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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 204 / Wednesday, October 22, 2014 / Notices
collection of information associated
with the DHS complaint form. DHS is
proposing to make one change to the
DHS compliant form. This change is the
addition of a new checkbox that says
‘‘gender identity’’ as a sub-category
under the existing checkbox that says
‘‘sex’’ on the form. Gender identity
discrimination is a form of sex
discrimination, which is covered under
Title VII. So this information is already
included in data gathered in EEO
complaints; adding the separate check
box just more clearly identifies a subcategory. This form modification is in
accordance with new instructions from
EEOC—requiring all government
agencies to specifically identify this
type of information on our complaint
forms.
The Office of Management and Budget
is particularly interested in comments
which:
1. Evaluate whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary
for the proper performance of the
functions of the agency, including
whether the information will have
practical utility;
2. Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
3. Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
4. Minimize the burden of the
collection of information on those who
are to respond, including through the
use of appropriate automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other
technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology,
e.g., permitting electronic submissions
of responses.

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Analysis
Agency: Office for Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties, DHS.
Title: DHS Individual Complaint of
Employment Discrimination.
OMB Number: 1610–0001.
Frequency: Annually.
Affected Public: Federal Government.
Number of Respondents: 1200.
Estimated Time per Respondent: 30
minutes.
Total Burden Hours: 600 hours.
Dated: October 9, 2014.
Margaret H. Graves,
Deputy Chief Information Officer.
[FR Doc. 2014–25055 Filed 10–21–14; 8:45 am]
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Agency Information Collection
Activities: Regional Equipment and
Capabilities Exchange, DHS Form
10090 and DHS Form 10089
Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, DHS.
ACTION: 30-Day Notice and request for
comments; New Collection, 1601–NEW.
AGENCY:

The Department of Homeland
Security, Domestic Nuclear Dectection
Office, DHS will submit the following
information collection request (ICR) to
the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) for review and clearance in
accordance with the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–13,
44 U.S.C. Chapter 35). DHS previously
published this information collection
request (ICR) in the Federal Register on
July 1, 2014 at 79 FR 37337 for a 60-day
public comment period. No comments
were received by DHS. The purpose of
this notice is to allow additional 30days for public comments.
DATES: Comments are encouraged and
will be accepted until November 21,
2014. This process is conducted in
accordance with 5 CFR 1320.10.
ADDRESSES: Interested persons are
invited to submit written comments on
the proposed information collection to
the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, Office of Management and
Budget. Comments should be addressed
to OMB Desk Officer, Department of
Homeland Security and sent via
electronic mail to oira_submission@
omb.eop.gov or faxed to (202) 395–5806.
The Office of Management and Budget
is particularly interested in comments
which:
1. Evaluate whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary
for the proper performance of the
functions of the agency, including
whether the information will have
practical utility;
2. Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
3. Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
4. Minimize the burden of the
collection of information on those who
are to respond, including through the
use of appropriate automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other
technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology,
e.g., permitting electronic submissions
of responses.
SUMMARY:

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The Joint
Analysis Center (JAC), of the Operation
Support Division, is responsible for
providing awareness of the Global
Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA),
and functions as a central point of the
GNDA providing awareness of nuclear
threats to the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO). The JAC plans
to implement a Regional Equipment and
Capabilities Exchange (RECE) to identify
and compare existing information
referencing the domestic nuclear
radiological detection capabilities of all
participating stakeholders.
The circumstances that make the
RECE necessary is the need for a
database that accurately reflects the
current R/N detection capabilities
federal, state, tribal, territorial, and local
(FSTTL) stakeholders.
The RECE will recognize a standard
process and procedure that the JAC
facilitates to ensure a collaborative and
coordinated data collection
methodology is followed for fidelity of
information. The successful
implementation of the RECE will aid
DNDO in achieving specific objectives
mandated in National Security
Presidential Directive (NSPD)–43/
Homeland Security Presidential
Directive (HSPD)–14, and codified in
Title 6, United States Code (U.S.C.) 592.
Attached is the HSPD14/NSPD43,
please reference the following sections
within NSPD–43/HSPD–14:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Subject: Domestic Nuclear Detection
(1)(b) Continue to enhance the
effective integration of nuclear and
radiological detection capabilities across
Federal, State, local, and tribal
governments and the private sector for
a managed, coordinated response;
(2)(b) Enhance and coordinate the
nuclear detection efforts of Federal,
State, local, and tribal governments and
the private sector to ensure a managed,
coordinated response;
(2)(f) Support and enhance the
effective sharing and use of appropriate
information generated by the
intelligence community, law
enforcement agencies, counterterrorism
community, other government agencies,
and foreign governments, as well as
provide appropriate information to
these entities; and
DNDO needs the information to be
collected by the RECE to enhance and
coordinate the rad/nuc detection efforts
of Federal, State, local and tribal
governments, and to effectively share
the resources information with all
interested entities.
Although not legal justification to
collect information, the 2010 GNDA
Strategic Plan goals are provided as

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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 204 / Wednesday, October 22, 2014 / Notices

additional information that serves as
examples for how this collection effort
supports internal DNDO initiatives.
The RECE directly relates to the
following specific goals within the 2010
GNDA Strategic Plan:
• Goal 3: Communicate—Exchange
relevant data, by receiving information
from and disseminating information to
relevant authorities and the general
public, as appropriate.
• Goal 4: Coordinate—Ensure that
stakeholders with GNDA functions
minimize gaps and unintended overlaps
in roles and responsibilities, including
through collaboration and cooperation.
Additionally, the RECE helps DNDO
meet DHS’ lead and supporting roles in
the following 2010 GNDA Strategic Plan
Objectives:
• Objective 4: Assist state, local, and
tribal governments in detecting and
reporting on any unauthorized nuclear
and radiological materials within their
jurisdictions.
• Objective 5: Develop or enhance the
federal interior detection architectures
and strategies.
• Objective 7: Receive information
from, and disseminate information to
relevant authorities and the general
public.
• Objective 8: Ensure that
Stakeholders with GNDA functions
minimize gaps and unnecessary
overlaps in roles, responsibilities, and
activities.
• Objective 9: Ensure that the GNDA
can adapt and react in response to
changes in technology, protocols, and
adversary capabilities.
Information collected is the type used
in the ordinary course of business
(official business Points of Contact;
names, addresses, emails, office phone
number to call.) The purpose of the
RECE form (DHS Form 10089) is to
collect and warehouse relevant data for
federal, state, tribal, territorial, and local
(FSTTL) authorities to minimize gaps
and unintended overlaps in roles and
responsibilities for radiological or
nuclear (R/N) detection capabilities. The
primary purpose of the RECE
Questionnaire form is to collect data on
current stakeholder (primarily directed
at state and local) radiological or
nuclear (R/N) detection equipment
inventories and resources to streamline
access to a real-time depiction of R/N
detection capabilities and serve as a
warehouse for the data. Data collected
will be available via the Joint Analysis
Center Collaborative Information
System (JACCIS). The Adobe Active
‘‘fillable’’ form focuses on the specific
information regarding the respective R/
N detection program plans, assets, and
status of equipment. As part of the

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overall mission of the JAC, the RECE
presents an opportunity to extend
access to stakeholders with a RND
mission, program, or equipment but not
reflected in an accessible database.
The JAC aims to provide assistance to
State or Local entities with limited
access to resources as part of the RECE,
and establish a standing collection
strategy. Information can be submitted
through use of a questionnaire (hard/
soft copy transmittal), or scripted phone
interviews. The questionnaire will be
distributed in compatible file format
Adobe PDF Fill-able Form. All emails
and phone interviews will not deviate
from the scope or content of the DHS
Form 10089. Phone interviews will be
conducted on an as needed basis for the
purposes of non-submittals or to address
questions related to answers of
information provided within the form.
All data submitted will be processed
and stored in a Microsoft Excel
spreadsheet for review prior to Joint
Analysis Center Collaborative
Information System (JACCIS)
integration. The RECE will help to
accurately reflect the current domestic
radiological and detection capabilities
within JACCIS. The JACCIS Dashboard
provides a secure web interface to
collaborate with mission partners and
includes a GIS that allows users to view
detection information, detectors,
situational awareness reports, and other
overlays (critical infrastructure, etc.) in
a geospatial viewer. Web Service
interfaces to other mission partner’s
systems and content routers provide
linkages to detection assets around the
country in real-time.
The information collected will be
used to provide a more accurate or realtime depiction of the GNDA.
Information can be submitted through
use of a questionnaire (hard/soft copy
transmittal), email DNDO.JAC2@
HQ.DHS.GOV or phone interviews 1–
877–363–6522. Use of these three
methods of information submittals
provides flexibility to the targeted
collection audience which may have
limited access to technological
collection. All data submitted will be
processed and stored in an excel
spreadsheet, saved in a designated
folder within a non-public DHS network
share drive folder. Following review of
spreadsheet information, data will be
integrated into JACCIS in accordance
with agreed distribution or sharing
regulations; each questionnaire
participant will be encouraged to
acquire a JACCIS account, and point of
contact information for JACCIS account
acquisition are included within DHS
Form 10089 RECE Questionnaire
Directives. Information already available

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cannot be used or modified for use
because it extremely dated, and lacks
the specificity required for accurate
accountability. To provide real-time
depiction of the GNDA, there needs to
be accountability of current resources
available at all levels. RND equipment
varies greatly between States, Territories
and Local jurisdictions, and it is often
not controlled or regulated by a single
entity.
Efforts to identify duplication have
included coordination with Federal
stakeholders such as FEMA, CBP, and
the FBI; each engagement revealed none
of these agencies were in possession of
a comprehensive complete data source
which included specific domestic
(United States) R/N detection
capabilities for all States, Territories or
Local jurisdictions.
In 2007 and 2009 COL Brent
Bredehoft Deputy Assistant Director (in
2007/2009) of the Joint Analysis Center
(JAC) directed his staff to conduct an
informal information data call to federal
entities only. In 2007 State and Local
data was collected by the FBI (2006/
2007) and provided to the JAC. Neither
data collection was for JACCIS, but a
plan was developed to put data
collected in JACCIS after receiving. This
information was neither consistent nor
comprehensive and largely inaccurate
since much of the information was
haphazardly compiled with limited
distribution. Additionally the FBI has
not updated or made available a revised
version of the 2006/2007 data call.
Additionally the RECE is organizing
and analyzing relevant data from
domestic Preventative Radiological
Nuclear Detection (PRND) reports,
specifically the National Capabilities
Effort (NCE), but many of these NCE
reports are extremely dated (greater than
5 years old), do not provide definitive
identification details regarding
equipment, therefore there is no way to
de-conflict with existing equipment
data. The NCE reports were a contracted
effort through Defense Threat Reduction
Agency (DTRA), and due to proprietary
limitations when distributed to DNDO
were not accompanied by the related
raw data collection. Additionally, the
NCE reports were created through
informal collection techniques, and are
largely inconsistent.
Lastly, in the years since the NCE
reports and JACCIS informal data calls
many States, Territories and Local
jurisdictions have made significant
advancements and or efforts towards
acquiring R/N detection capability. With
that said, State, Territories and Local
jurisdictions are not subjected to any
standing reporting requirement
regarding R/N detection equipment or

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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 204 / Wednesday, October 22, 2014 / Notices
capabilities, which precludes DNDO or
any other Federal Agency from
providing a real-time and accurate
accountability to decision-makers
regarding available domestic R/N
detection assets.
There is no assurance of
confidentiality provided to respondents.
There will be no collection of trade
secret or business proprietary
information. Furnishing this
information is voluntary; however,
failure to furnish the requested
information may prevent a user from
contributing radiological or nuclear
detection information to RECE. This
could cause a hindrance when
attempting to allocate resources during
a global nuclear detection architecture
related threat incident.
The Office of Management and Budget
is particularly interested in comments
which:
1. Evaluate whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary
for the proper performance of the
functions of the agency, including
whether the information will have
practical utility;
2. Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
3. Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
4. Minimize the burden of the
collection of information on those who
are to respond, including through the
use of appropriate automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other
technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology,
e.g., permitting electronic submissions
of responses.

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Analysis
Agency: Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, DHS.
Title: Regional Equipment and
Capabilities Exchange.
OMB Number: 1601–NEW.
Frequency: Annually.
Affected Public: State, Local, Tribal
Governments.
Number of Respondents: 102.
Estimated Time per Respondent: 1
hour.
Total Burden Hours: 102.
Dated: October 9, 2014.
Margaret H. Graves,
Deputy Chief Information Officer.
[FR Doc. 2014–25050 Filed 10–21–14; 8:45 am]
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Office of the Secretary
United States Secret Service Protective
Mission Panel
Office of the Secretary,
Department of Homeland Security.
ACTION: Committee management: notice
of committee establishment.
AGENCY:

In order to facilitate an
effective review of the security provided
by the U.S. Secret Service to the White
House compound, the Department of
Homeland Security (Department or
DHS) is creating the U.S. Secret Service
Protective Mission Panel (USSSPMP or
Panel). Pursuant to the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, the Department is
taking immediate measures to establish
this independent panel of experts to
inquire into recent incidents at the
White House compound and to provide
to the Secretary of Homeland Security
recommendations for potential new
directors of the U.S. Secret Service and
whether there should be a broader
review of the U.S. Secret Service.
Name of Committee: U.S. Secret
Service Protective Mission Panel.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Peter Boogaard, Office of Public Affairs,
(202) 282–8010, MediaInquiry@
HQ.DHS.GOV.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:

I. Background
DHS is establishing an independent
panel to review the recent fence
jumping incident at the White House on
September 19, 2014 and related issues
concerning security at the White House
compound; to provide
recommendations for potential new
directors of the Secret Service; and to
recommend whether there should be a
broader review of the Secret Service.
This time-sensitive and important
review will entail discussion of
classified information.
This Department has recognized in
the past that some highly critical issues
cannot be discussed in public without
jeopardizing the security and
confidentiality of sensitive homeland
security information. For example, in
2006, the Department established the
Critical Infrastructure Partnership
Advisory Council (CIPAC) to aid in the
communication and coordination
between critical private sector entities
and the Federal agencies charged with
regulating them. See 71 FR 14930 (Mar.
24, 2006). Discussions between the
members of that Council involve
intelligence and law enforcement

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information and remain non-public to
avoid giving our nation’s enemies
information they could use to effectively
attack a particular infrastructure.
Many of the issues to be reviewed by
the Panel will require access to, and
discussion of, non-public classified
information and other non-public law
enforcement sensitive information.
These matters include protective
measures at the White House, sensitive
law enforcement techniques and
methods, and the management of these
protective and law enforcement
missions of the Secret Service.
II. Identifying Solutions
The Department recognizes the
importance of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (FACA). The FACA,
when it applies, generally requires
advisory committees to meet in open
session and make publicly available
associated written materials. It also
requires a 15-day notice before any
meeting may be closed to public
attendance. These requirements,
however, would prevent the Department
from convening on short notice a panel
to discuss the sensitive and classified
information surrounding the review of
protective measures at the White House
compound and other U.S. Secret Service
law enforcement missions in an
appropriate setting. The FACA contains
a number of exceptions to its general
disclosure rules, but the applicability of
those exceptions are not sufficient to
address the proper handling of
classified material and the protection of
law enforcement sensitive information
in this unique context. The information
that will be discussed and reviewed by
this panel will be deliberative in nature
and will involve classified information
that, if discussed in public, would result
in the unauthorized disclosure of
information that could reasonably be
expected to result in threats or damage
to national security. Furthermore, the
information discussed will involve
techniques and procedures for law
enforcement investigations. The release
of this information would enable
criminals and enemies to use that
information to circumvent the law and
could reasonably be expected to
endanger the life or physical safety of
individuals.
Section 871 of the Homeland Security
Act provides the Secretary of Homeland
Security with the authority to establish
advisory committees and exempt them
from the FACA. 6 U.S.C. 451(a). This
authority allows the Department to
freely and completely review the
security procedures, to discuss potential
vulnerabilities, and to provide the
Department with information and

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