FR Notice of Inquiry

Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 224 / Wednesday, November 20, 2002 / Notices
Signed in Washington, DC, this 8th day of
November, 2002.
Faryar Shirzad,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Import
Administration, Alternate Chairman, ForeignTrade Zones Board.
Dennis Puccinelli,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 02–29500 Filed 11–19–02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–DS–P

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Foreign-Trade Zones Board
[Order No. 1257]

Grant of Authority for Subzone Status;
Kiewit Offshore Services, Ltd.
(Offshore Drilling Platforms), Ingleside,
TX
Pursuant to its authority under the ForeignTrade Zones Act of June 18, 1934, as
amended (19 U.S.C. 81a–81u), the ForeignTrade Zones Board (the Board) adopts the
following Order:

Whereas, by an Act of Congress
approved June 18, 1934, an Act ‘‘To
provide for the establishment * * * of
foreign-trade zones in ports of entry of
the United States, to expedite and
encourage foreign commerce, and for
other purposes,’’ as amended (19 U.S.C.
81a–81u) (the FTZ Act), the ForeignTrade Zones Board (the Board) is
authorized to grant to qualified
corporations the privilege of
establishing foreign-trade zones in or
adjacent to U.S. Customs ports of entry;
Whereas, the Board’s regulations (15
CFR part 400) provide for the
establishment of special-purpose
subzones when existing zone facilities
cannot serve the specific use involved,
and when the activity results in a
significant public benefit and is in the
public interest;
Whereas, an application from the Port
of Corpus Christi Authority, grantee of
FTZ 122, for authority to establish
special-purpose subzone status for the
offshore drilling platform manufacturing
facility of Kiewit Offshore Services,
Ltd., in Ingleside, Texas, was filed by
the Board on June 3, 2002, and notice
inviting public comment was given in
the Federal Register (FTZ Docket 26–
2002, 67 FR 40269, June 12, 2002); and,
Whereas, the Board adopts the
findings and recommendations of the
examiner’s report, and finds that the
requirements of the FTZ Act and
Board’s regulations would be satisfied,
and that approval of the application
would be in the public interest if
approval were given subject to the
standard shipyard restriction on foreign
steel mill products;

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Now, therefore, the Board hereby
grants authority for subzone status at the
offshore drilling platform manufacturing
facility of Kiewit Offshore Services, Ltd.
(KOS), in Ingleside, Texas (Subzone
122P), at the location described in the
application, subject to the FTZ Act and
the Board’s regulations, including
Section 400.28, and subject to the
following special conditions:
1. Any foreign steel mill product admitted
to the subzone, including plate, angles,
shapes, channels, rolled steel stock, bars,
pipes and tubes, not incorporated into
merchandise otherwise classified, and which
is used in manufacturing, shall be subject to
Customs duties in accordance with
applicable law, unless the Executive
Secretary determines that the same item is
not then being produced by a domestic steel
mill.
2. In addition to the annual report, KOS
shall advise the Board’s Executive Secretary
(§ 400.28(a)(3)) as to significant new contracts
with appropriate information concerning
foreign purchases otherwise dutiable, so that
the Board may consider whether any foreign
dutiable items are being imported for
manufacturing in the subzone primarily
because of subzone status and whether the
Board should consider requiring Customs
duties to be paid on such items.
Signed at Washington, DC, this 8th day of
November 2002.
Faryar Shirzad,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Import
Administration, Alternate Chairman, ForeignTrade Zones Board.
Dennis Puccinelli,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 02–29503 Filed 11–19–02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–DS–P

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
[Docket No. 020904209–2209–01]

Protocol Additional to the Agreement
Between the United States of America
and the International Atomic Energy
Agency Concerning the Application of
Safeguards in the United States of
America (short title ‘‘U.S. Additional
Protocol’’)
AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and
Security, Commerce.
ACTION: Notice of inquiry.
SUMMARY: On May 9, 2002, the President
transmitted the Protocol Additional to
the Agreement Between the United
States and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) for the
Application of Safeguards in the United
States of America (hereinafter referred
to as the U.S. Additional Protocol),
signed by the United States in 1998, to

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the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification. The requirements of the
U.S. Additional Protocol would
supplement the existing Agreement
Between the United States of America
and the International Atomic Energy
Agency for the Application of
Safeguards in the United States (U.S.–
IAEA Safeguards Agreement) by
expanding the declaration, reporting
and on-site access requirements of the
U.S.–IAEA Safeguards Agreement to
capture elements of the domestic
nuclear fuel-cycle additional to those
covered by the present U.S.–IAEA
Safeguards Agreement. These elements
include mining and milling of nuclear
materials, nuclear-related equipment
manufacturing, nuclear-related imports
and exports, nuclear fuel cycle research
and development not involving nuclear
material, and forms of nuclear material
not currently subject to the U.S.–IAEA
Safeguards Agreement. The Department
of Commerce, in consultation with other
Executive Branch agencies, is working
to reach an understanding of the
universe of commercial locations that
would be affected by implementation of
the Additional Protocol. This Notice of
Inquiry is part of an effort to collect
information to estimate the potential
impact that the implementation of the
U.S. Additional Protocol will have on
U.S. industry and to gain a better
understanding of the universe of
locations that may be affected by
implementation, should the Additional
Protocol enter into effect.
DATES: Comments are due on or before
January 21, 2003.
ADDRESSES: Written comments (four
copies) should be submitted to Willard
Fisher, Regulatory Policy Division,
Office of Exporter Services, Bureau of
Industry and Security, U.S. Department
of Commerce, 14th Street and
Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Room 2705,
Washington, DC 20230. In order to meet
the due date for comments, single
copies may be faxed to (202) 482–3355,
provided that you follow up by
submitting the appropriate number (four
copies) of written comments.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
questions on the U.S. Additional
Protocol, contact Brandon Williams,
Treaty Compliance Division, Office of
Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty
Compliance, Bureau of Industry and
Security, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Phone: (703) 605–4400. For questions
on the submission of comments, contact
Willard Fisher, Regulatory Policy
Division, Office of Exporter Services,
Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Phone: (202)
482–2440.

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Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 224 / Wednesday, November 20, 2002 / Notices

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background
The requirement for a comprehensive
international safeguards system to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons
was first established by the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT). The NPT was signed by
the United States on July 1, 1968, and
entered into force on March 5, 1970.
The treaty banned nuclear weapon
states (NWS) from transferring nuclear
weapons to non-nuclear weapon states
(NNWS) or assisting NNWS to acquire
such weapons, and stipulated that each
non-nuclear weapon State Party to the
NPT would undertake to accept
safeguards as set forth in an agreement
to be negotiated and concluded with the
IAEA. Although the NPT required the
establishment of safeguards, the
formulation of detailed provisions for a
model NPT Safeguards Agreement was
not completed by the IAEA until 1971.
These safeguards were designed to
provide assurance that the nuclear
material of States Parties which had not
already developed nuclear weapons
would not be diverted from peaceful use
to making nuclear weapons.
During deliberations of the NPT,
several major industrialized nations
expressed concern that the absence of
requirements for IAEA safeguards in
NWS would place NNWS at a
commercial and industrial disadvantage
in developing nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes. Specifically, the
NNWS were concerned that application
of safeguards would interfere with the
efficient operations of their commercial
activities and would possibly
compromise industrial and trade secrets
as a result of access by IAEA inspectors
to their facilities and records. In order
to allay these concerns, the United
States voluntarily offered in 1967 to
permit the IAEA to apply safeguards to
all nuclear facilities in the United States
except only for those associated with
activities of direct national security
significance. Since then, the other four
NWS recognized under the NPT (China,
France, the Russian Federation and the
United Kingdom) have also agreed to
subject all or part of their civil nuclear
activities to IAEA safeguards.
The U.S.–IAEA Safeguards Agreement
was signed on November 18, 1977, and
entered into force on December 9, 1980.
At that time the United States submitted
to the IAEA a list of more than 200
eligible facilities for which safeguards
could be applied if selected by the
IAEA. This list included facilities
licensed by the NRC and eligible
Department of Energy facilities. The
United States has added additional

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facilities to the eligible facilities list
since that time. Under the U.S.–IAEA
Safeguards Agreement, about a dozen
commercial facilities have been selected
for inspection since 1980.
Although the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards
Agreement is based on the model
safeguards agreement developed by the
IAEA, the terms of the U.S. offer and the
obligations of NNWS party to the NPT
differ in several respects. First, the U.S.
offer excludes nuclear facilities
associated with activities of direct
national security significance and does
not contain any limitations on use of
nuclear material by the United States.
Also, the United States decides which
U.S. facilities are eligible for safeguards
and the IAEA decides which eligible
facilities will be selected for application
of safeguards, although the IAEA need
not select any. Furthermore, the United
States has made separate commitments
to provide to the IAEA, for safeguards
purposes, information on exports of
nuclear material.
In the aftermath of the 1991 Persian
Gulf War, international inspectors
determined that Iraq had been engaged
in a clandestine nuclear weapon
development program at locations not
directly subject to IAEA safeguards,
despite inspections. The international
community determined that the
safeguards system needed to be
strengthened and negotiated a model
Additional Protocol to amend existing
bilateral safeguards agreements. The
model Additional Protocol requires
enhanced information collection and
access to provide IAEA inspectors with
greater ability to detect clandestine
nuclear activities in NNWS, and covers
almost all of a state’s nuclear fuel cycle.
The United States, as a NWS party to
the NPT, is not obligated to accept IAEA
safeguards on its nuclear activities.
However, the United States voluntarily
signed the U.S. Additional Protocol on
June 12, 1998. By submitting itself to the
same safeguards on all of its civil
nuclear activities that NNWS parties to
the NPT are subject to, the United States
intends to demonstrate that adherence
to the model Additional Protocol does
not place other countries at a
commercial disadvantage. In this
Additional Protocol, the United States
accepts all of the measures of the Model
Protocol except where their application
would result in access by the IAEA to
activiites with direct national security
significance to the United States or to
locations or information associated with
such activities.
On May 9, 2002, the President
transmitted the U.S. Additional Protocol
to the Senate for its advice and consent
to ratification. The U.S. Additional

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Protocol will not enter into force until
the United States notifies the IAEA that
the statutory and constitutional
requirements for entry into force have
been met. These requirements include
ratification, implementing legislation,
and issuance of regulations.
Declarations submitted under the U.S.
Additional Protocol would provide the
IAEA with information about additional
aspects of the U.S. nuclear fuel cycle,
including mining and milling of nuclear
materials, nuclear-related equipment
manufacturing, nuclear-related imports
and exports, research and development
not involving nuclear material, and
other nuclear material activities not
currently subject to the U.S.-Safeguards
Agreement. There are no routine
inspections under the Additional
Protocol, but IAEA inspectors may be
provided access (referred to as
‘‘complementary access’’) to the U.S.
nuclear fuel cycle where there is a
question or an inconsistency about the
completeness or correctness of the U.S.
declaration, which could relate to
declared or undeclared industrial
locations. Access to industrial locations
is predicated upon an IAEA request for
clarification of a declaration and may be
exercised by the IAEA with a minimum
of 24-hours notice. As with the U.S.IAEA Safeguards Agreement, the IAEA
would not be required to seek access to
any U.S. locations. In carrying out
responsibilities delegated to it for
implementation of the U.S. Additional
Protocol, the Department would apply a
philosophy of ensuring compliance
while minimizing intrusion and the
burden on commercial activities.
Discussion and Request for Comments
The U.S. Additional Protocol is based
on the model Additional Protocol
(INFCIRC/540) which is organized into
eighteen different Articles. INFCIRC/540
is available on the IAEA website
(www.iaea.org). Article 2 describes the
information required in a U.S.
declaration to be submitted to the IAEA
and in periodic reports and updates.
The Department recognizes that some of
this information is already being
reported by commercial entities to U.S.
Government agencies under U.S.
Government regulations but is seeking
to gain a better understanding of the
number and type of locations that may
be impacted by the declaration
requirements of the U.S. Additional
Protocol in order to refine estimates of
the potential burden on U.S. industry
and design future information collection
systems. Where practical, the intent is to
avoid redundancy in reporting required
under an existing legislative mandate.
However, in some of these instances, the

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Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 224 / Wednesday, November 20, 2002 / Notices
Additional Protocol may require more
information than is currently being
provided, such as mining capacity or
the scale of operations of equipment
manufactured but not exported. Such
cases would require additional
submission of information. Also, for
example, in cases where the data has
been previously collected by voluntary
survey, submissions to the Department
would be mandated under the U.S.
Additional Protocol. Data submissions
related to activities such as public and
private research and development are
expected to comprise predominantly
information previously unreported
under any existing regulatory authority.
There are some instances, such as the
U.S. right to exclude activities or
locations with direct national security
significance under the U.S. Additional
Protocol, where the model Additional
Protocol, designed for NNWS, does not
have relevance in the United States.
This notice takes those instances into
account.
It is the intent of the Department, by
publishing this Notice of Inquiry, to
gauge the scope of the impact of the
Additional Protocol, both in newly
reportable entities and additional
impacts on those already reporting
similar information under existing
regulations. Information received will
be used by the Executive Branch
agencies who are given responsibility to
implement the Additional Protocol a
better understanding of the universe of
commercial locations that will be
affected. It would be most useful for the
Department to receive comments on: (1)
Estimated numbers of commercial
locations that would be subject to
reporting under the specific declaration
elements and (2) whether this
information is already reported to U.S.
Government agencies and if so, to
whom. For the purpose of this Notice of
Inquiry, commercial locations are those
not owned by or leased to the U.S.
Government. The Department also
welcomes discussion regarding: (1) Any
concerns with the potential release of
proprietary or confidential business
information; (2) what information
should not be subject to disclosure; (3)
the type of information that could best
satisfy the Additional Protocol
requirements; (4) redundancy of
reporting and data requirements; (5) the
degree to which impacted companies
would have new reporting
requirements; and (6) the burden,
including cost estimates, represented by
requirements for companies to collect
and report new information both
initially and for annual updates. The
specific elements to be reported to the

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IAEA in the U.S. declaration and a
general discussion of the expected
sources of this information are
described below.
1. Research and Development Activities
(Public and Private)
Article 2.a(i) of the model Additional
Protocol requires a general description
and information specifying the location
of nuclear fuel cycle-related research
and development activities not
involving nuclear material, carried out
anywhere, that are funded, specifically
authorized or controlled by, or carried
out on behalf of, the government of the
United States. Article 2.b(i) requires this
information for nuclear fuel cyclerelated research and development
activities not involving nuclear material
that are not funded, specifically
authorized or controlled by, or carried
out on behalf of, the government of the
United States. General description
requirements are expected to include
brief information regarding the fuel
cycle stage to which the project is
related, title of the project, the project
number or other unique designation,
description of work being performed,
objectives of the project, degree of
project completion, and intended
application of the project results.
For the purpose of the Additional
Protocol, ‘‘nuclear material’’ is defined
as any source or special fissionable
material (i.e., enriched, natural, and
depleted uranium and thorium—
processed beyond the raw ore stage; i.e.,
mill products and subsequent materials)
it does not include ore or ore residue.
‘‘Nuclear fuel cycle-related research and
development activities’’ are defined in
the Additional Protocol as those
activities which are specifically related
to any process or system development
aspect of any of the following:
conversion (from one chemical species
to another) of nuclear material,
enrichment of nuclear material, nuclear
fuel fabrication, reactors, critical
facilities, reprocessing of nuclear fuel,
processing (not including repackaging
or conditioning not involving the
separation of elements, for storage or
disposal) of intermediate or high-level
waste containing plutonium, high
enriched uranium or uranium-233.
Declaration requirements exclude
activities related to theoretical or basic
scientific research or to research and
development on industrial radioisotope
applications, medical, hydrological and
agricultural applications, health and
environmental effects and improved
maintenance.

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2. Operational Activities of Safeguards
Relevance
Article 2.a(ii) of the model Additional
Protocol requires information identified
by the IAEA on operational activities of
safeguards relevance at facilities and
locations outside facilities where
nuclear material is customarily used. In
the United States, this element will
apply only at nuclear facilities where
the IAEA is applying safeguards in the
United States and where agreed to by
the United States Government. At the
present time, only four facilities are
subject to safeguards. Examples of such
operational activities include, but are
not limited to, nuclear material
transfers, empty spent fuel cask
transfers, crane movement records,
reactor fuel production, isotope
production, and maintenance activities.
A ‘‘facility’’ is defined in the Additional
Protocol as a reactor, critical facility,
conversion plant, fabrication plant,
reprocessing plant, isotope separation
plant or separate storage installation, or
any location where nuclear material in
amounts greater than one effective
kilogram is customarily used.
The Department expects that these
activities are subject to license by the
NRC and the collection of this
information will be the responsibility of
the NRC.
3. Nuclear Facility Site Descriptions and
Site Maps
Article 2.a(iii) of the model
Additional Protocol requires a general
description of each building on a site,
including the building’s use and, if not
apparent from that description, its
contents. In the United States, this
element will apply only in instances
where the United States has provided to
the IAEA the relevant design
information. Under the terms of the
U.S.–IAEA Safeguards Agreement, the
U.S. has provided such information on
the nuclear facilities that have been
inspected in the United States. The
description is expected to include a
building number or other unambiguous
identification, approximate size of the
building (i.e., number of floors and total
area), use of the building, and the main
contents of the building. A map of the
site is also required.
A ‘‘site’’ is defined in the model
Additional Protocol as that area
delimited by the United States in the
relevant design information for a
facility, including a closed-down
facility, and in the relevant information
on a location outside facilities where
nuclear material is customarily used,
including a closed-down location
outside facilities where nuclear material

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Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 224 / Wednesday, November 20, 2002 / Notices

was customarily used (this is limited to
locations with hot cells or where
activities related to conversion,
enrichment, fuel fabrication or
reprocessing were carried out). A ‘‘site’’
also includes all installations, colocated with the facility or location, for
the provision or use of essential
services, including: hot cells for
processing irradiated materials not
containing nuclear material;
installations for the treatment, storage
and disposal of waste; and buildings
associated with specified activities
identified by the United States under
Article 2.a(iv) (see discussion below
under Equipment Manufacturers).
The Department expects that the
collection of information pertaining to
facilities licensed by the NRC will be
the responsibility of the NRC. However,
the definition of ‘‘site’’ extends beyond
areas involving nuclear material
activities.
4. Equipment Manufacturers
Article 2.a(iv) of the model Additional
Protocol requires a description of the
scale of operations for each location
engaged in certain nuclear-related
manufacturing and/or assembly
activities described in detail in Annex I
to the model Additional Protocol and
listed below (items a–s). The activities
relate to equipment and non-nuclear
material listed in Annex II to the model
Additional Protocol. Scale of operations
could mean, for example, approximate
production capacity and capacity
utilization during a declaration period.
Although information is already being
reported to the U.S. Government on the
export of such equipment, the
Department is not aware of any
regulatory authorities currently
collecting information on the scale of
operations for manufacturing such
equipment.
The model Additional Protocol
requires declaration and reporting for
the following nuclear-related
manufacturing activities which are
focused primarily on the manufacture of
items ‘‘especially designed or prepared’’
for uranium enrichment (a-k) or other
items related to the nuclear fuel cycle:
(a) The manufacture of centrifuge
rotor tubes or the assembly of gas
centrifuges that are especially designed
or prepared for the separation of
isotopes of uranium;
(b) The manufacture of gaseous
diffusion barriers with thin, porous
filters which are especially designed or
prepared for the enrichment of uranium;
(c) The manufacture or assembly of
laser-based isotope separation systems
especially designed or prepared for
enrichment of uranium;

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(d) The manufacture or assembly of
electromagnetic isotope separators
especially designed or prepared for
enrichment of uranium;
(e) The manufacture or assembly of
columns or extraction equipment
especially designed or prepared for
enrichment of uranium;
(f) Uranium oxidation systems
(chemical exchange) especially designed
or prepared for enrichment of uranium;
(g) Fast-reacting ion exchange resins/
adsorbents (ion exchange) especially
designed or prepared for enrichment of
uranium;
(h) Ion exchange columns (ion
exchange) for isotope separation
especially designed or prepared for
enrichment of uranium;
(i) Ion exchange reflux systems (ion
exchange) for isotope separation
especially designed or prepared for
enrichment of uranium;
(j) The manufacture of aerodynamic
separation nozzles or vortex tubes
especially designed or prepared for
enrichment of uranium;
(k) The manufacture or assembly of
uranium plasma generation systems
especially designed or prepared for
enrichment of uranium;
(l) The manufacture of zirconium
tubes especially designed or prepared
for use in a reactor;
(m) The manufacture or upgrading of
heavy water or deuterium in which the
ration of deuterium to hydrogen atoms
exceeds 1:5000;
(n) The manufacture of nuclear grade
graphite at a purity level better than 5
parts per million boron equivalent and
with a density greater than 1.50 g/cm 3
(o) The manufacture of flasks for
irradiated fuel;
(p) The manufacture of reactor control
rods especially designed or prepared for
the control of the reaction rate in a
nuclear reactor;
(q) The manufacture of criticality safe
tanks and vessels especially designed or
prepared for use in a reprocessing plant;
(r) The manufacture of irradiated fuel
element chopping machines especially
designed or prepared for use in a
reprocessing plant; and
(s) The construction of hot cells with
a cell or interconnected cells totaling at
least 6 cubic meters in volume with
shielding equal to or greater than the
equivalent of 0.5 meters of concrete,
with a density of 3.2 g/cm 3 or greater,
outfitted with equipment for remote
operations.
5. Uranium and Thorium Mines and
Mills
Article 2.a(v) of the model Additional
Protocol requires information on the
location, operational status and the

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estimated annual production capacity of
uranium mines and concentration
plants and thorium concentration
plants, and the current annual
production of such mines and
concentration plants in the United
States. Uranium and thorium
concentration plants engage in the
processing and milling of ore. Currently,
the Department of Energy collects
information via the Energy Information
Agency regarding uranium mines. This
includes some but not all of the required
information regarding ore processing.
The NRC licenses uranium and thorium
mills, and the Department expects the
collection of this information to be the
responsibility of the NRC. Information
on mine production capacity represents
new reporting requirements under the
Additional Protocol.
6. Source Material Not Suitable for Fuel
Fabrication or Isotopic Enrichment
Article 2.a(vi) of the model Additional
Protocol requires information on natural
and depleted uranium in quantities
greater than 10 metric tons or on
thorium in quantities greater than 20
metric tons. The Department expects
that these activities are subject to
license by the NRC and the collection of
this information will be the
responsibility of the NRC.
7. Nuclear Material Exempted From
Safeguards
Article 2.a(vii) of the model
Additional Protocol requires
information on nuclear material
declared by the United States but
exempted from safeguards by
arrangement with the IAEA. There is no
such material in the United States. If
there were, the Department expects that
the nuclear material would be subject to
license by the NRC, and the collection
of this information would be the
responsibility of the NRC.
8. Waste for Which Safeguards Have
Been Terminated
Article 2.a(viii) of the model
Additional Protocol requires
information on the location or further
processing of intermediate or high-level
waste containing plutonium, highenriched uranium or uranium-233 on
which IAEA safeguards have been
terminated. High-enriched uranium
means uranium containing 20 percent or
more of the isotope uranium-235. There
is no nuclear material in the United
States on which IAEA safeguards have
been terminated.

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9. Export and Import of Specified
Equipment and Non-Nuclear Material
Article 2.a(ix) of the model Additional
Protocol requires information on the
export and import of certain nuclearrelated equipment and non-nuclear
material listed in Annex II to the model
Additional Protocol and listed below
(items a-m). These items are subject to
export license by the NRC and the
Department expects the collection of
this information will be the
responsibility of the NRC. The
Department is not aware of any current
regulatory authority for collecting
information on imports of such
equipment and non-nuclear material.
There will be no routine reporting
requirements for import data since the
submission of import data is upon
specific request by the IAEA. The
equipment and non-nuclear material
subject to Article 2.a(ix) are described in
Annex II to the U.S.-IAEA Additional
Protocol and include:
(a) Reactors and equipment including
complete nuclear reactors, and specially
designed reactor pressure vessels,
reactor fuel charging and discharging
machines, reactor control rods, reactor
pressure tubes, zirconium tubes,
primary coolant pumps;
(b) Non-nuclear materials for reactors
including deuterium and nuclear grade
graphite;
(c) Specially designed irradiated fuel
element chopping machines, dissolvers,
solvent extractors and solvent extraction
equipment, chemical holding or storage
vessels, plutonium nitrate to oxide
conversion system, plutonium oxide to
metal production system;
(d) Specially designed equipment that
seals the nuclear material within the
cladding, and any other which normally
comes in direct contact with, or directly
processes, or controls, the production
flow of nuclear material;
(e) Specially designed gas centrifuges
and assemblies and components
especially designed or prepared for use
in gas centrifuges;
(f) Specially designed gas diffusion
assemblies and components especially
designed or prepared for use in gas
diffusion enrichment;
(g) Specially designed or prepared
systems, equipment and components
especially designed for use in
aerodynamic enrichment plants;
(h) Specially designed or prepared
systems, equipment and components for
use in chemical exchange or ion
exchange enrichment plants;
(i) Specially designed or prepared
systems, equipment and components for
use in laser-based enrichment plants;
(j) Specially designed or prepared
systems, equipment and components for

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use in plasma separation enrichment
plants;
(k) Specially designed or prepared
systems, equipment and components for
use in electromagnetic enrichment
plants;
(l) Specially designed or prepared
equipment for plants for the production
of heavy water, deuterium and
deuterium compounds; and
(m) Specially designed or prepared
systems for the conversion of uranium
ore concentrates to UO3, conversion of
UO3 to UF6, conversion of UO3 to UO2,
conversion of UO2 to UF4, conversion of
UF4 to UF6, conversion of UF4 to U
metal, conversion of UF6 to UO2, and
conversion of UF6 to UF4.
10. Ten-Year General Plans
Article 2.a(x) of the model Additional
Protocol requires information regarding
general plans for the succeeding tenyear period relevant to the development
of the nuclear fuel cycle (including
planned nuclear fuel cycle-related
research and development activities)
when approved by the appropriate
authorities in the United States. The
Department expects that the Department
of Energy will be the approving
authority for these plans and will be
responsible for the collection of such
data.
11. Activities Related to a ‘‘Site’’
Article 2.b(ii) requires, upon specific
request by the IAEA, a general
description of activities and the identity
of the person or entity carrying out
activities at a particular location which
has not been included as part of a ‘‘site’’
but which the IAEA considers may be
functionally related to the activities on
a ‘‘site’’ declared under 2(a)(iii) The U.S.
Government will review such requests
on a case-by-case basis. This provision
relates only to element 3 above, where
the United States has provided site
descriptions and site maps.
Submission of Comments
All comments must be submitted to
the address indicated in this notice. The
Department requires that all comments
be submitted in written form.
The Department encourages interested
persons who wish to comment to do so
at the earliest possible time. The period
for submission of comments will close
January 21, 2003. The Department will
consider all comments received before
the close of the comment period.
Comments received after the end of the
comment period will be considered, if
possible, but their consideration cannot
be assured. The Department will not
accept comments accompanied by a
request that a part or all of the material

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be treated confidentially because of its
business proprietary nature or for any
other reason. The Department will
return such comments and materials to
the persons submitting the comments
and will not consider them. All
comments submitted in response to this
notice will be a matter of public record
and will be available for public
inspection and copying.
The Office of Administration, Bureau
of Industry and Security, U.S.
Department of Commerce, displays
public comments on the BIS Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) web site at
http://www.bis.doc.gov/foia. This office
does not maintain a separate public
inspection facility. If you have technical
difficulties accessing this web site,
please call BIS’s Office of
Administration, at (202) 482–0637, for
assistance.
Dated: November 14, 2002.
James J. Jochum,
Assistant Secretary for Export
Administration.
[FR Doc. 02–29513 Filed 11–19–02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–33–P

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration
[A-570–874]

Notice of Amended Preliminary
Determination of Sales at Less Than
Fair Value: Certain Ball Bearings and
Parts Thereof From the People’s
Republic of China
AGENCY: Import Administration,
International Trade Administration,
Department of Commerce.
ACTION: Notice of Amended Preliminary
Determination.
EFFECTIVE DATE:

November 20, 2002.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

James Terpstra or Cindy Lai Robinson,
AD/CVD Enforcement, Office 6, Group
II, Import Administration, International
Trade Administration, US Department
of Commerce, 14th Street and
Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington,
DC 20230; telephone:(202) 482–3965
and (202) 482–3797, respectively.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
The Applicable Statute and Regulations
Unless otherwise indicated, all
citations to the statute are references to
the provisions effective January 1, 1995,
the effective date of the amendments
made to the Tariff Act of 1930 (the Act)
by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
(URAA). In addition, unless otherwise
indicated, all citationsto the Department

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