EAR Part 742

PART 742
CONTROL POLICY -- CCL BASED CONTROLS
Sec.

Page

742.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

742.2

Proliferation of chemical and biological weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

742.3

Nuclear nonproliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

742.4

National security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

742.5

Missile technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

742.6

Regional stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

742.7

Crime control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

742.8

Anti-Terrorism: Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

742.9

Anti-Terrorism: Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

742.10 Anti-Terrorism: Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
742.11 Specially designed implements of torture, thumbscrews, and thumbcuffs;
and parts and accessories, n.e.s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
742.12 [RESERVED] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
742.13 Communications intercepting devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
742.14 Significant Items: hot section technology for the development, production
or overhaul of commercial aircraft engines, components, and systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
742.15 Encryption items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
742.16 [RESERVED] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
742.17 Exports of firearms to OAS member countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
742.18 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or Convention) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
742.19 Anti-terrorism: North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

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NONPROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SUPPLEMENT NO. 1
ANTI-TERRORISM CONTROLS: IRAN, NORTH KOREA,
SYRIA AND SUDAN CONTRACT SANCTITY DATES AND RELATED
POLICIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SUPPLEMENT NO. 2
[RESERVED] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SUPPLEMENT NO. 3
[RESERVED] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SUPPLEMENT NO. 4
CHECKLIST ON ENCRYPTION AND OTHER
“INFORMATION SECURITY” FUNCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SUPPLEMENT NO. 5
GUIDELINES FOR SUBMITTING REVIEW
REQUESTS FOR ENCRYPTION ITEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SUPPLEMENT NO. 6
DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SUPPLEMENT NO. 7

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§742.1
INTRODUCTION
In this part, references to the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR) are
References to 15 CFR Chapter VII, Subchapter C.
(a) Scope
This part describes all the reasons for control reflected in the Country Chart in Supplement No. 1
to part 738 of the EAR. In addition, it includes
licensing requirements and licensing policies for
the following items that are not reflected on the
Country Chart: specially designed implements of
torture, high performance computers, and
communications intercepting devices. In addition
to describing the reasons for control and licensing
requirements and policies, this part describes any
applicable contract sanctity provisions that may
apply to specific controls and includes a
description of any multilateral regime under
which specific controls are maintained.
(b) Reasons for control listed on the CCL not
covered by this part
This part describes the license requirements and
the licensing policies for all the “Reasons for
Control” that are listed on the Commerce Control
List (CCL) except “Short Supply” and “U.N.
Sanctions”, which do not appear on the Country
Chart.
(1)
Short Supply. ECCNs containing items
subject to short supply controls (“SS”) refer the
exporter to part 754 of the EAR. These ECCNs
are: 0A980 (Horses for export by sea); 1C980
(certain inorganic chemicals); 1C981 (Crude
petroleum, including reconstituted crude
petroleum, tar sands, and crude shale oil); 1C982
(certain other petroleum products); 1C983
(Natural gas liquids and other natural gas
derivatives); 1C984 (certain manufactured gas
and synthetic natural gas (except when
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commingled with natural gas and thus subject to
export authorization from the Department of
Energy); and 1C988 (Western red cedar (thuja
plicata) logs and timber, and rough, dressed and
worked lumber containing wane).
(2) U.N. Sanctions. The United Nations imposes
sanctions, short of complete embargoes, against
certain countries which may result in controls that
supplement those otherwise maintained under the
EAR for that particular country. This part does
not address license requirements and licensing
policies for controls implementing U.N.
sanctions. CCL entries containing items subject
to U.N. sanctions will refer the exporter to part
746 of the EAR, Embargoes and Other Special
Controls, for any supplemental controls that may
apply to exports and reexports involving these
countries.
(c) Exports and reexports involving
Cuba and Iran
This part does not cover license requirements and
licensing policies that apply to exports and
reexports to embargoed destinations (Cuba and
Iran). These comprehensive embargoes cover a
broader range of items than those reflected in the
CCL. If you are exporting or reexporting to any
of these destinations, you should first review part
746 of the EAR, Embargoes and Other Special
Controls.
(d) Anti-terrorism Controls on Cuba, Iran,
North Korea, Sudan and Syria
Commerce maintains anti-terrorism controls on
Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria and Sudan under
section 6(a) of the Export Administration Act.
Items controlled under section 6(a) to Iran, Syria,
Sudan, and North Korea are described in §§742.8,
742.9, 742.10, and 742.19, respectively, and in
Supplement No. 2 to part 742. Commerce also
maintains controls under section 6(j) of the EAA
to Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria.
Items controlled to these countries under EAA
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section 6(j) are also described in Supplement 2 to
part 742. The Secretaries of Commerce and State
are required to notify appropriate Committees of
the Congress 30 days before issuing a license for
an item controlled under section 6(j) to Cuba,
North Korea, Iran, Sudan or Syria. If you are
exporting or reexporting to Cuba, Iran, or North
Korea, you should review part 746 of the EAR,
Embargoes and Other Special Controls.
(e) End-user and end-use based controls
This part does not cover prohibitions and
licensing requirements for exports of items not included on the CCL that are subject to end-use and
end-user controls: certain nuclear end-uses;
certain missile end-uses; certain chemical and
biological weapons end-uses; certain naval
nuclear propulsion end-uses; certain activities of
U.S. persons; and certain exports to and for the
use of certain foreign vessels or aircraft.
Licensing requirements and policies for these
exports are contained in part 744 of the EAR.
(f) Overlapping license policies
Many items on the CCL are subject to more than
one type of control (e.g., national security (NS),
missile technology (MT), nuclear
nonproliferation (NP), regional stability (RS)). In
addition, applications for all items on the CCL,
other than those controlled for short supply
reasons, may be reviewed for missile technology
(see §742.5(b)(3) of this part), nuclear
nonproliferation (see §742.3(b)(2) of this part), or
chemical and biological weapons (see
§742.2(b)(3) of this part), if the end-use or enduser may be involved in certain proliferation
activities. Finally, many multilaterally controlled
items are reviewed for anti-terrorism reasons if
they are destined for a terrorism-supporting
country (see paragraph (d) of this section). Your
application for a license will be reviewed under
all applicable licensing policies. A license will be
issued only if an application can be approved
under all applicable licensing policies.
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§742.2
PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
(a) License requirements
The following controls are maintained in support
of the U.S. foreign policy of opposing the
proliferation and illegal use of chemical and
biological weapons. (See also §742.18 of this
part for license requirements pursuant to the
Chemical Weapons Convention).
(1) If CB Column 1 of the Country Chart
(Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is
indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is
required to all destinations, including Canada, for
the following:
(i) Human pathogens, zoonoses, toxins,
animal pathogens, genetically modified
microorganisms and plant pathogens identified in
ECCNs 1C351, 1C352, 1C353, 1C354 and
1C360; and
(ii) Technology (ECCNs 1E001 and 1E351)
for the production and/or disposal of
microbiological commodities described in
paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section.
(2) If CB Column 2 of the Country Chart
(Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is
indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is
required to all destinations except countries in
Country Group A:3 (see Supplement No. 1 to part
740 of the EAR) (Australia Group members) for
the following:
(i) Chemicals identified in ECCN 1C350
(precursor and intermediate chemicals used in the
production of chemical warfare agents).
(A) This license requirement includes
chemical mixtures identified in ECCN 1C350.b,
.c, or .d, except as specified in License
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Requirements Note 2 to that ECCN.
(B) This licensing requirement does not
include chemical compounds created with any
chemicals identified in ECCN 1C350, unless
those compounds are also identified in ECCN
1C350.
(C) This licensing requirement does not
apply to any of the following medical, analytical,
diagnostic, and food testing kits that consist of
pre-packaged materials of defined composition
that are specifically developed, packaged, and
marketed for diagnostic, analytical, or public
health purposes:
(1) Test kits containing no more than
300 grams of any chemical controlled by ECCN
1C350.b or .c (CB-controlled chemicals also
identified as Schedule 2 or 3 chemicals under the
CWC) that are destined for export or reexport to
CWC States Parties (destinations listed in
Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR). Such
test kits are controlled by ECCN 1C395 for CB
and CW reasons, to States not Party to the CWC
(destinations not listed in Supplement No. 2 to
part 745 of the EAR), and for AT reasons.
(2) Test kits that contain no more
than 300 grams of any chemical controlled by
ECCN 1C350.d (CB-controlled chemicals not
also identified as Schedule 1, 2, or 3 chemicals
under the CWC). Such test kits are controlled by
ECCN 1C995 for AT reasons.
(ii) Software (ECCN 1D390) for process
control that is specifically configured to control
or initiate production of the chemical precursors
controlled by ECCN 1C350.
(iii) Technology (ECCN 1E001) for the
development or production of chemical detection
systems and dedicated detectors therefore,
controlled by ECCN 1A004.c, that also have the
technical characteristics described in ECCN
2B351.a.
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(iv) Technology (ECCNs 1E001 and 1E350)
involving the following for facilities designed or
intended to produce chemicals described in
1C350:
(A) Overall plant design;
(B) Design, specification, or procurement
of equipment;
(C) Supervision of construction,
installation, or operation of complete plant or
components thereof;
(D) Training of personnel; or
(E) Consultation on specific problems
involving such facilities.
(v) Technology (ECCNs 1E001 and 1E351)
for the production and/or disposal of chemical
precursors described in ECCN 1C350;
(vi) Equipment and materials identified in
ECCN 2B350 or 2B351 on the CCL, chemical
detection systems controlled by 1A004.c for
detecting chemical warfare agents and having the
characteristics of toxic gas monitoring systems
described in 2B351.a, and valves controlled by
ECCN 2A226 or ECCN 2A292 having the
characteristics of those described in 2B350.g,
which can be used in the production of chemical
weapons precursors or chemical warfare agents.
(vii) Equipment and materials identified in
ECCN 2B352, which can be used in the
production of biological agents.
(viii) Technology identified in ECCN 2E001,
2E002, or 2E301 for:
(A) The development, production, or use
of items controlled by ECCN 2B350, 2B351, or
2B352; or
(B) The development or production of
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valves controlled by ECCN 2A226 or 2A292
having the characteristics of those described in
ECCN 2B350.g.

(i) The specific nature of the end-use,
including the appropriateness of the stated enduse;

(ix) Technology identified in ECCN 2E201
or 2E290 for the use of valves controlled by
ECCN 2A226 or 2A292 having the characteristics
of those described in 2B350.g.

(ii) The significance of the export and
reexport in terms of its potential contribution to
the design, development, production, stockpiling,
or use of chemical or biological weapons;

(3) If CB Column 3 of the Country Chart
(Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is
indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is
required to Country Group D:3 (see Supplement
No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) for medical
products identified in ECCN 1C991.d.

(iii) The nonproliferation credentials of the
importing country, including the importing
country’s chemical and biological capabilities and
objectives;

(4) A license is required, to States not Party to the
CWC (destinations not listed in Supplement No.
2 to part 745 of the EAR), for mixtures controlled
by ECCN 1C395.a and test kits controlled by
ECCN 1C395.b.
(b) Licensing policy
(1) License applications for the items described
in paragraph (a) of this section will be considered
on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the
export or reexport would make a material
contribution to the design, development,
production, stockpiling or use of chemical or
biological weapons. When an export or reexport
is deemed to make such a material contribution,
the license will be denied. When an export or
reexport is intended to be used in a chemical
weapons or biological weapons program, or for
chemical or biological weapons terrorism
purposes, it is deemed to make a material
contribution. The factors listed in paragraph
(b)(2) of this section are among those that will be
considered to determine what action should be
taken on license applications for these items.
(2) The following factors are among those that
will be considered to determine what action
should be taken on license applications for the
items described in paragraph (a) of this section:
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(iv) The extent and effectiveness of the export
control system in the importing country and in
any intermediary country through which the items
being exported or reexported will transit or be
transshipped en route to the importing country;
(v) The risk that the items will be diverted
for use in a chemical weapons or biological
weapons program, or for chemical weapons or
biological weapons terrorism purposes;
(vi) The reliability of the parties to the
transaction, including whether:
(A) An export or reexport license
application involving any such parties has
previously been denied;
(B) Any such parties have been engaged
in clandestine or illegal procurement activities;
(C) The end-user is capable of securely
handling and storing the items to be exported or
reexported;
(vii) Relevant information about proliferation
and terrorism activities, including activities
involving the design, development, production,
stockpiling, or use of chemical or biological
weapons by any parties to the transaction;
(viii) The types of assurances or guarantees
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against the design, development, production,
stockpiling, or use of chemical or biological
weapons that are given in a particular case,
including any relevant assurances provided by the
importing country or the end-user;
(ix) The applicability of other multilateral
export control or nonproliferation agreements
(e.g., the Chemical Weapons Convention and the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention) to
the transaction; and
(x) The existence of a pre-existing contract.
(3) BIS will review license applications in
accordance with the licensing policy described in
paragraph (b)(1) of this section for items not
described in paragraph (a) of this section that:
(i) Require a license for reasons other than
short supply; and
(ii) Could be destined for the design,
development, production, stockpiling, or use of
chemical or biological weapons, or for a facility
engaged in such activities.
(4)
License applications for items described
in paragraph (a) of this section, when destined for
the People’s Republic of China, will be reviewed
in accordance with the licensing policies in both
paragraph (b) of this section and §742.4(b)(7).
(c) Contract sanctity
Contract sanctity dates are set forth in
Supplement No. 1 to part 742. Applicants who
wish that a pre-existing contract be considered in
reviewing their license applications must submit
documentation sufficient to establish the
existence of such a contract.
(d) Australia Group
The Australia Group, a multilateral body that
works to halt the spread of chemical and
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biological weapons, has developed common
control lists of items specifically related to
chemical and biological weapons. Australia
Group members are listed in Country Group A:3
(see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR).
Controls on items listed in paragraph (a) of this
section are consistent with lists agreed to in the
Australia Group.
(e) License application requirements
and instructions
(1) Supplement No. 1 to Part 748 of the EAR
provides general instructions for completing
license applications.
When preparing
applications for items controlled for chemical and
biological reasons, pay particular attention to the
instructions contained in paragraphs (e) and (f) of
the Supplement that apply to entering “Quantity”
and “Units,” respectively, on license applications.
Paragraphs (e) and (f) require that, if an item is
licensed in terms of “$ value” (refer to the “Unit”
paragraph within the appropriate ECCN), the unit
of quantity commonly used in the trade must also
be shown on the license application. In such
cases, Section 750.7 of the EAR provides that the
quantity of commodities authorized is limited by
the total dollar value as shown on the approved
license and not by the quantity specified thereon.
Although the EAR do not place a specific
limitation on quantity in such cases, the total
quantity that may be exported or reexported is
limited, to a significant degree, by the fact that
the EAR do not provide a shipping tolerance for
items licensed by “dollar value” (see Section
750.11(b)(1) of the EAR) and require that the
“unit price” indicated on the license application
reflect the fair market value of the items listed on
the application (see paragraph (g) of Supplement
No. 1 to Part 748 of the EAR).
(2) Unique application and submission
requirements for chemicals, medicinals, and
pharmaceuticals are described in paragraph (a) of
Supplement No. 2 to Part 748 of the EAR.

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§742.3
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
(a) License requirements
Section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act of 1978 requires BIS to identify items subject
to the EAR that could be of significance for
nuclear explosive purposes if used for activities
other than those authorized at the time of export
or reexport. ECCNs on the CCL that include the
symbols “NP” or “NP 2" in the “Country Chart”
column of the “License Requirements” section
identify items that could be of significance for
nuclear explosive purposes and are therefore
subject to licensing requirements under this part
and under section 309(c) of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. These items are
referred to as “The Nuclear Referral List” and are
subject to the following licensing requirements:
(1) If NP Column 1 of the Country Chart
(Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is
indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is
required to all destinations except Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) member countries
(Country Group A:4) (see Supplement No. 1 to
part 740 of the EAR).
(2) If NP Column 2 of the Country Chart
(Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is
indicated in the applicable ECCN, a license is
required to Country Group D:2 (see Supplement
No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) except India.
(3) Other nuclear-related license requirements
are described in §§744.2 and 744.5 of the EAR.
(b) Licensing policy
(1) To implement the controls in paragraph (a) of
this section, the following factors are among
those used to determine what action should be
taken on individual applications:

Part 742-page 6

(i) Whether the items to be transferred are
appropriate for the stated end-use and whether
that stated end-use is appropriate for the end-user;
(ii) The significance for nuclear purposes of
the particular item;
(iii) Whether the items to be exported or
reexported are to be used in research on, or for
the development, design, manufacture,
construction, operation, or maintenance of, any
reprocessing or enrichment facility;
(iv) The types of assurances or guarantees
given against use for nuclear explosive purposes
or proliferation in the particular case;
(v) Whether any party to the transaction has
been engaged in clandestine or illegal
procurement activities;
(vi) Whether an application for a license to
export or reexport to the end-user has previously
been denied, or whether the end-user has
previously diverted items received under a
general license, a License Exception, or a
validated license to unauthorized activities;
(vii) Whether the export or reexport would
present an unacceptable risk of diversion to a
nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded
nuclear fuel-cycle activity described in §744.2(a)
of the EAR; and
(viii) The nonproliferation credentials of the
importing country, based on consideration of the
following factors:
(A) Whether the importing country is a
party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) or to the Treaty for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of
Tlatelolco) or to a similar international legallybinding nuclear nonproliferation agreement;
(B) Whether the importing country has

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all of its nuclear activities, facilities, or installations that are operational, being designed, or
under construction under International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards or equivalent
full scope safeguards;
(C) Whether there is an agreement for
cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy
between the U.S. and the importing country;
(D) Whether the actions, statements, and
policies of the government of the importing country are in support of nuclear nonproliferation and
whether that government is in compliance with its
international obligations in the field of nonproliferation;
(E) The degree to which the government
of the importing country cooperates in nonproliferation policy generally (e.g., willingness to
consult on international nonproliferation issues);
and
(F) Information on the importing
country's nuclear intentions and activities.
(2)
In addition, BIS will review license
applications in accordance with the licensing
policy described in paragraph (b) of this section
for items not on the Nuclear Referral List that:

Part 742-page 7

in accordance with the licensing policies in both
paragraph (b) of this section and §742.4(b)(7).
(c) Contract sanctity
Contract sanctity provisions are not available for
license applications reviewed under this section.
(d) Nuclear Suppliers Group
Most items on the Nuclear Referral List that
require a license under NP Column No. 1 on the
Country Chart (see Supplement No. 1 to part 738
of the EAR) are contained in the Annex to the
“Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related
Dual-Use Equipment, Material, and Related
Technology” (the Annex), as published by the
International Atomic Energy Agency in
INFCIRC/254/Revision 1/Part 2. The adherents
to INFCIRC/254/Revision 1/Part 2, which
includes the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines, have
agreed to establish export licensing procedures
for the transfer of items identified in the Annex.
Items that are listed as requiring a license under
NP Column No. 2 on the Country Chart (see
Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) are not
included in the Annex and are controlled only by
the United States.

§742.4
(i) Require a license on the CCL for reasons
other than “short supply;” and
(ii) Are intended for a nuclear related
end-use or end-user.
(3) For the People’s Republic of China, the
general licensing policy for applications for those
items that would make a direct and significant
contribution to nuclear weapons and their
delivery systems is extended review or denial.
(4)
License applications for items described
in paragraph (a) of this section, when destined to
the People’s Republic of China, will be reviewed
Export Administration Regulations

NATIONAL SECURITY
(a) License requirements
It is the policy of the United States to restrict the
export and reexport of items that would make a
significant contribution to the military potential
of any other country or combination of countries
that would prove detrimental to the national
security of the United States. Accordingly, a
license is required for exports and reexports to all
destinations, except Canada, for all items in
ECCNs on the CCL that include NS Column 1 in
the Country Chart column of the “License
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Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

Requirements” section. A license is required to
all destinations except Country Group A:1 and
cooperating countries (see Supplement No. 1 to
part 740), Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia for all items in
ECCNs on the CCL that include NS Column 2 in
the Country Chart column of the “License
Requirements” section. The purpose of the
controls is to ensure that these items do not make
a contribution to the military potential of
countries in Country Group D:1 (see Supplement
No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) that would prove
detrimental to the national security of the United
States. License Exception GBS is available for
the export and reexport of certain national
security controlled items to Country Group B (see
§740.4 and Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the
EAR).
(b) Licensing policy
(1) The policy for national security controlled
items exported or reexported to any country
except a country in Country Group D:1 (see
Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) is to
approve applications unless there is a significant
risk that the items will be diverted to a country in
Country Group D:1.
(2) Except for those countries described in paragraphs (b)(5) through (b)(7) of this section, the
general policy for exports and reexports of items
to Country Group D:1 (see Supplement No. 1 to
part 740 of the EAR) is to approve applications
when BIS determines, on a case-by-case basis,
that the items are for civilian use or would
otherwise not make a significant contribution to
the military potential of the country of destination
that would prove detrimental to the national
security of the United States.
(3) To permit such policy judgments to be made,
each application is reviewed in the light of
prevailing policies with full consideration of all
aspects of the proposed transaction. The review
Export Administration Regulations

Part 742-page 8

generally includes:
(i) An analysis of the kinds and quantities of
items to be shipped;
(ii) Their military or civilian uses;
(iii) The unrestricted availability abroad of
the same or comparable items;
(iv) The country of destination;
(v) The ultimate end-users in the country of
destination; and
(vi) The intended end-use.
(4) Although each proposed transaction is
considered individually, items described in
Advisory Notes on the Commerce Control List
are more likely to be approved than others.
(5) In recognition of efforts made to adopt
safeguard measures for exports and reexports,
Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and Russia are accorded
enhanced favorable consideration licensing
treatment.
(6) The general policy for Cambodia and Laos is
to approve license applications when BIS
determines, on a case-by-case basis, that the items
are for an authorized use in Cambodia or Laos
and are not likely to be diverted to another
country or use contrary to the national security or
foreign policy controls of the United States.
(7) For the People’s Republic of China (PRC),
there is a general policy of approval for license
applications to export, reexport, or transfer items
to civil end-uses. There is a presumption of
denial for license applications to export, reexport,
or transfer items that would make a direct and
significant contribution to the PRC’s military
capabilities such as, but not limited to, the major
weapons systems described in Supplement No. 7
to Part 742 of the EAR.
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Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

(c) Contract sanctity
Contract sanctity provisions are not available for
license applications reviewed under this section.
(d) [RESERVED]

§742.5
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY
(a) License requirements
(1) In support of U.S. foreign policy to limit the
proliferation of missiles, a license is required to
export and reexport items related to the design,
development, production, or use of missiles.
These items are identified in ECCNs on the CCL
as MT Column No. 1 in the Country Chart
column of the “License Requirements” section.
Licenses for these items are required to all
destinations, except Canada, as indicated by MT
Column 1 of the Country Chart (see Supplement
No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR).
(2) The term “missiles” is defined as rocket
systems (including ballistic missile systems,
space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) and
unmanned air vehicle systems (including cruise
missile systems, target drones, and
reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering at
least 500 kilograms (kg) payload to a range of at
least 300 kilometers (km). See §746.3 of the
EAR for definition of a “ballistic missile” to be
exported or reexported to Iraq.
(b) Licensing policy
(1) Applications to export and reexport items
identified in ECCNs on the CCL as MT Column
No. 1 in the Country Chart column of the
“License Requirements” section will be
considered on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether the export or reexport would make a
material contribution to the proliferation of
Export Administration Regulations

Part 742-page 9

missiles. Applications for exports and reexports
of such items contained in Category 7A or
described by ECCN 9A101 on the CCL will be
considered more favorably if such exports or
reexports are determined to be destined to a
manned aircraft, satellite, land vehicle, or marine
vessel, in quantities appropriate for replacement
parts for such applications. When an export or
reexport is deemed to make a material
contribution to the proliferation of missiles, the
license will be denied.
(2) The following factors are among those that
will be considered in reviewing individual
applications.
(i) The specific nature of the end-use;
(ii) The significance of the export and
reexport in terms of its contribution to the design,
development, production, or use of missiles;
(iii) The capabilities and objectives of the
missile and space programs of the recipient country;
(iv) The nonproliferation credentials of the
importing country;
(v) The types of assurances or guarantees against design, development, production, or use of
missiles that are given in a particular case; and
(vi) The existence of a pre-existing contract.
(3) Controls on other items. BIS will review
license applications, in accordance with the
licensing policy described in paragraph (b)(1) of
this section, for items not described in paragraph
(a) of this section that:
(i) Require a validated license for reasons
other than short supply; and
(ii) Could be destined for the design,
development, production, or use of missiles, or
January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

Part 742-page 10

for a facility engaged in such activities.

stability:

(4) License applications for items described in
paragraph (a) of this section, when destined for
the People’s Republic of China, will be reviewed
in accordance with the licensing policies in both
paragraph (b) of this section and §742.4(b)(7).

(1) As indicated in the CCL and in RS Column 1
of the Country Chart (see Supplement No. 1 to
part 738 of the EAR), a license is required to all
destinations, except Canada, for items described
on the CCL under ECCNs 6A002.a.1, a.2, a.3 , .c,
or .e; 6A003.b.3 and b.4; 6A008.j.1; 6A998.b;
6D001 (only “software” for the “development” or
“production” of items in 6A002.a.1, a.2, a.3, .c;
6A003.b.3 and .b.4; or 6A008.j.1); 6D002 (only
“software” for the “use” of items in 6A002.a.1,
a.2, a.3, .c; 6A003.b.3 and .b.4; or 6A008.j.1);
6D991 (only “software” for the “development,”
“production,” or “use” of equipment controlled by
6A002.e or 6A998.b); 6E001 (only “technology”
for “development” of items in 6A002.a.1, a.2, a.3
(except 6A002.a.3.d.a.2 and 6A002.a.3.e for lead
selenide focal plane arrays), and .c or .e,
6A003.b.3 and b.4, or 6A008.j.1); 6E002 (only
“technology” for “production” of items in
6A002.a.1, a.2, a.3, .c, or .e, 6A003.b.3 or b.4, or
6A008.j.1); 6E991 (only “technology” for the
“development,” “production,” or “use” of
equipment controlled by 6A998.b); 7D001 (only
“software” for “development” or “production” of
items in 7A001, 7A002, or 7A003); 7E001 (only
“technology” for the “development” of inertial
navigation systems, inertial equipment, and
specially designed components therefor for civil
aircraft); 7E002 (only “technology” for the
“production” of inertial navigation systems,
inertial equipment, and specially designed
components therefor for civil aircraft); 7E101
(only “technology” for the “use” of inertial
navigation systems, inertial equipment, and
specially designed components for civil aircraft).

(c) Contract sanctity
The following contract sanctity dates have been
established:
(1) License applications for batch mixers
specified in ECCN 1B117 involving contracts
that were entered into prior to January 19, 1990,
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
(2) License applications subject to ECCN
1B115.b or .c that involve a contract entered into
prior to March 7, 1991, will be considered on a
case-by-case basis.
(3) Applicants who wish that a pre-existing contract be considered in reviewing their license
applications must submit documentation
sufficient to establish the existence of a contract.
(d) Missile Technology Control Regime
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
members are listed in Country Group A:2 (see
Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR). Controls on items identified in paragraph (a) of this
section are consistent with the list agreed to in the
MTCR and included in the MTCR Annex.

§742.6
REGIONAL STABILITY
(a) License requirements
The following controls are maintained in support
of U.S. foreign policy to maintain regional
Export Administration Regulations

(2) As indicated in the CCL and in RS Column 2
of the Country Chart (see Supplement No. 1 to
part 738 of the EAR), a license is required to any
destination except Australia, Japan, New Zealand,
and countries in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) for items described on the
CCL under ECCNs 0A918, 0E918, 2A983,
2D983 2E983, 8A918, and for military vehicles
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Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

and certain commodities (specially designed)
used to manufacture military equipment,
described on the CCL in ECCNs 0A018.c,
1B018.a, 2B018, and 9A018.a and .b.
(3) As indicated on the CCL, a license is required
for the export or reexport to Iraq or transfer
within Iraq of the following items controlled for
RS reasons on the CCL: 0B999, 0D999, 1B999,
1C992, 1C995, 1C997, 1C999 and 6A992. The
Commerce Country Chart is not designed to
determine RS licensing requirements for these
ECCNs.

Part 742-page 11

2E983 destined for countries not listed in Country
Group E (Supplement 1 to part 740). See parts
742 and 746 for the contract sanctity
requirements applicable to exports and reexports
to countries listed in Country Group E.
(d) U.S. controls
Although the United States seeks cooperation
from like-minded countries in maintaining
regional stability controls, at this time these
controls are maintained only by the United States.

(b) Licensing policy

§742.7

(1) Applications to export and reexport items
described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section will
be reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether the export or reexport could contribute
directly or indirectly to any country’s military
capabilities in a manner that would alter or
destabilize a region’s military balance contrary to
the foreign policy interests of the United States.

CRIME CONTROL

(2) Applications to export and reexport
commodities described in paragraph (a)(2) of this
section will generally be considered favorably on
a case-by-case basis unless there is evidence that
the export or reexport would contribute
significantly to the destabilization of the region to
which the equipment is destined.
(3)
For terrorist-designated countries, the
applicable licensing policies are found in parts
742 and 746 of the EAR
(4) See §746.3(b) of the EAR for the applicable
licensing policies for items controlled for RS
reasons to Iraq.
(c) Contract sanctity
Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003. This
contract sanctity date applies only to items
controlled under ECCNs 2A983, 2D983 and
Export Administration Regulations

(a) License requirements
In support of U.S. foreign policy to promote the
observance of human rights throughout the world,
a license is required to export and reexport crime
control and detection equipment, related
technology and software as follows:
(1) Crime control and detection instruments and
equipment and related technology and software
identified in the appropriate ECCNs on the CCL
under CC Column 1 in the Country Chart column
of the “License Requirements” section. A license
is required to countries listed in CC Column 1
(Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR).
Items affected by this requirement are identified
on the CCL under the following ECCNs: 0A978,
0A979, 0A984, 0A987, 0E984, 1A984, 1A985,
3A980, 3A981, 3D980, 3E980, 4A003 (for
fingerprint computers only), 4A980, 4D001 (for
fingerprint computers only), 4D980, 4E001 (for
fingerprint computers only), 4E980, 6A002 (for
police-model infrared viewers only), 6E001 (for
police-model infrared viewers only), 6E002 (for
police-model infrared viewers only), and 9A980.
(2) Shotguns with a barrel length greater than or
equal to 24 inches, identified in ECCN 0A984 on
January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

Part 742-page 12

the CCL under CC Column 2 in the Country
Chart column of the “License Requirements”
section regardless of end-user to countries listed
in CC Column 2 (Supplement No. 1 part 738 of
the EAR).

sanctity applies only to items controlled under
ECCNs 0A982, 0A985 and 0E982 destined for
countries not listed in CC Column 1 of the
Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of
the EAR).

(3) Shotguns with barrel length greater than or
equal to 24 inches, identified in ECCN 0A984 on
the CCL under CC Column 3 in the Country
Chart column of the “License Requirements”
section only if for sale or resale to police or law
enforcement entities in countries listed in CC
Column 3 (Supplement No. 1 part 738 of the
EAR).

(d) U.S. controls

(4) Certain crime control items require a license
to all destinations, except Canada. These items
are identified under ECCNs 0A982, 0A985, and
0E982. Controls for these
items appear in each ECCN; a column specific to
these controls does not appear in the Country
Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR).
(5) See §742.11 of the EAR for further
information on items controlled under ECCN
0A983, which require a license to all destinations,
including Canada.
(b) Licensing policy
Applications for items controlled under this
section will generally be considered favorably on
a case-by-case basis unless there is civil disorder
in the country or region or unless there is
evidence that the government of the importing
country may have violated internationally
recognized human rights. The judicious use of
export controls is intended to deter the
development of a consistent pattern of human
rights abuses, distance the United States from
such abuses and avoid contributing to civil
disorder in a country or region.
(c) Contract sanctity
Contract sanctity date: August 22, 2000. Contract
Export Administration Regulations

Although the United States seeks cooperation
from like-minded countries in maintaining
controls on crime control and detection items, at
this time these controls are maintained only by
the United States.

§742.8
ANTI-TERRORISM: IRAN
(a) License requirements
(1) A license is required for anti-terrorism
purposes to export or reexport to Iran any item for
which AT column 1 or AT column 2 is indicated
in the Country Chart column of the applicable
ECCN or any item described in ECCNs 1C350,
1C355, 1C395, 2A994, 2D994 and 2E994. See
paragraph (a)(5) of this section for controls
maintained by the Department of the Treasury.
See §746.7 of the EAR for additional EAR
license requirements that apply to Iran.
(2) [RESERVED]
(3) The Secretary of State has designated Iran as
a country whose Government has repeatedly
provided support for acts of international
terrorism.
(4) In support of U.S. foreign policy applicable to
terrorism- supporting countries, the EAR imposes
anti-terrorism license requirements on exports and
reexports to Iran pursuant to sections 6(j) and 6(a)
of the Export Administration Act.
(i)

Section 6(j) anti-terrorism controls.
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Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

Section 6(j) requirements apply to all exports and
reexports destined to the police, military or other
sensitive end-users of items listed on the
Commerce Control List (Supp. No. 1 to part 774
of the EAR) for which any listed reason for
control in the applicable ECCN is NS (national
security), CB (chemical or biological weapons
proliferation), MT (missile proliferation), NP
(nuclear weapons proliferation) or an Export
Control Classification Number ending in "18"
(military related items). BIS may not issue a
license for a transaction subject to section 6(j)
controls until 30 days after the notification
described in Section 6(j)(2) of the Export
Administration Act is delivered to the committees
of Congress specified in that section. License
applications for all other items controlled under
section 6(a) are also reviewed to determine
whether section 6(j) applies.

Part 742-page 13

License applications for which contract sanctity is
established may be considered under policies in
effect prior to the enactment of that Act.
Otherwise, licenses for such items to Iran are
subject to a general policy of denial.
(2) License applications for items controlled
under section 6(a) of the EAA will also be
reviewed to determine whether requirements of
section 6(j) apply. Whenever the Secretary of
State determines that an export or reexport could
make a significant contribution to the military
potential of Iran, including its military logistics
capability, or could enhance Iran’s ability to
support acts of international terrorism, the
Secretaries of State and Commerce will notify the
Congress 30 days prior to the issuance of a
license.
(c) Contract sanctity

(5) Exports and certain reexports to Iran are
subject to a comprehensive embargo administered
by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). If you wish to
export or reexport to Iran, the Government of Iran
or any entity owned or controlled by that
Government, you should review part 746 of the
EAR and consult with OFAC. Please note that
authorization from OFAC constitutes
authorization under the EAR and no separate
license or authorization from BIS is required.

Section 6(f) of the Export Administration Act
requires that a report be delivered to Congress
before foreign policy based export controls are
imposed, expanded or extended. Consistent with
section 6(p) of the Export Administration Act,
certain exports or reexports in fulfillment of
contracts entered into before such delivery of the
report applicable to a particular license
requirement or licensing policy may be subject to
the license requirements and licensing policy that
were in force before the report was delivered.
License applicants who wish to have their
application considered under such pre-existing
requirements or policy must include. evidence of
the pre-existing contract with their license
applications.

(b) Licensing policy

(d) U.S. controls

(1) The Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of
October 23, 1992, requires BIS to deny licenses
for items controlled to Iran for national security
(section 5 of the 1979 EAA) or foreign policy
reasons (section 6 of the 1979 EAA), absent
contract sanctity or a Presidential waiver.

Although the United States seeks cooperation
from like-minded countries in maintaining antiterrorism controls, at this time these controls are
maintained only by the United States.

(ii) Section 6(a) anti-terrorism controls.
Section 6(a) requirements apply to all exports and
reexports regardless of the end user of items
described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section.

Export Administration Regulations

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Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

§742.9
ANTI-TERRORISM: SYRIA
(a) License requirements
(1) If AT Column 1 of the Country Chart
(Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is
indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is
required for export and reexport to Syria for antiterrorism purposes.
(2) The Secretary of State has designated Syria
as a country whose government has repeatedly
provided support for acts of international
terrorism.
(3) In support of U.S. foreign policy against
terrorism, BIS maintains two types of antiterrorism controls on the export and reexport to
Syria of items described in Supplement No. 2 to
part 742.
(i) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1)
through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742, if
destined to military, police, intelligence or other
end-users in Syria, are controlled under section
6(j) of the Export Administration Act, as
amended (EAA).
(ii) Items listed in paragraphs (c)(1) through
(c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 destined to
other end-users in Syria, as well as items to all
end-users listed in (c)(6) through (c)(8), (c)(10)
through (c)(14), (c)(16) through (c)(19), and
(c)(22) through (c)(44) of Supplement No. 2 to
part 742, are controlled to Syria under section
6(a) of the EAA.
(b) Licensing policy
(1) Applications for export and reexport to all
end-users in Syria of the following items will
generally be denied:

Export Administration Regulations

Part 742-page 14

(i) Items that are controlled for chemical and
biological weapons proliferation reasons to any
destination. These are items that contain CB
Column 1, CB Column 2, or CB Column 3 in the
Country Chart column of the “License
Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL.
(ii) Military-related items controlled for
national security reasons to any destination.
These are items that contain NS Column 1 in the
Country Chart column of the “License
Requirements” section in an ECCN on the CCL
and is controlled by equipment or material
entries ending in the number “18.”
(iii) Items that are controlled for missile
proliferation reasons to any destination. These
are items that have an MT Column 1 in the
Country Chart column of the “License
Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL.
(iv) All aircraft (powered and unpowered),
helicopters, engines, and related spare parts and
components, except that parts and components
intended to ensure the safety of civil aviation and
the safe operation of commercial passenger
aircraft will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis,
with a presumption of approval. These are items
controlled to any destination for national security
and missile technology reasons and items
controlled to Syria for anti-terrorism purposes.
Such items contain an NS Column 1, NS Column
2, MT Column 1, or AT Column 1 in the Country
Chart column of the “License Requirements”
section of an ECCN on the CCL. Note that,
consistent with the general rule that applies to
computing U.S. parts and components content
incorporated into foreign made products, all
aircraft-related items that require a license to
Syria will be included as controlled U.S. content,
except for ECCNs 6A998, 7A994, and 9A991.d,
for purposes of such licensing requirements.
(v)
Cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and
crypto-logic items controlled to any destination
for national security reasons. Such items contain
January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

Part 742-page 15

an AT Column 1 and an NS Column 1 or NS
Column 2 in the Country Chart column of the
“License Requirements” section of an ECCN on
the CCL.
(vi)
Explosives detection
controlled under ECCN 2A983.

equipment

(vii) “Software” (ECCN 2D983) specially
designed or modified for the “development”,
“production” or “use” of explosives detection
equipment controlled by 2A983.
(viii) “Technology” (ECCN 2E983) specially
designed or modified for the “development”,
“production” or “use” of explosives detection
equipment controlled by 2A983.
(ix)
Commercial charges and devices
controlled under ECCN 1C992.
(x) Ammonium nitrate, including certain
fertilizers containing ammonium nitrate,
controlled under ECCN 1C997.
(xi) Technology for the production of
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule
2 and 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1E355.
(2) Applications for export and reexport to Syria
of all other items described in paragraph (a) of
this section, and not described by paragraph
(b)(1) of this section, will generally be denied if
the export or reexport is destined to a military
end-user or for military end-use. Applications for
non-military end-users or for non-military
end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case
basis.
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs
(b)(1) and (b)(2), of this section, applications for
Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis
if:

ultimate destination at the time of original export
from the United States, provided that the exports
from the U.S. occurred prior to the applicable
contract sanctity date (or, where the contract
sanctity date is December 16, 1986, prior to June
18, 1987).
(ii) The U.S. content of foreign-produced
commodities is 20% or less by value; or
(iii) The commodities are medical items.
Note to paragraph (b) of this section:
Applicants who wish any of the factors
described in paragraph (b) of this section to
be considered in reviewing their license
applications must submit adequate
documentation demonstrating the value of the
U.S. content, the specifications and medical
use of the equipment, or the date of export
from the United States.
(4) License applications for items reviewed
under 6(a) controls will also be reviewed to
determine the applicability of 6(j) controls to the
transaction. When it is determined that an export
or reexport could make a significant contribution
to the military potential of Syria, including its
military logistics capability, or could enhance
Syria’s ability to support acts of international
terrorism, the Secretaries of State and Commerce
will notify the Congress 30 days prior to issuance
of a license.
(c) Contract sanctity
Contract sanctity dates and related licensing
policies for Syria are set forth in Supplement No.
2 to part 742. Applicants who wish a pre-existing
contract to be considered must submit sufficient
documentation to establish the existence of a
contract.
(d) U.S. controls

(i) The transaction involves the reexport to
Syria of items where Syria was not the intended
Export Administration Regulations

Although the United States seeks cooperation
January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

from like-minded countries in maintaining antiterrorism controls, at this time these controls are
maintained only by the United States.
(e) General Order No. 2, Supplement No. 1 to
part 736 of the EAR, sets forth special controls
for exports and reexports to Syria. General Order
No. 2 supersedes the provisions of paragraphs (a)
through (d) of this section.

Part 742-page 16

a license.
(3) The Secretary of State has designated Sudan
as a country whose government has repeatedly
provided support for acts of international
terrorism.
(4) In support of U.S. foreign policy against
terrorism, BIS maintains anti-terrorism controls
on the export and reexport to Sudan of items
described in Supplement No. 2 to part 742.

§742.10
ANTI-TERRORISM: SUDAN
(a) License Requirements
(1) If AT column 1 or AT column 21 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the
EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a
license is required for export to Sudan for antiterrorism purposes.
(2) If AT column 1 or AT column 2 of the
Commerce Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to
part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the
appropriate ECCN, a license is required for
reexport to Sudan for anti-terrorism purposes,
except for ECCNs 2A994, 3A992.a, 5A991.g,
5A992, 6A991, 6A998, 7A994, 8A992.d, .e, .f,
and .g, 9A990.a and .b, and 9A991.d and .e. In
addition, items in these ECCNs are not counted as
controlled U.S. content for the purpose of
determining license requirements for U.S. parts,
components or materials incorporated into foreign
made products. However, the export from the
United States to any destination with knowledge
that they will be reexported directly or indirectly,
in whole or in part to Sudan is prohibited without

1

AT column 1 refers to items controlled to Iran,
Sudan, and Syria for anti-terrorism purposes. AT
column 2 refers to additional items controlled to Iran
and Sudan for anti-terrorism purposes. In addition,
items included in ECCNs 2A994, 2D994 and 2E994
are controlled to Iran for anti-terrorism purposes.
Export Administration Regulations

(i) Items described in paragraph (c)(1)
through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 if
destined to military, police, intelligence or other
sensitive end-users in Sudan are controlled under
section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, as
amended (EAA).
(ii) Items listed in paragraphs (c)(1) through
(c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 destined to
other end-users in Sudan, as well as items to all
end-users listed in (c)(6) through (c)(14) and
(c)(16) through (c)(44) of Supplement No. 2 to
part 742 are controlled to Sudan under section
6(a) of the EAA.
(b) Licensing policy
(1) Applications for export and reexport to all
end-users in Sudan of the following items will
generally be denied:
(i) Items that are controlled for chemical and
biological weapons proliferation reasons to any
destination. These are items that contain CB
Column 1, CB Column 2, or CB Column 3 in the
Country Chart column of the “License
Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL.
(ii) Military-related items controlled for
national security reasons to any destination.
These are items that contain NS Column 1 in the
Country Chart column of the “License
Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL
and is controlled by equipment or material entries
January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

Part 742-page 17

ending in the number “18.”
(iii) Items that are controlled for missile
proliferation reasons to any destination. These
are items that contain a MT Column 1 in the
Country Chart column of the “License
Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL.
(iv) All aircraft (powered and unpowered),
helicopters, engines, and related spare parts and
components. These are items controlled to any
destination for national security reasons and items
controlled to Sudan for anti-terrorism reasons.
Such items contain an NS Column 1, NS Column
2, or AT Column 1 in the Country Chart column
of the “License Requirements” section of an
ECCN on the CCL. Note that, consistent with the
general rule that applies to computing U.S. parts
and components content incorporated in foreign
made products, all aircraft-related items that
require a license to Sudan will be included as
controlled US content for purposes of such
license requirements.
(v)
Cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and
crypto-logic items controlled to any destination.
These are items that contain an NS Column 1, NS
Column 2, AT Column 1 or AT Column 2 in the
Country Chart column of the “License
Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL.
(vi)
Explosives detection
controlled under ECCN 2A983.

(xi) Ammonium nitrate, including certain
fertilizers containing ammonium nitrate,
controlled under ECCN 1C997.
(2) Applications for the export and reexport of all
other items described in paragraph (a) of this
section, and not described in paragraph (b)(1) of
this section, will be denied if the export or
reexport is destined to a military end-user or for
military end-use. Applications for non-military
end-users or for non-military end-uses will be
considered on a case-by-case basis.
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs
(b)(1) and (b)(2) of this section, applications for
Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis
if:
(i) The transaction involves the reexport to
Sudan of items where Sudan was not the intended
ultimate destination at the time of original export
from the United States, provided that the exports
from the U.S. occurred prior to the applicable
contract sanctity date.
(ii) The U.S. content of foreign-produced
commodities is 20% or less by value; or

equipment

(vii) “Software” (ECCN 2D983) specially
designed or modified for the “development”,
“production” or “use” of explosives detection
equipment controlled by 2A983.
(viii) “Technology” (ECCN 2E983) specially
designed or modified for the “development”,
“production” or “use” of explosives detection
equipment controlled by 2A983.
(ix)
Commercial charges and devices
controlled under ECCN 1C992.
Export Administration Regulations

(x) Technology for the production of
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule
2 and 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1E355.

(iii) The commodities are medical items.
Note to paragraph (b) of this section:
Applicants who wish any of the factors described
in paragraph (b)(4) of this section to be
considered in reviewing their license applications
must submit adequate documentation
demonstrating the value of the U.S. content, the
specifications and medical use of the equipment,
or the date of export from the United States.
(4) License applications for items reviewed
under 6(a) controls will also be reviewed to
determine the applicability of 6(j) controls to the
January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

transaction. When it is determined that an export
or reexport could make a significant contribution
to the military potential of Sudan, including its
military logistics capability, or could enhance
Sudan’s ability to support acts of international
terrorism, the appropriate committees of the
Congress will be notified 30 days before issuance
of a license to export or reexport such items.
(c) Contract sanctity
Contract sanctity dates and related licensing
information for Sudan are set forth in Supplement
No. 2 to part 742. Applicants who wish a
pre-existing contract to be considered must
submit sufficient documentation to establish the
existence of a contract.
(d) U.S. controls
Although the United States seeks cooperation
from like-minded countries in maintaining antiterrorism controls, at this time these controls are
maintained only by the United States.

§742.11
SPECIALLY DESIGNED IMPLEMENTS
OF TORTURE, THUMBSCREWS, AND
THUMBCUFFS; AND PARTS AND
ACCESSORIES, N.E.S.
(a) License requirements
In support of U.S. foreign policy to promote the
observance of human rights throughout the world,
a license is required to export any commodity
controlled by ECCN 0A983 to all destinations
including Canada.
(b) Licensing policy
Applications for such licenses will generally be
denied to all destinations.

Export Administration Regulations

Part 742-page 18

(c) Contract sanctity
The contract sanctity date is November 9, 1995.
Contract sanctity will be a factor in considering
only applications for export to the NATO
countries, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.
(d) U.S. Controls
Although the United States seeks cooperation
from like-minded countries in maintaining
controls on implements of torture, at this time
these controls are maintained only by the United
States.

§742.12
[RESERVED]

§742.13
COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTING
DEVICES; SOFTWARE AND
TECHNOLOGY FOR
COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTING
DEVICES
(a) License requirement
(1) In support of U.S. foreign policy to prohibit
the export of items that may be used for the
surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or
electronic communications, a license is required
for all destinations, including Canada, for ECCNs
having an “SL” under the “Reason for Control”
paragraph. These items include any electronic,
mechanical, or other device primarily useful for
the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or
electronic communications (ECCN 5A980); and
for related software primarily useful for the
surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or
electronic communications, and software
primarily useful for the “development”,
“production”, or “use” of devices controlled
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Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

under ECCN 5A980 (ECCN 5D980); and
technology primarily useful for the
“development”, “production”, or “use” of devices
controlled under ECCN 5A980 (ECCN 5E980).
These licensing requirements do not supersede
the requirements contained in the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended
(18 U.S.C. Section 2512).
This license
requirement is not reflected on the Commerce
Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to Part 738 of
the EAR).
(2) “Communications intercepting devices” are
electronic, mechanical, or other devices that can
be used for interception of wire, oral, or
electronic communications if their design renders
them primarily useful for surreptitious listening
even though they may also have innocent uses. A
device is not restricted merely because it is small
or may be adapted to wiretapping or
eavesdropping. Some examples of devices to
which these restrictions apply are: the martini
olive transmitter; the infinity transmitter; the
spike mike; and the disguised microphone
appearing as a wristwatch, cufflink, or cigarette
pack; etc. The restrictions do not apply to devices
such as the parabolic microphone or other
directional microphones ordinarily used by
broadcasters at sports events, since these devices
are not primarily useful for surreptitious listening.

Part 742-page 19

(ii) An officer, agent, or employee of, or a
person under contract with, the United States, one
of the 50 States, or a political subdivision thereof,
when engaged in the normal course of
government activities.
NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (b)(1): For SL
reasons, license applications will generally be
denied to countries that are subject to controls
for AT reasons.
NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (b)(1)(i): The
normal course of the business of providing a wire
or electronic communications service includes
any activity which is a necessary incident to the
rendition of the service or to the protection of the
rights and property of the provider of that
service.
(2) Other license applications will generally be
denied for exports or reexports requiring a license
for SL reasons.
(c) Contract sanctity
Contract sanctity provisions are not available for
license applications involving exports and
reexports of communications interception
devices.
(d) U.S. controls

(b) Licensing policy
(1) License applications, except for those
applications for which a license is required for
both SL and AT reasons, will generally be
approved for exports or reexports requiring a
license for SL reasons when the exporter or
reexporter is:

Controls on items classified under ECCNs
5A980, 5D980, and 5E980 are maintained by the
United States government for foreign policy
purposes.

(i) A provider of wire or electronic
communication services or an officer, agent, or
employee of, or person under contract with such
a provider, in the normal course of the business
of providing that wire or electronic
communication service; or
Export Administration Regulations

January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

§742.14
SIGNIFICANT ITEMS: HOT SECTION
TECHNOLOGY FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION OR
OVERHAUL OF COMMERCIAL
AIRCRAFT ENGINES, COMPONENTS,
AND SYSTEMS

Part 742-page 20

(5) The types of assurance against unauthorized
use or diversion that are given in a particular case.
(c) Contract sanctity
Contract sanctity provisions are not available for
license applications reviewed under this §742.14.
(d) [RESERVED]

(a) License requirement
Licenses are required for all destinations, except
Canada, for ECCNs having an “SI” under the
“Reason for Control” paragraph. These items
include hot section technology for the
development, production or overhaul of
commercial aircraft engines controlled under
ECCN 9E003.a.1. through a.12., .f, and related
controls.
(b) Licensing policy
Pursuant to section 6 of the Export
Administration Act of 1979, as amended, foreign
policy controls apply to technology required for
the development, production or overhaul of
commercial aircraft engines controlled by ECCN
9E003.a.1. through a.12, .f, and related controls.
These controls supplement the national security
controls that apply to these items. Applications
for export and reexport to all destinations will be
reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether the export or reexport is consistent with
U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.
The following factors are among those that will
be considered to determine what action will be
taken on license applications:
(1) The country of destination;

§742.15
ENCRYPTION ITEMS
Encryption items can be used to maintain the
secrecy of information, and thereby may be used
by persons abroad to harm U.S. national security,
foreign policy and law enforcement interests.
The United States has a critical interest in
ensuring that important and sensitive information
of the public and private sector is protected.
Consistent with our international obligations as a
member of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the
United States has a responsibility to maintain
control over the export and reexport of encryption
items. As the President indicated in Executive
Order 13026 and in his Memorandum of
November 15, 1996, exports and reexports of
encryption software, like exports and reexports of
encryption hardware, are controlled because of
this functional capacity to encrypt information,
and not because of any informational or
theoretical value that such software may reflect,
contain, or represent, or that its export or reexport
may convey to others abroad. For this reason,
export controls on encryption software are
distinguished from controls on other software
regulated under the EAR.

(2) The ultimate end-user(s);
(a) Licensing requirements and policy
(3) The technology involved;
(4) The specific nature of the end-use(s); and

Export Administration Regulations

(1) Licensing requirements. A license is
required to export or reexport encryption items
(“EI”) classified under ECCN 5A002.a.1, a.2, a.5,
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Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

a.6 and a.9; 5D002.a or c.1 for equipment
controlled for EI reasons in ECCN 5A002; or
5E002 for “technology” for the “development,”
“production,” or “use” of commodities or
“software” controlled for EI reasons in ECCNs
5A002 or 5D002 to all destinations, except
Canada. Refer to part 740 of the EAR, for license
exceptions that apply to certain encryption items,
and to § 772.1 of the EAR for definitions of
encryption items and terms. Most encryption
items may be exported under the provisions of
License Exception ENC set forth in §740.17 of
the EAR. Before submitting a license application,
please review License Exception ENC to
determine whether this license exception is
available for your item or transaction. For
exports and reexports of encryption items that are
not eligible for a license exception, exporters
must submit an application to obtain authorization
under a license or an Encryption Licensing
Arrangement.
(2) Licensing policy. Applications will be
reviewed on a case-by-case basis by BIS, in
conjunction with other agencies, to determine
whether the export or reexport is consistent with
U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.
Encryption Licensing Arrangements (ELAs) may
be authorized for exports and reexports of
unlimited quantities of encryption commodities
and software to national or federal government
bureaucratic agencies for civil use, and to state,
provincial or local governments, in all
destinations, except countries listed in Country
Group E:1 of Supplement No. 1 to part 740.
ELAs are valid for four years and may require
post-export reporting or pre-shipment
notification. Applicants seeking authorization for
Encryption Licensing Arrangements must specify
the sales territory and class of end-user on their
license applications.
Note to paragraph (a): Pursuant to Note 3
to Category 5 Part 2 of the Commerce Control
List in Supplement No. 1 to part 774, once mass
market encryption commodities and software
Export Administration Regulations

Part 742-page 21

have been reviewed by BIS and the ENC
Encryption Request Coordinator (Ft. Meade,
MD) and released from “EI” and “NS” controls
pursuant to §742.15(b) of the EAR, they are
classified under ECCN 5A992 and 5D992
respectively, and are thereafter outside the scope
of this section.
(b) Review requirement for mass market
encryption commodities and software
exceeding 64 bits:
Mass market encryption commodities and
software employing a key length greater than 64
bits for the symmetric algorithm (including such
products previously reviewed by BIS and
exported under ECCN 5A002 or 5D002) are
subject to the EAR and require review by BIS and
the ENC Encryption Request Coordinator (Ft.
Meade, MD), prior to export or reexport.
Encryption commodities and software that are
described in § 740.17(b)(2) of the EAR do not
qualify for mass market treatment. A new
product review is required if a change is made to
the cryptographic functionality (e.g., algorithms)
or other technical characteristics affecting mass
market eligibility (e.g., performance
enhancements to provide network infrastructure
services, or customizations to end-user
specifications) of the originally reviewed product.
However, a new product review is not required
when a change involves:
the subsequent
bundling, patches, upgrades or releases of a
product; name changes; or changes to a
previously reviewed encryption product where the
change is limited to updates of encryption
software components where the product is
otherwise unchanged.
(1) Procedures for requesting review. To
request review of your mass market encryption
products, you must submit to BIS and the ENC
Encryption Request Coordinator the information
described in paragraphs (a) through (e) of
Supplement No. 6 to this part 742, and you must
include specific information describing how your
January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

products qualify for mass market treatment under
the criteria in the Cryptography Note (Note 3) of
Category 5, Part 2 (“Information Security”), of
the Commerce Control List (Supplement No. 1 to
part 774 of the EAR). Review requests must be
submitted on Form BIS-748P (Multipurpose
Application), or its electronic equivalent, as
described in §748.3 of the EAR. See paragraph
(r) of Supplement No. 2 to Part 748 of the EAR
for special instructions about this submission.
Review requests that are not submitted
electronically to BIS should be mailed to the
address indicated in §748.2(c) of the EAR.
Submissions to the ENC Encryption Request
Coordinator should be directed to the mailing
address indicated in §740.17(e)(1)(ii) of the EAR.
BIS will notify you if there are any questions
concerning your request for review (e.g., because
of missing or incompat ible support
documentation).
(2) Action by BIS. Once BIS has completed its
review, you will receive written confirmation
concerning the eligibility of your items for export
or reexport as mass market encryption
commodities or software classified under ECCN
5A992 or 5D992. If, during the course of its
review, BIS determines that your encryption items
do not qualify for mass market treatment under
the EAR, or are otherwise classified under ECCN
5A002, 5B002, 5D002 or 5E002, BIS will notify
you and will review your commodities or
software for eligibility under License Exception
ENC (see §740.17 of the EAR for review and
reporting requirements for encryption items under
License Exception ENC). BIS reserves the right
to suspend your eligibility to export and reexport
under the provisions of this paragraph (b) and to
return review requests, without action, if the
requirements for review have not been met.
Thirty days after BIS registers your review
request, you may export or reexport these mass
market encryption products, without a license, to
government and non-government end-users
located in most destinations outside the countries
listed in Supplement No. 3 to part 740 of the EAR
Export Administration Regulations

Part 742-page 22

(certain destinations and persons may require a
license for anti-terrorism (AT) reasons or for
reasons specified elsewhere in the EAR), unless
otherwise notified by BIS (e.g., because of
missing or incomplete support documentation or
conversion to License Exception ENC review.)
The thirty days does not include any time that
your review request is on hold without action.
(3) Exclusions from review requirements.
The following commodities and software do not
require review prior to export or reexport as mass
market products.
(i)
Short-range wireless encryption
functions. Commodities and software not
otherwise controlled in Category 5, but that are
classified under ECCN 5A992 or 5D992 only
because they incorporate components or software
that provide short-range wireless encryption
functions (e.g., with a nominal operating range
not exceeding 100 meters according to the
manufacturer's specifications). Commodities and
software included in this description include
those designed to comply with the Institute of
Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE)
802.11 wireless LAN standard (35 meters) for
short-range use and those designed to comply
with the IEEE 802.15.1 standard that provide only
the short-range wireless encryption functionality,
and would not be classified under Category 5,
part 1 of the CCL (telecommunications) absent
this encryption functionality. Certain items
excluded from review by this paragraph may also
be excluded from review under paragraph
(b)(3)(ii) of this section (personal area networks)
or paragraph (b)(3)(iii) of this section
(commodities and software that provide “ancillary
cryptography”).
(ii) Wireless “personal area network”
items. Wireless “personal area network” items
that implement only published or commercial
cryptographic standards and where the
cryptographic capability is limited to a nominal
operating range not exceeding 30 meters
January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

Part 742-page 23

according to the manufacturer's specifications.
See Nota Bene of the definition for “personal area
network” in §772.1 of the EAR.
( i i i ) “ A nc i llary c r yp t o gr a p hy ” .
Commodities and software that perform
“ancillary cryptography.” See Nota Bene of
definition of “ancillary cryptography” in §772.1
of the EAR.
(4) Commodities and software that activate or
enable c r yptographic functionality.
Commodities, software, and components that
allow the end-user to activate or enable
cryptographic functionality in encryption
products which would otherwise remain disabled,
are controlled according to the functionality of
the activated encryption product.
(5) Examples of mass market encryption
products. Subject to the requirements of the
Cryptography Note (Note 3) in Category 5, Part 2,
of the Commerce Control List, mass market
encryption products include, but are not limited
to, general purpose operating systems and desktop
applications (e.g., e-mail, browsers, games, word
processing, database, financial applications or
utilities) designed for use with computers
classified as ECCN 4A994 or EAR99, laptops, or
hand-held devices; commodities and software for
client Internet appliances and client wireless LAN
devices; home use networking commodities and
software (e.g., personal firewalls, cable modems
for personal computers, and consumer set top
boxes); and portable or mobile civil
telecommunications commodities and software
(e.g., personal data assistants (PDAs), radios, or
cellular products).
§742.16
[RESERVED]

§742.17
EXPORTS OF FIREARMS TO OAS
MEMBER COUNTRIES
(a) License requirements
BIS maintains a licensing system for the export of
shotguns and related items to all OAS member
countries.
This action is based on the
Organization of American States (OAS) Model
Regulations for the Control of the International
Movement of Firearms, their Parts and
Components and Munitions (OAS Model
Regulations) which were developed to assist OAS
member countries to implement the InterAmerican Convention Against the Illicit
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related
Materials (Firearms Convention)2 . Items subject
to these controls are identified by “FC Column 1"
in the “License Requirements” section of their
Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) on
the Commerce Control List (CCL). If “FC
Column 1" of the Commerce Country Chart
(Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is
indicated for a particular country, a license is
required for export to that destination. Licenses
will generally be issued on an Import Certificate
or equivalent official document, satisfactory to
BIS, issued by the government of the importing
country is also required for the export of such
items to OAS member countries.
(b) Licensing policy
Applications supported by an Import Certificate
or equivalent official document issued by the
government of the importing country for such
items will generally be approved, except there is
a policy of denial for applications to export items

2

Status of Convention as of April 13, 1999 had not
entered into force.
Export Administration Regulations

January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

linked to such activities as drug trafficking,
terrorism, and transnational organized crime.
(c) Contract sanctity

Part 742-page 24

period of two years, your ability to ship items that
require an Import Certificate or equivalent official
document under this section may be affected by
the validity of the Import Certificate or equivalent
official document (see §748.14(f) of the EAR).

Contract sanctity provisions are not available for
license applications under this §742.17.
§742.18
(d) OAS Model Regulations
The OAS Model Regulations on which
regulations are based are designed by OAS
member countries to combat illicit manufacturing
of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition,
explosives, and other related materials in North
and South America because of their links to such
activities as drug trafficking, terrorism, and
transnational organized crime.
(e) OAS member countries to which firearms
controls under this section apply
The OAS member countries include: Antigua and
Barbuda, Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados,
Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, the
United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
(f) Items/Commodities
Items requiring a license under this section are
ECCNs 0A984 (shotguns with a barrel length 18
inches or over and related parts, and buckshot
shotgun shells), 0A986 (shotgun shells, and
related parts) and 0A987 (optical sighting
devices). (See Supplement No. 1 to Part 774 of
the EAR.)
(g) Validity period for licenses
Although licenses generally will be valid for a
Export Administration Regulations

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
(CWC OR CONVENTION)
States that are parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and
on Their Destruction, also known as the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC or Convention),
undertake never to develop, produce, acquire,
stockpile, transfer, or use chemical weapons. As
a State Party to the Convention, the United States
is subjecting certain toxic chemicals and their
precursors listed in Schedules within the
Convention to trade restrictions.
Trade
restrictions include: a prohibition on the export
of Schedule 1 chemicals to States not Party to the
CWC; a prohibition on the reexport of Schedule 1
chemicals to all destinations (both States Parties
to the CWC and States not Party to the CWC);
license requirements for the export of Schedule 1
chemicals to all States Parties; a prohibition on
the export of Schedule 2 chemicals to States not
Party to the CWC; and an End-Use Certificate
requirement for exports of Schedule 3 chemicals
to States not Party to the CWC. Exports of CWC
chemicals that do not require a license for CW
reasons (e.g., exports and reexports of Schedule 2
and Schedule 3 chemicals to States Parties to the
CWC) may require a license for other reasons set
forth in the EAR. (See, in particular, the license
requirements in §742.2 of the EAR that apply to
exports and reexports of precursor chemicals
controlled by ECCN 1C350, for CB reasons.
Also note the end-use and end-user restrictions in
part 744 of the EAR and the restrictions that
apply to embargoed countries in part 746 of the
EAR.)
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Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

(a) License requirements
(1) Schedule 1 chemicals and mixtures
controlled under ECCN 1C351. A license is
required for CW reasons to export or reexport
Schedule 1 chemicals controlled under ECCN
1C351.d.5 or d.6 to all destinations including
Canada. CW applies to 1C351.d.5 for ricin in the
form of Ricinus Communis AgglutininII (RCAII),
which is also known as ricin D or Ricinus
Communis LectinIII (RCLIII), and Ricinus
Communis LectinIV (RCLIV ), which is also known
as ricin E. CW applies to 1C351.d.6 for saxitoxin
identified by C.A.S. #35523-89-8. (Note that the
advance notification procedures and annual
reporting requirements described in §745.1 of the
EAR also apply to exports of Schedule 1
chemicals.)
(2) Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals and
mixtures controlled under ECCN 1C350,
ECCN 1C355, or ECCN 1C395.
(i) States Parties to the CWC. Neither a
license nor an End-Use Certificate is required for
CW reasons to export or reexport Schedule 2 or 3
chemicals and mixtures controlled under ECCN
1C350, ECCN 1C355, or ECCN 1C395 to States
Parties to the CWC (destinations listed in
Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR).

Part 742-page 25

mixtures controlled under ECCN 1C350.c, ECCN
1C355.b, or ECCN 1C395.b to States not Party to
the CWC (destinations not listed in Supplement
No. 2 to Part 745 of the EAR), unless the exporter
obtains from the consignee an End-Use
Certificate (issued by the government of the
importing country) prior to exporting the
Schedule 3 chemicals and submits it to BIS in
accordance with the procedures described in
§745.2 of the EAR. Note, however, that
obtaining an End-Use Certificate does not relieve
the exporter from the responsibility of complying
with other license requirements set forth
elsewhere in the EAR.
(2) Reexports.
(i) Reexports from States Parties
to the CWC. Neither a license nor an End-Use
Certificate is required for CW reasons to reexport
Schedule 3 chemicals and mixtures controlled
under ECCN 1C350.c, ECCN 1C355.b, or ECCN
1C395.b from States Parties to the CWC
(destinations listed in Supplement No. 2 to part
745 of the EAR) to States not Party to the CWC.
However, a license may be required for other
reasons set forth elsewhere in the EAR. In
addition, reexports of Schedule 3 chemicals may
be subject to an End-Use Certificate requirement
by governments of other countries when the
chemicals are destined for States not Party to the
CWC.

(ii) States not Party to the CWC.
(A) Schedule 2 chemicals. A license is
required for CW reasons to export or reexport
Schedule 2 chemicals and mixtures controlled
under ECCN 1C350.b, ECCN 1C355.a, or ECCN
1C395 to States not Party to the CWC
(destinations not listed in Supplement No. 2 to
part 745 of the EAR).
(B) Schedule 3 chemicals.
(1) Exports. A license is required for
CW reasons to export Schedule 3 chemicals and
Export Administration Regulations

(ii) Reexports from States not
Party to the CWC. A license is required for CW
reasons to reexport Schedule 3 chemicals and
mixtures controlled under ECCN 1C350.c, ECCN
1C355.b, or ECCN 1C395.b from a State not
Party to the CWC (a destination not listed in
Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR) to any
other State not Party to the CWC.
(C) Technology controlled under ECCN
1E355. A license is required for CW reasons to
export or reexport technology controlled under
ECCN 1E355 to all States not Party to the CWC
January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

(destinations not listed in Supplement No. 2 to
part 745 of the EAR), except for Israel and
Taiwan.

Part 742-page 26

EAR) generally will be denied, consistent with
U.S. obligations under the CWC to prohibit
exports of these chemicals to States not Party to
the CWC.

(b) Licensing policy
(1) Schedule 1 chemicals and mixtures.
(i) Exports to States Parties to the CWC.
Applications to export Schedule 1 chemicals
controlled under ECCN 1C351.d.5 or .d.6 to
States Parties to the CWC (destinations listed in
Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR)
generally will be denied, unless all of the
following conditions are met:
(A) The chemicals are destined only for
purposes not prohibited under the CWC (i.e.,
research, medical, pharmaceutical, or protective
purposes);
(B) The types and quantities of chemicals
are strictly limited to those that can be justified
for those purposes;
(C) The Schedule 1 chemicals were not
previously imported into the United States (this
does not apply to Schedule 1 chemicals imported
into the United States prior to April 29, 1997, or
imported into the United States directly from the
same State Party to which they now are to be
returned, i.e., exported); and
(D) The aggregate amount of Schedule 1
chemicals in the country of destination at any
given time is equal to or less than one metric ton
and receipt of the proposed export will not cause
the country of destination to acquire or to have
acquired one metric ton or more of Schedule 1
chemicals in any calendar year.
(ii) Exports to States not Party to the CWC.
Applications to export Schedule 1 chemicals
controlled under ECCN 1C351.d.5 or .d.6 to
States not Party to the CWC (destinations not
listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the
Export Administration Regulations

(iii) Reexports. Applications to reexport
Schedule 1 chemicals controlled under ECCN
1C351.d.5 or .d.6 generally will be denied to all
destinations (including both States Parties to the
CWC and States not Party to the CWC).
(2) Schedule 2 chemicals and mixtures.
Applications to export or reexport Schedule 2
chemicals and mixtures controlled under ECCN
1C350.b, ECCN 1C355.a, or ECCN 1C395 to
States not Party to the CWC (destinations not
listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the
EAR) generally will be denied, consistent with
U.S. obligations under the CWC to prohibit
exports of these chemicals to States not Party to
the CWC.
(3) Schedule 3 chemicals and mixtures.
(i) Exports. Applications to export Schedule
3 chemicals and mixtures controlled under ECCN
1C350.c, ECCN 1C355.b, or ECCN 1C395.b to
States not Party to the CWC (destinations not
listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the
EAR) generally will be denied.
(ii) Reexports from States not Party to the
CWC. Applications to reexport Schedule 3
chemicals and mixtures controlled under ECCN
1C350.c, ECCN 1C355.b, or ECCN 1C395.b
from a State not Party to the CWC (a destination
not listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the
EAR) to any other State not Party to the CWC
generally will be denied.
(4) Technology controlled under ECCN 1E355.
Exports and reexports of technology controlled
under ECCN 1E355 will be reviewed on a caseby-case basis.

January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

(c) Contract sanctity
Contract sanctity provisions are not available for
license applications reviewed under this section.

§742.19
ANTI-TERRORISM: NORTH KOREA
(a) License requirements
(1) All items on the Commerce Control List
(CCL) (i.e., with a designation other than EAR99)
that are controlled for anti-terrorism reasons
require a license for export or reexport to North
Korea. This includes all items on the CCL
containing AT column 1 or AT column 2 in the
Country Chart column of the License
requirements section of an ECCN; and ECCNs
0A986, 0A988, 0A999, 0B986, 0B999, 0D999,
1A999, 1B999, 1C995, 1C999, 1D999, 2A994,
2A999, 2B999, 2D994, 2E994, 3A999, and
6A999. See also part 746 of the EAR.
(2) The Secretary of State has designated North
Korea as a country whose Government has
repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism.
(3) In support of U.S. foreign policy on
terrorism-supporting countries, BIS maintains two
types of anti-terrorism controls on the export and
reexport of items described in Supplement 2 to
part 742.
(i) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1)
through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742
are controlled under section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act, as amended (EAA), if
destined to military, police, intelligence or other
sensitive end-users.
(ii) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1)
through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742
destined to non-sensitive end-users, as well as
Export Administration Regulations

Part 742-page 27

items described in paragraph (c)(6) through
(c)(45) to all end-users, are controlled to North
Korea under section 6(a) of the EAA. License
applications for items reviewed under section 6(a)
controls will also be reviewed to determine the
applicability of section 6(j) controls to the
transaction. When it is determined that an export
or reexport could make a significant contribution
to the military potential of North Korea, including
its military logistics capability, or could enhance
North Korea’s ability to support acts of
international terrorism, the Secretaries of State
and Commerce will notify the Congress 30 days
prior to issuance of a license. (See Supplement
No. 2 to part 742 for more information on items
controlled under sections 6(a) and 6(j) of the
EAA and §750.6 of the EAR for procedures for
processing license applications for items
controlled under EAA section 6(j).)
(b) Licensing policy
(1) Applications for export and reexport to all
end-users in North Korea of the following items
will generally be denied:
(i) Items controlled for chemical and
biological weapons proliferation reasons to any
destination. These items contain CB Column 1,
CB Column 2, or CB Column 3 in the Country
Chart column of the “License Requirements”
section of an ECCN on the CCL.
(ii) Items controlled for missile proliferation
reasons to any destination. These items have an
MT Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the
“License Requirements” section of an ECCN on
the CCL.
(iii) Items controlled for nuclear weapons
proliferation reasons to any destination. These
items contain NP Column 1 or NP Column 2 in
the Country Chart column of the “License
Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL.
(iv) Items controlled for national security
January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

Part 742-page 28

reasons to any destination. These items contain
NS Column 1 or NS Column 2 in the Country
Chart column of the “License Requirements”
section of an ECCN on the CCL.
(v) Military-related items controlled for
national security reasons to any destination.
These items contain NS Column 1 in the Country
Chart column of the “License Requirements”
section in an ECCN on the CCL and are
controlled by equipment or material entries
ending in the number “18.”
(vi) All aircraft (powered and unpowered),
helicopters, engines, and related spare parts and
components. Such items contain an NS Column
1, NS Column 2, MT Column 1, or AT Column 1
in the Country Chart column of the “License
Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL.
(Not including parts and components for
safety-of-flight, which will be reviewed on a
case-by-case basis in accordance with paragraph
(b)(2) of this section.)
(vii) Cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and
crypto-logic items controlled any destination.
These are items that contain an NS Column 1, NS
Column 2, AT Column 1 or AT Column 2 in the
Country Chart column of the “License
Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL.
(viii) Submersible systems controlled under
ECCN 8A992.
(ix) Scuba gear and related equipment
controlled under ECCN 8A992.
(x) Pressurized aircraft breathing equipment
controlled under ECCN 9A991.
(xi) Explosives detection
controlled under ECCN 2A983.

equipment

(xii) “Software” (ECCN 2D983) specially
designed or modified for the “development”,
“production” or “use” of explosives detection
Export Administration Regulations

equipment controlled by 2A983.
(xiii) “Technology” (ECCN 2E983) specially
designed or modified for the “development”,
“production” or “use” of explosives detection
equipment controlled by 2A983.
(xiv) Commercial charges and devices
controlled under ECCN 1C992.
(xv) Computer numerically controlled
machine tools controlled under ECCN 2B991.
(xvi) Aircraft skin and spar milling machines
controlled under ECCN 2B991.
(xvii) Semiconductor manufacturing
equipment controlled under ECCN 3B991.
(xviii) Digital computers with an Adjusted
Peak Performance (APP) exceeding 0.0004
Weighted TeraFLOPS (WT).
(xix) Microprocessors with a processing
speed of 0.5 GFLOPS or above.
(xx) Ammonium nitrate, including certain
fertilizers containing ammonium nitrate,
controlled under ECCN 1C997.
(xxi) Technology for the production of
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule
2 and 3 Chemicals controlled under ECCN
1E355.
(2) Applications for export and reexport to North
Korea of all other items described in paragraph
(a) of this section, and not described by paragraph
(b)(1) of this section, will generally be denied if
the export or reexport is destined to a military
end-user or for military end-use. Applications for
non-military end-users or for non-military
end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case
basis. Applications to export or reexport
humanitarian items intended for the benefit of the
North Korean people; items in support of United
January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

Nations humanitarian efforts; and agricultural
commodities and medical devices will generally
be approved.
(3) Applications for export and reexport to North
Korea of items described in paragraphs (c)(12),
(c)(24), (c)(34), (c)(37), (c)(38), and (c)(45) of
Supplement No. 2 to part 742 will generally be
denied if the export or reexport is destined to
nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses.
Applications for non-nuclear end-users or for
non-nuclear end-uses, excluding items described
in (c)(24)(iv)(A) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742,
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

Export Administration Regulations

Part 742-page 29

(4) License applications for items reviewed
under section 6(a) controls will also be reviewed
to determine the applicability of section 6(j)
controls to the transaction. When it is determined
that an export or reexport could make a
significant contribution to the military potential
of North Korea, including its military logistics
capability, or could enhance North Korea’s ability
to support acts of international terrorism, the
Secretaries of State and Commerce will notify the
Congress 30 days prior to issuance of a license.

January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

Supplement No. 1 to Part 742-page 1

NONPROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
NOTE: Exports and reexports of items in
performance of contracts entered into before the
applicable contract sanctity date(s) will be
eligible for review on a case-by-case basis or
other applicable licensing policies that were in
effect prior to the contract sanctity date. The
contract sanctity dates set forth in this
Supplement are for the guidance of exporters.
Contract sanctity dates are established in the
course of the imposition of foreign policy controls
on specific items and are the relevant dates for
the purpose of licensing determinations involving
such items. If you believe that a specific contract
sanctity date is applicable to your transaction,
you should include all relevant information with
your license application.
(1) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran
or Syria of dimethyl methylphosphonate,
phosphorous oxychloride, thiodiglycol,
dimethylamine hydrochloride, dimethylamine,
ethylene chlorohydrin (2-chloroethanol), and
potassium fluoride is April 28, 1986.
(2) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran
or Syria of dimethyl phosphite (dimethyl
hydrogen
phosphite),
methyl
phosphonyldichloride, 3-quinuclidinol,
N,N-diisopropylamino -et han e-2-thiol,
N , N -d i i s o p r o p yl a mi n o e t hyl -2 -c h l o r i d e ,
3-hydroxy-1-methylpiperidine, trimethyl
phosphite, phosphorous trichloride, and thionyl
chloride is July 6, 1987.
(3) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran
or Syria of items in ECCNs 1C351, 1C352,
1C353 and 1C354 is February 22, 1989.
(4) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran
of dimethyl methylphosphonate, phosphorus
oxychloride, and thiodiglycol is February 22,
1989.

Export Administration Regulations

(5) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran
or Syria of potassium hydrogen fluoride,
ammonium hydrogen fluoride, sodium fluoride,
sodium bifluoride, phosphorus pentasulfide,
sodium cyanide, triethanolamine,
diisopropylamine, sodium sulfide, and
N,N-diethylethanolamine is December 12, 1989.
(6) The contract sanctity date for exports to all
destinations (except Iran or Syria) of phosphorus
trichloride, trimethyl phosphite, and thionyl
chloride is December 12, 1989. For exports to
Iran or Syria, paragraph (2) of this Supplement
applies.
(7) The contract sanctity date for exports to all
destinations (except Iran or Syria) of
2-chloroethanol and triethanolamine is January
15, 1991. For exports of 2-chloroethanol to Iran
or Syria, paragraph (1) of this Supplement
applies. For exports of triethanolamine to Iran or
Syria, paragraph (5) of this Supplement applies.
(8) The contract sanctity date for exports to all
destinations (except Iran or Syria) of chemicals
controlled by ECCN 1C350 is March 7, 1991,
except for applications to export the following
c he mic als: 2-chloroethanol, dime t hyl
methylphosphonate, dimethyl phosphite (dimethyl
hydrogen phosphite), phosphorus oxychloride,
phosphorous trichloride, thiodiglycol, thionyl
chloride triethanolamine, and trimethyl phosphite.
(See also paragraphs (6) and (7) of this
Supplement.) For exports to Iran or Syria, see
paragraphs (1) through (6) of this Supplement.
(9) The contract sanctity date for exports and
reexports of the following commodities and technical data is March 7, 1991:
(i) Equipment (for producing chemical
weapon precursors and chemical warfare agents)
described in ECCNs 2B350 and 2B351;
January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

(ii) Equipment and materials (for producing
biological agents) described in ECCNs 1C351,
1C352, 1C353, 1C354, and 2B352; and
(iii) Technology (for the development,
production, and use of equipment described in
ECCNs 1C351, 1C352, 1C353, 1C354, 2B350,
2B351, and 2B352) described in ECCNs 2E001,
2E002, and 2E301.
(10) The contract sanctity date for license
applications subject to §742.2(b)(3) of this part is
March 7, 1991.

Export Administration Regulations

Supplement No. 1 to Part 742-page 2

(11) The contract sanctity date for reexports of
chemicals controlled under ECCN 1C350 is
March 7, 1991, except that the contract sanctity
date for reexports of these chemicals to Iran or
Syria is December 12, 1989.
(12) The contract sanctity date for reexports of
human pathogens, zoonoses, toxins, animal pathogens, genetically modified microorganisms and
plant pathogens controlled by ECCNs 1C351,
1C352, 1C353 and 1C354 is March 7, 1991.

January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

Supplement No. 2 to Part 742-page 1

ANTI-TERRORISM CONTROLS: NORTH KOREA, SYRIA AND SUDAN
CONTRACT SANCTITY DATES AND RELATED POLICIES
NOTE: Exports and reexports of items in
performance of contracts entered into before the
applicable contract sanctity date(s) will be
eligible for review on a case-by-case basis or
other applicable licensing policies that were in
effect prior to the contract sanctity date. The
contract sanctity dates set forth in this
Supplement are for the guidance of exporters.
Contract sanctity dates are established in the
course of the imposition of foreign policy controls
on specific items and are the relevant dates for
the purpose of licensing determinations involving
such items. If you believe that a specific contract
sanctity date is applicable to your transaction,
you should include all relevant information with
your license application. BIS will determine any
applicable contract sanctity date at the time an
application with relevant supporting documents is
submitted.

days before a license for such an item may be
issued.

(a) Terrorist-supporting countries

(3) Items controlled for anti-terrorism reasons
under section 6(a) to North Korea, Sudan and
Syria are:

The Secretary of State has designated Cuba,
North Korea, Sudan and Syria as countries whose
governments have repeatedly provided support
for acts of international terrorism under section
6(j) of the Export Administration Act (EAA).
(b) Items controlled under EAA sections 6(j)
and 6(a)
Whenever the Secretary of State determines that
an export or reexport to any of these countries
could make a significant contribution to the
military potential of such country, including its
military logistics capability, or could enhance the
ability of such country to support acts of
international terrorism, the item is subject to
mandatory control under EAA section 6(j) and the
Secretaries of Commerce and State are required to

notify appropriate Committees of the Congress 30
Export Administration Regulations

(1) On December 28, 1993, the Secretary of State
determined that the export to Cuba, North Korea,
Sudan, or Syria of items described in paragraphs
(c)(1) through (c)(5) of this Supplement, if
destined to military, police, intelligence or other
sensitive end-users, are controlled under EAA
section 6(j). Therefore, the 30-day advance
Congressional notification requirement applies to
the export or reexport of these items to sensitive
end-users in any of these countries.
(2) License applications for items controlled to
designated terrorist-supporting countries under
EAA section 6(a) will also be reviewed to
determine whether the Congressional notification
requirements of EAA section 6(j) apply.

(i) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1)
through (c)(5) to non-sensitive end-users, and
(ii) The following items to all end-users: for
North Korea, items in paragraph (c)(6) through
(c)(45) of this Supplement; for Sudan, items in
paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(14) and (c)(16)
through (c)(44) of this Supplement; and for Syria,
items in paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(8), (c)(10)
through (c)(14), (c)(16) through (c)(19), and
(c)(22) through (c)(44) of this Supplement.
(c) The license requirements and licensing
policies for items controlled for anti-terrorism
reasons to Syria, Sudan, and North Korea are
generally described in §§ 742.9, 742.10, and
742.19 of this part, respectively.
This
Supplement provides guidance on licensing
policies for North Korea, Syria, and Sudan and
January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

Supplement No. 2 to Part 742-page 2

related contract sanctity dates that may be
available for transactions benefitting from
pre-existing contracts involving Syria, and
Sudan. Exporters are advised that the Treasury
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
administers a comprehensive trade and
investment embargo against (See Executive
Orders 12957, 12959 and 13059 of March 15,
1995, May 6, 1995 and August 19, 1997,
respectively.)

Applications for all end-users in North Korea,
Syria, or Sudan of these items will generally be
denied. See Supplement No. 1 to part 742 for
contract sanctity dates for Syria. Contract
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless
a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items
first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy
reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract
sanctity date of December 28, 1993), or unless an
earlier date for any item is listed in Supplement 1
to part 742.

(1) All items subject to national security
controls.

(3) All items subject to missile proliferation
controls (MTCR). Applications for all end-users
in North Korea, Syria, or Sudan will generally be
denied. Contract sanctity provisions for Syria are
not available. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)
have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
1993).

(i) [RESERVED].
(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users
or military end-uses in Syria will generally be
denied. Applications for non-military end-users
or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case
basis, unless otherwise specified in paragraphs
(c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement. No
contract sanctity date is available for items valued
at $7 million or more to military end-users or enduses. The contract sanctity date for all other
items for all end-users: December 16, 1986.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or military end-uses in Sudan will generally
be denied. Applications for non-military endusers or end-uses will be considered on a case-bycase basis unless otherwise specified in
paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this
Supplement. Contract sanctity date: January 19,
1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies
(e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign
policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a
contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
(iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will
generally be denied.
(2)
All items subject to chemical and
biological weapons proliferation controls.
Export Administration Regulations

(4) All items subject to nuclear weapons
proliferation controls (NRL).
(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users
or end-uses to Syria will generally be denied.
Applications for non-military end-users or enduses will be considered on a case-by-case basis
unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2)
through (c)(42) of this Supplement. No contract
sanctity date is available.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or end-uses in Sudan will generally be
denied. Applications for export and reexport to
non-military end-users or end-uses will be
considered on a case-by-case basis unless
otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through
(c)(42) of this Supplement. No contract sanctity
date is available.
(iv) North Korea. Applications for all endJanuary 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

Supplement No. 2 to Part 742-page 3

users in North Korea will generally be denied.

December 16, 1986.

(5) All military-related items, i.e., applications
for export and reexport of items controlled by
CCL entries ending with the number “18".

(D) Contract sanctity date for helicopter
or aircraft parts and components controlled by
ECCN 9A991.d: August 28, 1991.

(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for all end-users in
Syria will generally be denied. Contract sanctity
date: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in
Sudan will generally be denied. Contract sanctity
date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior
contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first
controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons
under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity
date of December 28, 1993).
(iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea will generally be denied.
(6) All aircraft (powered and unpowered),
helicopters, engines, and related spare parts
and components.
(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for all end-users in
Syria will generally be denied.
(A) There is no contract sanctity for
helicopters exceeding 10,000 lbs. empty weight or
fixed wing aircraft valued at $3 million or more;
except that passenger aircraft, regardless of value,
have a contract sanctity date of December 16,
1986, if destined for a regularly scheduled airline
with assurance against military use.
(B) Contract sanctity date for helicopters
with 10,000 lbs. empty weight or less: April 28,
1986.
(C) Contract sanctity date for other
aircraft and gas turbine engines therefor:
Export Administration Regulations

(iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in
Sudan will generally be denied. Contract sanctity
date: January 19, 1996.
(iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea will generally be denied.
(7) Heavy duty, on-highway tractors.
(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users
or for military end-uses in Syria will generally be
denied. Applications for non-military end-users
or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be
considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract
sanctity date: August 28, 1991.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military
end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.
(iv) North Korea. Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea
will generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military end-uses in
North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case
basis.
(8) Off-highway wheel tractors of carriage
capacity 9t (10 tons) or more.
(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria will
generally be denied. Applications for nonJanuary 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

Supplement No. 2 to Part 742-page 4

military end-users or for non-military end-uses in
Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Contract sanctity date: August 28, 1991.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan will
generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military end-uses in
Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.
(iv) North Korea. Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea
will generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military end-uses in
North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case
basis.
(9) Large diesel engines (greater than 400
horsepower) and parts to power tank
transporters.

(ii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan will
generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military end-uses in
Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.
(iii) North Korea. Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea
will generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military end-uses in
North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case
basis.

Syria.

A license is required for all

Export Administration Regulations

(iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of any such equipment will
generally be denied.

(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such
equipment will generally be denied. Applications
for non-military end-users or for non-military
end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-bycase basis.
(A) Contract sanctity date for exports of
navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment
that was subject to national security controls on
August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this
Supplement.

and

(i) [RESERVED]

(ii)

(iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in
Sudan of any such equipment will generally be
denied. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)
have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
1993).

(11) Navigation, direction finding, and radar
equipment.

(i) [RESERVED]

(10) Cryptographic, cryptoanalytic,
cryptologic equipment.

national security-controlled cryptographic,
cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment to all
end-users. Applications for all end-users in Syria
will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date
for cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic
equipment that was subject to national security
controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph
(c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other
navigation, direction finding, and radar
equipment: August 28, 1991.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such
January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

equipment will generally be denied. Applications
for non-military end-users or for non-military
end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will be
considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless
a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items
first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy
reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
(iv) North Korea. Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea
of such equipment will generally be denied.
Applications for non-military end-users or for
non-military end-uses in North Korea will be
considered on a case-by-case basis.
(12) Electronic test equipment.
(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users
or for military end-uses in Syria of such
equipment will generally be denied. Applications
for non-military end-users or for non-military
end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-bycase basis.
(A) Contract sanctity date for electronic
test equipment that was subject to national
security controls on August 28, 1991: see
paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
(B) Contract sanctity date for all other
electronic test equipment: August 28, 1991.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such
equipment will generally be denied. Applications
for non-military end-users or for non-military
end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)
have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
Export Administration Regulations

Supplement No. 2 to Part 742-page 5

1993).
(iv) North Korea. Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear
end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of
such equipment will generally be denied.
Applications for non-military end-users or for
non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear endusers or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
(13) Mobile communications equipment.
(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such
equipment will generally be denied. Applications
for non-military end-users or for non-military
end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-bycase basis.
(A) Contract sanctity date for mobile
communications equipment that was subject to
national security controls on August 28, 1991:
see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of
all other mobile communications equipment:
August 28, 1991.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such
equipment will generally be denied. Applications
for non-military end-users or for non-military
end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will be
considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract
sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless
a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items
first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy
reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract
sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
(iv) North Korea. Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea
of such equipment will generally be denied.
January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

Applications for non-military end-users or for
non-military end-uses in North Korea will be
considered on a case-by-case basis.
(14) Acoustic underwater detection equipment.

Supplement No. 2 to Part 742-page 6

end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea
of such equipment will generally be denied.
Applications for non-military end-users or for
non-military end-uses in North Korea of such
equipment will be considered on a case-by-case
basis.

(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. A license is required for acoustic
underwater detection equipment that was subject
to national security controls on August 28, 1991,
to all end-users. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria will
generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military end-uses in
Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Contract sanctity date for acoustic underwater
detection equipment that was subject to national
security controls on August 28, 1991: see
paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses to Sudan of such
equipment will generally be denied. Applications
for non-military end-users or for non-military
end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)
have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
1993).
(iv) North Korea. Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea
of such equipment of these items will generally
be denied. Applications for non-military endusers or for non-military end-uses in North Korea
of such equipment will be considered on a caseby-case basis.
(15) Portable electric power generator.

(16) Vessels and boats, including inflatable
boats.
(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. A license is required for national
security-controlled vessels and boats.
Applications for military end-users or for military
end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be
denied. Applications for non-military end-users
or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be
considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract
sanctity date for vessels and boats that were subject to national security controls on August 28,
1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these
items will generally be denied. Applications for
non-military end-users or for non-military enduses in Sudan will be considered on a case-bycase basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
for foreign policy under EAA section 6(j) have a
contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
(iv) North Korea. Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea
of these items will generally be denied.
Applications for non-military end-users or for
non-military end-uses in North Korea of these
items will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
(17) Marine and submarine engines (outboard/inboard, regardless of horsepower).

(i) [RESERVED]
(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) North Korea. Applications for military
Export Administration Regulations

January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

(ii) Syria. A license is required for all
marine and submarine engines subject to national
security controls to all end-users. Applications
for military end-users or for military end-uses in
Syria of these items will generally be denied.
Applications for non-military end-users or for
non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered
on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date
for marine and submarine engines that were
subject to national security controls on August 28,
1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these
items will generally be denied. Applications for
non-military end-users or for non-military enduses in Sudan will be considered on a case-bycase basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)
have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
1993).
(iv) North Korea. Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea
of these items will generally be denied.
Applications for non-military end-users or for
non-military end-uses in North Korea of these
items will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
(18) Underwater photographic equipment.
(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such
equipment will generally be denied. Applications
for non-military end-users or for non-military
end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-bycase basis.
(A) Contract sanctity date for underwater
photographic equipment that was subject to
national security controls on August 28, 1991:
see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
Export Administration Regulations

Supplement No. 2 to Part 742-page 7

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other
underwater photographic equipment: August 28,
1991.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such
equipment will generally be denied. Applications
for non-military end-users or for non-military
end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)
have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
1993).
(iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will
generally be denied.
(19) Submersible systems.
(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users
or for military end-uses in Syria of such systems
will generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military end-uses in
Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
(A)
Contract sanctity date for
submersible systems that were subject to national
security controls on August 28, 1991: see
paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
(B) Contract sanctity date for all other
submersible systems: August 28, 1991.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such
systems will generally be denied. Applications
for non-military end-users or for non-military
end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies(e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

Supplement No. 2 to Part 742-page 8

for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)
have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
1993).
(iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will
generally be denied.
(20) Scuba gear and related equipment.
(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers and end-uses in Sudan of these items will
generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military end-uses in
Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.
(iii) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will
generally be denied.
(21) Pressurized
equipment.

aircraft

breathing

(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these
items will generally be denied. Applications for
non-military end-users or for non-military enduses in Sudan will be considered on a case-bycase basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19,
1996.
(iii) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will
generally be denied.
(22)
Computer
machine tools.

numerically

or for military end-uses in Syria of these items
will generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military end-uses
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
(A) Contract sanctity date for computer
numerically controlled machine tools that were
subject to national security controls on August 28,
1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of
all other computer numerically controlled
machine tools: August 28, 1991.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these
items will generally be denied. Applications for
non-military end-users or for non-military enduses in Sudan will be considered on a case-bycase basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)
have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
1993).
(iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will
generally be denied.
(23) Vibration test equipment.
(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such
equipment will generally be denied. Applications
for non-military end-users or for non-military
end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case
basis.

controlled

(i) [RESERVED]

(A) Contract sanctity date for vibration
test equipment that was subject to national
security controls on August 28, 1991: see
paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users
Export Administration Regulations

January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of
all other vibration test equipment: August 28,
1991.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such
equipment will generally be denied. Applications
for non-military end-users or for non-military
end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)
have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
1993).
(iv) North Korea. Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea
of these items will generally be denied.
Applications for non-military end-users or for
non-military end-uses will be considered on a
case-by-case basis.
(24) Digital computers with an APP of .00001
WT or above, assemblies, related equipment,
equipment for development or production of
magnetic and optical storage equipment, and
materials for fabrication of head/disk
assemblies.
(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users
or for military end-uses in Syria of these items
will generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military end-uses
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
(A) Contract sanctity dates for items that
were subject to national security controls on
August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this
Supplement.
(B) Contract sanctity date for all other
items: August 28, 1991.

Supplement No. 2 to Part 742-page 9

(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these
items will generally be denied. Applications for
non-military end-users or for non-military enduses in Sudan will be considered on a case-bycase basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)
have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
1993).
(iv) North Korea.
(A) Computers with an APP exceeding
0.0004 WT: Applications for all end-users will
generally be denied.
(B) Computers with an APP equal to or
less than 0.0004 WT: Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear
end-users or nuclear end-uses, will generally be
denied. Applications for non-military end-users
or for non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear
end-users or non- nuclear end-uses, will be
considered on a case-by-case basis.
(25) Telecommunications equipment.
(i) A license is required for the following
telecommunications equipment:
(A) Radio relay systems or equipment
operating at a frequency equal to or greater than
19.7 GHz or “spectral efficiency” greater than 3
bit/s/Hz;
(B) Fiber optic systems or equipment
operating at a wavelength greater than 1000 nm;
(C) “Telecommunications transmission
systems” or equipment with a “digital transfer
rate” at the highest multiplex level exceeding 45
Mb/s.
(ii) [RESERVED]

Export Administration Regulations

January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

(iii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such
equipment will generally be denied. Applications
for non-military end-users or for non-military
end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case
basis.
(A) Contract sanctity date for exports of
telecommunications equipment that was subject
to national security controls on August 28, 1991:
see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of
all other telecommunications equipment: August
28, 1991.
(iv) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such
equipment will generally be denied. Applications
for non-military end-users or for non-military
end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)
have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
1993).

Supplement No. 2 to Part 742-page 10

(1) Contract sanctity date for
microprocessors that were subject to national
security controls on August 28, 1991: see
paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
(2) Contract sanctity date for all
other microprocessors: August 28, 1991.
(C) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these
items will generally be denied. Applications for
non-military end-users or for non-military enduses in Sudan will be considered on a case-bycase basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)
have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
1993).
(ii) With a processing speed of 0.5 GFLOPS
or above.
(A) North Korea. Applications for all
end-users in North Korea of these items will
generally be denied.
(B) [RESERVED]

(v) North Korea. Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea
of such equipment will generally be denied.
Applications for non-military end-users or for
non-military end-uses will be considered on a
case-by-case basis.
(26) Microprocessors.
(i) Operating at a clock speed over 25 MHz.
(A) [RESERVED]
(B) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of these
items will generally be denied. Applications for
non-military end-users or for non-military enduses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Export Administration Regulations

(27) Semiconductor manufacturing equipment.
For Syria, Sudan, or North Korea, a license is
required for all such equipment described in
ECCNs 3B001 and 3B991.
(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such
equipment will generally be denied. Applications
for non-military end-users or for non-military
end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case
basis.
(A)
Contract sanctity date for
semiconductor manufacturing equipment that was
subject to national security controls on August 28,
January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
(B) Contract sanctity date for all other
semiconductor manufacturing equipment: August
28, 1991.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such
equipment will generally be denied. Applications
for non-military end-users or for non-military
end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)
have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
1993).
(iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will
generally be denied.
(28) Software specially designed for the
computer-aided design and manufacture of
integrated circuits.
(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such
software will generally be denied. Applications
for non-military end-users or for non-military
end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case
basis.
(A) Contract sanctity date for such
software that was subject to national security
controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph
(c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
(B) Contract sanctity date for all other
such software: August 28, 1991.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such
software will generally be denied. Applications
Export Administration Regulations

Supplement No. 2 to Part 742-page 11

for non-military end-users or for non-military
end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)
have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
1993).
(iv) North Korea. Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea
of such software will generally be denied.
Applications for non-military end-users or for
non-military end-uses will be considered on a
case-by-case basis.
(29) Packet switches. Equipment described in
ECCN 5A991.c.
(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users
or for military end-uses in Syria of such
equipment will generally be denied. Applications
for non-military end-users or for non-military
end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case
basis.
(A) Contract sanctity date for packet
switches that were subject to national security
controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph
(c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
(B) Contract sanctity date for all other
packet switches: August 28, 1991.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such
equipment will generally be denied. Applications
for non-military end-users or for non-military
end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)
have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

1993).
(iv) North Korea. Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea
of these items will generally be denied.
Applications for non-military end-users or for
non-military end-uses will be considered on a
case-by-case basis.

Supplement No. 2 to Part 742-page 12

Applications for non-military end-users or for
non-military end-uses will be considered on a
case-by-case basis.
(31) Gravity meters having static accuracy of
less (better) than 100 microgal, or gravity
meters of the quartz element (worden) type.
(i) [RESERVED]

(30) Specially designed software for air traffic
control applications that uses any digital signal
processing techniques for automatic target
tracking or that has a facility for electronic
tracking.

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users
or for military end-uses in Syria of these items
will generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military end-uses
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users
or for military end-uses in Syria of such software
will generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military end-uses
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
(A) Contract sanctity date for such
software that was subject to national security
controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph
(c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of
all other such software: August 28, 1991.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such
software will generally be denied. Applications
for non-military end-users or for non-military
end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)
have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
1993).
(iv) North Korea. Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea
of such software will generally be denied.
Export Administration Regulations

(A) Contract sanctity date for gravity
meters that were subject to national security
controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph
(c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of
all other such gravity meters: August 28, 1991.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these
items will generally be denied. Applications for
non-military end-users or for non-military enduses in Sudan will be considered on a case-bycase basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)
have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
1993).
(iv) North Korea. Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea
of these items will generally be denied.
Applications for non-military end-users or for
non-military end-uses will be considered on a
case-by-case basis.
(32) Magnetometers with a sensitivity lower
(better) than 1.0 nt rms per square root Hertz.

January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users
or for military end-uses in Syria of these items
will generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military end-uses
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
(A) Contract sanctity date for such
magnetometers that were subject to national
security controls on August 28, 1991: see
paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
(B) Contract sanctity date for all other
such magnetometers: August 28, 1991.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these
items will generally be denied. Applications for
non-military end-users or for non-military enduses in Sudan will be considered on a case-bycase basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)
have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
1993).
(iv) North Korea. Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea
of these items will generally be denied.
Applications for non-military end-users or for
non-military end-uses will be considered on a
case-by-case basis.
(33) Fluorocarbon compounds described in
ECCN 1C006.d for cooling fluids for radar.
(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such
compounds will generally be denied.
Applications for non-military end-users or for
non-military end-uses will be considered on a
case-by-case basis.
Export Administration Regulations

Supplement No. 2 to Part 742-page 13

(A) Contract sanctity date for such
fluorocarbon compounds that were subject to
national security controls on August 28, 1991:
see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
(B) Contract sanctity date for all other
such fluorocarbon compounds: August 28, 1991.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such
compounds will generally be denied.
Applications for non-military end-users or for
non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered
on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date
for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior
contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first
controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons
under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity
date of December 28, 1993).
(iv) North Korea. Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea
of these items will generally be denied.
Applications for non-military end-users or for
non-military end-uses will be considered on a
case-by-case basis.
(34) High strength organic and inorganic
fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210.
(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users
or for military end-uses in Syria of such fibers
will generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military end-uses
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
(A) Contract sanctity date for high
strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar)
described in ECCN 1C210 that were subject to
national security controls on August 28, 1991:
see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
(B) Contract sanctity date for all other
high strength organic and inorganic fibers
January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

(kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210: August 28,
1991.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such
fibers will generally be denied. Applications for
non-military end-users or for non-military enduses in Sudan will be considered on a case-bycase basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)
have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
1993).
(iv) North Korea. Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear
end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of
such equipment will generally be denied.
Applications for non-military end-users or for
non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear endusers or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
(35) Machines described in ECCNs 2B003 and
2B993 for cutting gears up to 1.25 meters in
diameter.
(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of these
items will generally be denied. Applications for
non-military end-users or for non-military enduses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
(A) Contract sanctity date for machines
that were subject to national security controls on
August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this
Supplement.
(B) Contract sanctity date for all other
machines: August 28, 1991.

(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endExport Administration Regulations

Supplement No. 2 to Part 742-page 14

users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these
items will generally be denied. Applications for
non-military end-users or for non-military enduses in Sudan will be considered on a case-bycase basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)
have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
1993).
(iv) North Korea. Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea
of these items will generally be denied.
Applications for non-military end-users or for
non-military end-uses will be considered on a
case-by-case basis.
(36) Aircraft skin and spar milling machines.
(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users
or for military end-uses in Syria of these items
will generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military end-uses
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
(A) Contract sanctity date for aircraft
skin and spar milling machines that were subject
to national security controls on August 28, 1991:
see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
(B) Contract sanctity date for all other
aircraft skin and spar milling machines: August
28, 1991.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these
items will generally be denied. Applications for
non-military end-users or for non-military enduses in Sudan will be considered on a case-bycase basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)
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Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

Supplement No. 2 to Part 742-page 15

have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
1993).

users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will
generally be denied.

(38) Robots capable of employing feedback
information in real time processing to generate
or modify programs.

(37) Manual dimensional inspection machines
described in ECCN 2B996.
(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users
or for military end-uses in Syria of these items
will generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military end-uses in
Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
(A) Contract sanctity date for such
manual dimensional inspection machines that
were subject to national security controls on
August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this
Supplement.
(B) Contract sanctity date for all other
such manual dimensional inspection machines:
August 28, 1991.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these
items will generally be denied. Applications for
non-military end-users or for non-military enduses in Sudan will be considered on a case-bycase basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)
have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
1993).
(iv) North Korea. Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear
end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of
such equipment will generally be denied.
Applications for non-military end-users or for
non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear endExport Administration Regulations

(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of these
items will generally be denied. Applications for
non-military end-users or for non-military enduses in Syria will be considered on a case-by case
basis.
(A) Contract sanctity date for such robots
that were subject to national security controls on
August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this
Supplement.
(B) Contract sanctity date for all other
such robots: August 28, 1991.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these
items will generally be denied. Applications for
non-military end-users or for non-military enduses in Sudan will be considered on a case-bycase basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan:
January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity
date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan
for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j)
have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
1993).
(iv) North Korea. Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear
end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of
such equipment will generally be denied.
Applications for non-military end-users or for
non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear endusers or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

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Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

(39) Explosives detection equipment described
in ECCN 2A983.
(i) Explosives detection equipment described
in ECCN 2A983, controlled prior to April 3, 2003
under ECCN 2A993.
(A) [RESERVED]
(B) Syria. Applications for all end-users
in Syria of these items will generally be denied.
Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.
(C) Sudan. Applications for all endusers in Sudan of these items will generally be
denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.
(D) North Korea. Applications for all
end-users in North Korea of these items will
generally be denied.
(ii) Explosives detection equipment described
in ECCN 2A983, not controlled prior to April 3,
2003 under ECCN 2A993.
(A) [RESERVED]
(B) Syria. Applications for all end-users
in Syria of these items will generally be denied.
Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.
(C) Sudan. Applications for all endusers in Sudan of these items will generally be
denied. Contract sanctity date for reexports by
non-U.S. persons: March 21, 2003.
(D) North Korea. Applications for all
end-users in North Korea of these items will
generally be denied. Contract sanctity date:
March 21, 2003.

Supplement No. 2 to Part 742-page 16

(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for all end-users in
Syria of these items will generally be denied.
Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in
Sudan of these items will generally be denied.
Contract sanctity date for reexports by non-U.S.
persons: March 21, 2003.
(iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of these items will generally
be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21,
2003.
(41) “Technology” described in ECCN 2E983
specially designed or modified for the
“development”, “production” or “use” of
explosives detection equipment.
(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for all end-users in
Syria of these items will generally be denied.
Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in
Sudan of these items will generally be denied.
Contract sanctity date for reexports by non-U.S.
persons: March 21, 2003.
(iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of these items will generally
be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21,
2003.
(42) Production technology controlled under
ECCN 1C355 on the CCL.
(i) [RESERVED]

(40) “Software” described in ECCN 2D983
specially designed or modified for the
“development”, “production” or “use” of
explosives detection equipment.

Export Administration Regulations

(ii) Syria. Applications for military end-users
or for military end-uses in Syria of these items
will generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military end-uses in
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Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in
Sudan of these items will generally be denied.

Supplement No. 2 to Part 742-page 17

(44) Ammonium nitrate, including certain
fertilizers containing ammonium nitrate,
under ECCN 1C997 on the CCL.
(i) [RESERVED]

(iv) North Korea. Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea
of these items will generally be denied.
Applications for non-military end-users or for
non-military end-uses will be considered on a
case-by-case basis.
(43) Commercial Charges and devices
controlled under ECCN 1C992 on the CCL.
(i) [RESERVED]
(ii) Syria. Applications for all end-users in
Syria of these items will generally be denied.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in
Sudan of these items will generally be denied.
(iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of these items will generally
be denied.

(ii) Syria. Applications for all end-users in
Syria of these items will generally be denied.
Contract sanctity date: June 15, 2001.
(iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in
Sudan of these items will generally be denied.
(iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of these items will generally
be denied. Contract sanctity date: June 15, 2001.
(45) Specific processing equipment, materials
and software controlled under ECCNs 0A999,
0B999, 0D999, 1A999, 1C999, 1D999, 2A999,
2B999, 3A999, and 6A999 on the CCL.
(i) North Korea. Applications for military
end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear
end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of
such equipment will generally be denied.
Applications for non-military end-users or for
non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear endusers or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea
will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
(ii) [RESERVED]

Export Administration Regulations

January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

Supplement No. 3 to Part 742-page 1

[RESERVED]

Export Administration Regulations

January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

Supplement No. 4 to Part 742-page 1

RESERVED

Export Administration Regulations

January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

Supplement No. 5 to Part 742--page 1

CHECKLIST ON ENCRYPTION AND OTHER “INFORMATION SECURITY” FUNCTIONS
1.

Does your product perform “cryptography”, or otherwise contain any parts or components that are
capable of performing any of the following “information security” functions?

(Mark with an “X” all that apply)
a. _____

encryption

b. _____ decryption only (no encryption)
c. _____

key management / public key infrastructure (PKI)

d. _____ authentication (e.g., password protection, digital signatures)
e. _____

copy protection

f. _____

anti-virus protection

g. _____ other (please explain) : ________________________________________
h. _____ NONE / NOT APPLICABLE
2. For items with encryption, decryption and/or key management functions (1.a, 1.b, 1.c above):
a. What symmetric algorithms and key lengths (e.g., 56-bit DES, 112 / 168-bit Triple-DES, 128 / 256-bit
AES / Rijndael) are implemented or supported?
b. What asymmetric algorithms and key lengths (e.g., 512-bit RSA / Diffie-Hellman, 1024 / 2048-bit RSA
/ Diffie-Hellman) are implemented or supported?
c. What encryption protocols (e.g., SSL, SSH, IPSEC or PKCS standards) are implemented or supported?
d. What type of data is encrypted?
3.

For products that contain an “encryption component”, can this encryption component be easily used
by another product, or else accessed by the end-user for cryptographic use?

Export Administration Regulations

January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

Supplement No. 6 to part 742--page 1

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMITTING REVIEW REQUESTS FOR ENCRYPTION ITEMS
Review requests for encryption items must be
submitted on Form BIS-748P (Multipurpose
Application), or its electronic equivalent, and
supported by the documentation described in this
Supplement, in accordance with the procedures
described in §748.3 of the EAR. To ensure that
your review request is properly routed, insert the
phrase “Mass market encryption” or “License
Exception ENC” (whichever is applicable) in
Block 9 (Special Purpose) of the application form
and place an “X” in the box marked
“Classification Request” in Block 5 (Type of
Application) - Block 5 does not provide a
separate item to check for the submission of
encryption review requests. Failure to properly
complete these items may delay consideration of
your review request. BIS recommends that review
requests be delivered via courier service be sent
to:

certification of these documents is needed.

Bureau of Industry and Security
U.S. Department of Commerce
14th Street and Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Room 2705
Washington, D.C. 20230

(3) Describe how encryption is used in the
product and the categories of encrypted data (e.g.,
stored data, communications, management data,
internal data, etc.).

For electronic submissions via SNAP-R, support
documents not readily attached in PDF format
must be sent to:
Bureau of Industry and Security
Information Technology Controls Division
Room 2093
14th Street and Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20230.
In addition, you must send a copy of your review
request and all support documents to:
Attn: ENC Encryption Request Coordinator
9800 Savage Road, Suite 6940
Fort Meade, MD 20755-6000.
If you intend to rely on the 30 day registration
provisions of the regulations, express mail
Export Administration Regulations

(a)(1) State the name(s) of each product being
submitted for review and provide a brief
non-technical description of the type of product
(e.g., routers, disk drives, cell phones, chips, etc.)
being submitted.
(2) Indicate whether there have been any prior
reviews of the product(s), if such reviews are
applicable to the current submission. For
products with minor changes in encryption
functionality, you must include a cover sheet with
complete reference to the previous review
(Commodity Classification Automated Tracking
System (CCATS) number, Application Control
Number (ACN), Export Control Classification
Number (ECCN), authorization paragraph) along
with a clear description of the changes.

(4) For mass market review requests, describe
specifically to whom and how the product is
being marketed and state how this method of
marketing and other relevant information (e.g.,
cost of product and volume of sales) are described
by the Cryptography Note (Note 3 to Category 5,
Part 2).
(5) Is any “encryption source code” being
provided (shipped or bundled) as part of this
offering? If yes, is this source code publicly
available source code, unchanged from the code
obtained from an open source web site, or is it
proprietary “encryption source code?”
(b) State that a duplicate copy has been sent to the
ENC Encryption Request Coordinator.
(c) For review requests for a commodity or
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Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

software, provide the following information:
(1) Description of all the symmetric and
asymmetric encryption algorithms and key
lengths and how the algorithms are used,
including relevant parameters, inputs and settings.
Specify which encryption modes are supported
(e.g., cipher feedback mode or cipher block
chaining mode).
(2) State the key management algorithms,
including modulus sizes, that are supported.
(3) For products with proprietary algorithms,
include a textual description and the source code
of the algorithm.
(4) Describe the pre-processing methods (e.g.,
data compression or data interleaving) that are
applied to the plaintext data prior to encryption.
(5) Describe the post-processing methods (e.g.,
packetization, encapsulation) that are applied to
the cipher text data after encryption.
(6)State all communication protocols (e.g.,
X.25, Telnet, TCP, IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.16,
SIP ...) and cryptographic protocols and methods
(e.g., SSL, TLS, SSH, IPSEC, IKE, SRTP,
ECCN, MD5, SHA, X.509, PKCS standards...)
that are supported and describe how they are
used.
(7) Describe the encryption-related
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) that
are implemented and/or supported. Explain
which interfaces are for internal (private) and/or
external (public) use.
(8) Describe the cryptographic functionality
that is provided by third-party hardware or
software encryption components (if any).
Identify the manufacturers of the hardware or
software components, including specific part
numbers and version information as needed to
describe the product. Describe whether the
Export Administration Regulations

Supplement No. 6 to part 742--page 2

encryption software components (if any) are
statically or dynamically linked.
(9) For commodities or software using Java
byte code, describe the techniques (including
obfuscation, private access modifiers or final
classes) that are used to protect against
decompilation and misuse.
(10) State how the product is written to
preclude user modification of the encryption
algorithms, key management and key space.
(11) License Exception ENC 'Restricted'
commodities and software described by the
criteria in §740.17(b)(2) require licenses to
certain “government end-users.” Describe
whether the product(s) meet any of the
§740.17(b)(2) criteria. Provide specific data for
each of the parameters listed, as applicable (e.g.,
maximum aggregate encrypted user data
throughput, maximum number of concurrent
encrypted channels, and operating range for
wireless products). If the §740.17(b)(2)
parameters are not applicable to the commodity or
software, clearly explain why, (e.g., by providing
specific data evaluated against the §740.17(b)(2)
thresholds.)
(12) For products which incorporate an open
cryptographic interface as defined in part 772 of
the EAR, describe the Open Cryptographic
Interface.
(d) For review requests for hardware or software
“encryption components” other than source code
(i.e., chips, toolkits, executable or linkable
modules intended for use in or production of
another encryption item) provide the following
additional information:
(1) Reference the application for which the
components are used in, if known;
(2) State if there is a general programming
interface to the component;
January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

(3) State whether the component is constrained
by function; and
(4) Identify the encryption component and
include the name of the manufacturer, component
model number or other identifier.
(e) For review requests for “encryption source
code” provide the following information:
(1) If applicable, reference the executable
(object code) product that was previously
reviewed;

Export Administration Regulations

Supplement No. 6 to part 742--page 3

(2) Include whether the source code has been
modified, and the technical details on how the
source code was modified; and
(3) Include a copy of the sections of the source
code that contain the encryption algorithm, key
management routines and their related calls.
(f) For step-by-step instructions and guidance on
submitting review requests for encryption items,
visit our webpage at www.bis.doc.gov/Encryption
and click on the navigation button labeled
“Guidance”.

January 15, 2009

Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

Supplement No. 7 to Part 742–page 1

DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS
(1) Battle Tanks:
Tracked or wheeled
self-propelled armored fighting vehicles with high
cross-country mobility and a high-level of self
protection, weighing at least 16.5 metric tons
unladen weight, with a high muzzle velocity
direct fire main gun of at least 75 millimeters
caliber.
(2) Armored Combat Vehicles: Tracked,
semi-tracked, or wheeled self-propelled vehicles,
with armored protection and cross-country
capability, either designed and equipped to
transport a squad of four or more infantrymen, or
armed with an integral or organic weapon of a
least 12.5 millimeters caliber or a missile
launcher.
(3) Large-Caliber Artillery Systems: Guns,
howitzers, artillery pieces combining the
characteristics of a gun or a howitzer, mortars or
multiple-launch rocket systems, capable of
engaging surface targets by delivering primarily
indirect fire, with a caliber of 75 millimeters and
above.
(4) Combat Aircraft: Fixed-wing or
variable-geometry wing aircraft designed,
equipped, or modified to engage targets by
employing guided missiles, unguided rockets,
bombs, guns, cannons, or other weapons of
destruction, including versions of these aircraft
which perform specialized electronic warfare,
suppression of air defense or reconnaissance
missions. The term “combat aircraft” does not
include primary trainer aircraft, unless designed,
equipped, or modified as described above.
(5) Attack Helicopters: Rotary-wing aircraft
designed, equipped or modified to engage targets
by employing guided or unguided anti-armor,
air-to-surface, air-to-subsurface, or air-to-air
weapons and equipped with an integrated fire
control and aiming system for these weapons,
including versions of these aircraft that perform
Export Administration Regulations

specialized reconnaissance or electronic warfare
missions.
(6) Warships: Vessels or submarines armed and
equipped for military use with a standard
displacement of 750 metric tons or above, and
those with a standard displacement of less than
750 metric tons that are equipped for launching
missiles with a range of at least 25 kilometers or
torpedoes with a similar range.
(7) Missiles and Missile Launchers:
(a) Guided or unguided rockets, or ballistic, or
cruise missiles capable of delivering a warhead or
weapon of destruction to a range of at least 25
kilometers, and those items that are designed or
modified specifically for launching such missiles
or rockets, if not covered by systems identified in
paragraphs (1) through (6) of this Supplement.
For purposes of this rule, systems in this
paragraph include remotely piloted vehicles with
the characteristics for missiles as defined in this
paragraph but do not include ground-to-air
missiles;
(b) Man-Portable
(MANPADS); or

Air-Defense

Systems

(c) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) of any
type, including sensors for guidance and control
of these systems, except model airplanes.
(8) Offensive Space Weapons: Systems or
capabilities that can deny freedom of action in
space for the United States and its allies or hinder
the United States and its allies from denying an
adversary the ability to take action in space. This
includes systems such as anti-satellite missiles, or
other systems designed to defeat or destroy assets
in space.

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Control Policy—CCL Based Controls

(9) Command, Control, Communications,
Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (C4ISR): Systems that support
military commanders in the exercise of authority
and direction over assigned forces across the
range of military operations; collect, process,
integrate, analyze, evaluate, or interpret
information concerning foreign countries or
areas; systematically observe aerospace, surface
or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by
visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other
means; and obtain, by visual observation or other
detection methods, information about the
activities and resources of an enemy or potential
enemy, or secure data concerning the
meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic
characteristics of a particular area, including
Undersea communications. Also includes sensor
technologies.
(10) Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs),
including “smart bombs”: Weapons used in

Export Administration Regulations

Supplement No. 7 to Part 742–page 2

precision bombing missions such as specially
designed weapons, or bombs fitted with kits to
allow them to be guided to their target.
(11) Night vision equipment:
Any
electro-optical device that is used to detect visible
and infrared energy and to provide an image. This
includes night vision goggles, forward-looking
infrared systems, thermal sights, and low-light
level systems that are night vision devices, as well
as infrared focal plane array detectors and
cameras specifically designed, developed,
modified, or configured for military use; image
intensification and other night sighting equipment
or systems specifically designed, modified or
configured for military use; second generation
and above military image intensification tubes
specifically designed, developed, modified, or
configured for military use, and infrared, visible
and ultraviolet devices specifically designed,
developed, modified, or configured for military
application.

January 15, 2009