Attachment I1 Section III: Medical Care & Countermeasures_TEST - Final
Form Approved
OMB Number: 0920-0879
Expiration Date: 03/31/2018
Introduction
Background
The 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic underscored the importance of
communities being prepared for potential threats to public health
security. Because of its unique abilities to respond to infectious,
occupational, or environmental incidents, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) plays a pivotal role in ensuring that
state and local public health systems are prepared for these and
other public health incidents.
The
identification of the novel influenza A (H7N9) virus illnesses in
China in 2013 highlights the importance of influenza pandemic
preparedness. To date, the reported case fatality ratio from human
H7N9 infections is more than 30%. Should the H7N9 virus mutate to
allow for sustained human-to-human transmission, it appears capable
of causing severe disease in all ages. To better prepare for such a
scenario, it is important to understand the collective
ability of our nation to prepare for and respond to a pandemic of
substantially different epidemiology than the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.
State and local public health departments are first
responders for public health incidents. To better prepare these
agencies to respond, CDC provides funding and technical assistance
for state, local, and territorial public health departments through
the Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) cooperative
agreement. CDC’s Public Health Preparedness Capabilities:
National Standards for State and Local Planning provide national
standards that help state and local public health departments
strengthen their ability to respond to all hazards, including
influenza pandemics, and build more resilient communities.
Consistent with this approach, the following Pandemic Preparedness
Readiness Assessment for State and Local Public Health Planners
specifically aligns with 11 public health preparedness capabilities
and administrative preparedness planning goals.
Overview
The
Pandemic Preparedness Readiness Assessment for State and Local Public
Health Planners promotes state, local, and territorial public health
preparedness and immunization program collaboration through the
administration of a self-assessment designed to measure
jurisdictional readiness to respond to an influenza pandemic.
Although the content of this assessment does not encompass every
contingency or element necessary to effectively respond to an
influenza pandemic, CDC technical experts in differing programs have
helped to arrange content within the following seven priority
planning areas:
1.
Vaccination Planning
2.
Epidemiology and laboratory
3.
Medical Care and Countermeasures
4.
Healthcare Systems
5.
Community Mitigation
6.
Public Information and Communication
7.
Public Health and Immunization Workforce
Information
collected from the assessment will not be used to score or
competitively rank public health emergency preparedness or
immunization programs. Rather, this assessment is designed to
identify preparedness gaps, as well as promising state, local, and
territorial preparedness practices. Assessment results will be used
by the CDC to inform technical assistance and future program
improvement initiatives.
Definitions
Allocation:
Amount of pandemic influenza vaccine available for ordering.
Allocating:
Process of dividing available vaccine among CDC’s PHEP awardees
or among registered pandemic influenza vaccine providers and
facilities within an awardee’s jurisdiction.
Critical
infrastructure personnel (CIP):
The full list of CIP is defined in Guidance on Allocating and
Targeting Pandemic Influenza Vaccine; U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS)/U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS);
2008 Guidance
on Allocating and Targeting Pandemic Influenza
Vaccine
Distribution:
The process of transporting pandemic influenza vaccine from one
location to another.
Enrollment:
The process of enabling registered healthcare providers and
facilities to legally provide pandemic influenza vaccine.
Ordering:
Process of requesting pandemic influenza vaccine from either the
federal, state, city, or local government. Orders can be placed
against an allocation or independent of allocation.
Non-pharmaceutical
interventions (NPIs): Those
interventions that can mitigate transmission of influenza and do not
involve medical countermeasures. NPIs include voluntary home
isolation, school closures, respiratory etiquette, hand hygiene, and
routine cleaning of frequently touched surfaces and objects.
Peak vaccine
administration capacity:
The highest rate at which a jurisdiction is able to provide pandemic
influenza vaccine to its population; CDC recommends a peak vaccine
administration capacity of at least 10% of the population per week.
Point of
dispensing (POD) / mass vaccination clinic:
Location for dispensing medical countermeasures, specifically for
vaccine, during an influenza pandemic response. Located in a
public or private space, this clinic is designed to vaccinate a large
group of persons over a short time period. The POD or clinic might
target the entire population or people in specific priority or
high-risk groups. Public and/or private entities can manage a POD or
clinic.
Closed
POD: Point of
dispensing/vaccination clinic closed to the general public and open
only to a specific group (e.g., staff of a participating business or
healthcare personnel in a specific hospital).
Open
POD: Point of
dispensing/vaccination clinic open to the general public,
specifically to provide vaccine, during an influenza pandemic
response.
Recruitment:
The process of soliciting healthcare providers and facilities
interested in and willing to provide pandemic influenza vaccine.
Registration:
The submission of required information, similar to an application, by
healthcare providers or facilities interested in providing pandemic
influenza vaccinations.
Retail-based
clinics: Non-pharmacy
businesses that sell retail products (e.g., Walmart, Target) and
serve as PODs/mass vaccination clinics.
School-located
vaccination clinics:
Vaccination clinics that target students and are typically held on
school grounds.
Public reporting burden of this collection of information is estimated to average 30 minutes per response, including time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing information. An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget control number. Send comments regarding this burden estimate, or any other aspect of this information collection, including suggestions for reducing this burden to CDC/Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry Information Collection Review Office, 1600 Clifton Road NE, MS D-74, Atlanta, Georgia 30333; Attention: PRA (0920-0879).
(End of Page 1)
Section III: Medical Care and Countermeasures
Goal:
Each awardee will distribute medical countermeasures (MCM) during an
influenza pandemic in collaboration with hospitals, healthcare
coalitions, and pharmacies to assure that these MCMs reach the
affected population(s) in an efficient, equitable, and timely
manner.
Planning
Assumptions:
•
Awardees are working collaboratively with hospitals, healthcare
coalitions, and pharmacies to optimize MCM distribution during an
influenza pandemic.
• Jurisdictions that have mechanical
ventilators and respiratory protective devices stockpiled in advance
of a severe influenza pandemic will use these to offset commercial
shortages of these devices.
• During a severe influenza
pandemic, the number of commercially available and stockpiled
ventilators and respiratory protective devices (RPDs) within the
jurisdiction may not be able to meet the entire need.
Information gathered will help to inform the development
of tools to assist awardees to improve planning for state-level
allocation, distribution, and use of MCMs during an influenza
pandemic.
(End of Page 2)
Section III: Medical Care and Countermeasures
Please select your jurisdiction:
Alabama
Alaska
American Samoa
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Chicago
Colorado
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
Connecticut
Delaware
Federated States of Micronesia
Florida
Georgia
Guam
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Los Angeles County
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
New York City
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
Republic of Palau
Republic of the Marshall Islands
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
U.S. Virgin Islands
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
Washington, DC
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Please select your position:
PHEP Director
Strategic National Stockpile Coordinator
Healthcare Preparedness Program Director
Other (please specify) ____________________
(End of Page 3)
Section III: Medical Care and Countermeasures
1.
Does your agency manage a stockpile of mechanical ventilators for
distribution to hospitals in your jurisdiction during an influenza
pandemic?
(Please
do not include any additional stockpiles that might be available for
use but are not directly managed by your agency.)
Yes
No >>>>
Skip to Page 6: 3. Does your jurisdiction plan to distribute
ventilators during an influenza pandemic?
(End of Page 4)
Section III: Medical Care and Countermeasures
2.
Please describe the make, model, and number of mechanical ventilators
that you currently have stockpiled:
Make
Ventilator 1: |
____________________
|
Ventilator 2: |
____________________
|
Ventilator 3: |
____________________
|
Ventilator 4: |
____________________
|
Model
Ventilator 1: |
____________________
|
Ventilator 2: |
____________________
|
Ventilator 3: |
____________________
|
Ventilator 4: |
____________________
|
Number Stockpiled
Ventilator 1: |
____________________
|
Ventilator 2: |
____________________
|
Ventilator 3: |
____________________
|
Ventilator 4: |
____________________
|
(End of Page 5)
Section III: Medical Care and Countermeasures
3.
Does your jurisdiction plan to distribute ventilators during an
influenza pandemic?
Yes, directly from the U.S. Strategic National Stockpile
Yes, through allocations from the state health department from the U.S. Strategic National Stockpile
Yes, from state stockpiles
No
Not sure
(End of Page 6)
Section III: Medical Care and Countermeasures
The following set of questions asks possible ways your jurisdiction may choose to allocate ventilators during a severe influenza pandemic; assuming uniform demand across hospitals:
4.
Please state which of the following considerations below your
jurisdiction will allocate ventilators for. Please respond with an
N/A if the consideration is not applicable to your jurisdiction.
|
Yes |
No |
N/A |
Size of jurisdictional population |
|
|
|
Size of population served by a hospital |
|
|
|
Number of ICU beds in a hospital |
|
|
|
First come/first served basis (e.g., provide ventilators based on the order in which requests are received until stockpiled supply is depleted) |
|
|
|
Availability of trained and qualified staff to operate additional ventilators and care for patients with complex illnesses |
|
|
|
Sufficient space to accommodate additional ventilated patients |
|
|
|
Equipment needed to support additional ventilaged patients |
|
|
|
Other factors |
|
|
|
5. Did your jurisdiction conduct a hospital-based assessment between June 30, 2010 and June 30, 2014 to determine their mechanical ventilation capabilities? Please indicate which of the following considerations were included in the assessment (please check all that apply)?
No assessment conducted
Number of ventilators in normal conditions
Availability of "surge" ventilators
Types of populations to be served during an influenza pandemic (e.g., underserved or vulnerable populations)
Availability of trained and qualified staff to operate additional ventilators and care for patients with complex illnesses
Sufficient space to accommodate additional ventilated patients
Adequate equipment needed to support additional ventilated patients
Familiarity of hospitals with portable ventilators used in the U.S. Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)
6. Please enter the percentage of the hospitals within your jurisdiction that were included in your assessment.
(Please enter a percentage) ____________________
7. How will your jurisdiction coordinate hospital requests for ventilators during an influenza pandemic (please check all that apply)?
Through ESF-8 lead
Through state, regional, or local hospital associations
Through state, regional, or local healthcare coalitions
Other (please specify) ____________________
(End of Page 7)
Section III: Medical Care and Countermeasures
8.
Has your jurisdiction determined when and how it will train
healthcare systems to operate federally stockpiled ventilators that
are distributed to hospitals?
Yes
No, but in development
No >>>>
Skip to Page 9: 9. Has your jurisdiction collaborated with hospitals
and/or healthcare coalitions to stockpile fit-tested respiratory
protective devices for their healthcare workforce that could be used
during an influenza pandemic?
Don't know
(End of Page 8)
Respiratory Protective Devices
9.
Has your jurisdiction collaborated with hospitals and/or healthcare
coalitions to stockpile fit-tested respiratory protective devices for
their healthcare workforce that could be used during an influenza
pandemic?
Yes
No
(End of Page 9)
Respiratory Protective Devices
10.
Since June 2010, has your jurisdiction issued recommendations or
guidance to hospitals and/or healthcare coalitions about stockpiling
fit-tested respiratory protective devices for their healthcare
workforce?
Yes
No >>>> Skip to End Page: Survey Submitted
(End of Page 10)
Respiratory Protective Devices
11. If yes, which of the following items were included in your jurisdiction’s guidelines?
Number of respiratory protective devices to stockpile based on the projected duration of the pandemic
Recommendations about who should wear respiratory protective devices
Recommendations about circumstances in which respiratory protective devices should be worn
Recommendations about fit-testing for respiratory protective devices
Other (please specify) ____________________
(End of Page 11)
Medical Countermeasures Distribution and Dispensing
12. Which of the following partnerships has your jurisdiction established to enhance antiviral distribution/ dispensing during a pandemic (please check all that apply)?
We have not established partnerships to enhance antiviral distribution / dispensing during a pandemic
Community pharmacies
Pharmaceutical distributors
State Board of Pharmacy
Pharmacy training programs
Other (Please specify) ____________________
13. Please describe the role of these partners in your jurisdiction’s antiviral distribution/dispensing plans.
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
(End of Page 12)
File Type | application/msword |
File Title | I1. Section III_Medical Care Countermeasures |
Author | Nacalaban, Olga |
Last Modified By | CDC User |
File Modified | 2015-04-10 |
File Created | 2015-03-20 |