RAB
shares, and allocating among the
controlled participants any unallocated
territorial interests in cost shared
intangibles. CST adjustments must be
reflected in the year in which the IDCs
are incurred, along with any appropriate
allocation of arm’s length interest to the
date of payment.
Under proposed § 1.482–7(i)(3), the
Commissioner may make appropriate
allocations to adjust PCT Payments in
accordance with the proposed
regulations. Thus, the Commissioner
may examine the taxpayer’s method for
determining the amount charged in a
PCT in accordance with the provisions
of the section 482 regulations as
supplemented by proposed § 1.482–7(g).
The Commissioner may either propose
adjustments to the taxpayer’s method or
apply another method to adjust the
results reported by the taxpayer
consistent with an arm’s length result.
Under proposed § 1.482–7(i)(4), the
Commissioner may make appropriate
allocations regarding changes in
participation in accordance with
proposed § 1.482–7(f).
2. Allocations When CSTs Are
Consistently and Materially
Disproportionate to RAB Shares—
Proposed § 1.482–7(i)(5)
The fundamental requirement of a
CSA with regard to CSTs is for the
controlled participants to share IDCs in
proportion to their respective RAB
shares. Under proposed § 1.482–7(e)(1),
RAB shares must be updated to account

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for changes in economic conditions, the
business operations and practices of the
participants and the ongoing
development of intangibles. Such
updates must reflect a comprehensive
revision over the entire past and
projected future period of intangible
exploitation in light of the most current
reliable data.
To the extent the controlled
participants consistently and materially
fail to bear IDC shares equal to their
respective RAB shares, the
Commissioner would be able to exercise
its authority pursuant to existing
§ 1.482–1(d)(3)(ii)(B) (Identifying
contractual terms) to impute an
agreement that is consistent with the
controlled participants’ course of
conduct. Thus, a participant that bears
a disproportionately greater IDC share
may be allocated an undivided interest
in another territory or territories of
exploitation of the cost shared
intangibles, and would be allocated
arm’s length consideration from any
other controlled participant whose IDC
share is less than its RAB share over
time.
Current § 1.482–7(g)(5) provides that
these allocations be ‘‘after any cost
allocations authorized by [§ 1.482–
7(a)(2)]’’ is eliminated. Some have
interpreted this reference to mean that
the Commissioner must make cost
allocations, and failure to do so would
bar the Commissioner from making an
allocation pursuant to existing § 1.482–
7(g)(5). This interpretation, if accepted,
defeats the expectation that controlled
participants must themselves act
consistently with their CST deal and
maintain their RAB shares current for
that purpose. No inference is intended
regarding the outcome under the
existing regulations.
3. Periodic Adjustments—Proposed
§ 1.482–7(i)(6)
In 1986, Congress indicated a
significant degree of skepticism about
related-party transfers of high-profit
potential intangibles for relatively
insignificant lump sum or royalty
consideration that effectively place all
the intangible development downside
risk in one controlled taxpayer and all
the upside profit potential in another.
See H.R. Rep. 99–426, at 424–25 (1985).
See also Notice 88–123 (the White
Paper), 1988–2 C.B. 458, 472–74, 477–
480. The legislative history also notes
that it is especially difficult to obtain
realistic comparables with respect to
such intangibles because they seldom if
ever are transferred to unrelated parties.
See id.
The Commissioner’s ability to
evaluate controlled participants’ deals

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with regard to high-profit potential
intangibles is hampered, not only by the
absence of comparables, but by an
asymmetry of information vis-a-vis the
taxpayer. The taxpayer is in the best
position to know its business and
prospects. The Commissioner faces real
challenges in ascertaining the reliability
of the ex ante expectations of taxpayer’s
initial arrangements in light of
significantly different ex post outcomes.
While risk and uncertain outcomes are
typically the hallmarks of high-profit
potential intangibles, significantly
different results raise concerns whether
the form of the initial arrangement
matches its substance. These concerns
are particularly problematic given the
information asymmetry between
taxpayers and the IRS. Periodic
adjustments effectively permit the IRS
to impute an arm’s length arrangement
that appropriately reflects the profit
potential of transferred intangibles
where the IRS believes that the
taxpayers’ arrangement does not
appropriately reflect such profit
potential. Because the guidance on
periodic adjustments is intended to
address the problem of information
asymmetry, and because it is
exceedingly unlikely that a taxpayer
would use information asymmetry for
anything other than a tax-advantaged
result, periodic adjustments of this type
can only be exercised by the
Commissioner.
Accordingly, taxpayers cannot
exercise periodic adjustments of this
type. This prohibition is necessary for
proper administration of these rules.
Moreover, taxpayers are not
inappropriately disadvantaged by this
rule because they have the ability to
structure their related-party
arrangements in line with the economic
prospects of their business. A taxpayer
can always protect itself against
periodic adjustments by adopting an
arrangement that appropriately reflects
the profit potential and risks associated
with an intangible transfer, which it is
in the best position to evaluate in an
economically realistic way. There are
various forms of consideration that
taxpayers at arm’s length might adopt in
the face of uncertainty and risk. In some
cases, uncontrolled taxpayers might find
that projections of anticipated profits
are sufficiently reliable to fix the pricing
for the transaction at the outset on the
basis of those projections. In other cases
the uncertainty in valuing intangible
property might lead them to adopt from
the outset contingent terms of different
varieties and degrees that allow for
adjustment in light of actual profit
experience. This does not mean that the

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taxpayer must adopt an arrangement
that tilts the risks in a way that
necessarily always involves reporting
income without regard to later actual
results. For example, contingent
arrangements may appropriately reflect
profit potential and yet appropriately tie
in with later outcomes. In such
arrangements, less income may properly
result if the outcomes are less successful
than reasonably anticipated, or greater
income will result if the outcomes are
more successful. Taxpayers simply are
in the best position to structure their
arrangements upfront to accommodate a
range of potential outcomes.
Proposed § 1.482–7(j)(6) provides
guidance on how periodic adjustments
may be made in the context of a CSA.
The goal is to conform the results of
CSTs and PCTs to the arm’s length
standard. In accordance with the 1986
legislative history, achieving that goal
requires that the ‘‘income allocated
among the parties reasonably reflect the
actual economic activity undertaken by
each’’ and that ‘‘to the extent, if any,
that one party is actually contributing
funds toward research and development
at a significantly earlier point in time
than the other, or is otherwise
effectively putting its funds at risk to a
greater extent than the other, it would be
expected that an appropriate return
would be provided to such party to
reflect its investment.’’ H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 99–841 at II–638 (1986). (Emphasis
supplied.)
The proposed regulations build the
CSA periodic adjustment provisions
upon the previously discussed investor
model. The taxpayer’s arrangement will
be respected so long as a controlled
participant’s actually experienced
return ratio (AERR), equal to the present
value of its actually experienced
operating profits from exploiting cost
shared intangibles divided by its
investment in the CSA (consisting of the
present value sum of its cost
contributions and PCT Payments), is
within a specified periodic return ratio
range (PRRR). The PRRR provides a
band of comfort for actual return ratios
of no more than 2 and no less than 1⁄2
(unless there is a failure to substantially
comply with the administrative
requirements of proposed § 1.482–7(k),
in which case the comfort band consists
of actual return ratios of no more than
1.5 and no less than .67). Results above
or below these respective thresholds
typically warrant a more thorough and
detailed examination of the arm’s length
nature of the initial taxpayer
arrangement, as well as a means to
impute an alternative arrangement that
more reliably reflects an arm’s length
result, as described below.

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51129

In determining a controlled
participant’s AERR, the present values
of its operating profits and CSA
investments are measured from the
period beginning on the commencement
of the CSA through the end of the year
of adjustment. For these purposes,
present values are determined using an
applicable discount rate (ADR)
appropriate to the risks associated with
the given CSA, as the Commissioner
may determine under the guidance of
proposed § 1.482–7(g)(2)(vi). Where the
stock of the PCT Payor, or another
company that owns stock in the PCT
Payor and is in a consolidated group
with the PCT Payor for financial
accounting purposes is publicly traded,
the Commissioner may treat the ADR as
equal to the publicly traded company’s
weighted average cost of capital, as
determined pursuant to the capital asset
pricing model, subject to the taxpayer’s
ability to show another discount rate is
more appropriate in the facts and
circumstances to the satisfaction of the
Commissioner. Where there is no
publicly traded company in the PCT
Payor group, the ADR will be
determined under the general principles
applicable for discount rates, subject to
such adjustments as the Commissioner
determines is appropriate.
In determining the AERR and, thus,
whether the AERR is within or without
the PRRR, it is intended that the items
entering into the computation (e.g.,
operating profits, cost contributions,
and PCT Payments) are those items as
adjusted (including as the result of any
prior IRS adjustments).
The guidance on periodic adjustments
is not intended, for example, to
systematically reallocate above-market
returns after-the-fact, since such returns
may in whole or in part reward
legitimate ex ante risk-taking by CSA
investors. Accordingly, an AERR
outside the PRRR does not necessarily
mean that adjustments will ultimately
be warranted. Rather, the PRRR
provides comfort to taxpayers that
within the PRRR they will not be subject
to periodic adjustments. If the AERR is
outside the PRRR, the proposed
regulations provide exceptions pursuant
to which periodic adjustments will not
be made where a taxpayer can
demonstrate that its deal was
nevertheless arm’s length. These
exceptions adapt the exceptions in
existing § 1.482–4(f)(2)(ii), along with
three additional exceptions appropriate
in the CSA context. One exception
effectively would avoid ‘‘start up’’
triggers from return ratios below the low
end of the PRRR by delaying low end
trigger testing until after the first five
years of substantial exploitation of cost

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shared intangibles resulting from the
CSA. A similar exception would enable
a taxpayer to avoid a low end trigger
that it can establish to the satisfaction of
the Commissioner results from the ‘‘cut
off’’ from consideration of anticipated
profits, cost contributions, or PCT
Payments beyond the end of the year of
adjustment. For purposes of the
foregoing exception, the taxpayer may
assume that the yearly average of past
operating profits for the years up
through the year of adjustment in which
there has been substantial exploitation
of cost shared intangibles will continue
into the future. The third additional
exception would enable a taxpayer to
avoid a high end trigger that it can
establish to the satisfaction of the
Commissioner results from routine
contributions to its profitability, or from
nonroutine contributions, including its
own external contributions.
In the event that the AERR is outside
the PRRR, and no exception applies,
then the Commissioner may adjust the
taxpayer’s PCT Payments to the level of
an equivalent stream of contingent
royalties as would be determined under
a modified RPSM. The modified RPSM
would vary depending on whether the
periodic adjustment was triggered by an
AERR above the high end or below the
low end of the PRRR.
In the event of a trigger above the high
end of the PRRR, the arrangement going
forward beginning with the year of
adjustment would effectively treat the
past cost contribution shares of all
controlled participants as bought out
and would determine new fractions for
cost contribution shares as of the start
of the year of adjustment (if
development activity is then continuing
under the CSA). Prior cost contributions
and operating profits, therefore, would
not be taken into account in the second
step of the modified RPSM. The relative
valuation of nonroutine contributions,
including external contributions, in the
third step of the modified RPSM would
still be determined as of the original
date of the PCTs, but taking into account
any data relevant to such relative
valuation as may be available up
through the date of the periodic
adjustment.
In the event of a trigger below the low
end of the PRRR, the arrangement going
forward beginning with the year of
adjustment would effectively recompute
the original cost contribution share
fractions by substituting projections as
revised in light of actual experience up
through the date of the periodic
adjustment.
For these purposes only, the residual
profit split method may be used even
where only one controlled participant

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makes significant nonroutine
contributions to the CSA Activity. (As
mentioned above in the discussion of
the residual profit split method,
applying the residual profit split
method in such a situation is logically
equivalent to applying the income
method using an applicable rate on
profit. For convenience, the proposed
regulations apply the residual profit
split method to all periodic adjustments
rather than separately describing an
equivalent modified income method for
the situation in which only one
controlled participant makes significant
nonroutine contributions to the CSA
Activity.) If only one controlled
participant provides all the external
contributions and other nonroutine
contributions, then the third step
residual profit or loss belongs entirely to
such controlled participant.
It should be emphasized that the
Commissioner’s determination whether
or not to make periodic adjustments
would be informed by whether the
outcome as adjusted more reliably
reflects an arm’s length result.

well as any which serendipitously may
result from the IDA.
Cost shared intangibles include any
portion thereof that may be attributable
to an external contribution and,
therefore, do not simply represent the
incremental results of the IDA. For
example, if a new generation software
resulting from the IDA incorporates
elements of the prior generation
software, the cost shared intangible is
the total result of the prior and
subsequent contributions. No inference
is intended as to the outcome under the
existing regulations.

F. Definitions and Special Rules—
Proposed § 1.482–7(j)
Proposed § 1.482–7(j) provides
definitions and special rules relevant to
CSAs.

The proposed regulations clarify the
definition of benefits found in existing
§ 1.482–7(e)(1). Benefits means the sum
of additional revenue generated, plus
cost savings, minus any cost increases
from exploiting cost shared intangibles.

1. Controlled Participant—Proposed
§ 1.482–7(j)(1)(i)
The proposed regulations incorporate
the existing definitions and examples
with regard to a controlled participant
with conforming changes to reflect the
new framework and terminology. Thus,
a controlled participant is a controlled
taxpayer that is a party to the CSA
contractual agreement that reasonably
anticipates that it will derive benefits
from exploiting one or more cost shared
intangibles.
The proposed regulations dispense
with the possibility of an uncontrolled
participant in a CSA. The Treasury
Department and the IRS are not aware
of any uncontrolled participants in any
CSAs. The elimination of uncontrolled
participants simplified various
provisions of the proposed regulations.
The Treasury Department and the IRS
request comments in this regard.
2. Cost Shared Intangible—Proposed
§ 1.482–7(j)(1)(ii)
The term cost shared intangible
replaces the term covered intangible
from existing § 1.482–7(b)(4)(iv). A cost
shared intangible means any intangible
developed or to be developed as a result
of the IDA. Thus, cost shared intangibles
include both the intangibles that are
contemplated to result from the IDA as

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3. Interest In An Intangible—Proposed
§ 1.482–7(j)(1)(iii)
The proposed regulations employ the
same general definition of an interest in
an intangible found in existing § 1.482–
7(a)(2). It should be noted, however, that
the proposed regulations provide that
the interests in cost shared intangibles
must be divided among the controlled
participants on a territorial basis. See
proposed § 1.482–7(b)(1)(i) and (b)(4).
4. Benefits—Proposed § 1.482–7(j)(1)(iv)

5. Reasonably Anticipated Benefits—
Proposed § 1.482–7(j)(1)(v)
The proposed regulations effectively
employ the same definition of
reasonably anticipated benefits found in
existing § 1.482–7(e)(2).
6. Territorial Operating Profit or Loss—
Proposed § 1.482–7(j)(1)(vi)
The proposed regulations define
territorial operating profit or loss as the
operating profit or loss as separately
earned by each controlled participant in
its geographic territory from the CSA
Activity, determined before an expense
(including amortization) on account of
IDCs, routine external contributions,
and nonroutine contributions.
7. CSA Activity—Proposed § 1.482–
7(j)(1)(vii)
The proposed regulations define CSA
Activity as the activity of developing
and exploiting cost shared intangibles.
8. Consolidated Group—Proposed
§ 1.482–7(j)(2)(i)
In line with existing § 1.482–7(c)(3),
the proposed regulations treat all
members of a U.S. group filing
consolidated income tax returns as one
taxpayer for purposes of the CSA
provisions. The proposed regulations

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would also treat all members of a
foreign fiscal unity as one taxpayer for
these purposes.

provisions are more likely to reliably
reflect (without hindsight) the relative
risks of the controlled participants.

9. No Trade or Business and
Partnership—Proposed § 1.482–
7(j)(2)(ii) and (iii)
In line with existing §§ 1.482–7(a)(1)
and 301.7701–1(c), the proposed
regulations provide that participation in
a CSA, of itself, does not constitute a
U.S. trade or business or result in the
creation of a partnership for federal
income tax purposes.

2. CSA Documentation Requirements—
Proposed § 1.482–7(k)(2)
Under proposed § 1.482–7(k)(2)(i), the
controlled participants must timely
update and maintain sufficient
documentation to establish that the
participants have met the contractual
requirements of proposed § 1.482–
7(k)(1). In addition, the controlled
participants must timely update and
maintain documentation sufficient to
establish and support the items listed in
proposed § 1.482–7(k)(2)(ii) regarding
the ongoing implementation of the CSA,
CSTs, and PCTs. Thus, each controlled
participant must at timely intervals
update and maintain the documentation
required by proposed § 1.482–7(k)(2)(i)
and (ii) on an ongoing basis from the
outset of the formation of the CSA. To
the extent that additional
documentation is required by the new
availability of information or the
occurrence of post-formation events,
each controlled participant must
maintain such documentation in a
manner such that the controlled
participant retains and supplements
(but does not replace) the
documentation maintained from the
outset.
Proposed § 1.482–7(k)(2)(iii), which
replaces existing § 1.482–7(j)(2)(ii),
cross-references proposed § 1.6662–
6(d)(2)(iii)(D) for the coordination of the
CSA documentation rules with the
specified method documentation rules
under the section 6662 transfer pricing
penalty regulations. Proposed § 1.6662–
6(d)(2)(iii)(D) provides that satisfaction
of the CSA documentation requirements
satisfies the specified method principal
documentation requirements with
respect to the CSTs and PCTs, other
than the requirements to provide a
description of the relevant
organizational structure and an index of
principal and background documents,
provided that such documentation is
sufficient to establish that the taxpayer
reasonably concluded that its method
and application provided the most
reliable measure of an arm’s length
result. Each controlled participant must
provide such documentation to the IRS
within 30 days of a request, subject to
extension in the Commissioner’s
discretion.

10. Character of Payments—Proposed
§ 1.482–7(j)(3)
In line with existing § 1.482–7(h), the
proposed regulations provide ordering
rules for characterizing cost sharing
payments with regard to the items they
reimburse. PCT Payments will be
characterized consistently with the
designation of the type of transaction
involved in the RT. The proposed
regulations continue to provide for the
netting of PCT Payments made to, and
received by, a controlled participant.
G. Administrative Provisions—Proposed
§ 1.482–7(k)
The proposed regulations include
provisions to facilitate administration
of, and compliance with, the cost
sharing rules. Thus, under a CSA, the
controlled participants must
substantially comply with certain
contractual, documentation, accounting,
and reporting requirements. Similar
requirements are spread throughout the
existing regulations in § 1.482–7(b),
(c)(1), (i), and (j). In the proposed
regulations, the substantial compliance
standard is included in proposed
§ 1.482–7(b)(1)(iv) through (vii), and the
specific requirements are assembled
together in § 1.482–7(k).
1. CSA Contractual Requirements—
Proposed § 1.482–7(k)(1)
Under proposed § 1.482–7(k)(1)(i), a
CSA must be recorded in writing in a
contract that is contemporaneous with
the formation (and any revision) of the
CSA. The written CSA must incorporate
the contractual provisions set forth in
proposed § 1.482–7(k)(1)(ii). Proposed
§ 1.482–7(k)(1)(iii) provides that a
written contractual agreement is
contemporaneous with the formation (or
revision) of a CSA if, and only if, the
controlled participants record the CSA,
in its entirety, in a document that they
sign and date no later than 60 days after
the first occurrence of any IDC to which
such agreement (or revision) is to apply.
By requiring that CSAs be memorialized
contemporaneously with formation (or
revision), the CSA contractual

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3. CSA Accounting Requirements—
Proposed § 1.482–7(k)(3)
Proposed § 1.482–7(k)(3)(i) tracks the
existing regulations in requiring that the
controlled participants establish a
consistent method of accounting,

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51131

translate foreign currencies on a
consistent basis, and explain any
material differences from U.S. generally
accepted accounting principles. Under
proposed § 1.482–7(k)(3)(ii), controlled
participants may not rely solely upon
financial accounting rules to establish
satisfaction of the accounting
requirements. Rather, the method of
accounting must clearly reflect income.
4. CSA Reporting Requirements—
Proposed § 1.482–7(k)(4)
Proposed § 1.482–(7)(k)(4)(i) requires
that each controlled participant must
file with the Ogden Campus a statement
regarding its participation in a CSA
(CSA Statement). The CSA Statement
must provide the information
enumerated in proposed § 1.482–
7(k)(4)(ii), including the earliest date
that any IDC occurred, the date on
which the controlled participants
formed (or revised) the CSA, and (if
different from the immediately
preceding date) the date on which the
controlled participants recorded the
CSA (or revision) in accordance with
the contemporaneous recordation
requirement.
Pursuant to proposed § 1.482–
7(k)(4)(iii)(A), each controlled
participant must file an original CSA
Statement with the IRS no later than 90
days after the first occurrence of an IDC
to which the newly-formed CSA applies
or, in the case of a taxpayer that became
a controlled participant after the
formation of the CSA, no later than 90
days after such taxpayer became a
controlled participant. The CSA
Statement must be dated and signed,
under penalties of perjury, by an officer
of the controlled participant who is duly
authorized (under local law) to sign the
statement on behalf of the controlled
participant.
In addition to the 90-day rule
described above, proposed § 1.482–
7(k)(4)(iii)(B) contains an annual
reporting requirement. Each controlled
participant must attach to its U.S.
income tax return, for each taxable year
for the duration of the CSA, a copy of
the original CSA Statement that the
controlled participant filed in
accordance with the 90-day rule.
Further, the annual reporting by the
controlled participant must update the
information reflected on the original
CSA Statement by attaching a schedule
that documents changes in such
information over time. If a controlled
participant does not file a U.S. income
tax return, then it must ensure that the
foregoing CSA Statement and updated
schedule are attached to any Schedule
M of Form 5471, to any Form 5472, or

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I. Changes to Other Provisions

to any Form 8865 with respect to that
participant.
H. Effective Date and Transition Rule—
Proposed §§ 1.482–7(l) and (m)
The proposed regulations are
proposed to be applicable on the date of
publication of the proposed regulations
as a final regulation in the Federal
Register. Thus, CSAs commencing on or
after such date, and CSTs and PCTs
occurring after such date with respect to
CSAs existing as of the effective date,
will be subject to § 1.482–7, as then
finally revised. Conversely, other
transactions not reasonably anticipated
to contribute to developing intangibles
pursuant to an arrangement constituting
a CSA described in § 1.482–7(b)(1) or (5)
will be subject to other applicable
section 482 regulations. See proposed
§ 1.482–7(a)(3)(iii).
The proposed regulations provide
transition rules under which an existing
arrangement that constituted a qualified
cost sharing arrangement under the
regulations before the effective date will
be considered a CSA and will be
allowed an additional period to conform
to the new rules with certain
modifications. Although certain
documentation requirements are
delayed and certain substantive
requirements concerning pre-effective
date matters are relaxed for a
grandfathered CSA described in the
previous sentence, the controlled
participants’ CSTs and PCTs that occur
after the effective date would have to
comply with the substantive
requirements of these regulations
beginning immediately after such date.
CSTs and PCTs occurring prior to the
effective date are subject to these
regulations only in the event that PCT
Payments become subject to periodic
adjustment under paragraph (i)(6) as a
result of a subsequent PCT occurring on
or after the effective date.
The proposed regulations specify
circumstances under which the
grandfathered status of pre-effective
date arrangements would terminate.
Accordingly, an otherwise
grandfathered arrangement would cease
to be so grandfathered from the earliest
of a failure of the controlled participants
to substantially comply with the
regulations as transitionally modified, a
material change in the scope of the CSA
as contemplated in the underlying
contractual arrangement (such as a
material expansion of the activities
undertaken in the CSA beyond those
undertaken as of the effective date), or
a 50 percent change in the beneficial
ownership of the interests in cost shared
intangibles.

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The proposed regulations make
conforming changes to § 1.367(a)–1T,
§ 1.861–17, and §§ 1.482–1 et seq. of the
section 482 regulations to reflect the
new terminology and framework of the
CSA provisions.
The proposed regulations redesignate
current § 1.482–7 as § 1.482–7A which
would continue to apply for dates prior
to the publication of this document as
a final regulation in the Federal Register
and to the extent applicable under the
transition rule of proposed § 1.482–
7(m).
The proposed regulations add
examples to § 1.482–8 to illustrate the
application of the best method rule in
connection with the new specified
methods under proposed § 1.482–7(g).
As previously stated, proposed
§ 1.6662–6(d)(2)(iii)(D) coordinates the
CSA documentation requirements of
proposed § 1.482–7(k)(2) with the
specified method documentation
requirements of the section 6662
transfer pricing penalty regulations.
In line with the penultimate sentence
of existing § 1.482–7(a)(1) and proposed
§ 1.482–7(j)(2)(iii), proposed
§ 301.7701–1(c) provides that
participation in a CSA, of itself, does
not give rise to a separate entity.
Special Analysis
It has been determined that this notice
of proposed rulemaking is not a
significant regulatory action as defined
in Executive Order 12866. Therefore, a
regulatory assessment is not required. It
has been determined also that section
553(b) of the Administrative Procedure
Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 5) does not apply
to these regulations. It is hereby
certified that the collections of
information in these regulations will not
have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities.
This certification is based on the fact
that few small entities are expected to
enter into cost sharing agreements, as
defined herein, and that for those that
do, the burdens imposed under
proposed § 1.482–7(b)(1)(iv) through
(vii) and (k) would be minimal.
Therefore, a Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis under the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 6) is
not required. Pursuant to section
7805(f), this notice of proposed
rulemaking will be submitted to the
Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small
Business Administration for comment
on its impact on small business.
Comments and Public Hearing
Before these proposed regulations are
adopted as final regulations,

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consideration will be given to any
electronic or written comments (a
signed original and eight (8) copies) that
are submitted timely to the IRS. The
Treasury Department and the IRS
specifically request comments on the
clarity of the proposed regulations and
how they may be made easier to
understand. All comments will be
available for public inspection and
copying.
A public hearing has been scheduled
for November 16, 2005, at 10 a.m., in the
auditorium, Internal Revenue Building,
1111 Constitution Avenue, NW.,
Washington, DC. Due to building
security procedures, visitors must enter
at the Constitution Avenue entrance. In
addition, all visitors must present photo
identification to enter the building.
Because of access restrictions, visitors
will not be admitted beyond the
immediate entrance more than 30
minutes before the hearing starts. For
information about having your name
placed on the building access list to
attend the hearing, see the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this
preamble.
The rules of 26 CFR 601.601(a)(3)
apply to the hearing. Persons who wish
to present oral comments at the hearing
must submit electronic or written
comments and an outline of the topics
to be discussed and the time to be
devoted to each topic (signed original
and eight (8) copies) by October 26,
2005. A period of 10 minutes will be
allotted to each person for making
comments.
An agenda showing the scheduling of
the speakers will be prepared after the
deadline for receiving outlines has
passed. Copies of the agenda will be
available free of charge at the hearing.
Drafting Information
The principal author of these
proposed regulations is Jeffrey L. Parry
of the Office of Chief Counsel
(International). However, other
personnel from the Treasury
Department and the IRS participated in
their development.
List of Subjects
26 CFR Part 1
Income taxes, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
26 CFR Part 301
Employment taxes, Estate taxes,
Excise taxes, Gift taxes, Income taxes,
Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.

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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 166 / Monday, August 29, 2005 / Proposed Rules
Proposed Amendments to the
Regulations
Accordingly, 26 CFR parts 1 and 301
are proposed to be amended as follows:
PART 1—INCOME TAXES
Paragraph 1. The authority citation
for part 1 is amended by adding an entry
in numerical order to read, in part, as
follows:
Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *
Section 1.482–7A also issued under 26
U.S.C. 482. * * *

Par 2. Section 1.367(a)–1T is
amended by revising the second
sentence of paragraph (d)(3) to read as
follows:
§ 1.367(a)–1T Transfers to foreign
corporations subject to section 367(a): In
general (temporary).

*

*
*
*
*
(d) * * *
(3) Transfer. * * * A person’s
entering into a cost sharing arrangement
under § 1.482–7 or acquiring rights to
intangible property under such an
arrangement shall not be considered a
transfer of property described in section
367(a)(1). * * *
*
*
*
*
*
Par. 3. Section 1.482–7 is
redesignated § 1.482–7A and an
undesignated centerheading preceding
§ 1.482–7A is added to read as follows:
Regulations applicable on or before
the date of publication of this document
as a final regulation in the Federal
Register.
Par. 4. Section 1.482–0 is amended by
revising the entry for § 1.482–7 to read
as follows:
§ 1.482–0 Outline of regulations under
section 482.

*

*

*

*

*

§ 1.482–7 Methods to determine taxable
income in connection with a cost sharing
arrangement.
(a) In general.
(1) RAB share method for cost sharing
transactions (CSTs).
(2) Methods for preliminary or
contemporaneous transactions (PCTs).
(3) Methods for other controlled
transactions.
(i) Contribution to a CSA by a controlled
taxpayer that is not a controlled participant.
(ii) Transfer of interest in a cost shared
intangible.
(iii) Controlled transactions not in
connection with a CSA.
(b) Cost sharing arrangement (CSA).
(1) In general.
(2) CSTs.
(i) In general.
(ii) Example.
(3) PCTs.
(i) In general.

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(ii) External contributions.
(iii) PCT Payments.
(iv) Reference transaction (RT).
(v) PFAs.
(vi) Form of payment.
(A) In general.
(B) PFAs.
(C) No PCT Payor stock.
(vii) Date of a PCT.
(viii) Examples.
(4) Territorial division of interests.
(i) In general.
(ii) Examples.
(5) CSAs in substance or form .
(i) CSAs in substance.
(ii) CSAs in form.
(iii) Example.
(6) Treatment of CSAs.
(c) Make-or-sell rights excluded.
(1) In general.
(2) Examples.
(d) Intangible development costs (IDCs).
(1) Costs included in IDCs.
(2) Allocation of costs.
(3) Stock-based compensation.
(i) In general.
(ii) Identification of stock-based
compensation with the IDA.
(iii) Measurement and timing of stockbased compensation IDC.
(A) In general.
(1) Transfers to which section 421 applies.
(2) Deductions of foreign controlled
participants.
(3) Modification of stock option.
(4) Expiration or termination of CSA.
(B) Election with respect to options on
publicly traded stock.
(1) In general.
(2) Publicly traded stock.
(3) Generally accepted accounting
principles.
(4) Time and manner of making the
election.
(C) Consistency.
(4) IDC share.
(5) Examples.
(e) Reasonably anticipated benefit shares
(RAB shares).
(1) In general.
(2) Measure of benefits.
(i) In general.
(ii) Indirect bases for measuring benefits.
(A) Units used, produced, or sold.
(B) Sales.
(C) Operating profit.
(D) Other bases for measuring anticipated
benefits.
(E) Examples.
(iii) Projections used to estimate benefits.
(A) In general.
(B) Examples.
(f) Changes in participation under a CSA.
(g) Supplemental guidance on methods
applicable to PCTs.
(1) In general.
(2) General principles.
(i) In general.
(ii) Valuation consistent with upfront
contractual terms and risk allocations.
(iii)Projections.
(iv) Realistic alternatives.
(A) In general.
(B) Examples.
(v) Aggregation of transactions.
(vi) Discount rate.

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51133

(A) In general.
(B) Examples.
(vii) Accounting principles.
(A) In general.
(B) Examples.
(viii) Valuation consistent with the
investor model.
(A) In general.
(B) Example.
(ix) Coordination of best method rule and
form of payment.
(x) Coordination of the valuations or prior
and subsequent PCTs.
(xi) Proration of PCT Payments to the
extent allocable to other business activities.
(3) Comparable uncontrolled transaction
method.
(4) Income method.
(i) In general.
(ii) Determination of arm’s length charge.
(A) In general.
(B) Example.
(iii) Application of income method using a
CUT.
(A) In general.
(B) Determination of arm’s length charge.
(1) In general.
(2) Applicable rate.
(3) Alternative rate.
(4) Cost contribution adjustment.
(C) Example.
(iv) Application of income method using
CPM.
(A) In general.
(B) Determination of arm’s length charge
based on sales.
(1) In general.
(2) Applicable rate.
(3) Alternative rate.
(4) Cost contribution adjustment.
(C) Determination of arm’s length charge
based on profit.
(1) In general.
(2) Alternative rate.
(3) Cost contribution adjustment.
(D) Example.
(v) Routine external contributions.
(vi) Comparability and reliability
considerations.
(A) In general.
(B) Application of the income method
using a CUT.
(C) Application of the income method
using CPM.
(5) Acquisition price method.
(i) In general.
(ii) Determination of arm’s length charge.
(iii) Adjusted acquisition price.
(iv) Reliability and comparability
considerations.
(v) Example.
(6) Market capitalization method.
(i) In general.
(ii) Determination of arm’s length charge.
(iii) Average market capitalization.
(iv) Adjusted average market capitalization.
(v) Reliability and comparability
considerations.
(vi) Examples.
(7) Residual profit split.
(i) In general.
(ii) Appropriate share of profits and losses.
(iii) Profit split.
(A) In general.
(B) Allocate income to routine
contributions other than cost contributions.

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(C) Allocate residual profit.
(1) In general.
(2) Cost contribution share of residual
profit or loss.
(3) Nonroutine contribution share of
residual profit or loss.
(4) Determination of PCT Payments.
(5) Routine external contributions.
(iv) Comparability and reliability
considerations.
(A) In general.
(B) Comparability.
(C) Data and assumptions.
(D) Other factors affecting reliability.
(v) Example.
(8) Unspecified methods.
(h) Coordination with the arm’s length
standard.
(i) Allocations by the Commissioner in
connection with a CSA.
(1) In general.
(2) CST allocations.
(i) In general.
(ii) Adjustments to improve the reliability
of projections used to RAB shares.
(A) Unreliable projections.
(B) Foreign-to-foreign adjustments.
(C) Correlative adjustments to PCTs.
(D) Examples.
(iii) Timing of CST allocations.
(3) PCT allocations.
(4) Allocations regarding changes in
participation under a CSA.
(5) Allocations when CSTs are consistently
and materially disproportionate to RAB
shares.
(6) Periodic adjustments.
(i) In general.
(ii) PRRR.
(iii) AERR.
(A) In general.
(B) PVTP.
(C) PVI.
(iv) ADR.
(A) In general.
(B) Publicly traded companies.
(C) Publicly traded.
(D) PCT Payor WACC.
(E) Generally accepted accounting
principles.
(v) Determination of periodic adjustments.
(vi) Exceptions to periodic adjustments.
(A) Transactions involving the same
external contributions as in the PCT.
(B) Results not reasonably anticipated.
(C) Reduced AERR does not cause Periodic
Trigger.
(D) Increased AERR does not cause
Periodic Trigger.
(E) 10-year period.
(F) 5-year period.
(vii) Examples.
(viii) Documentation.
(j) Definitions and special rules.
(1) Definitions.
(2) Special rules.
(i) Consolidated group.
(ii) Trade or business.
(iii) Partnership.
(3) Character.
(i) In general.
(ii) PCT Payments.
(iii) Examples.
(k) CSA contractual, documentation,
accounting, and reporting requirements.
(1) CSA contractual requirements.

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(i) In general.
(ii) Contractual provisions.
(iii) Meaning of contemporaneous.
(A) In general.
(B) Example.
(2) CSA documentation requirements.
(i) In general.
(ii) Additional CSA documentation
requirements.
(iii) Coordination rules and production of
documents.
(A) Coordination with penalty regulations.
(B) Production of documentation.
(3) CSA accounting requirements.
(i) In general.
(ii) Reliance on financial accounting.
(4) CSA reporting requirements.
(i) CSA Statement.
(ii) Content of CSA Statement.
(iii) Time for filing CSA Statement.
(A) 90-day rule.
(B) Annual return requirement.
(1) In general.
(2) Special filing rule for annual return
requirement.
(iv) Examples.
(l) Effective date.
(m) Transition rule.
(1) In general.
(2) Termination of grandfather status.
(3) Transitional modification of applicable
provisions.

*

*
*
*
*
Par. 5. Section 1.482–1 is amended
by:
1. Revising the second sentence of
paragraph (b)(2)(i).
2. Revising the last sentence of
paragraph (c)(1).
The revisions read as follows:
§ 1.482–1 Allocation of income and
deductions among taxpayers.

*

*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(2) * * *
(i) * * * Section 1.482–7 provides the
methods to be used to evaluate whether
a cost sharing arrangement produces
results consistent with an arm’s length
result.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(1) * * * See § 1.482–7 for the
applicable methods in the case of a cost
sharing arrangement.
*
*
*
*
*
Par. 6. Section 1.482–4 is amended by
1. Redesignating paragraph (f)(3)(iv)
as paragraph (f)(3)(v).
2. Adding a new paragraph (f)(3)(iv).
The addition reads as follows:
§ 1.482–4 Methods to determine taxable
income in connection with a transfer of
intangible property.

*

*
*
*
*
(f) * * *
(3) * * *
(iv) Cost sharing arrangements. The
rules in this paragraph (f)(3) regarding
ownership and assistance with respect

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to cost shared intangibles and cost
sharing arrangements will apply only as
provided in § 1.482–7.
*
*
*
*
*
Par. 7. Section 1.482–5 is amended by
revising the last sentence of paragraph
(c)(2)(iv) to read as follows:
§ 1.482–5

Comparable profits method.

*

*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(2) * * *
(iv) * * * As another example, it may
be appropriate to adjust the operating
profit of a party to account for material
differences in the utilization of or
accounting for stock-based
compensation (as defined by § 1.482–
7(d)(3)(i)) among the tested party and
comparable parties.
*
*
*
*
*
Par. 8. Section 1.482–7 is revised to
read as follows:
§ 1.482–7 Methods to determine taxable
income in connection with a cost sharing
arrangement.

(a) In general. The arm’s length
amount charged in a controlled
transaction reasonably anticipated to
contribute to developing intangibles
pursuant to a cost sharing arrangement
(CSA), as described in paragraph (b) of
this section, must be determined under
a method described in this section. Each
method must be applied in accordance
with the provisions of § 1.482–1, except
as those provisions are modified in this
section.
(1) RAB share method for cost sharing
transactions (CSTs). The controlled
participants that are parties to a cost
sharing transaction (CST), as described
in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, must
share the intangible development costs
(IDCs) of the cost shared intangibles in
proportion to their shares of reasonably
anticipated benefits (RAB shares). See
paragraph (j)(1) of this section for the
definitions of controlled participant,
cost shared intangible, benefits, and
reasonably anticipated benefits, and
paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section
regarding IDCs and RAB shares,
respectively.
(2) Methods for preliminary or
contemporaneous transactions (PCTs).
The arm’s length amount charged in a
preliminary or contemporaneous
transaction (PCT), as described in
paragraph (b)(3) of this section, must be
determined under the method or
methods under the other section or
sections of the section 482 regulations,
as supplemented by paragraph (g) of this
section, applicable to the reference
transaction (RT) reflected by the PCT.
See § 1.482–1(b)(2)(ii) (Selection of
category of method applicable to

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transaction), paragraph (b)(3)(iv) of this
section (Reference transaction), and
paragraph (g) of this section
(Supplemental guidance on methods
applicable to PCTs).
(3) Methods for other controlled
transactions—(i) Contribution to a CSA
by a controlled taxpayer that is not a
controlled participant. If a controlled
taxpayer that is not a controlled
participant contributes to developing
the cost shared intangibles, it must
receive consideration from the other
controlled participants under the rules
of § 1.482–4(f)(3)(iii) (Allocations with
respect to assistance provided to the
owner). Such consideration will be
treated as an intangible development
cost for purposes of paragraph (d) of this
section.
(ii) Transfer of interest in a cost
shared intangible. If at any time (during
the term, or upon or after the
termination, of a CSA) a controlled
participant transfers an interest in a cost
shared intangible to another controlled
taxpayer, the controlled participant
must receive an arm’s length amount of
consideration from the transferee under
the rules of §§ 1.482–1 and 1.482–4
through 1.482–6.
(iii) Controlled transactions not in
connection with a CSA. This section
does not apply to a controlled
transaction reasonably anticipated to
contribute to developing intangibles
pursuant to an arrangement that is not
a CSA described in paragraph (b)(1) or
paragraph (b)(5) of this section. Whether
the results of any such controlled
transaction are consistent with an arm’s
length result must be determined under
the applicable rules of the section 482
regulations without regard to this
section. For example, an arrangement
for developing intangibles in which one
controlled taxpayer’s costs of
developing the intangibles significantly
exceeds its share of reasonably
anticipated benefits from exploiting the
developed intangibles would not in
substance be a CSA, as described in
paragraphs (b)(1)(i) through (iii) or
paragraph (b)(5)(i) of this section. In
such a case, unless the rules of this
section are applicable by reason of
paragraph (b)(5)(ii) of this section, the
arrangement must be analyzed under
other applicable sections of the section
482 regulations to determine whether it
achieves arm’s length results, and if not,
to determine any allocations by the
Commissioner that are consistent with
such other section 482 regulations.
(b) Cost sharing arrangement (CSA)—
(1) In general. A CSA to which the
provisions of this section apply is a
contractual agreement to share the costs
of developing one or more intangibles

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under which the controlled
participants—
(i) At the outset of the arrangement
divide among themselves all interests in
cost shared intangibles on a territorial
basis as described in paragraph (b)(4) of
this section;
(ii) Enter into and effect CSTs
covering all IDCs and PCTs covering all
external contributions, as described in
paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) of this
section, for purposes of developing the
cost shared intangibles under the CSA;
(iii) As a result, individually own and
exploit their respective interests in the
cost shared intangibles without any
further obligation to compensate one
another for such interests;
(iv) Substantially comply with the
CSA contractual requirements that are
described in paragraph (k)(1) of this
section;
(v) Substantially comply with the
CSA documentation requirements that
are described in paragraph (k)(2) of this
section;
(vi) Substantially comply with the
CSA accounting requirements that are
described in paragraph (k)(3) of this
section; and
(vii) Substantially comply with the
CSA reporting requirements that are
described in paragraph (k)(4) of this
section.
(2) CSTs—(i) In general. CSTs are
controlled transactions between or
among controlled participants in which
such participants share the IDCs of one
or more cost shared intangibles in
proportion to their respective RAB
shares from their individual
exploitation of their interests in the cost
shared intangibles that they obtain
under the CSA. Cost sharing payments
may not be paid in shares of stock in the
payor. See paragraphs (b)(4), (d), and (e)
of this section for the rules regarding
interests in cost shared intangibles,
IDCs, and RAB shares, respectively.
(ii) Example. The following example
illustrates the principles of this
paragraph (b)(2):
Example. Companies C and D, who are
members of the same controlled group, enter
into a CSA that is described in paragraph
(b)(1) of this section. In the first year of the
CSA, C and D conduct the IDA, as described
in paragraph (d)(1) of this section. The total
IDCs in regard to such activity are $3,000,000
of which C and D pay $2,000,000 and
$1,000,000, respectively, directly to third
parties. As between C and D, however, their
CSA specifies that they will share all IDCs in
accordance with their RAB shares (as
described in paragraph (e)(1) of this section),
which are 60% for C and 40% for D. It
follows that C should bear $1,800,000 of the
total IDCs (60% of total IDCs of $3,000,000)
and D should bear $1,200,000 of the total
IDCs (40% of total IDCs of $3,000,000). D

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51135

makes a CST payment to C of $200,000, that
is, the amount by which D’s share of IDCs in
accordance with its RAB share exceeds the
amount of IDCs initially borne by D
($1,200,000 ¥$1,000,000), and which also
equals the amount by which the total IDCs
initially borne by C exceeds its share of IDCs
in accordance with its RAB share ($2,000,000
¥$1,800,000). As a result of D’s CST
payment to C, C and D will bear amounts of
total IDCs in accordance with their respective
RAB shares.

(3) PCTs—(i) In general. A PCT is a
controlled transaction in which each
other controlled participant (PCT Payor)
is obligated to compensate a controlled
participant (PCT Payee) for an external
contribution of the PCT Payee.
(ii) External contributions. An
external contribution consists of the
rights set forth under the reference
transaction (RT) in any resource or
capability that is reasonably anticipated
to contribute to developing cost shared
intangibles and that a PCT Payee has
developed, maintained, or acquired
externally to (whether prior to or during
the course of) the CSA. For purposes of
this section, external contributions do
not include rights in depreciable
tangible property or land, and do not
include rights in other resources
acquired by IDCs. See paragraphs (b)(2)
and (d)(1) of this section.
(iii) PCT Payments. The arm’s length
amount of the compensation due under
a PCT (PCT Payment) will be
determined under a method pursuant to
paragraphs (a)(2) and (g) of this section
applicable to the RT, as described in
paragraph (b)(3)(iv) of this section. The
applicable method will yield a value for
the compensation obligation of each
PCT Payor consistent with the product
of the combined value to all controlled
participants of the external contribution
that is the subject of the PCT multiplied
by the PCT Payor’s RAB share.
(iv) Reference transaction (RT). An RT
is a transaction providing the benefits of
all rights (RT Rights), exclusively and
perpetually, in a resource or capability
described in paragraph (b)(3)(ii) of this
section, excluding any rights to exploit
an existing intangible without further
development. See paragraph (c) of this
section (Make-or-sell rights excluded). If
a resource or capability is reasonably
anticipated to contribute both to
developing or exploiting cost shared
intangibles and to other business
activities of the PCT Payee, other than
exploiting an existing intangible
without further development, then the
PCT Payment that would otherwise be
determined with reference to the RT
(which generally presumes a provision
of exclusive and perpetual rights) may
need to be prorated as described in

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paragraph (g)(2)(xi) of this section. For
purposes of § 1.482–1(b)(2)(ii) and
paragraph (a)(2) of this section, the
controlled participants must include the
type of transaction involved in the RT
as part of the documentation of the RT
required under paragraph (k)(2)(ii)(H) of
this section. If different economically
equivalent types of RTs are possible
with respect to the relevant resource or
capability, the controlled participants
may designate the type of transaction
involved in the RT. If the controlled
participants fail to make this
designation in their documentation, the
Commissioner may make a designation
consistent with the RT and other facts
and circumstances. While the PCT
Payee and PCT Payors must enter into
the PCT providing for the relevant
compensation obligation, they are not
required to actually enter into the RT
that is referenced for purposes of
determining the magnitude of the
compensation obligation under the PCT.
(v) PFAs. A post formation acquisition
(PFA) is an external contribution that is
acquired by a controlled participant in
an uncontrolled transaction that takes
place after the formation of the CSA and
that as of the date of acquisition is
reasonably anticipated to contribute to
developing cost shared intangibles.
Resources or capabilities may be
acquired in a PFA either directly, or
indirectly through the acquisition of an
interest in an entity or tier of entities.
(vi) Form of payment—(A) In general.
The consideration under a PCT for an
external contribution other than a PFA
may take one or a combination of both
of the following forms—
(1) Payments of a fixed amount, either
paid in a lump sum payment or in
installment payments spread over a
specified period, with interest
calculated in accordance with § 1.482–
2(a) (Loans or advances); or
(2) Payments contingent on the
exploitation of cost shared intangibles
by the PCT Payor. The form of payment
selected for any PCT, including the
basis and structure of the payments,
must be specified no later than the date
of that PCT.
(B) PFAs. The consideration under a
PCT for a PFA must be paid in the same
form as the uncontrolled transaction in
which the PFA was acquired.
(C) No PCT Payor Stock. PCT
Payments may not be paid in shares of
stock in the PCT Payor.
(vii) Date of a PCT. The controlled
participants must enter into a PCT as of
the earliest date on or after the CSA is
entered into on which the external
contribution is reasonably anticipated to
contribute to developing cost shared
intangibles.

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(viii) Examples. The following
examples illustrate the principles of this
paragraph (b)(3). In each example,
Companies P and S are members of the
same controlled group, and execute a
CSA that is described in paragraph
(b)(1) of this section. The examples are
as follows:
Example 1. Company P has developed and
currently markets version 1.0 of a new
software application XYZ. Company P and
Company S execute a CSA under which they
will share the IDCs for developing future
versions of XYZ. Version 1.0 is reasonably
anticipated to contribute to the development
of future versions of XYZ and therefore the
RT rights in version 1.0 constitute an external
contribution of Company P for which
compensation is due from Company S
pursuant to a PCT. The applicable method
and determination of the arm’s length
compensation due pursuant to the PCT will
be based on the RT. The controlled
participants designate the RT as a transfer of
intangibles that would otherwise be governed
by § 1.482–4, if entered into by controlled
parties. Accordingly, pursuant to paragraph
(a)(2) of this section, the applicable method
for determining the arm’s length value of the
compensation obligation under the PCT
between Company P and Company S will be
governed by § 1.482–4 as supplemented by
paragraph (g) of this section. The RT in this
case is the perpetual and exclusive provision
of the benefit of all rights in version 1.0,
other than the rights described in paragraph
(c) of this section (Make-or-sell rights
excluded). This includes the exclusive right
to use version 1.0 for purposes of research
and the right to exploit any products that
incorporated the platform technology of
version 1.0, and would cover a term
extending as long as the uncontrolled
taxpayer were to continue to exploit future
versions of XYZ or any other product based
on the version 1.0 platform. Though
Company P and Company S are not required
to actually enter into the transaction
described by the RT, the value of the
compensation obligation of Company S for
the PCT will reflect the full value of the
external contribution defined by the RT, as
limited by Company S’s RAB share.
Example 2. Company P and Company S
execute a CSA under which they will share
the IDCs for developing Vaccine Z. Company
P will commit its research team that has
successfully developed a number of other
vaccines to the project. The expertise and
existing integration of the research team is a
unique resource or capability of Company P
which is reasonably anticipated to contribute
to the development of Vaccine Z and
therefore the RT Rights in the research team
constitute an external contribution for which
compensation is due from Company S as part
of a PCT. The applicable method and
determination of the arm’s length
compensation due pursuant to the PCT will
be based on the RT. The controlled parties
designate the RT as a provision of services
that would otherwise be governed by
§ 1.482–2(b)(3)(first sentence) if entered into
by controlled parties. Accordingly, pursuant
to paragraph (a)(2) of this section, the

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applicable method for determining the arm’s
length value of the compensation obligation
under the PCT between Company P and
Company S will be governed by § 1.482–
2(b)(3)(first sentence) as supplemented by
paragraph (g) of this section. The RT in this
case is the perpetual and exclusive provision
of the benefits by Company P of its research
team to the development of Vaccine Z by the
uncontrolled party. Because the IDCs include
the ongoing compensation of the researchers,
the compensation obligation under the PCT
is only for the value of the commitment of
the research team by Company P to the CSA’s
development efforts net of such researcher
compensation. Though Company P and
Company S are not required to actually enter
into the transaction described by the RT, the
value of the compensation obligation of
Company S for the PCT will reflect the full
value of provision of services described in
the RT, as limited by Company S’s RAB
share.
Example 3. In Year 1, Company P and
Company S execute a CSA under which they
will share the IDCs for developing Product X.
In Year 3, Company P acquires technology
intangibles that it anticipates will contribute
to the development of Product X from an
uncontrolled party for a lump sum
consideration. Because the technology
intangibles are reasonably anticipated to
contribute to the development on the date of
the acquisition and the acquisition is an
uncontrolled transaction that takes place
after the formation of the CSA, the RT Rights
in the technology intangibles are an external
contribution acquired as part of a PFA.
Accordingly, Company P and Company S
must enter into a PCT in which Company S
compensates Company P for the RT Rights in
the technology intangibles and pursuant to
paragraph (b)(3)(vi)(B) of this section, the
form of payment of the PCT must mirror the
lump sum form of payment of the PFA.
Example 4. Assume the same facts as in
Example 3. In Year 4 Company P acquires
Company X in a tax-free stock-for-stock
acquisition. Company X is a start-up
technology company with negligible amounts
of tangible property and liabilities. Company
X joins in the filing of a U.S. consolidated
income tax return with USP and is treated as
one taxpayer with Company P under
paragraph (j)(2)(i) of this section.
Accordingly, under paragraph (b)(3)(v) of this
section, Company P’s acquisition of the stock
of Company X will be treated as an indirect
acquisition of the resources and capabilities
of Company X. The in-process technology
and workforce of Company X acquired by
Company P are reasonably anticipated to
contribute to the development of product Z
and therefore the RT Rights in the in-process
technology and workforce of Company X are
external contributions for which
compensation is due to Company P from
Company S under a PCT. Furthermore,
because these external contributions were
acquired by Company P in an uncontrolled
transaction that took place after the formation
of the CSA, they are also PFAs. Accordingly,
the consideration due from S under the PCT
must be paid in the same form of payment
as Company’s P acquisition of Company X,
which was done in a lump sum payment.

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Therefore, consideration for the PCT must be
paid in a lump sum.

(4) Territorial division of interests—(i)
In general. Pursuant to paragraph
(b)(1)(i) of this section, at the outset of
the CSA the controlled participants
must divide among themselves all
interests in cost shared intangibles on a
territorial basis as follows. The entire
world must be divided into two or more
non-overlapping geographic territories.
Each controlled participant must receive
at least one such territory, and in the
aggregate all the participants must
receive all such territories. Each
controlled participant must be entitled
to the perpetual and exclusive right to
the profits from transactions of any
member of the controlled group that
includes the controlled participant with
uncontrolled taxpayers regarding
property or services for use,
consumption, or disposition in such
controlled participant’s territory or
territories, to the extent that such profits
are attributable to cost shared
intangibles. Absent the controlled
participant’s or other member of its
controlled group’s actual knowledge or
reason to know otherwise, for purposes
of the preceding sentence such use,
consumption, or disposition of property
or services will be considered to occur
at the location(s) to which notices and
other communications to the
uncontrolled taxpayer(s) are to be
provided in accordance with the
contractual provisions of the relevant
transactions.
(ii) Example. The following example
illustrates the principles of this
paragraph (b)(4):
Example. Companies P and S, both
members of the same controlled group, enter
into a CSA to develop product Z. Under the
CSA, P receives the interest in product Z in
the United States and S receives the interest
in product Z in the rest of the world, as
described in paragraph (b)(4)(i) of this
section. Both P and S have plants for
manufacturing product Z located in their
respective geographic territories. However,
for commercial reasons product Z is
nevertheless manufactured by P in the
United States for sale to customers in certain
locations just outside the United States in
close proximity to P’s U.S. manufacturing
plant. Because S owns the territorial rights
outside the United States, intercompany
compensation must be provided for between
P and S to ensure that S realizes all the cost
shared intangible profits from sales of
product Z to customers in such proximate
areas, even though the manufacturing is done
by P in the United States. The pricing of such
intercompany compensation must also
ensure that P realizes an appropriate
manufacturing return for its efforts. Benefits
projected with respect to such sales will be
included for purposes of estimating S’s, but
not P’s, RAB share.

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(5) CSAs in substance or form—(i)
CSAs in substance. The Commissioner
may apply, consistently with the rules
of § 1.482–1(d)(3)(ii)(B) (Identifying
contractual terms), the rules of this
section to any arrangement that in
substance constitutes a CSA described
in paragraphs (b)(1)(i) through (iii) of
this section, notwithstanding a failure to
comply with any requirement of this
section.
(ii) CSAs in form. Provided the
requirements of paragraphs (b)(1)(iv)
through (vii) are met with respect to an
arrangement among controlled
taxpayers,
(A) The Commissioner must apply the
rules of this section to any such
arrangement that the controlled
taxpayers reasonably concluded to be a
CSA, as described in paragraph (b)(1) of
this section; and
(B) Otherwise, the Commissioner may
apply the rules of this section to any
other such arrangement.
(iii) Examples. The following
examples illustrate the principles of this
paragraph (b)(5). In the examples,
assume that Companies P and S are both
members of the same controlled group.
The examples are as follows:
Example 1. (i) P owns the patent on a
formula for a capsulated pain reliever, P-Cap.
P reasonably anticipates, pending further
research and experimentation, that the P-Cap
formula could form the platform for a
formula for P-Ves, an effervescent version of
P-Cap. P also owns proprietary software that
it reasonably anticipates to be critical to the
research efforts. P and S execute a CSA by
which they agree to proportionally share the
costs and risks of developing a formula for
P-Ves. The agreement reflects the various
contractual requirements described in
paragraph (k)(1) of this section and P and S
comply with the documentation, accounting
and reporting requirements of paragraphs
(k)(2) through (4) of this section. Both the
patent for P-Cap and the software are
reasonably anticipated to contribute to the
development of P-Ves and therefore are
external contributions for which
compensation is due from S as part of PCTs.
Though P and S enter into a PCT for the PCap patent, they fail to enter into a PCT for
the software.
(ii) In this case, P and S have substantially
complied with the contractual requirements
of paragraph (k)(1) of this section and the
documentation, accounting and reporting
requirements of paragraphs (k)(2) through (4)
of this section and therefore have met the
formal requirements of paragraphs (b)(1)(iv)
through (vii) of this section. However,
because they did not enter into a PCT, as
required under paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this
section, for the software that was reasonably
anticipated to be critical to the development
of P-Ves, they cannot reasonably conclude
that their arrangement was a CSA.
Accordingly, the Commissioner is not
required under paragraph (b)(5)(ii)(A) of this

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51137

section to apply the rules of this section to
their arrangement. Nevertheless, pursuant to
paragraph (b)(5)(ii)(B), the Commissioner
may apply the rules of this section and treat
P and S as entering into a PCT for the
software in accordance with the requirements
of paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section, and
make any appropriate allocations under
paragraph (i) of this section. Alternatively,
the Commissioner may decide that the
arrangement is not a CSA described in
paragraph (b)(1) of this section and therefore
that this section’s provisions do not apply in
determining whether the arrangement
reaches arm’s length results. In this case, the
arrangement would be analyzed under the
methods under the section 482 regulations,
without regard to this section, to determine
whether the arrangement reaches such
results.
Example 2. The facts are the same as
Example 1 except that P and S do enter into
a PCT for the software. Although the
Commissioner determines that the PCT
Payments for the software were not arm’s
length, nevertheless, under the facts and
circumstances at the time they entered into
the CSA and PCTs, P and S reasonably
concluded their arrangement to be a CSA.
Because P and S have met the requirements
of paragraphs (b)(1)(iv) through (vii) and
reasonably concluded their arrangement is a
CSA, pursuant to paragraph (b)(5)(ii)(A) of
this section, the Commissioner must apply
the rules of this section to their arrangement.
Accordingly, the Commissioner treats the
arrangement as a CSA and makes
adjustments to the PCT Payments as
appropriate under this section to achieve an
arm’s length result for the PCT for the
software.

(6) Treatment of CSAs. See
§ 301.7701–1(c) of this chapter for the
treatment of CSAs for purposes of the
Internal Revenue Code.
(c) Make-or-sell rights excluded—(1)
In general. Any right to exploit an
existing intangible without further
development, such as the right to make
or sell existing products, does not
constitute an external contribution to a
CSA, as described in paragraph (b)(3) of
this section. Thus, the arm’s length
compensation for such rights does not
satisfy the compensation obligation
under a PCT.
(2) Examples. The following examples
illustrate the principles of this
paragraph (c):
Example 1. P and S, who are members of
the same controlled group, execute a CSA
that is described in paragraph (b)(1) of this
section. Under the CSA, P and S will bear
their proportional shares of IDCs for
developing the second generation of ABC, a
computer software program. Prior to that
arrangement, P had incurred substantial costs
and risks to develop ABC. Concurrently with
entering into the arrangement, P (as the
licensor) executes a license with S (as the
licensee) by which S may make and sell
copies of the existing ABC. Such make-andsell rights do not constitute an external

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contribution to the CSA. The rules of
§§ 1.482–1 and 1.482–4 through 1.482–6,
without regard to the rules of this section,
must be applied to determine the arm’s
length consideration in connection with the
make-and-sell licensing arrangement. In
certain circumstances this determination of
the arm’s length consideration may be done
on an aggregate basis with the evaluation of
compensation obligations pursuant to PCTs
entered into by P and S in connection with
the CSA. See paragraph (g)(2)(v) of this
section.
Example 2. (i) P, a software company, has
developed and currently exploits software
program ABC. P and S enter into a CSA to
develop future generations of ABC. The ABC
source code is the platform on which future
generations of ABC will be built and is
therefore an external contribution of P for
which compensation is due from S pursuant
to a PCT. Concurrently with entering into the
CSA, P licenses to S the make-and-sell rights
for the current version of ABC. P has entered
into similar licenses with uncontrolled
parties calling for sales-based royalty
payments at a rate of 20%. The current
version of ABC has an expected product life
of three years. P and S enter into a contingent
payment agreement to cover both the PCT
Payments due from S for P’s external
contribution and for the make-and-sell
license. Based on the uncontrolled make-andsell licenses, P and S agree on a sales-based
royalty rate of 20% in Year 1 that declines
on a straight line basis to 0% over the 3 year
product life of ABC.
(ii) The make-and-sell rights for the current
version of ABC are not external
contributions, though paragraph (g)(2)(v) of
this section provides for the possibility that
the most reliable determination of an arm’s
length charge for the PCT and the make-andsell license may be one that values the two
transactions in the aggregate. A contingent
payment schedule based on the uncontrolled
make-and-sell licenses may provide an arm’s
length charge for the separate make-and-sell
license between P and S, provided the
royalty rates in the uncontrolled licenses
similarly decline, but as a measure of the
aggregate PCT and license payments it does
not account for the arm’s length value of P’s
external contributions which include the RT
Rights in the source code and future
development rights in ABC.

(d) Intangible development costs
(IDCs)—(1) Costs included in IDCs. For
purposes of this section, IDCs mean all
costs, in cash or in kind (including
stock-based compensation, as described
in paragraph (d)(3) of this section), but
excluding costs for land or depreciable
property, in the ordinary course of
business after the formation of a CSA
that, based on analysis of the facts and
circumstances, are directly identified
with, or are reasonably allocable to, the
activity under the CSA of developing or
attempting to develop intangibles (IDA).
IDCs shall also include the arm’s length
rental charge for the use of any land or
depreciable tangible property (as
determined under § 1.482–2(c) (Use of

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tangible property)) directly identified
with, or reasonably allocable to, the
IDA. Reference to generally accepted
accounting principles or federal income
tax accounting rules may provide a
useful starting point but will not be
conclusive regarding inclusion of costs
in IDCs. IDCs do not include interest
expense, foreign income taxes (as
defined in § 1.901–2(a)), or domestic
income taxes.
(2) Allocation of costs. If a particular
cost is reasonably allocable both to the
IDA and to other business activities, the
cost must be allocated on a reasonable
basis between the IDA and such other
business activities in proportion to the
relative economic value that the IDA
and such other business activities are
anticipated to derive over time as a
result of such cost.
(3) Stock-based compensation—(i) In
general. As used in this section, the
term stock-based compensation means
any compensation provided by a
controlled participant to an employee or
independent contractor in the form of
equity instruments, options to acquire
stock (stock options), or rights with
respect to (or determined by reference
to) equity instruments or stock options,
including but not limited to property to
which section 83 applies and stock
options to which section 421 applies,
regardless of whether ultimately settled
in the form of cash, stock, or other
property.
(ii) Identification of stock-based
compensation with the IDA. The
determination of whether stock-based
compensation is directly identified
with, or reasonably allocable to, the IDA
is made as of the date that the stockbased compensation is granted.
Accordingly, all stock-based
compensation that is granted during the
term of the CSA and, at date of grant,
is directly identified with, or reasonably
allocable to, the IDA is included as an
IDC under paragraph (d)(1) of this
section. In the case of a repricing or
other modification of a stock option, the
determination of whether the repricing
or other modification constitutes the
grant of a new stock option for purposes
of this paragraph (d)(3)(ii) will be made
in accordance with the rules of section
424(h) and related regulations.
(iii) Measurement and timing of stockbased compensation IDC—(A) In
general. Except as otherwise provided
in this paragraph (d)(3)(iii), the cost
attributable to stock-based
compensation is equal to the amount
allowable to the controlled participant
as a deduction for federal income tax
purposes with respect to that stockbased compensation (for example, under
section 83(h)) and is taken into account

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as an IDC under this section for the
taxable year for which the deduction is
allowable.
(1) Transfers to which section 421
applies. Solely for purposes of this
paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(A), section 421 does
not apply to the transfer of stock
pursuant to the exercise of an option
that meets the requirements of section
422(a) or 423(a).
(2) Deductions of foreign controlled
participants. Solely for purposes of this
paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(A), an amount is
treated as an allowable deduction of a
controlled participant to the extent that
a deduction would be allowable to a
United States taxpayer.
(3) Modification of stock option.
Solely for purposes of this paragraph
(d)(3)(iii)(A), if the repricing or other
modification of a stock option is
determined, under paragraph (d)(3)(ii)
of this section, to constitute the grant of
a new stock option not identified with,
or reasonably allocable to, the IDA, the
stock option that is repriced or
otherwise modified will be treated as
being exercised immediately before the
modification, provided that the stock
option is then exercisable and the fair
market value of the underlying stock
then exceeds the price at which the
stock option is exercisable. Accordingly,
the amount of the deduction that would
be allowable (or treated as allowable
under this paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(A)) to
the controlled participant upon exercise
of the stock option immediately before
the modification must be taken into
account as an IDC as of the date of the
modification.
(4) Expiration or termination of CSA.
Solely for purposes of this paragraph
(d)(3)(iii)(A), if an item of stock-based
compensation identified with, or
reasonably allocable to, the IDA is not
exercised during the term of a CSA, that
item of stock-based compensation will
be treated as being exercised
immediately before the expiration or
termination of the CSA, provided that
the stock-based compensation is then
exercisable and the fair market value of
the underlying stock then exceeds the
price at which the stock-based
compensation is exercisable.
Accordingly, the amount of the
deduction that would be allowable (or
treated as allowable under this
paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(A)) to the
controlled participant upon exercise of
the stock-based compensation must be
taken into account as an IDC as of the
date of the expiration or termination of
the CSA.
(B) Election with respect to options on
publicly traded stock—(1) In general.
With respect to stock-based
compensation in the form of options on

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publicly traded stock, the controlled
participants in a CSA may elect to take
into account all IDCs attributable to
those stock options in the same amount,
and as of the same time, as the fair value
of the stock options reflected as a charge
against income in audited financial
statements or disclosed in footnotes to
such financial statements, provided that
such statements are prepared in
accordance with United States generally
accepted accounting principles by or on
behalf of the company issuing the
publicly traded stock.
(2) Publicly traded stock. As used in
this paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(B), the term
publicly traded stock means stock that
is regularly traded on an established
United States securities market and is
issued by a company whose financial
statements are prepared in accordance
with United States generally accepted
accounting principles for the taxable
year.
(3) Generally accepted accounting
principles. For purposes of this
paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(B), a financial
statement prepared in accordance with
a comprehensive body of generally
accepted accounting principles other
than United States generally accepted
accounting principles is considered to
be prepared in accordance with United
States generally accepted accounting
principles provided that either—
(i) The fair value of the stock options
under consideration is reflected in the
reconciliation between such other
accounting principles and United States
generally accepted accounting
principles required to be incorporated
into the financial statement by the
securities laws governing companies
whose stock is regularly traded on
United States securities markets; or
(ii) In the absence of a reconciliation
between such other accounting
principles and United States generally
accepted accounting principles that
reflects the fair value of the stock
options under consideration, such other
accounting principles require that the
fair value of the stock options under
consideration be reflected as a charge
against income in audited financial
statements or disclosed in footnotes to
such statements.
(4) Time and manner of making the
election. The election described in this
paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(B) is made by an
explicit reference to the election in the
written CSA required by paragraph
(k)(1) of this section or in a written
amendment to the CSA entered into
with the consent of the Commissioner
pursuant to paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(C) of
this section. In the case of a CSA in
existence on August 26, 2003, the
election by written amendment to the

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CSA may be made without the consent
of the Commissioner if such amendment
is entered into not later than the latest
due date (with regard to extensions) of
a federal income tax return of any
controlled participant for the first
taxable year beginning after August 26,
2003.
(C) Consistency. Generally, all
controlled participants in a CSA taking
options on publicly traded stock into
account under paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(A) or
(d)(3)(iii)(B) of this section must use that
same method of measurement and
timing for all options on publicly traded
stock with respect to that CSA.
Controlled participants may change
their method only with the consent of
the Commissioner and only with respect
to stock options granted during taxable
years subsequent to the taxable year in
which the Commissioner’s consent is
obtained. All controlled participants in
the CSA must join in requests for the
Commissioner’s consent under this
paragraph. Thus, for example, if the
controlled participants make the
election described in paragraph
(d)(3)(iii)(B) of this section upon the
formation of the CSA, the election may
be revoked only with the consent of the
Commissioner, and the consent will
apply only to stock options granted in
taxable years subsequent to the taxable
year in which consent is obtained.
Similarly, if controlled participants
already have granted stock options that
have been or will be taken into account
under the general rule of paragraph
(d)(3)(iii)(A) of this section, then except
in cases specified in the last sentence of
paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(B)(4) of this section,
the controlled participants may make
the election described in paragraph
(d)(3)(iii)(B) of this section only with the
consent of the Commissioner, and the
consent will apply only to stock options
granted in taxable years subsequent to
the taxable year in which consent is
obtained.
(4) IDC share. A controlled
participant’s IDC share for a taxable year
is equal to the controlled participant’s
cost contribution for the taxable year,
divided by the sum of all IDCs for the
taxable year. A controlled participant’s
cost contribution for a taxable year
means all of the IDCs initially borne by
the controlled participant, plus all of the
cost sharing payments that the
participant makes to other controlled
participants, minus all of the cost
sharing payments that the participant
receives from other controlled
participants.
(5) Examples. The following examples
illustrate this paragraph (d):

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51139

Example 1. Foreign parent (FP) and its U.S.
subsidiary (USS) enter into a CSA to develop
a better mousetrap. USS and FP share the
costs of FP’s R&D facility that will be
exclusively dedicated to this research, the
salaries of the researchers, and reasonable
overhead costs attributable to the project.
They also share the cost of a conference
facility that is at the disposal of the senior
executive management of each company.
Based on the facts and circumstances, the
cost of the conference facility cannot be
directly identified with, and is not
reasonably allocable to, the IDA. In this case,
the cost of the conference facility must be
excluded from the amount of IDCs.
Example 2. U.S. parent (USP) and its
foreign subsidiary (FS) enter into a CSA to
develop intangibles for producing a new
device. USP and FS share the costs of an R&D
facility, the salaries of the facility’s
researchers, and reasonable overhead costs
attributable to the project. Although USP also
incurs costs related to field testing of the
device, USP does not include those costs in
the IDCs that USP and FS will share under
the CSA. The Commissioner may determine,
based on the facts and circumstances, that
the costs of field testing are IDCs that the
participants must share.
Example 3. U.S. parent (USP) and its
foreign subsidiary (FS) enter into a CSA to
develop a new process patent. USP employs
researchers who perform R&D functions in
connection both with the development of the
new process patent and with the
development of a new design patent the
development of which is outside the scope of
the CSA. During years covered by the CSA,
USP compensates such employees with cash
salaries, stock-based compensation, or a
combination of both. USP and FS anticipate
that the economic value attributable to such
employees will be derived from the process
patent and the design patent at a relative
proportion of 75% and 25%, respectively.
Applying the principles of paragraph (d)(2) of
this section, 75% of the compensation of
such employees must be allocated to the
development of the new process patent and,
thus, treated as IDCs. With respect to the cash
salary compensation, the IDC is 75% of the
face value of the cash. With respect to the
stock-based compensation, the IDC is 75% of
the value of the stock-based compensation as
determined under paragraph (d)(3)(iii) of this
section.
Example 4. Foreign parent (FP) and its U.S.
subsidiary (USS) enter into a CSA to develop
a new computer source code. FP’s executive
officers who oversee a research facility and
employees dedicated solely to the IDA have
additional responsibilities, including
oversight of other research facilities and
employees not in any way relevant to the
development of the new computer source
code. The full amount of the costs of the
research facility and employees dedicated
solely to the IDA can be directly identified
with the IDA and, therefore, are IDCs. In
addition, the participants determine that, of
the economic value attributable to the
executive officers, the new computer source
code’s share is 50%. Applying the principles
of paragraph (d)(2) of this section, 50% of the
compensation of such executives must be

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allocated to the development of the new
computer source code and, thus, treated as
IDCs.

(e) Reasonably anticipated benefits
share (RAB share)—(1) In general. A
controlled participant’s share of
reasonably anticipated benefits (RAB
share) is equal to its reasonably
anticipated benefits divided by the sum
of the reasonably anticipated benefits of
all the controlled participants. See
paragraph (j)(1)(v) of this section
(defining reasonably anticipated
benefits). RAB shares must be updated
to account for changes in economic
conditions, the business operations and
practices of the participants, and the
ongoing development of intangibles
under the CSA. For purposes of
determining RAB shares at any given
time, reasonably anticipated benefits
must be estimated over the entire
period, past and future, of exploitation
of the cost shared intangibles, and must
reflect appropriate updates to take into
account the most current reliable data
regarding past and projected future
results as is available at such time. A
controlled participant’s RAB share must
be determined by using the most
reliable estimate. In determining which
of two or more available estimates is
most reliable, the quality of the data and
assumptions used in the analysis must
be taken into account, consistent with
§ 1.482–1(c)(2)(ii) (Data and
assumptions). Thus, the reliability of an
estimate will depend largely on the
completeness and accuracy of the data,
the soundness of the assumptions, and
the relative effects of particular
deficiencies in data or assumptions on
different estimates. If two estimates are
equally reliable, no adjustment should
be made based on differences in the
results. The following factors will be
particularly relevant in determining the
reliability of an estimate of RAB
shares—
(A) The basis used for measuring
benefits, as described in paragraph
(e)(2)(i) of this section; and
(B) The projections used to estimate
benefits, as described in paragraph
(e)(2)(iii) of this section.
(2) Measure of benefits—(i) In general.
In order to estimate a controlled
participant’s RAB share, the amount of
each controlled participant’s reasonably
anticipated benefits must be measured
on a basis that is consistent for all such
participants. See paragraph (e)(2)(ii)(E)
Example 8 of this section. If a controlled
participant transfers a cost shared
intangible to another controlled
taxpayer, other than by way of a transfer
described in paragraph (f) of this
section, that participant’s benefits from
the transferred intangible must be

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measured by reference to the
transferee’s benefits, disregarding any
consideration paid by the transferee to
the controlled participant (such as a
royalty pursuant to a license agreement).
Reasonably anticipated benefits are
measured either on a direct basis, by
reference to estimated benefits to be
generated by the use of cost shared
intangibles, or on an indirect basis, by
reference to certain measurements that
reasonably can be assumed to be related
to benefits to be generated. Such
indirect bases of measurement of
anticipated benefits are described in
paragraph (e)(2)(ii) of this section. A
controlled participant’s reasonably
anticipated benefits must be measured
on the basis, whether direct or indirect,
that most reliably determines RAB
shares. In determining which of two
bases of measurement is most reliable,
the factors set forth in § 1.482–1(c)(2)(ii)
(Data and assumptions) must be taken
into account. It normally will be
expected that the basis that provided the
most reliable estimate for a particular
year will continue to provide the most
reliable estimate in subsequent years,
absent a material change in the factors
that affect the reliability of the estimate.
Regardless of whether a direct or
indirect basis of measurement is used,
adjustments may be required to account
for material differences in the activities
that controlled participants undertake to
exploit their interests in cost shared
intangibles. See Example 6 of paragraph
(e)(2)(ii)(E) of this section.
(ii) Indirect bases for measuring
anticipated benefits. Indirect bases for
measuring anticipated benefits from
participation in a CSA include the
following:
(A) Units used, produced, or sold.
Units of items used, produced, or sold
by each controlled participant in the
business activities in which cost shared
intangibles are exploited may be used as
an indirect basis for measuring its
anticipated benefits. This basis of
measurement will more reliably
determine RAB shares to the extent that
each controlled participant is expected
to have a similar increase in net profit
or decrease in net loss attributable to the
cost shared intangibles per unit of the
item or items used, produced, or sold.
This circumstance is most likely to arise
when the cost shared intangibles are
exploited by the controlled participants
in the use, production, or sale of
substantially uniform items under
similar economic conditions.
(B) Sales. Sales by each controlled
participant in the business activities in
which cost shared intangibles are
exploited may be used as an indirect
basis for measuring its anticipated

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benefits. This basis of measurement will
more reliably determine RAB shares to
the extent that each controlled
participant is expected to have a similar
increase in net profit or decrease in net
loss attributable to cost shared
intangibles per dollar of sales. This
circumstance is most likely to arise if
the costs of exploiting cost shared
intangibles are not substantial relative to
the revenues generated, or if the
principal effect of using cost shared
intangibles is to increase the controlled
participants’ revenues (for example,
through a price premium on the
products they sell) without affecting
their costs substantially. Sales by each
controlled participant are unlikely to
provide a reliable basis for measuring
RAB shares unless each controlled
participant operates at the same market
level (for example, manufacturing,
distribution, etc.).
(C) Operating profit. Operating profit
of each controlled participant from the
activities in which cost shared
intangibles are exploited, as determined
before any expense (including
amortization) on account of IDCS, may
be used as an indirect basis for
measuring anticipated benefits. This
basis of measurement will more reliably
determine RAB shares to the extent that
such profit is largely attributable to the
use of cost shared intangibles, or if the
share of profits attributable to the use of
cost shared intangibles is expected to be
similar for each controlled participant.
This circumstance is most likely to arise
when cost shared intangibles are closely
associated with the activity that
generates the profit and the activity
could not be carried on or would
generate little profit without use of
those intangibles.
(D) Other bases for measuring
anticipated benefits. Other bases for
measuring anticipated benefits may, in
some circumstances, be appropriate, but
only to the extent that there is expected
to be a reasonably identifiable
relationship between the basis of
measurement used and additional
income generated or costs saved by the
use of cost shared intangibles. For
example, a division of costs based on
employee compensation would be
considered unreliable unless there were
a relationship between the amount of
compensation and the expected income
of the controlled participants from using
the cost shared intangibles.
(E) Examples. The following examples
illustrate this paragraph (e)(2)(ii):
Example 1. Foreign Parent (FP) and U.S.
Subsidiary (USS) both produce a feedstock
for the manufacture of various highperformance plastic products. Producing the
feedstock requires large amounts of

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electricity, which accounts for a significant
portion of its production cost. FP and USS
enter into a CSA to develop a new process
that will reduce the amount of electricity
required to produce a unit of the feedstock.
FP and USS currently both incur an
electricity cost of $2 per unit of feedstock
produced and rates for each are expected to
remain similar in the future. The new
process, if it is successful, will reduce the
amount of electricity required by each
company to produce a unit of the feedstock
by 50%. Therefore, the cost savings each
company is expected to achieve after
implementing the new process are $1 per
unit of feedstock produced. Under the CSA,
FP and USS divide the costs of developing
the new process based on the units of the
feedstock each is anticipated to produce in
the future. In this case, units produced is the
most reliable basis for measuring RAB shares
and dividing the IDCs because each
controlled participant is expected to have a
similar $1 (50% of current charge of $2)
decrease in costs per unit of the feedstock
produced.
Example 2. The facts are the same as in
Example 1, except that currently USS pays
$3 per unit of feedstock produced for
electricity while FP pays $6 per unit of
feedstock produced. In this case, units
produced is not the most reliable basis for
measuring RAB shares and dividing the IDCs
because the participants do not expect to
have a similar decrease in costs per unit of
the feedstock produced. The Commissioner
determines that the most reliable measure of
RAB shares may be based on units of the
feedstock produced if FP’s units are weighted
relative to USS’ units by a factor of 2. This
reflects the fact that FP pays twice as much
as USS as a percentage of its other
production costs for electricity and,
therefore, FP’s savings of $3 per unit of the
feedstock (50% reduction of current charge of
$6) would be twice USS’s savings of $1.50
per unit of feedstock (50% reduction of
current charge of $3) from any new process
eventually developed.
Example 3. The facts are the same as in
Example 2, except that to supply the
particular needs of the U.S. market USS
manufactures the feedstock with somewhat
different properties than FP’s feedstock. This
requires USS to employ a somewhat different
production process than does FP. Because of
this difference, it will be more costly for USS
to adopt any new process that may be
developed under the cost sharing agreement.
In this case, units produced is not the most
reliable basis for measuring RAB shares. In
order to reliably determine RAB shares, the
Commissioner offsets the reasonably
anticipated costs of adopting the new process
against the reasonably anticipated total
savings in electricity costs.
Example 4. U.S. Parent (USP) and Foreign
Subsidiary (FS) enter into a CSA to develop
new anesthetic drugs. USP obtains the right
to use any resulting patent in the U.S.
market, and FS obtains the right to use the
patent in the rest of the world. USP and FS
divide costs on the basis of anticipated
operating profit from each patent under
development. USP anticipates that it will
receive a much higher profit than FS per unit

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sold because drug prices are uncontrolled in
the United States, whereas drug prices are
regulated in many non-U.S. jurisdictions. In
both controlled participants’ territories, the
operating profits are almost entirely
attributable to the use of the cost shared
intangible. In this case, the controlled
participants’ basis for measuring RAB shares
is the most reliable.
Example 5. (i) Foreign Parent (FP) and U.S.
Subsidiary (USS) both manufacture and sell
fertilizers. They enter into a CSA to develop
a new pellet form of a common agricultural
fertilizer that is currently available only in
powder form. Under the CSA, USS obtains
the rights to produce and sell the new form
of fertilizer for the U.S. market while FP
obtains the rights to produce and sell the
fertilizer for the rest of the world. The costs
of developing the new form of fertilizer are
divided on the basis of the anticipated sales
of fertilizer in the controlled participants’
respective markets.
(ii) If the research and development is
successful, the pellet form will deliver the
fertilizer more efficiently to crops and less
fertilizer will be required to achieve the same
effect on crop growth. The pellet form of
fertilizer can be expected to sell at a price
premium over the powder form of fertilizer
based on the savings in the amount of
fertilizer that needs to be used. This price
premium will be a similar premium per
dollar of sales in each territory. If the
research and development is successful, the
costs of producing pellet fertilizer are
expected to be approximately the same as the
costs of producing powder fertilizer and the
same for both FP and USS. Both FP and USS
operate at approximately the same market
levels, selling their fertilizers largely to
independent distributors.
(iii) In this case, the controlled
participants’ basis for measuring RAB shares
is the most reliable.
Example 6. The facts are the same as in
Example 5, except that FP distributes its
fertilizers directly while USS sells to
independent distributors. In this case, sales
of USS and FP are not the most reliable basis
for measuring RAB shares unless adjustments
are made to account for the difference in
market levels at which the sales occur.
Example 7. Foreign Parent (FP) and U.S.
Subsidiary (USS) enter into a CSA to develop
materials that will be used to train all new
entry-level employees. FP and USS
determine that the new materials will save
approximately ten hours of training time per
employee. Because their entry-level
employees are paid on differing wage scales,
FP and USS decide that they should not
measure benefits based on the number of
entry-level employees hired by each. Rather,
they measure benefits based on
compensation paid to the entry-level
employees hired by each. In this case, the
basis used for measuring RAB shares is the
most reliable because there is a direct
relationship between compensation paid to
new entry-level employees and costs saved
by FP and USS from the use of the new
training materials.
Example 8. U.S. Parent (USP), Foreign
Subsidiary 1 (FS1) and Foreign Subsidiary 2

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(FS2) enter into a CSA to develop computer
software that each will market and install on
customers’ computer systems. The controlled
participants measure benefits on the basis of
projected sales by USP, FS1, and FS2 of the
software in their respective geographic areas.
However, FS1 plans not only to sell but also
to license the software to unrelated
customers, and FS1’s licensing income
(which is a percentage of the licensees’ sales)
is not counted in the projected benefits. In
this case, the basis used for measuring the
benefits of each controlled participant is not
the most reliable because all of the benefits
received by controlled participants are not
taken into account. In order to reliably
determine RAB shares, FS1’s projected
benefits from licensing must be included in
the measurement on a basis that is the same
as that used to measure its own and the other
controlled participants’ projected benefits
from sales (for example, all controlled
participants might measure their benefits on
the basis of operating profit).

(iii) Projections used to estimate
benefits—(A) In general. The reliability
of an estimate of RAB shares also
depends upon the reliability of
projections used in making the estimate.
Projections required for this purpose
generally include a determination of the
time period between the inception of
the research and development activities
under the CSA and the receipt of
benefits, a projection of the time over
which benefits will be received, and a
projection of the benefits anticipated for
each year in which it is anticipated that
the cost shared intangible will generate
benefits. A projection of the relevant
basis for measuring anticipated benefits
may require a projection of the factors
that underlie it. For example, a
projection of operating profits may
require a projection of sales, cost of
sales, operating expenses, and other
factors that affect operating profits. If it
is anticipated that there will be
significant variation among controlled
participants in the timing of their
receipt of benefits, and consequently
benefit shares are expected to vary
significantly over the years in which
benefits will be received, it normally
will be necessary to use the present
discounted value of the projected
benefits to reliably determine RAB
shares. See paragraph (g)(2)(vi) of this
section for guidance on discount rates
used for this purpose. If it is not
anticipated that benefit shares will
significantly change over time, current
annual benefit shares may provide a
reliable projection of RAB shares. This
circumstance is most likely to occur
when the CSA is a long-term
arrangement, the arrangement covers a
wide variety of intangibles, the
composition of the cost shared
intangibles is unlikely to change, the
cost shared intangibles are unlikely to

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generate unusual profits, and each
controlled participant’s share of the
market is stable.
(B) Examples. The following
examples illustrate the principles of this
paragraph (e)(2)(iii):
Example 1. (i) Foreign Parent (FP) and U.S.
Subsidiary (USS) enter into a CSA to develop
a new car model. The controlled participants
plan to spend four years developing the new
model and four years producing and selling
the new model. USS and FP project total
sales of $4 billion and $2 billion,
respectively, over the planned four years of
exploitation of the new model. Cost shares
are divided for each year based on projected
total sales. Therefore, USS bears 662⁄3% of
each year’s IDCs and FP bears 331⁄3% of such
costs.
(ii) USS typically begins producing and
selling new car models a year after FP begins
producing and selling new car models. In
order to reflect USS’ one-year lag in
introducing new car models, a more reliable
projection of each participant’s RAB share
would be based on a projection of all four
years of sales for each participant, discounted
to present value.
Example 2. U.S. Parent (USP) and Foreign
Subsidiary (FS) enter into a CSA to develop
new and improved household cleaning
products. Both controlled participants have
sold household cleaning products for many
years and have stable market shares. The
products under development are unlikely to
produce unusual profits for either controlled
participant. The controlled participants
divide costs on the basis of each controlled
participant’s current sales of household
cleaning products. In this case, the controlled
participants’ RAB shares are reliably
projected by current sales of cleaning
products.
Example 3. The facts are the same as in
Example 2, except that FS’s market share is
rapidly expanding because of the business
failure of a competitor in its geographic area.
The controlled participants’ RAB shares are
not reliably projected by current sales of
cleaning products. FS’s benefit projections
should take into account its growth in sales.
Example 4. Foreign Parent (FP) and U.S.
Subsidiary (USS) enter into a CSA to develop
synthetic fertilizers and insecticides. FP and
USS share costs on the basis of each
controlled participant’s current sales of
fertilizers and insecticides. The market
shares of the controlled participants have
been stable for fertilizers, but FP’s market
share for insecticides has been expanding.
The controlled participants’ projections of
RAB shares are reliable with regard to
fertilizers, but not reliable with regard to
insecticides; a more reliable projection of
RAB shares would take into account the
expanding market share for insecticides.

(f) Changes in participation under a
CSA—In the case of any change in
participation under a CSA as the result
of a controlled transfer of all or part of
a controlled participant’s territorial
rights under the CSA, as described in
paragraph (b)(4) of this section, along

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with the assumption by the transferee of
the associated obligations under the
CSA, the transferee will be treated as
succeeding to the transferor’s prior
history under the CSA, including the
transferor’s cost contributions, benefits
derived, and PCT Payments attributable
to such rights or obligations. The
transferor must receive an arm’s length
amount of consideration from the
transferee under the rules of §§ 1.482–1
and 1.482–4 through 1.482–6, as
described in paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this
section. For purposes of this section,
such a change in participation under a
CSA includes, for example, any
transaction in which—
(1) A controlled participant transfers
all or part of its territorial rights to
another controlled participant that
assumes the associated obligations
under a CSA;
(2) A new controlled participant
enters an ongoing CSA and acquires any
territorial rights and assumes associated
obligations under the CSA; or
(3) A controlled participant
withdraws from an ongoing CSA, or
otherwise abandons or relinquishes
territorial rights and associated
obligations under the CSA.
(g) Supplemental guidance on
methods applicable to PCTs—(1) In
general. This subsection provides
supplemental guidance on applying the
methods listed below for purposes of
evaluating the arm’s length amount
charged in a PCT. Each method must be
applied in accordance with the
provisions of § 1.482–1, including best
method rule of § 1.482–1(c), the
comparability analysis of § 1.482–1(d),
and the arm’s length range of § 1.482–
1(e), except as those provisions are
modified in this subsection. The
methods are—
(i) The comparable uncontrolled
transaction method described in
§ 1.482–4(c), or the arm’s length charge
described in § 1.482–2(b)(3)(first
sentence) based on a comparable
uncontrolled transaction, further
described in paragraph (g)(3) of this
section;
(ii) The income method, described in
paragraph (g)(4) of this section;
(iii) The acquisition price method,
described in paragraph (g)(5) of this
section;
(iv) The market capitalization method,
described in paragraph (g)(6) of this
section;
(v) The residual profit split method,
described in paragraph (g)(7) of this
section; and
(vi) Unspecified methods, described
in paragraph (g)(8) of this section.
(2) General principles—(i) In general.
The principles set forth in this

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paragraph (g)(2) apply, as appropriate,
to the use of any of the methods set
forth in this section to determine the
arm’s length charge for a PCT.
(ii) Valuations consistent with upfront
contractual terms and risk allocations.
The application of any method as of any
time must be consistent with the
applicable contractual terms and
allocation of risk under the CSA and
this section among the controlled
participants as of the date of the PCT,
unless there has been a change in such
terms or allocation made in return for
arm’s length consideration.
(iii) Projections. The reliability of an
estimate of the value of an external
contribution in connection with a PCT
will often depend upon the reliability of
projections used in making the estimate.
Projections necessary for this purpose
may include a projection of sales, IDCs,
routine operating expenses, and costs of
sales. For these purposes, projections
that have been prepared for non-tax
purposes are generally more reliable
than projections that have been
prepared solely for purposes of meeting
the requirements in this paragraph (g).
(iv) Realistic alternatives—(A) In
general. Regardless of the method or
methods used, evaluation of the arm’s
length charge for the PCT in question
should take into account the general
principle that uncontrolled taxpayers
dealing at arm’s length would have
evaluated the terms of a transaction, and
only entered into a particular
transaction, if no alternative is
preferable. This condition is not met, for
example, where for any controlled
participant the total anticipated present
value from entering into the CSA to that
controlled participant, as of the date of
the PCT, is less than the total
anticipated present value that could be
achieved through an alternative
arrangement realistically available to
that controlled participant. When
applying the realistic alternatives
principle, the reliability of the
respective net present value calculations
may need to be considered.
(B) Examples. The following
examples illustrate the principles of this
paragraph (g)(2)(iv):
Example 1. (i) P, a corporation, and S, a
wholly-owned subsidiary of P, enter into a
CSA to develop a gyroscopic personal
transportation device (the product). Under
the arrangement, P will undertake all of the
R&D, and manufacture and market the
product in Country X. S will make CST
payments to P for its appropriate share of P’s
R&D costs, and manufacture and market the
product in the rest of the world. P owns
existing patents and trade secrets associated
with gyroscopic applications. These patents
and trade secrets are reasonably anticipated
to contribute to the development of the

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product and are therefore the RT Rights in
the patents and trade secrets are external
contributions for which compensation is due
from S as part of a PCT.
(ii) S’s manufacturing and distribution
activities under the CSA will be routine in
nature, and identical to the activities it
would undertake if it alternatively licensed
the product from P.
(iii) Reasonably reliable estimates indicate
that P could self-develop and license the
product outside of the Country X for a royalty
of 20% of sales. Based on reliable financial
projections that include all future
development costs and licensing revenue, the
net present value of this licensing alternative
to P for the non-Country X market (measured
as of the date of the PCT) would be $500
million of operating income. Thus, based on
this realistic alternative, the anticipated net
present value under the CSA to P in the nonCountry X market (measured as of the date
of the PCT), including R&D reimbursement
and PCT Payments from S, should not be less
than $500 million.
Example 2. (i) The facts are the same as
Example 1, except that there are no reliable
estimates of the value to P from the licensing
alternative to the CSA. However, reasonably
reliable estimates indicate that S can earn a
10% mark-up on total accounting costs
related to its routine manufacturing and
distribution activities.
(ii) P undertakes an economic analysis that
derives S’s cost contributions under the CSA,
based on reliable financial projections. Based
on this and further economic analysis, P
determines S’s PCT Payment as a certain
lump sum amount to be paid as of the date
of the PCT.
(iii) Based on reliable financial projections
that include S’s cost contributions and that
incorporate S’s PCT Payment, and using a
discount rate of D%, appropriate for the
riskiness of the CSA (see paragraph (g)(2)(vi)
of this section), the anticipated net present
value to S under the CSA (measured at the
time of the PCT) is $800 million. Of this
amount, $100 million is the portion
associated with the 10% markup on S’s total
accounting costs from its manufacturing and
distribution activities, utilizing its existing
investment in plant and equipment.
(iv) In evaluating the PCT under the CSA,
the Commissioner concludes that the
respective activities undertaken by P and S
would be identical regardless of whether the
arrangement was undertaken as a CSA or as
a licensing arrangement. That is, under either
alternative, P would undertake all research
activities and S would undertake routine
manufacturing and distribution activities
associated with its territory. Consequently, in
every year the total anticipated combined
nominal profits of P and S would be identical
regardless of whether the arrangement was
undertaken as a CSA or as a licensing
arrangement. In addition, the Commissioner
considers the fact that S’s economic role in
the CSA (beyond its routine activities) is
merely that of an investor. A similarly
situated investor would be willing to invest
an amount in a similar R&D project such that
it earns an anticipated return on that
investment of D% and therefore has a net
present value of $0 on the project (not taking

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into account any returns to routine
activities). If S were to realize a D% return
on its lump sum PCT Payment, then the
anticipated net present value to S of the CSA
would be $100 million, equal to the $100
million anticipated net present value related
to S’s manufacturing and distribution
activities, utilizing its existing investment in
plant and equipment, plus the $0 anticipated
net present value from the investment in the
form of the lump sum PCT Payment in the
IDA of the CSA at a D% discount rate.
(v) The lump sum PCT Payment computed
by P results in S having significantly higher
anticipated discounted profitability, and
therefore, in this case, higher anticipated
nominal profitability, than it could achieve
under the licensing alternative. By
implication, P must correspondingly earn
lower nominal profits under the CSA than it
would under the licensing alternative (that is,
S’s enhanced profitability under the CSA is
matched dollar-for-dollar by P’s reduced
profitability under the CSA). Consequently,
the Commissioner concludes that P is earning
a lower anticipated return through the CSA
than it could achieve under its realistic
alternative to the CSA, and that consequently
S’s lump sum PCT Payment undercompensates P for its external contribution.
Example 3. (i) The facts are the same as
Example 2 except as follows. Based on
reliable financial projections that include S’s
cost contributions and S’s PCT Payment,
discounted at a rate of D% to reflect the
riskiness of the CSA, the anticipated net
present value to S under the CSA (measured
as of the date of the PCT) is $50 million.
Instead of entering the CSA, S has the
realistic alternative of investing in an R&D
project with similar risk, at an anticipated
return of D%, and manufacturing and
distributing products unrelated to the
gyroscopic personal transportation device to
the same extent as its manufacturing and
distribution under the CSA, with the same
anticipated 10% mark-up on total costs.
(ii) Under its realistic alternative, at a
discount rate of D%, S anticipates a present
value of $100 million from the routine
manufacturing and distribution and $0 from
the R&D investment, for a total of $100
million.
(iii) Because the lump sum PCT Payment
made by S results in S having a considerably
lower anticipated net present value than S
could achieve through an alternative
arrangement realistically available to it, the
Commissioner may conclude that the lump
sum PCT Payment overcompensates P for its
external contribution.

(v) Aggregation of transactions. In
some cases, controlled participants are
required to determine arm’s length
payments for multiple PCTs covering
various external contributions or, in
addition to one or more PCTs, for
transactions covering resources or
capabilities that are not governed by this
section, such as the transfer of make-orsell rights as described in paragraph (c)
of this section. Following the principles
of aggregation described in § 1.482–
1(f)(2)(i), a best method analysis under

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§ 1.482–1(c) may determine that the
method that provides the most reliable
measure of an arm’s length charge for
the multiple PCTs and other
transactions not governed by this
section, if any, is a method that
determines the arm’s length charge for
the multiple transactions on an
aggregate basis under this section. A
section 482 adjustment may be made by
comparing the aggregate arm’s length
charge so determined to the aggregate
payments actually made for the multiple
transactions. In such a case, it generally
will not be necessary to allocate
separately the aggregate arm’s length
charge as between various PCTs or as
between PCTs and transactions
governed by other regulations under
section 482. However, such an
allocation may be necessary for other
purposes, such as applying paragraph
(i)(6) (Periodic adjustments) of this
section. An aggregate determination of
the arm’s length charge for multiple
transactions will generally yield a
payment for a controlled participant
that is equal to the aggregate value of the
external contributions and other
resources and capabilities covered by
the multiple transactions multiplied by
that controlled participant’s RAB share.
Because RAB shares only include
benefits from cost shared intangibles,
the reliability of an aggregate
determination of payments for multiple
transactions may be reduced to the
extent that it includes transactions not
governed by this section covering
resources and capabilities for which the
controlled participants’ expected benefit
shares differ substantially from their
RAB shares.
(vi) Discount rate—(A) In general.
Some calculations set forth in this
paragraph (g) and elsewhere in this
section require determining a rate of
return which is used to convert a future
or past monetary sum associated with a
particular set of activities or
transactions into a present value. For
this purpose, a discount rate should be
used that most reliably reflects the risk
of the activities and the transactions
based on all the information potentially
available at the time for which the
present value calculation is to be
performed. Depending on the particular
facts and circumstances, the risk
involved and thus, the discount rate,
may differ among a company’s various
activities or transactions. Normally,
discount rates are most reliably
determined by reference to market
information. For example, the weighted
average cost of capital (WACC) of the
relevant activities and transactions
derived using the capital asset pricing

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model might provide the most reliable
discount rate. In such cases, this WACC
might most reliably be based on
information from uncontrolled
companies whose business activities as
a whole constitute comparable
uncontrolled transactions. Where a
company is publicly traded and its CSA
involves substantially the same risk as
projects undertaken by the company as
a whole, then the WACC of the relevant
activities and transactions might most
reliably be based on the company’s own
WACC. Depending on comparability
and reliability considerations, including
the extent to which the company’s
hurdle rate reflects market information
and is used in a similar manner in the
controlled and uncontrolled
transactions, in some circumstances
discount rates might be most reliably
determined by reference to other data
such as a company’s internal hurdle rate
for projects of comparable risk.
(B) Examples. The following
examples illustrate the principles of this
paragraph (g)(2)(vi):
Example 1. USPharm, a publicly traded
U.S. pharmaceutical company, enters into a
CSA with FPharm, its wholly-owned foreign
subsidiary. Under the agreement both
controlled participants agree to share the
research costs of developing a specific drug
compound called T. USPharm is also
engaged in another development project for
compounds U and V, which involves
different risks than the T development
project and which is not part of the CSA.
However, there are a large number of
uncontrolled publicly traded U.S. companies,
for which information can be reliably
derived, that are highly comparable to
USPharm but that conduct research only on
compounds similar to T involving risks
similar to those of the T development project.
At the commencement of the CSA (Year 1),
USPharm and FPharm enter into a PCT with
respect to external contributions owned by
USPharm in the form of the RT Rights in its
pre-existing drug research. As part of the
method that USPharm determines will most
reliably calculate PCT Payments, a discount
rate is needed to convert future monetary
sums into a present value. After analysis,
USPharm concludes that the discount rate is
most reliably determined by calculating a
WACC based on the information relating to
the comparable uncontrolled companies,
with suitable adjustments for factors such as
differences in capital structure between
USPharm and the comparables, and for the
stability and other statistical properties of the
beta measurement of the comparables.
Example 2. The facts are the same as in
Example 1 except that the T development
project is the only business activity of
USPharm and FPharm and no reliable data
exists on uncontrolled companies
undertaking similar activities and risk as
those associated with the CSA. After
analysis, USPharm concludes that the
discount rate is most reliably determined by

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reference to its own WACC. USPharm funds
its operations with debt and common stock.
Debt comprises 40% of its financing and
USPharm’s cost of debt is 6%. Equity
comprises the remaining 60% of financing.
USPharm is publicly traded and its equity
beta is 1.25. Using third party information,
USPharm concluded that the appropriate
risk-free rate and equity risk premium are
X% and Y%, respectively, implying a return
on USPharm’s equity of Z% [ X% + ( 1.25
× Y% )]. The weighted average cost of capital
is calculated by blending and weighting the
after-tax cost of debt and the cost of equity
according to percentage of total financing.
USPharm’s weighted average cost of capital
is W% [( 6% × 0.4 ) + ( Z% × 0.6 )].
Example 3. Use of a documented discount
rate. The facts are the same as Example 1
except that no data exists on uncontrolled
companies undertaking similar activities and
risks as those associated with the CSA.
USPharm has documented a hurdle rate of
12% that it uses as the minimum anticipated
return for its business investments having a
comparable risk profile. The Commissioner
examines USPharm’s documentation and
concludes that the hurdle rate provides a
reliable discount rate in this case.

(vii) Accounting principles—(A) In
general. Allocations or other valuations
done for accounting purposes may
provide a useful starting point but will
not be conclusive for purposes of
assessing or applying methods to
evaluate the arm’s length charge in a
PCT, particularly where the accounting
treatment of an asset is inconsistent
with its economic value.
(B) Examples. The following
examples illustrate the principles of this
paragraph (g)(2)(vii):
Example 1. (i) USP, a U.S. corporation and
FSub, a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary of
USP, enter into a CSA in Year 1 to develop
software programs with application in the
medical field. Company X is an uncontrolled
software company located in the United
States that is engaged in developing software
programs that could significantly enhance
the programs being developed by USP and
FSub. Company X is still in a startup phase,
so it has no currently exploitable products or
marketing intangibles and its workforce
consists of a team of software developers.
Company X has negligible liabilities and
tangible property. In Year 2, USP purchases
Company X as part of an uncontrolled
transaction in order to acquire its in-process
technology and workforce for purposes of the
development activities of the CSA. USP files
a consolidated return that includes Company
X. For accounting purposes, $50 million of
the $100 million acquisition price is
allocated to the in-process technology and
workforce, and the residual $50 million is
allocated to goodwill.
(ii) The in-process technology and
workforce of Company X acquired by USP
are reasonably anticipated to contribute to
developing cost shared intangibles and
therefore the RT Rights in the in-process
technology and workforce of Company X

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external contributions for which FSub must
compensate USP as part of a PCT. In
determining whether to apply the acquisition
price or another method for purposes of
evaluating the arm’s length charge in the
PCT, relevant comparability and reliability
considerations must be weighed in light of
the general principles of paragraph (g)(2) of
this section. The allocation for accounting
purposes raises an issue as to the reliability
of using the acquisition price method in this
case because it indicates that a significant
portion of the value of Company X’s assets
is allocable to goodwill, which is often
difficult to value reliably and which,
depending on the facts and circumstances,
might not be attributable to external
contributions that are to be compensated by
PCTs. See paragraph (g)(5)(iv(A) of this
section.
(iii) Paragraph (g)(2)(vii) of this section
provides that accounting treatment may be a
starting point, but is not determinative for
purposes of assessing or applying methods to
evaluate the arm’s length charge in a PCT.
The facts here reveal that Company X has
nothing of economic value aside from its inprocess technology and assembled workforce.
The $50 million of the acquisition price
allocated to goodwill for accounting
purposes, therefore, is economically
attributable to either or both the in-process
technology and the workforce. That moots
the potential issue under the acquisition
price method of the reliability of valuation of
assets not to be compensated by PCTs, since
there are no such assets. Assuming the
acquisition price method is otherwise the
most reliable method, the aggregate value of
Company X’s in-process technology and
workforce is the full acquisition price of $100
million. Accordingly, the aggregate value of
the arm’s length PCT Payments due from
FSub to USP for the external contributions
consisting of the RT Rights in Company X’s
in-process technology and workforce will
equal $100 million multiplied by FSub’s RAB
share.
Example 2. (i) The facts are the same as in
Example 1, except that Company X is a
mature software business in the United States
with a successful current generation of
software that it markets under a recognized
trademark, in addition to having the research
team and new generation software in process
that could significantly enhance the
programs being developed under USP’s and
FSub’s CSA. USP continues Company X’s
existing business and integrates the research
team and the in-process technology into the
efforts under its CSA with FSub. For
accounting purposes, the $100 million
acquisition price for acquiring Company X is
allocated $50 million to existing software and
trademark, $25 million to in-process
technology and research workforce, and the
residual $25 million to goodwill and going
concern value.
(ii) In this case an analysis of the facts
indicates a likelihood, consistent with the
allocation under the accounting treatment
(although not necessarily in the same
amount), of goodwill and going concern
value economically attributable to the
existing U.S. software business rather than to
the external contributions consisting of the

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RT Rights in the in-process technology and
research workforce. Accordingly, further
consideration must be given to the extent to
which these circumstances reduce the
relative reliability of the acquisition price
method in comparison to other potentially
applicable methods for evaluating the PCT
Payment.
Example 3. (i) USP, a U.S. corporation and
FSub, a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary of
USP, enter into a CSA in Year 1 to develop
Product A. Company Y is an uncontrolled
corporation that owns Technology X that is
critical to the development of Product A.
Company Y currently markets Product B,
which is dependent on Technology X. USP
is solely interested in acquiring Technology
X, but is only able to do so through the
acquisition of Company Y in its entirety for
$200 million in an uncontrolled transaction
in Year 2. For accounting purposes, the
acquisition price is allocated as follows: $120
million to Product B and the underlying
Technology X, $30 million to trademark and
other marketing intangibles, and the residual
$50 million to goodwill and going concern.
After the acquisition of Company Y,
Technology X is used to develop Product A.
No other part of Company Y is utilized in any
manner. Product B is discontinued and
accordingly, the accompanying marketing
intangibles become worthless. None of the
previous employees of Company Y are
retained.
(ii) The Technology X of Company Y
acquired by USP is reasonably anticipated to
contribute to developing cost shared
intangibles and is therefore an external
contribution for which FSub must
compensate USP as part of a PCT. Although
for accounting purposes a significant portion
of the acquisition price of Company Y was
allocated to items other than Technology X,
the facts demonstrate that USP had no
intention of using and therefore placed no
economic value on any part of Company Y
other than Technology X. If USP was willing
to pay $200 million for Company Y solely for
purposes of acquiring Technology X, then
assuming the acquisition price method is
otherwise the most reliable method, the value
of Technology X is the full $200 million
acquisition price. Accordingly, the value of
the arm’s length PCT Payment due from FSub
to USP for the external contribution
consisting of the RT Rights in Technology X
will equal $200 million multiplied by FSub’s
RAB share.

(viii) Valuation consistent with the
investor model—(A) In general. The
valuation of the amount charged in a
PCT must be consistent with the
assumption that, as of the date of the
PCT, each controlled participant’s
aggregate net investment in developing
cost shared intangibles pursuant to the
CSA, attributable to both external
contributions and cost contributions, is
reasonably anticipated to earn a rate of
return equal to the appropriate discount
rate, determined following the
principles set forth in paragraph
(g)(2)(vi) of this section, over the entire
period of developing and exploiting the

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cost shared intangibles. If the cost
shared intangibles themselves are
reasonably anticipated to contribute to
developing other intangibles, then the
period in the preceding sentence
includes the period of developing and
exploiting such indirectly benefited
intangibles.
(B) Example. The following example
illustrates the principles of this
paragraph (g)(2)(viii):
Example. (i) P, a U.S. corporation, has
developed a software program, DEF, which
applies certain algorithms to reconstruct
complete DNA sequences from partiallyobserved DNA sequences. S is a whollyowned foreign subsidiary of P. P and S enter
into a CSA to develop a new generation of
genetic tests, GHI, based in part on the use
of DEF which is therefore an external
contribution of P for which compensation is
due from S pursuant to a PCT. S makes no
external contributions to the CSA. GHI sales
are projected to commence two years after
the inception of the CSA, which is on the
first day of Year 1, and then to continue for
eight more years. P and S project that GHI
will be replaced by a new generation of
genetic testing based on technology unrelated
to DEF or GHI at the end of Year 10.
(ii) For purposes of valuing the PCT for P’s
external contribution of DEF to the CSA, P
and S apply a type of residual profit split
method that is not described in paragraph
(g)(7) of this section and which, accordingly,
constitutes an unspecified method. See
paragraph (g)(7)(i) (last sentence) of this
section. The principles of this paragraph
(g)(2) apply to any method for valuing a PCT,
including the unspecified method used by P
and S.
(iii) Under the method employed by P and
S, in each Year, a portion of the income from
sales of GHI in S’s territory is allocated to
certain routine contributions made by S. The
residual of the profit or loss from GHI sales
in S’s territory after the routine allocation
step is divided between the controlled
participants pro rata to their capital stocks
allocable to S’s territory. Each controlled
participant’s capital stock is computed by
growing and amortizing (in the case of P) its
historical expenditures regarding DEF
allocable to S’s territory and (in the case of
S) its ongoing cost contributions towards
developing GHI. The amortization of the
capital stocks is effected on a straight-line
basis over an assumed four-year life for the
relevant expenditures. The capital stocks are
grown using an assumed growth factor which
P and S consider to be appropriate. Thus, the
residual profit or loss from sales of GHI in
S’s territory is divided between P and S pro
rata to P’s capital stock in DEF attributable
to S’s territory and to S’s capital stock from
its cost contributions.
(iv) The assumption that all expenditures
amortize on a straight-line basis over four
years does not appropriately reflect the
principle that as of the date of the PCT
regarding DEF, every contribution to the
development of GHI, including DEF is
reasonably anticipated to have value
throughout the entire period of exploitation
of GHI as projected to continue through Year

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10. Under this method as applied by P and
S, P’s capital stock in DEF, and therefore the
amount of profit in S’s territory allocated to
P as a PCT Payment from S, will decrease
every year. After Year 4, P’s capital stock in
DEF will necessarily be $0. Thus, under this
method, P will receive none of the residual
profit or loss from GHI sales in S’s territory
after Year 4 as a PCT Payment. As a result
of this limitation of the PCT Payments to be
made by S, the return to S’s aggregate
investment in the CSA is anticipated to be
significantly higher than the appropriate
discount rate for the CSA. This is not
consistent with the investor model principle
that S should anticipate a return to its
aggregate investment in the CSA equal to the
appropriate discount rate over the entire
period of developing and exploiting GHI. The
inconsistency of the method with the
investor model materially lessens its
reliability for purposes of a best method
analysis. See § 1.482–1(c)(2)(ii)(B).

(ix) Coordination of best method rule
and form of payment. A method
described in paragraph (g)(1) of this
section evaluates the arm’s length
amount charged in a PCT in terms of a
form of payment (method payment
form). For example, the method
payment form for the income method
described in paragraph (g)(4)(iii) or (iv)
of this section is payment contingent on
the exploitation of cost shared
intangibles by the PCT Payor, and the
method payment form for the market
capitalization method is lump sum
payment. The method payment form
may not necessarily correspond to the
form of payment specified pursuant to
paragraphs (b)(3)(vi)(A) and (k)(2)(ii)(l)
of this section (specified payment form).
The determination under § 1.482–1(c) of
the method that provides the most
reliable measure of an arm’s length
result is to be made without regard to
whether the respective method payment
forms under the competing methods
correspond to the specified payment
form. If the method payment form of the
method determined under § 1.482–1(c)
to provide the most reliable measure of
an arm’s length result differs from the
specified payment form, then the
conversion from such method payment
form to such specified payment form
will be made on a reasonable basis to
the satisfaction of the Commissioner.
For purposes of the preceding sentence,
if the method described in the
documentation by the controlled
participants pursuant to paragraph
(k)(2)(ii)(J) of this section is determined
under § 1.482–1(c) to provide the most
reliable measure of an arm’s length
result, then the Commissioner will give
due consideration whether the
conversion from the method payment
form to the specified payment form was
made by the controlled participants on
a reasonable basis.

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(x) Coordination of the valuations of
prior and subsequent PCTs—(A) In
general. In cases where PCTs are
required on different dates, coordination
of the valuations of the prior and
subsequent PCTs must be effected
pursuant to a method that provides the
most reliable measure of an arm’s length
result. Depending on the facts and
circumstances, such as whether the
external contributions that were the
subject of the prior and subsequent
PCTs were nonroutine contributions, an
approach which may be appropriate
would be to determine PCT Payments
both for the prior and subsequent PCTs
going forward from the date of the
subsequent PCT pursuant to a residual
profit split method, as described in
paragraph (g)(7) of this section. Such
application of the residual profit split
method would include as nonroutine
contributions all of the following: The
external contribution(s) that were the
subject of the prior PCT(s), the external
contribution that is the subject of the
subsequent PCT, and the interests of the
controlled participants in the
incremental cost shared intangible
development resulting from the
development activities under the CSA.
Paragraph (g)(2)(x)(B) of this section
specifies the appropriate coordination
with a prior PCT in the case of a
subsequent PCT the subject of which is
a PFA.
(B) Coordination with regard to PFAs.
PCT Payments for a subsequent PCT
that is derived from a PFA are
determined independently of any prior
PCTs. Such PCT Payments will be
treated, for purposes of the application
of the method used for evaluating a
prior PCT, the same as IDCs, the actual
amounts of which may not correspond
to those projected on the date of the
prior PCT. A divergence between actual
and anticipated IDCs does not require
alteration in the application of the
method used to value PCT Payments.
Similarly, a subsequent PCT derived
from a PFA will not require alteration in
the application of the method used to
value PCT Payments for a prior PCT.
(xi) Proration of PCT Payments to the
extent allocable to other business
activities. If a resource or capability that
is the subject of a PCT is reasonably
anticipated to contribute both to
developing or exploiting cost shared
intangibles and to other business
activities of the PCT Payee (other than
exploiting an existing intangible
without further development), then to
the extent it can be demonstrated that a
portion of the value of the relevant PCT
Payments otherwise determined under
this section is attributable to such other
business activities, the PCT Payments

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must be prorated. Such proration will be
done on a reasonable basis in proportion
to the relative economic value, as of the
date of the PCT, reasonably anticipated
to be derived from the resource or
capability by the CSA Activity as
compared to such other business
activities of the PCT Payee. In the case
of an aggregate valuation done under the
principles of paragraph (g)(2)(v) of this
section that includes payment for rights
to exploit an existing intangible without
further development, the prorated
aggregate payments must take into
account the economic value attributable
to such exploitation rights as well. For
purposes of the best method rule under
§ 1.482–1(c), the reliability of the
analysis under a method that requires
proration pursuant to this paragraph is
reduced relative to the reliability of an
analysis under a method that does not
require proration.
(3) Comparable uncontrolled
transaction method. The comparable
uncontrolled transaction (CUT) method
described in § 1.482–4(c), and the arm’s
length charge described in § 1.482–
2(b)(3) (first sentence) based on a
comparable uncontrolled transaction,
may be applied to evaluate whether the
amount charged in a PCT is arm’s length
by reference to the amount charged in
a comparable uncontrolled transaction.
When applied in the manner described
in § 1.482–4(c), or where a comparable
uncontrolled transaction provides the
most reliable measure of the arm’s
length charge described in § 1.482–
2(b)(3) (first sentence), the CUT method,
or the arm’s length charge in the
comparable uncontrolled transaction,
will typically yield an arm’s length total
value for the external contribution that
is the subject of the PCT. That value
must then be multiplied by each PCT
Payor’s respective RAB share in order to
determine the arm’s length PCT
Payment due from each PCT Payor. The
reliability of a CUT that yields a value
for the external contribution only in the
PCT Payor’s territory will be reduced to
the extent that value is not consistent
with the total worldwide value of the
external contribution multiplied by the
PCT Payor’s RAB share.
(4) Income method—(i) In general.
The income method evaluates whether
the amount charged in a PCT is arm’s
length by reference to the controlled
participants’ realistic alternatives to
entering into a CSA.
(ii) Determination of arm’s length
charge—(A) In general. Under this
method, the arm’s length charge for a
PCT Payment will be an amount such
that a controlled participant’s present
value, as of the date of the PCT, of
entering into a CSA equals the present

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value of its best realistic alternative.
Paragraphs (g)(4)(iii) and (iv) of this
section describe two specific
applications of the income method, but
do not exclude other possible
applications of this method.
(B) Example. The following example
illustrates the principles of this
paragraph (g)(4)(ii):
Example. (i) USP, a U.S. manufacturer, has
developed a new, lightweight fabric for
sleeping bags. In Year 1 USP enters into a
CSA with its wholly-owned foreign
subsidiary, FSub, to develop an improved
version of this fabric. Under the CSA, USP
will own the rights to exploit improved
versions of the fabric in the United States and
FSub will own the rights to exploit
improvements in the rest of the world
(ROW). The rights to further develop the
fabric are reasonably anticipated to
contribute to the development of future
improved versions and therefore the RT
Rights in the fabric are external contributions
for which compensation is due pursuant to
a PCT. USP does not transfer the right to
exploit its current fabric to FSub. FSub does
not furnish any external contributions. If USP
did not participate in the CSA, its next best
realistic alternative would be to develop
future versions of the fabric on its own,
exploit those versions in the United States
and license such versions for exploitation
outside the United States to FSub. In Year 1,
USP estimates that its present value of this
alternative (including arm’s length royalties
on sales in the ROW) is $100 million. Under
the CSA, USP projects U.S. sleeping bag sales
with improved versions of the fabric to
amount to $80 million (present value in Year
1). The costs (other than IDCs) plus the
routine return to such costs associated with
the U.S. sales are anticipated to be $10
million. USP’s anticipated cost contributions
under the CSA are $10 million (present value
in Year 1). FSub projects that in the ROW,
future sales should amount to $100 million
(present value in Year 1).
(ii) An arm’s length contingent PCT
Payment under the income method is a salesbased royalty at a rate, p, such that the
present value to USP of the next best realistic
alternative is equal to the present value to
USP of participating in the CSA. In other
words, the rate is such that $100 million
(value of licensing alternative) = $80 million
(anticipated U.S. sales) ¥ $10 million
(anticipated costs, other than IDCs, plus
routine return) ¥ $10 million (anticipated
cost contribution) + (p * $100 million
(anticipated ROW sales)), or 40%.
Accordingly, FSub should pay USP a royalty
of 40% of actual ROW sales annually when
the two begin to exploit future generations of
the fabric.

(iii) Application of income method
using a CUT—(A) In general. This
application of the income method is
typically used in cases where only one
controlled participant furnishes
nonroutine contributions, as described
in paragraph (g)(7)(iii)(C)(1) of this
section. This application assumes that

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the best reasonable alternative of the
PCT Payee to entering into the CSA
would be to develop the cost shared
intangibles on its own, bearing all the
IDCs itself, and then to license the cost
shared intangibles to the other
controlled participants.
(B) Determination of arm’s length
charge—(1) In general. An arm’s length
PCT Payment under this application of
the income method is represented as an
applicable rate on sales from exploiting
the cost shared intangibles, determined
as of the date of the PCT.
(2) Applicable rate. The applicable
rate is equal to the alternative rate less
the cost contribution adjustment.
(3) Alternative rate. The alternative
rate is the constant rate the PCT Payee
would charge an uncontrolled licensee
over the period the cost shared
intangibles are anticipated to be
exploited if the PCT Payee had
developed the cost shared intangibles
on its own and licensed them to the
uncontrolled licensee. The alternative
rate is determined using the comparable
uncontrolled transaction method, as
described in § 1.482–4(c)(1) and (2).
(4) Cost contribution adjustment. The
cost contribution adjustment is equal to
a fraction, the numerator of which is the
present value of the PCT Payor’s total
anticipated cost contributions and the
denominator of which is the present
value of the PCT Payor’s total
anticipated sales from exploiting the
cost shared intangibles.
(C) Example. The following example
illustrates the principles of this
paragraph (g)(4)(iii):
Example. (i) USP, a software company, has
developed version 1.0 of a new software
application which it is currently marketing.
In Year 1 USP enters into a CSA with its
wholly-owned foreign subsidiary, FS, to
develop future versions of the software
application. Under the CSA, USP will have
the rights to exploit the future versions in the
United States, and FS will have the rights to
exploit them in the rest of the world (ROW).
The future rights in version 1.0, and USP’s
development team, are reasonably
anticipated to contribute to the development
of future versions and therefore the RT Rights
in version 1.0 are external contributions for
which compensation is due from FS as part
of a PCT. USP does not transfer the current
exploitation rights in version 1.0 to FS. FS
does not furnish any external contributions.
FS anticipates sales of $100 million (present
value in Year 1) in its territory and
anticipates cost contributions of $40 million
(present value in Year 1). The arm’s length
rate USP would have charged an
uncontrolled licensee for a license of future
versions of the software had USP further
developed version 1.0 on its own is 60%, as
determined under the comparable
uncontrolled transaction method in § 1.482–
4(c).

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(ii) An arm’s length contingent PCT
Payment under the income method is an
applicable rate equal to the alternative rate
less the cost contribution adjustment. In this
case the alternative rate is 60%, the arm’s
length rate determined under § 1.482–4(c).
The cost contribution adjustment is 40%, the
present value to FS of its anticipated cost
contribution over the present value of its
anticipated sales of future versions of the
software, that is, $40 million / $100 million.
The applicable rate, which represents an
arm’s length contingent PCT Payment,
payable by the FS to USP on all actual ROW
sales of the future versions of the software
therefore is 20%, which is equal to the
alternative rate of 60% less the cost
contribution adjustment of 40%.

(iv) Application of income method
using CPM—(A) In general. This
application of the income method is
typically used in cases where only one
controlled participant furnishes
nonroutine contributions. Under this
application, the present value of the
anticipated PCT Payments is equal to
the present value, as of the date of the
PCT, of the PCT Payor’s anticipated
profit from developing and exploiting
cost shared intangibles. This PCT
Payment ensures that PCT Payors who
do not furnish any external
contributions subject to a PCT receive
an appropriate ex ante risk adjusted
return on their investment in the CSA.
(B) Determination of arm’s length
charge based on sales—(1) In general.
An arm’s length PCT Payment under
this application of the income method is
represented as an applicable rate on
sales from exploiting the cost shared
intangibles, determined as of the date of
the PCT.
(2) Applicable rate. The applicable
rate is equal to the alternative rate less
the cost contribution adjustment.
(3) Alternative rate. The alternative
rate is determined using the comparable
profits method described in § 1.482–5
and is estimated as a fraction. The
numerator of the fraction is the present
value of the PCT Payor’s total
anticipated territorial operating profit,
as defined in paragraph (j)(1)(vi) of this
section, reduced by a market return for
the routine contributions (other than
cost contributions) to the relevant
business activity in the relevant
territory. The denominator of the
fraction is the discounted present value
of the PCT Payor’s total anticipated
sales from exploiting the cost shared
intangibles.
(4) Cost contribution adjustment. The
cost contribution adjustment is equal to
a fraction the numerator of which is the
present value of the PCT Payor’s total
anticipated cost contributions and the
denominator of which is the present
value of the PCT Payor’s total

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anticipated sales from exploiting the
cost shared intangibles.
(C) Determination of arm’s length
charge based on profit—(1) In general.
An arm’s length PCT Payment under
this application of the income method
may also be represented as an
applicable rate on territorial operating
profit, as defined in paragraph (j)(1)(vi)
of this section, reduced by a market
return for the routine contributions
(other than cost contributions) to the
relevant business activity in the relevant
territory. This is done following the
calculations described in paragraph
(g)(4)(iv)(B) of this section, substituting
anticipated territorial operating profit,
reduced by a market return for the
routine contributions (other than cost
contributions) to the relevant business
activity in the relevant territory,
wherever anticipated sales appear in the
calculations.
(2) Alternative rate. Substituting
territorial operating profits, reduced by
a market return for the routine
contributions (other than cost
contributions) to the relevant business
activity in the relevant territory, for
sales in the calculation of the alternative
rate results in a fraction with both a
numerator and denominator equal to the
present value of the PCT Payor’s total
anticipated territorial operating profit,
as defined in paragraph (j)(1)(vi) of this
section, reduced by a market return for
the routine contributions (other than
cost contributions) to the relevant
business activity in the relevant
territory. Therefore the alternative rate
under this application is 1, or 100%.
(3) Cost contribution adjustment.
Substituting territorial operating profit,
reduced by a market return for the
routine contributions (other than cost
contributions) to the relevant business
activity in the relevant territory, for
sales results in a cost contribution
adjustment equal to a fraction the
numerator of which is the present value
of the PCT Payor’s total anticipated cost
contributions and the denominator of
which is the present value of the PCT
Payor’s total anticipated territorial
operating profit, as defined in paragraph
(j)(1)(vi) of this section, reduced by a
market return for the routine
contributions (other than cost
contributions) to the relevant business
activity in the relevant territory.
(D) Example. The following example
illustrates the principles of this
paragraph (g)(4)(iv):
Example. (i) USP, a U.S. pharmaceutical
company, invests in research and
development to begin developing a vaccine
for disease K. In Year 1, USP enters into a
CSA with its wholly-owned foreign
subsidiary, FS, to complete the development

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of the vaccine. Under the CSA, USP will have
the rights to exploit the vaccine in the United
States, and FS will have the rights to exploit
it in the rest of the world. The partially
developed vaccine owned by USP, and USP’s
development team, are reasonably
anticipated to contribute to the development
of the final vaccine and therefore the RT
Rights in the vaccine and the development
team are external contributions for which
compensation is due from FS as part of a
PCT. FS does not furnish any external
contributions. The total anticipated IDCs
under the CSA are $100 million (in Year 1
dollars). USP and FS each have total
projected sales of $100 million (in Year 1
dollars) of the vaccine, which they use as the
basis for determining RAB shares.
Accordingly, they divide the development
costs based on 50/50 RAB shares, $50 million
(in Year 1 dollars) paid by each participant.
Based on an analysis under the comparable
profits method under § 1.482–5, FS’s
anticipated territorial operating profit, as
reduced by a market return for its routine
contributions to exploiting the vaccine in its
territory, is $80 million (in Year 1 dollars).
(ii) An arm’s length contingent PCT
Payment under the income method is an
applicable rate equal to the alternative rate
less the cost contribution adjustment. In this
case the alternative rate is 80% (($80 million
territorial operating profit/$100 million
sales). The cost contribution adjustment is
50%, the present value to FS of its
anticipated cost contributions over the
present value of its anticipated sales of the
vaccine, that is, $50 million/$100 million.
The applicable rate, which represents an
arm’s length contingent PCT Payment,
payable by the FS to the USP over the period
the vaccine is exploited therefore is 30%,
which is equal to the alternative rate of 80%
less the cost contribution adjustment of 50%.
(iii) An arm’s length contingent PCT
Payment based on territorial operating profits
under the income method is an applicable
rate equal to the alternative rate less the cost
contribution adjustment. In this case the
alternative rate is 100% (($80 million
territorial operating profit /$80 million
territorial operating profit). The cost
contribution adjustment is 62.5%, the
present value to FS of its anticipated cost
contributions over the present value of its
anticipated territorial profits from sales of the
vaccine, that is, $50 million/$80 million. The
applicable rate on territorial operating profit,
which represents an arm’s length contingent
PCT Payment, payable by the FS to the USP
over the period the vaccine is exploited
therefore is 37.5%, which is equal to the
alternative rate of 100% less the cost
contribution adjustment of 62.5%.

(v) Routine external contributions. For
purposes of this paragraph (g)(4), any
routine contributions that are external
contributions (routine external
contributions), the valuation and PCT
Payments for which are determined and
made independently of the income
method, are treated similarly to cost
contributions. Accordingly, wherever
the term cost contributions appears in
this paragraph (g)(4) it shall be read to

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include net routine external
contributions. Net routine external
contributions are defined as a controlled
participant’s total anticipated routine
external contributions, plus its
anticipated PCT Payments to other
controlled participants in respect of
their routine external contributions,
minus the anticipated PCT Payments it
is to receive from other controlled
participants in respect of its routine
external contributions.
(vi) Comparability and reliability
considerations—(A) In general. Whether
results derived from this method are the
most reliable measure of the arm’s
length result is determined using the
factors described under the best method
rule in § 1.482–1(c). Thus, comparability
and the quality of data and assumptions
must be considered in determining
whether this method provides the most
reliable measure of an arm’s length
result. Consistent with those
considerations, the reliability of
applying the income method as a
measure of the arm’s length charge for
a PCT Payment is typically less reliable
to the extent that more than one
controlled participant furnishes
nonroutine contributions.
(B) Application of the income method
using a CUT. If the income method is
applied using a CUT, as described in
paragraph (g)(4)(iii) of this section, any
additional comparability and reliability
considerations stated in § 1.482–4(c)(2)
may apply.
(C) Application of the income method
using CPM. If the income method is
applied using CPM, as described in
paragraph (g)(4)(iv) of this section, any
additional comparability and reliability
considerations stated in § 1.482–5(c)
apply.
(5) Acquisition price method—(i) In
general. The acquisition price method
applies the comparable uncontrolled
transaction method of § 1.482–4(c), or
the arm’s length charge described in
§ 1.482–2(b)(3)(first sentence) based on a
comparable uncontrolled transaction, to
evaluate whether the amount charged in
a PCT, or group of PCTs, is arm’s length
by reference to the amount charged (the
acquisition price) for the stock or asset
purchase of an entire organization or
portion thereof (the target) in an
uncontrolled transaction. The
acquisition price method is ordinarily
used only where substantially all the
target’s nonroutine contributions (as
described in paragraph (g)(7)(iii)(C)(1) of
this section) to the PCT Payee’s business
activities are covered by a PCT or group
of PCTs.
(ii) Determination of arm’s length
charge. Under this method, the arm’s
length charge for a PCT or group of

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PCTs covering resources and
capabilities of the target is equal to the
adjusted acquisition price, as divided
among the controlled participants
according to their respective RAB
shares.
(iii) Adjusted acquisition price. The
adjusted acquisition price is the
acquisition price of the target increased
by the value of the target’s liabilities on
the date of the acquisition, other than
liabilities not assumed in the case of an
asset purchase, and decreased by the
value of the target’s tangible property on
that date and by the value on that date
of any other resources and capabilities
not covered by a PCT or group of PCTs.
(iv) Reliability and comparability
considerations. The comparability and
reliability considerations stated in
§ 1.482–4(c)(2) apply. Consistent with
those considerations, the reliability of
applying the acquisition price method
as a measure of the arm’s length charge
for the PCT Payment normally is
reduced if—
(A) A substantial portion of the
target’s nonroutine contributions to the
PCT Payee’s business activities is not
required to be covered by a PCT or
group of PCTs, and that portion of the
nonroutine contributions cannot
reliably be valued; or
(B) A substantial portion of the
target’s assets consists of tangible
property that cannot reliably be valued.
(v) Example. The following example
illustrates the principles of this
paragraph (g)(5):
Example. USP, a U.S. corporation, and its
newly incorporated, wholly-owned foreign
subsidiary (FS) enter into a CSA in Year 1 to
develop Group Z products. Under the CSA,
USP and FS will have the exclusive rights to
exploit the Group Z products in the U.S. and
the rest of the world, respectively. Based on
RAB shares, USP will bear 60% and FS will
bear 40% of the costs incurred during the
term of the agreement. USP acquires
Company X in Year 2 for cash consideration
worth $110 million. Company X joins in the
filing of a U.S. consolidated income tax
return with USP. Under paragraph (j)(2)(i) of
this section, Company X and USP are treated
as one taxpayer. Accordingly, the RT Rights
in any of Company X’s resources and
capabilities that are reasonably anticipated to
contribute to the development activities of
the CSA will be considered external
contributions furnished by USP. Company
X’s resources and capabilities consist of its
workforce, certain technology intangibles,
$15 million of tangible property and other
assets and $5 million in liabilities. The
technology intangibles, as well as Company
X’s workforce, are reasonably anticipated to
contribute to the development of the Group
Z products under the CSA and therefore the
RT Rights in the technology intangibles and
the workforce are external contributions by
way of a PFA for which FS must make a PCT

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Payment to USP. None of Company X’s
existing intangible assets or any of its
workforce are anticipated to contribute to
activities outside the CSA. Applying the
acquisition price method, the value of USP’s
external contributions is the adjusted
acquisition price $100 million ($110 million
acquisition price plus $5 million liabilities
less $15 million tangible property and other
assets). FS must make a PCT Payment to USP
for these external contributions in an amount
of $40 million, which is the product of $100
million (the value of the external
contributions) and 40% (FS’s RAB share).

(6) Market capitalization method—(i)
In general. The market capitalization
method applies the comparable
uncontrolled transaction method of
§ 1.482–4(c), or the arm’s length charge
described in § 1.482–2(b)(3)(first
sentence) based on a comparable
uncontrolled transaction, to evaluate
whether the amount charged in a PCT,
or group of PCTs, is arm’s length by
reference to the average market
capitalization of a controlled participant
(PCT Payee) whose stock is regularly
traded on an established securities
market. The market capitalization
method is ordinarily used only where
substantially all of the PCT Payee’s
nonroutine contributions (as described
in paragraph (g)(7)(iii)(C)(1) of this
section) to the PCT Payee’s business are
covered by a PCT or group of PCTs.
(ii) Determination of arm’s length
charge. Under the market capitalization
method, the arm’s length charge for a
PCT or group of PCTs covering
resources and capabilities of the PCT
Payee is equal to the adjusted average
market capitalization, as divided among
the controlled participants according to
their respective RAB shares.
(iii) Average market capitalization.
The average market capitalization is the
average of the daily market
capitalizations of the PCT Payee over a
period of time beginning 60 days before
the date of the PCT and ending on the
date of the PCT. The daily market
capitalization of the PCT Payee is
calculated on each day its stock is
actively traded as the total number of
shares outstanding multiplied by the
adjusted closing price of the stock on
that day. The adjusted closing price is
the daily closing price of the stock, after
adjustments for stock-based transactions
(dividends and stock splits) and other
pending corporate (combination and
spin-off) restructuring transactions for
which reliable arm’s length adjustments
can be made.
(iv) Adjusted average market
capitalization. The adjusted average
market capitalization is the average
market capitalization of the PCT Payee
increased by the value of the PCT
Payee’s liabilities on the date of the PCT

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and decreased by the value on such date
of the PCT Payee’s tangible property and
of any other resources and capabilities
of the PCT Payee not covered by a PCT
or group of PCTs.
(v) Reliability and comparability
considerations. The comparability and
reliability considerations stated in
§ 1.482–4(c)(2) apply. Consistent with
those considerations, the reliability of
applying the comparable uncontrolled
transaction method using the adjusted
market capitalization of a company as a
measure of the arm’s length charge for
the PCT Payment normally is reduced
if—
(A) A substantial portion of the PCT
Payee’s nonroutine contributions to its
business activities is not required to be
covered by a PCT or group of PCTs, and
that portion of the nonroutine
contributions cannot reliably be valued;
(B) A substantial portion of the PCT
Payee’s assets consists of tangible
property that cannot reliably be valued;
or
(C) Facts and circumstances
demonstrate the likelihood of a material
divergence between the average market
capitalization of the PCT Payee and the
value of its resources and capabilities
for which reliable adjustments cannot
be made.
(vi) Examples. The following
examples illustrate the principles of this
paragraph (g)(6):
Example 1. (i) USP, a publicly traded U.S.
company, and its newly incorporated whollyowned foreign subsidiary (FS) enter into a
CSA on Date 1 to develop software. Under
the CSA, USP and FS will have the exclusive
rights to exploit all future generations of the
software in the United States and the rest of
the world, respectively. Based on RAB
shares, USP will bear 70% and FS will bear
30% of the costs incurred during the term of
the CSA. USP’s assembled team of
researchers and its entire existing and inprocess software are reasonably anticipated
to contribute to the development of the
software under the CSA and the RT Rights in
the research team and existing and in-process
software are therefore external contributions
for which compensation is due from FS. USP
separately enters into a license agreement
with FS for make-and-sell rights for all
existing software in the rest of the world.
This license of current make-and-sell rights
is a transaction that is governed by § 1.482–
4. However, after analysis, it is determined
that the PCT Payments and the arm’s length
payments for the make-and-sell license may
be most reliably determined in the aggregate
using the market capitalization method,
under principles described in paragraph
(g)(2)(v) of this section.
(ii) On Date 1, USP had an average market
capitalization of $205 million, tangible
property and other assets that can be reliably
valued worth $5 million and no liabilities.
Applying the market capitalization method,
the aggregate value of USP’s external

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contributions and the make-and-sell rights in
its existing software is $200 million ($205
million average market capitalization of USP
less $5 million of tangible property and other
assets). The total arm’s length value of the
PCT Payments and license payments FS must
make to USP for the external contributions
and current make-and-sell rights is $60
million, which is the product of $200 million
(the value of the external contributions and
the make-and-sell rights) and 30% (FS’s
share of anticipated benefits of 30%).
Example 2. The facts are the same as
Example 1 except that USP also makes
significant nonroutine contributions that are
difficult to value to several other mature
business divisions it operates that are not
reasonably anticipated to contribute software
development that is the subject of the CSA
and are therefore not external contributions
and accordingly not required to be covered
by a PCT. The reliability of using the market
capitalization method to determine the value
of USP’s external contributions to the CSA is
significantly reduced in this case because it
would require adjusting USP’s average
market capitalization to account for the
significant nonroutine contributions that are
not required to be covered by a PCT.

(7) Residual profit split method—(i) In
general. The residual profit split method
evaluates whether the allocation of
combined operating profit or loss
attributable to one or more external
contributions subject to a PCT is arm’s
length by reference to the relative value
of each controlled participant’s
contribution to that combined operating
profit or loss. The combined operating
profit or loss must be derived from the
most narrowly identifiable business
activity of the controlled participants for
which data are available that include
the developing and exploiting of cost
shared intangibles (relevant business
activity). The residual profit split
method may not be used where only one
controlled participant makes significant
nonroutine contributions to the
development and exploitation of the
cost shared intangibles. The provisions
of § 1.482–6 shall apply to CSAs only to
the extent provided and as modified in
this paragraph (g)(7). Any other
application to a CSA of a residual profit
method not described below will
constitute an unspecified method for
purposes of sections 482 and 6662(e)
and the regulations thereunder.
(ii) Appropriate share of profits and
losses. The relative value of each
controlled participant’s contribution to
the success of the relevant business
activity must be determined in a manner
that reflects the functions performed,
risks assumed, and resources employed
by each participant in the relevant
business activity, consistent with the
comparability provisions of § 1.482–
1(d)(3). Such an allocation is intended
to correspond to the division of profit or

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loss that would result from an
arrangement between uncontrolled
taxpayers, each performing functions
similar to those of the various controlled
participants engaged in the relevant
business activity. The profit allocated to
any particular controlled participant is
not necessarily limited to the total
operating profit of the group from the
relevant business activity. For example,
in a given year, one controlled
participant may earn a profit while
another controlled participant incurs a
loss. In addition, it may not be assumed
that the combined operating profit or
loss from the relevant business activity
should be shared equally, or in any
other arbitrary proportion.
(iii) Profit split—(A) In general. Under
the residual profit split method, each
controlled participant’s territorial
operating profit or loss, as defined in
paragraph (j)(1)(vi) of this section, is
allocated between the controlled
participants that each furnish significant
nonroutine contributions to the relevant
business activity in that territory
following the three step process set forth
in paragraphs (g)(7)(iii)(B) and (C) of
this section.
(B) Allocate income to routine
contributions other than cost
contributions. The first step allocates an
amount of income to each controlled
participant that is subtracted from its
territorial operating profit or loss to
provide a market return for the
controlled participant’s routine
contributions (other than cost
contributions) to the relevant business
activity in its territory. Routine
contributions are contributions of the
same or a similar kind to those made by
uncontrolled taxpayers involved in
similar business activities for which it is
possible to identify market returns.
Routine contributions ordinarily
include contributions of tangible
property, services and intangibles that
are generally owned or provided by
uncontrolled taxpayers engaged in
similar activities. A functional analysis
is required to identify these
contributions according to the functions
performed, risks assumed, and resources
employed by each of the controlled
participants. Market returns for the
routine contributions should be
determined by reference to the returns
achieved by uncontrolled taxpayers
engaged in similar activities, consistent
with the methods described in §§ 1.482–
3, 1.482–4, and1.482–5, or with the
arm’s length charge described in
§ 1.482–2(b)(3) (first sentence) based on
a comparable uncontrolled transaction.
(C) Allocate residual profit—(1) In
general. The allocation of income to
each controlled participant’s routine

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contributions in the first step will not
reflect profit or loss attributable to that
controlled participant’s cost
contributions, nor reflect the profit or
loss attributable to any controlled
participant’s nonroutine contributions
to the relevant business activity.
Nonroutine contributions include
nonroutine external contributions, and
other nonroutine contributions, to the
relevant business activity in the relevant
territory. The residual territorial profit
or loss after the allocation of income in
the first step in paragraph (g)(7)(iii)(B) of
this section is further allocated under
the second and third steps in paragraphs
(g)(7)(iii)(C)(2) and (3) of this section.
(2) Cost contribution share of residual
profit or loss. Under the second step, a
portion of each controlled participant’s
residual territorial profit or loss after the
first step allocation is allocated to that
controlled participant’s cost
contributions (cost contribution share).
A controlled participant’s cost
contribution share is equal to the
following fraction of such residual
territorial profit or loss. The numerator
is the present value, determined as of
the relevant date, of the summation,
over the entire period of developing and
exploiting cost shared intangibles, of the
total value of such controlled
participant’s total anticipated cost
contributions. The denominator is the
present value, determined as of the
relevant date, of the summation, over
the same period, of such controlled
participant’s total anticipated territorial
operating profits, as defined in
paragraph (j)(1)(vi) of this section,
reduced by a market return for the
routine contributions (other than cost
contributions) to the relevant business
activity in the relevant territory. For
these purposes, the relevant date is the
date of the PCTs.
(3) Nonroutine contribution share of
residual profit or loss. Under the third
step, the remaining share of each
controlled participant’s residual
territorial profit or loss after the first and
second step allocations generally should
be divided among all of the controlled
participants based upon the relative
value, determined as of the date of the
PCTs, of their nonroutine contributions
to the relevant business activity in the
relevant territory. The relative value of
the nonroutine contributions of each
controlled participant may be measured
by external market benchmarks that
reflect the fair market value of such
nonroutine contributions. Alternatively,
the relative value of nonroutine
contributions may be estimated by the
capitalized cost of developing the
nonroutine contributions and updates,
as appropriately grown or discounted so

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that all contributions may be valued on
a comparable dollar basis as of the same
date. If the nonroutine contributions by
a controlled participant are also used in
other business activities (such as the
exploitation of make-or-sell rights
described in paragraph (c) of this
section), an allocation of the value of the
nonroutine contributions must be made
on a reasonable basis among all the
business activities in which they are
used in proportion to the relative
economic value that the relevant
business activity and such other
business activities are anticipated to
derive over time as the result of such
nonroutine contributions.
(4) Determination of PCT Payments.
Any amount of a controlled
participant’s territorial operating profit
or loss that is allocated to another
controlled participant’s external
contributions to the relevant business
activity in the relevant territory under
the third step represents the amount of
the PCT Payment due to that other
controlled participant for its such
external contributions.
(5) Routine external contributions. For
purposes of this paragraph (g)(7),
routine external contributions, the
valuation and PCT Payments for which
are determined and made
independently of the residual profit
split method, are treated similarly to
cost contributions. Accordingly,
wherever used in this paragraph (g)(7),
the term routine contribution shall not
be read to include routine external
contributions and the term cost
contribution shall be read to include net
routine external contributions, as
defined in paragraph (g)(4)(v) of this
section.
(iv) Comparability and reliability
considerations—(A) In general. Whether
results derived from this method are the
most reliable measure of the arm’s
length result is determined using the
factors described under the best method
rule in § 1.482–1(c). Thus, comparability
and the quality of data and assumptions
must be considered in determining
whether this method provides the most
reliable measure of an arm’s length
result. The application of these factors
to the residual profit split in the context
of the relevant business activity of
developing and exploiting cost shared
intangibles is discussed in paragraphs
(g)(7)(iv)(B), (C), and (D) of this section.
(B) Comparability. The first step of the
residual profit split relies on market
benchmarks of profitability. Thus, the
comparability considerations that are
relevant for the first step of the residual
profit split are those that are relevant for
the methods that are used to determine

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market returns for the routine
contributions.
(C) Data and assumptions. The
reliability of the results derived from the
residual profit split is affected by the
quality of the data and assumptions
used to apply this method. In particular,
the following factors must be
considered—
(1) The reliability of the allocation of
costs, income, and assets between the
relevant business activity and the
controlled participants’ other activities
will affect the reliability of the
determination of the territorial operating
profit and its allocation among the
controlled participants. See § 1.482–
6(c)(2)(ii)(C)(1);
(2) The degree of consistency between
the controlled participants and
uncontrolled taxpayers in accounting
practices that materially affect the items
that determine the amount and
allocation of operating profit affects the
reliability of the result. See § 1.482–
6(c)(2)(ii)(C)(2); and
(3) The reliability of the data used and
the assumptions made in valuing the
nonroutine contributions by the
controlled participants. In particular, if
capitalized costs of development are
used to estimate the value of intangible
property, the reliability of the results is
reduced relative to the reliability of
other methods that do not require such
an estimate, for the following reasons. In
any given case, the costs of developing
the intangible may not be related to its
market value. In addition, the
calculation of the capitalized costs of
development may require the allocation
of indirect costs between the relevant
business activity and the controlled
participant’s other activities, which may
affect the reliability of the analysis.
(D) Other factors affecting reliability.
Like the methods described in §§ 1.482–
3, 1.482–4, and 1.482–5, or with the
arm’s length charge described in
§ 1.482–2(b)(3) (first sentence) based on
a comparable uncontrolled transaction,
the first step of the residual profit split
relies exclusively on external market
benchmarks. As indicated in § 1.482–
1(c)(2)(i), as the degree of comparability
between the controlled participants and
uncontrolled transactions increases, the
relative weight accorded the analysis
under this method will increase. In
addition, to the extent the allocation of
profits in the third step is not based on
external market benchmarks, the
reliability of the analysis will be
decreased in relation to an analysis
under a method that relies on market
benchmarks. Finally, the reliability of
the analysis under this method may be
enhanced by the fact that all the
controlled participants are evaluated

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under the residual profit split. However,
the reliability of the results of an
analysis based on information from all
the controlled participants is affected by
the reliability of the data and the
assumptions pertaining to each
controlled participant. Thus, if the data
and assumptions are significantly more
reliable with respect to one of the
controlled participants than with
respect to the others, a different method,
focusing solely on the results of that
party, may yield more reliable results.
(v) Example. The following example
illustrates the principles of this
paragraph (g)(7):
Example. (i) USP, a U.S. nanotech
company, has partially developed technology
for nanomotors which are used to provide
mobility for nanodevices. At the same time,
USP’s wholly-owned subsidiary, FS, a
foreign nanotech company, has partially
developed technology for nanosensors which
provide sensing capabilities for nanodevices.
At the beginning of Year 1, USP enters into
a CSA with FS to develop NanoBuild, a
technology which will be used to build a
wide range of fully functioning nanodevices.
The partially developed nanomotor and
nanosensor technologies owned by USP and
FS, respectively, are reasonably anticipated
to contribute to the development of
NanoBuild and therefore the RT Rights in the
nanomotor and nanosensor technologies
constitute external contributions of USP and
FS for which compensation is due under
PCTs. Under the CSA, USP will have the
right to exploit NanoBuild in the United
States, while FS will have the right to exploit
NanoBuild in the rest of the world. USP’s
and FS’s RAB shares are 40% and 60%
respectively.
(ii) The present value of the total projected
IDCs for the CSA is $10 billion (as of the date
of the PCTs). Based on RAB shares, USP
expects to bear 40%, or $4 billion, of these
IDCS and FS expects to bear 60%, or $6
billion. For accounting purposes, USP and FS
project a combined operating profit from
exploitation of the NanoBuild of $11 billion
(in Year 1 dollars), taking into account the
$10 billion of projected IDCs. However, for
purposes of applying the residual profit split
method, combined operating profit is
determined without taking into account IDCs.
Therefore, USP and FS redetermine their
combined operating profits for purposes of
the residual profit split method to equal $21
billion (adding $10 billion of IDCs back to the
accounting profit of $11 billion). Of this
amount, 40% or $8.4 billion is expected to
be generated by USP in the U.S. and 60% or
$12.6 billion is expected to be generated by
FS in the rest of the world.
(iii) USP and FS each undertake routine
distribution activities in their respective
markets that constitute routine contributions
to the relevant business activity of exploiting
NanoBuild. They estimate that the total
market return (costs plus a market return on
those costs) on these routine contributions
will amount to $1 billion, (in Year 1 dollars).
Of this amount, USP’s anticipated routine
return is $400 million and FS’s anticipated

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51151

routine return is $600 million. After
deducting the routine return, USP’s total
anticipated residual operating profit is $8
billion ($8.4 billion–$0.4 billion) and FS’s
total anticipated residual operating profit
equals $12 billion ($12.6 billion–$0.6
billion).
(iv) After analysis, USP and FS determine
that the relative values of the nanomotor and
nanosensor technologies are most reliably
measured by their respective capitalized
costs of development. Some of the factors
considered in this analysis include the
similar nature and success, and the relatively
contemporaneous timing, of the
nanoengineering research done to develop
both the nanomoter and nanosensor
technologies and the lack of external market
benchmarks. The capitalized costs of the
nanomotor and nonsensor technologies are
$3 billion and $5 billion, respectively.
(v) Under the residual profit split method,
in each taxable year USP and FS will allocate
the operating income they each separately
report in their territory (territorial operating
income) between their routine contributions,
their cost contribution share and their
nonroutine contributions, in this case the
nanomotor and nanosensor technologies.
(vi) In step one of the residual profit split,
USP and FS each allocate an amount of
income that is subtracted from their actual
territorial operating income for the taxable
year to provide a market return for their
actual routine contributions in that year.
(vii) In step two, a portion of residual
territorial operating profit or loss after
accounting for the allocation of income to
routine contributions in step one, will be
allocated by USP and FS to their cost
contribution shares. The percentage allocable
to the cost contribution share in this case is
equal to the each participant’s share of total
anticipated IDCs divided by the difference
between its total anticipated operating profits
in its territory and the total anticipated
routine return in its territory. It follows that
the cost contribution shares of USP and FS
are as follows: USP = 50% ($4 billion/$8
billion) and FS = 50% ($6 billion/$12
billion).
(viii) In step three, USP and FS each
allocate a portion of their residual territorial
operating income remaining after application
of steps one and two between their respective
nonroutine contributions. USP and FS have
estimated relative values for USP’s
nanomotor technology at $3 billion and FS’s
nanosensor technology at $5 billion. The
percentage of each participant’s residual
territorial operating income that is allocated
to the nanomotor technology is therefore
37.5% ($3 billion/($3 billion + $5 billion))
and the percentage allocated to the
nanosensor technology is 62.5% ($5 billion/
($3 billion + $5 billion)).
(ix) USP will owe a PCT Payment to FS
equal to the amount of its territorial operating
profit or loss that is allocated in step three
to FS’s nanosensor technology and FS will
owe a PCT Payment to USP equal to the
amount of its territorial operating iprofit or
loss that is allocated in step three to USP’s
nanomotor technology. The PCT Payments
owed each year by USP and FS, respectively,
will be netted against each other, so that only

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one participant will make a net PCT
Payment.

(8) Unspecified methods. Methods not
specified in paragraphs (g)(3) through
(7) of this section may be used to
evaluate whether the amount charged
for a PCT is arm’s length. Any method
used under this paragraph (g)(8) must be
applied in accordance with the
provisions of § 1.482–1 and of paragraph
(g)(2) of this section. Consistent with the
specified methods, an unspecified
method should take into account the
general principle that uncontrolled
taxpayers evaluate the terms of a
transaction by considering the realistic
alternatives to that transaction, and only
enter into a particular transaction if
none of the alternatives is preferable to
it. Therefore, in establishing whether a
PCT achieved an arm’s length result, an
unspecified method should provide
information on the prices or profits that
the controlled participant could have
realized by choosing a realistic
alternative to the CSA. As with any
method, an unspecified method will not
be applied unless it provides the most
reliable measure of an arm’s length
result under the principles of the best
method rule. See § 1.482–1(c). In
accordance with § 1.482–1(d)
(Comparability), to the extent that an
unspecified method relies on internal
data rather than uncontrolled
comparables, its reliability will be
reduced. Similarly, the reliability of a
method will be affected by the
reliability of the data and assumptions
used to apply the method, including any
projections used.
(h) Coordination with the arm’s length
standard. A CSA produces results that
are consistent with an arm’s length
result within the meaning of § 1.482–
1(b)(1) if, and only if, each controlled
participant’s IDC share (as determined
under paragraph (d)(4) of this section)
equals its RAB share (as required by
paragraph (a)(1) of this section), and all
other requirements of this section are
satisfied.
(i) Allocations by the Commissioner in
connection with a CSA—(1) In general.
The Commissioner may make
allocations to adjust the results of a
controlled transaction in connection
with a CSA so that the results are
consistent with an arm’s length result,
in accordance with the provisions of
this paragraph (i).
(2) CST allocations—(i) In general.
The Commissioner may make
allocations to adjust the results of a CST
so that the results are consistent with an
arm’s length result, including any
allocations to make each controlled
participant’s IDC share, as determined

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under paragraph (d)(4) of this section,
equal to that participant’s RAB share, as
determined under paragraph (e)(1) of
this section. Such allocations may result
from, for purposes of CST
determinations, adjustments to—
(A) Redetermine IDCs by adding any
costs (or cost categories) that are directly
identified with, or are reasonably
allocable to, the IDA, or by removing
any costs (or cost categories) that are not
IDCs;
(B) Reallocate costs between the IDA
and other business activities;
(C) Improve the reliability of the
selection or application of the basis
used for measuring benefits for purposes
of estimating a controlled participant’s
RAB share;
(D) Improve the reliability of the
projections used to estimate RAB shares,
including adjustments described in
paragraph (i)(2)(ii) of this section; and
(E) Allocate among the controlled
participants any unallocated interests in
cost shared intangibles.
(ii) Adjustments to improve the
reliability of projections used to
estimate RAB shares—(A) Unreliable
projections. A significant divergence
between projected benefit shares and
benefit shares adjusted to take into
account any available actual benefits to
date (adjusted benefit shares) may
indicate that the projections were not
reliable for purposes of estimating RAB
shares. In such a case, the
Commissioner may use adjusted benefit
shares as the most reliable measure of
RAB shares and adjust IDC shares
accordingly. The projected benefit
shares will not be considered unreliable,
as applied in a given taxable year, based
on a divergence from adjusted benefit
shares for every controlled participant
that is less than or equal to 20% of the
participant’s projected benefits share.
Further, the Commissioner will not
make an allocation based on such
divergence if the difference is due to an
extraordinary event, beyond the control
of the controlled participants, which
could not reasonably have been
anticipated at the time that costs were
shared. The Commissioner generally
may adjust projections of benefits used
to calculate benefit shares in accordance
with the provisions of § 1.482–1. In
particular, if benefits are projected over
a period of years, and the projections for
initial years of the period prove to be
unreliable, this may indicate that the
projections for the remaining years of
the period are also unreliable and thus
should be adjusted. For purposes of this
paragraph, all controlled participants
that are not U.S. persons are treated as
a single controlled participant.
Therefore, an adjustment based on an

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unreliable projection of RAB shares will
be made to the IDC shares of foreign
controlled participants only if there is a
matching adjustment to the IDC shares
of controlled participants that are U.S.
persons. Nothing in this paragraph
(i)(2)(ii)(A) prevents the Commissioner
from making an allocation if taxpayer
did not use the most reliable basis for
measuring anticipated benefits. For
example, if the taxpayer measures its
anticipated benefits based on units sold,
and the Commissioner determines that
another basis is more reliable for
measuring anticipated benefits, then the
fact that actual units sold were within
20% of the projected unit sales will not
preclude an allocation under this
section.
(B) Foreign-to-foreign adjustments.
Adjustments to IDC shares based on an
unreliable projection also may be made
solely among foreign controlled
participants if the variation between
actual and projected benefits has the
effect of substantially reducing U.S. tax.
(C) Correlative adjustments to PCTs.
Correlative adjustments will be made to
any PCT Payments of a fixed amount
that were determined based on RAB
shares which are subsequently adjusted
on a finding that they were based on
unreliable projections. No correlative
adjustments will be made to contingent
PCT Payments regardless of whether
RAB shares were used as a parameter in
the valuation of those payments.
(D) Examples. The following
examples illustrate the principles of this
paragraph (i)(2)(ii):
Example 1. U.S. Parent (USP) and Foreign
Subsidiary (FS) enter into a CSA to develop
new food products, dividing costs on the
basis of projected sales two years in the
future. In Year 1, USP and FS project that
their sales in Year 3 will be equal, and they
divide costs accordingly. In Year 3, the
Commissioner examines the controlled
participants’ method for dividing costs. USP
and FS actually accounted for 42% and 58%
of total sales, respectively. The
Commissioner agrees that sales two years in
the future provide a reliable basis for
estimating benefit shares. Because the
differences between USP’s and FS’s adjusted
and projected benefit shares are less than
20% of their projected benefit shares, the
projection of future benefits for Year 3 is
reliable.
Example 2. The facts are the same as in
Example 1, except that in Year 3 USP and FS
actually accounted for 35% and 65% of total
sales, respectively. The divergence between
USP’s projected and adjusted benefit shares
is greater than 20% of USP’s projected
benefit share and is not due to an
extraordinary event beyond the control of the
controlled participants. The Commissioner
concludes that the projected benefit shares
were unreliable, and uses adjusted benefit
shares as the basis for an adjustment to the
cost shares borne by USP and FS.

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Example 3. U.S. Parent (USP), a U.S.
corporation, and its foreign subsidiary (FS)
enter a CSA in Year 1. They project that they
will begin to receive benefits from covered
intangibles in Years 4 through 6, and that
USP will receive 60% of total benefits and FS
40% of total benefits. In Years 4 through 6,
USP and FS actually receive 50% each of the
total benefits. In evaluating the reliability of
the controlled participants’ projections, the
Commissioner compares the adjusted benefit
shares to the projected benefit shares.
Although USP’s adjusted benefit share (50%)
is within 20% of its projected benefit share
(60%), FS’s adjusted benefit share (50%) is
not within 20% of its projected benefit share
(40%). Based on this discrepancy, the
Commissioner may conclude that the
controlled participants’ projections were not
reliable and may use adjusted benefit shares
as the basis for an adjustment to the cost
shares borne by USP and FS.
Example 4. Three controlled taxpayers,
USP, FS1 and FS2 enter into a CSA. FS1 and
FS2 are foreign. USP is a United States
corporation that controls all the stock of FS1
and FS2. The controlled participants project
that they will share the total benefits of the
covered intangibles in the following
percentages: USP 50%; FS1 30%; and FS2
20%. Adjusted benefit shares are as follows:
USP 45%; FS1 25%; and FS2 30%. In
evaluating the reliability of the controlled
participants’ projections, the Commissioner
compares these adjusted benefit shares to the
projected benefit shares. For this purpose,
FS1 and FS2 are treated as a single controlled
participant. The adjusted benefit share
received by USP (45%) is within 20% of its
projected benefit share (50%). In addition,
the non-US controlled participants’ adjusted
benefit share (55%) is also within 20% of
their projected benefit share (50%).
Therefore, the Commissioner concludes that
the controlled participants’ projections of
future benefits were reliable, despite the fact
that FS2’s adjusted benefit share (30%) is not
within 20% of its projected benefit share
(20%).
Example 5. The facts are the same as in
Example 4. In addition, the Commissioner
determines that FS2 has significant operating
losses and has no earnings and profits, and
that FS1 is profitable and has earnings and
profits. Based on all the evidence, the
Commissioner concludes that the controlled
participants arranged that FS1 would bear a
larger cost share than appropriate in order to
reduce FS1’s earnings and profits and
thereby reduce inclusions USP otherwise
would be deemed to have on account of FS1
under subpart F. Pursuant to paragraph
(i)(2)(ii)(B) of this section, the Commissioner
may make an adjustment solely to the cost
shares borne by FS1 and FS2 because FS2’s
projection of future benefits was unreliable
and the variation between adjusted and
projected benefits had the effect of
substantially reducing USP’s U.S. income tax
liability (on account of FS1 subpart F
income).
Example 6. (i)(A) Foreign Parent (FP) and
U.S. Subsidiary (USS) enter into a CSA in
1996 to develop a new treatment for
baldness. USS’s interest in any treatment
developed is the right to produce and sell the

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treatment in the U.S. market while FP retains
rights to produce and sell the treatment in
the rest of the world. USS and FP measure
their anticipated benefits from the cost
sharing arrangement based on their
respective projected future sales of the
baldness treatment. The following sales
projections are used:

three years of the period the share of
total sales of at least one of the parties
diverged by over 20% from its projected
share of sales. However, by Year 5 both
parties’ sales had leveled off at
approximately their projected values.
Taking into account this leveling off of
sales and all the facts and
circumstances, the Commissioner
SALES
determines that it is appropriate to use
[In millions of dollars]
the original projections for the
remaining years of sales. Combining the
Year
USS
FP
actual results through Year 5 with the
1 ........................
5
10 projections for subsequent years, and
2 ........................
20
20 using a discount rate of 10%, the
3 ........................
30
30 present discounted value of sales is
4 ........................
40
40 approximately $141.6 million for USS
5 ........................
40
40 and $187.3 million for FP. This result
6 ........................
40
40
implies that USS and FP obtain
7 ........................
40
40
8 ........................
20
20 approximately 43.1% and 56.9%,
9 ........................
10
10 respectively, of the anticipated benefits
10 ......................
5
5 from the baldness treatment. Because
these adjusted benefit shares are within
(B) In Year 1, the first year of sales,
20% of the benefit shares calculated
USS is projected to have lower sales
based on the original sales projections,
than FP due to lags in U.S. regulatory
the Commissioner determines that,
approval for the baldness treatment. In
based on the difference between
each subsequent year USS and FP are
adjusted and projected benefit shares,
projected to have equal sales. Sales are
the original projections were not
projected to build over the first three
unreliable. No adjustment is made based
years of the period, level off for several
on the difference between adjusted and
years, and then decline over the final
projected benefit shares.
years of the period as new and
Example 7. (i) The facts are the same as in
improved baldness treatments reach the Example 6, except that the actual sales
results through Year 5 are as follows:
market.
(ii) To account for USS’s lag in sales
SALES
in the Year 1, the present discounted
value of sales over the period is used as
[In millions of dollars]
the basis for measuring benefits. Based
Year
USS
FP
on the risk associated with this venture,
a discount rate of 10 percent is selected.
1 ........................
0
17
The present discounted value of
2 ........................
17
35
projected sales is determined to be
3 ........................
25
44
approximately $154.4 million for USS
4 ........................
34
54
and $158.9 million for FP. On this basis 5 ........................
36
55
USS and FP are projected to obtain
approximately 49.3% and 50.7% of the
(ii) Based on the discrepancy between the
benefit, respectively, and the costs of
projections and the actual results and on
consideration of all the facts, the
developing the baldness treatment are
Commissioner determines that for the
shared accordingly.
remaining years the following sales
(iii) (A) In Year 6 the Commissioner
projections are more reliable than the original
examines the cost sharing arrangement.
projections:
USS and FP have obtained the following
sales results through the Year 5:

SALES
[In millions of dollars]

SALES
[In millions of dollars]
Year
1
2
3
4
5

USS

........................
........................
........................
........................
........................

Year
FP

0
17
25
38
39

17
35
41
41
41

(B) USS’s sales initially grew more
slowly than projected while FP’s sales
grew more quickly. In each of the first

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6 ........................
7 ........................
8 ........................
9 ........................
10 ......................

USS

FP
36
36
18
9
4.5

55
55
28
14
7

(iii) Combining the actual results through
Year 5 with the projections for subsequent
years, and using a discount rate of 10%, the
present discounted value of sales is
approximately $131.2 million for USS and

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$229.4 million for FP. This result implies
that USS and FP obtain approximately 35.4%
and 63.6%, respectively, of the anticipated
benefits from the baldness treatment. These
adjusted benefit shares diverge by greater
than 20% from the benefit shares calculated
based on the original sales projections, and
the Commissioner determines that, based on
the difference between adjusted and
projected benefit shares, the original
projections were unreliable. The
Commissioner adjusts costs shares for each of
the taxable years under examination to
conform them to the recalculated shares of
anticipated benefits.

(iii) Timing of CST allocations. If the
Commissioner makes an allocation to
adjust the results of a CST, the
allocation must be reflected for tax
purposes in the year in which the IDCs
were incurred. When a cost sharing
payment is owed by one controlled
participant to another controlled
participant, the Commissioner may
make appropriate allocations to reflect
an arm’s length rate of interest for the
time value of money, consistent with
the provisions of § 1.482–2(a) (Loans or
advances).
(3) PCT allocations. The
Commissioner may make allocations to
adjust the results of a PCT so that the
results are consistent with an arm’s
length result in accordance with the
provisions of the applicable sections of
the section 482 regulations, as
determined pursuant to paragraph (a)(2)
of this section.
(4) Allocations regarding changes in
participation under a CSA. The
Commissioner may make allocations to
adjust the results of any controlled
transaction described in paragraph (f) of
this section, if the controlled
participants do not reflect arm’s length
results in relation to any such
transaction.
(5) Allocations when CSTs are
consistently and materially
disproportionate to RAB shares. If a
controlled participant bears IDC shares
that are consistently and materially
greater or lesser than its RAB share, then
the Commissioner may conclude that
the economic substance of the
arrangement between the controlled
participants is inconsistent with the
terms of the CSA. In such a case, the
Commissioner may disregard such terms
and impute an agreement that is
consistent with the controlled
participants’ course of conduct, under
which a controlled participant that bore
a disproportionately greater IDC share
received additional interests in the cost
shared intangibles. See § 1.482–
1(d)(3)(ii)(B) (Identifying contractual
terms) and § 1.482–4(f)(3)(ii)
(Identification of owner). Such
additional interests will consist of

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partial undivided interests in another
controlled participant’s territory.
Accordingly, that controlled participant
must receive arm’s length consideration
from any controlled participant whose
IDC share is less than its RAB share over
time, under the provisions of §§ 1.482–
1 and 1.482–4 through 1.482–6.
(6) Periodic adjustments—(i) In
general. Subject to the exceptions in
paragraph (i)(6)(vi) of this section, the
Commissioner may make periodic
adjustments with respect to all PCT
Payments for an open taxable year (the
Adjustment Year), and for all
subsequent taxable years for the
duration of the CSA Activity, if the
Commissioner determines that, for a
particular PCT (the Trigger PCT), a
particular controlled participant that
owes or owed a PCT Payment relating
to that PCT (the PCT Payor) has realized
an Actually Experienced Return Ratio
(AERR) that is outside the Periodic
Return Ratio Range (PRRR). The
satisfaction of the condition stated in
the preceding sentence is referred to as
a Periodic Trigger. See paragraph
(i)(6)(ii) through (vi) of this section
regarding the PRRR, the AERR, and
periodic adjustments. In determining
whether to make such adjustments, the
Commissioner may consider whether
the outcome as adjusted more reliably
reflects an arm’s length result under all
the relevant facts and circumstances,
including any information known as of
the Determination Date. The
Determination Date is the date of the
relevant determination by the
Commissioner. The failure of the
Commissioner to determine for an
earlier taxable year that a PCT Payment
was not arm’s length will not preclude
the Commissioner from making a
periodic adjustment for a subsequent
year. A periodic adjustment under this
paragraph may be made without regard
to whether the taxable year of the
Trigger PCT or any other PCT remains
open for statute of limitations purposes.
(ii) PRRR. Except as provided in the
next sentence, the PRRR will consist of
return ratios that are not less than 1⁄2 nor
more than 2. Alternatively, if the
controlled participants have not
substantially complied with the
documentation requirements referenced
in paragraph (k) of this section, as
modified, if applicable, by paragraph
(m)(3) of this section, the PRRR will
consist of the return ratios that are not
less than .67 nor more than 1.5.
(iii) AERR. (A) In general. The AERR
is the Present Value of Total Profits
(PVTP) divided by the Present Value of
Investment (PVI). In computing PVTP
and PVI, present values are computed
using the Applicable Discount Rate

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(ADR), and all information available as
of the Determination Date is taken into
account.
(B) PVTP. The PVTP is the present
value, as of the earliest date that any
IDC described in paragraph (d)(1) of this
section occurred (the CSA Start Date), of
the PCT Payor’s actually experienced
territorial operating profits, as defined
in paragraph (j)(1)(vi) of this section,
from the CSA Start Date through the end
of the Adjustment Year.
(C) PVI. The PVI is the present value,
as of the CSA Start Date, of the PCT
Payor’s investment associated with the
CSA Activity, defined as the sum of its
cost contributions and its PCT
Payments, from the CSA Start Date
through the end of the Adjustment Year.
For purposes of computing the PVI, PCT
Payments means all PCT Payments due
from a PCT Payor before netting against
PCT Payments due from other
controlled participants.
(iv) ADR—(A) In general. Except as
provided in paragraph (i)(6)(iv)(B) of
this section, the ADR is the discount
rate pursuant to paragraph (g)(2)(vi) of
this section, subject to such adjustments
as the Commissioner determines
appropriate.
(B) Publicly traded companies. If the
PCT Payor meets the conditions of
paragraph (i)(6)(iv)(C) of this section,
the ADR is the PCT Payor WACC as of
the date of the trigger PCT. However, if
the Commissioner determines, or the
controlled participants establish to the
Commissioner’s satisfaction, that a
discount rate other than the PCT Payor
WACC better reflects the degree of risk
of the CSA Activity as of such date, the
ADR is such other discount rate.
(C) Publicly traded. A PCT Payor
meets the conditions of this paragraph
(i)(6)(iv)(C) if—
(1) Stock of the PCT Payor is publicly
traded; or
(2) Stock of the PCT Payor is not
publicly traded, provided—
(i) The PCT Payor is included in a
group of companies for which
consolidated financial statements are
prepared; and
(ii) A publicly traded company in
such group owns, directly or indirectly,
stock in PCT Payor. Stock of a company
is publicly traded within the meaning of
this paragraph (i)(6)(iv)(C) if such stock
is regularly traded on an established
United States securities market and the
company issues financial statements
prepared in accordance with United
States generally accepted accounting
principles for the taxable year.
(D) PCT Payor WACC. The PCT Payor
WACC is the WACC of the PCT Payor
or the publicly traded company

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described in paragraph (i)(6)(iv)(C)(2) of
this section, as the case may be.
(E) Generally accepted accounting
principles. For purposes of paragraph
(i)(6)(iv)(C) of this section, a financial
statement prepared in accordance with
a comprehensive body of generally
accepted accounting principles other
than United States generally accepted
accounting principles is considered to
be prepared in accordance with United
States generally accepted accounting
principles provided that the amounts of
debt, equity and interest expense are
reflected in the reconciliation between
such other accounting principles and
United States generally accepted
accounting principles required to be
incorporated into the financial
statement by the securities laws
governing companies whose stock is
regularly traded on United States
securities markets.
(v) Determination of periodic
adjustments. In the event of a Periodic
Trigger, subject to paragraph (i)(6)(vi) of
this section, the Commissioner may
make periodic adjustments with respect
to all PCT Payments between all PCT
Payors and PCT Payees for the
Adjustment Year and all subsequent
years for the duration of the CSA
Activity pursuant to the residual profit
split method as provided in paragraph
(g)(7) of this section, subject to the
further modifications in this paragraph
(i)(6)(v).
(A) If the AERR is less than the PRRR,
then the cost contribution share of
residual profit or loss under paragraph
(g)(7)(iii)(C)(2) of this section is
determined as follows:
(1) The relevant date specified in that
paragraph is the CSA Start Date.
However, the effect of using such
relevant date is modified as specified in
paragraphs (i)(6)(vi)(A)(2) and
(i)(6)(vi)(A)(3) of this section.
(2) The discount rate to be used in
paragraph (g)(7)(iii)(C)(2) of this section
is determined as of the relevant date,
but taking into account any data
relevant to such determination that may
become available up through the
Determination Date.
(3) The present values of the
summations described in paragraph
(g)(7)(iii)(C)(2) of this section are
determined by substituting actual
results up through the Determination
Date, and future results anticipated on
that date, for the results anticipated on
the relevant date. It is possible that,
because of these substitutions, the
resulting fraction determined in that
paragraph will be greater than one.
(B) If the AERR is greater than the
PRRR, then the cost contribution share
of residual profit or loss under

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paragraph (g)(7)(iii)(C)(2) of this section
is determined as follows:
(1) The relevant date specified in that
paragraph is the first day of the
Adjustment Year. However, the effect of
using such relevant date is modified as
specified in paragraphs (i)(6)(vi)(B)(2)
and (i)(6)(vi)(B)(3) of this section.
(2) The discount rate to be used in
paragraph (g)(7)(iii)(C)(2) of this section
is determined as of the relevant date,
but taking into account any data
relevant to such determination that may
become available up through the
Determination Date.
(3) In computing the fraction
described in paragraph (g)(7)(iii)(C)(2) of
this section, the summation period
described in that paragraph is modified
to start on the first day of the
Adjustment Year; thus, the summations
described in that paragraph that are
used to determine that fraction will not
include any items relating to periods
before the first day of the Adjustment
Year.
(C) The relative value of nonroutine
contributions in paragraph
(g)(7)(iii)(C)(3) of this section are
determined as described in that
paragraph, but taking into account any
data relevant to such determination that
may become available up through the
Determination Date.
(D) For these purposes, the residual
profit split method may be used even
where only one controlled participant
makes significant nonroutine
contributions to the CSA Activity. If
only one controlled participant provides
all the external contributions and other
nonroutine contributions, then the third
step residual profit or loss belongs
entirely to such controlled participant.
(vi) Exceptions to periodic
adjustments—(A) Transactions
involving the same external contribution
as in the PCT. If—
(1) The same external contribution is
furnished to an uncontrolled taxpayer
under substantially the same
circumstances as those of the relevant
RT (as defined in paragraph (b)(3)(iii) of
this section) and with a similar form of
payment as the PCT;
(2) This transaction serves as the basis
for the application of the comparable
uncontrolled transaction method
described in § 1.482–4(c), or the arm’s
length charge described in § 1.482–
2(b)(3)(first sentence) based on a
comparable uncontrolled transaction, in
the first year in which substantial PCT
Payments relating to this PCT were
required to be paid; and
(3) The amount of those PCT
Payments in that year was arm’s length;
then no periodic adjustment that uses
that PCT as the Trigger PCT will be

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51155

made under paragraphs (i)(6)(i) and
(i)(6)(v) of this section.
(B) Results not reasonably
anticipated. If the controlled
participants establish to the satisfaction
of the Commissioner that the differential
between the AERR and the nearest
bound of the PRRR is due to
extraordinary events beyond its control
and that could not reasonably have been
anticipated at the time of the Trigger
PCT, then no periodic adjustment will
be made under paragraphs (i)(6)(i) and
(i)(6)(v) of this section.
(C) Reduced AERR does not cause
Periodic Trigger. If the controlled
participants establish to the satisfaction
of the Commissioner that the Periodic
Trigger would not have occurred had
the PCT Payor’s operating profits used
to calculate its PVTP excluded those
operating profits attributable to the PCT
Payor’s routine contributions to its
exploitation of cost shared intangibles,
and nonroutine contributions to the
CSA Activity, then no periodic
adjustment will be made under
paragraphs (i)(6)(i) and (i)(6)(v) of this
section.
(D) Increased AERR does not cause
Periodic Trigger—(1) If the controlled
participants establish to the satisfaction
of the Commissioner that the Periodic
Trigger would not have occurred had
the operating profits of the PCT Payor
used to calculate its PVTP included its
reasonably anticipated operating profits
after the Adjustment Year from the CSA
Activity, including from routine
contributions to that activity, and had
the cost contributions and PCT
Payments of the PCT Payor used to
calculate its PVI included its reasonably
anticipated cost contributions and PCT
Payments after the Adjustment Year,
then no periodic adjustment will be
made under paragraphs (i)(6)(i) and
(i)(6)(v) of this section. The reasonably
anticipated amounts in the previous
sentence are determined based on all
information available as of the
Determination Date.
(2) For purposes of this paragraph
(i)(6)(vii)(D) of this section, the
controlled participants may, if they
wish, assume that the average yearly
operating profits for all taxable years
prior to and including the Adjustment
Year, in which there has been
substantial exploitation of cost shared
intangibles resulting from the CSA
(exploitation years), will continue to be
earned in each year over a period of
years equal to 15 minus the number of
exploitation years prior to and including
the Determination Date.
(E) 10-year period. If the AERR
determined is within the PRRR for each
year of the 10-year period beginning

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with the first taxable year in which
there is substantial exploitation of cost
shared intangibles resulting from the
CSA is, then no periodic adjustment in
a subsequent year will be made under
paragraphs (i)(6)(i) and (i)(6)(v) of this
section.
(F) 5-year period. For any year of the
5-year period beginning with the first
taxable year in which there is
substantial exploitation of cost shared
intangibles resulting from the CSA, no
Periodic Trigger will be considered to
occur as a result of a determination that
Year

Sales

1 .......................
2 .......................
3 .......................
4 .......................
5 .......................
6 .......................
7 .......................
8 .......................
NPV through
Year 5 ...........
NPV through
Year 6 ...........
NPV through
Year 7 ...........

average cost of capital of the controlled group
that includes USP and FS in Year 1 is 15%.
In Year 10, the Commissioner audits Years 1
through 8 of the CSA to determine whether
or not any periodic adjustments should be
made. USP and FS have substantially
complied with the documentation
requirements of this section.
(ii) FS derives the following actual cash
flow from its participation in the CSA. The
cash flows include the lump sum PCT of
$100 million made by FS to USP. The
derivation of such PCT Payment was based
on financial projections undertaken in Year
1 (not shown). (All amounts in this table and
the tables that follow are in millions.)

the AERR falls below the lower bound
of the PRRR.
(vii) Examples. The following
examples illustrates the principles of
this paragraph (i)(6):
Example 1. (i) At the beginning of Year 1,
USP, a publicly traded U.S. company, and
FS, its wholly-owned foreign subsidiary,
enter into a CSA to develop new technology
for wireless cell phones. As part of a PCT,
USP furnishes an external contribution, the
RT Rights for an in-process technology that
when developed will improve the clarity of
cell to cell calls, for which compensation is
due from FS. FS furnishes no external
contributions to the CSA. The weighted

Non-IDC
costs

PCT
payments

IDCs

Total inv.
costs

Operating
profits
(accounting)

Exploitation
profits

AERR

0
0
0
780
936
1,123
1,179
1,238

0
0
0
562
618
680
747
822

15
17
18
20
22
24
27
29

100
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

115
17
18
20
22
24
27
29

¥115
¥17
¥18
198
296
420
405
387

0
0
0
218
318
444
432
416

1,048

722

69

100

169

157

326

1.9

1,606

1,060

81

100

181

365

546

3.0

2,116

1,383

92

100

192

541

733

3.8

(iii) Because USP is publicly traded in the
United States and is a member of the
controlled group to which the PCT Payor, FS,
belongs, for purposes of calculating the AERR
for FS, the present values of its PVTP and
PVI are determined using an ADR of 15%,
the weighted average cost of capital of the
controlled group. At a 15% discount rate, the
PVTP, calculated in Year 8 as of Year 1, and
based on actual profits realized by FS
through Year 7 from exploiting the new
wireless cell phone technology developed by
the CSA, is $733 million. The PVI, based on
FS’s IDCs and its compensation expenditures
pursuant to the PCT, is $192 million. The
AERR for FS is equal to its PVTP divided by

its PVI, $733 million/$192 million, or 3.8.
There is a Periodic Trigger because FS’s
AERR of 3.8 falls outside the PRRR of 1⁄2 to
2, the applicable PRRR for controlled
participants complying with the
documentation requirements of this section.
(iv) At the time of the Determination Date,
it is determined that the first Adjustment
Year in which a Periodic Trigger occurred
was Year 6, when the AERR of FS was
determined to be 3.0. It is also determined
that none of the exceptions to periodic
adjustments described in paragraph (i)(6)(vi)
of this section applies. It follows that the
arm’s length PCT Payments made by FS from
Year 6 forward shall be determined each

Year

IDCs

taxable year using the residual profit split
method described in paragraph (g)(7) of this
section as modified by paragraph (i)(6)(v) of
this section. Periodic adjustments will be
made to the extent the PCT Payments
actually made by FS differ from the PCT
Payment calculation under the residual profit
split.
(v) Actual and projected IDCs, territorial
operating profits and returns to routine
contributions for the remainder of the
exploitation of the cost shared intangibles,
determined as of the beginning of Year 6 are
as follows:
Territorial operating profits

Return to
routine
contributions

Profits less
routine return

6 ...............................................................................................................................
7 ...............................................................................................................................
8 ...............................................................................................................................
9 (Projected) ............................................................................................................
10 (Projected) ..........................................................................................................

24
27
29
32
35

444
432
416
396
370

68
75
82
90
99

376
357
334
305
271

Total PV as of Year 6 .......................................................................................

116

1666

326

1340

(vi) Under step one of the residual profit
split method, for each taxable year, FS will
be allocated a portion of its actual territorial
operating income for the taxable year to
provide a market return for its actual routine

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contributions in that year. As a result of a
transfer pricing analysis, the Commissioner
determines that the return to FS’s routine
activities, based on the return for comparable
routine functions undertaken by comparable

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unrelated companies, is 10% of non-IDC
costs. The allocations of actual territorial
profits in Years 6 through 8 are as follows:

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Year

Territorial operating profits

Return to
routine
contributions

444
432
416

68
75
82

6 .........................................................................................................................................................
7 .........................................................................................................................................................
8 .........................................................................................................................................................

(vii) Under step two, a portion of the
residual territorial operating profit or loss
after the allocation of profit to routine
contributions in step one will be allocated by
FS to its cost contribution share. The
percentage allocable to the cost contribution
share is equal to FS’s share of the total
anticipated IDCs divided by its total
anticipated territorial operating profits
reduced by total expected return to its

routine contributions to the exploitation of
the cost shared technology in its territory. All
amounts are determined as present values as
of the first day of Year 6, using an
appropriate discount rate on that date, and
do not include any amounts relating to
periods before the first day of Year 6.
Following these rules, it is determined that
the present value of FS’s share of the total
anticipated IDCs after the first day of Year 6

6 .........................................................................................................................................................
7 .........................................................................................................................................................
8 .........................................................................................................................................................

(viii) In step three, because USP provided
the only nonroutine contributions to the CSA
Activity, 100% of FS’s residual operating
income after steps one and two is allocated
to USP’s external contributions and therefore

represents the amount of the PCT Payment
due from FS to USP for the particular taxable
year. Also because USP provided the only
nonroutine contributions to the CSA
Activity, none of its residual territorial
Residual
profits after
step 2

Year
6 ...............................................................................................................................
7 ...............................................................................................................................
8 ...............................................................................................................................

Example 2. The facts are the same as
Example 1 paragraphs (i) through (iii). At the
time of the Determination Date, it is
determined that the first Adjustment Year in
which a Periodic Trigger occurred was Year
6, when the AERR of FS was determined to
be 3.0. Upon further investigation as to what
may have caused the high return in FS’s
market, the Commissioner learns that, in
Year 4, significant health risks were linked to
the use of wireless cell phones of USP’s
leading competitors. No such health risk was
linked to the cell phones developed by USP
and FS under the CSA. This resulted in a
significant increase in USP’s and FS’s market
share for cellular phones. Further analysis
determines that it was this unforeseen
occurrence that was primarily responsible for
the AERR trigger. Based on paragraph
(i)(6)(vi)(B) of this section, the Commissioner
concludes that no adjustments are warranted,
as FS simply has earned the premium return
that any such investor would earn under the
circumstances.

(j) Definitions and special rules—(1)
Definitions. For purposes of this section:
(i) Controlled participant means a
controlled taxpayer, as defined under
§ 1.482–1(i)(5), that is a party to the
contractual agreement that underlies the

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376
357
334

Step 2 profits
allocated to
FS
32
31
29

Residual
profits after
step 2
344
327
305

operating profit or loss is attributable to FS,
therefore no offsetting PCT Payment is due
from USP to FS. The PCT Payments due and
adjustments made in Years 6 through 8 are
as follows:
PCT payment
due from FS
to USP

344
327
305

CSA, and that reasonably anticipates
that it will derive benefits, as defined in
paragraph (j)(1)(iv) of this section, from
exploiting one or more cost shared
intangibles.
(ii) Cost shared intangible means any
intangible, within the meaning of
§ 1.482–4(b), developed or to be
developed as a result of the IDA, as
described in paragraph (d)(1) of this
section, including any portion of such
intangible that reflects an external
contribution, as described in paragraph
(b)(3)(ii) of this section.
(iii) An interest in an intangible
includes any commercially transferable
interest, the benefits of which are
susceptible of valuation.
(iv) Benefits mean the sum of
additional revenue generated, plus cost
savings, minus any cost increases from
exploiting cost shared intangibles.
(v) A controlled participant’s
reasonably anticipated benefits mean
the aggregate benefits that reasonably
may be anticipated to be derived from
exploiting cost shared intangibles.

376
357
334

is $116 million and its total anticipated
territorial operating profits reduced by the
return to its routine contributions is $1,340
million. It follows that the percentage of
residual territorial operating profit or loss
allocated to FS’s cost contribution share is
8.6% ($116/$1,340). The allocation of actual
residual profits after Step 1 in Years 6
through 8 is as follows:
Residual
profits after
step 1

Year

Residual
profits after
step 1

344
327
305

Actual PCT
payment
made
0
0
0

Adjustment
344
327
305

(vi) Territorial operating profit or loss
means the operating profit or loss as
separately earned by each controlled
participant in its geographic territory,
described in paragraph (b)(4) of this
section, from the CSA activity,
determined before any expense
(including amortization) on account of
IDCs, routine external contributions,
and nonroutine contributions.
(vii) The CSA Activity is the activity
of developing and exploiting cost shared
intangibles.
(viii) Examples. The following
examples illustrate the principles of this
paragraph (j)(1):
Example 1. Controlled participant. Foreign
Parent (FP) is a foreign corporation engaged
in the extraction of a natural resource. FP has
a U.S. subsidiary (USS) to which FP sells
supplies of this resource for sale in the
United States. FP enters into a CSA with USS
to develop a new machine to extract the
natural resource. The machine uses a new
extraction process that will be patented in
the United States and in other countries. The
CSA provides that USS will receive the rights
to exploit the machine in the extraction of
the natural resource in the United States, and

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FP will receive the rights in the rest of the
world. This resource does not, however, exist
in the United States. Despite the fact that
USS has received the right to exploit this
process in the United States, USS is not a
controlled participant because it will not
derive a benefit from the exploiting the
intangible developed under the CSA.
Example 2. Controlled participants. (i) U.S.
Parent (USP), one foreign subsidiary (FS),
and a second foreign subsidiary constituting
the group’s research arm (R+D) enter into a
CSA to develop manufacturing intangibles
for a new product line A. USP and FS are
assigned the exclusive rights to exploit the
intangibles respectively in the United States
and the rest of the world, where each
presently manufactures and sells various
existing product lines. R+D is not assigned
any rights to exploit the intangibles. R+D’s
activity consists solely in carrying out
research for the group. It is reliably projected
that the RAB shares of USP and FS will be
662⁄3% and 331⁄3%, respectively, and the
parties’ agreement provides that USP and FS
will reimburse 662⁄3% and 331⁄3%,
respectively, of the IDCs incurred by R+D
with respect to the new intangible.
(ii) R+D does not qualify as a controlled
participant within the meaning of paragraph
(j)(1)(i) of this section, because it will not
derive any benefits from exploiting cost
shared intangibles. Therefore, R+D is treated
as a service provider for purposes of this
section and must receive arm’s length
consideration for the assistance it is deemed
to provide to USP and FS, under the rules of
paragraph (a)(3) of this section and § 1.482–
4(f)(3)(iii). Such consideration must be
treated as IDCs incurred by USP and FS in
proportion to their RAB shares (i.e., 662⁄3%
and 331⁄3%, respectively). R+D will not be
considered to bear any share of the IDCs
under the arrangement.
Example 3. Cost shared intangible. U.S.
Parent (USP) has developed and currently
exploits an antihistamine, XY, which is
manufactured in tablet form. USP enters into
a CSA with its wholly-owned foreign
subsidiary (FS) to develop XYZ, a new
improved version of XY that will be
manufactured as a nasal spray. XYZ is a cost
shared intangible under the CSA.
Example 4. Cost shared intangible. The
facts are the same as in Example 3, except
that instead of developing XYZ, the
controlled participants develop ABC, a cure
for the common cold. ABC is a cost shared
intangible under the CSA.
Example 5. Reasonably anticipated
benefits. Controlled parties A and B enter
into a cost sharing arrangement to develop
product and process intangibles for an
already existing Product P. Without such
intangibles, A and B would each reasonably
anticipate revenue, in present value terms, of
$100M from sales of Product P until it
became obsolete. With the intangibles, A and
B each reasonably anticipate selling the same
number of units each year, but reasonably
anticipate that the price will be higher.
Because the particular product intangible is
more highly regarded in A’s market, A
reasonably anticipates an increase of $20M in
present value revenue from the product

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intangible, while B reasonably anticipates
only an increase of $10M. Further, A and B
each reasonably anticipate spending an extra
$5M present value in production costs to
include the feature embodying the product
intangible. Finally, A and B each reasonably
anticipate saving $2M present value in
production costs by using the process
intangible. A and B reasonably anticipate no
other economic effects from exploiting the
cost shared intangibles. A’s reasonably
anticipated benefits from exploiting the cost
shared intangibles equal its reasonably
anticipated increase in revenue ($20M) plus
its reasonably anticipated cost savings ($2M)
minus its reasonably anticipated increased
costs ($5M), which equals $17M. Similarly,
B’s reasonably anticipated benefits from
exploiting the cost shared intangibles equal
its reasonably anticipated increase in revenue
($10M) plus its reasonably anticipated cost
savings ($2M) minus its reasonably
anticipated increased costs ($5M), which
equals $7M. Thus A’s reasonably anticipated
benefits are $17M and B’s reasonably
anticipated benefits are $7M.

(2) Special rules—(i) Consolidated
group. For purposes of this section, all
members of the same consolidated
group shall be treated as one taxpayer.
For purposes of this paragraph (j)(2)(i),
the term consolidated group means all
members of a group of controlled
entities created or organized within a
single country and subjected to an
income tax by such country on the basis
of their combined income.
(ii) Trade or business. A participant
that is a foreign corporation or
nonresident alien individual will not be
treated as engaged in a trade or business
within the United States solely by
reason of its participation in a CSA
described in paragraph (b)(1) of this
section. See generally § 1.864–2(a).
(iii) Partnership. A CSA, or an
arrangement to which the Commissioner
applies the rules of this section, will not
be treated as a partnership to which the
rules of subchapter K of the Internal
Revenue Code apply. See § 301.7701–
1(c) of this chapter.
(3) Character—(i) In general. CST
payments generally will be considered
costs of developing intangibles of the
payor and reimbursements of the same
kind of costs of developing intangibles
of the payee. For purposes of this
paragraph (j)(3), a controlled
participant’s payment required under a
CSA is deemed to be reduced to the
extent of any payments owed to it under
the CSA from other controlled
participants. Each payment received by
a payee will be treated as coming pro
rata from payments made by all payors.
Such payments will be applied pro rata
against deductions for the taxable year
that the payee is allowed in connection
with the CSA. Payments received in
excess of such deductions will be

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treated as in consideration for use of the
land and tangible property furnished for
purposes of the CSA by the payee. For
purposes of the research credit
determined under section 41, cost
sharing payments among controlled
participants will be treated as provided
for intra-group transactions in § 1.41–
6(e). Any payment made or received by
a taxpayer pursuant to an arrangement
that the Commissioner determines not
to be a CSA will be subject to the
provisions of §§ 1.482–1 and 1.482–4
through 1.482–6. Any payment that in
substance constitutes a cost sharing
payment will be treated as such for
purposes of this section, regardless of its
characterization under foreign law.
(ii) PCT Payments. A PCT Payor’s
payment required under paragraphs
(b)(1)(ii) and (b)(3) of this section is
deemed to be reduced to the extent of
any payments owed to it under such
paragraphs from other controlled
participants. Each PCT Payment
received by a PCT Payee will be treated
as coming pro rata out of payments
made by all PCT Payors. PCT Payments
will be characterized consistently with
the designation of the type of
transaction involved in the RT pursuant
to paragraph (b)(iv) of this section.
Depending on such designation, such
payments will be treated as either
consideration for a transfer of an interest
in intangible property or for services.
(iii) Examples. The following
examples illustrate this paragraph (j)(3):
Example 1. U.S. Parent (USP) and its
wholly owned Foreign Subsidiary (FS) form
a CSA to develop a miniature widget, the
Small R. Based on RAB shares, USP agrees
to bear 40% and FS to bear 60% of the costs
incurred during the term of the agreement.
The principal IDCs are operating costs
incurred by FS in Country Z of 100X
annually, and costs incurred by USP in the
United States also of 100X annually. Of the
total costs of 200X, USP’s share is 80X and
FS’s share is 120X. The payment will be
treated as a reimbursement of 20X of USP’s
costs in the United States. Accordingly,
USP’s Form 1120 will reflect an 80X
deduction on account of activities performed
in the United States for purposes of
allocation and apportionment of the
deduction to source. The Form 5471 for FS
will reflect a 100X deduction on account of
activities performed in Country Z, and a 20X
deduction on account of activities performed
in the United States.
Example 2. The facts are the same as in
Example 1, except that the 100X of costs
borne by USP consist of 5X of costs incurred
by USP in the United States and 95X of arm’s
length rental charge, as described in
paragraph (d)(1) of this section, for the use
of a facility in the United States. The
depreciation deduction attributable to the
U.S. facility is 7X. The 20X net payment by
FS to USP will first be applied in reduction

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pro rata of the 5X deduction for costs and the
7X depreciation deduction attributable to the
U.S. facility. The 8X remainder will be
treated as rent for the U.S. facility.
Example 3. (i) Four members A, B, C, and
D of a controlled group form a CSA to

develop the next generation technology for
their business. Based on RAB shares, the
participants agree to bear shares of the costs
incurred during the term of the agreement in
the following percentages: A 40%; B 15%; C
25%; and D 20%. The arm’s length values of

the external contributions they respectively
own are in the following amounts for the
taxable year: A 80X; B 40X; C 30X; and D
30X. The provisional (before offsets) and
final PCT Payments among A, B, C, and D are
shown in the table as follows:

[All amounts stated in X’s]

A

B

Payments .................................................................................................................................................
Receipts ...................................................................................................................................................

<40>
48

<21>
34

<37.5>
22.5

<30>
24

Final ..................................................................................................................................................

8

13

<15>

<6>

(ii) The first row/first column shows A’s
provisional PCT Payment equal to the
product of 100X (sum of 40X, 30X, and 30X)
and A’s RAB share of 40%. The second row/
first column shows A’s provisional PCT
receipts equal to the sum of the products of
80X and B’s, C’s, and D’s RAB shares (15%,
25%, and 20%, respectively). The other
entries in the first two rows of the table are
similarly computed. The last row shows the
final PCT receipts/payments after offsets.
Thus, for the taxable year, A and B are
treated as receiving the 8X and 13X,
respectively, pro rata out of payments by C
and D of 15X and 6X, respectively.

(k) CSA contractual, documentation,
accounting, and reporting
requirements—(1) CSA contractual
requirements—(i) In general. A CSA that
is described in paragraph (b)(1) of this
section must be recorded in writing in
a contract that is contemporaneous with
the formation (and any revision) of the
CSA and that includes the contractual
provisions described in this paragraph
(k)(1).
(ii) Contractual provisions. The
written contract described in this
paragraph (k)(1) must include
provisions that—
(A) List the controlled participants
and any other members of the controlled
group that are reasonably anticipated to
benefit from the use of the cost shared
intangibles, including the address of
each domestic entity and the country of
organization of each foreign entity;
(B) Describe the scope of the IDA to
be undertaken, including each cost
shared intangible or class of cost shared
intangibles that the controlled
participants intend to develop under the
CSA;
(C) Specify the functions and risks
that each controlled participant will
undertake in connection with the CSA;
(D) Divide among the controlled
participants all interests in cost shared
intangibles and specify each controlled
participant’s territorial interest in the
cost shared intangibles, as described in
paragraph (b)(4) of this section, that it
will own and exploit without any
further obligation to compensate any

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other controlled participant for such
interest;
(E) Provide a method to calculate the
controlled participants’ RAB shares,
based on factors that can reasonably be
expected to reflect the participants’
shares of anticipated benefits, and
require that such RAB shares must be
updated, as described in paragraph
(e)(1) of this section (see also paragraph
(k)(2)(ii)(F) of this section);
(F) Enumerate all categories of IDCs to
be shared under the CSA;
(G) Specify that the controlled
participants must use a consistent
method of accounting to determine IDCs
and RAB shares, as described in
paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section,
respectively, and must translate foreign
currencies on a consistent basis;
(H) Require the controlled
participants to enter into CSTs covering
all IDCs, as described in paragraph (b)(2)
of this section, in connection with the
CSA;
(I) Require the controlled participants
to enter into PCTs covering all external
contributions, as described in paragraph
(b)(3) of this section, in connection with
the CSA; and
(J) Specify the duration of the CSA,
the conditions under which the CSA
may be modified or terminated, and the
consequences of a modification or
termination (including consequences
described under the rules of paragraph
(f) of this section).
(iii) Meaning of contemporaneous—
(A) In general. For purposes of this
paragraph (k)(1), a written contractual
agreement is contemporaneous with the
formation (or revision) of a CSA if, and
only if, the controlled participants
record the CSA, in its entirety, in a
document that they sign and date no
later than 60 days after the first
occurrence of any IDC described in
paragraph (d) of this section to which
such agreement (or revision) is to apply.
(B) Example. The following example
illustrates the principles of this
paragraph (k)(1)(iii):

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C

D

Example. Companies A and B, both of
which are members of the same controlled
group, commence an IDA on March 1, Year
1. Company A pays the first IDCs in relation
to the IDA, as cash salaries to A’s research
staff, for the staff’s work during the first week
of March, Year 1. A and B, however, do not
sign and date any written contractual
agreement until August 1, Year 1, whereupon
they execute a ‘‘Cost Sharing Agreement’’
that purports to be ‘‘effective as of’’ March 1
of Year 1. The arrangement fails the
requirement that the participants record their
arrangement in a written contractual
agreement that is contemporaneous with the
formation of a CSA.

(2) CSA documentation
requirements—(i) In general. The
controlled participants must timely
update and maintain sufficient
documentation to establish that the
participants have met the CSA
contractual requirements of paragraph
(k)(1) of this section and the additional
CSA documentation requirements of
this paragraph (k)(2).
(ii) Additional CSA documentation
requirements. The controlled
participants to a CSA must timely
update and maintain documentation
sufficient to—
(A) Identify the cost shared
intangibles that the controlled
participants have developed or intend to
develop under the CSA, together with
each controlled participant’s interest
therein;
(B) Establish that each controlled
participant reasonably anticipates that it
will derive benefits from exploiting cost
shared intangibles;
(C) Describe the functions and risks
that each controlled participant has
undertaken during the term of the CSA;
(D) Provide an overview of each
controlled participant’s business
segments, including an analysis of the
economic and legal factors that affect
CST and PCT pricing;
(E) Establish the amount of each
controlled participant’s IDCs for each
taxable year under the CSA, including
all IDCs attributable to stock-based
compensation, as described in

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paragraph (d)(3) of this section
(including the method of measurement
and timing used in determining such
IDCs, and the data, as of the date of
grant, used to identify stock-based
compensation with the IDA);
(F) Describe the method used to
estimate each controlled participant’s
RAB share for each year during the
course of the CSA, including—
(1) All projections used to estimate
benefits;
(2) All updates of the RAB shares in
accordance with paragraph (e)(1) of this
section; and
(3) An explanation of why that
method was selected and why the
method provides the most reliable
measure for estimating RAB shares;
(G) Describe all external
contributions, as described in paragraph
(b)(3)(ii) of this section;
(H) Describe the RT for each PCT or
group of PCTs;
(I) Specify the form of payment due
under each PCT or group of PCTs;
(J) Describe and explain the method
selected to determine the arm’s length
payment due under each PCT,
including—
(1) An explanation of why the method
selected constitutes the best method, as
described in § 1.482–1(c)(2), for
measuring an arm’s length result;
(2) The economic analyses, data, and
projections relied upon in developing
and selecting the best method, including
the source of the data and projections
use;
(3) Each alternative method that was
considered, and the reason or reasons
that the alternative method was not
selected;
(4) Any data that the controlled
participant obtains, after the CSA takes
effect, that would help determine if the
controlled participant method selected
has been applied in a reasonable
manner;
(5) The discount rate, where
applicable, used to value each payment
due under a PCT, and a demonstration
that the discount rate used is consistent
with the principles of paragraph
(g)(2)(vi) of this section;
(6) The estimated arm’s length values
of any external contributions as of the
dates of the relevant PCTs, in
accordance with paragraph (g)(2)(ii) of
this section;
(7) A discussion, where applicable, of
why transactions were or were not
aggregated under the principles of
paragraph (g)(2)(v) of this section;
(8) The method payment form and
any conversion made from the method
payment form to the specified payment
form, as described in paragraph
(g)(2)(ix) of this section; and

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(9) If applicable under paragraph
(i)(6)(iv) of this section, the WACC of
the controlled group that includes the
controlled participants.
(iii) Coordination rules and
production of documents—(A)
Coordination with penalty regulations.
See § 1.6662–6(d)(2)(iii)(D) regarding
coordination of the rules of this
paragraph (k) with the documentation
requirements for purposes of the
accuracy-related penalty under section
6662(e) and (h).
(B) Production of documentation.
Each controlled participant must
provide to the Commissioner, within 30
days of a request, the items described in
paragraphs (k)(2) and (3) of this section.
The time for compliance described in
this paragraph (k)(2)(iii)(B) may be
extended at the discretion of the
Commissioner.
(3) CSA accounting requirements—(i)
In general. The controlled participants
must maintain books and records (and
related or underlying data and
information) that are sufficient to—
(A) Establish that the controlled
participants have used (and are using) a
consistent method of accounting to
measure costs and benefits;
(B) Translate foreign currencies on a
consistent basis; and
(C) To the extent that the method
materially differs from U.S. generally
accepted accounting principles, explain
any such material differences.
(ii) Reliance on financial accounting.
For purposes of this section, the
controlled participants may not rely
solely upon financial accounting to
establish satisfaction of the accounting
requirements of this paragraph (k)(3).
Rather, the method of accounting must
clearly reflect income. Thor Power Tools
Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522
(1979).
(4) CSA reporting requirements—(i)
CSA Statement. Each controlled
participant must file with the Internal
Revenue Service, in the manner
described in this paragraph (k)(4), a
‘‘Statement of Controlled Participant to
§ 1.482–7 Cost Sharing Arrangement’’
(CSA Statement) that complies with the
requirements of this paragraph (k)(4).
(ii) Content of CSA Statement. The
CSA Statement of each controlled
participant must—
(A) State that the participant is a
controlled participant in a CSA;
(B) Provide the controlled
participant’s taxpayer identification
number;
(C) List the other controlled
participants in the CSA, the country of
organization of each such participant,
and the taxpayer identification number
of each such participant;

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(D) Specify the earliest date that any
IDC described in paragraph (d)(1) of this
section occurred; and
(E) Indicate the date on which the
controlled participants formed (or
revised) the CSA and, if different from
such date, the date on which the
controlled participants recorded the
CSA (or any revision)
contemporaneously in accordance with
paragraphs (k)(1)(i) and (iii) of this
section.
(iii) Time for filing CSA Statement—
(A) 90-day rule. Each controlled
participant must file its original CSA
Statement with the Internal Revenue
Service Ogden Campus, no later than 90
days after the first occurrence of an IDC
to which the newly-formed CSA
applies, as described in paragraph
(k)(1)(iii)(A) of this section, or, in the
case of a taxpayer that became a
controlled participant after the
formation of the CSA, no later than 90
days after such taxpayer became a
controlled participant. A CSA Statement
filed in accordance with this paragraph
(k)(4)(iii)(A) must be dated and signed,
under penalties of perjury, by an officer
of the controlled participant who is duly
authorized (under local law) to sign the
statement on behalf of the controlled
participant.
(B) Annual return requirement—(1) In
general. Each controlled participant
must attach to its U.S. income tax
return, for each taxable year for the
duration of the CSA, a copy of the
original CSA Statement that the
controlled participant filed in
accordance with the 90-day rule of
paragraph (k)(4)(iii)(A) of this section. In
addition, the controlled participant
must update the information reflected
on the original CSA Statement annually
by attaching a schedule that documents
changes in such information over time.
(2) Special filing rule for annual
return requirement. If a controlled
participant is not required to file a U.S.
income tax return, the participant must
ensure that the copy or copies of the
CSA Statement and any updates are
attached to Schedule M of any Form
5471, any Form 5472, or any Form 8865,
filed with respect to that participant.
(iv) Examples. The following
examples illustrate this paragraph (k)(4).
In each example, Companies A and B
are members of the same controlled
group. The examples are as follows:
Example 1. A and B, both of which file
U.S. tax returns, agree to share the costs of
developing a new chemical formula in
accordance with the provisions of this
section. On March 30, Year 1, A and B record
their agreement in a written contract styled,
‘‘Cost Sharing Agreement.’’ The contract
applies by its terms to IDCs occurring after

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March 1, Year 1. The first IDCs to which the
CSA applies occurred on March 15, Year 1.
To comply with paragraph (k)(4)(iii)(A) of
this section, A and B individually must file
separate CSA Statements no later than 90
days after March 15, Year 1 (June 13, Year
1). Further, to comply with paragraph
(k)(4)(iii)(B) of this section, A and B must
attach copies of their respective CSA
Statements to their respective Year 1 U.S.
income tax returns.
Example 2. The facts are the same as in
Example 1, except that a year has passed and
C, which files a U.S. tax return, joined the
CSA on May 9, Year 2. To comply with the
annual filing requirement described in
paragraph (k)(4)(iii)(B) of this section, A and
B must each attach copies of their respective
CSA Statements (as filed for Year 1) to their
respective Year 2 income tax returns, along
with a schedule updated appropriately to
reflect the changes in information described
in paragraph (k)(4)(ii) of this section resulting
from the addition of C to the CSA. To comply
with both the 90-day rule described in
paragraph (k)(4)(iii)(A) of this section and the
annual filing requirement described in
paragraph (k)(4)(iii)(B) of this section, C must
file a CSA Statement no later than 90 days
after May 9, Year 2 (August 7, Year 2), and
must attach a copy of such CSA Statement to
its Year 2 income tax return.

(l) Effective date. This section applies
on the date of publication of this
document as a final regulation in the
Federal Register.
(m) Transition rule—(1) In general.
Subject to paragraph (m)(2) of this
section, an arrangement in existence
before the date of publication of this
document as a final regulation in the
Federal Register will be considered a
CSA, as described under paragraph (b)
of this section, if, prior to such date, it
was a qualified cost sharing
arrangement under the provisions of
§ 1.482–7 (as contained in the 26 CFR
part 1 edition revised as of January 1,
1996, hereafter in this section referred to
as ‘‘former § 1.482–7’’), but only if the
written contract, as described in
paragraph (k)(1) of this section, is
amended, if necessary, to conform with
the provisions of this section, as
modified by paragraph (m)(3) of this
section, by the close of the 120th day
after the date of publication of this
document as a final regulation in the
Federal Register.
(2) Termination of grandfather status.
Notwithstanding paragraph (m)(1) of
this section, an arrangement otherwise
therein described will not be considered
a CSA from the earliest of—
(i) A failure of the controlled
participants to substantially comply
with the provisions of this section, as
modified by paragraph (m)(3) of this
section;
(ii) A material change in the scope of
the arrangement, such as a material

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expansion of the activities undertaken
beyond the scope of the intangible
development area, as described in
former § 1.482–7(b)(4)(iv), as of the date
of publication of this document as a
final regulation in the Federal Register;
or
(iii) The date 50 percent or more of
the value of the interests in cost shared
intangibles are owned directly or
indirectly by a person or persons that
were not direct or indirect owners of
such interests as of the date of
publication of this document as a final
regulation in the Federal Register.
(3) Transitional modification of
applicable provisions. For purposes of
this paragraph (m), conformity and
substantial compliance with the
provisions of this section shall be
determined with the following
modifications:
(i) CSTs and PCTs occurring prior to
the date of publication of this document
as a final regulation in the Federal
Register shall be subject to the
provisions of former § 1.482–7 rather
than this section. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, PCTs of a CSA will be subject
to the provisions of this section if there
is a Periodic Trigger for such CSA for
which a subsequent PCT, occurring on
or after the date of publication of this
document as a final regulation in the
Federal Register, is the Trigger PCT.
(ii) Paragraph (b)(1)(i) and paragraph
(b)(4) of this section shall not apply.
(iii) Paragraph (k)(1)(ii)(D) of this
section shall not apply.
(iv) Paragraph (k)(1)(ii)(H) and
paragraph (k)(1)(ii)(I) of this section
shall be construed as applying only to
transactions entered into on or after the
date of publication of this document as
a final regulation in the Federal
Register.
(v) The deadline for recordation of the
revised written contractual agreement
pursuant to paragraph (k)(1)(iii) of this
section shall be no later than the 120th
day after the date of publication of this
document as a final regulation in the
Federal Register.
(vi) Paragraphs (k)(2)(ii)(G) through (J)
of this section shall be construed as
applying only with reference to PCTs
entered into on or after the date of
publication of this document as a final
regulation in the Federal Register.
(vii) Paragraph (k)(4)(iii)(A) shall be
construed as requiring a CSA Statement
with respect to the revised written
contractual agreement described in
paragraph (m)(3)(iv) of this section no
later than the 180th day after the date
of publication of this document as a
final regulation in the Federal Register.
(viii) Paragraph (k)(4)(iii)(B) shall be
construed as only applying for taxable

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51161

years ending after the filing of the CSA
Statement described in paragraph
(m)(3)(vii) of this section.
Par. 9. Section 1.482–8 is amended by
adding Examples 10 through 15 at the
end of the section to read as follows:
§ 1.482–8
rule.

*

*

Examples of the best method

*

*

*

Example 10. Preference for acquisition
price method. (i) USP develops,
manufacturers, and distributes ethical
pharmaceutical products. USP and FS, USP’s
wholly-owned subsidiary, enter into a CSA to
develop a new oncological drug, Oncol.
Immediately prior to entering into the CSA,
USP acquires Company X, an unrelated U.S.
pharmaceutical company. Company X is
solely engaged in oncological pharmaceutical
research, and its only significant resources
and capabilities are its workforce and its sole
patent, which is associated with Compound
Y, a promising molecular compound derived
from a rare plant, which USP reasonably
anticipates will contribute to developing
Oncol. All of Company X researchers will be
engaged solely in research that is reasonably
anticipated to contribute to developing Oncol
as well. The RT Rights in the Compound X
and the commitment of Company X’s
researchers to the development of Oncol are
external contributions for which
compensation is due from FS as part of a
PCT. Under the terms of the CSA, USP is to
be compensated for its external contributions
on a lump sum basis.
(ii) In this case, the acquisition price
method, based on the lump sum price paid
by USP for Company X, is likely to provide
a more reliable measure of an arm’s length
PCT Payment due to USP than the
application of any other method.
Example 11. Preference for market
capitalization method. (i) Company X is a
publicly traded U.S. company solely engaged
in oncological pharmaceutical research and
its only significant resources and capabilities
are its workforce and the its sole patent,
which is associated with Compound Y, a
promising molecular compound derived from
a rare plant. Company X has no marketable
products. Company X enters into a CSA with
FS, a newly-formed foreign subsidiary, to
develop a new oncological drug, Oncol,
derived from Compound Y. Compound X is
reasonably anticipated to contribute to
developing Oncol. All of Company X
researchers will be engaged solely in research
that is reasonably anticipated to contribute to
the developing Oncol under the CSA. The RT
Rights in Compound Y and the commitment
of Company X’s researchers are external
contributions for which compensation is due
from FS as part of a PCT. Under the terms
of the CSA, Company X is to be compensated
for its external contributions on a lump sum
basis.
(ii) In this case, given that Company X’s
external contributions covered by PCTs relate
to its entire economic value, the application
of the market capitalization method, based on
the market capitalization of Company X, is
likely to provide a more reliable measure of
an arm’s length result for Company X’s PCTs

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to the CSA than the application of any other
method.
Example 12. Preference for market
capitalization method. (i) MicroDent, Inc.
(MDI) is a publicly traded company that
developed a new dental surgical microscope
ScopeX–1, which drastically shortens many
surgical procedures. On January 1 of Year 1,
MDI entered into a CSA with a whollyowned foreign subsidiary (FS) to develop
ScopeX–2, the next generation of ScopeX–1.
The RT Rights associated with ScopeX–1, as
well as MDI’s research capabilities are
reasonably anticipated to contribute to the
development of ScopeX–2 and are therefore
external contributions for which
compensation is due from FS as part of a
PCT. Under the terms of the CSA, MDI is to
be compensated for its external contributions
on a lump sum basis. At the time of the PCT,
MDI’s only product was the ScopeX-I
microscope, although MDI was in the process
of developing ScopeX–2. Concurrent with the
CSA, MDI separately transfers exclusive and
perpetual exploitation rights associated with
ScopeX–1 to FS in the same specified
geographic area as assigned to FS in the CSA.
(ii) Although the transactions between MDI
and FS under the CSA are distinct from the
transactions between MDI and FS relating to
the exploitation rights for ScopeX–1, it is
likely to be more reliable to evaluate the
combined effect of the transactions than to
evaluate them in isolation. This is because
the combined transactions between MDI and
FS relate to all of the economic value of MDI
(that is, the exploitation rights and research
rights associated with ScopeX–1, as well as
the research capabilities of MDI). In this case,
application of the market capitalization
method, based on the enterprise value of MDI
on January 1 of Year 1, is likely to provide
a more reliable measure of an arm’s length
payment for the aggregated transactions than
the application of any other method.
(iii) Notwithstanding that the market
capitalization method provides the most
reliable measure of the aggregated
transactions between MDI and FS, see
paragraph (g)(2)(v) of this section for further
considerations of when further analysis may
be required to distinguish between the
remuneration to MDI associated with PCTs
under the CSA (for research rights and
capabilities associated with ScopeX–1) and
the remuneration to MDI for the exploitation
rights associated with ScopeX–1.
Example 13. Income method (CPM-based)
preferred to acquisition price method. The
facts are the same as Example 10, except that
the acquisition occurred significantly in
advance of formation of the CSA, and reliable
adjustments cannot be made for this time
difference. In addition, Company X has other
valuable molecular patents and associated
research capabilities, apart from Compound
Y, that are not reasonably anticipated to
contribute to the development of Oncol and
that cannot be reliably valued. Under the
terms of the CSA, USP will undertake all
R&D (consisting of laboratory research and
clinical testing) and manufacturing
associated with Oncol, as well as the
distribution activities for its assigned area
(the United States). FS will distribute Oncol
in its assigned area (the rest of the world).

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FS’s distribution activities are routine in
nature, and the profitability from its activities
may be reliably determined from third-party
comparables. FS does not furnish any
external contributions. At the time of the
PCT, reliable (ex ante) financial projections
associated with the development of Oncol
and its separate exploitation in each of USP’s
and FSub’s assigned geographical territories
are undertaken. In this case, application of
the income method is likely to provide a
more reliable measure of an arm’s length
result than application of the acquisition
price method based on the price paid by USP
for Company X.
Example 14. Evaluation of alternative
methods. (i) The facts are the same as
Example 10, except that the acquisition
occurred sometime prior to the CSA, and
Company X has some areas of promising
research that are not reasonably anticipated
to contribute to developing Oncol. In general,
the Commissioner determines that the
acquisition price data is useful in informing
the arm’s length price, but not necessarily
determinative. Under the terms of the CSA,
USP will undertake all R&D (consisting of
laboratory research and clinical testing) and
manufacturing associated with Oncol, as well
as the distribution activities for its assigned
area (the United States). FS will distribute
Oncol in its assigned area (the rest of the
world). FS’s distribution activities are routine
in nature, and the profitability from its
activities may be reliably determined from
third-party comparables. At the time of the
PCT, financial projections associated with
the development of Oncol and its separate
exploitation in each of USP’s and FSub’s
assigned geographical territories are
undertaken.
(ii) Under the facts, it is possible that the
acquisition price method or the CPM-based
income method might reasonably be applied.
Whether the acquisition price method or the
income method provides the most reliable
evidence of the arm’s length price of USP’
contributions depends on a number of
factors, including the reliability of the
financial projections, the reliability of the
discount rate chosen, and the extent to which
the acquisition price of Company X can be
reliably adjusted to account for changes in
value over the time period between the
acquisition and the formation of the CSA and
to account for the value of the in-process
research done by Company X that does not
constitute external contributions to the CSA.
Example 15. Evaluation of alternative
methods. (i) The facts are the same as
Example 14, except that FS has a patent on
Compound Y, which the parties reasonably
anticipate will be useful in mitigating
potential side effects associated with
Compound X and thereby contribute to the
development of Oncol. The RT Rights in
Compound Y constitute an external
contribution for which compensation is due
from USP as part of a PCT. The value of FS’s
external contribution cannot be reliably
measured by market benchmarks.
(ii) Under the facts, it is possible that either
the acquisition price method and the income
method together or the residual profit split
method might reasonably be applied to
determine the arm’s length PCT Payments

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due between USP and FS. Under the first
option the PCT Payment for the external
contributions related to Company X’s
workforce and Compound X would be
determined using the acquisition price
method referring to the lump sum price paid
by USP for Company X. Because the value of
these external contributions can be
determined by reference to a market
benchmark they are considered routine
external contributions. Accordingly, under
this option, the external contribution related
to Compound Y would be the only
nonroutine external contribution and the
relevant PCT Payment is determined using
the income method. Under the second
option, rather than looking to the acquisition
price for Company X, all the external
contributions are considered nonroutine and
the RPSM is applied to determine the PCT
Payments for each external contribution.
Under either option, the PCT Payments will
be netted against each other.
(iii) Whether the acquisition price method
together with the income method or the
residual profit split method provides the
most reliable evidence of the arm’s length
price of the external contributions of USP
and FS depends on a number of factors,
including the reliability of the determination
of the relative values of the external
contributions for purposes of the RPSM, and
the extent to which the acquisition price of
Company X can be reliably adjusted to
account for changes in value over the time
period between the acquisition and the
formation of the CSA and to account for the
value of the RT Rights in the in-process
research done by Company X that does not
constitute external contributions to the CSA.
In these circumstances, it is also relevant to
consider whether the results of each method
are consistent with each other, or whether
one or both methods are consistent with
other potential methods that could be
applied.

Par. 10. Section 1.861–17 is amended
by revising paragraph (c)(3)(iv) to read
as follows:
§ 1.861–17 Allocation and apportionment
of research and experimental expenditures.

*

*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(3) * * *
(iv) Effect of cost sharing
arrangements. If the corporation
controlled by the taxpayer has entered
into a cost sharing arrangement, in
accordance with the provisions of
§ 1.482–7, with the taxpayer for the
purpose of developing intangible
property, then that corporation shall not
reasonably be expected to benefit from
the taxpayer’s share of the research
expense.
*
*
*
*
*
Par. 11. Section 1.6662–6 is amended
by:
1. Removing the third and fourth
sentence of paragraph (d)(2)(i).
2. Adding paragraph (d)(2)(iii)(D).
The addition reads as follows:

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§ 1.6662–6 Transaction between persons
described in section 482 and net section
482 transfer price adjustments.

*

*
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(d) * * *
(2) * * *
(iii) * * *
(D) Satisfaction of the documentation
requirements described in § 1.482–
7(k)(2) for the purpose of complying
with the rules for CSAs under § 1.482–
7 also satisfies all of the documentation
requirements listed in paragraph
(d)(2)(iii)(B) of this section, except the
requirements listed in paragraphs (2)
and (10) of such paragraph, with respect
to CSTs and PCTs described in § 1.482–
7(b)(2) and (3), provided that the

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documentation also satisfies the
requirements of paragraph (d)(2)(iii)(A)
of this section.
*
*
*
*
*
PART 301—PROCEDURE AND
ADMINISTRATION
Par. 12. The authority for part 301
continues to read, in part, as follows:
Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Par. 13. Section 301.7701–1 is
amended by revising paragraph (c) to
read as follows:

51163

(c) Cost sharing arrangements. A cost
sharing arrangement that is described in
§ 1.482–7 of this chapter, including any
arrangement that the Commissioner
treats as a CSA under § 1.482–7(b)(5) of
this chapter, is not recognized as a
separate entity for purposes of the
Internal Revenue Code. See § 1.482–7 of
this chapter for the rules regarding
CSAs.
*
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*
*

§ 301.7701–1 Classification of
organizations for federal tax purposes.

Mark E. Matthews,
Deputy Commissioner for Services and
Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 05–16626 Filed 8–22–05; 2:48 pm]

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