Download:
pdf |
pdfNUREG-0561, Rev. 2
Physical Protection of
Shipments of Irradiated
Reactor Fuel
Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
AVAILABILITY OF REFERENCE MATERIALS
IN NRC PUBLICATIONS
NRC Reference Material
Non-NRC Reference Material
As of November 1999, you may electronically access
NUREG-series publications and other NRC records at
NRC’s Public Electronic Reading Room at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html. Publicly released
records include, to name a few, NUREG-series
publications; Federal Register notices; applicant,
licensee, and vendor documents and correspondence;
NRC correspondence and internal memoranda;
bulletins and information notices; inspection and
investigative reports; licensee event reports; and
Commission papers and their attachments.
Documents available from public and special technical
libraries include all open literature items, such as
books, journal articles, and transactions, Federal
Register notices, Federal and State legislation, and
congressional reports. Such documents as theses,
dissertations, foreign reports and translations, and
non-NRC conference proceedings may be purchased
from their sponsoring organization.
NRC publications in the NUREG series, NRC
regulations, and Title 10, Energy, in the Code of
Federal Regulations may also be purchased from one
of these two sources.
1. The Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Mail Stop SSOP
Washington, DC 20402-0001
Internet: http://bookstore.gpo.gov
Telephone: 202-512-1800
Fax: 202-512-2250
2. The National Technical Information Service
Springfield, VA 22161-0002
www.ntis.gov
1-800-553-6847 or, locally, 703-605-6000
A single copy of each NRC draft report for comment is
available free, to the extent of supply, upon written
request as follows:
Address: Office of the Chief Information Officer,
Reproduction and Distribution Services
Section
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001
E-mail: [email protected]
Facsimile: 301-415-2289
Some publications in the NUREG series that are posted
at NRC’s Web site address http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/nuregs are updated periodically and
may differ from the last printed version. Although
references to material found on a Web site bear the
date the material was accessed, the material available
on the date cited may subsequently be removed from
the site.
Copies of industry codes and standards used in a
substantive manner in the NRC regulatory process are
maintained at–
The NRC Technical Library
Two White Flint North
11545 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852-2738
These standards are available in the library for
reference use by the public. Codes and standards are
usually copyrighted and may be purchased from the
originating organization or, if they are American
National Standards, from–
American National Standards Institute
11 West 42nd Street
New York, NY 10036-8002
212-642-4900
www.ansi.org
Legally binding regulatory requirements are stated
only in Regulations; NRC regulations; licenses,
including technical specifications; or orders, not in
NUREG-series publications. The views expressed
in contractor-prepared publications in this series are
not necessarily those of the NRC.
The NUREG series comprises (1) technical and
administrative reports and books prepared by the
staff (NUREG-XXXX) or agency contractors
(NUREG/CR-XXXX), (2) proceedings of conferences
(NUREG/CP-XXXX), (3) reports resulting from
international agreements (NUREG/IA-XXXX),
(4) brochures (NUREG/BR-XXXX), and
(5) compilations of legal decisions and orders of the
Commission and Atomic and Safety Licensing
Boards and of Directors’ decisions under
Section 2.206 of NRC’s regulations (NUREG-0750).
DISCLAIMER: This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the U.S. Government.
Neither the U.S. Government nor any agency thereof, nor any employee, makes any warranty, expressed or
implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party’s use, or the results of such use, of any
information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed in this publication, or represents that its use by such a third
party would not infringe privately owned rights.
NUREG-0561, Rev. 2
Physical Protection of Shipments
of Irradiated Reactor Fuel
Date Published: December 2012
Prepared by
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
P.O. Box 999
Richland, WA 99352
and
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001
Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
ABSTRACT
This guidance document sets forth means, methods and procedures that the staff of the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) considers acceptable for satisfying the requirements for
the physical protection of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) during transportation by road, rail and water,
and for satisfying the requirements for background investigations of individuals granted
unescorted access to SNF during transportation. Chapter 1 discusses the regulatory basis and
definitions applicable to shipments of SNF. Chapter 2 corresponds to the general requirements
for the physical protection of SNF while in transit. These requirements apply to all SNF
shipments regardless of the mode of transportation used for a particular shipment. Chapters 3,
4, and 5 discuss additional requirements specific to each particular transport mode—road, rail,
or U.S. waters. Chapter 6 discusses the requirements for background investigations of
individuals with unescorted access to SNF in transit.
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
This NUREG contains information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These information collections were approved
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), approval numbers 3150-0008 and 3150-0002.
Public Protection Notification
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for
information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a
currently valid OMB approval number.
iii
CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ...............................................................................................................................iii
PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT ......................................................................iii
PUBLIC PROTECTION NOTIFICATION ...................................................................................iii
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1
1.1. Regulatory Authority .................................................................................................... 1
1.2. Organization of NUREG-0561 ..................................................................................... 2
1.3. Definitions.................................................................................................................... 3
2. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS .............................................................................................. 4
2.1. NRC Approval of SNF Shipment Routes...................................................................... 4
2.1.1. Route Selection Criteria ................................................................................... 6
2.1.2. Format of Route Approval Applications ............................................................ 7
2.1.2.1. Route Plan and Mileage .................................................................... 7
2.1.2.2. Safe Havens ...................................................................................... 8
2.1.2.3. Mapping Requirements...................................................................... 9
2.1.2.4. Contact Information ........................................................................... 9
2.1.2.5. Communications Capability along the Route ....................................10
2.2. Preplanning and Coordination of Shipments ...............................................................10
2.2.1. Avoidance of Intermediate Stops.....................................................................11
2.2.2. Procedures at Stops........................................................................................11
2.2.2.1. Stops during Road Shipments ..........................................................11
2.2.2.2. Stops during Rail Shipments.............................................................12
2.2.2.3. Stops during Waterborne Shipments ................................................12
2.3. Advance Notification of Shipments .............................................................................13
2.3.1. Advance Notification of the State(s) and Tribes...............................................13
2.3.2. Advance Notification of the NRC .....................................................................15
2.3.2.1. 10-Day Advance Notice ....................................................................15
2.3.2.2. 2-Day Advance Notice, 2-Hour Notice, and Delivery Receipt
Confirmation .....................................................................................15
2.3.3. Notification of Schedule Deviations .................................................................15
2.4. Communications .........................................................................................................16
2.4.1. Movement Control Centers .............................................................................16
2.4.2. Periodic Contacts with Movement Control Center ...........................................17
2.5. Arrangements with Local Law Enforcement Agencies ................................................17
2.6. Armed Escorts ............................................................................................................17
2.7. Shipment Log .............................................................................................................19
2.8. Procedures, Training, and Control of Information........................................................19
2.8.1. Procedures for Coping with Threats and Emergencies ....................................20
2.8.2. Training of Personnel Associated with Shipments ...........................................21
2.8.3. Control of Shipment Information ......................................................................21
3. SHIPMENTS BY ROAD ......................................................................................................22
3.1. Protection of Road Shipments ....................................................................................22
3.2. Communications for Road Shipments.........................................................................22
3.3. Immobilization of Transport Vehicle ............................................................................23
v
3.3.1. Immobilization Device Performance Criteria ....................................................23
3.3.2. Immobilization Device Design .........................................................................24
3.3.3. Format of Approval Request ...........................................................................24
3.4. Training Program for Drivers.......................................................................................24
4. SHIPMENTS BY RAIL ........................................................................................................25
4.1. Protection of Rail Shipments.......................................................................................25
4.2. Communications for Rail Shipments ...........................................................................26
5. SHIPMENTS BY U.S. WATERS .........................................................................................27
5.1. Protection of Waterborne Shipments ..........................................................................27
5.2. Communications for Waterborne Shipments...............................................................28
6. BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS FOR UNESCORTED ACCESS TO SPENT NUCLEAR
FUEL IN TRANSIT ..............................................................................................................29
6.1. Informed Consent .......................................................................................................29
6.2. Protection of Information .............................................................................................29
6.3. Background Investigation Elements ............................................................................30
6.3.1. Fingerprinting and FBI Identification and Criminal History Records Check ......30
6.3.2. Collection of Fingerprints ................................................................................31
6.3.3. Resubmittal of Fingerprints .............................................................................33
6.3.4. Verification of True Identity..............................................................................34
6.3.5. Employment History Evaluation ......................................................................34
6.3.6. Verification of Education .................................................................................35
6.3.7. Verification of Military Service .........................................................................35
6.3.8. Credit History Evaluation .................................................................................35
6.3.9. Criminal History Review ..................................................................................36
6.3.10. Character and Reputation Determination ........................................................36
6.3.11. Inability or Refusal to Support a Background Investigation ..............................37
6.4. Determination of Trustworthiness and Reliability ........................................................37
6.5. Reinvestigations .........................................................................................................38
6.6. Prohibitions.................................................................................................................38
6.7. Right to Correct and Complete Information .................................................................38
APPENDIX A ............................................................................................................................. 1
Table A-1 Sample Route Mileage Summary ........................................................................ 2
Table A-2 Sample Detailed Route Plan ............................................................................... 3
vi
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the regulatory authority for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) requirements for physical protection of and access to spent nuclear fuel (SNF)
shipments. The chapter also includes definitions of terms used in this guidance and a
discussion of the organization of this NUREG.
1.1.
Regulatory Authority
The guidance in this NUREG pertains to the physical protection of irradiated reactor fuel during
transportation and to background investigations of individuals granted unescorted access to
irradiated reactor fuel during transportation, as required by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 73.37,
―Requirements for Physical Protection of Irradiated Reactor Fuel in Transit,‖ and 10 CFR 73.38,
―Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Irradiated Reactor Fuel in Transit.‖
The requirements of 10 CFR 73.37 apply to each licensee who transports, or delivers to a
carrier for transport, in a single shipment, a quantity of irradiated reactor fuel in excess of
100 grams (0.22 lbs) in net weight of irradiated fuel, exclusive of cladding or other structural or
packaging material, which has a total external radiation dose rate in excess of 1 Gy (100 rad)
per hour at a distance of 1 meter (3.3 feet) from any accessible surface without intervening
shielding.
For the purposes of 10 CFR 73.37, 10 CFR 73.38, and this NUREG, the terms ―irradiated
reactor fuel‖ and ―spent nuclear fuel‖ are considered synonymous and are used
interchangeably. In addition, references to ―the staff‖ in this NUREG means the NRC staff,
unless otherwise noted.
These regulations apply to SNF from either power or nonpower reactors that is contained in a
domestic shipment or the domestic portions of import or export shipments (i.e., while the
shipment is within U.S. territory or U.S. territorial waters). The 100 gram threshold quantity is
intended to apply to the combination of uranium and plutonium compounds and associated
fission products generated during irradiation. The weight of the fuel cladding or other structural
or packaging material associated with the fuel should not be included in determining whether
the quantity of SNF in the given shipment needs to be protected under the requirements of
10 CFR 73.37.
The objective of the physical protection system for shipments of such material is to minimize the
potential for theft, diversion, or radiological sabotage of SNF shipments and to facilitate the
location and recovery of SNF shipments that may have come under the control of unauthorized
individuals. The NRC is cognizant that radiological sabotage could result in economic
consequences and social disruptions. The staff believes these impacts will be minimized if the
security requirements in 10 CFR Part 73 are effectively implemented. As noted in the Final
Rule, the Commission did not change the definition of radiological sabotage in 10 CFR 73.2.
The term radiological sabotage as used in this guidance document has the same meaning as
the definition in 10 CFR 73.2.
The licensee shall establish a physical protection system for SNF in transit that includes armed
escorts and a movement control center staffed and equipped to monitor and control shipments,
communicate with local law enforcement authorities (LLEA), and respond to normal conditions
1
and security contingencies. In accordance with the performance objectives of
10 CFR 73.37(a)(2), the physical protection system shall do the following:
•
Provide early detection and assessment of attempts to gain unauthorized access to, or
control over, SNF shipments.
•
Delay and impede attempts at theft, diversion, or radiological sabotage of SNF
shipments.
•
Provide notification to the appropriate response forces of any attempts at theft, diversion,
or radiological sabotage of SNF shipments.
Before granting an individual unescorted access to SNF in transit, the licensee shall determine if
the individual is trustworthy and reliable by completing a background investigation of the
individual in accordance with 10 CFR 73.38. The requirements of 10 CFR 73.38 apply to
vehicle operators, escorts, train crews, and any other individuals accompanying the shipment
during transport, as well as movement control center personnel. Fingerprinting and the other
investigative elements in 10 CFR 73.38 do not apply to Federal, State, local, and Tribal1 law
enforcement personnel, nor do they apply to other persons identified in 10 CFR 73.59, ―Relief
from Fingerprinting, Identification and Criminal History Record Checks for Designated
Categories of Individuals,‖ as well as other categories of persons, as specified in
10 CFR 73.38(c)(2).
1.2.
Organization of NUREG-0561
The guidance contained in this document is organized to correspond to applicable sections of
10 CFR 73.37 and 10 CFR 73.38. Chapter 1 describes the regulatory basis and definitions
applicable to shipments of SNF. Chapter 2 corresponds to the general requirements contained
in 10 CFR 73.37(b) and 10 CFR 73.37(f). These requirements apply to all SNF shipments
regardless of the mode of transportation used for a particular shipment. Chapters 3, 4, and 5
correspond to 10 CFR 73.37(c), 10 CFR 73.37(d), and 10 CFR 73.37(e), respectively, which
contain additional requirements specific to each particular transport mode—road, rail, or
U.S. waters. Chapter 6 corresponds to 10 CFR 73.38, which addresses requirements for
background investigations of individuals with unescorted access to SNF in transit.
In addition to the specific physical protection requirements in 10 CFR 73.37(b),
10 CFR 73.37(c), 10 CFR 73.37(d), 10 CFR 73.37(e), and 10 CFR 73.37(f), the regulation
includes performance objectives in 10 CFR 73.37(a). These performance objectives are not
intended to be implemented as specific requirements, but rather are general statements of the
Commission’s intent. These objectives characterize and further define the general level of
protection that physical protection systems designed to satisfy the requirements of the
regulation are expected to provide. In this document, discussions about the requirements in
10 CFR 73.37(b) through (f) have been developed to be consistent with and to support the
performance objectives in 10 CFR 73.37(a) to the extent that each objective applies to a specific
element of the physical protection system.
1
After June 11, 2013, licensees must comply with the requirements in this document pertaining to
participating Tribes, Tribal law enforcement personnel, Tribal officials, Tribal official’s designees and Tribal
reservations (77 FR 34194; June 11, 2012).
2
1.3.
Definitions
The following definitions apply to terms used in this guidance document. These definitions shall
apply irrespective of the mode of transport, except as otherwise noted. Terms used in this
guidance not defined below shall have the same meaning as defined in 10 CFR 73.2,
―Definitions.‖
Escort: A person with similar duties to that of an armed escort, who may or may not be armed.
Local law enforcement agency (or authority) (LLEA): Any State, Tribal, county, or municipal
agency that has law enforcement authority within the locality or jurisdiction through which the
shipment may pass. The term is usually limited to the particular law enforcement agencies
responsible for responding to calls for assistance by escorts, such as county or municipal police
forces, port authority police, railroad police, or the highway patrol. In some instances involving
waterborne shipments, the U.S. Coast Guard or another Federal agency also may be
considered as the LLEA, depending on whether or not they are relied on to provide a response
to a request for assistance.
LLEA radio communications: The radio communications system that the LLEA normally uses
to communicate with its mobile units.
Monitor: Capability to observe and detect unauthorized access.
Participating Tribe: An Indian Tribe, as defined in 10 CFR 73.2, which has notified the NRC
that it would like to receive advance notification of any shipment of SNF that passes within or
across the Tribal reservation and that has certified to the NRC that any Safeguards Information
(SGI) it receives will be appropriately protected.
Radiological sabotage: As defined in 10 CFR 73.2, this term refers to any deliberate act
directed against a plant or transport in which an activity licensed under the regulations in this
chapter is conducted, or against a component of such a plant or transport that could directly or
indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
Safe haven: A readily recognizable and accessible site at which security is present or from
which, in the event of an emergency, the transport crew can notify and wait for LLEA response.
A safe haven is an area that can provide prudent security measures when a shipment is
removed from transit because of an elevated threat condition.
Telemetric monitoring system: A data transfer system that captures information by
instrumentation or measuring devices about the location and status of a transport vehicle or
package between the departure and destination location. The U.S. Department of Energy’s
TRANSCOM system is one example of a telemetric monitoring system.
Transport vehicle or shipment vehicle: For a road shipment, an integrated-unit type of truck
or combination tractor-trailer that bears an SNF shipment; for a rail shipment, the shipment
vehicle or shipment car is the rail car containing the SNF package. In 10 CFR 73.37, it is written
in terms of a single transport vehicle or shipment car being used for a given SNF shipment.
However, it is recognized that more than one such vehicle may be used in a single shipment. In
this case, all provisions of the regulation should be interpreted to apply to all of the transport
vehicles as a group, unless noted otherwise in the guidance.
3
2.
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
This chapter provides guidance on the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
requirements for physical protection of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) shipments made by road, rail or
water. Requirements discussed in this chapter apply to all SNF shipments regardless of the
mode of transport, unless otherwise noted. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 provide additional guidance on
requirements specific to physical protection of road, rail and waterborne SNF shipments,
respectfully.
2.1.
NRC Approval of SNF Shipment Routes
In 10 CFR 73.37(b)(1)(vi), the NRC requires the licensee to obtain NRC approval for the
planned road and rail routes over which SNF is to be shipped and for any U.S. ports where a
vessel carrying an SNF shipment is scheduled to dock. Whenever possible, the licensee should
request approval of two routes (i.e., a primary and an alternative) when transporting SNF by
road or rail.
Section 73.37(b)(1)(vi) requires that the licensee obtain the route approval in writing from the
NRC before the 10-day advanced notification requirement in 10 CFR 73.72(a)(2). Licensees
should submit applications for route approvals at least 6 months before the planned date of the
shipment to allow the staff adequate time to review and approve the requested route. Requests
to approve a route that do not comply with this requirement will be handled on a case-by-case
basis.
In 10 CFR 73.37(b(1)(iv), the NRC requires that routes used for shipping SNF comply with
applicable requirements of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations in Title 49
of the Code of Federal Regulations (49 CFR), in particular, those identified in 10 CFR 71.5,
―Transportation of Licensed Material.‖ For shipments by road, DOT requirements for the
security of radioactive material shipments are found in Subpart I ―Safety and Security Plans,‖ to
49 CFR Part 172, ―Hazardous Materials Table, Special Provisions, Hazardous Materials
Communications, Emergency Response Information, and Training Requirements,‖ and
Subpart D, ―Routing of Class 7 (Radioactive) Materials,‖ to 49 CFR Part 397 ‖Transportation of
Hazardous Materials; Driving and Parking Rules.‖ The licensee should document that the
highway route complies with DOT routing requirements of Subpart D to 49 CFR Part 397, or that
DOT approval has been obtained if it does not. For shipments by rail, DOT requirements for the
security of radioactive material shipments are found in 49 CFR Part 172, 49 CFR Part 174,
‖Carriage By Rail,‖ and 49 CFR Part 209, ―Railroad Safety Enforcement Procedures.‖
The application for an NRC route approval shall include the following information about the
planned shipping campaign and route as required by Section 73.37(b)(1)(vi):
•
Shipper, consignee (receiver), carriers, transfer points and modes of shipment
•
Statement of shipment security arrangements, including, if applicable, points where
armed escorts transfer responsibility for the shipment
•
Location of safe havens that have been coordinated with the appropriate States(s) for
road shipments
The licensee should also include the following in the route approval application:
4
•
Description of the cargo, including type of SNF, quantity of irradiated fuel elements, and
the radiation level at 1 meter unshielded (e.g., reactor type, number of elements, and
confirmation that the absorbed dose rate is greater than 1 gray per hour)
•
Package identification (e.g., package design, package capacity). (Note: specific
package identification parameters (e.g., serial number) may be submitted later if
unknown when the route approval request is submitted to the NRC)
•
Loaded weight of road transport vehicle or shipment rail car; for waterborne shipments,
weight of loaded package or cargo containers
•
Information about the planned shipping campaign schedule, including the following:
– number of shipments proposed in a series of shipments
– approximate duration of each shipment from point of origin to destination
– anticipated date(s) of shipment(s)
•
Justification for the staff’s priority review of the proposed route if the shipment is planned
for less than 60 days from the date of the approval request
•
Description of the route to be used, including route plan and mileage, safe havens along
the route, summary map of the route, detailed maps of the route, contact information
along the route, communications capability along the route, and confirmation that a route
inspection was performed (the description of the route selection criteria and application
format is discussed in further detail in Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2).
•
Propose alternate routes and shipping schedules such that each shipment departs at a
different time of the day if the licensee is planning to ship to the same destination for
multiple shipping campaigns. Shipping operations should not appear routine,
transparent, or predictable.
The licensee should submit the application for route approvals, including maps, tables, or charts
in both paper copy and on a compact disc or other appropriate electronic storage media. The
word processing file format used to develop the application should be the latest version of
Microsoft Word or in a format readily convertible. In most cases, route approvals contain
information designated as Safeguards Information (SGI). SGI must be stored, transmitted, and
handled in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21, ―Protection of Safeguards
Information: Performance Requirements,‖ and 10 CFR 73.22, ―Protection of Safeguards
Information: Specific Requirements.‖
The information requested above should be submitted, in writing, along with the request for
route approval to the following:
Director, Division of Security Policy
Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555
Upon approval of a complete application, the NRC will approve road routes for 5 years and rail
routes for 7 years of use. Port approvals will not carry a specific approval time; the port
approval will be consistent with the mode by which the shipment enters or leaves the port. If a
5
route is mixed (i.e., both rail and road), it will be approved for 5 years.2 For renewals and
amendments to existing routes, the licensee need only submit information containing changes
from the previously approved route and reference the previous approval.
Before shipping by rail, the licensee should verify with the rail carrier that a route the NRC has
previously approved is still the route posing the least overall safety and security risk. The
licensee should submit a request to the NRC to amend the approved rail route if conditions
warrant changes to certain segments of the route.
2.1.1. Route Selection Criteria
Licensees should apply the following criteria when selecting and developing primary and
alternate routes for road, rail, and waterborne SNF shipments:
•
Minimized transit time. Routes should be selected to minimize the time or distance that
the shipment is en route. When shipping by road, to the maximum extent practicable,
shipments should be on primary highways with minimal use of secondary roads and
should be made without intermediate stops except for refueling, rest, or an emergency.
Routes that are neither minimum distance nor minimum time in transit are acceptable if
the application documents that affected States and Tribes agree to the use of the route
and that it meets DOT routing requirements or that DOT approval has been obtained.
•
Availability of swift local law enforcement agency (LLEA) response. Select routes that
permit more timely LLEA response when assistance is requested.
•
Availability of safe haven locations. Routes should be selected that feature locations
either on or near the approved route where, in the event of a security-related
emergency, either security is present or from which the transport crew can notify or wait
for the LLEA to respond. Section 2.1.2.2 discusses safe havens in greater detail.
•
Avoidance of tactically disadvantageous positions. Select routes that avoid, as much as
practicable, passage through heavily populated areas and areas or terrain that would
place the shipment or shipment escorts in significantly tactically disadvantageous
positions (e.g., long tunnels or over bridges spanning heavily populated areas).
•
Availability of appropriate rest and refueling stops. Shipment routes should feature
sufficient locations for rest and refueling stops to allow flexibility in adjusting schedules to
accommodate unexpected situations.
•
Availability of good transportation safety design features. Road and rail routes featuring
advanced safety design features (e.g., divided highways, guard rails, limited access
highways for road shipments; high-grade track for rail shipments) are preferred over
those with portions in disrepair or that are obsolete.
When selecting a route by road, the licensee should physically inspect the proposed route.
Once a route is inspected, the licensee may use this information for future shipments over the
same roads. The licensee should determine whether a new inspection is warranted because of
2
NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-01, ―Expiration Date for NRC-Approved Spent Fuel Transportation
Routes,‖ dated January 24, 2006, sets the policy for 5-year approval of highway routes and 7-year approval
of railway routes. (see Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) accession
number ML052970029)
6
changing road conditions (e.g., significant road construction, demolition, or construction of rest
areas). An inspection is also recommended when re-approval of an expiring route is being
requested.
The road inspection team should consist of at least two personnel who travel the route to collect
data and monitor the communications capability along the route. Two-person teams are
recommended to perform these functions safely while driving. The road inspection should, at a
minimum, include locating safe havens, fuel, and food stops for the carrier; developing LLEA
contacts; and identifying potential driving problems along the route. When appropriate, the staff
may conduct its own inspection of the proposed route or portions of it.
2.1.2. Format of Route Approval Applications
The licensee should submit a letter to the NRC requesting approval of the planned road or rail
route(s) and U.S. port(s) where vessels carrying SNF are scheduled to stop. The information
requested in Section 2.1 should be included in the licensee’s request. The route overview and
specific details should be attached to the letter and protected against unauthorized disclosure in
accordance with 10 CFR 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22. The following sections describe the route
overview information and specific details expected in the submittal.
2.1.2.1. Route Plan and Mileage
The licensee should include the following information in the request to the NRC for approval of
planned and alternative routes for road, rail, and waterborne shipments of SNF:
•
origin and destination (i.e., specific locations and addresses)
•
estimated travel time for each segment (i.e., estimated time for each segment under
good conditions)
•
location of planned or available stopover points for each route segment (e.g., for food,
fuel, loading, or unloading)
•
escort arrangements for each proposed route and alternative route
•
firearms to be carried by armed escorts, if private guards are employed
•
location and arrangements for staffing of movement control center
•
plans for providing required communications capabilities
The licensee should include the following additional information in the request for approval of
planned and alternative routes for road shipments:
•
a mileage summary table that specifies the number of miles and accumulated distances,
with driving directions, for each road by State (see the sample mileage summary table in
Table A-1 of Appendix A)
•
detailed route plan tables that specify the route segments by county and by participating
Tribe’s reservation for each State (see the sample detailed route plan table in Table A-2
of Appendix A)
7
The licensee should include a mileage summary by State in the request to the NRC for approval
of planned and alternative routes for rail and waterborne shipments.
During the course of an actual shipment, circumstances may arise that preclude the use of
some portion of the approved route for an extended period of time. In this case, detours may be
taken provided that certain determinations are made and procedures are followed in lieu of
having specific advance NRC approval of the revised portion of the route. These
determinations and procedures are as follows:
•
Licensee determines that a portion of the approved route is impassible or that conditions
along the route will likely result in unplanned stops of 1 hour or more.
•
Licensee determines that it is impractical to use an alternative route that the NRC has
previously approved.
•
Licensee determines that the detour selected will most likely allow for uninterrupted
travel until the shipment is able to resume travel along the planned approved route or
along a previously approved alternative route, or that the detour selected will most likely
result in fewer stops or delays as compared to the planned approved route.
•
Licensee ensures that contacts with the LLEA along the proposed detour route have
been previously established or are established when a determination is made to use the
detour route.
•
Escorts notify the movement control center of the change in shipment itinerary, delays
experienced along the planned or alternative route, and estimated duration of the detour.
•
Licensee makes arrangements to provide any additional resources for physical
protection needed to comply with the specific requirements of 10 CFR 73.37(c), (d),
or (e).
•
Licensee notifies the NRC Headquarters Operations Center about the detour.
Escorts should anticipate the need for making unplanned detours so that the shipment may
keep moving without interruption. The shipment should not be stopped solely for the purpose of
making new LLEA contacts along the detour or informing the movement control center that a
detour is necessary, unless stopping is unavoidable, as may be the case if the escorts are
unable to establish communications with either the LLEA or the movement control center. In
these situations, the shipment should proceed to the nearest available safe haven before
making the stop.
2.1.2.2. Safe Havens
Section 73.37(1)(vi) requires that the licensee include the locations of identified safe havens
along road routes for temporary refuge or emergency assistance. These safe havens must be
coordinated with the State(s) through which the shipment will pass. Safe havens do not apply to
rail or waterborne shipments.
The licensee should identify safe havens along the route at routine intervals generally not
exceeding 50 miles. If intervals greater than 50 miles are proposed, the licensee should provide
8
justification for the greater distance. Also, safe havens should be as close to the highway as
possible, easily accessible by the transportation vehicle, controlled, and well lit.
Examples of possible safe havens include truck stops, rest areas, military installations, highway
patrol barracks, and weigh stations. Unless specifically approved by the State, hospitals, public
libraries, and schools are not acceptable safe havens. The mile marker or exit number
corresponding to each safe haven along the entire route in each State should be identified and
incorporated into the detailed route plan tables.
2.1.2.3. Mapping Requirements
The licensee should provide a summary map that identifies the origination and destination
facilities and the complete route that will be used for the shipment. In addition, the licensee
should provide detailed individual State maps of the planned route and any alternate routes,
indicating the locations of identified stops, boundary lines of any reservations of participating
Tribes along the route, and the safe havens that have been coordinated with the State(s)
through which the shipment will pass. Maps should be part of the word processing files or
images easily integrated into the final approval document.
2.1.2.4. Contact Information
The route approval request should include the contact information for each LLEA jurisdiction
along the planned route and, if applicable, the citizens band radio channels that each LLEA
typically monitors. The licensee should provide the following:
•
Twenty-four hour contact information available throughout the United States for the
LLEAs responsible for every participating Tribe’s reservation and county in each State
along the route.
•
Twenty-four hour, 10-digit emergency telephone number available throughout the United
States for each State along the route.
•
Contact information for the governor’s designee and participating Tribal official’s
designee for advance notification of SNF shipments for the route segment in each State
and participating Tribe’s reservation along the route.
As part of the review, the staff will verify that the contact information is correct and current. Both
the transport (i.e., driver and escorts) and the movement control center (see Section 2.4.1) will
use the contact information. In addition to the telephone numbers listed above, an emergency
number, such as 911, may be provided as a secondary number for the transport. However, the
licensee should demonstrate in its application that its method of communication (e.g., cell
phone, satellite phone) will reach the correct en-route 911 emergency response center. The
licensee should demonstrate that an en-route 911 call will not be misdirected, thereby resulting
in a delay of emergency response.
As stated earlier, routes will be approved for use over many years. However, during the
approval period, State and participating Tribe contact information may change. Before each
shipment of SNF, the licensee is responsible for ensuring that all the contact information along
the route is current. Updating contact information is considered a change that does not reduce
the effectiveness of the route and the licensee may make such updates to contact information
without prior approval from the NRC.
9
The contact information specified above should be provided to drivers, escorts accompanying
the shipment, and movement control center personnel monitoring the shipment. As required by
Section 73.37(b)(4), the licensee must ensure that such personnel are instructed in the proper
use of such information. If a large number of shipments are planned over the same route, spot
checking LLEA telephone numbers and contacts during each trip would be sufficient for
updating purposes. However, the licensee should perform more systematic verification
procedures if shipments along the route are infrequent (e.g., more than 6 months apart). Route
information verifications should be recorded on the shipment log.
The route applications should describe armed escort arrangements (including any transfers at
State or local boundaries), contacts, and coordination with State governors or their designees.
(While coordination with Tribal officials is not required, it is considered a best practice, as
described more fully in Section 2.2, below.) The NRC may conduct surveys of proposed routes,
including verifying the response capabilities of LLEAs along the routes.
2.1.2.5. Communications Capability along the Route
Poor communication may exist in areas along the shipment route. Therefore, the licensee
should provide NRC with information about the primary and secondary communications
capability along the route. The licensee should clearly identify areas along the route and any
identified alternative route within a State or participating Tribe’s reservation where poor
communications may exist. This information should be incorporated into the detailed route plan
tables.
2.2.
Preplanning and Coordination of Shipments
In addition to meeting the requirements in 10 CFR 73.37(b)(1)(vi) to obtain advance approval of
the proposed route, the licensee should preplan and coordinate other aspects of the shipment
before it begins.
Section 73.37(b)(1) requires the licensee to preplan and coordinate shipment details no later
than two weeks before the SNF shipment or before the first shipment of a series of shipments,
with the governor, or the governor’s designee, of each State through which or across whose
boundaries the shipment will pass. The objectives of this activity are to:
•
Ensure minimal intermediate stops and delays.
•
Discuss the State’s intention to provide law enforcement escorts.
•
Arrange for sharing positional information about a shipment when a State requests it.
•
Develop primary and, where applicable, alternate route information, including the
identification of safe havens.
•
Arrange the response to an emergency or call for assistance along the shipment route
with the LLEA.
The licensee also shall coordinate shipment schedules and itineraries with the receiver at the
final delivery point to ensure that the receiver is present to accept the shipment. Additionally, if
applicable, any transfer of custody (in which armed escorts transfer responsibility for the
10
shipment) during the shipment must be preplanned and coordinated to ensure that the required
written certification of the transfer of custody is properly documented and completed.
The licensee is also required to protect SGI in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21 and
10 CFR 73.22. Preplanning and coordination activities should address how this information will
be protected, especially the determination of the trustworthiness and reliability of any individual
whose assigned duties will provide access to the SNF shipment information.
The licensee should document the preplanning and coordination activities and protect sensitive
information as SGI as specified in 10 CFR 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22. The types of activities that
should be documented include, but are not limited, to timelines for outreach to States
(e.g., meetings, teleconferences), summaries of planning meeting discussions, and lists of
personnel contacted.
Although not a requirement, a best practice also would be to preplan and coordinate shipment
details no later than 2 weeks before the shipment or before the first shipment of a series of
shipments with the Tribal official, or the Tribal official’s designee of each participating Tribe’s
reservation through which or across whose boundaries the shipment will pass.
2.2.1. Avoidance of Intermediate Stops
To satisfy 10 CFR 73.37(b)(1)(iv)(A), the licensee should ensure that intermediate stops and
delays are kept to a minimum. Intermediate stops should be avoided to the extent practicable
because it is recognized that a shipment is generally more vulnerable to attempts at theft,
diversion, or radiological sabotage when stationary. Scheduled stops for SNF shipments should
be justified by a security or operational need for making the stop. When possible, stops should
be planned to serve multiple purposes and to avoid set patterns in the times and places they
occur.
2.2.2. Procedures at Stops
Shipments are vulnerable to attack while stationary. In accordance with
10 CFR 73.37(b)(3)(vii)(C), the licensee shall ensure that at least one armed escort other than
the driver maintains constant visual surveillance of the shipment and reports to the movement
control center at regular, pre-set intervals not to exceed 30 minutes during periods when the
shipment vehicle is stopped or the shipment vessel is docked. Maintaining surveillance of the
shipment during these periods is intended to ensure that any attack would be detected as early
as possible so that the adversary would have only a minimal amount of time to attempt theft,
diversion, or sabotage of the SNF before response forces arrive.
2.2.2.1. Stops during Road Shipments
The licensee should ensure that, when a shipment has stopped, the armed escorts maintain
visual observation of the transport vehicle to detect tampering with or unauthorized access to
the shipment. The visual observation by the armed escorts should include periodic walks
around the vehicle. Multiple armed escorts should be separated to prevent being
simultaneously incapacitated by a single adversary act. Additionally, 10 CFR 73.37(c)(2)
requires, as permitted by law, that each armed escort be equipped with a minimum of two
weapons (e.g., a handgun and a rifle or shotgun). This requirement does not apply to LLEA
personnel performing escort duties.
11
The licensee should ensure that the driver and armed escorts assigned to the vehicle
surveillance are provided with the following:
•
the means to immobilize the transport vehicle
•
the means to communicate with the movement control center and LLEA
•
the route overview information containing specific, direct LLEA contacts, other than
dialing 911
If the LLEA is not directly involved in the escort, the LLEA should be advised of the presence of
the shipment within its jurisdiction and the location, purpose and projected duration of the stop.
The LLEA should be requested to be alert for possible assistance calls during the stop.
Whether occupied or not, the doors and windows of the transport vehicle should be closed and
locked to impede unauthorized access. Before making the stop, the escorts should ensure that
communications equipment is properly operating and that LLEA contact information is readily
available.
All of the armed escorts should participate in the surveillance, as well as any drivers or
accompanying individuals not engaged in essential activities associated with the purpose of the
stop.
2.2.2.2. Stops during Rail Shipments
Procedures for maintaining visual surveillance of a rail shipment reflect the same concerns that
form the basis of surveillance procedures for road shipments.
During all stops, the licensee should ensure that the rail car is placed under surveillance by two
armed escorts positioned on the train within view of the shipment car. If the armed escorts
cannot or do not remain on the train, they should relocate to a protected position with an
unobstructed view of the shipment car and possible approaches to it. The escorts should have
immediate access to communications equipment and the route overview information containing
LLEA contacts and should be alert to external activities that may indicate a possible threat to the
safety or security of the shipment.
When practical, multiple armed escorts should be separated to prevent being simultaneously
incapacitated by a single adversary act. Additionally, 10 CFR 73.37(d)(2) requires, as permitted
by law, that each armed escort be equipped with a minimum of two weapons (e.g., a handgun
and a rifle or shotgun). This requirement does not apply to LLEA personnel performing escort
duties.
2.2.2.3. Stops during Waterborne Shipments
When incoming and outgoing waterborne shipments of SNF are temporarily located on a dock
or aboard a docked vessel, 10 CFR 73.37(e) requires the licensee to ensure surveillance by
either of the following methods:
•
two armed escorts stationed either on board the shipment vessel or on the dock at a
location that will permit observation of the shipment vessel or the points of access to the
shipment, if it is located in an enclosed cargo compartment
12
•
a member of an LLEA, equipped with normal radio communications, stationed either on
the vessel or on the dock
Section 73.37(b)(3) requires surveillance to be provided continuously for outgoing shipments
from the time the shipment arrives at the terminal aboard a road or rail transport vehicle to the
time the loaded shipment vessel leaves the dock. Incoming shipments must be placed under
continuous surveillance from the time the shipment vessel docks to the time it is loaded onto a
road or rail transport vehicle and begins movement from the terminal, at which time the physical
protection requirements governing road or rail transport shall apply.
These procedures also apply to intermediate stops at U.S. ports during which the shipment
remains on the shipment vessel. Visual surveillance of the shipment should be accomplished
by direct observation of the shipment or by observing points of access to the shipment if it is
located in an enclosed cargo compartment.
Armed escorts performing the surveillance should have immediate access to communications
equipment and the route overview information containing LLEA contacts and should be alert to
external activities that may indicate possible threats to the safety or security of the shipment.
Additionally, 10 CFR 73.37(e)(2) requires as permitted by law that each armed escort be
equipped with a minimum of two weapons (e.g., a handgun and a rifle or shotgun). This
requirement does not apply to LLEA personnel performing escort duties.
2.3.
Advance Notification of Shipments
Both 10 CFR 73.37, ―Requirements for Physical Protection of Irradiated Reactor Fuel In
Transit,‖ and 10 CFR 73.72, ―Requirements for Advance Notice of Shipment of Formula
Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material, Special Nuclear Material of Moderate Strategic
Significance, or Irradiated Reactor Fuel‖ contain specific requirements for advance notification
of SNF shipments. Before transporting SNF outside the confines of the licensee’s facility or
other place of use or storage, the licensee shall provide notification to the NRC. The licensee
shall also provide notification to the governors of the States, or the governors’ designees, and
after June 11, 2013, to the Tribal officials of participating Tribes or the Tribal officials’ designees
of any SNF shipment moving through or across the boundary of the applicable States or a
participating Tribe’s reservation. A licensee that conducts an onsite transfer of SNF that does
not travel on or cross a public highway is exempt from the requirements for advance
notifications for that transfer.
2.3.1. Advance Notification of the State(s) and Tribes
Section 73.37(b)(2) requires that advance notification delivered to a State or participating Tribe
by mail be postmarked at least 10 days before transport of a shipment within or through the
State or the participating Tribe’s reservation. If a notification is delivered by any other method, it
must reach the office of the governor, or the governor's designee, and the Tribal official or the
Tribal official’s designee at least 7 days before the scheduled transport of a shipment within or
through the State or the participating Tribe’s reservation.
Section 10 CFR 73.37(b)(2)requires that advance notification be in writing and include the
following information:
13
•
name, address, and telephone number of the shipper, carrier, and receiver of the
shipment and the license number of the shipper and receiver
•
a description of the shipment as specified by DOT in 49 CFR 172.202, ―Description of
Hazardous Material on Shipping Papers,‖ and 49 CFR 172.203(d)
•
a list of the routes to be used within the State or participating Tribe’s reservation
A best practice would be to provide within the advance notification a unique identifier for each
SNF shipment. An example of an identifier is ―ANO-1201,‖ in which ―ANO‖ would indicate the
shipper (in this example, Arkansas Nuclear 1) and ―1201‖ would indicate the first SNF shipment
from ANO in 2012. Referring to this unique shipment identifier—instead of resorting to more
obvious identifiable information when discussing the shipment in subsequent communications
with the NRC, States, and participating Tribes—would help prevent inadvertent passing of SGI
information through an unsecure method.
Section 73.37(b)(2)(iii) requires that the following information be contained in a separate
enclosure to the written notification:
•
the estimated date and time of departure from the point of origin of the shipment
•
the estimated date and time of entry into the State or the participating Tribe’s reservation
•
the estimated date and time of arrival of the shipment at the destination
•
a statement that schedule information must be protected in accordance with the
provisions of 10 CFR 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22 until at least 10 days after the shipment
has entered or originated within the State or participating Tribe’s reservation, for the
case of a single shipment whose schedule is not related to the schedule of any
subsequent shipment
•
a statement that schedule information must be protected in accordance with the
provisions of 10 CFR 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22 until 10 days after the last shipment in
the series has entered or originated within the State or participating Tribe’s reservation
and an estimate of the date on which the last shipment in the series will enter or
originate within the State or participating Tribe’s reservation, for the case of a shipment
in a series of shipments whose schedules are related.
In accordance with 10 CFR 73.37(b)(2)(vi), the licensee must retain a copy of the advance
notification(s), any revision notice(s), and cancellation notice(s) as a record for 3 years.
The State and participating Tribe contact information, including telephone number and mailing
addresses of governors, governors’ designees, Tribal officials, and Tribal officials’ designees is
available on the NRC Web site at http://nrc-stp.ornl.gov/special/designee.pdf.
A list of the mailing addresses of governors, governors’ designees, Tribal officials, and Tribal
officials’ designees is also available upon request from the following:
Director, Division of Intergovernmental Liaison and Rulemaking
Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental
Management Programs
14
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001
2.3.2. Advance Notification of the NRC
A licensee that transports, ships, imports, or exports SNF must make advance notifications to
the NRC at various times before and after the shipment begins, as specified in 10 CFR 73.72.
2.3.2.1. 10-Day Advance Notice
In accordance with 10 CFR 73.72, the licensee must notify the NRC at least 10 days before
transport of the shipment begins at the shipping facility. The licensee shall provide written
notification to the NRC Director, Division of Security Policy, Office of Nuclear Security and
Incident Response. Notifications that contain SGI must be made in compliance with the
requirements in 10 CFR 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22.
The notification should include the following information:
•
the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the shipper, receiver, and carrier(s)
•
the physical form of the SNF, quantity, type of reactor, and original enrichment
•
a list of the modes of shipment, transfer points, and routes to be used
•
the estimated time and date that the shipment will begin
•
for exports and imports of SNF: the estimated time and date that each country along the
route is scheduled to be entered
•
the estimated time and date of arrival of the shipment at the destination
2.3.2.2. 2-Day Advance Notice, 2-Hour Notice, and Delivery Receipt Confirmation
Section 73.72(a)(4)requires the licensee to make additional notifications after the 10-day
advance notification. The NRC Headquarters Operations Center shall be notified about the
shipment status by telephone at the phone numbers listed in Appendix A, ―U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission Offices and Classified Mailing Addresses,‖ to 10 CFR Part 73,
―Physical Protection of Plants and Materials.‖ SGI notifications shall be made by secure
telephone. The notifications shall take place at the following intervals:
•
•
•
at least 2 days before the shipment begins
2 hours before the shipment begins
once the shipment is received at its destination
2.3.3. Notification of Schedule Deviations
Section 73.37(b)(2)(iv) requires the licensee to provide a revised notice if the SNF shipment
schedule changes by more than 6 hours from the notification provided to the State and
participating Tribes. The licensee must notify, by telephone or other means, a responsible
individual in the office of the governor, or in the office of the governor’s designee, and in the
office of the Tribal official, or in the office of the Tribal official’s designee, about the schedule
15
change and shall inform that individual of the number of hours of advance or delay relative to
the written schedule previously furnished. In addition, the licensee must notify the NRC
Headquarters Operations Center by telephone at the phone numbers listed in Appendix A to
10 CFR Part 73. SGI notifications must be made by secure telephone.
If a shipment is cancelled after the advance notifications have been made, 10 CFR
73.37(b)(2)(v) requires that the licensee send a cancellation notice to the governor of each
State, or to the governor’s designee, and to each Tribal official or to the Tribal official’s designee
previously notified. The cancellation notice must also be sent to the NRC’s Director, Division of
Security Policy, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response. To avoid situations in which
State and Tribal resources are committed unnecessarily, the notice should be transmitted as
soon as possible after the decision has been made to cancel the shipment. The licensee shall
state in the notice that it is a cancellation and identify the advance notification being canceled.
While a telephone call is the preferred method of communicating a notice of cancellation, the
licensee must ensure that the notice does not contain SGI. As required in 10 CFR 73.22, an
NRC-approved secure electronic device, such as a facsimile or secure telephone must be used
if the notice contains SGI (e.g., detailed information related to rescheduling the shipment).
Section 73.37(f) requires the licensee that made the arrangements for the SNF shipment to
immediately conduct an investigation, in coordination with the receiving licensee, when a
shipment is lost or unaccounted for after the designated no-later-than arrival time in the advance
notification (i.e., the estimated arrival time). While the investigation is ongoing, all information
about the investigation shall be protected against unauthorized disclosure as required
by10 CFR 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22. Once the investigation is complete, the records shall be
designated and managed in accordance with these regulations.
2.4.
Communications
2.4.1. Movement Control Centers
Section 73.37(b)(3) requires the licensee to establish a movement control center that is
continuously staffed (24 hours a day, 7 days a week) by at least one individual with the authority
to coordinate physical protection activities during the active shipment. This individual(s) is
responsible for monitoring the progress of the SNF shipment to ensure its continued integrity
and to notify the appropriate agencies in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71, ―Reporting of
Safeguards Events,‖ should such an event arise. As required by Section 73.37(b)(3)(v)(B), the
licensee shall develop, maintain, revise, and implement written procedures that document the
duties of the movement control center personnel.
The movement control center operator should maintain a record of the status reports received
for inclusion in the shipment log (see Section 2.7 of this document). The operator also should
maintain a record of any deviation from the planned shipment itinerary, any significant incidents
that occur, and reports made to the NRC and others. The operator should have a copy readily
available of the route data for the shipment and should request assistance from the LLEA in
whose jurisdiction the shipment is believed to be located if the transport does not report in on
schedule or cannot be contacted, or if a request for assistance is received from the shipment
escorts. (Escort procedures should require escorts to request LLEA assistance directly in cases
when it is operationally feasible to do so.) The movement control center should be able to
directly contact appropriate LLEA in each jurisdiction; the center should not rely on calls to 911
systems to provide aid to shipments of SNF.
16
A procedure or device should be used to ensure that the movement control center operator
becomes aware immediately when a report from the shipment escorts is overdue. The operator
can carry out other work while a shipment is en route, provided that the other work does not
interfere with prompt response to incoming messages from the transport or with other
security-related duties.
2.4.2. Periodic Contacts with Movement Control Center
Section 73.37(b)(3)(vii)(B)requires escorts for road and rail shipments to notify the movement
control center at random intervals not to exceed 2 hours while in motion. Section
73.37(b)(3)(vii)(C)requires at least one armed escort to remain alert, maintain visual surveillance
of the shipment, and periodically report to the movement control center at regular intervals not
to exceed 30 minutes during periods when the shipment vehicle is stopped or the shipment
vessel is docked. Notification calls also should be made when the shipment undergoes a
significant change in status or when delays are encountered that will result in changes in the
shipment schedule or itinerary (e.g., when making an unscheduled stop or detour, or resuming
travel).
Section 73.37(b)(3)(v)requires the licensee to develop, maintain, revise, and implement written
communication protocols for use during an SNF shipment. These protocols should include a
strategy for the use of authentication and duress codes, the management of refueling or other
stops and detours, and the loss of communications, temporary or otherwise.
2.5.
Arrangements with Local Law Enforcement Agencies
In 10 CFR 73.37(b)(1)(v), the NRC requires that licensees make arrangements with LLEA for
their response to a security-related emergency or a call for assistance along the routes of road
and rail shipments, and at U.S. ports where vessels carrying SNF shipments are docked. This
requirement is designed to provide for rapid LLEA assistance in the event of a security-related
emergency or a call for assistance. It is also intended to ensure that the selected LLEAs along
the route are familiar with the types of situations to expect when responding to such calls.
Section 73.37(b)(4)(iv)requires the licensee to notify LLEAs of suspicious activities and to
request assistance without delay, but no later than 15 minutes after discovery of the threat.
The licensee’s application for route approval should describe armed escort arrangements,
contacts, State governor coordination, and, if applicable, points where armed escorts transfer
responsibility for the shipment. The NRC may conduct surveys of proposed routes, including
verifying the response capabilities of LLEAs along the routes.
2.6.
Armed Escorts
Section 73.37(b)(3)(v)(B)requires that the licensee develop, maintain, revise, and implement
written transportation physical protection procedures that address the duties of the armed
escorts.
The licensee must arrange for armed escorts in accordance with 10 CFR 73.37. Depending on
State requirements or availability, each State may provide the armed escorts, or the applicant
may need to contract armed escorts. This requirement does not pre-empt existing Federal or
State statutes or regulations on the use of weapons and use of deadly force.
17
As required by Section 73.37(b)(1)(i), each licensee shall ensure that each armed escort is
instructed in the use of force sufficient to counter the force directed at that individual, including
the use of deadly force when the armed escort has a reasonable belief that it is necessary in
self-defense or in the defense of others, or any other circumstances, as authorized by
applicable Federal and State laws. This requirement does not apply to members of LLEAs
performing escort duties.
The licensee should evaluate the State requirements for armed escorts moving firearms from
State to State in accordance with 10 CFR 73.37(b)(1). All armed escorts, with the exception of
LLEA personnel, must comply with and be trained in the appropriate State rules governing the
use of firearms.
In addition, as permitted by law, each armed escort shall be equipped with a minimum of two
weapons. The NRC recommends that each weapon provide separate and distinct response
capabilities (e.g., a handgun and a rifle or shotgun). This requirement does not apply to LLEA
personnel performing escort duties.
Section 73.37(b)(3)(vii), requires that armed escorts for road, rail, or waterborne shipments of
SNF successfully complete the training required by Appendix D, ―Physical Protection of
Irradiated Reactor Fuel in Transit, Training Program Subject Schedule,‖ to 10 CFR Part 73,
including the equivalent of the weapons training and qualifications program required of guards,
as described in Sections III and IV of Appendix B, ―General Criteria for Security Personnel,‖ to
Part 73. These training and qualification requirements do not apply to LLEA personnel or ship’s
officers serving as unarmed escorts. Appendix D contains a list of subjects the course should
cover. The detailed material taught under each subject heading should be adapted to the
particular modes of transportation used for the shipment that the armed escort will be assigned
to protect. The licensee may adjust the length of the course depending on the background and
the experience of the individuals selected to be armed escorts. The licensee should be
prepared to demonstrate the efficacy of the training program to comply with the NRC inspection
and enforcement program. One way to accomplish this is to maintain records of the licensee’s
evaluations (written tests, field tests, or observation of performance) of the trainees’ progress in
the instruction program and any remedial training required.
Training for the armed escorts also should address the need for the escorts to anticipate making
unplanned detours so that the shipment may keep moving without interruption. The shipment
should not be stopped solely for the purpose of making new LLEA contacts or communicating
with the movement control center. In some situations, however, stops may be unavoidable. In
these cases, the shipment should proceed to the nearest available safe haven before making
the stop.
LLEA personnel serving as escorts are considered to be adequately trained to carry out the
escort duties they are expected to perform and are not required to undergo the training
specifically required for private armed escorts. However, a member of an LLEA should be
briefed on the shipment procedures as necessary to perform the escort functions.
Section 73.37(b)(3)(vii) requires shipment escorts to provide notifications to the movement
control center at random intervals, not to exceed 2 hours, to advise of the status of road and rail
shipments while in motion, and at regular intervals not to exceed 30 minutes when the shipment
vehicles are stopped or the shipment vessels are docked at U.S. ports. These requirements are
covered in Section 2.4.
18
2.7.
Shipment Log
Section 73.37(b)(3)(iv)requires the movement control center personnel and the armed escorts to
maintain a written log for every SNF shipment. The log should contain information describing
the shipment and any significant events that occur during the shipment. Entries in the log
should be coordinated between the armed escorts and the movement control personnel
monitoring the shipment. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that protection
requirements have been carried out properly, to allow NRC staff to identify areas where
protection improvement is needed, and to ensure the availability of an accurate record of the
shipment to assist in resolving any questions of public concern about the shipment that could
arise after its completion.
The shipment log should include the following types of information:
•
names of shipping and receiving organizations, carriers, escorts, drivers (for road
shipments), chief engineers (for rail shipments), and vessels and their masters (for
waterborne shipments)
•
origin, destination, and approved route (copy of route overview)
•
general description of cargo and shipping containers
•
dates and times of departure and arrival (planned and actual)
•
dates, times, and locations of stopovers and custody transfers
•
identification of the movement control center and its staff
•
dates, times, and locations of status reports made by shipment escorts to the movement
control center, and schedule of expected status reports, as well as the name of the
escort making the report and the movement control operator taking the report
•
deviations from the planned route
•
other abnormal occurrences with regard to route, equipment, vehicles, personnel,
weather, traffic, or threats
In accordance with 10 CFR 73.37(b)(3)(iv), the licensee shall retain the shipment log for 3 years
following completion of the shipment and make the log available to the NRC upon request.
2.8.
Procedures, Training, and Control of Information
To comply with 10 CFR 73.37(b)(3)(v), the licensee shall develop, maintain, revise, and
implement written procedures for transportation physical protection to address the following
issues:
•
access controls to ensure that no unauthorized persons have access to the shipment
and SGI
•
duties of the movement control center personnel, drivers, armed escorts, and other
individuals responsible for the security of the shipment
19
•
reporting of safeguards events in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71
•
communication protocols that include a strategy for the use of authentication and duress
codes; the management of refueling or other stops, detours, and the loss of
communications, temporary or otherwise; and communication with the NRC in
accordance with 10 CFR 73.4, ―Communications‖
•
normal-condition operating procedures
To comply with 10 CFR 73.37(b)(3)(vi), each licensee should develop and implement a method
or system to ensure that records of transportation physical protection procedures are
maintained for at least 3 years after the close of the period for which the licensee possesses the
SNF. If any portion of the procedure is superseded, the licensee should ensure the retention of
the superseded material for 3 years after each change.
2.8.1. Procedures for Coping with Threats and Emergencies
Section 73.37(b)(4)(i)requires the licensee to establish, maintain, and follow written contingency
and response procedures to deal with threats, theft, and radiological sabotage related to SNF in
transit.
The contingency plan and procedures shall be retained as a record for 3 years after the close of
the period for which the licensee possesses the SNF in accordance with 10 CFR 73.37(b)(4)(iii).
Additionally, each licensee shall ensure that information related to the physical protection
procedures for coping with threats and emergencies is protected in accordance with the
requirements in 10 CFR 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22.
Upon detection of the abnormal presence of unauthorized individuals, vehicles, or vessels in the
vicinity of an SNF shipment or upon detection of a deliberately induced situation that has the
potential for damaging an SNF shipment, the contingency plan and procedures should direct the
armed escort to do the following:
•
Determine whether a threat exists.
•
Assess the extent of the threat, if any.
•
Implement the approved contingency and response procedures developed in
accordance with these requirements.
•
Make the necessary tactical moves to prevent or impede theft, diversion, or radiological
sabotage of SNF.
•
Inform the LLEA of the threat and request assistance without delay, not exceeding
15 minutes after discovery.
It is important to note that armed escorts are neither required nor expected to take offensive
action against aggressors (e.g., actively pursuing and apprehending suspected aggressors), but
they are expected to assume a defensive posture to delay and impede attempts at theft,
diversion, and radiological sabotage of SNF shipments as appropriate, considering threat
characteristics, shipment characteristics, and the primary requirement for personnel to provide
20
for their own safety. It is imperative for armed escorts, drivers, or other accompanying
personnel to contact response personnel without delay as soon as they detect a threat to the
shipment or to themselves.
If a shipment is lost or unaccounted for after the designated no-later-than arrival time in the
advance notification, the licensee that made the arrangements for the shipment of SNF shall
immediately conduct an investigation as required by 10 CFR 73.37(f). The receiving licensee
shall also assist in the investigation. While the investigation is ongoing, all information about the
investigation shall be protected against unauthorized disclosure as specified in 10 CFR 73.21
and 10 CFR 73.22. Once the investigation is complete, the records shall be designated and
managed in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22.
2.8.2. Training of Personnel Associated with Shipments
To ensure that personnel associated with SNF shipments are adequately prepared for all
possible scenarios, the licensee should develop and implement a documented training program
that covers the procedures set forth in 10 CFR 73.37(b)(3)(v) and 10 CFR 73.37(b)(4), to
include transportation physical protection procedures, normal operations procedures, and
contingency and response procedures. See Section 2.6 above for information on specific
training requirements for armed escorts.
2.8.3. Control of Shipment Information
The procedures for transportation physical protection shall be protected against unauthorized
disclosure as specified in 10 CFR 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22. The licensee should ensure that
procedures are developed and implemented to protect shipment information, procedures for
transportation physical protection, and all required records against unauthorized disclosure. As
required by 10 CFR 73.38, ―Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Irradiated
Reactor Fuel in Transit,‖ each licensee must also determine the trustworthiness and reliability of
any individual whose assigned duties provide access to SNF shipment information.
21
3.
SHIPMENTS BY ROAD
This chapter provides guidance on the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
requirements specific to physical protection of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) shipments made by
road. Requirements discussed in this chapter are in addition to and not a substitute for
requirements listed elsewhere in this NUREG that are applicable to physical protection of all
SNF shipments regardless of the mode of transport (road, rail or water). The requirements for
road shipments apply to all SNF shipment vehicles in a convoy, unless noted otherwise.
Information on 10 CFR 73.37(c)(3), (4), and (6) shall be protected against unauthorized
disclosure as specified in 10 CFR 73.21, ―Protection of Safeguards Information: Performance
Requirements,‖ and 10 CFR 73.22, ―Protection of Safeguards Information: Specific
Requirements.‖
3.1.
Protection of Road Shipments
In addition to the general requirements in 10 CFR 73.37(b), the physical protection system for
any portion of an SNF shipment made by road must meet the requirements in 10 CFR 73.37(c).
When SNF is transported by road, the transport vehicle must be accompanied by at least two
armed escorts. This requirement can be met in one of two ways:
1.
The transport vehicle is occupied by at least two individuals, one of whom serves as an
armed escort, and the transport vehicle is escorted by an armed member of the local law
enforcement agency (LLEA) in a mobile unit of this agency.
2.
The transport vehicle is led and trailed by escort vehicles containing at least one armed
escort each, for a minimum of three vehicles in the convoy.
Section 73.37(c)(2) requires, as permitted by law, that each armed escort carry a minimum of
two weapons. The NRC recommends that each weapon provide separate and distinct response
capabilities (e.g., a handgun and a rifle or shotgun). This requirement does not apply to LLEA
personnel performing escort duties.
3.2.
Communications for Road Shipments
The purposes of communication requirements for SNF shipments by road are to: (1) provide
the escorts with the capability to call for assistance when necessary, either directly to the LLEA
or indirectly through the movement control center, (2) permit personnel at the movement control
center to monitor the progress of the shipment, (3) provide the escorts with a way to quickly
develop new LLEA contacts and obtain new route information when unexpected detours
become necessary, and (4) provide a way to coordinate the movement of transport and escort
vehicles when more than one vehicle is used in the shipment.
In 10 CFR 73.37(c)(3), the NRC requires the transport vehicle and all escort vehicles to be
equipped with redundant communications abilities that provide for two-way communications
among the transport vehicle, escort vehicles, movement control center, LLEA, and each other at
all times. Alternate communication methods should not be subject to the same failure modes as
the primary communication method. The transport vehicle and armed escorts must use a
method capable of contacting the emergency phone numbers provided in the approved route.
22
If a citizens’ band (CB) radio is being used, all escorts and drivers should be knowledgeable of
the specific CB channels normally monitored by the LLEA and Radio Emergency Associated
Communications Teams (REACT) as they pass through different jurisdictions on the shipment
route. If an emergency arises, the occupants of each transport or escort vehicle are then
capable of independently contacting the LLEA by CB radio. This information should be
indicated on the route overview.
In addition to voice communication, 10 CFR 73.37(c)(6) requires licensees to ensure that
shipments are continuously and actively monitored by a telemetric position monitoring system or
an alternative tracking system reporting to a movement control center. The movement control
center shall provide positive confirmation of the location, status, and control over the shipment.
Additionally, the movement control center shall implement preplanned procedures in response
to deviations from the authorized route or a notification of actual, attempted, or suspicious
activities related to the theft, loss, or diversion of a shipment. These procedures will include, but
are not limited to, the identification of and contact information for the appropriate LLEA along the
shipment route.
3.3.
Immobilization of Transport Vehicle
As required by 10 CFR 73.37(c)(4), the transport vehicle must be equipped with NRC-approved
features that permit immobilization of the cab or cargo-carrying portion of the vehicle. This
requirement applies equally to all transport vehicles used in a single shipment. In this
requirement, immobilization means rendering the loaded transport vehicle incapable of
movement under its own power.
The purpose of this requirement is to deny an adversary who may succeed in gaining control of
a transport vehicle the ability to move or flee with the vehicle. The immobilization technique
should be implemented only when it is apparent that an attempt is being made to gain
unauthorized control over the shipment. Immobilization should not be initiated in a way that
would endanger the driver, escorts, or members of the public.
Immobilization procedures should be included in the contingency and response procedures
developed in accordance with 10 CFR 73.37(b)(4). As required by 10 CFR 73.37(c)(5),
operation of the immobilization technique and the procedures governing its use must be
covered in both the training course for escorts and the familiarization program for drivers.
3.3.1. Immobilization Device Performance Criteria
The immobilization device should meet each of the following criteria:
•
The immobilization device and procedure should be able to be operated and performed
from inside the cab of the transport vehicle by one person.
•
Immobilization should occur shortly (several seconds) after the immobilization
procedures are initiated.
•
After immobilization is accomplished, skilled technical personnel should require at least
one-half hour to return the transport vehicle to normal operating conditions. It should not
be possible, by coercion of the drivers or escorts, for an adversary to bypass the effects
23
of the immobilization or to significantly shorten the time needed to make the transport
operational again.
•
The device should pose no significant safety hazard before, during, or after the
immobilization.
3.3.2. Immobilization Device Design
Devices employed to effect immobilization may be mechanical or electrical. They should be
relatively simple and reliable to operate, so that they can be activated quickly under stressful
conditions. The following are some techniques that may form the basis for acceptable
immobilization procedures:
•
severing the main wire harness under the dashboard
•
disabling a critical portion of the ignition system by overloading or dismantling a key
component of the ignition system or starting system
•
disabling the gear shifting mechanism
•
using an electronic ignition control system with a procedurally irreversible time delay
feature
3.3.3. Format of Approval Request
The licensee shall submit a letter to the NRC requesting approval of the intended immobilization
device in advance. The device specification shall be attached to the letter and protected in
accordance with 10 CFR 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22.
3.4.
Training Program for Drivers
Transport vehicle drivers are required in 10 CFR 73.37(c)(5) to be familiar with and capable of
implementing transport vehicle immobilization, communications, and other security procedures.
The extent to which drivers may become involved in the physical protection of the shipment
depends on the arrangements made between the carrier and the shipper or receiver (licensee).
The greatest degree of driver involvement would occur when the driver is also a fully trained
armed escort and alternately assumes driving and physical protection responsibilities with other
armed escorts. However, in other circumstances, the driver may have only minimal
responsibilities in protecting the shipment. In all cases, as required by Section 73.37(c)(5), the
licensee must ensure that the driver is familiar with the basic security functions of transport
vehicle immobilization, redundant communications systems, and any other security procedures
that would affect the driver’s operation of the transport vehicle.
The licensee should review the roles and responsibilities of the driver and ensure that the
required training is conducted before the SNF shipment commences.
24
4.
SHIPMENTS BY RAIL
This chapter provides guidance on the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
requirements specific to physical protection of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) shipments made by rail.
Requirements discussed in this chapter are in addition to and not a substitute for requirements
listed elsewhere in this NUREG that are applicable to physical protection of all SNF shipments
regardless of the mode of transport (road, rail or water).
The transport vehicle in the case of a rail shipment is the shipment car carrying one or more
SNF packages. The requirements for rail shipments should be understood to apply to the
shipment cars as a group, unless noted otherwise.
Information identified in 10 CFR 73.37(d)(3) and 10 CFR 73.37(d)(4) shall be protected against
unauthorized disclosure as specified in 10 CFR 73.21, ―Protection of Safeguards Information:
Performance Requirements,‖ and 10 CFR 73.22, ―Protection of Safeguards Information:
Specific Requirements.‖
4.1.
Protection of Rail Shipments
In addition to the general requirements of 10 CFR 73.37(b), 10 CFR 73.37(d) requires the
physical protection system for any portion of an SNF shipment transported by rail to provide the
following:
•
A shipment car is accompanied by two armed escorts (who may be members of a local
law enforcement agency (LLEA)), at least one of whom is stationed at a location on the
train that will permit observation of the shipment car while in motion.
•
As permitted by law, each armed escort shall be equipped with a minimum of two
weapons. The NRC recommends that each weapon provide separate and distinct
response capabilities (e.g., a handgun and a rifle or shotgun). This requirement does
not apply to LLEA personnel performing escort duties.
The armed escorts may be private guards or members of the LLEA. The armed escorts shall be
trained in accordance with Appendix D, ―Physical Protection of Irradiated Reactor Fuel in
Transit, Training Program Subject Schedule,‖ to 10 CFR Part 73, ―Physical Protection of Plants
and Materials,‖ and should be thoroughly familiar with all security requirements. The armed
escorts should be alert to recognize any situations that might constitute a threat to the safety or
security of the shipment. See Section 2.6 above for more information on specific training
requirements for armed escorts.
A copy of the route overview data (i.e., route identification, mileage data, LLEA identification,
jurisdiction, and response centers, LLEA telephone numbers, communication channels
monitored by LLEAs, cellular and satellite phone coverage along the route) should be readily
available to the escorts at all times.
The escorts should maintain close cooperation with the train’s crew to ensure adherence as
close as practicable to the shipment schedule and to ensure that the crew remains aware of all
security requirements as the shipment progresses.
25
4.2.
Communications for Rail Shipments
The purposes of the communication requirements for SNF shipments by rail are to: (1) provide
escorts with the capability to call for assistance when necessary, (2) permit personnel at the
movement control center to monitor the progress of the shipment, and (3) provide the escorts
with a way to develop new LLEA contacts quickly and obtain new route information when
unexpected detours become necessary.
Section 73.37(d)(3) requires the train’s operator(s) and each escort to be equipped with
redundant communications abilities that provide for two-way communications among the train
operator(s), escorts, movement control center, LLEAs, and one another at all times. Alternate
communication methods should not be subject to the same failure modes as the primary
communication method. The use of telephones in call boxes located along the tracks generally
is not acceptable as one of the communication methods because the telephones may not be
available if the train is forced to make an emergency stop. However, call boxes could be relied
on for short intervals during which cellular and satellite phone service is unavailable.
If the train’s communications system is used, complementary communication capabilities should
be provided to ensure that the escorts will have immediate access to the communications
equipment when necessary, if it is located a considerable distance from the escort.
The shipment route overview should indicate areas where cellular, satellite, or other equivalent
communications equipment may not be effective along the route. For such areas, alternate
means of communication should be planned.
All equipment used to satisfy the communications requirements in 10 CFR 73.37(d)(3) should
be maintained properly and checked for proper operation before the shipment begins to ensure
that everything is in good operating condition before commencing the shipment.
As required by 10 CFR 73.37(d)(4), the licensee must ensure that rail shipments are monitored
by a telemetric position monitoring system or an alternative tracking system reporting to the
licensee, third-party, or railroad movement control center. The movement control center shall
provide positive confirmation of the location of the shipment and its status. The movement
control center shall implement preplanned procedures in response to deviations from the
authorized route or to a notification of actual, attempted, or suspicious activities related to the
theft or diversion of a shipment. These procedures will include, but are not limited to, the
identification of and contact information for the appropriate LLEA along the shipment route.
The operator in the movement control center is required to monitor the shipping container to
ensure its continued integrity while en route and to maintain periodic contact with the transport
vehicle, at a frequency not to exceed 2 hours.
26
5.
SHIPMENTS BY U.S. WATERS
This chapter provides guidance on the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
requirements specific to physical protection of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) shipments that travel on
U.S. waters. Requirements discussed in this chapter are in addition to and not a substitute for
requirements listed elsewhere in this NUREG that are applicable to physical protection of all
SNF shipments regardless of the mode of transport (road, rail or water).
For the purposes of these requirements, U.S. waters are considered to extend 3 nautical miles
from U.S. land territory, with the exception of small offshore islets. U.S. land territory includes
the 48 contiguous States, Alaska, the eight largest islands of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Northern
Mariana Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the three major islands of the U.S. Virgin
Islands. Security of sea shipments between 3 and 12 nautical miles out is the responsibility of
the U.S. Coast Guard, which also publishes detailed security requirements pertaining to
U.S. ports (Subchapter H, ―Maritime Security‖ to Chapter I of 33 CFR). Information identified in
10 CFR 73.37(e)(4) shall be protected against unauthorized disclosure as specified in
10 CFR 73.21, ―Protection of Safeguards Information: Performance Requirements,‖ and
10 CFR 73.22, ―Protection of Safeguards Information: Specific Requirements.‖
5.1.
Protection of Waterborne Shipments
The purpose of the requirements in 10 CFR 73.37(e) is to ensure that the licensee has provided
a capability for immediate, active protection of a waterborne shipment of SNF against theft, loss,
diversion, or radiological sabotage while the shipment vessel is docked at a U.S. port, and for
exports and imports, from the time the import enters the 3-mile zone until it arrives at a
U.S. port, and from the time the export departs a U.S. port until it leaves the 3-mile zone. The
licensee is to achieve this objective by ensuring that personnel who are on duty on or near the
shipment vessel have the capability to delay or impede such acts and to request assistance
promptly from local law enforcement agency (LLEA) response forces.
The requirements in 10 CFR 73.37(e) are applicable at any U.S. port through which the
shipment may pass. If a U.S. port is used during a transport, the licensee shall coordinate with
the U.S. Coast Guard and local port authorities to ensure that all parties are appropriately
informed of the material being received at the port and to ensure that the physical protection
requirements of 10 CFR 73.37, ―Requirements for Physical Protection of Irradiated Reactor Fuel
in Transit,‖ are complied with during port operations. In addition to the provisions of
10 CFR 73.37(b), a shipment vessel, while docked at a U.S. port, must meet either of the
following escort requirements:
•
two armed escorts stationed on board the shipment vessel, or stationed on the dock at a
location that will permit observation of the shipment vessel or the points of access to the
SNF shipment, if it is located in an enclosed cargo compartment
•
a member of an LLEA, equipped with normal LLEA radio communications, who is
stationed on board the shipment vessel, or on the dock at a location that will permit
observation of the shipment vessel or the points of access to the SNF shipment, if it is
located in an enclosed cargo compartment
Section 73.37(e)(2) requires as permitted by law, that each armed escort carry a minimum of
two weapons. Each weapon should provide separate and distinct response capabilities (e.g., a
27
handgun and a rifle or shotgun). This requirement does not apply to LLEA personnel
performing escort duties.
Additionally, 10 CFR 73.37(e)(3) requires that while a shipment vessel is within U.S. territorial
waters, an individual must accompany it who will ensure that the shipment is unloaded only as
authorized by the licensee. This requirement ensures that the SNF shipment is under
surveillance against possible theft, loss, diversion, or radiological sabotage and that any
necessary request for assistance from LLEA response forces is communicated promptly.
The individual accompanying the shipment may be provided in a number of ways. The
individual may come aboard the vessel at the time of loading (or stopover) in a foreign port, may
come aboard as the ship nears U.S. territorial waters (as do ship’s pilots), or may be a ship’s
officer who assumes this surveillance role as the SNF shipment enters U.S. waters.
The accompanying individual should be familiar with the vessel’s itinerary. Before the vessel
enters port, the individual should verify that the SNF shipment is intact and has not been
tampered with. During unloading of any cargo in U.S. territory, the individual should ensure that
the SNF shipment is unloaded only at the port that the shipper (licensee) has authorized.
Should any deviation from authorized handling of the SNF shipment occur, the individual should
bring the matter to the immediate attention of the ship’s most senior officer present. If it appears
that the SNF shipment is likely to be unloaded at a port other than the planned destination, the
individual should also immediately notify the NRC, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the licensee by
ship-to-shore radio, radiotelephone, or other available means.
5.2.
Communications for Waterborne Shipments
Section 73.37(e)(4) requires each armed escort to be equipped with redundant communications
capabilities that provide for two-way communication among the escorts, vessel, movement
control center, LLEA, and one another at all times. The purpose of the communications
requirements for waterborne shipments is similar to that of road and rail shipments, which is
primarily to ensure that a capability exists to contact the LLEA in case a threat is detected to the
safety or security of the shipment. The communications equipment provided may be the ship’s
regular ship-to-shore communications device, but alternate communication methods should not
be subject to the same failure modes as the primary communication method.
28
6.
BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS FOR UNESCORTED ACCESS
TO SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL IN TRANSIT
This chapter provides guidance on the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
requirements for granting and controlling unescorted access to shipments of spent nuclear fuel
(SNF).
Before granting an individual unescorted access to SNF in transit, the licensee shall complete a
background investigation of the individual, in accordance with 10 CFR 73.38, ―Personnel Access
Authorization Requirements for Irradiated Reactor Fuel in Transit,‖ to determine if the individual
is trustworthy and reliable. The requirements of 10 CFR 73.38 apply to vehicle operators,
escorts, and any other individuals accompanying the SNF shipment during transport, as well as
to movement control center personnel, reviewing officials, background screeners, and any other
access authorization program personnel.
The licensee is solely responsible for granting and controlling unescorted access to SNF in
transit. The licensee should use any information obtained as part of a criminal history records
check solely for the purpose of determining an individual’s suitability for unescorted access to
SNF in transit.
Section 73.38(j) requires licensees, contractors, and vendors to develop, implement, and
maintain written procedures for conducting background investigations for individuals applying for
unescorted access to SNF or for reinstatement of unescorted access, and for individuals denied
unescorted access.
The scope of the background investigation must include the previous 10 year period, or if 10
years of information is not available, then as many years in the past in which information is
available, as required by 10 CFR 73.38(d).
6.1.
Informed Consent
Before initiating an individual’s background investigation for unescorted access, the licensee
must inform the individual and obtain the individual’s written consent in accordance with
10 CFR 73.38(d)(1). The individual shall be informed of the types of records that may be
produced and retained, where these records are normally maintained, and the duration of
records retention. The individual also shall be informed of his or her right to review the
information and to ensure its accuracy and completeness, as well as to whom and under what
circumstances the information may be released.
An individual may withdraw consent to a background investigation at any time. When an
individual withdraws consent, all processing must cease as soon as practical. Withdrawal of
consent is the same as withdrawal of the application for unescorted access.
6.2.
Protection of Information
In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.38(f), licensees are required to protect
information collected while performing a criminal history records check and background
investigation. The following are guidelines for the protection of information:
29
•
Each licensee that obtains an individual’s criminal history records check, in accordance
with 10 CFR 73.38(c)(1), shall establish and maintain a system of files and procedures
for protecting the record and the personal information from unauthorized disclosure.
•
As specified in 10 CFR 73.38(f)(2), the licensee may not disclose the record or personal
information collected and maintained to persons other than the subject individual, his or
her representative, or those who have a need to access the information in performing
assigned duties in the process of determining access to SNF in transit. No individual
authorized to have access to the information may disseminate the information to any
other individual who does not have a need to know.
•
The personal information obtained about an individual from a criminal history records
check and background investigation may be transferred to another licensee in
accordance with 10 CFR 73.38(f)(3). This transfer may only take place when both of the
following conditions are met:
– if the licensee holding the criminal history records check receives the individual’s
written request to disseminate the information contained in his or her file and
– the acquiring licensee verifies information such as the individual’s name, date of birth,
Social Security number, sex, and other applicable physical characteristics for
identification purposes
•
The licensee shall make criminal history records checks obtained under this section
available for examination by an authorized representative of the NRC to determine
compliance with the regulations and laws as specified in 10 CFR 73.38(f)(4).
•
Under 10 CFR 73.38(f)(5), the licensee shall retain all fingerprint and criminal history
records checks received from the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) (including data
indicating no record), or a copy of such records if the individual’s file has been
transferred, for 5 years after termination of employment or 5 years after the individual no
longer requires unescorted access to SNF in transit.
•
After the required 5-year period, all personal information should be destroyed by a
method that will prevent reconstruction of the information in whole or in part.
6.3.
Background Investigation Elements
6.3.1. Fingerprinting and FBI Identification and Criminal History Records Check
Each individual who is seeking or permitted unescorted access to SNF in transit is subject to
fingerprinting and an FBI identification and criminal history records check as specified in
10 CFR 73.57, ―Requirements for Criminal History Records Checks of Individuals Granted
Unescorted Access to a Nuclear Power Facility or Access to Safeguards Information.‖ The
licensee shall review and use the information received from the FBI in the determination to grant
or deny the individual unescorted access to SNF in transit.
As specified in 10 CFR 73.38(c)(2), fingerprinting and the identification and criminal history
records checks and other elements of the background investigation are not required for the
following individuals before granting unescorted access to SNF in transit:
30
•
Persons identified in 10 CFR 73.59, ―Relief from Fingerprinting, Identification and
Criminal History Records Checks and Other Elements of Background Checks for
Designated Categories of Individuals,‖ and 10 CFR 73.61, ―Relief from Fingerprinting
and Criminal History Records Check for Designated Categories of Individuals Permitted
Unescorted Access to Certain Radioactive Materials or Other Property,‖
•
Federal, State, and local officials, including inspectors, whose occupational status is
consistent with the promotion of common defense and security or the protection of public
health and safety relative to SNF in transit,
•
Emergency response personnel who are responding to an emergency,
•
An individual who has had a favorably adjudicated U.S. Government criminal history
records check within the last 5 years, under a comparable U.S. Government program
involving fingerprinting and an FBI identification and criminal history records check
(e.g., National Agency Check, Transportation Worker Identification Credentials under
49 CFR 1572, Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives background check
and clearances under 27 CFR 555, Health and Human Services security risk
assessments for possession and use of select agents and toxins under 42 CFR 73,
hazardous material security threat assessment for hazardous material endorsement to
commercial driver’s license under 49 CFR 1572, Customs and Border Patrol’s Free and
Secure Trade Program) provided that he or she makes available the appropriate
documentation. Written confirmation from the agency or employer that granted the
Federal security clearance or reviewed the criminal history records check must be
provided to the licensee. The licensee shall retain this documentation for a period of
3 years from the date the individual no longer requires access authorization relative to
SNF in transit, and
•
Any individual who has an active Federal security clearance, provided that he or she
makes available the appropriate documentation substantiating that clearance. Written
confirmation from the agency or employer that granted the Federal security clearance or
reviewed the criminal history records check must be provided to the licensee. The
licensee shall retain this documentation for a period of 3 years from the date the
individual no longer requires access authorization relative to SNF in transit.
As mentioned previously, fingerprinting and the other investigative elements in 10 CFR 73.38 do
not apply to Federal, State, local, or Tribal law enforcement personnel.
Section 73.38(d)(1) requires the licensee to notify each affected individual that the fingerprints
will be used to secure his or her criminal history records check and shall inform the individual of
the procedures for revising the record or including an explanation in the record, as specified in
Section 6.7 of this guidance.
All fingerprints the licensee obtained under 10 CFR 73.38(d) must be submitted to the NRC for
transmission to the FBI.
6.3.2. Collection of Fingerprints
The licensee should have an authorized official, such as a representative from a local law
enforcement agency (LLEA), take the individual’s fingerprints. However, an authorized official
could be available through private entities, contractors, or an established onsite fingerprinting
31
program. If the licensee has fingerprints taken at a facility other than that of a recognized
Federal, State, or LLEA, then the licensee should ensure that the prints are taken legibly and
match the identity of the individual named on the fingerprint card. In these cases, the individual
taking fingerprints should, at a minimum, do the following:
•
Be trained to take fingerprints (training to take fingerprints is offered through the FBI, or
may be available from LLEAs and some professional associations).
•
Verify the identity of the individual being fingerprinted by checking a Government-issued
picture identification (e.g., passport or driver’s license) and comparing the name on the
fingerprint card to the name listed on the Government-issued identification.
•
Sign the block on the fingerprint card labeled ―SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING THE
FINGERPRINTS.‖
Section 73.38(d)(3) requires the licensee to submit one completed, legible standard fingerprint
card (Form FD 258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where practicable, other fingerprint records for each
individual seeking unescorted access to SNF in transit, to the NRC’s Division of Facilities and
Security, ATTN: Criminal History Program, Mail Stop T 06E46, Rockville, MD 20852.
Overnight mail is preferred. Include with the cards the name and address of the person to
whom the individual’s criminal history records check should be returned to for review.
Copies of the required forms may be obtained by writing to the Office of Information Services,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, by calling 301-415-7232, or by
e-mail to [email protected]. Alternative formats for requesting the forms are set forth in
10 CFR 73.4, ―Communications.‖ The licensee shall establish procedures to ensure that the
quality of the fingerprint impressions results in a low rejection rate because of illegible or
incomplete cards.
Licensees also may submit fingerprints to the NRC electronically. However, for many licensees
this option may be prohibitive because of the cost associated with purchasing electronic
fingerprinting equipment. To establish an electronic fingerprinting program with the NRC,
contact the NRC’s Facility Security Branch at 301-415-6511. Electronic submission of
fingerprints to the NRC must come directly from the licensee.
Once the NRC has reviewed submitted fingerprint cards for completeness, they will be scanned
and transmitted electronically to the FBI. The cards are retained and secured for approximately
1 month, after which time they are destroyed in accordance with Federal guidelines.
Any Form FD 258 fingerprint record containing omissions or evident errors will be returned to
the licensee for corrections. The fee for processing fingerprint checks includes one
resubmission if the FBI returns the initial submission because the fingerprint impressions are
unclassifiable (i.e., cannot be read by the FBI and used to identify the individual). The one free
resubmission must include the FBI transaction control number (TCN). Additional guidance on
resubmittal of fingerprint cards can be found in Section 6.3.3.
Fingerprints may be unclassifiable for several reasons:
•
incomplete impressions (fingers not completely rolled from one side of the nail to the
other)
32
•
left and right hands reversed on the fingerprint card
•
the same hand or finger printed twice on the card
•
fingerprints are not clear and distinct (smudged, uneven, too dark or light)
•
fingerprints on card missing or partially missing without an explanation
To avoid FBI rejection of fingerprints as unclassifiable, the licensee must ensure they are of
good quality and do not include any of these deficiencies, and that instructions on the back of
the fingerprint card have been followed completely.
The FBI has provided guidance on taking fingerprints for submission to the FBI at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/takingfps.html.
Fees for processing fingerprint checks are due upon application. Licensees shall submit
payment with the application for processing fingerprints by corporate check, certified check,
cashier’s check, or money order made payable to ―U.S. NRC.‖ (For guidance on making
electronic payments, contact the Facilities Security Branch, Division of Facilities and Security, at
301-415-7404.) Combined payment for multiple applications is acceptable. The application fee
is the sum of the user fee that the FBI charged for each fingerprint card or other fingerprint
record the NRC submitted on behalf of the licensee plus an NRC processing fee, which covers
administrative costs associated with NRC handling of the licensee’s fingerprint submissions.
The NRC publishes the amount of the fingerprint application fee on the NRC public Web site.
Once the NRC receives the FBI identification and criminal history records check results, it will
forward them to the licensee.
6.3.3. Resubmittal of Fingerprints
The overwhelming majority of fingerprint cards are returned as classifiable (i.e., can be read by
the FBI and used to identify the individual). However, if the FBI returns the initial fingerprint
submission because the fingerprint impressions cannot be classified, the licensee may retake
and resubmit them (i.e., through a new Form 258 or electronic submission) for a second
attempt. The licensee will not be charged for the resubmission if the licensee provides a copy of
the FBI response indicating that the fingerprints could not be classified or if they provide the
FBI TCN.
If the FBI is unable to classify the second submission of fingerprints, the licensee may submit
additional fingerprint impressions as follows:
1.
The third fingerprint card submission will require payment of an additional processing
fee.
2.
If the third submission is also returned as unclassifiable, the licensee may submit a
fourth set of fingerprints. An additional fee is not required because the fee for the third
submission includes one resubmission. As with the second submission, the FBI’s
response or TCN must be included or the submission may be treated as a new
submission and an additional fee may be imposed. The licensee may opt to submit the
third and fourth sets of prints together to avoid a potential delay in response. If the third
set is returned as unclassifiable, the NRC will automatically resubmit the fourth set.
33
3.
If the fourth submission is returned as unclassifiable, the licensee should submit six
additional fingerprint cards to the NRC for the individual. All six cards will be forwarded
to the FBI, which will select the best quality prints from each card to make a complete
set of fingerprints. An additional processing fee is required, which covers the processing
of all six fingerprint cards but does not include an additional resubmission.
4.
If the FBI is unable to obtain classifiable fingerprints from the six cards based on
conditions other than poor quality (e.g., medical conditions or physical anomalies that
prevent the taking of readable prints), then the NRC will automatically request a
background check based on a name search for the individual and will forward the results
to the licensee.
5.
No further submissions will be required and the licensee may consider the results of the
name search-based FBI identification and criminal history records check as a
component in determining the trustworthiness and reliability of the individual in
accordance with 10 CFR 73.38(e).
6.3.4. Verification of True Identity
Licensees shall, as required by 10 CFR 73.38(d)(4), verify the true identity of an individual
applying for unescorted access to SNF in transit to ensure that the individual is who he or she
claims to be. The licensee shall review official identification documents (e.g., driver’s license,
passport, Immigration and Naturalization Service Form I-9 (if applicable), Government
identification, birth certificate issued by a State, province, or country of birth) and compare the
documents to personal information data the individual provided to identify any discrepancy in
the information. The licensee should verify identity in the following ways:
•
Compare a valid (not expired) official photo identification (e.g., driver’s license, passport,
Government identification) with physical characteristics of the individual.
•
Cross-check and compare pertinent data from the background investigation with
information supplied by the applicant (e.g., Social Security number, date of birth,
physical characteristics of the individual).
Section 73.38(d)(4) requires the licensee to document the type, expiration, and identification
number of the identification or maintain a photocopy of identifying documents on file under
10 CFR 73.38(c), certify and affirm in writing that the identification was properly reviewed and
maintain the certification and all related documents for review during NRC inspections.
6.3.5. Employment History Evaluation
Section 73.38(d)(5) requires the licensee to document the employment history of the individual
seeking unescorted access to SNF in transit. The evaluation shall consist of contacts with
previous employers and should include the following information:
•
verification of claimed periods of employment or unemployment of 30 days or more
•
verification of periods of self-employment by reasonable methods (e.g., tax records,
customers, coworkers)
34
•
verification of length and nature of each period of employment, including reasons for
termination and eligibility for rehire
•
disciplinary history
•
any other information that would adversely reflect on the trustworthiness and reliability of
the individual as it relates to the individual being permitted unescorted access
•
verification of activities during interruptions of employment in excess of 30 days
Section 73.38(d) requires the licensee to use their best effort to verify a 10-year employment
history record; however, a minimum of a 3-year inclusive employment history immediately
preceding the application for unescorted access is strongly recommended. Best efforts include
such activities as documented attempts to contact previous employers and obtaining verification
by telephone, letter, or other means. If the employment history check could not be
accomplished for the entire 10-year period, the licensee should document this in an explanatory
statement delineating the reasons. Section 6.3.11 below describes the steps a licensee should
take if employment history cannot be readily verified.
For new hires without an employment history, the licensee will need to rely more on other
aspects of the background investigation. A lack of employment history need not be a negative
consideration in determining whether an individual is deemed to be trustworthy and reliable.
6.3.6. Verification of Education
Licensees must verify any claimed enrollment at an educational institution during the previous
10 years, as required by 10 CFR 73.38(d)(5). In addition, the licensee should verify the highest
claimed post-high school attendance leading to a degree, regardless of when the degree was
conferred. Section 6.3.11 below describes the steps a licensee should take when educational
history cannot be readily verified.
6.3.7. Verification of Military Service
Section 73.38(d)(5) requires the licensee to verify any periods of active military service that an
individual claims during the previous 10 years by reviewing a copy of the individual’s DD
Form 214 (―Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty‖). The licensee should also
contact the last duty station, verify the dates of the individual’s military service, determine the
conditions under which the individual terminated his or her duty (i.e., honorable or dishonorable
discharge), and if the individual would be eligible to serve again. The results of this contact
should be documented. Section 6.3.11 below describes the steps a licensee should take when
military service cannot be readily verified.
6.3.8. Credit History Evaluation
Section 73.38(d)(6) requires licensees to ensure that the full credit history of any individual who
is applying for unescorted access to SNF in transit is evaluated. A full credit history evaluation
must include, but is not limited to, an inquiry to detect potential fraud or misuse of Social
Security numbers or other financial identifiers, and a review and evaluation of all of the
information provided by a national credit-reporting agency on the individual’s credit history.
During the course of the credit history evaluation the licensee should ensure that its actions
35
comply with all Federal and applicable State and local laws and regulations that govern credit
history reports and access to such reports, including the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
For foreign nationals and U.S. citizens who have resided outside the United States and do not
have an established credit history that covers at least the most recent 7 years in the United
States, the licensee must document all attempts to obtain information about the individual’s
credit history and financial responsibility from some relevant entity located in the other country
or countries.
6.3.9. Criminal History Review
Section 73.38(d)(7) requires the licensee’s reviewing official to evaluate the results of the FBI
criminal history records check for an individual applying for unescorted access to SNF in transit
to determine whether the individual has a record of criminal activity that may compromise his or
her trustworthiness and reliability. The scope of the licensee’s review of the criminal history
records check must cover all residences of record for the 10-year period preceding the date of
application for unescorted access authorization. The licensee’s reviewing official is required to
evaluate all pertinent and available information in making a determination of unescorted access
to SNF in transit. The reviewing official should consider the following:
•
If negative information is discovered that the individual did not provide or that is different
in any material aspect from the information provided by the individual, this information
should be considered and decisions based on these findings must be documented.
•
Any record containing a pattern of behaviors that indicates that the behaviors could be
expected to recur or continue, or recent behaviors that cast doubt on whether an
individual should have unescorted access to SNF in transit, should be carefully
evaluated before any authorization of unescorted access to SNF in transit.
The licensee shall review the information received from the FBI and consider it, in conjunction
with the trustworthy and reliability requirements included in Section 6.3 of this guide, in
determining whether to grant the individual unescorted access to SNF in transit.
6.3.10. Character and Reputation Determination
The licensee must examine the character and reputation of an individual, as required by
10 CFR 73.38(d)(8), by conducting reference checks with current and former coworkers,
neighbors, or friends. Reference checks may not be conducted with any person who is known
to be a close member of the individual’s family, including but not limited to the individual’s
spouse, parents, siblings, or children, or any individual who resides in the individual’s
permanent household. References used to verify periods of employment or unemployment also
should not be used for the character and reputation determination.
The applicant’s reputation for reliability and trustworthiness should be verified through contact
with at least two references the applicant supplied and at least two additional references
developed during the investigation. The reference’s association with the applicant must be
substantive, such that the licensee can make a meaningful determination of the individual’s
character and reputation. The determination should emphasize the following:
•
criminal history
36
•
illegal use or possession of a controlled substance
•
abuse of alcohol, prescriptions, or over-the-counter drugs
•
susceptibility to coercion or bribery
•
any other conduct relating to an individual’s trustworthiness and reliability to perform job
duties
The licensee must document all contact with character references. In addition, the licensee
must document the source of the developed references. Section 6.3.11 below describes what a
licensee should do if references and developed references cannot be readily verified.
6.3.11. Inability or Refusal to Support a Background Investigation
As required by 10 CFR 73.38(d)(5), if a previous employer, educational institution, or any other
entity with which the individual claims to have been engaged fails to provide information or
indicates an inability or unwillingness to provide information within 3 business days of the
request, the licensee shall do the following:
•
Document the refusal, unwillingness, or inability in the record of investigation.
•
Obtain a confirmation of employment, educational enrollment, and attendance, or other
form of engagement claimed by the individual from at least one alternate source that has
not been previously used.
Independent information may be obtained through interviews with anybody who knows or
previously knew the individual, such as teachers, friends, coworkers, neighbors, and family
members.
The NRC understands that simple verbal confirmations of past employment, education, etc.,
and timeframe may be all the information an employer or other confirming entity may be willing
to provide on an individual. Although a simple confirmation of the nature and timeframe of past
employment, education, etc., would not in itself suffice to permit a licensee to find an individual
trustworthy and reliable, it would constitute independent corroboration of the accuracy of the
individual’s information about that period of personal history.
6.4.
Determination of Trustworthiness and Reliability
After obtaining and evaluating all of the information collected during the background
investigation conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 73.38(d), the licensee shall determine
whether the individual is trustworthy and reliable. If the licensee concludes that there is
reasonable assurance that the individual is trustworthy and reliable and does not constitute an
unreasonable risk for malevolent use of the material, then and only then may the licensee grant
the individual unescorted access to SNF in transit. The licensee shall document its
determination and the basis for it. The licensee shall maintain records of the determination for
5 years from the date the individual no longer requires access to SNF in transit.
The licensee is solely responsible for making a trustworthiness and reliability determination of
an employee, contractor, or other individual who would be granted unescorted access to SNF
while in transit. It is expected that licensees will use their best efforts to obtain the information
37
required to conduct a background investigation to determine an individual’s trustworthiness and
reliability.
The background investigation consists of a series of data points. Lack of a single data point
(e.g., inability to get employment history, inability to verify military record, inability to get
additional references) should not necessarily result in a determination that the individual is not
trustworthy and reliable.
6.5.
Reinvestigations
As required by 10 CFR 73.38(h), the licensee shall conduct fingerprinting, an FBI identification
and criminal history records check, and a credit history reevaluation every 10 years for any
individual who has been granted unescorted access to SNF in transit. The reinvestigations
must be completed within 10 years of the date on which these elements were last completed
and should address the 10 years following the previous investigation.
6.6.
Prohibitions
A licensee should not deny an individual unescorted access to SNF in transit solely on the basis
of information received from the FBI involving an arrest more than 1 year old for which there is
no information of the disposition of the case, or an arrest that resulted in dismissal of the charge
or an acquittal.
Licensees should not use information received from a criminal history records check obtained
under these requirements in a manner that would infringe on the rights of any individual under
the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, nor shall licensees use the
information in any way that would discriminate among individuals on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, sex, age, disability, veteran status, or genetic information.
6.7.
Right to Correct and Complete Information
Section 73.38(k) requires before any final adverse determination that the licensee make
available to the individual the contents of any criminal history records check obtained from the
FBI for the purpose of ensuring correct and complete information. The licensee must maintain
written confirmation by the individual of receipt of this notification for a period of 1 year from the
date of the notification.
If, after reviewing his or her criminal history record, an individual believes that it is incorrect or
incomplete and requests to change, correct, or explain anything in the record, the individual may
initiate procedures to challenge the determination. These procedures would include challenging
the criminal history records to the law enforcement agency that contributed the questioned
information. Or, an individual may challenge the accuracy or completeness of any entry on the
criminal history record by contacting the FBI at:
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division
ATTN: SCU, Mod. D-2
1000 Custer Hollow Road
Clarksburg, WV 26306
38
Instructions for a challenge to the FBI are set forth in 28 CFR 16.30, ―Purpose and Scope,‖
28 CFR 16.31, ―Definition of Identification Record,‖ 28 CFR 16.32, ―Procedure to Obtain an
Identification Record,‖ 28 CFR 16.33, ―Fee for Production of Identification Record,‖ and
28 CFR 16.34, ―Procedure to Obtain Change, Correction or Updating of Identification Records.‖
The FBI will forward the challenge to the agency that submitted the data, and will request that
the agency verify or correct the challenged entry. Upon receipt of an official communication
directly from the agency that contributed the original information, the FBI Identification Division
makes any necessary change to the individual’s criminal history record.
The licensee cannot make a final adverse determination based only upon the individual’s
criminal history record review until the licensee receives the FBI’s confirmation or correction of
the record.
Section 73.57(e) requires that the licensee provide at least 10 days for an individual to initiate
action to challenge the results of an FBI criminal history records check after the record has been
made available to the individual for review, although the licensee may allow more time. The
licensee may use its own judgment for other elements of the background information.
39
APPENDIX A
SAMPLE TABLES
A-1
Table A-1 Sample Route Mileage Summary
STATE
WAYPOINT/INTERSECTION
ROAD
DIR
TOWARD
DEPART ABC Licensee
STATE MILEAGE SUBTOTAL
STATE MILEAGE SUBTOTAL
ARRIVAL XYZ Licensee
STATE MILEAGE SUBTOTAL
ROUTE TOTAL
A-2
MILES TO NEXT
WAYPOINT
CUMULATIVE
ROUTE MILES
Table A-2 Sample Detailed Route Plan1
State:
Statewide Emergency Response Number:
Governor’s Designee and Phone Number:
Communications:
County/Reservation2
1
2
3
4
Satellite:
Cell Coverage:
Contacts3
Safe Havens4
Routes
The reviewer should verify that this portion of the application is designated correctly. The information
associated with the location of safe havens is designated Safeguards Information.
Identify each county and participating Tribe’s reservation within the State through which the shipment will
pass.
Identify the 24-hour emergency contact information for each county, when practicable. Twenty-four hour
numbers are preferred, but daytime phone numbers supplemented by after-hours phone numbers are
acceptable.
Identify the safe havens and their locations.
A-3
| File Type | application/pdf |
| File Modified | 2012-09-04 |
| File Created | 2012-08-31 |