Thalassorama: Initial Effects of the Alaska Halibut IFQ Program: Survey Comments of Alaska Fishermen

Marine Resource Economics, Volume 12, pp. 239–248
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Copyright © 1997 Marine Resources Foundation

Thalassorama
Initial Effects of the Alaska Halibut IFQ Program:
Survey Comments of Alaska Fishermen
GUNNAR KNAPP
University of Alaska, Anchorage
Introduction
In 1995 an Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) management plan was implemented for the
Alaska halibut fishery. With annual catches in the 1990s ranging from 34 to 53 million pounds, valued between $60 million and $99 million, the Alaska halibut fishery
is the largest fishery for which the United States has adopted IFQ management.1
Halibut IFQs are area and vessel class specific.2 Annual IFQ allocations are determined by multiplying total quotas for an area and vessel class by an individual’s
share of the total “quota share” for that area and vessel class. Quota share was
originally allocated to individuals based on landings of vessels owned or leased by
the individual during the years 1984–90. Although thousands of individuals received
at least some quota share in the initial allocation, much of the total allocation was
concentrated among a few hundred quota share holders.3
Quota share is transferable, although there are a variety of restrictions on transfers designed to limit consolidation in order “…to maintain, as much as possible, the
current character of the fleet, to allow for new entrants and crew members, and to
protect Alaskan coastal economies dependent on fishing” (National Marine Fisheries
Service).4 With certain exceptions, IFQ owners must be on board vessels fishing for
halibut.
The IFQ program has dramatically changed the Alaska halibut fishery. For most
of the decade prior to 1995, thousands of boats caught the entire Alaska halibut
Gunnar Knapp is professor of economics with the Institute of Social and Economic Research, University
of Alaska, Anchorage, 3211 Providence Dr., Anchorage, AK 99508; e-mail: [email protected].
1
Halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) is under the jurisdiction of the International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC), created in 1923 by a joint treaty between the U.S. and Canada. The commission establishes gear restrictions and area-specific fishing seasons and annual total allowable catches (TACs). The
United States government, through the North Pacific Fishery Management Council, establishes additional regulations to meet the TACs and to allocate harvests in U.S. waters. See Knapp (1996) for a description of the Alaska Halibut IFQ program. A similar program was also adopted for the Alaska sablefish (black cod) fishery.
2
There are eight halibut management areas and four vessel classes (freezer vessels of any length, catcher vessels 100 feet or longer, catcher vessels 35 to 65 feet in length, and catcher vessels under 35 feet).
3
In November 1995, 3,048 persons (approximately 57% of quota share holders) owned less than 11% of
the total quota share holdings (expressed in terms of 1995 IFQ lbs.); while 451 persons (or about 10% of
quota share holders) owned 62% of total quota share holdings (Knapp 1996). These estimates were calculated after about 14% of halibut quota share (as measured by 1995 IFQ lbs.) had already been transferred, reducing the number of quota share holders from about 5,500 to 4,420 individuals.
4
Restrictions limit the consolidation of small “blocked” holdings (those with less than approximately
20,000 lbs. of annual IFQ). Only original quota share recipients or crew members with more than 150
days experience in a U.S. fishery may purchase quota share.

239

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Knapp

quota in two or three 24-hour openings. With IFQ management, the halibut season is
now open from March until November. Average crew sizes have declined. With a
longer season, the share of Alaska halibut sold fresh has more than doubled, and exvessel and wholesale prices have increased. Coast Guard Search and Rescue cases
and fatalities associated with the halibut fishery have declined sharply.5
The IFQ program has been the subject of intense debate by fishermen, both
prior to and following adoption and implementation of the program. An earlier
Thalassorama contribution reported on halibut captains’ attitudes towards IFQs prior
to the implementation of the program, based on responses to 391 telephone interviews conducted in 1994 (Knapp 1996). That study concluded that:
Less than half of Alaska halibut captains preferred the IFQ system to the
current system, and less than one-third named the IFQ system as their first
choice for management of the fishery. Support for IFQs was clearly related to
whether or not captains expected their financial situation to improve with
IFQs—and the majority did not.

During the spring of 1996, the University of Alaska Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) conducted a mail survey of halibut quota share holders in
order to gather information about the halibut fishery during the first year of the IFQ
program. This survey also provided an opportunity to gather open-ended comments
from quota share holders about positive and negative effects of the program. This
paper reports on these comments. In addition to describing fishermen’s perceptions
of the most important effects of IFQ management, the comments also shed light on
fishermen’s attitudes towards the IFQ program after the first year.

Survey Administration and Design
The survey was conducted as part of a series of studies undertaken by federal and
state agencies in 1995 and 1996 to gather information about initial effects of IFQ
management of the Alaska halibut and sablefish fisheries (Smith and Parker).
Four page survey questionnaires were mailed to a randomly selected stratified
sample of 300 quota share (QS) holders. The purpose of the stratification was to
be able to accurately characterize QS holders in large vessel classes or with
large holdings (who constitute a small fraction of total quota share holders but a
large share of total IFQ pounds). Survey responses were weighted to reflect the
actual number of quota share holders represented by each respondent. The surveys were mailed in April 1996, with follow up mailings through June. As
shown in table 1, completed surveys were received from 129 quota share holders
for a response rate of 43%.6
Comparisons of survey estimates with information obtained from other sources
suggest that the survey respondents were reasonably representative of halibut quota
share holders. For example, estimated total 1995 halibut landings calculated from

5

A number of studies have examined initial effects of IFQ management on the halibut fishery. These
include Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (1996a,b); Gilroy and Sullivan (1996); Knapp and
Hull (1996a,b,c); Knapp (1997a,b); and Smith and Parker (1996). Copies of most of these studies are
available from the North Pacific Fishery Management Council, 605 West 4th Avenue, Suite 306, Anchorage, AK 99501-2252.
6
A detailed description of the survey administration and results is available in a 133 page report on the
survey (Knapp and Hull 1996a) available from the North Pacific Fishery Management Council at the address given in footnote 5. Surveys were also conducted of sablefish quota share holders (Knapp and Hull
1996c) and halibut and sablefish registered buyers (Knapp and Hull 1996b).

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Table 1
Survey Strata, Sampling Fractions, and Response Rates
Survey Strata
1

2

3

4

5

6

B
<20,000

C
>5,000

C
<5,000

D
any amt.

Total

Criteria used to assign QS
holders to stratum:
Vessel class of QS
Total lbs. owned
by QS holder

A
B
any amt. >20,000

Total IFQ pounds owned by
QS holders in stratum (000 lbs)
Number of QS holders in stratum
Number of surveys mailed
Sampling fraction
Number of completed surveys
Response rate

829
40

11,040
155

1,078
150

16,995
1,016

1,987
1,059

3,198
1,983

35,127
4,403

40
100%

52
34%

52
35%

52
5%

52
5%

52
3%

300
7%

12
30%

26
50%

16
31%

25
48%

27
52%

23
44%

129
43%

weighted survey responses were 95% of total landings reported by the NMFS Restricted Access Management (RAM) Division.7

Survey Questions
The survey included twenty-six questions about quota share holders’ participation in
the 1995 halibut fishery. These questions gathered information such as IFQ volume
harvested and not harvested, number of trips taken, number of IFQ holders on board,
number of crew on board, how crew and IFQ holders were paid, and factors affecting when trips were taken and where halibut were landed.
Three open-ended questions at the end of the survey invited respondents to comment on effects of the IFQ program, and to provide recommendations or suggestions
about the program:
#27. What have been the most positive effects of the IFQ program on your fishing operation?
#28. What have been the most negative effects of the IFQ program on your
fishing operation?
#29. Please use this space for any recommendations or suggestions you may
have about the halibut and sablefish IFQ program. We will provide these comments and suggestions to the State of Alaska, the National Marine Fisheries
Service, and the North Pacific Fishery Management Council.

Of the 129 respondents who returned completed surveys, 121 provided at least one
comment in response to these open-ended questions.

7

The survey estimate of the share of IFQ that went unharvested was 9%, compared with 10% reported
by the RAM Division. The survey estimate of the share of halibut landed outside Alaska was 12%, compared with 9% reported by the Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission.

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Knapp
Table 2
Number of Comments Expressed by Survey Respondents

Number of Separate Comments
Made in Responding to
Questions 27, 28, and 29
1–2
3–4
5–6
7–8
9–11
Total

Number of
Respondents
(Unweighted)

Number of
Comments
(Unweighted)

31
44
26
14
6

51
150
141
103
62

121

507

Grouping of Comments for Analysis
Survey respondents listed a wide variety of positive and negative effects of the program,
as well as many different recommendations and suggestions. For purposes of analysis,
we considered each separate effect or recommendation as a separate “comment.” As
shown in table 2, most survey respondents provided between 1 and 6 comments.
For purposes of presentation and analysis, we grouped comments into categories
based on the nature of the comment. Table 3 summarizes the number of comments
received in each category. The choice of categories and the grouping of comments
into categories was a matter of judgment. It would have been possible to develop
more specific or more general categories. Some categories, such as “increased
safety,” represent a specific effect or suggestion. Other categories, such as “administrative burden/problems,” represent a wide variety of effects or suggestions.
The most frequently mentioned positive effects included “ability to choose
when to fish,” “increased safety,” “better markets and prices,” “uncrowded fishing
grounds,” and “less stress, more relaxed.” The most frequently mentioned negative
effects included “QS allocation too small/uneconomic,” “administrative burden/
problems,” and “QS allocation unfair.” The appendix provides examples of specific
comments of survey respondents for these categories.
Note that in table 3 respondents are represented in proportion to the number of
separate comments they made. For example, the experiences and opinions of a respondent who offered ten comments have a proportionally greater weight in table 3
than those of a respondent who offered only two comments. However, there did not
appear to be any obvious difference between the number of comments offered by respondents with “favorable” or “unfavorable” attitudes towards the IFQ program.
The open-ended nature of the questions means that the number of responses in
each category does not provide a scientific measure of the extent to which quota
share holders experienced different effects or the extent to which they would support
different suggestions. For example, the fact that only 12% of respondents (weighted)
cited “uncrowded fishing grounds” as a positive effect of the IFQ program does not
mean that the remaining 88% did not experience uncrowded fishing grounds. Similarly, the fact that only 7% (weighted) cited “reduced income” as a negative effect
does not mean that only 7% of quota share holders experienced reduced income.
What the comments do represent are effects which quota share holders considered important enough to write down—what they considered the most positive or
negative effects of the program.

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Table 3
Summary of Comments Received About the IFQ Program
Number of
Comments
(Unweighted)

Unweighted

Weighted

Positive Effects
Ability to choose when to fish
Increased safety
Better markets and prices
Uncrowded fishing grounds
Less stress, more relaxed
Better for resource: less bycatch and waste
Stability and easier planning
Reduced gear loss
Lower costs
Better quality
Longer season
Better crew
Other positive effects
IFQ program has had no negative effects

46
44
29
19
14
19
13
7
4
14
4
5
18
21

38%
36%
24%
16%
12%
16%
11%
6%
3%
12%
3%
4%
15%
17%

38%
28%
15%
12%
10%
8%
7%
5%
4%
4%
3%
2%
18%
12%

Negative Effects
QS allocation too small/uneconomic
Administrative burden/problems
QS allocation unfair
Reduced crew employment
Forced out of fishery
Reduced income
Cost of buying additional QS
Harvest limited by QS amount
Overzealous enforcement
Other negative effects
IFQ program has had no positive effects

32
18
18
10
10
9
6
6
5
28
23

26%
15%
15%
8%
8%
7%
5%
5%
4%
23%
19%

34%
18%
11%
8%
8%
7%
5%
3%
2%
19%
18%

7
8
5
3
4

6%
7%
4%
2%
3%

9%
5%
4%
1%
1%

14
17

12%
14%

11%
9%

10

8%

5%

17

14%

13%

Nature of Comment

Suggestions and Comments
Simplify/change administration
Change block provisions
Change QS ownership limits
Change vessel size restrictions
Change observer regulations
Other suggestions/comments
about the IFQ program
Other suggestions/comments
General positive comments
about the IFQ program
General negative comments
about the IFQ program

Percentage of Respondents*

* Percentage of respondents who wrote comments or suggestions (121 unweighted, 4,144 weighted).

Quota Share Holders’ Attitudes Towards the IFQ Program
The survey questionnaire was not designed for the purpose of assessing attitudes towards the IFQ program. However, it was clear from the comments that many respondents held either clearly negative or clearly positive attitudes towards the IFQ program. For example, 12% of respondents (weighted) answered question 27 about the

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Knapp
Table 4
Attitudes Towards IFQs Expressed by Survey Respondents
Respondents’ Attitudes Towards IFQs

Number of respondents (unweighted)
Percent respondents (unweighted)
Percent respondents (weighted)
Percent respondents, by total IFQ holdings*
Less than 1,000 lbs.
1,000–4,999 lbs.
5,000–9,999 lbs.
10,000–19,999 lbs.
20,000–49,999 lbs.
More than 50,000 lbs.
Total

Positive

Mixed

Negative

Total

50
41%
29%

35
29%
37%

36
30%
34%

121
100%
100%

18%
22%
22%
49%
78%
85%
29%

30%
43%
54%
39%
18%
10%
37%

52%
35%
25%
11%
4%
5%
34%

100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

* Weighted responses.

“most positive effects of the IFQ program” using “phrases like “none,” “there are
none,” “NONE!” and “zero, zip, nada, nothing, zilch.” In complete contrast, a different 18% of respondents answered question 28 about “the most negative effects of the
IFQ program” using terms like “none,” “I can think of none,” “zero—it’s been
good,” and “none that I see.”
The fact that many respondents held obviously positive or negative attitudes towards the IFQ program provided an opportunity to examine how these attitudes
might be related to the size of total IFQ holdings. In order to do this, we coded attitudes as “positive” if the comments clearly indicated a generally positive attitude towards the IFQ program and its effects, and “negative” if the responses clearly indicated a generally negative attitude towards the IFQ program and its effects. In all
other cases, we coded respondents’ attitudes as “mixed.” 8
As shown in table 4 and figure 1, roughly equal percentages of survey respondents (weighted) held positive, mixed, and negative attitudes towards the IFQ program. Quota share holders’ attitudes towards the IFQ program were clearly related
to the size of their total IFQ holdings. The greater a quota share holder’s IFQ holdings, the more likely he was to have a positive attitude towards the IFQ program.
The smaller a quota share holder’s IFQ holdings, the more likely he was to have a
negative attitude towards the IFQ program.

Conclusions
The survey responses of halibut quota share holders to open-ended questions about
the effects of the Alaska IFQ program provide an indication of fishermen’s perceptions of the most important effects of the program. The positive effects mentioned
by many fishermen suggest that they believe that the program is providing many of
the benefits predicted by advocates of IFQ management, such as improved safety,

8

Some respondents mentioned both positive and negative effects, while still conveying a strong overall
positive or negative attitudes towards the program. We coded these respondents’ attitudes as either
“positive” or “negative.” Others mentioned both positive and negative effects, or in some cases only
positive or negative effects, but did not convey a strong overall attitude. We coded these respondents’
attitudes as “mixed.”

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Respondent’s total quota share holdings (1995 IFQ lbs.)

Thalassorama

Percentage of respondents

Figure 1. Survey Respondent’s Attitudes Towards IFQs

better prices, and a more rational fishery. Other survey responses as well as other
studies of initial effects of the program also support this conclusion.
However, the survey responses suggest that about one-third of all quota share
holders had a clearly negative attitude towards IFQ management—about as many as
had a clearly positive attitude. Attitudes towards the IFQ program were inversely correlated with the size of quota share holdings. Fishermen with large quota share holdings—
which in the first year of the program reflected primarily initial allocations of quota
share—tended to like the program; fishermen with small quota share holdings tended not
to like the program. This result is consistent with the results of the survey of halibut
captains prior to implementation of the IFQ program, in which those who expected
their financial situation to improve were more likely to support IFQ management.
While not surprising, these results are instructive. They serve to remind us that
management policies that may increase net benefits of fisheries do not necessarily
make all fishermen—or even a majority of fishermen—better off. This can contribute to strikingly different perceptions of the same management policies among different fishermen.

References
Berman, M., and L. Leask. 1994. “On the Eve of IFQs: Fishing for Alaska’s Halibut and
Sablefish.” Alaska Review of Social and Economic Conditions, University of Alaska Anchorage Institute of Social and Economic Research, November 1994. [Copies available
from ISER/UAA, 3211 Providence Drive, Anchorage, AK 99508.]
Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission. 1996a. Changes Under Alaska’s Halibut IFQ Program, 1995. CFEC Report Number 96-10N. September 1996.
_ . 1996b. Changes Under Alaska’s Sablefish IFQ Program, 1995. CFEC Report Number
96-11N. September 1996.

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Knapp

Gilroy, H., and P. Sullivan. 1996. Halibut Conservation and the IFQ Program. International
Pacific Halibut Commission, mimeo.
Knapp, G. 1996. “Thalassorama: Alaska Halibut Captains’ Attitudes Towards IFQs.” Marine
Resource Economics 11(Spring 1996):43–55.
_ . 1997a. Alaska Halibut Markets and the Alaska IFQ Program. Anchorage AK: University
of Alaska Institute of Social and Economic Research.
_ . 1997b. Modeling Community Economic Impacts of the Alaska Halibut IFQ Program.
Anchorage AK: University of Alaska Institute of Social and Economic Research.
Knapp, G., and D. Hull. 1996a. The First Year of the Alaska IFQ Program: A Survey of Halibut Quota Share Holders. Anchorage AK: University of Alaska Anchorage Institute of
Social and Economic Research.
_ . 1996b. The First Year of the Alaska IFQ Program: A Survey of Halibut and Sablefish
Registered Buyers. Anchorage AK: University of Alaska Anchorage Institute of Social
and Economic Research.
_ . 1996c. The First Year of the Alaska IFQ Program: A Survey of Sablefish Quota Share
Holders. Anchorage AK: University of Alaska Anchorage Institute of Social and Economic Research.
National Marine Fisheries Service, Restricted Access Management Division. 1995. The IFQ
Program: Under Way. February 1995.
_ . 1996. Implementation of the Halibut and Sablefish Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) Program.
Smith, P., and D. Parker. 1996. Report of the IFQ Research Planning Team. Background
document submitted to the North Pacific Fishery Management Council, Sitka, AK, September 1996.

Appendix
Selected Examples of Survey Comments
Positive Effects of IFQ Program
Ability to Choose When to Fish
IFQs have brought a measure of stability to my small operation—I can plan my season
now, and fish when it is best for myself and my crew.
Fish when the weather is good.
Can choose when to fish.
Pick and choose days.
Fishing when markets are good.
More flexibility.
Fish when weather is good.
Fish when I had the time to spare.
Somewhat relaxed fishing schedules, regulated mostly by what else is going on.
Flexibility.
Increased Safety
I will now be able to harvest during favorable, safe tides, and weather.
Increased safety.
I don’t have to go out in bad weather.
Weather.

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Safety. Not having to be out in inclement weather.
Being able to fish in good weather.
Being able to fish when weather is safe.
Safer for all.
Safety.
Safety. Being able to fish when weather is calm. Don’t have to fish during storms.
Not having to fish when weather is bad.
Safer fishing! Freedom to pick your weather to fish in, as well as working it around
other things. Less danger.
Better Markets and Prices
Fresh marketing.
Better market conditions.
Better quality product—better price.
Better care of fish—more money for the fish.
Higher ex-vessel price.
Better price—increased quality and steady supply make for a better price.
Getting a better price.
Price is usually higher. The halibut derbies flooded the market and quality was down.
We can now compete with Canadians for fresh fish market throughout seasons.
We can fish when the market and processors actually want the fish.
Better price.
Seems to be more competitive among buyers for product—translates into higher price
for product.
Uncrowded Fishing Grounds
Uncrowded fishing grounds.
No GEAR CONFLICTS. Less gear loss. Less expenses.
Less boats in area during season.
No other boats in the same area. No gear conflicts.
Fish where I want (not in a bunch of boats).
Fewer boats fishing at one time—gear tangles not a factor.
No crowding on grounds.
Not having crowded fishing conditions.
Not having to fight weather and congestion with other vessels on the grounds.
Less competition on grounds.
Gear conflicts are nil.
No crowds.
Less Stress, More Relaxed
Can take a slower pace.
Leisurely pace.
Not so STRESSFUL as before IFQ.
Reduced stress (safety factor, elimination of competitive factor).
Less stress about weather and time.
It saves hassle in fishing ground and time.
Less stress.
Much easier on my crew to have time to eat proper and sleep.
Less chaotic.
Also the fishery is more relaxed like it was in the ’70s. My daughter and I can fish it
ourselves and she gets more for college.
You can go fish—instead of a mad race!

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Knapp

Negative Effects of IFQ Program
QS Allocation too Small/Uneconomic
My quota share was too small to be practical and it will cost me several thousands of
dollars to purchase a practical amount.
I cannot use my vessel to catch my IFQ due to IFQ’s extremely small size.
Our quota was so small it’s not worth fishing for, so now we don’t halibut fish at all
when before we could go out for a small catch when we needed some extra money.
Small quota!!
The shares allotted to me do not even make it worthwhile for me to go out fishing.
The small amount, additionally the moratorium on crab. I own the boat but received no
share.
Too small of a poundage to survive in fishing.
QS Allocation Unfair
I crewed starting in 1974. Bought a boat in 1990 and ended up out of the fishery because
of a small IFQ.
The skipper who leased my vessel received all of the quota shares. I received a few
shares due to part ownership of a second vessel that made only one halibut trip.
It took away one-third of my total income. Now I have to rely on salmon to pay for my livelihood and salmon just doesn’t do it alone. In 1994 I caught 15,000 lbs. of halibut.
Now my quota is 2,000 lbs. You figure it out!
Out of more than twenty-five years of halibut fishing, the comm. picked the seven very
poorest years I fished. I therefore would end up receiving only about 12% of the
quota I should have received.
In the 1970s I caught 0.5 million lbs. In the 1980s I tendered. In 1994 I fished two days
caught $84,000. In 1995 IFQs limited us to 3,000 lbs.
Not enough IFQ. NMFS should have used qualifying years 1990–95 instead of 1985–90.
All of the fishermen I know just got into the fishing business. With their halibut cut
off, they don’t have a future in fishing.
I get to catch about 60% of my average catch over the last twelve years. I never have caught
less than 156,000 lbs. per year. I was issued 89,000. Call that taking a bad beating.
Administrative Burden/Problems
They refused to admit they made a mistake on my share type and turned down my request. I had to reappeal to the administrative office. Still no answer—except “Sorry,
we won’t get to it this YEAR!” This seems to be the typical “big government” BS—
they don’t care about the little guys.
Filling out paper work.
I have a small operation. Paperwork is tremendous!
Upon delivery must stay on boat until unloaded (very hard to understand).
Six-hour hailing time requirement before you can deliver fish.
This is a paperwork nightmare—with nine different card-permits needed.
I resent the law that confines crew to boat till catch is removed.
Three different steps and people just to sell the catch.
Philosophically oppose all the bureaucratic baloney.
Too many permits necessary to fish. Should consolidate requirements.
More red tape and BS.