Emergency Order No. 28, Notice No. 1 (Aug. 7,2013)

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changed from aeronautical to nonaeronautical use and release the lands
from the conditions of the Airport
Improvement Program Grant Agreement
Grant Assurances. In accordance with
49 U.S.C. 47107(c)(2)(B)(i) and (iii), the
airport will receive fair market value for
the property, which will be
subsequently reinvested in another
eligible airport improvement project for
general aviation facilities at the
Ottumwa Regional Airport.
Any person may inspect, by
appointment, the request in person at
the FAA office listed above under FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. In
addition, any person may, upon
appointment and request, inspect the
application, notice and other documents
determined by the FAA to be related to
the application in person at the
Ottumwa Regional Airport.
Issued in Kansas City, MO on July 26,
2013.
Jim A. Johnson,
Manager, Airports Division.
[FR Doc. 2013–19003 Filed 8–6–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

Electronic Access and Filing

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Highway Administration
[FHWA Docket No. FHWA–2013–0041]

Buy America Policy
Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of extension of deadline.
AGENCY:

The FHWA is extending the
deadline for comments regarding the
continued need, in whole or in part, for
the general waivers from Buy America
for manufactured products; for ferry
boat equipment; and for pig iron and
processed, pelletized, and reduced iron
ores, which was published on July 10,
2013. The original deadline for
submitting comments was August 9,
2013. This notice extends the deadline
by 30 calendar days to September 8,
2013.
DATES: Comments must be received on
or before September 8, 2013. Late filed
comments will be considered to the
extent practicable.
ADDRESSES: Mail or hand deliver
comments to the U.S. Department of
Transportation, Dockets Management
Facility, Room W12–140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC
20590, or submit electronically at
http://www.regulations.gov or fax
comments to (202) 493–2251. All
comments should include the docket
number that appears in the heading of

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SUMMARY:

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this document. All comments received
will be available for examination and
copying at the above address from 9
a.m. to 5 p.m., e.t., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays. Those
desiring notification or receipt of
comments must include a selfaddressed, stamped postcard or you
may print the acknowledgment page
that appears after submitting comments
electronically. You may review DOT’s
complete Privacy Act Statement in the
Federal Register published on April 11,
2000 (Volume 65, Number 70, Page
19477–78).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.
Gerald Yakowenko, Contract
Administration Team Leader, Office of
Program Administration, (202) 366–
1562, or Mr. Michael Harkins, Office of
the Chief Counsel, (202) 366–4928,
Federal Highway Administration, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington,
DC 20590. Office hours are from 8 a.m.
to 4:30 p.m., e.t., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

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This document and all comments
received may be viewed online through
the Federal eRulemaking portal at:
http:www.regulations.gov.
Regulations.gov is available 24 hours
each day, 365 days each year. Electronic
submission and retrieval help and
guidelines are available under the help
section of the Web site. An electronic
copy of this document may also be
downloaded by accessing the Office of
the Federal Register’s home page at:
http://www.archives.gov/federalregister/, or the Government Printing
Office’s Web page at: http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys.
Background
On July 10, 2013, at 78 FR 41492, the
FHWA published in the Federal
Register a notice seeking comments
regarding the continued need, in whole
or in part, for the general waivers from
Buy America for manufactured
products; for ferry boat equipment; and
for pig iron and processed, pelletized,
and reduced iron ores. This notice also
sought comment on the continuing need
for the FHWA’s minimal use threshold
(currently established at $2,500 or 1/10
of 1 percent of the total contract value,
whichever is greater). The original
deadline for comments was August 8,
2013. In a letter dated July 23, 2013, the
American Association of State Highway
and Transportation Officials (AASHTO)
submitted a comment to the docket for
this notice requesting a 30-day
extension to submit comments. This

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notice grants AASHTO’s request and
extends the deadline by 30 calendar
days to September 8, 2013.
Issued on: August 2, 2013.
Victor M. Mendez,
FHWA Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2013–19176 Filed 8–5–13; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910–22–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
[FRA Emergency Order No. 28, Notice No.
1]

Emergency Order Establishing
Additional Requirements for
Attendance and Securement of Certain
Freight Trains and Vehicles on
Mainline Track or Mainline Siding
Outside of a Yard or Terminal
The Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA) of the United States Department
of Transportation (DOT) has determined
that public safety compels issuance of
this Emergency Order (EO), which
requires railroads operating on the
general system to implement additional
processes and procedures to ensure that
certain unattended trains and vehicles 1
on mainline track or mainline siding
outside of a yard or terminal are
properly secured against unintended
movement. FRA re-examined its
regulations governing the securement of
such equipment in light of the July 6,
2013, derailment in Lac-Me´gantic,
Quebec, Canada, which demonstrated
the terrible consequences that can arise
when a railroad accident results in a
sudden release of flammable liquids.
FRA’s inspection data since January
2010 shows significant non-compliance
with FRA’s securement regulations, 49
CFR 232.103(n), with nearly 4,950
recorded defects in that time. Moreover,
FRA has seen a number of serious
accidents during rail transportation of
flammable liquids since 2009, and there
has been significant growth in these
types of rail shipments since 2011.
These factors lead FRA to the
conclusion that additional action is
necessary to eliminate an immediate
hazard of death, personal injury, or
significant harm to the environment,
particularly in instances where certain
hazardous materials are involved. As a
result, FRA is ordering that each
railroad take the following actions on
mainline track or mainline siding
outside of a yard or terminal to ensure
1 A vehicle, as defined in 49 U.S.C. 20301,
‘‘means a car, locomotive, tender, or similar
vehicle.’’

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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 152 / Wednesday, August 7, 2013 / Notices
the safe transportation by rail of
hazardous material:
1. No train or vehicle transporting
hazardous materials as described in
Appendix A shall be left unattended on
a mainline track or mainline siding
outside of a yard or terminal until the
railroad develops, adopts, complies
with and makes available to FRA upon
request, a plan that identifies specific
locations and circumstances when such
trains or vehicles may be left
unattended. The plan shall contain a
sufficient safety justification for any
determination allowing such trains or
vehicles to be unattended. FRA will
monitor such plans and if FRA
determines that adequate justification is
not provided, the railroad shall ensure
that trains and equipment are attended
until appropriate modifications to the
plan are completed. FRA does not
intend to grant approval to any plan.
Each railroad shall notify FRA when it
has developed a plan under this
provision prior to the railroad operating
pursuant to the plan.
2. Develop processes for the
securement of unattended trains or
vehicles transporting hazardous
materials as described in Appendix A
on mainline track or mainline siding
outside of a yard or terminal if
permitted by the railroad’s plan
required by this order that contains the
following requirements:
a. The controlling locomotive cab
must be locked or the reverser on the
controlling locomotive must be removed
and secured, and
b. Employees who are responsible for
securing trains and vehicles
transporting hazardous materials as
described in Appendix A must
communicate to the train dispatcher the
number of hand brakes applied, the
tonnage and length of the train or
vehicle, the grade and terrain features of
the track, any relevant weather
conditions, and the type of equipment
being secured; train dispatchers must
record the information provided; and
train dispatchers or other qualified
railroad employees must verify and
confirm with the train crew that the
securement meets the railroad’s
requirements.
3. Review and verify, and adjust, as
necessary, existing procedures and
processes related to the number of hand
brakes to be set on all unattended trains
and vehicles and ensure the means of
verifying that number is appropriate.
4. Implement operating rules and
practices requiring the discussion of
securement for any job that will impact
or require the securement of any train or
vehicle in the course of the work being
performed.

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5. Develop procedures to ensure that
a qualified railroad employee inspects
all equipment that any emergency
responder has been on, under, or
between for proper securement before
the train or vehicle is left unattended.
Additionally, each railroad must
provide notice of this EO to all
employees affected by this EO to ensure
that they have knowledge of the EO’s
requirements.
Authority
Authority to enforce Federal railroad
safety laws has been delegated by the
Secretary of Transportation to the
Administrator of FRA. 49 CFR 1.89.
Railroads are subject to FRA’s safety
jurisdiction under the Federal railroad
safety laws. 49 U.S.C. 20101, 20103.
FRA is authorized to issue emergency
orders where an unsafe condition or
practice ‘‘causes an emergency situation
involving a hazard of death, personal
injury, or significant harm to the
environment.’’ 49 U.S.C. 20104. These
orders may immediately impose
‘‘restrictions and prohibitions . . . that
may be necessary to abate the
situation.’’ Id.
Lac-Me´gantic Derailment
FRA has re-examined its requirements
for securing trains and vehicles on
mainline track and mainline sidings
outside of a yard or terminal in the
aftermath of the catastrophic July 6,
2013, accident involving loaded tank
cars containing petroleum crude oil that
occurred in the town of Lac-Me´gantic,
Quebec, Canada, on track owned by
Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway
Corporation (MMA), a company
incorporated in the United States. While
Canadian authorities are still
investigating the accident and no final
conclusions have been made, the
following is known based on
preliminary information released by the
Transportation Safety Board of Canada.
According to Rail Safety Advisory
Letters issued by the Transportation
Safety Board of Canada on July 19, 2013,
the incident is summarized as follows.
At approximately 10:45 p.m. Eastern
Daylight Time (EDT) on July 5, 2013,
MMA train 2 was proceeding eastward
from Montreal, Quebec, to St. John, New
Brunswick. The train was
approximately 4,700 feet long and
weighed over 10,000 tons. It consisted
of five locomotives, a loaded box car,
and 72 loaded tank cars containing
petroleum crude oil (U.S. DOT Hazard
Class 3, UN 1267). At approximately
11:00 p.m. the train stopped near
milepost 7.40 near Nantes, Quebec. At
that location the operator of the train
secured it and departed, leaving the

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train unattended on mainline track with
a descending grade of approximately 1.2
percent.
At around 11:50 p.m. a local resident
reported a fire on the controlling
locomotive (MMA 5017) of the train.
The local fire department was called
and responded with another MMA
employee. At approximately midnight,
the controlling locomotive was shut
down and the fire extinguished. After
the fire was extinguished, the fire
department and the MMA employee left
the site.
At approximately 1:00 a.m. the next
day (the early morning of July 6th) it
appears that the train began rolling and
picking up speed down the descending
grade toward the town of Lac-Me´gantic,
Quebec, which sits approximately 30
miles from the United States-Canada
border. Near the center of town, the box
car and 63 of the loaded tank cars
derailed. The locomotives, which
separated from the train, traveled an
additional 1⁄2 mile before coming to a
stop. A number of derailed tank cars
released product resulting in multiple
explosions and subsequent fires. At this
time, it is estimated that there were 42
fatalities and that 5 persons are still
missing. There was also extensive
damage to the town, and approximately
2,000 people were evacuated from the
surrounding area. While the
investigation is ongoing and the
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
has not reached any final conclusions,
it has made a determination that the
braking force applied to the train was
insufficient to hold it on the 1.2-percent
descending slope between Nantes and
Lac-Me´gantic.
In response to this accident, Transport
Canada (the Canadian government
department responsible for regulating
transportation safety in Canada) issued
an emergency railroad directive
pursuant to Section 33 of the Canadian
Railway Safety Act.2 While Transport
Canada explained in the emergency
directive that the cause of the accident
in Lac-Me´gantic remains unknown, the
emergency directive stated that:
[I]n light of the catastrophic results of the
Lac-Me´gantic accident and in the interest of
ensuring the continued safety and security of
railway transportation, there is an immediate
need to clarify the regime respecting
unattended locomotives on main track and
sidings and the transportation of dangerous
2 Available online at: http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/
mediaroom/backgrounders-safety-locomotives7292.html. Additionally, in response to this
accident, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada
issued Rail Safety Advisory Letter—09/13 regarding
the securement of equipment and trains left
unattended; available online at: http://
www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-media/sur-safe/letter/
rail/2013/r13d0054/r13d0054-617-09-13.asp.

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goods in tank cars using a one person crew
to address any threat to the safety and
security of railway operations.

As such, Transport Canada exercised
its statutory emergency directive
authority to order railroad companies
operating in Canada to comply with
certain requirements related to
unauthorized entry into locomotive
cabs, directional controls on
locomotives, the application of hand
brakes to cars left unattended for more
than one hour, setting of the automatic
brake and independent brake on any
locomotive attached to cars that is left
unattended for one hour or less,
attendance related to locomotives
attached to loaded tank cars
transporting dangerous goods on main
track, and the number of crew members
assigned to a locomotive attached to
loaded tank cars transporting dangerous
goods on a main track or siding.
In addition, Transport Canada issued
an accompanying order pursuant to
paragraph 19(a)(1) of the Canadian
Railway Safety Act directing railroad
companies in Canada to formulate or
revise certain railroad operating rules,
respecting the safety and security of
unattended locomotives, uncontrolled
movements, and crew size
requirements. The order provides that
rules should be based on an assessment
of safety and security risks, and shall at
a minimum ensure that the cab(s) of
unattended controlling locomotives are
secure against unauthorized entry;
ensure that the reversers of unattended
locomotives are removed and secured;
prevent uncontrolled movements of
railway equipment by addressing the
application of hand brakes; ensure the
security of stationary railway equipment
transporting dangerous goods; and
provide for minimum operating crew
requirements considering technology,
length of train, speeds, classification of
dangerous goods being transported, and
other risk factors.
DOT is taking actions consistent with
Transport Canada to ensure the safe
transportation of products by rail in the
United States, with a particular focus on
certain hazardous materials that present
an immediate danger for communities
and the environment in the event of a
train accident. Through this EO, FRA is
addressing the immediate dangers that
arise from unattended equipment that is
left unsecured. Additionally, FRA and
the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHMSA) are
issuing a joint Safety Advisory to
railroads and commodity shippers
detailing eight recommended actions
the industry should take to better ensure
the safe transport of hazardous
materials. These recommendations

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include the following: Reviewing the
details and lessons learned from the
Lac-Me´gantic accident; reviewing crew
staffing levels; removing and securing
the train’s ‘‘reverser’’ when unattended;
a thorough review of all railroad
operating procedures, testing and
operating rules around securing a train;
reviewing Transport Canada’s directives
to secure and safely operate a train; and
conducting a system-wide assessment of
security risks when a train is
unattended and identifying mitigation
efforts for those risks. Additionally, the
Safety Advisory recommends testing
and sampling of crude oil for proper
classification for shipment, as well as a
review of all shippers’ and carriers
safety and security plans. Finally, FRA
is convening an emergency meeting of
FRA’s Railroad Safety Advisory
Committee to begin the deliberative
process with FRA’s stakeholders,
including railroad management, railroad
labor, shippers, car owners, and others,
as the agency considers
recommendations in the Safety
Advisory that should be made a part of
its regulations.
Safety Concerns Arising Out of the LacMe´gantic Derailment
Generally, the transportation of
hazardous materials by rail is extremely
safe. The vast majority of hazardous
materials shipped by rail each year
arrive at their destinations safely and
without incident. Indeed, in calendar
year 2011, there were only 20 accidents
in which a hazardous material was
released out of approximately 2.2
million shipments of hazardous material
transported by rail in the United States.
However, the Lac-Me´gantic incident
demonstrates the substantial potential
for danger that exists when an
unattended train rolls away and derails
resulting in the sudden release of
hazardous materials into the
environment. Although the LacMe´gantic incident occurred in Canada,
the freight railroad operating
environment in Canada is similar to that
in the United States, and a number of
railroads operate in both countries.3
Freight railroads in the United States
also transport a substantial amount and
variety of hazardous materials,
including materials poisonous by
inhalation (PIH), materials or toxic by
inhalation (TIH), and explosive
materials. Moreover, an increasing
proportion of the hazardous materials
3 As an example, MMA operates both in the
United States and Canada, with approximately 510
miles of track in Maine, Vermont, and Quebec, and
the tank cars transporting the crude oil that derailed
in Lac-Me´gantic originated in the Williston Basin of
North Dakota.

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being transported by rail is classified as
flammable.4
The MMA train in the Lac-Me´gantic
incident was transporting 72 carloads of
petroleum crude oil with five
locomotives and a loaded box car. A
similar type of train consist is
commonly found on rail lines in the
United States because crude oil is often
transported in units of cars or by a unit
train consisting virtually entirely of tank
cars containing crude oil. Crude oil is
often classified by an offeror as a
flammable liquid; per PHMSA’s Hazmat
Regulations (HMR), however, its
packing group can be I, II, or III
depending on the blend of constituent
crude oils. According to the Association
of American Railroads (AAR), crude oil
traffic increased 443 percent in the
United States between 2005 and 2012.
Much of this growth has occurred
because of developments in North
Dakota, as the Bakken formation in the
Williston Basin has become a major
source for oil production in the United
States. Texas also has contributed to the
growth of crude oil shipments by rail.
As a result, carloads of crude oil
increased from approximately 65,600 in
2011 to approximately 257,450 in 2012.
The Bakken crude oil from North Dakota
is primarily shipped via rail to refineries
located near the U.S. Gulf Coast—
particularly in Texas and Louisiana—or
also to pipeline connections, most
notably to connections located in
Oklahoma. Crude oil is also shipped via
rail to refineries on the East Coast and,
to a lesser extent, refineries in other
regions of the U.S.5
All indications from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA)
within the U.S. Department of Energy
are that rail export capacity for Bakken
crude oil from the Williston Basin will
continue to expand to meet production.6
4 PHMSA prescribes a comprehensive regulatory
safety system that categorizes hazardous materials
into nine hazard classes based on the type of
hazards presented by the materials. See 49 CFR
Parts 172 and 173. Under PHMSA’s regulations,
crude oil, in most forms, meets the definition of a
‘‘Class 3’’ hazardous material, which signifies that
it is a flammable liquid. Ethanol, discussed below,
also is a Class 3 hazardous material. PIH materials,
referenced above, include ‘‘Class 2 and Division
2.3’’ gases and ‘‘Class 6, and Division 6.1’’ poisons
other than gases. Chlorine gas and anhydrous
ammonia are two examples of PIH materials
(Division 2.3) that are commonly transported by
rail.
5 See AAR’s May 2013 paper ‘‘Moving Crude Oil
by Rail’’ available online at: https://www.aar.org/
keyissues/Documents/Background-Papers/Crudeoil-by-rail.pdf.
6 See EIA reports ‘‘Bakken crude oil price
differential to WTI narrows over last 14 months,’’
available online at: http://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=10431; and ‘‘Rail
delivery of U.S. oil and petroleum products
continues to increase, but pace slows,’’ available

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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 152 / Wednesday, August 7, 2013 / Notices
Rail exports from the North Dakota
region are forecast to increase over the
next two years (as are pipeline exports).
Much of the near-term growth in rail
originations right now is a function of
how quickly tank car manufacturers can
produce new cars to meet the demand
for tank cars, primarily for transporting
Bakken crude oil. The rise in rail
originations in crude oil is subject to
changes in the number of tank cars
available, price of crude oil, and overall
production of crude oil in that region,
and is also dependent on whether, or
how quickly, additional pipeline export
capacity from that region comes online.
However, for the foreseeable future, all
indications are for continued growth of
rail originations of crude in that region
as new tank car fleets come online to
meet demand.
As demonstrated by the Lac-Me´gantic
derailment, in a catastrophic incident,
crude oil is problematic when released
because it is flammable. This risk is
compounded because it is commonly
shipped in large units. Similar dangers
exist with other hazardous materials
such as ethanol, which is another
flammable liquid that is commonly
transported by rail. More carloads of
ethanol were transported via rail than
any other hazardous material in 2012.
Ethanol experienced an increase in
traffic of 442 percent between 2005 and
2010. Although in 2012 the number of
carloads dropped by 11 percent from
2010 levels, there were still
approximately 366,000 carloads
transported by rail. Since 2009, there
have been at least four serious mainline
derailments resulting in the breach of
tank cars containing ethanol. While FRA
recognizes that none of these four
derailments resulted from a roll-away
situation, they are instructive on the
destructive potential of a derailment
involving tank cars containing
flammable products:
• On June 19, 2009, in Cherry Valley,
IL, a Canadian National Railway train
derailed 19 tank cars loaded with
ethanol. Thirteen of the 19 derailed cars
caught fire, and there were reports of
explosions. One person died, and there
were 9 reported injuries related to the
fire. Additionally, approximately 600
residences were evacuated within a 1⁄2mile radius of the derailment.
• On February 6, 2011, in Arcadia,
OH, a Norfolk Southern Railway Co.
(Norfolk Southern) train operating on
single main track derailed 33 tank cars
loaded with ethanol. The derailment
caused a major fire and forced the
online at: http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.cfm?id=12031.

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evacuation of a one-mile radius around
the derailment.
• On July 11, 2012, in Columbus, OH,
a Norfolk Southern train derailed while
operating on main track. Thirteen tank
cars containing ethanol derailed
resulting in a fire and the evacuation of
100 people within a one-mile radius of
the derailment.
• On August 5, 2012, in Plevna, MT,
a BNSF Railway Co. train derailed 18
cars while en route from Baker, MT.
Seventeen of the 18 cars were tank cars
loaded with denatured alcohol, a form
of ethanol. Five of the cars caught on
fire resulting in explosions, the burning
of surrounding property not within the
railroad’s right-of-way, and the
evacuation of the immediate area.
Although these accidents were
serious, their results had potential for
more catastrophic outcomes. The
catastrophic releases created the
potential for additional deaths, injuries,
property damage, and environmental
damage.
There are other hazardous materials
that have similar potential for
catastrophic danger. For example,
accidents involving trains transporting
other hazardous materials, including
PIH materials, such as chlorine and
anhydrous ammonia, can also result in
serious consequences as evidenced by
the following accidents:
• On July 18, 2001, 11 of 60 cars in
a CSX Transportation, Inc. freight train
derailed while passing through the
Howard Street Tunnel in downtown
Baltimore, MD. The train included 8
tank cars loaded with hazardous
material; 4 of these were among the cars
that derailed. A leak in a tank car
containing tripropylene resulted in a
chemical fire. A break in a water main
above the tunnel flooded both the
tunnel and the streets above it, resulting
in the tunnel collapsing.
• On January 18, 2002, a Canadian
Pacific Railway train containing 15 tank
cars of anhydrous ammonia derailed
half a mile from the city limits of Minot,
ND due to a breaking of the rail at a
joint. Five of these tank cars ruptured
catastrophically, resulting in an
ammonia vapor that spread 5 miles
downwind over an area where 11,600
people lived. The accident caused one
death, 11 serious injuries, and 322
minor injuries. Environmental cleanup
costs reported to the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
were $8 million.
• On June 28, 2004, near Macdona,
TX, a Union Pacific Railroad Company
train passed a stop signal and collided
with a BNSF train. A chlorine car was
punctured and the chlorine gas that was
released killed three and injured 32.

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• On January 6, 2005, in Graniteville,
SC, a Norfolk Southern train collided
with another Norfolk Southern train that
was parked on a customer side track,
derailing both locomotives and 16 cars
of the moving train. The accident was
caused by a misaligned switch. Three
tank cars containing chlorine derailed,
one of which was punctured. The
resulting chlorine exposure caused 9
deaths, approximately 554 people were
taken to local hospitals, and an
additional 5,400 people within a onemile radius of the site were evacuated
by law enforcement personnel. FRA’s
analysis of the total cost of the accident
was $126 million, including fatalities,
injuries, evacuation costs, property
damage, environmental cleanup, and
track out of service.
While train accidents involving
hazardous materials are caused by a
variety of factors, nearly one-half of all
accidents are related to railroad human
factors or equipment defects. FRA’s data
shows that since 2009, human factors
have been the most common cause of
reportable train accidents. Based on
FRA’s accident reporting data for the
period from 2009 through 2012, 35.7
percent of train accidents were human
factor-caused. With regard to the
securement of unattended equipment,
specifically, FRA accident data
indicates that approximately 8.5 percent
of human factor-caused train accidents
from calendar year 2011 until April
2013 were the result of improper
securement. This EO is intended to
address some of the human factors
failures that may cause unattended
equipment to be improperly secured to
protect against a derailment situation
similar to that which occurred in LacMe´gantic.
Securement Requirements
As previously noted, FRA has issued
regulations designed to ensure that
trains and vehicles are properly secured
before being left unattended. See
§ 232.103(n). ‘‘Unattended equipment’’
is defined as ‘‘equipment left standing
and unmanned in such a manner that
the brake system of the equipment
cannot be readily controlled by a
qualified person.’’ Id. Section
232.103(n) addresses the securement of
unattended equipment by stating that a
train’s air brakes must not be depended
on to hold equipment standing
unattended on a grade and further
requires the application of a sufficient
number of hand brakes to hold the
equipment with the air brakes released
and the ventilation of the brake pipe
pressure to zero with the angle cock
opened on one end of a cut of cars when
not connected to a locomotive or other

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compressed air source. The regulations
also require railroads to develop a
process or procedure for verifying that
the hand brakes that are applied are
sufficient to hold the equipment with
the air brakes released. When dealing
with locomotives and locomotive
consists, § 232.103(n)(3) establishes
specific additional requirements:
• All hand brakes must be fully
applied on all locomotives in the lead
consist of an unattended train.
• All hand brakes must be fully
applied on all locomotives in an
unattended locomotive consist outside
of yard limits.
• The minimum requirement for an
unattended locomotive consist within
yard limits is that the hand brake must
be fully applied on the controlling
locomotive.
• Railroads must develop, adopt, and
comply with procedures for securing
any unattended locomotive that is not
equipped with an operative hand brake.
Additionally, FRA requires each
railroad to adopt and comply with
instructions addressing the throttle
position, status of the reverse lever
(commonly referred to as a ‘‘reverser’’),
position of the generator field switch,
status of the independent brakes,
position of the isolation switch, and
position of the automatic brake valve of
an unattended locomotive. See
§ 232.103(n)(4).
In FRA’s view, these regulations—
when followed—substantially reduce
the risk of movement of unattended
equipment. However, FRA has found
there is significant non-compliance
among the railroads with respect to
FRA’s securement regulations. With
limited resources, FRA can inspect only
a small percentage of trains and vehicles
for regulatory compliance. However,
even with its limited resources, FRA has
recorded nearly 4,950 securement
defects in the course of its inspections
since January 2010, an average of
approximately 1,483 defects per year.
With increased shipments of hazardous
materials such as crude oil and ethanol,
securement non-compliance,
particularly on mainline track and
mainline sidings outside of a yard or
terminal, has become a serious,
immediate safety concern. Therefore,
additional measures are necessary to
protect the health and safety of railroad
employees, the general public, and the
environment.
First, in this EO, FRA is prohibiting
railroads from leaving trains or vehicles
that are transporting hazardous
materials as described in Appendix A
unattended on mainline track or
mainline siding outside of a yard or
terminal unless the railroad adopts and

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complies with a plan that identifies the
specific locations and circumstances for
which it is safe and suitable for leaving
such trains or vehicles unattended. The
plan must contain sufficient analysis of
the safety risks and any mitigating
circumstances the railroad has
considered in making its determination.
FRA does not intend to grant approval
to any plan, per se. However, FRA will
monitor such plans and if FRA
determines that adequate justification is
not provided, the railroad shall ensure
that trains and equipment are attended
until appropriate modifications are
made to the railroad’s plan.
Second, FRA is requiring railroads to
develop specific processes for
employees responsible for securing any
unattended train or vehicles
transporting hazardous materials as
described in Appendix A that must be
left on mainline track or a mainline
siding outside of a yard or terminal. The
employees responsible for securing the
train or vehicles must lock the
controlling locomotive cab door before
leaving it unattended or remove and
secure the reverser. The reverser is the
directional control for the locomotive.
Removing it would put the locomotive
in neutral, preventing it from moving
forward or backward under the power of
the engine. Additionally, employees
must communicate to the train
dispatcher the number of hand brakes
applied, the tonnage of the train or
vehicle, the grade and terrain features of
the track, any other relevant weather
conditions, and the type of equipment
being secured. The dispatcher is then
required to record the information
provided by the employee. Finally, the
dispatcher or other qualified railroad
employee must verify and confirm with
the train crew that the securement meets
the railroad’s requirements. This
requirement provides a check on those
individuals setting hand brakes to
ensure appropriate securement
procedures are followed. The
requirement is similar to FRA’s existing
regulations that require employees to
report to the train dispatcher when a
main track switch in non-signaled
territory has been restored to normal
position and locked. FRA believes this
type of notification and verification
requirement will help ensure that
employees responsible for securing
equipment containing hazardous
materials will follow appropriate
procedures because the employee will
need to fully consider the securement
procedures in order to relay what was
done to the dispatcher. Further, the
dispatcher or other qualified railroad
employee (e.g. a trainmaster, road

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foreman of engines, or another train
crew employee) will be in a position to
ensure that a sufficient number of hand
brakes have been applied.
Third, this E.O. requires that railroads
review, verify, and adjust, as necessary,
existing requirements and instructions
related to the number of hand brakes to
be set on unattended trains and vehicles
and that railroads review and adjust, as
necessary, the procedures for verifying
that the number of hand brakes is
sufficient to hold the train or vehicle
with the air brakes released. FRA’s
concern is that existing railroad
processes and procedures related to
setting and verifying hand brakes on
unattended trains and equipment may
not be sufficient to hold all trains and
vehicles in all circumstances. FRA
expects that the procedures and number
of hand brakes required to be set will
vary significantly, depending on a
variety of factors, including, but not
limited to: The length and weight of the
train or vehicle(s), the location, the
grade and other terrain features of the
track, the weather conditions, the type
of equipment being secured, and
whether the hand brakes apply on one
or more trucks of a piece of equipment.
The procedures should also ensure that
an additional margin of safety is
provided when determining the number
of hand brakes to be set in order to
compensate for the differing ability of
individuals to set a hand brake at a
specified level. FRA also expects
railroads to develop appropriate
procedures to be followed by their
employees to test or verify that the
number of hand brakes set will hold the
equipment with the air brakes released.
Fourth, this E.O. requires railroads to
implement operating rules and practices
requiring the job briefing of securement
among crewmembers and other
involved railroad employees before
engaging in any job that will impact or
require the securement of any train or
vehicle in the course of the work being
performed. This requirement is
analogous to other Federal regulations
that require crewmembers to have a job
briefing before performing various tasks,
such as confirming the position of a
main track switch before leaving an
area. The purpose of this job briefing
requirement is to make certain that all
crewmembers and other involved
railroad employees are aware of what is
necessary to properly secure the
equipment in compliance with
§ 232.103(n).
Finally, FRA is requiring railroads to
develop procedures to ensure that a
qualified railroad employee inspects all
equipment that any emergency
responder has been on, under, or

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between for proper securement before
the rail equipment or train is left
unattended. One of the facts that has
come to light in the aftermath of the
Lac-Me´gantic derailment is that first
responders were at milepost 7.4 near
Nantes (along with an MMA employee)
to check a report of a fire on the train.
This was well after the operator had
secured the train and left it unattended.
Because it may be necessary for
emergency responders to modify the
state of the equipment if it is necessary
for them to go on, under, or between
equipment in order to perform their
jobs, it is critical for the railroad to have
a qualified employee inspect the
equipment after the emergency
responders have completed their jobs to
ensure that the equipment is properly
secured before it is again left
unattended.
Finding and Order
While FRA recognizes that the
transportation of hazardous materials by
rail is extremely safe and that the vast
majority of hazardous materials shipped
by rail each year arrive at their
destinations safely and without
incident, FRA finds that there are gaps
in the regulatory scheme that create an
emergency situation involving a hazard
of death, personal injury, or significant
harm to the environment, with respect
to securement of unattended vehicles
and trains transporting a hazardous
material of the type described in
Appendix A to this E.O. on mainline
track and mainline sidings outside of a
yard or terminal. Accordingly, pursuant
to the authority of 49 U.S.C. 20104,
delegated to the FRA Administrator by
the Secretary of Transportation, 49 CFR
1.89, it is hereby ordered that each
railroad must institute and carry out the
following measures, effective within 30
days after the date of this order:
1. No train or vehicles transporting
the type and quantity of hazardous
materials described in Appendix A
(Appendix A Materials) shall be left
unattended on a mainline track or
mainline siding outside of a yard or
terminal until the railroad develops,
adopts, complies with and makes
available to FRA upon request a plan
that identifies specific locations and
circumstances when such trains or
vehicles may be left unattended. The
plan shall contain a sufficient safety
justification for any determination
allowing such trains or vehicles to be
unattended. FRA will monitor such
plans and if FRA determines that
adequate justification is not provided,
the railroad shall ensure that trains and
equipment are attended until
appropriate modifications to the plan

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are completed. FRA does not intend to
grant approval to any plan. Railroads
shall notify FRA when the railroad has
developed a plan under this provision
prior to the railroad operating pursuant
to the plan.
2. Railroads shall develop processes
for securing unattended trains or
vehicles transporting Appendix A
Materials on a mainline track or
mainline siding outside of a yard or
terminal if permitted by the railroad’s
plan required under paragraph (1) of
this order that contains the following
requirements:
a. The controlling locomotive cab
must be locked or the reverser on the
controlling locomotive must be removed
and secured.
b. Employees who are responsible for
securing trains and vehicles
transporting Appendix A Materials must
communicate to the train dispatcher the
number of hand brakes applied, the
tonnage and length of the train or
vehicle, the grade and terrain features of
the track, any relevant weather
conditions, and the type of equipment
being secured; train dispatchers must
record the information provided; and
train dispatchers or other qualified
railroad employees must verify and
confirm with the train crew that the
securement meets the railroad’s
requirements.
3. Railroads shall review and verify,
and adjust, as necessary, existing
procedures and processes related to the
number of hand brakes to be set on all
unattended trains and equipment and
shall ensure the means of verifying that
number is appropriate.
4. Railroads shall implement
operating rules and practices requiring
the job briefing of securement for any
job that will impact or require the
securement of any train or vehicle in the
course of the work being performed.
5. Railroads shall develop procedures
to ensure that a qualified railroad
employee inspects all equipment that
any emergency responder has been on,
under, or between for proper
securement before the train or vehicle is
left unattended.
6. Notice of this E.O. shall be
provided to all employees affected by
this E.O..

Associate Administrator shall grant
petitions only in which a petitioner has
clearly articulated an alternative action
that will provide, in the Associate
Administrator’s judgment, at least a
level of safety equivalent to that
provided by this E.O..

Relief
Petitions for special approval to take
actions not in accordance with this E.O.
may be submitted to the Associate
Administrator for Railroad Safety/Chief
Safety Officer (Associate Administrator),
who shall be authorized to dispose of
those requests without the necessity of
amending this E.O.. In reviewing any
petition for special review, the

Appendix A to Emergency Order 28

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Penalties
Any violation of this order or the
terms of any written plan adopted
pursuant to this order to provide
alternate protection shall subject the
person committing the violation to a
civil penalty of up to $105,000. 49
U.S.C. 21301. Any individual who
willfully violates a prohibition stated in
this order is subject to civil penalties
under 49 U.S.C. 21301. In addition,
such an individual whose violation of
this order demonstrates the individual’s
unfitness for safety-sensitive service
may be removed from safety-sensitive
service on the railroad under 49 U.S.C.
20111. If appropriate, FRA may pursue
criminal penalties under 49 U.S.C.
522(a) and 49 U.S.C. 21311(a), as well
as 18 U.S.C. 1001, for the knowing and
willful falsification of a report required
by this order. FRA may, through the
Attorney General, also seek injunctive
relief to enforce this order. 49 U.S.C.
20112.
Effective Date and Notice to Affected
Persons
Upon issuance of this E.O., railroads
shall immediately initiate steps to
implement this E.O.. Railroads shall
complete implementation no later than
September 1, 2013. Notice of this E.O.
will be provided by publishing it in the
Federal Register.
Review
Opportunity for formal review of this
E.O. will be provided in accordance
with 49 U.S.C. 20104(b) and section 554
of title 5 of the United States Code.
Administrative procedures governing
such review are found at 49 CFR part
211. See 49 CFR 211.47, 211.71, 211.73,
211.75, and 211.77.
Issued in Washington, DC, on August 2,
2013.
Joseph C. Szabo,
Administrator.

(1) Five or more tank car loads of any one
or any combination of materials poisonous by
inhalation as defined in 49 CFR 171.8, and
including anhydrous ammonia (UN 1005)
and ammonia solutions (UN 3318); or
(2) 20 rail car loads or intermodal portable
tank loads of any one or any combination of
materials listed in (1) above, or, any Division
2.1 flammable gas, Class 3 flammable liquid
or combustible liquid, Class 1.1 or 1.2

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explosive, or hazardous substance listed in
49 CFR 173.31(f)(2).7
[FR Doc. 2013–19215 Filed 8–6–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–06–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
[Safety Advisory 2013–06]

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration
[Docket No. PHMSA–2013–0196; Notice No.
13–13]

Lac-Me´gantic Railroad Accident
Discussion and DOT Safety
Recommendations
Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) and Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA), Department
of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory and
Announcement of Emergency Meeting
of the Railroad Safety Advisory
Committee.
AGENCY:

A recent catastrophic railroad
accident occurred in Canada when an
unattended freight train containing
hazardous materials rolled down a
descending grade and subsequently
derailed. It is currently estimated that
this accident resulted in 42 fatalities,
and 5 persons are still reported to be
missing. In response, FRA issued
Emergency Order No. 28 regarding the
securement of trains, and FRA and
PHMSA (collectively, DOT) are also
issuing this safety advisory. This safety
advisory discusses the circumstances
surrounding the accident and makes
certain safety-related recommendations
to railroads operating in the United
States. This safety advisory also
provides notice of FRA’s intent to
schedule an emergency meeting of the
Railroad Safety Advisory Committee to
discuss this accident and potential
regulatory actions to prevent similar
future accidents from occurring.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Thomas J. Herrmann, Acting Director,
Office of Safety Assurance and
Compliance, Office of Railroad Safety,
FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202)
493–6404; Joseph St. Peter, Trial
Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202)

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SUMMARY:

7 See 49 CFR 173.115 for the definition of
Division 2.1 flammable gas, 173.120 for definition
of Class 3 flammable liquid; and 173.50 for the
definition of the various classes of explosives.

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493–6047; or Charles Betts, Director,
Standards and Rulemaking Division,
Office of Hazardous Materials Safety,
PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202)
366–8553.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Incident Summary
On July 6, 2013, a catastrophic
accident involving a freight train
containing loaded tank cars of
petroleum crude oil occurred in the
town of Lac-Me´gantic, Quebec, on the
Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway
(MMA). While the accident is still being
investigated by Canadian authorities
and no final determinations have been
made, the following is known based on
preliminary information released by the
Transportation Safety Board of Canada.1
According to Rail Safety Advisory
Letters issued by the Transportation
Safety Board of Canada on July 19, 2013,
the incident is summarized as follows.
At approximately 10:45 p.m. (EDT) on
July 5, 2013, an MMA train was
proceeding eastward from Montreal,
Quebec, to St. John, New Brunswick.
The train was approximately 4,700 feet
long, weighed over 10,000 tons and
consisted of five locomotives, a loaded
box car, and 72 loaded tank cars
containing petroleum crude oil (Class 3,
UN 1267). At approximately 11:00 p.m.
the train stopped near mile post 7.40
near Nantes, Quebec. At that location
the single operator secured the train and
departed, leaving the train unattended
on mainline track with a descending
grade of approximately 1.2 percent.
At approximately 11:50 p.m., a local
resident reported a fire on the lead
locomotive (MMA 5017) of the train and
the local fire department was called and
responded with another MMA
employee. At approximately midnight,
in accordance with established
operating procedures, the lead
locomotive was shut down and the fire
extinguished. After the fire was
extinguished, the fire department and
the MMA employee left the site.
At approximately 1:00 a.m. the next
day, it appears that the train began
rolling and picking up speed down the
descending grade toward the town of
Lac-Me´gantic, Quebec. Near the center
of town, the train derailed. The
locomotives separated from the train
1 This accident occurred in Canada and DOT is
neither responsible for determining, nor has
jurisdiction to investigate, the cause of this
accident. Further, Canadian authorities have not yet
determined the cause of this accident. As such,
nothing in this safety advisory is intended to
attribute a definitive cause to this accident or place
responsibility for the incident on the acts or
omissions of any specific person or entity.

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and came to a stop approximately 1⁄2
mile from the derailment site. The box
car and 63 of the loaded tank cars
derailed. A number of derailed tank cars
released product resulting in multiple
explosions and subsequent fires. At this
time, it is estimated that there were 42
fatalities and 5 persons are still missing.
There was also extensive damage to the
town, and approximately 2,000 people
were evacuated from the surrounding
area.
Transport Canada Emergency Directive
In response to this accident, Transport
Canada (the Canadian government
department responsible for regulating
transportation safety in Canada) issued
an emergency railroad directive
pursuant to Section 33 of the Canadian
Railway Safety Act.2 The directive
ordered railroad companies in Canada
to ensure that:
• Within five days of the issuance of
the directive, all unattended controlling
locomotives on a main track and sidings
are protected from unauthorized entry
into the cab;
• The directional controls, commonly
known as reversers, are removed from
any unattended locomotives, preventing
them from moving forward or backward,
on a main track or sidings;
• Their company’s special
instructions on hand brakes are applied
to any locomotive attached to one or
more cars that are left unattended for
more than one hour on a main track or
sidings;
• In addition to complying with their
company’s special instructions on hand
brakes referred to in the item
immediately above, the automatic brake
is set in full service position and the
independent brake is fully applied for
any locomotive attached to one or more
cars that are left unattended for one
hour or less on a main track or sidings;
• No locomotive attached to one or
more loaded tank cars transporting
dangerous goods is left unattended on a
main track; and
• No locomotive attached to one or
more loaded tank cars transporting
dangerous goods is operated on a main
track or siding with fewer than two
persons qualified under their company’s
requirements for operating employees.
Transport Canada explained in the
emergency directive that the cause of
2 Available online at: http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/
mediaroom/backgrounders-safety-locomotives7292.html. Additionally, in response to this
accident, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada
issued Rail Safety Advisory Letter—09/13 regarding
the securement of equipment and trains left
unattended; available online at: http://
www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-media/sur-safe/letter/
rail/2013/r13d0054/r13d0054-617-09-13.asp.

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