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pdfVol. 79
Monday,
No. 22
February 3, 2014
Part IV
Department of Homeland Security
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Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Personnel Surety Program;
Notice
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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
[Docket No. DHS–2012–0061]
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards Personnel Surety Program
National Protection and
Programs Directorate, DHS.
ACTION: 30-Day notice and request for
comments; New Information Collection
Request: 1670–NEW.
AGENCY:
The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), National Protection and
Programs Directorate (NPPD), Office of
Infrastructure Protection (IP),
Infrastructure Security Compliance
Division (ISCD) will submit the
following Information Collection
Request (ICR) to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for
review and clearance in accordance
with the Paperwork Reduction Act
(PRA) of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–13, 44 U.S.C.
Chapter 35). The Department previously
published a notice about the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program Information
Collection Request in the Federal
Register on March 22, 2013, for a 60-day
public comment period.1 On May 21,
2013, the Department extended the
comment period an additional 14 days.2
In this notice, NPPD is (1) responding to
28 comments submitted in response to
the 60-day notice previously published
about this ICR, and (2) soliciting public
comments concerning this ICR for an
additional 30 days. This notice also
describes the nature of the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program Information
Collection Request, the categories of
respondents, the estimated burden (in
hours), and the estimated burden cost
necessary to implement the Chemical
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
(CFATS) Personnel Surety Program
pursuant to 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv).
DATES: Comments are encouraged and
will be accepted until March 5, 2014.
This process is conducted in accordance
with 5 CFR 1320.8.
ADDRESSES: Interested persons are
invited to submit written comments on
the proposed information collection to
the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, OMB. Comments should be
addressed to OMB Desk Officer,
Department of Homeland Security,
National Protection and Programs
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SUMMARY:
1 See 78 FR 17680 (March 22, 2013). The 60-day
Federal Register notice for Information Collection
1670–NEW, which solicited comments for 60 days,
may be found at https://federalregister.gov/a/201306184.
2 See 78 FR 29759 (May 21, 2013). The Federal
Register notice that extended the comment period
an additional 14 days may be viewed at https://
federalregister.gov/a/2013-12059.
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Directorate. Comments must be
identified by the docket number DHS–
2012–0061 and may be submitted by
one of the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://
www.regulations.gov.
• Email: oira_submission@
omb.eop.gov. Include the docket
number in the subject line of the
message.
• Fax: (202) 395–5806.
Instructions: All submissions received
must include the words ‘‘Department of
Homeland Security’’ and the docket
number for this action. Comments
received will be posted without
alteration at http://www.regulations.gov,
including any personal information
provided.
Comments that include trade secrets,
confidential commercial or financial
information, Chemical-terrorism
Vulnerability Information (CVI),3
Sensitive Security Information (SSI),4 or
Protected Critical Infrastructure
Information (PCII) 5 should not be
submitted to the public regulatory
docket. Please submit such comments
separately from other comments in
response to this notice. Comments
containing trade secrets, confidential
commercial or financial information,
CVI, SSI, or PCII should be
appropriately marked and submitted by
mail to the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, OMB. Comments
should be addressed to OMB Desk
Officer, care of the DHS/NPPD/IP/ISCD
CFATS Program Manager at the
Department of Homeland Security, 245
Murray Lane SW., Mail Stop 0610,
Arlington, VA 20528–0610. Comments
must be identified by docket number
DHS–2012–0061.
OMB is particularly interested in
comments that:
1. Evaluate whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary
for the proper performance of the
functions of the agency, including
whether the information will have
practical utility;
2. Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
3 For more information about CVI see 6 CFR
27.400 and the CVI Procedural Manual at http://
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_cvi_
proceduresmanual.pdf.
4 For more information about SSI see 49 CFR part
1520 and the SSI Program Web page at http://
www.tsa.gov/ssi.
5 For more information about PCII see 6 CFR part
29 and the PCII Program Web page at http://
www.dhs.gov/protected-critical-infrastructureinformation-pcii-program.
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3. Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
4. Minimize the burden of the
collection of information on those who
are to respond, including through the
use of appropriate automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other
technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology,
e.g., permitting electronic submissions
of responses.
Table of Contents
I. Supplementary Information
• Summary of Options Available to HighRisk Chemical Facilities To Comply
With RBPS 12(iv)
• Scope of This Notice and Commitment
To Explore Additional Options in the
Future
• Who is Impacted by the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program?
• What/Who is the Source of the
Information Under Option 1 and Option
2
• CSAT User Roles and Responsibilities
• Burden Resulting From the Submission
of Duplicate Records About an Affected
Individual
• Compliance With RBPS 12(iv) and the
Potential for Increased Burden to Enter
the Restricted Areas or Critical Assets at
a High-Risk Chemical Facility
• Additional Data Privacy Considerations
II. Information Collected About Affected
Individuals
• Option 1: Collecting Information To
Conduct Direct Vetting
• Option 2: Collecting Information To Use
Vetting Conducted Under Other DHS
Programs
• Option 3: Electronic Verification of
TWIC
• Other Information Collected
III. Request For Exception To the
Requirement Under 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3)
IV. Responses to Comments Submitted
During 60-Day Comment Period
V. The Department’s Methodology in
Estimating the Burden
• Summary of Changes From 60-Day
Notice
• Frequency
• Affected Public
• Number of Respondents
Æ Number and Type of High-Risk
Chemical Facilities
Æ Estimated Number of Affected
Individuals at Each Type of High-Risk
Chemical Facility—Unescorted Visitors With
Access to Restricted Areas or Critical Assets
Æ Estimated Number of Affected
Individuals at Each Type of High-Risk
Chemical Facility—Facility Personnel
With Access To Restricted Areas or
Critical Assets
Æ Summary of Alternatives to Estimate the
Number of Respondents
Æ Limitation of Respondents To Tier 1 and
Tier 2 Facilities
• Total Annual Burden Hours
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• Estimated Time per Respondent
• Total Burden Cost (Capital/Startup)
Æ Estimating Capital Costs for Option 3—
Number and Type of High-Risk Chemical
Facilities That May Choose to Use Option 3
Æ Estimating Capital Costs for Option 3—
TWIC Reader Costs
Æ Consideration of Other Capital Costs
• Recordkeeping Costs
• Total Burden Cost (Operating/
Maintaining)
VI. Solicitation of Comments
VII. Analysis
I. Supplementary Information
Section 550 of the Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act
of 2007, Public Law 109–295 (2006)
(‘‘Section 550’’), provides the
Department with the authority to
identify and regulate the security of
high-risk chemical facilities using a riskbased approach. On April 9, 2007, the
Department issued the CFATS Interim
Final Rule (IFR) implementing this
statutory mandate. See 72 FR 17688
(April 9, 2007).
Section 550 requires that the
Department establish risk-based
performance standards (RBPS) for highrisk chemical facilities and under
CFATS the Department promulgated 18
RBPS. Each chemical facility that has
been finally determined by the
Department to be high-risk must submit
a Site Security Plan (SSP), or an
Alternative Security Program (ASP) if
the facility so chooses, for Department
approval that satisfies each applicable
RBPS. RBPS 12—Personnel Surety—
requires high-risk chemical facilities to:
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Perform appropriate background checks on
and ensure appropriate credentials for
facility personnel, and as appropriate, for
unescorted visitors with access to restricted
areas or critical assets, including, (i)
Measures designed to verify and validate
identity; (ii) Measures designed to check
criminal history; (iii) Measures designed to
verify and validate legal authorization to
work; and (iv) Measures designed to identify
people with terrorist ties[.]
See 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12).
As explained by the Department in
the preamble to the CFATS IFR, the
ability to identify affected individuals
(i.e., facility personnel or unescorted
visitors with access to restricted areas or
critical assets at high-risk chemical
facilities) who have terrorist ties is an
inherently governmental function and
necessarily requires the use of
information held in governmentmaintained databases that are
unavailable to high-risk chemical
facilities. See 72 FR 17709 (April 9,
2007). Thus, under RBPS 12(iv), the
Department and high-risk chemical
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facilities must work together to satisfy
the ‘‘terrorist ties’’ aspect of the
Personnel Surety performance standard.
As a result, the CFATS Personnel Surety
Program will identify individuals with
terrorist ties that have or are seeking
access to the restricted areas and/or
critical assets at the nation’s high-risk
chemical facilities. Accordingly, in the
preamble to the CFATS IFR, the
Department outlined two potential
approaches to help high-risk chemical
facilities satisfy that particular standard,
both of which would involve high-risk
chemical facilities submitting certain
information to the Department. See id.
The first approach would involve
facilities submitting certain information
about affected individuals to the
Department, which the Department
would use to vet those individuals for
terrorist ties. Specifically, identifying
information about affected individuals
would be compared against identifying
information of known or suspected
terrorists contained in the federal
government’s consolidated and
integrated terrorist watchlist, the
Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB),
which is maintained on behalf of the
federal government by the Department
of Justice (DOJ) Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) in the Terrorist
Screening Center (TSC).6
In order to avoid unnecessary
duplication of terrorist screening, the
Department also described an additional
approach under which high-risk
chemical facilities would submit
information about affected individuals
possessing certain credentials that rely
on security threat assessments
conducted by the Department. See 72
FR 17709 (April 9, 2007).
The Department has developed a
CFATS Personnel Surety Program that
will provide high-risk chemical
facilities additional options to comply
with RBPS 12(iv) while continuing to
make available the two alternatives
outlined in the preamble to the CFATS
IFR. In addition to the alternatives
expressly described in this document,
the Department also intends to permit
high-risk chemical facilities to propose
other alternative measures for terrorist
ties identification in their SSPs or ASPs,
which the Department will consider on
a case-by-case basis in evaluating highrisk chemical facilities’ SSPs or ASPs.
As a result of the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program, regardless of the option
selected by the high-risk chemical
facility, the Department will identify
individuals with terrorist ties that have
6 For more information about the TSDB, see DOJ/
FBI—019 Terrorist Screening Records System, 72
FR 47073 (August 22, 2007).
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or are seeking access to the restricted
areas and/or critical assets at the
nation’s high-risk chemical facilities.
The first option is consistent with the
primary approach described in the
CFATS IFR preamble, as discussed
above. Under Option 1—Direct Vetting,
high-risk chemical facilities (or others
acting on their behalf) would submit
certain information about affected
individuals to the Department through a
Personnel Surety application in an
online technology system developed
under CFATS called the Chemical
Security Assessment Tool (CSAT).
Access to and the use of CSAT is
provided free of charge to high-risk
chemical facilities (or others acting on
their behalf).
Under this option, information about
affected individuals submitted by, or on
behalf of, high-risk chemical facilities
would be vetted against information
contained in the federal government’s
consolidated and integrated terrorist
watchlist.
The second option is also consistent
with the second approach described in
the CFATS IFR preamble. Under Option
2—Use Of Vetting Conducted Under
Other DHS Programs, high-risk chemical
facilities (or others acting on their
behalf) would also submit certain
information about affected individuals
to the Department through the CSAT
Personnel Surety application.
Option 2 would, however, allow highrisk chemical facilities and the
Department to take advantage of the
vetting for terrorist ties already being
conducted on affected individuals
enrolled in the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC)
Program, Hazardous Materials
Endorsement (HME) Program, as well as
the NEXUS, Secure Electronic Network
for Travelers Rapid Inspection
(SENTRI), Free and Secure Trade
(FAST), and Global Entry Trusted
Traveler Programs.7 All of these
programs conduct terrorist ties vetting
equivalent to the terrorist ties vetting
that would be conducted under Option
1.8 Under Option 2, high-risk chemical
7 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has
introduced SENTRI and Global Entry as Trusted
Traveler Programs since the publication of CFATS
in April 2007. The Department, therefore, intends
to enable high-risk chemical facilities (or their
designees) to submit information about affected
individuals’ SENTRI and Global Entry enrollments
to DHS under Option 2, even though SENTRI and
Global Entry were not listed along with the other
Trusted Traveler Programs in the CFATS IFR
preamble. See 72 FR 17709 (April 9, 2007).
8 Each of the DHS programs referenced conducts
recurrent vetting, which is equivalent to the
terrorist ties vetting conducted under Option 1.
Recurrent vetting compares an affected individual’s
information against new and/or updated TSDB
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facilities, or their designees (e.g., third
parties), could submit information to the
Department about affected individuals
possessing the appropriate credentials
to enable the Department to
electronically verify the affected
individuals’ enrollments in these other
programs. The Department would
subsequently notify the Submitter of the
high-risk chemical facility whether or
not an affected individual’s enrollment
in one of these other DHS programs was
electronically verified. The Department
would also periodically re-verify each
affected individual’s continued
enrollment in one of these other
programs, and notify the appropriate
designee of the high-risk chemical
facility of significant changes in the
status of an affected individual’s
enrollment (e.g., if an affected
individual who has been enrolled in the
HME Program ceases to be enrolled, the
Department would change the status of
the affected individual in the CSAT
Personnel Surety application and notify
the Submitter).9 Electronic verification
and re-verification would enable the
Department and the high-risk chemical
facility to ensure that an affected
individual’s credential or endorsement
is appropriate to rely on (i.e., an
indicator that the affected individual is
being recurrently vetted for terrorist
ties) in compliance with RBPS 12(iv).
In addition to Option 1 and Option 2,
the Department has considered other
potential options to help high-risk
chemical facilities satisfy RBPS 12(iv).
In particular, the Department has
investigated the feasibility of options
that would not involve the submission
of information about an affected
individual if the affected individual
participated in one of the programs
identified under Option 2. The
Department believes that, for the
purpose of compliance with RBPS
12(iv), simply relying on a visual
inspection of a credential or
endorsement is inadequate because the
credential or endorsement could be
expired, revoked, or fraudulent.
However, the Department has
concluded that information about an
affected individual, enrolled in a DHS
program that conducts vetting for
terrorist ties equivalent to the vetting
that would be conducted under Option
1, would not need to be submitted to the
records as those new and/or updated records
become available. Recurrent vetting is a Department
best practice.
9 When the Department notifies the appropriate
designee of the high-risk chemical facility of
significant changes in the status of an affected
individual’s enrollment, such a notification should
not be construed to indicate that an individual has
terrorist ties or be treated as derogatory information.
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Department if the credential in the
possession of the affected individual is
electronically verified and validated.
Accordingly, the Department plans to
offer high-risk chemical facilities a third
option. Under Option 3—Electronic
Verification of TWIC, a high-risk
chemical facility (or others acting on
their behalf) would not submit
information about affected individuals
in possession of TWICs to the
Department if the high-risk chemical
facility (or others acting on their behalf)
electronically verify and validate the
affected individuals’ TWICs 10 through
the use of TWIC readers (or other
technology that is periodically updated
using the with revoked card
information).11 Any high-risk chemical
facilities that choose this option would
need to describe in their SSPs or ASPs
the procedures they will follow if they
choose to use TWIC readers for
compliance with RBPS 12(iv).12
High-risk chemical facilities would
have discretion as to which option(s) to
use for an affected individual. For
example, even though a high-risk
chemical facility could comply with
RBPS 12(iv) for certain affected
individuals by using Option 2, the highrisk chemical facility could choose to
use Option 1 for those affected
individuals. Similarly, a high-risk
chemical facility, at its discretion, may
choose to use either Option 1 or Option
2 rather than Option 3 for affected
individuals who have TWICs. High-risk
chemical facilities also may choose to
combine Option 1 with Option 2 and/
or Option 3, as appropriate, to ensure
that adequate terrorist ties checks are
performed on different types of affected
individuals (e.g., employees,
10 Verification
and validation of an affected
individual’s TWIC requires authentication that the
affected individual’s TWIC is (1) a valid credential
issued by TSA, and (2) contains the Card Holder
Unique Identifier and correct digital signature.
11 The Department currently offers two ways to
determine if a TWIC has been revoked (or reported
lost or stolen). One is the Canceled Card List (CCL),
the other is the Certificate Revocation List (CRL).
More information about the Canceled Card List may
be found at http://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/pdf/twic/canceled_card_list_ccl_
faq.pdf. More information about the CRL may be in
the TWIC NPRM published on March 29, 2009 at
74 FR 13364 which may be accessed at https://
www.federalregister.gov/articles/2009/03/27/E96852/transportation-worker-identificationcredential-twic-reader-requirements#p-122.
12 On March 22, 2013, the U.S. Coast Guard
published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)
titled ‘‘TWIC Reader Requirements.’’ The
procedures for using TWIC readers that are
discussed in that NPRM would not apply to highrisk chemical facilities regulated under CFATS.
Likewise, the ways in which high-risk chemical
facilities could leverage TWICs as part of the
CFATS Personnel Surety Program do not apply to
maritime facilities or vessels regulated by the U.S.
Coast Guard.
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contractors, unescorted visitors). Each
high-risk chemical facility will need to
describe how it will comply with RBPS
12(iv) in its SSP or ASP.
In addition to the options described
above for satisfying RBPS 12(iv), highrisk chemical facilities are welcome to
propose alternative or supplemental
options not described in this PRA notice
in their SSPs or ASPs. The Department
will assess the adequacy of such
alternative or supplemental options on
a facility-by-facility basis, in the course
of evaluating each facility’s SSP or ASP.
Although outside the scope of this
PRA notice and the underlying ICR, the
Department would like to highlight that
high-risk chemical facilities also have
other methods to address, or minimize
the impacts of, compliance with RBPS
12(iv). For example, facilities may
restrict the numbers and types of
persons whom they allow to access their
restricted areas and critical assets, thus
limiting the number of persons who will
need to be checked for terrorist ties.
Facilities also have wide latitude in how
they define their restricted areas and
critical assets in their SSPs or ASPs,
thus potentially limiting the number of
persons who will need to be checked for
terrorist ties. High-risk chemical
facilities also may choose to escort
visitors to restricted areas and critical
assets in lieu of performing the
background checks required by RBPS
12. For example, high-risk chemical
facilities could propose in their SSPs or
ASPs traditional escorting solutions
and/or innovative escorting alternatives
such as video monitoring (which may
reduce facility security costs), as
appropriate, to address the unique
security risks present at each facility.
Summary of Options Available to HighRisk Chemical Facilities To Comply
With RBPS 12(iv)
The purpose of the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program is to identify
individuals with terrorist ties that have
or are seeking access to the restricted
areas and/or critical assets at the
nation’s high-risk chemical facilities. As
described above, under the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program, for each
affected individual a high-risk chemical
facility would have at least three
options under RBPS 12(iv):
• OPTION 1—DIRECT VETTING:
High-risk chemical facilities (or their
designees) may submit information to
the Department about an affected
individual to be compared against
information about known or suspected
terrorists, and/or
• OPTION 2 –USE OF VETTING
CONDUCTED UNDER OTHER DHS
PROGRAMS: High-risk chemical
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facilities (or their designees) may submit
information to the Department about an
affected individual’s enrollment in
another DHS program so that the
Department may electronically verify
and validate that the affected individual
is enrolled in the other program, and/or
• OPTION 3—ELECTRONIC
VERIFICATION OF TWIC: High-risk
chemical facilities may electronically
verify and validate an affected
individual’s TWIC, through the use of
TWIC readers (or other technology
which is periodically updated with
revoked card information), rather than
submitting information about the
affected individual to the Department.
Regardless of the option, in the event
that there is a potential match, the
Department has procedures in place that
it will follow to resolve the match and
coordinate with appropriate law
enforcement entities as necessary.
The Department intends to provide
high-risk chemical facilities, and their
designees, the ability to create an alert
within the CSAT Personnel Surety
application that can notify them when
the Department has received
information about an affected
individual(s), under Option 1 or Option
2. Further, the Department will also
allow high-risk chemical facilities the
ability to view the status (e.g., that some
information about an affected individual
has been inputted into CSAT but not yet
submitted to the Department under
Option 1 or Option 2; that information
about an affected individual has been
submitted; etc.) of records about affected
individuals associated with their facility
within the CSAT Personnel Surety
application.
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Scope of This Notice and Commitment
To Explore Additional Options in the
Future
Between August 2012, and
publication of the 60-day notice in
March 2013, the Department had
substantial dialogue with key CFATS
stakeholders. The discussion included
program design issues, the CSAT
Personnel Surety application, options
the Department has been considering to
date, and additional options
stakeholders have recommended for the
Department’s consideration, both in the
short and long term.
The options described in this notice
and, if approved, the ICR that the
Department will submit to OMB would
allow high-risk chemical facilities and
the Department to implement the
CFATS Personnel Surety Program
within the Department’s existing
statutory and regulatory authority, and
U.S. Government watchlisting policies.
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The Department is committed,
however, to continuing to work with
interested stakeholders to identify
additional potential options that could
further reduce the burdens related to the
CFATS Personnel Surety Program,
while still meeting the national security
mandate to reduce the risk of an
individual with terrorist ties obtaining
access to the restricted areas or critical
assets at a high-risk chemical facility.
The Department will consider and
review any alternatives suggested as
part of public comments on this notice.
Through both the PRA process and
other ongoing dialogues, the Department
will, as appropriate, also continue to
work with stakeholders to identify
potential additional alternatives as new
technologies emerge, and as other
terrorist ties vetting programs are
modified or become available over time,
so as to reduce the burden of this new
information collection.
Who is Impacted by the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program?
The CFATS Personnel Surety Program
will provide high-risk chemical
facilities the ability to submit certain
biographic information about affected
individuals to the Department. As
explained above, affected individuals
are (1) facility personnel who have
access, either unescorted or otherwise,
to restricted areas or critical assets, and
(2) unescorted visitors who have access
to restricted areas or critical assets.
There are also certain groups of
persons that the Department does not
consider to be affected individuals, such
as (1) Federal officials that gain
unescorted access to restricted areas or
critical assets as part of their official
duties; (2) state and local law
enforcement officials that gain
unescorted access to restricted areas or
critical assets as part of their official
duties; and (3) emergency responders at
the state or local level that gain
unescorted access to restricted areas or
critical assets during emergency
situations.
In some emergency or exigent
situations, access to restricted areas or
critical assets by other individuals who
have not had appropriate background
checks under RBPS 12 may be
necessary. For example, emergency
responders not described above may
require such access as part of their
official duties under appropriate
circumstances. If high-risk chemical
facilities anticipate that any individuals
will require access to restricted areas or
critical assets without visitor escorts or
without the background checks listed in
RBPS 12 under exceptional
circumstances (e.g., foreseeable but
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6421
unpredictable circumstances), facilities
may describe such situations and the
types of individuals who might require
access in those situations in their SSPs
or ASPs. The Department will assess the
appropriateness of such situations, and
any security measures to mitigate the
inherent vulnerability in such
situations, on a case-by-case basis as it
reviews each high-risk chemical
facility’s SSP or ASP.
What/Who is the Source of the
Information Under Option 1 And
Option 2
High-risk chemical facilities are
responsible for complying with RBPS
12(iv). However, companies operating
multiple high-risk chemical facilities, as
well as companies operating only one
high-risk chemical facility, may comply
with RBPS 12(iv) in a variety of ways.
High-risk chemical facilities, or their
parent companies, may choose to
comply with RBPS 12(iv) by identifying
and submitting the information about
affected individuals to the Department
directly. Alternatively, high-risk
chemical facilities, or their parent
companies, may choose to comply with
RBPS 12(iv) by outsourcing the
information submission process to third
parties.
The Department anticipates that many
high-risk chemical facilities will rely on
businesses that provide contract
services (e.g., complex turn-arounds,
freight delivery services, lawn mowing)
to the high-risk chemical facilities to
identify and submit the appropriate
information about affected individuals
they employ to the Department for
vetting pursuant to RBPS 12(iv).
Businesses that provide services to highrisk chemical facilities may in turn
choose to manage compliance with
RBPS 12(iv) themselves or to acquire the
services of other third party companies
to submit appropriate information about
affected individuals to the Department.
CSAT User Roles and Responsibilities
To minimize the burden of submitting
information about affected individuals,
under Options 1 and 2 (as described
above), high-risk chemical facilities
would have wide latitude in assigning
CSAT user roles to align with their
business operations and/or the business
operations of third parties that provide
contracted services to them.13
Furthermore, the Department intends to
structure the CSAT Personnel Surety
application to allow designees of high13 CSAT user registration and the assignment of
user roles within CSAT are covered under a
different Information Collection (i.e., 1670–0007),
which can be found at http://www.reginfo.gov/
public/do/PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=201001-1670-007#.
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risk chemical facilities to submit
information about affected individuals
directly to the Department on behalf of
high-risk chemical facilities.
High-risk chemical facilities and their
designees will be able to structure their
CSAT user roles to submit information
about affected individuals to the
Department in several ways:
(1) A high-risk chemical facility could
directly submit information about
affected individuals, and designate one
or more officers or employees of the
facility with appropriate CSAT user
roles; and/or
(2) A high-risk chemical facility could
ensure the submission of information
about affected individuals by
designating one or more persons
affiliated with a third party (or with
multiple third parties); and/or
(3) A company owning several highrisk chemical facilities could
consolidate its submission process for
affected individuals. Specifically, the
company could designate one or more
persons to submit information about
affected individuals on behalf of all of
the high-risk chemical facilities on a
company-wide basis.
The Department may, upon request,
also consider allowing CSAT users with
the ability to submit information about
affected individuals to the Department
via a Web-service. The ability to submit
information about affected individuals
via a Web-service will be provided on
a case by cases basis, when in the
opinion of the Department, sufficient
additional security and privacy
safeguards have been agreed to by the
CSAT user.14
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
Burden Resulting From the Submission
of Duplicate Records About an Affected
Individual
The Department is aware that an
affected individual may be associated
with multiple high-risk chemical
facilities, and thus information about an
affected individual may be submitted to
the Department multiple times by
different high-risk chemical facilities
and/or their designated third parties.
However, the Department has learned in
its dialogue with stakeholders
(including third-party companies that
conduct background checks for highrisk chemical facilities) that the
duplicate submission of records about
affected individuals is a common
industry practice for companies when
managing information about
individuals. Specifically, when a person
who has already had a background
14 A Web-service is software system designed to
support interoperable machine-to-machine
interaction over a network.
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check (e.g., verification of legal
authorization to work or criminal
history) needs a new background check
for different companies or for a new or
different purpose (e.g., change in jobs or
contract), third parties that routinely
conduct background checks routinely
will submit information about a person
again to agencies responsible for
maintaining relevant information (e.g.,
state government agencies responsible
for maintaining state motor vehicle
databases). Therefore, for the purpose of
this notice, the Department’s estimation
of burden accounts for potential
multiple submissions of information
about affected individuals by high-risk
chemical facilities and their designated
third parties.
Compliance With RBPS 12(iv) and the
Potential for Increased Burden To Enter
the Restricted Areas or Critical Assets at
a High-Risk Chemical Facility
Since the Department first began
seeking to implement the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program, stakeholders
have expressed concern that the
submission of information about
affected individuals under Option 1 and
Option 2 to the Department would
impede the ability of affected
individuals to enter the restricted areas
or critical assets at high-risk chemical
facilities. The Department does not
believe that if a facility complies with
RBPS 12(iv) the high-risk chemical
facility will, on a routine basis,
experience an unreasonable impact in
allowing affected individuals access to
restricted areas or critical assets.
In general, the Department expects
that high-risk chemical facilities or their
designees (e.g., third parties or
companies employing affected
individuals that provide services to
high-risk chemical facilities) will
already possess much, if not all, of the
necessary information about affected
individuals as a result of standard
business practices related to
employment or managing of service
contracts. In the event that high-risk
chemical facilities, or their designees,
need to collect any additional
information for the purpose of
complying with RBPS 12(iv), they have
significant flexibility in how to collect
this information since CFATS does not
prescribe how to do so.
The Department also expects that
high-risk chemical facilities will likely
consolidate RBPS 12(iv) processing with
related routine hiring and access control
procedures involving background
checks that are already occurring prior
to access by facility personnel or
unescorted visitors to restricted areas or
critical assets. Consolidating RBPS
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12(iv) processing with these other
routine procedures would allow
submission of personal information
already collected and maintained by
facilities or their designees (e.g., a third
party, contracted service company, or
third party acting on behalf of a
contracted service company) to the
Department under RBPS 12(iv) before
affected individuals require access to
restricted areas or critical assets.
As mentioned above, third parties
could submit screening information to
the Department on behalf of high-risk
chemical facilities as part of facilities’
routine hiring and access control
procedures. Some stakeholders have
expressed concerns to the Department
about submission of screening
information by third parties, suggesting
that in such cases facilities would not be
able to adequately oversee third parties’
work to ensure appropriate information
submission to the Department. The
Department expects, however, that highrisk chemical facilities could audit and/
or review their third party designees’
information collection and submission
processes, to ensure that their designees
submit appropriate information.
The Department has provided below
several illustrative examples about how
high-risk chemical facilitates or
designees are likely to consolidate RBPS
12(iv) processing with routine
background check activities related to
those required by RBPS 12(i)–(iii),
namely, (i) measures designed to verify
and validate identity; (ii) measures
designed to check criminal history; and
(iii) measures designed to verify and
validate legal authorization to work. By
consolidating RBPS 12(iv) with routine
background check activities related to
RBPS 12(i)-(iii), high-risk chemical
facilities will likely choose to
incorporate the submission of
information about affected individuals
to the Department under RBPS 12(iv)
into the routine background check
activities required by RBPS 12(i)–(iii).
Although estimating the burden of
RBPS 12(i)–(iii) is not within the scope
of this Paperwork Reduction Act notice,
when and how high-risk chemical
facilities could collect information for
submission to the Department has
influenced the Department’s design of
the CFATS Personnel Surety Program.
The Department believes that the
illustrative examples provided below
show how, if the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program is implemented, a highrisk chemical facility and its associated
third party companies could access the
CSAT Personnel Surety application for
purposes of submitting terrorist ties
screening information to the Department
on its behalf under RBPS 12(iv), in
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tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
coordination with other normal
business activities not required by RBPS
12(iv).
SCENARIO #1: Employees Who Are
‘‘Facility Personnel’’
This scenario could apply to a highrisk chemical facility that has a number
of employees it deems in its SSP or ASP
to be ‘‘facility personnel’’ with access to
restricted areas and/or critical assets.
In its SSP or ASP, the high-risk
chemical facility could choose to
comply with RBPS 12(i)–(iii) for these
employees by either:
• Hiring a third party background
check company to perform identity,
criminal history, and legal authorization
to work background checks on these
employees.
Æ A contract or agreement between
the high-risk chemical facility and the
third party could establish the criteria
for these background checks, and could
establish which background check
results qualify individuals to access the
restricted areas or critical assets at the
high-risk chemical facility or disqualify
individuals from accessing the restricted
areas or critical assets at the high-risk
chemical facility.
Æ The third party could submit
appropriate information, under Option 1
and/or Option 2, to the Department
while it conducts these identity,
criminal history, and legal authorization
to work background checks.
Æ The high-risk chemical facility
could audit or review the background
checks being conducted to ensure
contractual compliance.
Or,
• Performing identity, criminal
history, and legal authorization to work
background checks itself.
Æ The high-risk chemical facility
could establish the criteria for these
background checks, and could establish
which background check results qualify
individuals to access the restricted areas
or critical assets at the high-risk
chemical facility or disqualify
individuals from accessing the restricted
areas or critical assets at the high-risk
chemical facility.
Æ The facility could submit
appropriate information, under Option 1
and/or Option 2, to the Department
while it conducts these identity,
criminal history, and legal authorization
to work background checks.
Prior to an employee being granted
access to restricted areas or critical
assets (i.e., prior to being issued a
facility-specific access credential/card,
or door/gate key(s)), identity, criminal
history, and legal authorization to work
background checks could be completed
by the third party or the high-risk
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chemical facility in accordance with the
high-risk chemical facility’s SSP or ASP.
If appropriate, based upon the results of
those background checks, the employee
could then be determined suitable to
access the high-risk chemical facility’s
restricted areas and/or critical assets.
The third party or the high-risk
chemical facility could then report its
suitability finding to the appropriate
party at the high-risk chemical facility
so that facility-specific access
credentials/cards, or door/gate key(s)
could be granted, if appropriate.
Completion of submission of
information about the affected
individual to the Department in
compliance with RBPS 12(iv) therefore
would not impede the routine access
control procedures of the high-risk
chemical facility because the
information submission would likely be
accomplished in concert with the other
background check activities, prior to
access.
SCENARIO #2: Resident Contractors
Who Are ‘‘Facility Personnel’’
This scenario could apply to a highrisk chemical facility that has a number
of resident contractors it deems in its
SSP or ASP to be ‘‘facility personnel’’
with access to restricted areas or critical
assets.
In its SSP or ASP, the high-risk
chemical facility could choose to
comply with RBPS 12(i)–(iii) for
resident contractors by:
• Stipulating in a contract between
the high-risk chemical facility and the
company employing the resident
contractors that the contractors’
employer will perform or provide for
identity, criminal history, and legal
authorization to work background
checks to be conducted on the resident
contractors.
Æ A contract or agreement between
the high-risk chemical facility and the
company employing the resident
contractors could establish the criteria
for these background checks, and could
establish which background check
results qualify individuals to access the
restricted areas or critical assets at the
high-risk chemical facility or disqualify
individuals from accessing the restricted
areas or critical assets at the high-risk
chemical facility.
Æ The high-risk chemical facility
could audit or review the background
checks being conducted to ensure
contractual compliance.
• Prior to a resident contractor being
granted access to the restricted areas or
critical assets of the high-risk chemical
facility (i.e., being issued a facilityspecific access credential/card, door/
gate key(s)), identity, criminal history,
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6423
and legal authorization to work
background checks could be completed
by the company employing the resident
contractor in accordance with the highrisk chemical facility’s SSP or ASP.
Æ The company employing the
resident contractor could conduct these
identity, criminal history, and legal
authorization to work background
checks.
Æ The company employing the
resident contractor could submit
appropriate information, under Option 1
and/or Option 2, to the Department
while it conducts these identity,
criminal history, and legal authorization
to work background checks.
• The company employing the
resident contractor, however, might not
perform the actual background checks
itself. Rather, the company employing
the resident contractor could hire a
third party background check company
to perform identity, criminal history,
and legal authorization to work
background checks on its employees
(including the resident contractors at
the high-risk chemical facility).
Æ If the company employing the
resident contractor hires a third party
background check company for this
purpose, a contract or agreement
between the company employing the
resident contractor and the third party
background check company could
establish the criteria for these
background checks and could establish
which background check results are
acceptable for access to the restricted
areas and critical assets at the high-risk
chemical facility for which the resident
contractor performs services.
Æ The third party background check
company could submit appropriate
information, under Option 1 and/or
Option 2, to the Department while it
conducts these identity, criminal
history, and legal authorization to work
background checks.
Prior to the resident contractor being
granted access to restricted areas or
critical assets of the high-risk chemical
facility (i.e., being issued a facilityspecific access credential/card, or door/
gate key(s)), identity, criminal history,
and legal authorization to work
background checks could be completed
by the company employing the resident
contractor, or by a third party
background check company in
accordance with the high-risk chemical
facility’s SSP or ASP. If appropriate,
based on the results of those background
checks, the resident contractor could
then be determined suitable to access
the high-risk chemical facility’s
restricted areas and/or critical assets.
The company employing the resident
contractor, or a third party background
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check company, could then report
suitability findings to the high-risk
chemical facility. The appropriate party
at the high-risk chemical facility could
then grant the resident contractor
facility-specific access credentials/
cards, or door/gate key(s), if appropriate
based on those suitability findings. The
submission of information about the
affected individual to the Department in
compliance with RBPS 12(iv) therefore
would not impede the routine access
control procedures of the high-risk
chemical facility because the
submission of information would likely
be accomplished in concert with the
other background check activities, prior
to access.
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
SCENARIO #3: Frequent ‘‘Unescorted
Visitors’’
This scenario could apply to a highrisk chemical facility that has a number
of frequent unescorted visitors that have
or are seeking repeated access to the
restricted areas or critical assets of the
facility, pursuant to a contractual
relationship with a company employing
the frequent unescorted visitors.
In its SSP or ASP, the high-risk
chemical facility could choose to
comply with RBPS 12(i)–(iii) for
frequent unescorted visitors by:
• Stipulating in a contract between
the high-risk chemical facility and the
company employing the frequent
unescorted visitors that the frequent
unescorted visitors’ employer will
perform or provide for identity, criminal
history, and legal authorization to work
background checks to be conducted on
the frequent unescorted visitors.
Æ A contract or agreement between
the high-risk chemical facility and the
company employing the frequent
unescorted visitors could establish the
criteria for these background checks,
and could establish which background
check results qualify individuals to
access the restricted areas or critical
assets at the high-risk chemical facility
or disqualify individuals from accessing
the restricted areas or critical assets at
the high-risk chemical facility.
Æ The high-risk chemical facility
could audit or review the background
checks being conducted to ensure
contractual compliance.
• Prior to a frequent unescorted
visitor being granted access to the
restricted areas or critical assets of the
facility (i.e., being issued a facilityspecific access credential/card, door/
gate key(s)), identity, criminal history,
and legal authorization to work
background checks could be completed
by the company employing the frequent
unescorted visitor in accordance with
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the high-risk chemical facility’s SSP or
ASP.
Æ The company employing the
frequent unescorted visitor could
conduct these identity, criminal history,
and legal authorization to work
background checks.
Æ The company employing the
frequent unescorted visitor could
submit appropriate information, under
Option 1 and/or Option 2, to the
Department while it conducts these
identity, criminal history, and legal
authorization to work background
checks.
• The company employing the
frequent unescorted visitor, however,
might not perform the actual
background checks itself. Rather, the
company employing the frequent
unescorted visitor could hire a third
party background check company to
perform identity, criminal history, and
legal authorization to work background
checks on its employees (including the
frequent unescorted visitors that access
the restricted areas or critical assets of
a high-risk chemical facility).
Æ If the company employing the
frequent unescorted visitor hires a third
party background check company for
this purpose, a contract or agreement
between the company employing the
frequent unescorted visitor and the third
party background check company could
establish the criteria for these
background checks and could establish
which background check results are
acceptable for access to the restricted
areas and critical assets at the high-risk
chemical facility for which the frequent
unescorted visitor performs services.
Æ The third party background check
company could submit appropriate
information, under Option 1 and/or
Option 2, to the Department while it
conducts these identity, criminal
history, and legal authorization to work
background checks.
Prior to the frequent unescorted
visitor being granted access to restricted
areas or critical assets of the high-risk
chemical facility (i.e., being issued a
facility-specific access credential/card,
or door/gate key(s)), identity, criminal
history, and legal authorization to work
background checks could be completed
by the company employing the frequent
unescorted visitor, or by a third party
background check company in
accordance with the high-risk chemical
facility’s SSP or ASP. If appropriate
based on the results of those background
checks, the frequent unescorted visitor
could then be determined suitable to
access the restricted areas or critical
assets at the high-risk chemical facility.
The company employing the frequent
unescorted visitor, or a third party
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background check company, could then
report suitability findings to the highrisk chemical facility. The appropriate
party at the high-risk chemical facility
could then grant the frequent
unescorted visitor facility-specific
access credentials/cards, or door/gate
key(s), if appropriate based on those
suitability findings. The submission of
information about the affected
individual to the Department in
compliance with RBPS 12(iv) therefore
would not impede the routine access
control procedures of the high-risk
chemical facility because the
information submission would likely be
accomplished in concert with the other
background check activities, prior to
access.
SCENARIO #4: Infrequent ‘‘Unescorted
Visitors’’
Since the Department first began
developing the CFATS Personnel Surety
Program, some stakeholders have
expressed concern that the submission
of information to DHS about unescorted
visitors who have only rare or
infrequent access to high-risk chemical
facilities would be overly burdensome
and would make access by such
infrequent unescorted visitors too
difficult. As a general matter, however,
the Department does not believe it likely
that many high-risk chemical facilities
will propose in their SSPs or ASPs to
allow large numbers of visitors who
visit the high-risk chemical facility
infrequently to have unescorted access
to restricted areas and critical assets,
because then all four types of
background checks listed in RBPS 12
would be required to be conducted for
them. High-risk chemical facilities
could choose to escort infrequent
visitors in lieu of performing the four
types of RBPS 12 background checks on
them.
However, even for infrequent
unescorted visitors on whom the highrisk chemical facility chooses to
conduct all four types of background
checks, the Department does not expect
data submission to the Department in
compliance with RBPS 12(iv) to impede
routine access procedures because the
data submission is likely to be
accomplished in concert with the other
routine hiring and access control
background checks related to RBPS
12(i)–(iii) described above. The
Department believes that the data
submission for RBPS 12(iv) will likely
be accomplished in concert with the
routine hiring and access control
background checks related to RBPS
12(i)–(iii) because doing them in concert
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is likely to generate the potential for
cost savings.15
Additional Data Privacy Considerations
There are various privacy
requirements for high-risk chemical
facilities, their designees, and the
Department related to the exchange of
personally identifiable information (PII)
for the CFATS Personnel Surety
Program. Upon receipt of PII, the
Department complies with all
applicable federal privacy requirements
including those contained in the Privacy
Act, the E-Government Act, the
Homeland Security Act, and
Departmental policy. The United States
also follows international instruments
on privacy, all of which are consistent
with the Fair Information Practice
Principles (FIPPs).16 High-risk chemical
facilities, or their designees, are
responsible for complying with the
federal, state, and national privacy laws
applicable to the jurisdictions in which
they do business. The Department
believes that high-risk chemical
facilities, or their designees, have
multiple, established legal avenues that
enable them to submit PII to the
Department, which may include the
Safe Harbor Framework,17 and meet
their privacy obligations.
II. Information Collected About
Affected Individuals
Option 1: Collecting Information To
Conduct Direct Vetting
If high-risk chemical facilities select
Option 1 to satisfy RBPS 12(iv) for any
affected individuals, the following
information about these affected
individuals would be submitted to the
Department:
• For U.S. Persons (U.S. citizens and
nationals as well as U.S. lawful
permanent residents):
Æ Full Name
Æ Date of Birth
Æ Citizenship or Gender
• For Non-U.S. Persons:
Full Name
Date of Birth
Citizenship
Passport information and/or alien
registration number
To reduce the likelihood of false
positives in matching against records in
the federal government’s consolidated
and integrated terrorist watchlist, highrisk chemical facilities would also be
able to submit the following optional
information about affected individuals
to the Department:
• Aliases
• Gender (for Non-U.S. Persons)
• Place of Birth
• Redress Number 18
If a high-risk chemical facility chooses
to submit information about an affected
individual under Option 1, the
following table summarizes the
biographic data that would be submitted
to the Department.
Æ
Æ
Æ
Æ
TABLE 1—AFFECTED INDIVIDUAL REQUIRED AND OPTIONAL DATA UNDER
OPTION 1
Data elements
submitted to
the department
For a U.S.
person
Full Name ......
Date of Birth ...
Gender ...........
Required.
Required.
Must provide
Citizenship
or Gender.
........................
N/A ................
Citizenship .....
Passport Information and/
or Alien
Registration
Number.
Aliases ...........
Place of Birth
Redress number.
For a
non-U.S.
person
Optional.
Required.
Required.
Optional.
Optional.
Optional.
Option 2: Collecting Information To Use
Vetting Conducted Under Other DHS
Programs
In lieu of submitting information to
the Department under Option 1 for
6425
terrorist ties vetting, chemical facilities
would also have the option, where
appropriate, to submit information to
the Department to electronically verify
that an affected individual is currently
enrolled in one of the following DHS
programs:
• TWIC Program;
• HME Program;
• Trusted Traveler Programs,
including:
Æ NEXUS;
Æ FAST;
Æ SENTRI; and
Æ Global Entry.
Information collected by the
Department about affected individuals
under Option 2 would not be used to
conduct duplicative vetting against the
federal government’s consolidated and
integrated terrorist watchlist.
To verify an affected individual’s
enrollment in one of these programs
under Option 2, the Department would
collect the following information about
the affected individual:
• Full Name;
• Date of Birth; and
• Program-specific information or
credential information, such as unique
number, or issuing entity (e.g., State for
Commercial Driver’s License (CDL)
associated with an HME).
To further reduce the potential for
misidentification, high-risk chemical
facilities may also submit the following
optional information about affected
individuals to the Department:
• Aliases
• Gender
• Place of Birth
• Citizenship
If a high-risk chemical facility chooses
to submit information about an affected
individual under Option 2, the
following table summarizes the
biographic data that would be submitted
to the Department.
TABLE 2—AFFECTED INDIVIDUAL REQUIRED AND OPTIONAL DATA UNDER OPTION 2
Data elements
submitted to the
department
For affected individual with a
TWIC
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Full Name ......................................
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For affected individual enrolled in
a trusted traveler programs
(NEXUS, SENTRI, FAST, or
global entry)
Required.
15 This ICR does not estimate the potential cost
savings high-risk chemical facilities or their
designees could achieve as a result of submitting
data in concert with the other routine hiring and
access control background checks related to RBPS
12(i)–(iii) because the scope of this ICR is limited
to the Departments obligation to estimate the
burden of submitting information about affected
individuals to identify terrorist ties under RBPS
12(iv) in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction
Act.
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16 Examples of the international privacy
instruments which the United States has endorsed
are: (1) Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) Guidelines on the Protection
of Privacy and Trans-border Flows of Personal Data
(1980), and (2) Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) Privacy Framework (2004).
17 The Safe Harbor Framework, which applies to
commercial information, was developed by the U.S.
Department of Commerce in consultation with the
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European Commission in order to provide a
streamlined means for U.S. organizations to comply
with the European Union Data Protection Directive
95/46/EC. More information on the Safe Harbor
Framework can be found at http://export.gov/
safeharbor.
18 For more information about Redress Numbers,
please go to http://www.dhs.gov/one-stop-travelersredress-process#1.
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TABLE 2—AFFECTED INDIVIDUAL REQUIRED AND OPTIONAL DATA UNDER OPTION 2—Continued
Data elements
submitted to the
department
For affected individual with a
TWIC
Date of Birth ...................................
Expiration Date ..............................
Unique Identifying Number ............
Issuing State of CDL .....................
Aliases ...........................................
Gender ...........................................
Place of Birth .................................
Citizenship .....................................
Required.
Required.
TWIC Serial Number: Required ...
N/A ................................................
Optional.
Optional.
Optional.
Optional.
Under the CFATS Personnel Surety
Program, a high-risk chemical facility
would be able to choose to follow the
process described for Option 1, and
would not have to implement Option 2,
even if an affected individual seeking
access to the high-risk chemical facility
is already enrolled in the TWIC
Program, HME Program, or one of the
Trusted Traveler Programs.
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Option 3: Electronic Verification of
TWIC
Under Option 3, a high-risk chemical
facility would not need to submit
information about an affected individual
enrolled in the TWIC Program to the
Department, if the high-risk chemical
facility is able to electronically verify
and validate the affected individual’s
TWIC through the use of a TWIC reader
(or other technology that is periodically
updated with revoked card
information).
As discussed above, under the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program, high-risk
chemical facilities would also be able to
choose to follow the processes described
for Option 1 and/or Option 2, for some
or all affected individuals already
enrolled in the TWIC Program, in lieu
of or in addition to Option 3.
Other Information Collected
In addition to the information about
affected individuals collected under
Options 1 and 2, the Department plans
to collect certain information that
identifies the high-risk chemical facility,
or facilities, at which each affected
individual has or is seeking access to
restricted areas or critical assets.
The Department may also contact a
high-risk chemical facility or its
designees to request additional
information (e.g., visa information)
pertaining to affected individuals in
order to clarify suspected data errors or
resolve potential matches (e.g., in
situations where an affected individual
has a common name). Such requests
will not imply, and should not be
construed to indicate, that an affected
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For affected individual with an
HME
CDL Number: Required ................
Required .......................................
individual’s information has been
confirmed as a match to a record of an
individual with terrorist ties.
In the event that a confirmed match
is identified as part of the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program, the
Department may obtain references to
and/or information from other
government law enforcement and
intelligence databases, or other relevant
databases that may contain terrorism
information.
The Department may collect
information necessary to assist in the
submission and transmission of records,
including electronic verification that the
Department has received a particular
record.
The Department may also collect
information about points of contact who
the Department or federal law
enforcement personnel may contact
with follow-up questions. A request for
additional information from the
Department does not imply, and should
not be construed to indicate, that an
individual is known or suspected to be
associated with terrorism.
The Department may also collect
information provided by individuals or
high-risk chemical facilities in support
of any adjudications requested under
Subpart C of the CFATS regulation,19 or
in support of any other redress
requests.20
The Department may request
information pertaining to affected
individuals, previously provided to the
Department by high-risk chemical
facilities or their designees, in order to
confirm the accuracy of that
information, or to conduct data accuracy
reviews and audits as part of the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program.
19 See
6 CFR 27.300–345.
information about access, correction, and
redress requests under the Freedom of Information
Act and the Privacy Act can be found in Section
7.0 of the Privacy Impact Assessment for the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program, dated May 4, 2011, and
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
privacy/privacy-pia-nppd-cfats-ps.pdf.
20 More
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For affected individual enrolled in
a trusted traveler programs
(NEXUS, SENTRI, FAST, or
global entry)
PASS ID Number: Required.
N/A.
The Department will also collect
administrative or programmatic
information (e.g., affirmations or
certifications of compliance, extension
requests, brief surveys for process
improvement) necessary to manage the
CFATS Personnel Surety Program.
Under Options 1 and 2, the
Department will also collect information
that will allow high-risk chemical
facilities and their designees to manage
their data submissions. Specifically, the
Department will make available to highrisk chemical facilities and their
designees blank data fields. These blank
data fields may be used by a high-risk
chemical facility or its designees to
assign each record of an affected
individual a unique designation or
number that is meaningful to the highrisk chemical facility. Collecting this
information will enable a high-risk
chemical facility to manage the
electronic records it submits into the
CSAT Personnel Surety application.
Entering this information into the CSAT
Personnel Surety application will be
voluntary, and is intended solely to
enable high-risk chemical facilities and
their designees to search through, sort,
and manage the electronic records they
submit.
III. Request for Exception to the
Requirement Under 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3)
The Department is requesting from
OMB an exception for the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program to the PRA
notice requirement in 5 CFR
1320.8(b)(3), which requires federal
agencies to confirm that their
information collections provide certain
reasonable notices under the PRA to
affected individuals. If this exception is
granted, the Department will be relieved
of the potential obligation to require
high-risk chemical facilities to collect
signatures or other positive affirmations
of these notices from affected
individuals. Whether or not this
exception is granted, Submitters must
affirm that the required privacy notice
regarding the collection of personal
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information has been provided to
affected individuals before personal
information is submitted to the
Department.21
The Department’s request for an
exception to the PRA notice
requirement under 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3)
would not exempt high-risk chemical
facilities from having to adhere to
applicable federal, state, local, or tribal
laws, or to regulations or policies
pertaining to the privacy of affected
individuals.
IV. Responses to Comments Submitted
During 60-Day Comment Period
The Department solicited comments
on four questions:
(1) Evaluate whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary
for the proper performance of the
functions of the agency, including
whether the information will have
practical utility;
(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
(4) Minimize the burden of the
collection of information on those who
are to respond, including through the
use of appropriate automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other
technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology,
e.g., permitting electronic submissions
of responses.
In response to the 60-day notice that
solicited comments about the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program ICR, the
Department received 28 comments from
2 private citizens, 8 private sector
companies 22, 14 trade associations, 1
union, 1 training council, and the
Ranking Member of the House of
Representatives Committee on
Homeland Security.
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Comments Related to Whether the
Proposed Collection of Information is
Necessary for the Proper Performance of
the Functions of the Agency, Including
Whether the Information Will Have
Practical Utility
The Department did not receive any
comments suggesting that the proposed
collection of information was not
21 For more information, please see the Privacy
Impact Assessment for the CFATS Personnel Surety
Program, dated May 4, 2011 and available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/
privacy-pia-nppd-cfats-ps.pdf.
22 One private sector company submitted two
distinct comments.
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necessary for the proper performance of
the functions of the agency.
Comments Related to the Accuracy of
the Agency’s Estimate of the Burden of
the Proposed Collection of Information,
Including the Validity of the
Methodology and Assumptions Used
Comment: Several commenters
suggested that the annual turnover rate
of 71% for frequent unescorted visitors
estimated by the Department in the 60day notice underestimated the annual
turnover rate for delivery personnel.23
One commenter suggested that the
Department adopt a higher annual
turnover rate of 81.75% for all frequent
unescorted visitors.
Response: The Department agreed to
adopt the higher estimated rate for
frequent unescorted visitor annual
turnover of 81.75%. The Department’s
burden estimates reflect this revised
assumption.
Comment: One commenter suggested
that the Department made an error in
Table 18 of the 60-day notice by not
differentiating between the turnover
rates of employees, frequent visitors,
and infrequent visitors.
Response: In this notice, the
Department explicitly distinguishes the
turnover rates of employees, frequent
visitors, and infrequent visitors when
estimating the annual burden estimate.
Comment: One commenter suggested
that the Department did not accurately
estimate the annual burden estimate in
Table 19 of the 60-day notice.
Specifically, the commenter suggested
that Table 19 of the 60-day notice
reflects a figure ‘‘0.50’’ hours for initial
submission rather than ‘‘0.5425’’ hours
which was the estimated time per
respondent calculated in Table 18 of the
60-day notice.
Response: The Department disagrees
and believes that in Table 19 it was
accurate to use the figure ‘‘0.50’’ hours
when estimating the annual burden. The
figure 0.50 hours is distinct and is only
associated with initial submission and
not the other types of transactions
covered by the ICR such as updates,
corrections, and removals. The figure
0.5425 hours represented the weighted
average of all types of transactions and
thus would have been inappropriate to
use in Table 19 of the 60-day notice
when estimating the annual burden.
Comment: One commenter suggested
that the Department did not account for
costs imposed by information
submission requests the Department
may require. Specifically, when the
Department ‘‘may’’ require facilities to
23 See Table 6 in the 60-day notice published on
March 22, 2013 at 78 FR 17690.
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provide other pieces of information
pertaining to affected individuals
including visa information, the
submission and transmission of records
such as electronic verification that the
facility provided a particular record,
points of contact at a facility, and
information supporting any
adjudications or redress requests.
Response: In the 60-day notice,
Department estimated the average time
per respondent to be 0.54 hours. The
Department believes that the burden
associated with requests from the
Department for additional information
about the affected individuals will be
very rare and thus de minimus in
nature. The Department also believes
that the burden associated with
information requests to support
adjudication or redress requests will
also be very rare and thus de minimus
as well. Finally, the Department will
collect submission and transmission of
records, including electronic
verification that the Department has
received a particular record,
automatically via system log files. This
collection will not impose a burden on
the high-risk chemical facility or
designee. Therefore, for the reasons
expressed above, the Department
believes it has accurately estimated the
estimated time per respondent.
Comment: One commenter states that
the Department did not account for the
cost facilities will incur for a ‘‘facilityby-facility vetting of individuals
accessing multiples facilities.’’
Response: As mentioned earlier in
this notice, the Department is aware that
an affected individual may be associated
with multiple high-risk chemical
facilities, and thus information about an
affected individual may be submitted to
the Department multiple times by
different high-risk chemical facilities
and/or their designated third parties.
Therefore, for the purposes of this
notice, the Department’s estimation of
burden accounts for the notion that an
affected individual’s information may
be submitted by multiple times by highrisk chemical facilities and their
designated third parties.
Comment: Several commenters
objected to the Department’s
assumptions related to the potential
recordkeeping burden associated with
RBPS 12(iv). Namely, they objected to
the idea that no potential recordkeeping
should be estimated in this notice in
accordance with 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(2),
which directs federal agencies to not
count the costs associated with the time,
effort, and financial resources incurred
in the normal course of their activities
(e.g., in compiling and maintaining
business records) if the reporting,
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recordkeeping, or disclosure activities
are usual and customary. Furthermore,
commenters objected to the
Department’s belief that the types of
recordkeeping associated with RBPS
12(iv) are usual and customary costs
that high-risk chemical facilities would
incur to conduct background checks for
identity, criminal history, and legal
authorization to work as required by
RBPS 12(i)–(iii) and also by various
other federal, state, or local laws or
regulations.
Response: As mentioned earlier in
this notice, the Department expects that
high-risk chemical facilities or their
designees (e.g., third parties or
companies employing affected
individuals that provide services to
high-risk chemical facilities) will
already possess much, if not all, of the
necessary information about affected
individuals as a result of standard
business practices related to
employment or managing of service
contracts. Furthermore, the Department
also expects that high-risk chemical
facilities will likely consolidate RBPS
12(iv) processing with related routine
hiring and access control procedures
involving background checks that are
already occurring prior to access by
facility personnel or unescorted visitors
to restricted areas or critical assets.
Consolidating RBPS 12(iv) processing
with these other routine procedures
would allow submission of personal
information already collected and
maintained by facilities or their
designees (e.g., a third party, contracted
service company, or third party acting
on behalf of a contracted service
company) to the Department under
RBPS 12(iv). In this notice, the
Department provides several illustrative
examples to further clarify the
Department’s continued belief that the
types of recordkeeping associated with
RBPS 12(iv) are usual and customary
costs that high-risk chemical facilities
(or designees) would incur to conduct
background checks for identity, criminal
history, and legal authorization to work
as required by RBPS 12(i)–(iii).
Comments Related to the Quality,
Utility, and Clarity of the Information to
be Collected
Comment: One commenter requested
specifics about the mechanics of the
process on how to submit information
about affected individuals to the
Department.
Response: The Department will
publish a user manual when the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program is
implemented. The user manual will
contain the necessary details about how
information about affected individuals
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may be submitted, under Option1 or
Option 2, through CSAT to the
Department.
Comment: One commenter requested
specific information about the security
or information protection requirements
necessary to serve as a Submitter.
Response: While an owner or operator
of a chemical facility may designate
someone to submit information on its
behalf, the owner or operator is
responsible for satisfying all the
requirements of 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv).
The Department provides at 6 CFR
27.200(b)(3) that any such submitter
must be an officer of the corporation or
other person designated by an officer of
the corporation, and must be domiciled
in the United States, and is responsible
for attesting to the accuracy of the
submitted information.
When a high-risk chemical facilities
relies on third party companies to
submit appropriate information about
affected individuals to the Department
the same requirements will apply. The
submitter(s) must be designated by an
officer of the corporation, must be
domiciled in the United States, and is
responsible for attesting to the accuracy
of the submitted information.
determined from the CCL by using an
electronic card reader to compare the
TWIC’s Federal Agency Smart
Credential Number (FASC–N) to those
listed on the CCL. This could be
accomplished by periodically
downloading the current CCL from the
Internet to either a TWIC reader or a
Physical Access Control System
(PACS).24 The status of a TWIC can also
be confirmed by using a TWIC reader or
PACS to check the Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) for TWIC cards.
The Department will also consider, in
an SSP or ASP, any other specific
innovative technologies that could
allow high-risk chemical facilities to
leverage the CCL or CRL for compliance
with RBPS 12.
Other Comments Submitted in Response
to the Information Collection Request
Comment: Several commenters
suggested the Department develop
substantially different processes than
the processes described by the
Department in the CFATS IFR
published in April 2007. One
commenter suggested that the
Department establish a process to certify
vendors so that high-risk chemical
facilities could rely on the certification
Comments Related to Minimizing the
as proof that the vendor has
Burden of the Collection of Information
implemented security measures to
on Those Who are to Respond,
ensure that its employees do not have
Including Through the Use of
terrorist ties. Several commenters
Appropriate Automated, Electronic,
suggested establishing a voluntary
Mechanical, or Other Technological
process by which the Department could
Collection Techniques or Other Forms of collect information directly from
Information Technology, e.g., Permitting affected individuals, and subsequently
Electronic Submissions of Responses
issue individuals unique submission
numbers. The commenters suggested
Comment: One commenter requested
that an affected individual could then
the ability to submit information about
present the unique submission number
affected individuals ‘‘via some type of
to the high-risk chemical facility as
file (spreadsheet) upload as opposed to
evidence that the Department had
direct data entry into CSAT.’’
Response: When implemented, highconducted a security threat assessment
risk chemical facilities (and their
to determine whether or not they had
designees), under Option 1 and Option
any terrorist ties.
Response: Neither the notice
2, will have the ability to input records
published by the Department on March
about affected individuals in three
22, 2013, nor this notice are rulemaking
ways: (1) Manual entry, (2) bulk upload
via Microsoft Excel file or an Extensible notices. These notices are published in
accordance with the Paperwork
Markup Language (XML) file, and (3) a
Reduction Act and are not seeking to
direct Web Service connection.
Comment: One commenter requested
expand or change CFATS. Rather, these
clarification about Option 3,
Paperwork Reduction Act notices are
specifically, if the phrase ‘‘other
seeking comments on the burden
technology’’ means computer access to
associated with collecting information
the Internet.
necessary to implement the CFATS
Response: The Department’s phrase
Personnel Surety Program described in
‘‘other technology which is periodically the CFATS IFR.
updated using the CCL’’ was intended to
Comment: One commenter suggested
cover a variety of ways a high-risk
that the Department’s ‘‘preconditions’’
chemical facility could, in its SSP or
(i.e., the collection of information under
ASP, describe how it would determine
Option 2 to verify enrollment in the
if a TWIC was revoked for cause, or
TWIC, HME, and Trusted Traveler
revoked because it was reported lost or
24 See footnote 8, supra.
stolen. Revoked cards could be
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Programs) ‘‘ipso facto do not provide
reciprocal recognition of these vetting
programs.’’ The commenter further
suggested that the Department was not
following White House
recommendations to promote
comparability and reciprocity across
credentialing and screening programs.25
Specifically, recommendation 16 of the
Surface Transportation Security Priority
Assessment, which recommends that
the federal Government ‘‘create a more
efficient Federal credentialing system by
reducing credentialing redundancy,
leveraging existing investments, and
implementing the principle of ‘enroll
once, use many’ to reuse the
information of individuals applying for
multiple access privileges.’’
Response: The collection of
information under Option 2 to verify
enrollment of an affected individual in
the TWIC, HME, and the Trusted
Traveler Programs does recognize and
leverage the vetting activities of the
TWIC, HME, and Trusted Traveler
Programs. Further, the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program aligns with
the recommendations of the Surface
Transportation Security Priority
Assessment.
In discussions with high-risk
chemical facilities over the past several
years, the Department has attempted to
correct the persistent misinterpretation
held by commenters about the concept
of ‘‘enroll once, use many’’ as meaning
that an individual should only need to
submit information to the Department
once, and that the Department should
never collect information from that
individual again. Rather, the
Department has defined, and continues
to define, the ‘‘enroll once, use many’’
concept as the ability to reuse
previously submitted program
enrollment information and/or vetting
results upon collection of sufficient
information to confirm an individual’s
prior enrollment in a Department
program or prior vetting results.
One example of how the Department
has implemented ‘‘enroll once, use
many’’ in a DHS program other than the
CFATS Personnel Surety Program is
when a person whose is enrolled in the
TWIC Program seeks to obtain an HME.
TSA collects sufficient information from
the person enrolled in the TWIC
Program to verify the person’s identity
and verify the existence of a current and
valid security threat assessment.26 If
25 Recommendation 16 of the Surface
Transportation Security Priority Assessment may be
found on page 21 of the 2010 White House report
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
rss_viewer/STSA.pdf.
26 The online form may be found at https://
hazprints.tsa.dhs.gov/Public/STAStatus.aspx
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verified, the existing STA is leveraged
for the HME, which provides for
efficiencies such as reduced enrollment
cost and shorter processing time.
Comment: Several commenters
suggested that the collection of
information under Option 2 to verify an
affected individual’s enrollment in the
TWIC, HME, and the Trusted Traveler
Programs qualifies as a duplicative
background check.
Response: The information collected
by the Department under Option 2 is
used to verify an affected individual’s
enrollment in a DHS program. The
information collected under Option 2 is
not used to conduct a duplicative
background check.
Comment: Another commenter
suggested that the collection of
information under Option 2 from
affected individuals in possession of an
HME as a proposal to ‘‘screen drivers
carrying hazardous materials’’ violates
49 U.S.C. 5103a(g)(1)(B)(i) which states
that ‘‘[a]n individual with respect to
whom the Transportation Security
Administration—(I) has performed a
security threat assessment under this
section; and (II) has issued a final
notification of no security threat, is
deemed to have met the requirements of
any other background check that is
required for purposes of any Federal law
applicable to transportation workers if
that background check is equivalent to,
or less stringent than, the background
check required [to receive an HME].’’
Response: Collecting information to
verify an affected individual’s
enrollment, so that if verified the
Department may rely on the results of
the security threat assessment already
performed and being recurrently
performed, is not prohibited by 49
U.S.C. 5103a(g)(1)(B)(i), and comports
with the means of vetting verification
described in the CFATS IFR.
Comment: One commenter suggested
that the credentials be accepted ‘‘at face
value.’’ The commenter further
suggested that, ‘‘[t]he fact [that affected
individuals] have a valid card meets the
requirement specifically detailed in
RBPS 1[2] and any further collection
and submission of PII not only exceeds
DHS’ authority but results in
duplication of effort and unnecessary
cost to both the facilities and to DHS.’’
Another commenter suggested that
possession of a credential was ‘‘proof’’
that the affected individual was vetted
and is being revetted for terrorist ties.
Another commenter took an opposing
view, and supported Option 2. The
commenter agreed with the
Department’s intention to collect
information to electronically verify and
re-verify affected individuals’
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enrollments in the TWIC, HME, and
Trusted Traveler Programs.
Response: While visual inspection has
some security benefits, electronic
verification is significantly more reliable
than visual inspection for ensuring that
a TWIC, HME, or Trusted Traveler
Credential is not counterfeit or expired,
or has not been reported lost, stolen,
damaged, or revoked. Accordingly, if a
high-risk chemical facility chooses to
implement Option 2, the high-risk
chemical facility (or its designees) must
submit information to the Department
about affected individuals possessing
the appropriate credentials to enable the
Department to electronically verify,
with the relevant component of DHS
(i.e., CBP or TSA) using their
authoritative and original data, the
affected individuals’ enrollments in
these other programs.
Comment: Several commenters
suggested that the Department was
requiring all visitors to have their
information submitted to the
Department 48 hours in advance of
entering the site, which does not
comport with the operational realities of
the trucking industry.
Response: The Department disagrees
that this ICR does not comport with the
operational realities of the trucking
industry. The Department disagrees for
four reasons. First, if a high-risk
chemical facility chooses to allow
visitors (e.g., truck operators) access to
the high-risk chemical facilities, for only
those visitors with unescorted access to
restricted areas or critical assets will the
facility need to comply with RBPS 12.
Second, the Department does not
believe it likely that many high-risk
chemical facilities will propose in their
SSPs or ASPs to allow large numbers of
visitors who visit the high-risk chemical
facility infrequently to have unescorted
access to restricted areas and critical
assets, because then all four types of
background checks listed in RBPS 12
would be required to be conducted for
them. If the historical practice of a
chemical facility has been to allow
unescorted visitors access to the
restricted areas or critical assets,
without performing any background
checks on them, the Department
recognizes that the business practices of
such a high-risk chemical facility will
need to change as a result of RBPS 12(i),
(ii), (iii), and (iv). Third, the Department
generally expects that high-risk
chemical facilities and designees will
likely consolidate RBPS 12(iv)
processing with related routine hiring
and access control procedures already
occurring prior to access by facility
personnel or unescorted visitors to
restricted areas or critical assets. As a
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result of discussions with industry
stakeholders the Department
understands that, in general, routine
hiring and access control procedures are
already in place for individuals, likely
to be designated as affected individuals
because of access to restricted areas or
critical assets, working on behalf of
trucking companies. Fourth, in the
default schedule provided later in this
notice, the Department suggests that
information about a new affected
individual could be provided to the
Department no later than 48 hours prior
to that affected individual obtaining
access to the restricted areas or critical
assets at a high-risk chemical facility.
The Department would like to highlight
that information about a particular
affected individual does not need to be
re-submitted to the Department 48 hours
prior to each instance of access by that
particular affected individual. Rather, if
a high-risk chemical facility, or its
designees, are able to determine that an
affected individual requires repeated
access to restricted areas or critical
assets, the high-risk chemical facility
may structure the data submission to
CSAT so as to indicate that the affected
individual about whom the high-risk
chemical facility or designee is
submitting information to the
Department will have access to
restricted areas or critical assets on an
ongoing basis. A high-risk chemical
facility, or its designees, may also
structure the data submission to CSAT
to indicate that the affected individual
will have access to restricted areas or
critical assets for a discreet period of
time.
Therefore, for the reasons provided
above, the Department disagrees that
this ICR does not comport with the
operational realities of the trucking
industry.
Comment: Several commenters raised
objections to submitting a new affected
individual’s information at least 48
hours prior to their access to restricted
areas or critical assets at high-risk
chemical facilities. Some commenters
suggested that submission of a new
affected individual’s information should
occur, rather, only at the time the new
affected individual actually accesses
restricted areas or critical assets.
Alternatively, some commenters
suggested that that submission of a new
affected individual’s information should
occur after the affected individual
accessed restricted areas or critical
assets.
Response: The Department, in the
default schedule provided later in this
notice, suggests that information about
new affected individuals could be
provided to the Department no later
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than 48 hours prior to the affected
individual obtaining access to the
restricted areas or critical assets at the
high-risk chemical facility. The
Department believes that 48 hours is a
reasonable amount of time, which is
necessary for the Department to
successfully perform a background
check for terrorist ties. Therefore the
Department has suggested a period of
time (i.e., 48 hours) as a default for
when high-risk chemical facilities could
submit information to the Department
for new affected individuals rather than
at the time, or after the time, a new
affected individual obtains access to
restricted areas or critical assets. Later
in this notice, the Department also
reiterates that it will consider
alternative schedules suggested by highrisk chemical facilities in their SSPs or
ASPs, for Option 1 or Option 2, based
on their unique circumstances.
Comment: Several commenters
expressed concern about contractors
and visitors arriving upon short or no
notice such as when a production unit
goes down or otherwise requires
emergency maintenance.
Response: The Department
understands that contractors and
visitors may arrive with only short or no
notice such as when a production unit
goes down or otherwise requires
emergency maintenance. The
Department described, in the illustrative
examples provided earlier in this notice,
how a high-risk chemical facility could
comply with RBPS 12, ensuring that all
four background checks are conducted
in such situations. High-risk chemical
facilities should describe in their SSP or
ASP the procedures and process 27 to
plan for and prepare for exceptional
circumstances (e.g., unpredictable but
foreseeable situations) that result in
situations that require an affected
individual to have short or no notice
before accessing the restricted areas or
critical assets at high-risk chemical
facilities such as when a production
unit goes down or otherwise requires
emergency maintenance.
Comment: Several commenters
pointed out to the Department that TSA
recently modified the TWIC application
form 28 to expand the population of
27 One example applied from the illustrative
scenarios would be that the high-risk chemical
facility would have in it contract clauses that
require any contractors that provides emergency
repair or maintenance to have background checks
completed prior to arrival at the high-risk chemical
facility, to include the submission of information
about the affected individuals to the Department
under Option 1 or Option 2.
28 The revised TWIC application form may be
viewed at (http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
PRAViewIC?ref_nbr=201210-1652-001&icID
=182269).
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individuals eligible to apply for a TWIC.
The commenters uniformly suggested
that the Department expand the
population of individuals eligible to
apply for a TWIC to include affected
individuals that have or are seeking
access to the restricted areas or critical
assets of high-risk chemical facilities.
Response: Any determination the
Department or TSA makes to expand or
revise the population of individuals
eligible to apply and pay for TWICs is
outside the scope of this notice.
Comment: Some commenters
supported the Department’s
determination that certain groups are
not affected individuals, specifically, (1)
Federal officials that gain unescorted
access to restricted areas or critical
assets as part of their official duties; (2)
state and local law enforcement officials
that gain unescorted access to restricted
areas or critical assets as part of their
official duties; and (3) emergency
responders at the state or local level that
gain unescorted access to restricted
areas or critical assets during emergency
situations. One commenter did not
support the determination and
suggested that this determination only
incentivized terrorists to assume the
identities of law enforcement officials
rather than workers.
Response: The Department has opted
to align how CFATS treats certain
groups of persons with how those same
populations are treated under the TWIC
Program.29
Comment: One commenter objected to
the inclusion of railroad employees as
potentially affected individuals.
Response: Railroad employees may be
affected individuals if the high-risk
chemical facility has defined railroad
employees in their SSP or ASP as either
(1) facility personnel who have access,
either unescorted or otherwise, to
restricted areas or critical assets, or (2)
unescorted visitors who have access to
restricted areas or critical assets.
Each high risk chemical facility can
choose which option or options it
wishes to implement with regard to
railroad employees that would be
affected individuals. The Department
notes that many railroad employees
have TWICs and encourages high-risk
chemical to consider whether Option 2
or Option 3 may provide a reasonable
solution.
Comment: One commenter suggested
that the 60-day notice was unclear as to
which set of individuals would be
subject to vetting for terrorist ties. The
29 See 33 CFR 101.514 at (http://www.ecfr.gov/cgibin/retrieveECFR?gp=1&SID=ef5225aac07
eddf7f914e57c3fda36bf&ty=HTML&h=L&r=PART&
n=33y1.0.1.8.49#33:1.0.1.8.49.5.26.4)
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commenter pointed out that the
Department used the term ‘‘affected
individuals’’ inconsistently. In parts of
the 60-day notice, the Department
described the term to mean ‘‘facility
personnel or unescorted visitors with
access to restricted areas or critical
assets at high-risk chemical facilities.’’
In other parts of the 60-day notice the
Department described the term to mean
‘‘(1) facility personnel who have access,
either unescorted or otherwise, to
restricted areas or critical assets, and (2)
unescorted visitors who have access to
restricted areas or critical assets.’’
Response: 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12) defines
the scope of individuals for whom RBPS
12 (and thus RBPS 12(iv)) background
checks are required. 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)
defines the scope as ‘‘facility personnel,
and as appropriate, for unescorted
visitors with access to restricted areas or
critical assets’’ at high-risk chemical
facilities. The Department has provided
additional clarity in previous notices
that affected individuals are (1) facility
personnel who have access, either
unescorted or otherwise, to restricted
areas or critical assets, and (2)
unescorted visitors who have access to
restricted areas or critical assets.
In response to public comments
received on earlier notices, the
Department clarified, and does so here
in this notice, that individual high-risk
facilities may classify particular
contractors or categories of contractors
either as ‘‘facility personnel’’ or as
‘‘visitors.’’ This determination should be
a facility-specific determination, and
should be based on facility security,
operational requirements, and business
practices.
Comment: One commenter objected to
the Department’s intention to collect
information that identifies the high-risk
chemical facility or facilities at which
each affected individual has or is
seeking access.
Response: The Department requires
this information so that in the event of
a positive match, the Department may
provide the information to appropriate
federal law enforcement entities.
Comment: One commenter suggested
that the ICR approach was deficient
because the Department, based on
public comments received, is unable to
amend the text of 6 CFR part 27. The
commenter suggested that without the
benefit of a rule published in the Code
of Federal Regulations, covered facilities
will not know what identifying
information is to be provided on
individuals, and within what
timeframes thus rendering the standards
for personnel surety invisible.
Response: The ICR and the associated
60-day and 30-day notices do not
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modify 6 CFR part 27. The ICR and
associated notices provide descriptions
of the nature of the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program’s information collection,
categories of respondents, estimated
burden, and costs. The Department is
publishing this notice in accordance
with the Paperwork Reduction Act
because, although the Department has
the authority to implement the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program, the
Department must still comply with the
Paperwork Reduction Act and its
implementing regulations before
collecting the necessary information
from high-risk chemical facilities or
designees.
Comment: One commenter suggested
that the three options described in the
60-day notice are an impermissible
mandate. The commenter states that
RBPS 12 does not require that a facility
continuously vet covered individuals
against the TSDB.
Response: In April 2007, the CFATS
IFR outlined two options, described
earlier in this notice, for high-risk
chemical facilities to identify
individuals with terrorist ties. Both
options rely on recurrent vetting, which
was one of the underlying bases for
including those options in the CFATS
IFR.
Comment: Several commenters
suggested that the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program outlined in the ICR
exceeds the Department’s statutory
authority, because the proposed CFATS
Personnel Surety Program design
conflicts with Section 550. Commenters
suggested that the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program’s design eliminates a
high-risk facility’s flexibility to achieve
compliance with RBPS–12. The
commenters cited the following
examples: (1) The ‘‘48-hour rule,’’ (2)
‘‘submission of PII on valid TWIC, DOT
HAZMAT, or Trusted Traveler card
holders,’’ and (3) ‘‘notification when
personnel depart a regulated site[.]’’
Response: The CFATS Personnel
Surety Program will not exceed the
Department’s statutory authority, nor
will it violate or conflict with Section
550. With respect to the specific
examples cited by commenters, the
Department does not believe these
examples demonstrate a violation of the
statutory requirement that the
Department not disapprove a Site
Security Plan on the basis of the
presence or absence of a particular
security measure.
Not only does the Department
disagree that 48-hour advance
submission violates Section 550, the
Department also disagrees with the
characterization of the default schedule
as a ‘‘rule.’’ As discussed earlier in this
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notice, the Department is not seeking to
implement a new regulation. Rather,
this notice is published in accordance
with the Paperwork Reduction Act.
The Department disagrees that a
default expectation that high-risk
chemical facilities or designees submit
information about new affected
individuals at least 48 hours in advance
of access eliminates a high-risk facility’s
flexibility to achieve compliance with
RBPS–12. A high-risk chemical facility
may suggest alternative schedules, for
Option 1 or Option 2, based on their
unique circumstances in their SSPs or
ASPs.
The Department also disagrees that
the ‘‘submission of PII on valid TWIC,
DOT HAZMAT, or Trusted Traveler
card holders’’ violates Section 550. The
CFATS Personnel Surety Program will
not exceed the Department’s statutory
authority, nor will it violate or conflict
with Section 550 because the
Department will provide and approve
sufficient alternative methods for a
high-risk chemical facility to satisfy the
terrorism ties background check portion
of RBPS 12. A high-risk chemical
facility does not have to select Option
2. Rather, if a high-risk chemical facility
or its designees is unable or unwilling
to submit information about affected
individuals to verify their enrollment, a
high-risk chemical facility may select
Option 1, Option 3, or propose another
alternative.
The Department also notes the
commenter’s use of the term ‘‘valid.’’
Collection of information is necessary
under Option 2 because it would be
inappropriate to have confidence in the
validity of a credential based solely on
a visual inspection of the credential.
Electronic verification of the affected
individuals’ enrollments in other
programs provides significantly greater
confidence that the credential in the
possession of the affected individual is
not counterfeit or expired, or has not
been reported lost, stolen, damaged, or
revoked.
Finally, the Department disagrees that
‘‘notification when personnel depart a
regulated site’’ violates Section 550. The
CFATS Personnel Surety Program does
not require ‘‘notification when
personnel depart a regulated site.’’
Rather the Department requires
notification when an affected individual
whose information has been submitted
under Option 1 or Option 2 no longer
has access to restricted areas or critical
assets. This distinction is important—
the Department has not suggested that it
expects high-risk chemical facilities to
update the information it sends to DHS
through CSAT in real time as
individuals depart the workplace, nor
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has it suggested that notifications are
required under Option 3 or under any
other options high-risk chemical
facilities might propose to DHS in their
SSPs or ASPs. Notifications about
individuals whose information has been
submitted to DHS under Option 1 and
Option 2, and who will subsequently
lose access to restricted areas or critical
assets, could occur before or after access
is lost—high-risk facilities could
propose schedules for this type of
notification to DHS in their SSPs or
ASPs, and DHS would evaluate these
proposals on a case-by-case basis, taking
into account unique facility operational
and security needs.
The primary distinction between
‘‘notification when personnel depart a
regulated site’’ and the Department’s
requirement to be notified under
Options 1 and 2 when an affected
individual no longer has access is that
the CFATS Personnel Surety Program is
not tracking the real-time access of an
affected individual at a high-risk
chemical facility. Rather, the
Department, under the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program is seeking to
ensure that affected individuals
(whether they enter several times a day
or only once over the time period in
which they have the capability to enter)
are checked for terrorist ties. This
difference means that high-risk
chemical facilities or their designees
only need to notify the Department
when to cease vetting once. This is in
stark contrast to the multiple
notifications that would be necessary if
the Department required notification
when ‘‘personnel depart a regulated
site.’’
High-risk chemical facilities and their
designees have at least two alternatives
in how to notify the Department that an
affected individual whose information
has been submitted to DHS under
Option 1 or Option 2 no longer has
access. The first alternative is to submit
the notification when the affected
individual no longer has access. Under
this alternative, a high risk chemical
facility or designee would submit
information about the affected
individual initially and later in a
separate communication notify the
Department that the affected individual
no longer has access. A second
alternative the Department has provided
is to allow the high-risk chemical
facility or designee the ability to specify
when the Department should stop
vetting at the time of the initial
submission.
There are also additional alternatives
available to high-risk chemical facilities.
Under Option 3, the high risk chemical
facilities may electronically verify and
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validate an affected individual’s TWIC,
through the use of TWIC readers (or
other technology which is periodically
updated with revoked card
information), rather than submitting
information about the affected
individual to the Department.
Consequently, there is no need for a
high risk chemical facility to notify the
Department when the affected
individual no longer has access if the
affected individual’s TWIC is
electronically verify and validated,
through the use of TWIC readers (or
other technology which is periodically
updated with revoked card
information). As previously discussed
in this notice, high-risk chemical
facilities are also able to propose other
options for DHS consideration as part of
their SSPs or ASPs.
In conclusion, the only way the
Department will know that an affected
individual no longer has or is seeking
access, under Option 1 or Option2, is if
the facility (or their designee) notifies
the Department when personnel no
longer have (or no longer are seeking)
access to a regulated facility’s restricted
areas or critical assets. The Department
disagrees that this aspect of the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program exceeds the
Department’s statutory authority,
violates, or conflict with Section 550.
Comment: Several commenters
suggested that the Department, in
particular NPPD, has in the design of
the CFATS Personnel Surety Program
refused to leverage credentials from
comparable programs. The commenter
implied that NPPD could consider how
TSA opted to implement the ‘‘Air Cargo
Screening Program’’, and how ATF
implemented the Employee Possessor
Program.
Response: Not all federal background
checks conduct checks for terrorist ties
that are equivalent to the background
check for terrorist ties being conducted
by the CFATS Personnel Surety
Program. The Department has evaluated
the ATF Employee Possessor Program
and identified that the Employee
Possessor Program conducts point-intime vetting against the TSDB, which
means that ATF’s checks are conducted
at only specified times, not on a
recurrent basis. Recurrent vetting is a
DHS best practice and compares an
affected individual’s information against
new and/or updated TSDB records as
new and/or updated records become
available.
The Indirect Air Carrier (IAC) and the
Certified Cargo Screening Program
(CCSP) programs both conduct terrorist
ties vetting equivalent to the terrorist
ties vetting that would be conducted
under Option 1. After the initial
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implementation of the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program, if (A) the Department
learns through interactions with CFATS
stakeholders that a reasonable
percentage of affected individuals
participate in the IAC and CCSP
programs, and (B) there is substantial
interest from members of the regulated
community in leveraging the IAC and
CCSP programs, then NPPD may
consider allowing high-risk chemical
facilities to submit the full name, date
of birth, and appropriate programspecific information or credential
information necessary to enable the
Department to electronically verify the
affected individuals’ enrollments in IAC
and CCSP programs.
Comment: Several commenters
suggested that the ICR claims to leverage
the TWIC, HME, and the Trusted
Traveler Programs, but facilities or their
designees must submit more
information under Option 2 than if the
high-risk chemical facility or designee
opted to submit the minimum
information required under Option 1.
The commenters conclude those who
have already been screened face more
burdens and greater scrutiny than those
lacking any screening at all.
Response: The Department has long
conceded that the minimum number of
data elements necessary to conduct
vetting under Option 1 may, in some
cases, be less than the minimum
number of data elements to
electronically verify an affected
individual’s enrollment in the TWIC,
HME or Trusted Traveler Programs. This
is because of how the TWIC, HME, and
Trusted Traveler databases were
initially constructed, not because
affected individuals undergo extra
scrutiny when the Department
electronically verifies their enrollment
Comment: One commenter requested
clarification about the process of
releasing employee information.
Response: The scope of this notice is
limited to the information submitted by
a high-risk chemical facility (or
designee) to the Department, which is
subject to the Privacy Act of 1974 (5
U.S.C. 552a). The Department will only
release or disclose this information in
accordance with the applicable Privacy
Act System of Records Notice. The
Submitter(s) of each high-risk chemical
facility (or their designee) will be
required to affirm that, in accordance
with their Site Security Plans, notice
required by the Privacy Act of 1974 has
been given to affected individuals before
their information is submitted to DHS.
DHS has made available to high-risk
chemical facilities a sample notice that
complies with subsection (e)(3) of the
Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(3)) in the
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CFATS Personnel Surety Program
PIA.30 This notice would: (1) Notify
those individuals that their information
is being submitted to DHS for vetting
against the Terrorist Screening Database,
and that in some cases additional
information may be requested and
submitted in order to resolve a potential
match; (2) instruct those individuals
how to access their information; (3)
instruct those individuals how to
correct their information; and (4)
instruct those individuals on procedures
available to them for redress if they
believe their information has been
improperly matched by the Department
of Homeland Security to information
contained in the Terrorist Screening
Database. Individuals have the
opportunity and/or right to decline to
provide information, however, if an
individual declines to provide
information, he or she may impact a
high-risk chemical facility’s compliance
with CFATS.
In addition, high-risk chemical
facilities (or designees) may have
information about an affected individual
obtained for other purposes (e.g.,
compliance with RBPS 12(i)–(iii)) that
was never submitted to the Department
and thus not subject to the Privacy Act.
While under CFATS no specific controls
are required for information collected by
high-risk chemical facilities with regard
to RBPS 12(i)–(iii), the Department
expects that high-risk chemical facilities
will protect and safeguard the
information as outlined in their SSP and
in accordance with any other federal,
State, or local privacy laws which do
have jurisdiction relative to the
collection of the information.
Comment: One commenter expressed
concern about the Department’s request
for an exception to the PRA notice
requirement in 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3) when
the Department is also requiring that
Submitters must affirm that the required
privacy notice regarding the collection
of personal information has been
provided to affected individuals before
personal information is submitted to the
Department. Specifically, the
commenter suggested that ‘‘in order to
make such an affirmation in good faith,
the facility would almost certainly need
to obtain signatures or other positive
affirmations from affected individuals to
protect itself against any claims of noncompliance.’’
Response: The Department believes
that it is possible for a high-risk
chemical facility or designee to affirm,
in good faith, that the affected
individual has been given adequate
30 Available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/privacy/privacy-pia-nppd-cfats-ps.pdf.
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notice pursuant to the Privacy Act
without collecting a signature from each
and every affected individual. For
example, a high-risk chemical facility or
its designees could consider including
an appropriate statement in pay checks,
posting a sign near a restricted area or
critical asset, including an appropriate
statement within existing standard
privacy notices provided to individuals
when collecting information during a
routine and normal hiring process, or
including an appropriate statement in a
letter.
Comment: One commenter requested
clarification about what the Department
will do with the information it collects.
The commenter further suggested that
reducing the security risk associated
with personnel RBPS 12 could be in
conflict with selecting the ‘‘best
qualified personnel/contractor’’ to work
in the restricted area or critical asset.
Response: The Department will,
under this ICR, collect the information
necessary to implement the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program. The CFATS
Personnel Surety Program will use the
information to identify affected
individuals with terrorist ties.
With respect to the potential conflict
between reducing security risk and
selecting the best qualified personnel/
contractor, the Department stated in the
CFATS IFR, ‘‘that the level of screening
for employees and contractors should be
commensurate with the access
provided. As part of this approach, the
facility shall identify critical assets and
restricted areas and establish which
employees and contractors may need
unescorted access to those areas or
assets, and thus must undergo a
background check . . .’’.31 A facility’s
approach to personnel surety, including
its defined restricted areas and critical
assets, shall be detailed in the Site
Security Plan that the facility submits to
the Department for approval.
Comment: Some commenters
suggested that without a commitment
from the Department to be notified
when an affected individual has
terrorist ties, there was little value to the
default schedule which has high-risk
chemical facilities submitting
information about new affected
individuals 48 hours prior to access to
restricted areas or critical assets.
Response: The CFATS Personnel
Surety Program, when implemented,
will identify affected individuals with
terrorist ties. The Department has
procedures in place that it will follow
31 See 72 FR 17688 (April 9, 2007) at https://
www.federalregister.gov/articles/2007/04/09/E76363/chemical-facility-anti-terrorism-standards#p302.
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to resolve the match and coordinate
with appropriate law enforcement
entities as necessary. The Department
believes that 48 hours is a reasonable
amount of time for the Department to
successfully perform a background
check for terrorist ties, and to coordinate
with appropriate law enforcement
entities as necessary.
Comment: Several commenters
suggested that by not committing to
notify high-risk chemical facilities or
designees when an affected individual
has terrorist ties, the Department is
increasing the risk of an affected
individual with terrorist ties obtaining
access to the restricted areas or critical
assets at a high-risk chemical facility.
Response: The Department’s design of
the CFATS Program is intended to
promote and enhance the security of
high-risk chemical facilities; the
Personnel Surety Program is one
element of the larger CFATS Program.
To prevent a significant threat to a
facility or loss of life, a high-risk
chemical facility will be contacted
where appropriate and in accordance
with federal law and policy, as well as
law enforcement and intelligence
requirements.
Comment: One commenter suggested
that the design of the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program appears to indicate the
Department is playing an investigative
role rather than a preventative role.
Response: The CFATS Personnel
Surety Program is designed to identify
affected individuals with terrorist ties
who have or are seeking access to
restricted areas or critical assets at highrisk chemical facilities. The Department
does not lead the investigation of any
affected individual with terrorist ties;
rather the Department supports law
enforcement investigation activity. The
Department recognizes the significant
and vested interest the high-risk
chemical facility or designee may have
in ensuring an affected individual with
terrorist ties does not successfully carry
out a terrorist attack against or involving
a high-risk chemical facility.
Comment: One commenter requested
that the Department define what a highrisk chemical facility is.
Response: Public Law 109–295
required the Department to identify and
regulate the security of high-risk
chemical facilities. The CFATS
regulations implement this statute and
describe how DHS determines which
chemical facilities are high-risk
chemical facilities. Defining high-risk
chemical facilities is beyond the scope
of this notice and is beyond the scope
of the ICR for the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program.
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Comment: Several commenters
pointed out that under Option 1, the
Department will not be providing the
results (i.e., that the affected individual
does or does not have terrorist ties) to
the high-risk chemical facility or
designee, while under Option 2, the
Department will be providing the results
(i.e., that the Department was able to
electronically verify that the affected
individual is currently enrolled in either
the TWIC, HME, or Trusted Traveler
Programs). Some commenters suggested
that not providing results under Option
1 but providing results under Option 2
was confusing. Some commenters
suggested that by providing results
under Option 2, high-risk chemical
facilities will have greater confidence
that the affected individual does not
have terrorist ties (and the credential is
not expired, has not been revoked, and
is not fraudulent). The commenters
pointed out that high-risk chemical
facilities would also have greater
confidence than when only relying on
the visual inspection of the TWIC or
other federal credential.
Response: The Department has
designed the CFATS Personnel Surety
Program to support high-risk chemical
facilities’ compliance with RBPS 12(iv)
through a variety of options. The
Department does agree that the
flexibility high-risk chemical facilities
and designees have does increase the
complexity of the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program, however, this flexibility
increases the ability of each high-risk
chemical facility to be able to tailor their
SSP or ASP to their unique business
operations when considering how to
comply with RBPS 12(iv).
The Department also believes that this
flexibility provides ancillary benefits.
Specifically, a high-risk chemical
facility may choose to rely on the
electronic verification and reverifications provided by the
Department under Option 2 to
demonstrate compliance with RBPS
12(i)–(iii). A high-risk chemical facility
may choose to rely on the Department’s
electronic verification and reverification (provided via CSAT) under
Option 2 not only for RBPS 12(iv) but
also RBPS 12(i)–(iii) because an affected
individual’s enrollment in the TWIC,
HME, and Trusted Traveler Programs is
dependent not only on an equivalent
check for terrorist ties, but on several
other factors such as a verification of
identity, legal authorization to work,
and a criminal history check.
Therefore, a high-risk chemical
facility may, in their SSP or ASP,
choose to rely on the Department’s
electronic verification and reverification that an affected individual
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is currently enrolled in the TWIC, HME,
and Trusted Traveler Programs as a
means of complying with RBPS 12(i)–
(iii). High-risk chemical facilities should
carefully consider whether the specific
elements of the security threat
assessments performed under the TWIC,
HME, or Trusted Traveler Programs
meet their business and security needs
before choosing to rely on them for
compliance with RBPS 12(i)–(iii) in
their SSP or ASP.
The Department would like to
highlight that, under Option 2, high-risk
chemical facilities or designees will be
able to, for the first time, electronically
verify an affected individual’s
enrollment in either the HME Program
or Trusted Traveler Programs.
Consequently, a high-risk chemical
facility or designee may choose to rely
on the Department verification of
enrollment, Under Option 2, to comply
with RBPS 12(iv) and RBPS 12(i)–(iii).
Comment: Several commenters
suggested that providing information
about an affected individual to the
Department prior to access would
complicate the ability of a high-risk
chemical facility or designee to
substitute contract workers, service
providers, third party carriers, and the
like on short notice in the event of an
accident, illness or change in work
assignment/scope.
Response: Earlier in this notice the
Department outlined its understanding
about how high-risk chemical facilities
and designees could include steps for
RBPS 12(iv) in their normal business
operations when conducting the routine
and normal background checks required
for RBPS 12(i)–(iii). The steps a highrisk chemical facility normally takes to
comply with RBPS 12(i)–(iii) when
faced with substitute contract workers,
service providers, third party carriers,
and the like on short notice in the event
of an accident, illness or change in work
assignment/scope should be a part of a
high-risk chemical facility’s SSP or ASP.
These steps, or specific alternative steps
to comply with RBPS 12(iv) could also
be a part of, or incorporated within,
those steps a high-risk chemical facility
implements to comply with RBPS 12(i)–
(iii) in their SSP or ASP.
In addition, high-risk chemical
facilities are welcome to propose
alternative or supplemental options not
described in this PRA notice in their
SSPs or ASPs. The Department will
assess the adequacy of such alternative
or supplemental options on a facilityby-facility basis, in the course of
evaluating each facility’s SSP or ASP.
Comment: Submitters further
suggested that providing information
about an affected individual to the
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Department prior to access could also
complicate the admittance of
specialized crews brought in to
accomplish emergency repairs or
provide emergency response services.
Some commenters suggested that the
Department’s approach to allow each
high-risk chemical facility to address
these issues in their SSP or ASP is not
adequate because the absence of
uniform guidance across all the sectors,
programs and procedures will result in
inconsistent processes and procedures.
Response: Section 550 of Public Law
109–295 established a standards based
regulatory regime to allow each highrisk chemical facility to propose in their
SSP or ASP those security measures
which make sense for its business
operations and security risk. This will
naturally result in inconsistent
processes and procedures across highrisk chemical facilities. The Department
believes that the intent of Section 550 is
that flexibility (and thus some
subsequent variation) is in fact a desired
outcome of CFATS rather than a
negative and unanticipated result of the
CFATS regulatory program.
The Department would also like to
point out that P.L. 109–295 and its
implementing regulations do not
prohibit high-risk chemical facilities
from developing consistent approaches
or from adopting consistent security
measures or security protocols.
Comment: Several commenters
pointed out an apparent inconsistency
between the Department’s statement
that high-risk chemical facilities are not
required to create, keep, or retain
records under RBPS 12(iv) and the
Department’s statement that it may
request information pertaining to
affected individuals, previously
provided to the Department by high-risk
chemical facilities, or their designees, in
order to confirm the accuracy of that
information, or to conduct data accuracy
reviews and audits as part of the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program. Commenters
suggested that if records are not
required to be kept it is unclear (1) how
the Department can expect facilities to
provide information on affected
individuals to confirm the accuracy of
previously submitted information or (2)
how the Department can subject highrisk chemical facilities to data accuracy
reviews and audits.
Response: The Department disagrees
that there is a contradiction because
high-risk chemical facilities or their
designees will already possess or have
access to information about many
affected individuals as a result of
standard business practices related to
employment or managing of service
contracts. The Department also
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recognizes that, unrelated to this
Information Collection, high-risk
chemical facilities may propose to
maintain different sorts of records or
information related to RBPS 12 as part
of their SSPs or ASPs, and the
Department expects that the records or
information available could vary from
one high-risk chemical facility to
another. The types of information the
Department could request from highrisk chemical facilities as part of data
accuracy reviews or audits could thus
vary from facility to facility, based on
each facility’s standard business
practices and SSP or ASP.
Comment: Several commenters stated
that they do not routinely collect
information about affected individuals
who are not employees (e.g., contractors
and visitors).
Response: The Department
understands that high-risk chemical
facilities may not routinely collect
information about affected individuals
who are not employees. Earlier in this
notice the Department outlined several
illustrative scenarios which describe
some common business operations as
part of which high-risk chemical
facilities could manage the background
check requirements of contractors and
visitors under RBPS 12. In these
illustrative scenarios there is not an
expectation high-risk chemical facilities
will receive and subsequently retransmit the information to the
Department under Option 1 or Option 2.
Though such an approach is not
precluded, the Department will allow
wide latitude to high-risk chemical
facilities to enable third parties to
submit information about affected
individuals directly to the Department,
to satisfy RBPS 12(iv).
Comment: Several commenters
requested clarity about what records
would be considered government
records.
Response: Information about affected
individuals held by the Department are
government records. Thus information
about affected individuals obtained
from the Department (via CSAT) by
high-risk chemical facilities or their
designees are government records.
There is often confusion about copies of
information which is best clarified
through illustrations.
• ILLUSTRATION #1: A high-risk
chemical facility or designee holds
information about affected individuals
which it obtained to perform the four
background checks required under
RBPS 12. This information does not
qualify as government records.
• ILLUSTRATION #2: A high-risk
chemical facility or designee holds
information about affected individuals
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which it obtained to perform the four
background checks required under
RBPS 12. The high-risk chemical facility
or designee submits portions of the
information necessary under Option 1
and Option 2 to the Department via
CSAT. The information in the
possession of the high-risk chemical
facility or designee does not qualify as
government records.
• ILLUSTRATION #3: A high-risk
chemical facility or designee holds
information about affected individuals
which it obtained to perform the four
background checks required under
RBPS 12. The high-risk chemical facility
or designee submits portions of the
information necessary under Option 1
and Option 2 to the Department via
CSAT. The high-risk chemical facility or
designee logs into CSAT and
downloads, prints, or copies one or
more records about affected individuals.
Only the records downloaded, printed,
or copied from CSAT are government
records.
• ILLUSTRATION #4: A high-risk
chemical facility or designee holds
information about affected individuals
which it obtained to perform the four
background checks required under
RBPS 12. The high-risk chemical facility
or designee submits portions of the
information necessary under Option 1
and Option 2 to the Department via
CSAT. The high-risk chemical facility or
designee logs into CSAT and downloads
only whether or not an affected
individual, under Option 2, has or has
not been electronically verified as
enrolled in the TWIC, HME, or Trusted
Traveler Programs. The record of an
affected individual’s enrollment status
provided by the Department is a
government record.
Comment: Commenters requested
additional information about what
information and records, related to the
CFATS Personnel Surety Program was
and was not considered Chemicalterrorism Vulnerability Information
(CVI).
Response: The Department does not
generally expect information and
records related to the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program to contain CVI.
In the May 2011 CFATS Personnel
Surety Program Privacy Impact
Assessment (PIA), the Department
previously indicated that it would issue
a ‘‘verification of receipt’’ and that the
‘‘verification of receipt qualifies as
Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability
Information.[.]’’ 32 However, as
32 See section 5.3 of the Privacy Impact
Assessment for the CFATS Personnel Surety
Program, dated May 4, 2011, and available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/
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6435
discussed earlier in this notice, instead
the Department now intends to provide
high-risk chemical facilities, and their
designees, the ability to create an alert
within the CSAT Personnel Surety
application that can notify them when
the Department has received
information about an affected
individual(s). Such an alert would not
be CVI.
Comment: One commenter was
troubled by the information pertaining
to RBPS–12 contained in Appendix C of
the May 2009 Risk-Based Performance
Standards Guidance (http://
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_
cfats_riskbased_performance_
standards.pdf), because the commenter
believes that certain types of measures,
procedures, policies, and plans
mentioned in Appendix C are not
appropriate for determining if chemical
facility personnel are terrorist threats.
Response: The Department expects
high-risk chemical facilities to
implement appropriate security
measures to conduct identity, criminal
history, and legal authorization to work
background checks. These security
measures can vary from facility to
facility commensurate with facilityspecific risks, security issues, and
business practices. The guidance
referenced by the commenter (see pages
180 to 186 of the Risk-Based
Performance Standards Guidance) and
other guidance addressing identity,
criminal history, and legal authorization
to work background checks, however, is
not guidance addressing compliance
with 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv), and as
such is not the subject of this notice, nor
is it the subject of the underlying ICR or
of the 60-day notice preceding this
notice.
Comment: One commenter requested
that the Department clarify what appeal
or waiver options an affected individual
has if his/her employer takes an adverse
employment action against him/her
based on RBPS–12 background checks
or based on information received or
obtained under the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program. The commenter also
requested that the Department prevent
high-risk chemical facilities from using
personal information collected from
affected individuals as part of RBPS–12
for purposes other than conducting the
background checks required by RBPS–
12.
privacy-pia-nppd-cfats-ps.pdf. The Department also
discussed ‘‘verification of receipt’’ in previous
public notices related to an earlier (now withdrawn)
ICR for the Personnel Surety Program—see for
example NPPD’s June 14, 2011 PRA Response to
Comments Document, 76 FR 34720, 34721.
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Response: High-risk chemical
facilities’ employment actions are not
regulated by CFATS.
The ICR the Department will submit
to OMB, the 60-day notice, and the 30day notice address the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program, not the
identity, legal authorization to work,
and criminal history background checks
required by 6 CFR 230(a)(12)(i)–(iii).
Discussion of information collected as
part of those other three background
checks, or employment decisions based
on them, is beyond the scope of this
notice. However, the Department
expects that the high-risk chemical
facilities and their designees will
safeguard information collected and
maintained under RBPS–12 as outlined
in their SSP and in accordance with any
other applicable federal, State, or local
privacy laws which apply to the
collection of the information.
Comment: One commenter requested
information about the controls to
prevent an individual or the facility
from using the personal information for
purposes other than RBPS 12(iv).
Response: The Department expects
that high-risk chemical facilities and
their designees will safeguard
information collected and maintained
under RBPS–12 as outlined in their SSP.
While under CFATS, no additional
specific controls are required by the
Department for information collected by
high-risk chemical facilities, the
Department does expect that high-risk
chemical facilities will protect and
safeguard the information as outlined in
their SSP or ASP in accordance with
any other federal, State, or local privacy
laws which apply to the collection of
the information.
The information collected by a highrisk chemical facility pursuant to RBPS
12(iv) may be submitted to DHS under
Option 1 and Option 2. Information
collected or retained by the facility that
has not been submitted to DHS and
facility-generated copies of information
that have been submitted to DHS are not
considered government records and
therefore are not covered under the
Privacy Act of 1974. However, any
information about affected individuals
that is obtained from the CSAT
Personnel Surety application is a
government record and subject to the
Privacy Act of 1974. Those government
records must be protected as stated in
the DHS CSAT Personnel Surety
application Rules of Behavior, which
every CSAT user will be required to
affirm prior to receiving access to the
application.
V. The Department’s Methodology in
Estimating the Burden
Summary of Changes From 60-Day
Notice
When compared to the 60-day notice,
the Department made only a few
changes which impacted the burden
estimates in this notice. Table 3 below
briefly summarizes them.
TABLE 3—SUMMARY OF CHANGES
ICR Burden Variables
Description of changes
Frequency .................................................................................................
Affected Public ..........................................................................................
Number of Respondents ..........................................................................
No Changes.
No Changes.
Revised the turnover rate of frequent visitors from 71% to 81.75%. As
a result, the number of respondents increased from 192,000 affected
individuals to 195,000 affected individuals.
Updated from 0.54 hours to 0.58 hours as a result of the revised turnover rate increase.
Updated from 104,100 hours to 113,600 hours as a result of the revised turnover rate increase.
No Changes.
No Changes.
Updated from $4,771,00 to $4,844,000 as a result of the revised turnover rate increase.
Estimated Time Per Respondent .............................................................
Total Burden Hours ..................................................................................
Total Burden Cost (Capital/Startup) .........................................................
Total Recordkeeping ................................................................................
Total Burden Cost ....................................................................................
Frequency
The Department will expect, unless
otherwise noted in an authorized or
approved SSP or ASP, that high-risk
chemical facilities submit information,
under Option 1 and/or Option 2, about
affected individuals in accordance with
the schedule outlined below in Table 4.
High-risk chemical facilities may
suggest alternative schedules for Option
1 or Option 2 based on their unique
circumstances in their SSPs or ASPs.
The default schedule below would not
apply to Option 3. Schedules for
implementing Option 3, or alternative
security measures other than Option 1
or Option 2, could vary from high-risk
chemical facility to high-risk chemical
facility, as described in individual
facilities’ SSPs or ASPs, subject to
approval by the Department.
The Department will expect a highrisk chemical facility to begin
submitting information about affected
individuals under Option 1 and/or
Option 2 under the schedule below
after: (1) The high-risk chemical facility
has been directed to comply with RBPS
12(iv); and (2) the high-risk chemical
facility has been notified that the
Department has implemented the
CFATS Personnel Surety Program.
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TABLE 4—COMPLIANCE SCHEDULE FOR OPTION 1 AND OPTION 2 UNDER THE CFATS PERSONNEL SURETY PROGRAM
Initial Submission Of Affected Individuals’ Information.
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Tier 1
Tier 2
Tier 3
Tier 4
60 days after the day
when both conditions
are true:
(1) DHS directs the facility
to comply with RBPS
12(iv), AND
60 days after the day
when both conditions
are true:
(1) DHS directs the facility
to comply with RBPS
12(iv), AND
90 days after the day
when both conditions
are true:
(1) DHS directs the facility
to comply with RBPS
12(iv), AND
90 days after the day
when both conditions
are true:
(1) DHS directs the facility
to comply with RBPS
12(iv), AND
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TABLE 4—COMPLIANCE SCHEDULE FOR OPTION 1 AND OPTION 2 UNDER THE CFATS PERSONNEL SURETY PROGRAM—
Continued
Submission Of A New Affected Individual’s Information.
Submission Of Updates
And Corrections To An
Affected Individual’s Information
Submission Of Notification
That An Affected Individual No Longer Has
Access
Tier 1
Tier 2
Tier 3
Tier 4
(2) DHS provides notification that it has implemented the CFATS Personnel Surety Program.
48 hours prior to access to
restricted areas or critical assets.
Within 90 days of becoming aware of the need
for an update or correction.
Within 90 days of access
being removed.
(2) DHS provides notification that it has implemented the CFATS Personnel Surety Program.
48 hours prior to access to
restricted areas or critical assets.
Within 90 days of becoming aware of the need
for an update or correction.
Within 90 days of access
being removed.
(2) DHS provides notification that it has implemented the CFATS Personnel Surety Program.
48 hours prior to access to
restricted areas or critical assets.
Within 90 days of becoming aware of the need
for an update or correction.
Within 90 days of access
being removed.
(2) DHS provides notification that it has implemented the CFATS Personnel Surety Program.
48 hours prior to access to
restricted areas or critical assets.
Within 90 days of becoming aware of the need
for an update or correction.
Within 90 days of access
being removed.
Therefore, after evaluating the choices
available to the Department under
Question 16 on the Paperwork
Reduction Act Submission form
(Standard Form–83(i)),33 the
Department believes that the description
of ‘‘Other: In accordance with the
compliance schedule or the facility SSP
or ASP’’ is the most appropriate choice.
• the number of unescorted visitors at
each type of high-risk chemical facility,
and
• the number of facility personnel
and resident contractors at each type of
high-risk chemical facility.
Affected Public
The number of respondents under this
collection is the number of affected
individuals that high-risk chemical
facilities or their designees submit
information about in compliance with
RBPS 12(iv). As described more fully
below, for the purpose of this notice the
number of respondents is estimated by
multiplying:
• The estimated number and types of
high-risk chemical facilities, and
• the estimated number of affected
individuals at each type of high-risk
chemical facility.
For the purpose of this notice, the
Department estimates the number of
affected individuals at each type of
high-risk chemical facility as the sum of:
In the 60-day notice, the Department
followed the methodology used in the
2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment 34
which recognized that each chemical
facility is unique. In the 2007 CFATS
Regulatory Assessment the Department
determined that it was impractical to
estimate costs for each high-risk
chemical facility. Therefore, the
Department created four categories of
facilities for each tier; three categories of
facilities where loss of containment of
the chemicals of interest is the primary
concern and one category of facilities
where theft and diversion of chemicals
is the primary concern. Specifically,
• Group A includes open facilities
with 100 or more employees where loss
of containment is the primary concern.
These facilities are assumed to have five
security entrances for the purpose of the
cost analysis.
• Group B includes open facilities
with 99 or fewer employees where loss
of containment is the primary concern.
In addition, facilities that store
anhydrous ammonia for commercial
refrigeration in outdoor vessels are also
considered ‘‘open’’ for the purpose of
this analysis because it is the outdoor
storage that requires protection. These
facilities are assumed to have two
security entrances for the purpose of the
cost analysis.
33 A blank copy of Standard Form 83(i) may be
found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/omb/inforeg/83i-fill.pdf.
34 See CFATS Regulatory Assessment Section 5.1
(April 1, 2007), http://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=DHS-2006-0073-0116.
Most high-risk chemical facilities
regulated under CFATS are private
businesses, or parts of private
businesses. Most people that access the
restricted areas and critical assets of
high-risk chemical facilities do so for
business purposes. Therefore, after
evaluating the choices available to the
Department on Standard Form 83(i), the
Department selected the description of
‘‘Business or other for-profit’’ as the
most appropriate selection for this
proposed Information Collection.
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Number of Respondents
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Number and Type of High-Risk
Chemical Facilities
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• Group C facilities are enclosed
facilities where loss of containment is
the primary concern (i.e., warehouses,
enclosed manufacturing sites) that
manufacture, process, use, store and/or
distribute chemicals. The Department
did not segment enclosed facilities by
size because the same degree of
variation between a large open facility
(i.e., a 2,000-acre petrochemical
complex) and a small open 3–5-acre
facility does not exist. These facilities
are assumed to have one security
entrance for the purpose of the cost
analysis.
• Theft/Diversion facilities are
typically merchant wholesalers (often
called chemical distributors), chemical
manufacturers, or other manufacturers
that manufacture, process, use, store or
distribute chemicals that could be the
target of theft and diversion. The theft
of chemicals could include theft of
portable containers by employees,
visitors or adversaries. The diversion of
chemicals involves what often looks like
a legitimate transaction where an
adversary, impersonating a legitimate
customer, purchases chemicals that
could later be turned into weapons.
These facilities are assumed to have one
security entrance for the purposes of
cost analysis.
In the 60-day notice, the Department
updated the number and type of highrisk chemical facilities estimated in the
2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment.
The updated analysis, hereafter referred
to as the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety
Program Analysis, determined the highrisk chemical facility count for each of
the 16 model facility categories
identified in the 2007 Regulatory
Assessment by analyzing high-risk
chemical facilities designated with a
final tier under CFATS as of August
2012. A comparison of the number of
high-risk chemical facilities, estimated
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by the 2007 CFATS Regulatory
Assessment, to the number of high-risk
chemical facilities identified within the
2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program
Analysis is presented in Table 5.
TABLE 5—NUMBER OF FACILITIES IN EACH MODEL FACILITY CATEGORY
2007 CFATS
regulatory
assessment
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
2012 CFATS
personnel surety
program analysis
(raw data)
Group A .............................................................................................................................................
Group B .............................................................................................................................................
Group C .............................................................................................................................................
Theft ..................................................................................................................................................
Group A .............................................................................................................................................
Group B .............................................................................................................................................
Group C .............................................................................................................................................
Theft ..................................................................................................................................................
Group A .............................................................................................................................................
Group B .............................................................................................................................................
Group C .............................................................................................................................................
Theft ..................................................................................................................................................
Group A .............................................................................................................................................
Group B .............................................................................................................................................
Group C .............................................................................................................................................
Theft ..................................................................................................................................................
81
89
24
6
166
64
80
189
315
438
329
718
242
690
599
970
4
6
10
93
8
16
15
400
22
33
66
935
72
190
13
1,683
Total ......................................................................................................................................................
5,000
3,566
In the 60-day notice, the Department
normalized the number of facilities in
each model facility category of the 2012
CFATS Personnel Surety Program
Analysis to 4,000 facilities by
multiplying the number of high-risk
chemical facilities in each category by a
factor of 1.22.35 The 2012 CFATS
Personnel Surety Program Analysis
revised (i.e., normalized) high-risk
chemical facility count is compared to
the 2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment
high-risk chemical facility count, by
model facility category, in Table 6.
TABLE 6—NUMBER OF HIGH-RISK CHEMICAL FACILITIES IN EACH MODEL FACILITY CATEGORY
[Normalized to 4,000 facilities]
2007 CFATS
regulatory
assessment
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Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
2012 CFATS
personnel surety
program analysis
(normalized)
Group A .............................................................................................................................................
Group B .............................................................................................................................................
Group C .............................................................................................................................................
Theft ..................................................................................................................................................
Group A .............................................................................................................................................
Group B .............................................................................................................................................
Group C .............................................................................................................................................
Theft ..................................................................................................................................................
Group A .............................................................................................................................................
Group B .............................................................................................................................................
Group C .............................................................................................................................................
Theft ..................................................................................................................................................
Group A .............................................................................................................................................
Group B .............................................................................................................................................
Group C .............................................................................................................................................
Theft ..................................................................................................................................................
81
89
24
6
166
64
80
189
315
438
329
718
242
690
599
970
4
7
11
104
9
18
17
449
25
37
74
1,049
81
213
15
1,888
Total ......................................................................................................................................................
5,000
4,000
As in the 60-day notice, this notice
the Department continues to use the
number and type of high-risk chemical
facilities in each facility category
estimated through the normalized 2012
CFATS Personnel Surety Program
Analysis because the distribution of
facility type (i.e., facility count) is based
upon actual historical data.
35 The factor of 1.22 was used because (4,000
facilities/3566 facilities) = 1.22.
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Estimated Number of Affected
Individuals at Each Type of High-Risk
Chemical Facility—Unescorted Visitors
With Access to Restricted Areas or
Critical Assets
For the purpose of estimating the
potential burden this information
collection could impose, the
Department determined that it was
appropriate to continue to use the
conservative assumptions from the
American Chemistry Council (ACC)
about frequent and infrequent visitors
and treat them all as unescorted
visitors.36 Specifically, the ACC
provided the Department with an
estimate on the number and turnover of
frequent and infrequent visitors at highrisk chemical facilities.
ACC’s analysis suggests that 1,200
total visitors per year should be
expected at large open manufacturing
facilities that align with Group A (Tier
1 through 4) model facility categories;
300 visitors each at small open
manufacturing facilities (Group B model
facility categories, Tier 1 through 4) and
enclosed manufacturing facilities
(Group C model facility categories, Tier
1 through 4); and 50 visitors expected at
theft/diversion model facilities (Tier 1
through 4). ACC estimated an annual
turnover rate of 71 percent for frequent
visitors (e.g., delivery personnel) and an
annual turnover rate of 20 percent for
infrequent visitors that only visit the
facility once or twice a year (e.g.,
corporate auditors). In response to the
60-day notice, the Department received
a comment from American Trucking
Associations (ATA) that suggested the
annual turnover rate for frequent
visitors (e.g., delivery personnel)
suggested by ACC is too low. ATA
suggested that the Department use a
turnover rate of 81.75% instead of 71%.
As a result, the Department increased its
estimate of the frequent visitor annual
turnover rate to 81.75%.
The Department also continues to
maintain the assumption in the 60-day
notice that frequent and infrequent
visitors were expected to compose equal
volume of traffic at high-risk chemical
facilities.
ACC’s analysis assumed that all
visitors count towards the number of
affected individuals. However, high-risk
chemical facilities will only be
responsible for submitting information
for unescorted visitors with access to
restricted areas or critical assets. The
Department does not expect high-risk
chemical facilities to allow large
numbers of visitors to have unescorted
access to restricted areas or critical
assets. As a general matter, the
Department does not believe it to be
likely that many high-risk chemical
facilities will propose in their SSPs
under CFATS to allow large numbers of
visitors to have unescorted access to the
restricted areas and critical assets of
high-risk chemical facilities because
then these visitors would be subject to
all four types of background checks
listed in RBPS 12. However, for the
purpose of estimating the potential
burden this information collection
could impose, the Department continues
to use ACC’s conservative assumptions
about frequent and infrequent visitors
and treat them all as unescorted visitors.
Table 7 provides the Department’s
estimated number of unescorted visitors
that have or are seeking access to
restricted areas or critical assets.
TABLE 7—ESTIMATE OF UNESCORTED VISITORS THAT HAVE OR ARE SEEKING ACCESS TO RESTRICTED AREAS OR
CRITICAL ASSETS
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
A
B
C*
D**
E=C+D
A+B+E
Infrequent
visitors
Frequent
visitors
Infrequent
visitor annual
turnover
(20%)
Frequent
visitor annul
turnover
(81.75%)
Unescorted
visitor annual
turnover
Unescorted
visitor estimate
Group A .........................................
Group B .........................................
Group C .........................................
Theft ..............................................
Group A .........................................
Group B .........................................
Group C .........................................
Theft ..............................................
Group A .........................................
Group B .........................................
Group C .........................................
Theft ..............................................
Group A .........................................
Group B .........................................
Group C .........................................
Theft ..............................................
600
150
150
25
600
150
150
25
600
150
150
25
600
150
150
25
600
150
150
25
600
150
150
25
600
150
150
25
600
150
150
25
120
30
30
5
120
30
30
5
120
30
30
5
120
30
30
5
491
123
123
20
491
123
123
20
491
123
123
20
491
123
123
20
611
153
153
25
611
153
153
25
611
153
153
25
611
153
153
25
1811
453
453
75
1811
453
453
75
1811
453
453
75
1811
453
453
75
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
* C = A × 0.20, ** D = B × 0.8175.
Estimated Number of Affected
Individuals at Each Type of High-Risk
Chemical Facility—Facility Personnel
With Access to Restricted Areas or
Critical Assets
The 2007 CFATS Regulatory
Assessment also provided an estimate of
full time employees and resident
contractors for the 16 model facility
categories, as shown in Table 8.37
36 This cost estimate has been posted to Docket
DHS–2012–0061, which may be accessed through
the Federal eRulemaking Portal at http://
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DHS2012-0061-0008.
37 See CFATS Regulatory Assessment Section
6.3.7, Table 15 (April 1, 2007), http://
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DHS2006-0073-0116.
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TABLE 8—2007 CFATS REGULATORY ASSESSMENT ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF FULL TIME EMPLOYEES AND RESIDENT
CONTRACTORS
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
A
B
C*
D**
A+C+D
Number of
full time
employees per
facility
Resident
contractors per
facility
(as percent of
full time
employees)
Resident
contractors
per facility
20% Annual
turnover
(full time
employees
and resident
contractors
per facility)
Number of
full time
employees
and
resident
contractors per
facility
(including 20%
annual
turnover)
Group A .....................................................................
Group B .....................................................................
Group C .....................................................................
Theft ..........................................................................
Group A .....................................................................
Group B .....................................................................
Group C .....................................................................
Theft ..........................................................................
Group A .....................................................................
Group B .....................................................................
Group C .....................................................................
Theft ..........................................................................
Group A .....................................................................
Group B .....................................................................
Group C .....................................................................
Theft ..........................................................................
391
35
152
35
279
34
317
35
487
47
310
35
283
139
201
35
30
20
10
10
30
20
10
10
30
20
10
10
30
20
10
10
117
7
15
4
84
7
32
4
146
9
31
4
85
28
20
4
102
8
33
8
73
8
70
8
127
11
68
8
74
33
44
8
610
50
200
47
436
49
419
47
760
67
409
47
442
200
265
47
Total ..............................................................................
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
*C = A × B, **D = (A + C) × 0.20.
In the June 2011 ICR, the Department
updated the estimate of employees and
resident contractors in the 2007 CFATS
Regulatory Assessment in response to a
survey submitted by the American Fuel
and Petrochemical Manufacturers 38
during the 30 day comment period
associated with the previous CFATS
Personnel Surety Program ICR.39
Specifically, the Department increased
the estimated number of full time
employees/contractors in Group A
facilities by 5, as shown in Table 9.
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
TABLE 9—REVISED 2007 CFATS REGULATORY ASSESSMENT ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF FULL TIME EMPLOYEES AND
RESIDENT CONTRACTORS
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
A
B
C*
D**
A+C+D
Number of
full time
employees per
facility
Resident
contractors
per facility
(as percent of
full time
employees)
Resident
contractors
per facility
20% Annual
turnover
(full time
employees
and resident
contractors per
facility)
Number of
full time
employees
and
resident
contractors
per facility
(including
20% annual
turnover)
1,955
35
152
35
1,395
34
317
35
2,435
47
310
35
30
20
10
10
30
20
10
10
30
20
10
10
Group A .....................................................................
Group B .....................................................................
Group C .....................................................................
Theft ..........................................................................
Group A .....................................................................
Group B .....................................................................
Group C .....................................................................
Theft ..........................................................................
Group A .....................................................................
Group B .....................................................................
Group C .....................................................................
Theft ..........................................................................
38 The American Fuel and Petrochemical
Manufacturers is the name of the former National
Petrochemical & Refiners Association, whose
comment may be found at http://
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39 See Response To Comments Received During
30 Day Comment Period: New Information
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587
7
15
4
419
7
32
4
731
9
31
4
508
8
33
8
363
8
70
8
633
11
68
8
3,050
50
201
46
2,176
49
418
46
3,799
68
409
46
Collection Request 1670—NEW, 76 FR 34720 (June
14, 2011).
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TABLE 9—REVISED 2007 CFATS REGULATORY ASSESSMENT ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF FULL TIME EMPLOYEES AND
RESIDENT CONTRACTORS—Continued
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
A
B
C*
D**
A+C+D
Number of
full time
employees per
facility
Resident
contractors
per facility
(as percent of
full time
employees)
Resident
contractors
per facility
20% Annual
turnover
(full time
employees
and resident
contractors per
facility)
Number of
full time
employees
and
resident
contractors
per facility
(including
20% annual
turnover)
Group A .....................................................................
Group B .....................................................................
Group C .....................................................................
Theft ..........................................................................
1,415
139
201
35
30
20
10
10
425
28
20
4
368
33
44
8
2,207
200
265
46
Total ..............................................................................
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
4
4
4
4
*C = A × B, **D = (A + C) × 0.20.
In addition to submitting comments
on the Department’s June 2011
estimated burden about unescorted
visitors, ACC also suggested that 80
percent of employees/resident
contractors have access to restricted
areas and/or critical assets at Group A,
B and C facilities and only 15 percent
of employees/resident contractors have
access to theft/diversion facilities. To
provide an additional estimate of the
number of respondents the Department
applied this ACC assumption to the
revised 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety
Program Analysis. The resulting
estimate, referred to as the ‘‘Adjusted
June 2011 ICR Estimate of the Number
of Full Time Employees and Resident
Contractors’’ is shown in Table 10.
TABLE 10—ADJUSTED JUNE 2011 ICR ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF FULL TIME EMPLOYEES AND RESIDENT
CONTRACTORS
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
A
B
C*
D**
A+C+D
E
(A+C+D) × E
Number of
full time
employees per
facility
Resident
contractors
per facility
(as percent of
full time
employees)
Resident
contractors
per facility
20% annual
turnover
(full time
employees
and resident
contractors per
facility)
Number of
full time
employees
and
resident
contractors
per facility
(including
20% annual
turnover)
ACC’s
estimate of
full time
employees
and contractors
with access
to restricted
areas or
critical assets
(percent)
Number of
full time
employees
and resident
contractors
per facility
with access
to restricted
areas or
critical assets
(including
20% annual
turnover)
1 Group A .............
1 Group B .............
1 Group C .............
1 Theft ..................
2 Group A .............
2 Group B .............
Group C ................
2 Theft ..................
3 Group A .............
3 Group B .............
3 Group C .............
3 Theft ..................
4 Group A .............
4 Group B .............
4 Group C .............
4 Theft ..................
1,955
35
152
35
1,395
34
317
35
2,435
47
310
35
1,415
139
201
35
30
20
10
10
30
20
10
10
30
20
10
10
30
20
10
10
587
7
15
4
419
7
32
4
731
9
31
4
425
28
20
4
508
8
33
8
363
8
70
8
633
11
68
8
368
33
44
8
3,050
50
201
46
2,176
49
418
46
3,799
68
409
46
2,207
200
265
46
80
80
80
15
80
80
80
15
80
80
80
15
80
80
80
15
2,440
40
161
7
1,741
39
335
7
3,039
54
327
7
1,766
160
212
7
Total ......................
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
*C = A × B, **D = (A + C) × 0.020.
For the purpose of this notice, the
Department also evaluated whether or
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employees and resident contractors. To
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provide an additional estimate of the
number of respondents, the 2012
CFATS Personnel Surety Program
Analysis analyzed actual information
submitted by high-risk chemical
facilities in response to Top-Screen 40
Question Q:1.45–400.41 Based upon the
submitted information, the Department
was able to estimate full time employees
and resident contractors by each model
facility category, as shown in Table 11.
TABLE 11—2012 CFATS PERSONNEL SURETY PROGRAM ANALYSIS’ ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF FULL TIME
EMPLOYEES AND RESIDENT CONTRACTORS
A
Response to
top screen
question
Q:1.45–400
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
Group A ...................
Group B ...................
Group C ..................
Theft ........................
Group A ...................
Group B ...................
Group C ..................
Theft ........................
Group A ...................
Group B ...................
Group C ..................
Theft ........................
Group A ...................
Group B ...................
Group C ..................
Theft ........................
599
36
300
653
222
30
489
416
594
33
188
233
737
17
175
195
Total ............................
n/a
Resident contractors
per facility
(as percent of
full time employees)
Resident contractors
per facility
B
A+B
20% annual
turnover
(full time employees and resident
contractors per
facility)
Number of full
time employees
and resident contractors per facility
(including 20%
annual turnover)
N/A—Top Screen Question Q1:1.45–400 incorporates
estimate of resident contractors
120
7
60
131
44
6
98
83
119
7
38
47
147
3
35
39
719
43
360
783
267
36
587
499
713
39
225
279
884
20
211
234
n/a
n/a
* In question Top Screen Question Q:1.45–400, facilities provide both full time employees and resident contractors.
Table 12 compares the estimates of
full time employees and resident
contractors in the: (1) 2007 CFATS
Regulatory Assessment; (2) ICR
submitted in June of 2011; (3) adjusted
June 2011 ICR Estimate of the Number
of Full Time Employees and Resident
Contractors; and (4) 2012 CFATS
Personnel Surety Program Analysis.
TABLE 12—AVERAGE NUMBER OF FULL TIME EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS PER FACILITY BY MODEL FACILITY
CATEGORY
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
2007 CFATS
regulatory
assessment
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
Group A .................................................................................................
Group B .................................................................................................
Group C .................................................................................................
Theft ......................................................................................................
Group A .................................................................................................
Group B .................................................................................................
Group C .................................................................................................
Theft ......................................................................................................
Group A .................................................................................................
Group B .................................................................................................
Group C .................................................................................................
Theft ......................................................................................................
Group A .................................................................................................
Group B .................................................................................................
40 Top-Screen
is defined at 6 CFR 27.105.
refers to the specific question
reference number in the online Top-Screen
41 Q:1.45–400
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3,050
50
201
46
2,176
49
418
46
3,799
68
409
46
2,207
200
2,440
40
161
7
1,741
39
335
7
3,039
54
327
7
1,766
160
610
50
200
47
436
49
419
47
760
67
409
47
442
200
application which is not available to the general
public. However, the exact text of the question is
available on page 20 of the CSAT Top-Screen
Survey Application User Guide v1.99 in the row
PO 00000
Estimate used
in June 2011
ICR
June 2011
ICR
(adjusted
with ACC’s
assumption
on facility
personnel
with access to
restricted
areas or
critical assets)
2012 CFATS
personnel
surety
program
analysis
719
43
360
783
267
36
587
499
713
39
225
279
884
20
entitled, ‘‘Number of Full Time Employees.’’ See
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_
csattopscreenusersmanual.pdf.
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TABLE 12—AVERAGE NUMBER OF FULL TIME EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS PER FACILITY BY MODEL FACILITY
CATEGORY—Continued
2007 CFATS
regulatory
assessment
Tier 4 Group C .................................................................................................
Tier 4 Theft ......................................................................................................
When evaluating the reasonable
alternatives (see next section) to
estimate the total number of
respondents, the Department did not
consider alternatives that used an
assumption about the full time
employees and resident contractors
estimates from the 2007 CFATS
Regulatory Assessment or the estimate
in the June 2011 ICR.
Rather, when evaluating the
reasonable alternatives to estimate the
total number of respondents (see the
next section of this document for this
evaluation), the Department opted to
use the best available industry
estimates, as well as actual historical
data collected directly from high-risk
chemical facilities, to estimate the full
time employees and resident
contractors. Namely:
(1) the adjusted June 2011 ICR
estimate of full time employees and
resident contractors, and
Estimate used
in June 2011
ICR
June 2011
ICR
(adjusted
with ACC’s
assumption
on facility
personnel
with access to
restricted
areas or
critical assets)
265
46
212
7
265
47
(2) the estimate of full time employees
and resident contractors in the 2012
CFATS Personnel Surety Program
Analysis.
Summary of Alternatives To Estimate
the Number of Respondents
As mentioned above, for the purpose
of this notice, the number of
respondents is estimated by
multiplying:
• The number and type of high-risk
chemical facilities, and
• the number of affected individuals
at each type of high-risk chemical
facility.
For the purpose of this notice, the
Department estimates the number of
affected individuals at each type of
high-risk chemical facility as the sum of:
• The number of unescorted visitors
at each type of high-risk chemical
facility, and
2012 CFATS
personnel
surety
program
analysis
211
234
• the number of facility personnel
and resident contractors at each type of
high-risk chemical facility.
In light of the data submitted by
commenters and the Department’s own
analysis, three alternatives for the total
number of respondents were considered
by the Department.
First, the total number of respondents
is based on:
a. The number and type of high-risk
chemical facilities assumed in the 2012
CFATS Personnel Surety Program
Analysis;
b. the ACC’s estimates about
unescorted visitors; and
c. the adjusted June 2011 ICR estimate
of the number of full time employees
and resident contractors.
This alternative results in an estimate
of an initial 995,944 respondents with
an annual turnover of 313,819
respondents. See Table 13.
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
TABLE 13—ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS—ALTERNATIVE 1
B
A
B
C
Number of
full time
employees
and resident contractors
CFATS
personnel
surety program ICR
withdrawn
in July of
2012
(including
20% annual turnover)
(Table 8)
Estimate of
full time
employees
and
contractors
with access to restricted
areas or
critical assets
(Percent)
Full time
employees
and
resident
contractors
CFATS
personnel
surety program ICR
withdrawn
in July of
2012 with
estimates
of percentage of employees/
resident
contractors
with restricted
area and/
or critical
asset
(Table 9)
ACC
unescorted visitor
estimate
(including
81.75%
turnover
for frequent visitors, 20%
turnover
for infrequent visitors)
Table 6)
Number of
facilities
(Table 5)
3,050
50
80
80
2,440
40
1,811
453
4
7
Tier 1 Group A ...........
Tier 1 Group B ...........
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A
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D
E
(D + E) ×
C
Number of
initial respondents
(includes
20%
annual
turnover)
CFATS
personnel
surety
program
ICR withdrawn in
July of
2011 20%
annual
turnover
(Table 9)
ACC
unescorted
visitors
annual
turnover
(Table 6)
Annual respondent
turnover
19,071
3,318
508
8
611
153
5,020
1,084
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TABLE 13—ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS—ALTERNATIVE 1—Continued
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
E
(D + E) ×
C
Number of
initial respondents
(includes
20%
annual
turnover)
CFATS
personnel
surety
program
ICR withdrawn in
July of
2011 20%
annual
turnover
(Table 9)
ACC
unescorted
visitors
annual
turnover
(Table 6)
Annual respondent
turnover
11
104
9
18
17
449
25
37
74
1,049
81
213
15
1,888
6,878
8,592
31,870
8,826
13,248
36,957
119,671
18,759
57,744
86,387
288,842
130,592
9,695
155,496
33
8
363
8
70
8
633
11
68
8
368
33
44
8
153
25
611
153
153
25
611
153
153
25
611
153
153
25
2,087
3,457
8,733
2,886
3,741
14,868
30,689
6,067
16,348
34,754
79,018
39,638
2,870
62,558
4,000
995,944
n/a
n/a
313,819
B
A
B
C
Number of
full time
employees
and resident contractors
CFATS
personnel
surety program ICR
withdrawn
in July of
2012
(including
20% annual turnover)
(Table 8)
Estimate of
full time
employees
and
contractors
with access to restricted
areas or
critical assets
(Percent)
Full time
employees
and
resident
contractors
CFATS
personnel
surety program ICR
withdrawn
in July of
2012 with
estimates
of percentage of employees/
resident
contractors
with restricted
area and/
or critical
asset
(Table 9)
ACC
unescorted visitor
estimate
(including
81.75%
turnover
for frequent visitors, 20%
turnover
for infrequent visitors)
Table 6)
Number of
facilities
(Table 5)
Group C ...........
Theft .................
Group A ...........
Group B ...........
Group C ...........
Theft .................
Group A ...........
Group B ...........
Group C ...........
Theft .................
Group A ...........
Group B ...........
Group C ...........
Theft .................
201
46
2,176
49
418
46
3,799
68
409
46
2,207
200
265
46
80
15
80
80
80
15
80
80
80
15
80
80
80
15
161
7
1,741
39
335
7
3,039
54
327
7
1,766
160
212
7
453
75
1,811
453
453
75
1,811
453
453
75
1,811
453
453
75
Total ....................
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
Second, the total number of
respondents is based on:
a. The number and type of high-risk
chemical facilities assumed in the 2012
CFATS Personnel Surety Program
Analysis;
b. the ACC’s estimates about
unescorted visitors;
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
D
A
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(A + B) ×
C
c. the number of full time employees
and resident contractors estimated by
the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety
Program Analysis; and
d. ACC’s estimate of the percentage of
resident employees and contractors with
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Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4703
access to restricted areas or critical
assets.
This alternative results in an estimate
of an initial 919,646 respondents with
an annual turnover of 416,879
respondents. See Table 14.
E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM
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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices
TABLE 14—ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS—ALTERNATIVE 2
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
(A × B) =
C
A
B
2012
CFATS
personnel
surety program analysis average number of full
time employees
and contractors
(including
20%
turnover)
(Table 10)
Estimate of
full time
employees
and
contractors
with access to restricted
areas or
critical assets
(percent)
Group A ...........
Group B ...........
Group C ...........
Theft .................
Group A ...........
Group B ...........
Group C ...........
Theft .................
Group A ...........
Group B ...........
Group C ...........
Theft .................
Group A ...........
Group B ...........
Group C ...........
Theft .................
719
43
360
783
267
36
587
499
713
39
225
279
884
20
211
234
Total ....................
n/a
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
Third the total number of respondents
is based on:
a. The number and type of high-risk
chemical facilities assumed in the 2012
CFATS Personnel Surety Program
Analysis;
b. the ACC’s estimates about
unescorted visitors;
(C + D) ×
E
D
E
Average
number of
full time
employees
and
contractors
(including
20% turnover)
ACC
unescorted
visitor
estimate
(including
81.75%
turnover
for frequent visitors, 20%
turnover
for infrequent visitors)
(Table 6)
Number of
facilities
(Table 5)
80
80
80
15
80
80
80
15
80
80
80
15
80
80
80
15
575
34
288
118
213
29
469
75
571
31
180
42
707
16
168
35
1811
453
453
75
1,811
453
453
75
1,811
453
453
75
1,811
453
453
75
n/a
n/a
n/a
(F + G) ×
E
F
G
Number of
initial respondents
(includes
20%
annual
turnover)
2012
CFATS
personnel
surety
program
analysis
20% annual turnover
(Table 10)
ACC
unescorted
visitors
annual
turnover
(Table 6)
Annual respondent
turnover
4
7
11
104
9
18
17
449
25
37
74
1,049
81
213
15
1,888
10,702
3,278
8,304
20,127
18,161
8,645
15,514
67,405
58,760
17,917
46,854
123,087
203,357
99,897
9,057
208,578
120
7
60
131
44
6
98
83
119
7
38
47
147
3
35
39
611
153
153
25
611
153
153
25
611
153
153
25
611
153
153
25
3,277
1,075
2,384
16,273
5,877
2,848
4,214
48,700
17,999
5,892
14,079
75,533
61,209
33,243
2,737
121,538
4,000
919,646
n/a
n/a
416,879
c. the number of full time employees
and resident contractors estimated by
the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety
Program Analysis; and
d. does not include ACC’s estimate of
the percentage of resident employees
and contractors with access to restricted
areas or critical assets.
This alternative results in an estimate
of an initial 1,830,356 respondents with
an annual turnover of 416,879
respondents. See Table 15.
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
TABLE 15—ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS—ALTERNATIVE 3
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
1
1
1
1
2
B
2012
CFATS
personnel
surety
proram
analysis
average
number of
full time
employees
and contractors
(including
20% turnover)
(Table 10)
Estimate of
full time
employees
and
contractors
with access to restricted
areas or
critical assets
(percent)
719
43
360
783
267
100
100
100
100
100
Group A ...........
Group B ...........
Group C ...........
Theft .................
Group A ...........
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C
A
21:19 Jan 31, 2014
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PO 00000
D
E
(C + D) ×
E
Average
number of
full time
employees
and
contractors
(including
20% turnover)
ACC
unescorted
visitor
estimate
(including
81.75%
turnover
for frequent visitors, 20%
turnover
for infrequent visitors)
(Table 6)
Number of
facilities
(Table 5)
719
43
360
783
267
1,811
453
453
75
1,811
4
7
11
104
9
Frm 00029
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4703
(F + G) ×
E
F
G
Number of
initial respondents
2012
CFATS
personnel
surety
program
analysis
20% annual turnover
(Table 10)
ACC
unescorted
visitors
annual
turnover
(Table 6)
Annual respondent
turnover
11,347
3,336
9,111
89,587
18,640
120
7
60
131
44
611
153
153
25
611
3,277
1,075
2,384
16,273
5,877
E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM
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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices
TABLE 15—ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS—ALTERNATIVE 3—Continued
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
(A × B) =
C
D
E
(C + D) ×
E
Average
number of
full time
employees
and
contractors
(including
20% turnover)
ACC
unescorted
visitor
estimate
(including
81.75%
turnover
for frequent visitors, 20%
turnover
for infrequent visitors)
(Table 6)
Number of
facilities
(Table 5)
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
36
587
499
713
39
225
279
884
20
211
234
453
453
75
1,811
453
453
75
1,811
453
453
75
n/a
n/a
n/a
A
B
2012
CFATS
personnel
surety
proram
analysis
average
number of
full time
employees
and contractors
(including
20% turnover)
(Table 10)
Estimate of
full time
employees
and
contractors
with access to restricted
areas or
critical assets
(percent)
Group B ...........
Group C ...........
Theft .................
Group A ...........
Group B ...........
Group C ...........
Theft .................
Group A ...........
Group B ...........
Group C ...........
Theft .................
36
587
499
713
39
225
279
884
20
211
234
Total ....................
n/a
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
(F + G) ×
E
F
G
Number of
initial respondents
2012
CFATS
personnel
surety
program
analysis
20% annual turnover
(Table 10)
ACC
unescorted
visitors
annual
turnover
(Table 6)
Annual respondent
turnover
18
17
449
25
37
74
1,049
81
213
15
1,888
8,775
17,489
257,567
62,281
18,208
50,191
372,244
217,641
100,755
9,671
583,514
6
98
83
119
7
38
47
147
3
35
39
153
153
25
611
153
153
25
611
153
153
25
2,848
4,214
48,700
17,999
5,892
14,079
75,533
61,209
33,243
2,737
121,538
4,000
1,830,356
n/a
n/a
416,879
These three alternatives are
summarized in Table 16.
TABLE 16—COMPARISON OF NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS FOR ALTERNATIVES 1, 2 AND 3
Initial Year
Alternative 1 .....................................................................................................
Alternative 2 .....................................................................................................
Alternative 3 .....................................................................................................
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
For the purpose of this notice the
Department selected alternative 3.
Alternative 3 reasonably reflects the
type and number of facilities regulated
by CFATS, is based upon the actual
number of full time employees and
contractors as reported by high-risk
chemical facilities, and explicitly
estimates unescorted visitors as a
separate population from facility
employees and resident contractors.
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995,944
919,646
1,830,356
Limitation of Respondents to Tier 1 and
Tier 2 Facilities
The Department is proposing to limit
this information collection, and to limit
initial CFATS Personnel Surety Program
implementation, to only Tier 1 and Tier
2 high-risk chemical facilities. A limited
implementation would enable the
Department to implement the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program for those
facilities presenting the highest risk,
while not imposing the burden on all
PO 00000
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Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4703
Year 2
313,819
416,879
416,879
Year 3
313,819
416,879
416,879
Number of
respondents
(annual
average)
541,194
584,468
888,038
CFATS regulated facilities. Assuming
this information collection request is
approved, a subsequent ICR would be
published and submitted to OMB for
approval to incorporate any lessons
learned and potential improvements to
the CFATS Personnel Surety Program
prior to collecting information from Tier
3 and Tier 4 high-risk chemical
facilities. Table 17 provides the estimate
of the number of respondents using
alternative 3 for Tier 1 and 2 high-risk
chemical facilities.
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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices
TABLE 17—ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF TIER 1 & 2 RESPONDENTS
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
(A × B) =
C
D
E
(C + D) ×
E
Average
number of
full time
employees
and
contractors
(Including
20% turnover)
ACC
unescorted
visitor
estimate
(including
81.75%
turnover
for frequent visitors, 20%
turnover
for infrequent visitors)
(Table 6)
Number of
facilities
(Table 5)
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
719
43
360
783
267
36
587
499
1,811
453
453
75
1,811
453
453
75
n/a
n/a
n/a
A
B
2012
CFATS
personnel
surety program analysis average number of full
time employees
and contractors
(including
20% turnover)
(Table 10)
Estimate of
full time
employees
and
contractors
with access to restricted
areas or
critical assets
(Percent)
Group A ...........
Group B ...........
Group C ...........
Theft .................
Group A ...........
Group B ...........
Group C ...........
Theft .................
719
43
360
783
267
36
587
499
Total ....................
n/a
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
Therefore, the annual average number
of respondents is equal to 195,049, as
shown in Table 18. The Department’s
(F = G) ×
E
F
G
Number of
initial respondents
2012
CFATS
personnel
surety
program
analysis
20% annual turnover
(Table 10)
ACC
unescorted
visitors
annual
turnover
(Table 6)
Annual respondent
turnover
4
7
11
104
9
18
17
449
11,347
3,336
9,111
89,587
18,640
8,775
17,489
257,567
120
7
60
131
44
6
98
83
611
153
153
25
611
153
153
25
3,277
1,075
2,384
16,273
5,877
2,848
4,214
48,700
n/a
415,852
n/a
n/a
84,648
rounded estimate is 195,000
respondents.
TABLE 18—ESTIMATE OF ANNUAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS FOR TIER 1 & 2 FACILITIES
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
B
C
(A + B + C)/3
Total
respondents
year 1
Total
respondents
year 2
Total
respondents
year 3
Number of
respondents
(annual
average)
Group A .................................................................................................
Group B .................................................................................................
Group C .................................................................................................
Theft ......................................................................................................
Group A .................................................................................................
Group B .................................................................................................
Group C .................................................................................................
Theft ......................................................................................................
11,347
3,336
9,111
89,587
18,640
8,775
17,489
257,567
3,277
1,075
2,384
16,273
5,877
2,848
4,214
48,700
3,277
1,075
2,384
16,273
5,877
2,848
4,214
48,700
5,967
1,829
4,627
40,711
10,132
4,823
8,639
118,322
Total ..........................................................................................................
415,852
84,648
84,648
195,049
Total Annual Burden Hours
The total annual burden hours were
estimated in a three step process. The
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
A
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first step was to derive from previous
tables in this notice the estimated
number of initial submissions for Tier 1
and Tier 2 facilities: (1) Full time
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Sfmt 4703
employees and contractors, (2) frequent
visitors, and (3) infrequent visitors. The
derived estimates are shown in Table
18.
E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM
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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices
TABLE 19—STEP 1 OF ESTIMATING THE TOTAL ANNUAL BURDEN HOURS
[Estimate of initial submissions for Tier 1 & 2 facilities in Year 1]
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
A
B
C
D
E = (A × D)
F = (B × D)
G = (C × D)
Response to
top screen
question
Q:1.45–400
(Table 11)
Initial
submissions—
frequent visitors
(Table 7)
Initial
submissions—
infrequent
visitors
(Table 7)
2012 CFATS
personnel
surety
program
analysis
(normalized)
(Table 6)
Initial
submissions—
full time employees and
contractors
(Year 1)
Initial
submissions—
frequent visitors
(Year 1)
Initial
submissions—
infrequent
visitors
(Year 1)
Group A ...........................
Group B ...........................
Group C ...........................
Theft ................................
Group A ...........................
Group B ...........................
Group C ...........................
Theft ................................
599
36
300
653
222
30
489
416
600
150
150
25
600
150
150
25
600
150
150
25
600
150
150
25
4
7
11
104
9
18
17
449
2,686
241
3,362
68,098
1,994
543
8,228
186,433
2,692
1,010
1,683
2,608
5,384
2,692
2,524
11,217
2,692
1,010
1,683
2,608
5,384
2,692
2,524
11,217
Total ....................................
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
271,585
29,809
29,809
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
The second step of estimating the
total annual burden hours was to
estimate the average annual number of
submission by the type of submission.
The average annual number of
submissions, by the type of submission
for Tier 1 and Tier 2 Facilities over three
years is shown in Table 20.
TABLE 20—STEP 2 OF ESTIMATING THE TOTAL ANNUAL BURDEN HOURS
[Average annual estimate of total number of submissions, by type of submission, for Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities in each year]
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
Year 1
Full Time Employees and Contractors .........................
Frequent Visitors ...........................................................
Infrequent Visitors .........................................................
Year 1 Submissions .............................................................
Year 2
Full Time Employees and Contractors .........................
Frequent Visitors ...........................................................
Infrequent Visitors .........................................................
Year 2 Submissions .............................................................
Year 3
Full Time Employees and Contractors .........................
Frequent Visitors ...........................................................
Infrequent Visitors .........................................................
Year 3 Submissions .............................................................
Total Submissions Over 3 Years .........................................
Number of Average Annual Submissions ............................
The third, and final step of estimating
the total annual burden hours, was to
sum the average annual burden hours
for each type of submission.
The average annual burden hour for
each type of submission was estimated
by multiplying the average annual
number of: (1) Initial respondents
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A
B
A×B=C
(A + B) * 0.05
C
Initial
submissions
Annual
turnover
percentage
Additional
submissions
due to
industry
turnover
Update/
corrections
Removal due
to turnover
271,585
29,809
29,809
........................
20
81.75
20
415,853
54,317
24,369
5,962
........................
16,295
2,709
1,789
20,793
54,317
24,369
5,962
84,648
0
0
0
........................
........................
........................
........................
84,648
54,317
24,369
5,962
........................
2,716
1,218
298
4,232
54,317
24,369
5,962
84,648
0
0
0
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
84,648
585,149
195,050
54,317
24,369
5,962
........................
........................
........................
2,716
1,218
298
4,232
29,257
9,752
54,317
24,369
5,962
84,648
253,944
84,648
multiplied by the estimated time per
initial respondent (0.50 hours or 30
minutes); (2) respondents for which a
high-risk chemical facility will need to
update/correct information multiplied
by the number of hours necessary to
type and submit each update/correction
(i.e., 0.17 hours or 10 minutes); and (3)
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Sfmt 4703
respondents that are expected to no
longer have access to a high-risk
chemical facility’s restricted area(s)
multiplied by the number of hours
necessary to notify the Department (i.e.,
0.17 hours or 10 minutes).
Both calculations described above are
displayed below in Table 21.
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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices
TABLE 21—STEP 3 OF ESTIMATING THE ANNUAL BURDEN ESTIMATE
Initial Submissions .......................................................................................................................
Updates/Corrections ....................................................................................................................
Removal—Turnover .....................................................................................................................
Therefore, the average annual burden
is estimated to be 113,573 hours. The
Department’s rounded estimate is
113,600 hours.
Estimated Time per Respondent
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
For the purpose of estimating the time
per respondent, the Department
considered making an assumption about
the percentage of affected individuals
under the three options outlined in the
summary section of this notice (e.g.,
information about one-third of affected
individuals would be submitted for
direct vetting against the federal
government’s consolidated and
integrated terrorist watchlist,
information about one-third of affected
individuals would be submitted to
verify enrollment in other DHS
programs, and information about onethird of affected individuals would not
be submitted because they possess
TWICs that high-risk chemical facilities
would electronically verify through the
use of TWIC readers). However, the
Department concluded that such an
assumption was unwarranted because:
(1) The assumption would be without
any factual basis; (2) the burden to
submit information about an affected
individual for direct vetting is
approximately the same as the burden to
submit information in order to verify
enrollment (i.e., similar number of
required data elements); and (3) the
most conservative burden estimate
would assume that information is
submitted for all affected individuals
(i.e., no facilities will choose to
electronically verify the TWIC in the
possession of an affected individual).
42 Facilities that are partially regulated under both
MTSA and CFATS have the opportunity to identify
themselves in the CSAT Top-Screen. The text of the
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To avoid making unjustified
assumptions, and to avoid
underestimating the time per
respondent, the Department decided to
estimate the average burden per
respondent by assuming each and every
respondent’s information will be
manually submitted, rather than
uploaded via a bulk file or web-service,
to the Department for vetting for
terrorist ties.
Accordingly, the Department’s
‘‘estimated time per respondent’’ is
estimated by dividing the average
annual burden hours (113,573 hours) by
the number of respondents (195,049).
Therefore, for the purpose of this notice,
the estimated time per respondent is
0.5822 hours. The Department’s
rounded estimate is 0.58 hours.
A
B
(A × B) = C
Average annual respondents
Duration
(hours)
Burden hours
195,049
9,752
84,648
0.50
0.17
0.17
97,525
1,658
14,390
........................
........................
113,573
readers at the high-risk chemical
facilities.
Estimating Capital Costs for Option 3—
Number and Type of High-Risk
Chemical Facilities That May Choose To
Use Option 3
The Department expects no capital/
startup cost for high-risk chemical
facilities that choose to implement
Option 1 or Option 2.
Although there are no costs associated
with high-risk chemical facilities
providing information to the
Department under Option 3, the
Department has nonetheless estimated
the potential capital costs incurred by
high-risk chemical facilities that choose
to implement Option 3 under the
CFATS Personnel Surety Program to
ensure an appropriate accounting of the
costs potentially incurred by this
Information Collection. The capital cost
of Option 3 can be estimated by
multiplying (1) the number of high-risk
chemical facilities that are likely to
implement Option 3 by (2) the cost to
acquire, install, and maintain TWIC
High-risk chemical facilities and their
designees have wide latitude in how
they may implement Option 3, if they
choose to do so. High-risk chemical
facilities could propose, in their SSPs or
ASPs, to share the costs of TWIC readers
and any associated infrastructure at
central locations, or high-risk chemical
facilities could propose to purchase and
install TWIC readers for their own use.
The Department will assess the
adequacy of such proposals on a
facility-by-facility basis, in the course of
evaluating each facility’s SSP or ASP.
For the purpose of this notice, the
Department estimates that the number
of high-risk chemical facilities that are
likely to implement Option 3 is the
number of high-risk chemical facilities
likely to have affected individuals who
possess TWICs accessing their restricted
areas or critical assets. Through the
2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program
Analysis, the Department determined
that there are currently 32 high-risk
chemical facilities that have claimed a
partial Maritime Transportation
Security Act (MTSA) exemption 42 and
have received a final tier determination
under CFATS. The Department then
normalized the facility count by
multiplying the number of facilities that
claimed a partial exemption in each
category by a factor of 1.22 (as it did in
estimating the total number of facilities
in Table 6 above), as shown in Table 22.
question is available on page 22 of the CSAT TopScreen Survey Application User Guide v1.99. See
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_
csattopscreenusersmanual.pdf.
Total Burden Cost (Capital/Startup)
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TABLE 22—ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF HIGH-RISK CHEMICAL FACILITIES THAT MAY CHOOSE TO USE TWIC READERS
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
A
A × 1.22
2012 CFATS
personnel surety program
analysis
2012 CFATS
personnel surety program
analysis
(normalized)
Group A .........................................................................................................................................................
Group B .........................................................................................................................................................
Group C .........................................................................................................................................................
Theft ..............................................................................................................................................................
Group A .........................................................................................................................................................
Group B .........................................................................................................................................................
Group C .........................................................................................................................................................
Theft ..............................................................................................................................................................
Group A .........................................................................................................................................................
Group B .........................................................................................................................................................
Group C .........................................................................................................................................................
Theft ..............................................................................................................................................................
Group A .........................................................................................................................................................
Group B .........................................................................................................................................................
Group C .........................................................................................................................................................
Theft ..............................................................................................................................................................
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
3
0
2
13
1
2
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
3
0
2
15
1
2
0
8
Total ..................................................................................................................................................................
32
35
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
Estimating Capital Costs for Option 3—
TWIC Reader Costs
For the purpose of this notice, the
Department has based the potential per
high-risk chemical facility capital costs
related to Option 3 on the TWIC Reader
Requirements notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM).43 In the TWIC
Reader Requirements NPRM, the
Department estimated the initial phasein costs annual recurring costs, and
annual recurring costs that considers
equipment replacement for container
terminals, large passenger vessels/
terminals, petroleum facilities, breakbulk terminals and small passenger
vessels/towboats. For the purpose of
this notice, the Department has based
the capital costs related to Option 3 on
the costs incurred by the petroleum
facilities (i.e., bulk liquid facilities) in
the TWIC Reader Requirements NPRM.
Specifically, the Department estimated
the capital costs in this notice to be the
average of the initial phase-in cost plus
three years of the annual reoccurring
cost without equipment replacement.
NPPD opted to use the annual
reoccurring cost without equipment
replacement to align with the TWIC
Reader Requirements NPRM assumption
that equipment replacement cost occurs
every five years. This notice estimates
average annual costs for a three year
period. Thus, for the purposes of this
notice the estimated the capital costs
per facility is $99,953.33, [(($256,267 +
($14,531 × 3))/3].
The Department then calculated the
capital costs for the 35 high-risk
chemical facilities, as shown in Table
23.
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
TABLE 23—CAPITAL COST BURDEN ESTIMATE FOR HIGH-RISK CHEMICAL FACILITIES THAT MAY CHOOSE TO USE TWIC
READERS
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
A
B
(A × B)
Number of
facilities
Average TWIC
reader
implementation
cost per
facility
Capital cost of TWIC
reader implementation
Group A .............................................................................................................
Group B .............................................................................................................
Group C .............................................................................................................
Theft ..................................................................................................................
Group A .............................................................................................................
Group B .............................................................................................................
Group C .............................................................................................................
Theft ..................................................................................................................
Group A .............................................................................................................
Group B .............................................................................................................
Group C .............................................................................................................
Theft ..................................................................................................................
43 See 78 FR 17781 (March 22, 2013). The TWIC
Reader Requirements NPRM Table 4 may be found
at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/03/
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0
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
3
0
2
15
22/2013-06182/transportation-workeridentification-credential-twic-readerrequirements#t-6. Future cost estimates for TWIC
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$99,953
99,953
99,953
99,953
99,953
99,953
99,953
99,953
99,953
99,953
99,953
99,953
$0
0
0
0
0
0
99,953
299,860
299,860
0
199,907
1,499,300
readers may change as a result of updates to price
data and public comment received on the TWIC
Reader Requirements NPRM.
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TABLE 23—CAPITAL COST BURDEN ESTIMATE FOR HIGH-RISK CHEMICAL FACILITIES THAT MAY CHOOSE TO USE TWIC
READERS—Continued
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
4
4
4
4
A
B
(A × B)
Number of
facilities
Average TWIC
reader
implementation
cost per
facility
Capital cost of TWIC
reader implementation
Group A .............................................................................................................
Group B .............................................................................................................
Group C .............................................................................................................
Theft ..................................................................................................................
1
2
0
8
99,953
99,953
99,953
99,953
99,953
199,907
0
799,627
Total ......................................................................................................................
35
n/a
3,498,367
The capital cost for the 35 high-risk
chemical facilities totals $3,498,367.67;
however, the Department intends to
limit this information collection to only
Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities. Therefore,
for the purpose of this notice, the
Department estimates the capital cost
for the implementation of TWIC readers
is $399,813, as shown in Table 24. The
Department’s rounded estimate is
$399,800.
TABLE 24—CAPITAL COST BURDEN ESTIMATE FOR TIER 1 & 2 HIGH-RISK CHEMICAL FACILITIES THAT MAY CHOOSE TO
USE TWIC READERS
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
Tier
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
B
(A × B)
Number of
facilities
Average TWIC
reader implementation cost
per facility
Capital cost of
TWIC reader
implementation
Group A .............................................................................................................................
Group B .............................................................................................................................
Group C .............................................................................................................................
Theft ..................................................................................................................................
Group A .............................................................................................................................
Group B .............................................................................................................................
Group C .............................................................................................................................
Theft ..................................................................................................................................
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
$99,953
99,953
99,953
99,953
99,953
99,953
99,953
99,953
$0
0
0
0
0
0
99,953
299,860
Total ......................................................................................................................................
4
n/a
399,813
Consideration of Other Capital Costs
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
A
The burden estimates outlined in this
notice are limited in scope to those
activities listed in 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(1).
Specifically, 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(1) and 5
CFR 1320.8 require the Department to
estimate the total time, effort, or
financial resources expended by persons
to generate, maintain, retain, disclose or
provide information to or for a federal
agency. Therefore, many costs (e.g.,
physical modification of the facility
layout) a facility may choose to incur to
develop or implement its SSP or ASP
should not be accounted for when
estimating the capital costs associated
with this information collection.
The Department did consider
estimating certain facility capital costs
such as: (1) Capital costs for computer,
telecommunications equipment,
software, and storage to manage the data
collection, submissions, and tracking;
(2) capital and ongoing costs for
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designing, deploying and operating
information technology (IT) systems
necessary to maintain the data
collection, submissions, and tracking;
(3) cost of training facility personnel to
maintain the data collection,
submissions, and tracking; and (4) site
security officer time to manage the data
collection, submissions, and tracking.
However, the Department has
concluded that these costs should be
excluded in accordance with 5 CFR
1320.3(b)(2), which directs federal
agencies to not count the costs
associated with the time, effort, and
financial resources incurred in the
normal course of their activities (e.g., in
compiling and maintaining business
records) if the reporting, recordkeeping,
or disclosure activities are usual and
customary.
The Department believes that the
time, effort, and financial resources are
usual and customary costs because these
are costs that high-risk chemical
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facilities would incur to conduct
background checks for identity, criminal
history, and legal authorization to work
under 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(i)–(iii), and
also under various other federal, state,
or local laws or regulations.
Recordkeeping Costs
High-risk chemical facilities are not
required to create, keep, or retain
facility records under 6 CFR 27.255 to
comply with RBPS 12(iv). If a high-risk
chemical facility elects, for its own
business purposes, to create, keep, or
retain facility records that identify and
manage the submission of information
about affected individuals, those records
are not government records.
The recordkeeping costs, if any, to
create, keep, or retain facility records
pertaining to background checks as part
of a high-risk chemical facility’s SSP or
ASP, are properly estimated in the
recordkeeping estimates associated with
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the SSP Instrument under Information
Collection 1670–0007.44
The Department considered
estimating the potential recordkeeping
burden associated with RBPS 12(iv), but
subsequently concluded that no
potential recordkeeping should be
estimated in this notice in accordance
with 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(2), which directs
federal agencies to not count the costs
associated with the time, effort, and
financial resources incurred in the
normal course of their activities (e.g., in
compiling and maintaining business
records) if the reporting, recordkeeping,
or disclosure activities are usual and
customary. The Department believes
that the types of recordkeeping
associated with RBPS 12(iv) are usual
and customary costs that high-risk
chemical facilities would incur to
conduct background checks for identity,
criminal history, and legal authorization
to work as required by RBPS (12)(i)–(iii)
and also by various other federal, state,
or local laws or regulations.
Total Burden Cost (Operating/
Maintaining)
The annual burden cost is equal to the
sum of the: (1) Annual burden hours
multiplied by the hourly wage rate for
appropriate facility personnel; (2) the
capital costs ($399,800); and (3)
recordkeeping costs ($0).
Comments associated with the
previous ICR suggested an appropriate
wage rate between $20 and $40 per
hour; the Department picked the
midpoint of $30 to estimate the hourly
direct wage rate, which corresponds to
a fully loaded wage rate of $42.
Therefore, the annual burden not
including capital costs and
recordkeeping costs is $4,770,051 as
shown in Table 25. The rounded
estimate is $4,770,000.
TABLE 25—ESTIMATE OF ANNUAL BURDEN COST FOR TIER 1 & TIER 2 FACILITIES
B
(A × B)
Burden
(hours)
Waste rate
Cost
Initial Submission .........................................................................................................................
Updates/Corrections ....................................................................................................................
Removal-Turnover .......................................................................................................................
97,525
1,658
14,390
$42
42
42
$4,096,032
69,633
604,386
Total Burden Cost (operating/maintaining) ..........................................................................
113,573
42
4,770,051
Therefore, the total annual burden
cost is $4,844,008, after the inclusion of
the $399,813 capital cost burden. The
Department’s rounded estimate is
$4,844,000.
VI. Solicitation of Comments
OMB is particularly interested in
comments which:
(1) Evaluate whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary
for the proper performance of the
functions of the agency, including
whether the information will have
practical utility;
(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
A
(4) Minimize the burden of the
collection of information on those who
are to respond, including through the
use of appropriate automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other
technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology,
e.g., permitting electronic submissions
of responses.
VII. Analysis
Agency: Department of Homeland
Security, National Protection and
Programs Directorate, Office of
Infrastructure Protection, Infrastructure
Security Compliance Division.
Title: Chemical Facility AntiTerrorism Standards (CFATS) Personnel
Surety Program.
OMB Number: 1670—NEW.
Frequency: Other: In accordance with
the compliance schedule or the facility
Site Security Plan or Alternative
Security Plan.
Affected Public: Business or other forprofit.
Number of Respondents: 195,000
affected individuals.
Estimated Time per Respondent: 0.58
hours.
Total Burden Hours: 113,600 annual
burden hours.
Total Burden Cost (capital/startup):
$399,800.
Total Recordkeeping Burden: $0.
Total Burden Cost (operating/
maintaining): $4,844,000.
Dated: January 17, 2014.
Scott Libby,
Deputy Chief Information Officer, National
Protection and Programs Directorate,
Department of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2014–02082 Filed 1–31–14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110–9P–P
44 Information Collection 1670–0007 may be
viewed at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=201001-1670-007#.
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| File Type | application/pdf |
| File Modified | 2014-02-01 |
| File Created | 2014-02-01 |