Senior Financial Officer Survey

FR2023_May_1998_Survey

Senior Financial Officer Survey

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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

The May 1998 Senior Financial Officer Survey
In recent years, the reserve market and payment system have undergone significant
structural changes.1 In the reserve market, the proliferation of retail sweep accounts at
banks has led to a dramatic decline in the level of balances that banks must maintain at the
Federal Reserve in order to meet reserve requirements. Indeed, many institutions are now
able to satisfy their reserve requirement entirely with vault cash. In the past, low levels of
required reserve balances have been associated with increased volatility in the federal
funds rate. But the federal funds rate has not been especially volatile lately, in part
because banks have adapted to the current low required reserve environment by modifying
their reserve management practices, though a significant number report persisting
difficulties in managing their positions.2 Important changes in the payment system have
been: (i) the imposition of charges for so-called “daylight overdraft” credit that is extended
when depositories overdraw their Fed account during the course of the business day; and
(ii) the recent extension of operating hours for both Fedwire and CHIPS.
To obtain information on the effects of these developments, the Federal Reserve
conducted a survey of senior financial officers of large commercial banks in May 1998.3
This document summarizes the findings of that survey. The survey questions and
tabulations of the responses are included in Appendix A, a glossary of terms is given in
Appendix B, and examples of key reserve concepts are discussed in Appendix C.

Part I: Effects of Recent Changes in Bank Reserves
Part I of the survey included questions covering three basic areas--the impact of low
required reserve balances on bank reserve management practices, recent changes in banks’
behavior in the federal funds market, and changes in banks’attitudes toward the discount
window.

1. Many of the reserve market issues addressed in the survey were discussed by Governor Lawrence H.
Meyer in testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on March 3, 1998.
This testimony is available on the Federal Reserve Board’s web site (http://www.bog.frb.us/) under
“Testimony of Federal Reserve Board Officials.”
2. Volatility has also been contained by changes in open market operations to adapt to low reserves.
3. The Federal Reserve surveyed forty-four large commercial banks, with respondents selected from each
Federal Reserve District. The mean asset size of the survey banks is $40 billion, and total assets of the survey
banks account for about 40 percent of all commercial bank assets. In addition, these institutions account for 40
percent of aggregate required reserves and 36 percent of aggregate balances held at the Federal Reserve,
including required reserve balances, excess reserves, and required clearing balances. Ninety percent currently
have retail sweep programs in place. Given the nature of the sample, the results are most indicative of large
bank behavior.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Low Required Fed Account Balances and Bank Reserve Management Practices
(Questions 1-4)

Question 1 was aimed at determining the added degree of difficulty that bank funding
managers have faced in managing their reserve position in light of the lower required
reserve balances (henceforth, required Fed account balances).4 Most of the respondents
reported that their levels of required Fed account balances had indeed fallen over the last
two years. About one-third of these institutions reported that the reduction in their
average level of required Fed account balances had not caused them any increased
difficulties in reserve management. Another one-quarter noted that they had initially
experienced some difficulties in reserve management associated with low required Fed
account balances, but also that they had been able to overcome these difficulties through
changes in their reserve management practices. A significant number of banks said that
their low level of required Fed account balances had presented some problems and that
they still found reserve management more difficult today than in the past.
Respondents noted several ways in which reserve management had become more
complicated (question 3). A number of respondents said that low required Fed account
balances had reduced the usefulness of reserve carryover provisions. The Federal
Reserve’s Regulation D permits depositories to carry forward surpluses or deficiencies in
their reserve position up to 4 percent of the sum of their total reserve requirement and
clearing balance requirement. The carryover provisions allow an institution to benefit
from a large surplus carried in from a previous maintenance period by reducing the level of
reserves it holds in the current maintenance period. But if an institution satisfies a large
portion of its reserve requirement with vault cash, it is possible that its maximum
carryover allowance could be large in magnitude relative to its required Fed account
balance. In this case, it may not be able to lower its Fed account balance much in order to
take advantage of a large surplus carried in because doing so would entail very high risks
of incurring an overnight overdraft.
In a similar vein, many respondents noted that low required Fed account balances had
sometimes made it difficult to benefit fully from positive “as-of adjustments.” Ordinarily,
an institution can benefit from such adjustments--which are used as a means of
compensating banks for accounting or float-related corrections--by lowering the level of
its Fed account balance. Again, for an institution with very low required Fed account
balances, reducing its Fed account balance to take advantage of a positive as-of
adjustment may not be possible because of the heightened risk of overnight overdrafts as
Fed account balances decline.

4. Required Fed account balances plunged in early 1991 following the reduction in the reserve requirement
ratio for nontransaction accounts from 3 percent to zero in December 1990. For the next couple of years,
required Fed account balances grew slightly, followed by a steady decline brought on by the start of retail
sweep account programs in 1994.

May 1998 Senior Financial Officer Survey

One way in which banks have responded to such difficulties over time has been to increase
their clearing balance requirement at the Federal Reserve. Balances held to satisfy this
requirement earn implicit interest in the form of earnings credits
that can be used to defray charges for Federal Reserve priced services.5 Although total
clearing balance requirements have risen considerably during the 1990s, in the past year
the aggregate level of clearing balances has not increased. Many institutions may now be
in a position in which further increases in their clearing balance requirement would not be
profitable. Indeed, many of the respondents noted that they were not able to increase their
clearing balance requirement much because the current level of their requirements already
generates earnings credits sufficient to cover their typical priced services charges. Ten
assigned a rating of "5" (very significant) to this factor and another five rated it a "4"
(described in this summary as "significant"); nine more assigned a rating of "3" (described
here as "moderately important").
Another significant reserve management difficulty noted by respondents concerns the
treatment of carryover for banks that fully satisfy their reserve requirement with vault
cash--so-called “nonbound” institutions.6 With the proliferation of retail sweep accounts,
many depository institutions now fall in this category, including a number of large
institutions. Such institutions may still hold an excess Fed account balance or open a
clearing balance account in order to facilitate payments through their Fed account, but
these institutions are not eligible for carryover, and this situation obviously limits their
flexibility in managing reserve balances across maintenance periods. About one-third of
the respondents rated this as a significant or very significant factor complicating reserve
management, and for another one-fifth or so it is apparently a moderately important
consideration.
Another complication for nonbound institutions is that the effective return they earn on
balances held to meet clearing balance requirements is lowered.7 As a result, they have
reduced incentives to expand their clearing balance requirement. Indeed, anecdotal

5. Balances in such accounts also can be lowered in response to a positive as-of adjustment.
6. During the first four months of 1998, about three-quarters of the survey banks were bound on average in
a given maintenance period.
7. The implicit return that institutions receive on their clearing balance requirement is equal to the effective
federal funds rate over the maintenance period adjusted by an imputed reserve adjustment factor. The latter is
intended to ensure that the earnings credit rate on a clearing balance requirement does not exceed the total
return that a bank would earn if it held its clearing account with a correspondent bank rather than the Federal
Reserve. The adjustment includes a “deduction” of 10 percent, representing the assumed marginal reserve
requirement of the correspondent bank, and a “credit” of the bank’s own marginal reserve requirement. Thus,
if the bank itself has a 10 percent marginal reserve requirement, the reserve adjustment factor is equal to one
and the bank earns the full federal funds rate on balances held to satisfy its clearing balance requirement.
However, when an institution becomes “nonbound,” its marginal reserve requirement is set at zero in the
reserve adjustment factor, and hence it earns only 90 percent of the federal funds rate on balances held to
satisfy its clearing balance requirement.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

reports suggest that some larger banks have chosen to reduce their clearing balance
requirement after they had become nonbound. A total of nine institutions rated this as a
significant or very significant factor complicating reserve management, and for another six
it is a moderately important factor.
To the extent that the various reserve management complications noted above have
impaired banks’ability to arbitrage in the federal funds market across days in the
maintenance period or between maintenance periods, one might expect to see some pickup
in the daily volatility of the federal funds rate. For example, federal funds rate volatility
increased substantially in early 1991 when required Fed account balances had fallen very
low in the wake of the cut in reserve requirements in late 1990 and early 1991 (and
subsequently returned to prior typical levels).8 On balance over the last few years,
however, there has not been much of a pickup in funds rate volatility. In part, the lack of
substantial increase in volatility may reflect the fact that banks’reserve management
practices have evolved over time. For example, respondents cited improvements in their
automated systems and increases in the level of their clearing balance requirements
(question 2) as two important ways in which they had responded to the reserve
management complications associated with low required Fed account balances. The
practices of the Federal Reserve in supplying reserves through open market operations
have also evolved in the last two years. In addition to the usual focus on supplying an
appropriate quantity of reserves on average over the maintenance period, there is now an
increased emphasis on estimating and meeting reserve needs on each day of the
maintenance period, in part through enhanced reliance by the domestic Trading Desk on
overnight--as opposed to term--repurchase agreements.
A number of respondents also noted that low required Fed account balances had caused
them to change their general reserve management strategy within a maintenance period
(question 4). For example, many institutions reported that they had shifted toward a
strategy of “running short” on reserves for much of the maintenance period and then
holding relatively large reserve positions on the last days of the period in order to meet
reserve requirements. (The Board permits banks to meet their reserve requirements on
average over a two-week maintenance period.) Given the concerns that respondents had
noted in question 3 about the reduced usefulness of reserve carryover provisions, these
responses seem quite sensible. An institution that builds up a large cumulative reserve
8. For a general discussion of this episode and the connection between low required Fed account balances
and funds rate volatility, see the articles by Joshua N. Feinman, “Reserve Requirements: History, Current
Practice, and Potential Reform,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 79, (June 1993), 569-89, and Cheryl L.
Edwards, “Open Market Operations in the 1990s,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 83, (November 1997), 85974. For analytical discussions of low required Fed account balances and federal funds rate volatility see James
A. Clouse and Douglas W. Elmendorf, “Declining Required Reserves and the Volatility of the Federal Funds
Rate,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, #199730, and also Gordon H. Sellon Jr. and Stuart E. Weiner, “Monetary Policy Without Reserve Requirements:
Analytical Issues,” Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, vol. 96, (#4, 1996), 5-25.

May 1998 Senior Financial Officer Survey

surplus early in the period runs the risk that it will not be able to reduce that position in the
last days of the period. In some cases, institutions can become “locked in” to a surplus
position in the sense that they would need to run overdrafts in their Fed accounts on the
last day or two of the period in order to eliminate an accumulated surplus. As noted in the
responses to question 3, even if such a surplus could be carried forward, a bank might not
be able to make effective use of the carryover in the subsequent maintenance period.
Over the latter half of 1997, the aggregate level of excess reserves banks wished to hold
seemed to increase substantially. One hypothesis had been that this trend might be the
result of depositories holding a larger cushion of excess reserves to reduce the possibility
of overdrafts as their level of required Fed account balances fell. Two banks on the survey
indicated that they had indeed increased their desired level of excess Fed account balances
for this reason (question 2), but most respondents did not report a significant increase in
their desired excess reserves.

Daily Funding Strategies
(Questions 5-7)

These survey questions looked at how banks’intraday behavior in the federal funds
market on both “typical days” and “volatile days” might have been affected by declines in
required Fed account balances. In part, these questions were motivated by an increased
number of instances in which federal funds have traded quite firm early in the day but
ended the day on a softer note. Such situations have seemed often to coincide with
particular events that can generate sizable payment flows through reserve accounts,
including, for example, settlements for two- and five-year Treasury note auctions,
maintenance period ends, quarter-ends, corporate tax dates and so forth. One might
expect that the larger volume of payment flows on these days would create heightened
uncertainties for banks about their end-of-day reserve positions and, perhaps, that such
increased uncertainty about end-of-day reserve conditions might lead some banks to be
willing to pay a premium in the federal funds market early in the day to line up their
funding early.
Banks reported in question 5.1 that there was little difference between typical days and
volatile days in terms of how likely they were to be on the buy or sell side in the federal
funds market. Similarly, respondents in question 5.2 reported little difference in their
pattern of federal funds transactions over the course of a typical day versus that over the
course of a volatile day. Perhaps the premium usually observed in the funds rate on such
days is sufficient to deter the surveyed banks from trying to move their fed funds
purchases earlier in the day.
Responses to question 5.3 indicated that over the last two years, there has been a marked
tendency for trades of federal funds to be more concentrated toward the end of the day.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

In question 6, banks reported that deliveries had become more heavily weighted toward
the end of the day in the last two years as well. Banks said that on both typical and
volatile days, more than 60 percent of their federal funds purchased were not delivered to
their account until after 4 p.m. and that roughly 20 percent were not delivered until after 6
p.m.
It seems plausible that the shift in federal funds market transactions toward late in the day
might, in part, reflect the combined effects of low required Fed account balances and
payment system risk policies such as charges for daylight overdraft credit and monitoring
of intraday credit usage against daylight overdraft caps. With a smaller cushion of Fed
account balances, institutions might have a greater incentive to hold on to their federal
funds purchased from the previous day as long as possible in order to guard against
daylight overdraft charges and cap breaches. This behavior on the part of federal funds
buyers, in turn, might lead sellers of funds to be more cautious in committing to
transactions early in the day until they are sure that funds lent on the previous day will be
returned.
Given that most federal funds deliveries seem to be made quite late in the day, question 7
inquired about banks’need and ability to arrange for an expedited delivery of federal funds
if necessary. Most banks reported that they either almost never have a need for an
expedited delivery of federal funds or that they are almost never able to arrange such a
delivery. However, several banks reported that they are either sometimes or frequently
able to arrange such early deliveries. Not surprisingly, these banks reported that they
typically have to pay a premium of a few basis points to arrange an early delivery.
Presumably, the maximum premium that a bank would be willing to pay for an early
delivery of federal funds would be a fraction of the Federal Reserve’s fee for daylight
overdraft credit. For example, the maximum premium that a two-hour early delivery of
federal funds purchased should be worth would be the current daylight overdraft fee of 36
basis points multiplied by 1/12 (2 hrs/24 hrs per day) or about 3 basis points.
Conceivably, an institution might be willing to pay more than this for an early delivery if it
were especially concerned about the potential for a daylight overdraft cap breach and the
associated nonpecuniary penalties.

Attitudes Toward the Discount Window
(Question 8)

In principle, the discount window should play an important role in helping the money
market adapt to day-to-day imbalances in reserve supply and demand. However,
beginning in the mid-1980s, banks appeared to become quite reluctant to turn to the
discount window out of concerns that it would be perceived by regulators and others as a

May 1998 Senior Financial Officer Survey

sign of financial weakness.9 As noted in the May 1996 Senior Financial Officer Survey,
many banks remained concerned that discount officers, federal regulators, and market
participants would view turning to the discount window as a sign of distress.
One might have expected the recent strength in the economy and banking system to help
dispel fears about usage of the discount window. In addition, the
Federal Reserve, in its communications with banks, has noted that the discount window is
available in appropriate circumstances to meet unexpected funding needs.10 These factors
probably help to explain the responses to question 8. About one-third of the banks
reported that they had become either somewhat or considerably more willing to borrow
from the discount window over the last two years, and none indicated that they had
become less willing to borrow. Of those that indicated an increased willingness to borrow,
most reported that they had become less concerned that the Federal Reserve and other
federal regulators might view borrowing negatively, and a number reported that they had
become less concerned that the market would view borrowing as a sign of weakness.

Part II: Effects of Possible Changes in Reserve Market Structure
Part II of the survey focused on banks’hypothetical responses to various proposed and
imminent changes in reserve market structure. The first set of questions asked banks to
consider the potential effects if the Federal Reserve were allowed by statute to pay interest
on Fed account balances applied against reserve requirements or on excess Fed account
balances. In addition, banks were asked about their likely response if the Federal Reserve
were allowed to pay interest on reserves and if they could pay explicit interest on demand
deposits. A second set of questions asked banks about the likely impact on their reserve
management practices of the imminent transition to lagged reserve requirements.11 A third
set of questions asked banks to consider how they might react if the Federal Reserve were

9. For a discussion of trends in discount window borrowing behavior, see James A. Clouse, “Recent
Developments in Discount Window Policy,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 80 (November 1994), 965-77.
10. Banks’reluctance to borrow at the window was especially acute in the early 1990s. In February 1991,
Chairman Greenspan noted in his semiannual testimony to Congress under the Full Employment and Balance
Growth Act of 1978 (the Humphrey-Hawkins Act) that the discount window, as always, was available to meet
the short-term liquidity needs of depository institutions in appropriate circumstances. Given the findings in the
May 1996 Senior Financial Officer Survey indicating that banks remained quite reluctant to turn to the discount
window, Reserve Bank staff have met with officials of many depository institutions as well as with other federal
regulators in an effort to dispel misperceptions about the use of the discount window.
11. The notice of proposed rulemaking was published in the Federal Register, 62 FedReg 60671
(November 10, 1997). The final rule was approved by the Board of Governors on March 24, 1998. Under the
lagged reserve requirement system, depositories will maintain reserves over a two-week maintenance period
based upon their average level of transaction deposits over a two-week computation period. The maintenance
period begins on the third Thursday following the Monday end of the computation period.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

to restructure its discount window as a Lombard credit facility.12 In this structure, the
discount rate would be set above the expected typical level of short-term market interest
rates, but banks would be subject to little of the administrative scrutiny that currently
comes with borrowing at the discount window.

Payment of Interest on Fed Account Balances and Demand Deposits
(Questions 9-12)

The Federal Reserve has long supported proposals that would allow it to pay interest on
some reserves. One common version of such proposals would allow the Federal Reserve
to pay interest on Fed account balances applied against reserve requirements (question
10). Presumably, this policy would sharply reduce the incentives for banks to implement
new retail sweep programs. Several banks said that receiving interest on required reserves
would prompt them to dismantle their sweep programs, either immediately or eventually,
presumably because of the operational costs associated with such running programs.
More than half of the banks responded, though, that they would continue to seek ways to
reduce their required reserves even if required Fed account balances earned interest close
to the federal funds rate because they believed that they could earn higher returns on
alternative investments. Nonetheless, the results on this question seem qualitatively
different from the responses to a similar question on the May 1996 Senior Financial
Officer Survey. On that survey, about two-thirds of the respondents indicated that they
would dismantle their retail sweep programs either immediately or over time if interest
were paid on Fed account balances held to meet reserve requirements.
In other potential responses to the payment of interest on reserves, about one-half of the
banks noted that they would be quite likely to try to economize on vault cash in order to
meet a larger portion of their reserve requirement with interest-earning Fed account
balances. A number of banks reported that they might develop new types of transaction
accounts designed to lure back customers that had shifted their deposits to money market
mutual funds.13 And a few banks reported that they would be likely to pursue funding by
pledging private securities in repurchase agreement (RP) transactions. Currently, banks
that borrow in the RP market for less than seven days using anything other than
government and agency securities must classify the liability as a demand deposit that is
subject to reserve requirements. As a result, this form of financing is not currently
attractive to banks because of the costs of holding non-interest-bearing reserves to satisfy
the associated reserve requirements.

12. Such a change is not under active consideration by the Federal Reserve.
13. Presumably banks would try and lure back household customers, as the ability to lure back business
customers would be limited without interest on demand deposits.

May 1998 Senior Financial Officer Survey

Question 11 considered how banks might respond if the Federal Reserve were to pay
interest--albeit at a below-market rate--on excess reserves. Not surprisingly, a number of
banks indicated that they might hold somewhat higher levels of excess reserves. Some
banks also indicated that they might tend to meet a larger portion of their reserve
requirement early in the maintenance period because the cost of winding up with a large
positive excess reserve position would be reduced. However, most banks expected that
receiving interest on excess reserves would not affect their maintenance period average
level of excess reserves or their pattern of excess reserve holdings over the maintenance
period.
In some countries, the payment of interest on excess reserves has been used as a device to
establish a lower bound on the interbank interest rate. The interest rate on excess reserves
acts as a lower bound because banks would not be inclined to lend reserves in the market
at a rate below what they can earn on balances held at the central bank. Not surprisingly,
most banks indicated in the survey that they would be quite reluctant to lend in the federal
funds market at a rate below that offered by the Federal Reserve on excess reserves.
However, a few banks noted that they might be willing to sell federal funds at a rate below
that offered on excess reserves if it helped them to reduce an especially large excess Fed
account balance. These institutions expressed concern that a large excess Fed account
balance might be viewed by the Federal Reserve or their own senior management as a sign
of poor account management.
Question 12 asked banks about their likely pricing strategies for demand deposits in a
world in which the Federal Reserve paid interest on Fed account balances applied against
reserve requirements and in which banks could pay interest on demand deposits. Most
banks responded that it was unlikely that they would pay a single rate on all demand
deposit accounts. Rather, they indicated it was possible or likely that they would establish
a tiered-rate schedule in which accounts with higher balances would earn higher rates of
interest. A number of banks also noted that it was likely that the highest-tier rate on
demand deposits would still be considerably below the level of market interest rates.
The pricing strategy that banks would adopt in this scenario would have important
implications for how large an increase in demand deposits might be expected. For
example, banks on the survey in aggregate reported that, over the first quarter of this year,
they swept more than $90 billion in demand deposit balances on average at the end of the
day into market instruments such as RPs, Eurodollars, and money market mutual funds. If
banks elected to pay an attractive return on high-balance demand deposits, commercial
customers might choose to unwind some of their sweep arrangements in favor of simply
holding higher demand deposit balances. The respondents expected that about 30 percent
of their commercial sweep arrangements would unwind in favor of interest-bearing

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

demand deposits.14 If so, the resulting increase in demand deposits and required reserves
would be considerable. If 30 percent of the respondent banks’swept balances were
instead held as demand deposits, the level of demand deposits at the sample banks would
rise by about $27 billion which, in turn, would imply about a $2.7 billion dollar rise in their
required reserves. Extrapolating from this figure for the respondent banks to the entire
banking system is difficult. The sample banks account for about 40 percent of all bank
assets and about 35 percent of all bank demand deposits, but they probably account for a
larger share of all commercial balances swept because the sample includes many of the
largest banks in the country. It seems reasonable to infer that the aggregate increase in
demand deposits might be as large as twice that for the sample, or roughly $60 billion.15
Another important policy issue associated with allowing banks to pay interest on demand
deposits is the extent to which banks would incur increased costs and lower profits. The
responses to question 9 suggest how banks’short-run costs might be affected.
Respondents noted that about 60 percent of their total demand deposits were held by
businesses. In addition, about 60 percent of business demand deposits were held under
compensating balance arrangements or under the terms of a commercial loan agreement.
These ratios appear roughly consistent with historical information from the Demand

14. Even with an attractive rate of interest offered on demand deposits, there may be reasons for the
continuation of commercial sweep arrangements. For example, firms might be more comfortable sweeping a
large balance into an RP rather than holding it as a demand deposit because only the first $100,000 in a
demand deposit would be insured while balances in an RP agreement would be fully collateralized. Moreover,
there are apparently important tax considerations for some firms (and banks) in booking deposits as a deposit at
the foreign office of a U.S. bank rather than as a domestic demand deposit. See, for example, the discussion in
Marcia Stigum, The Money Market, (Dow Jones-Irwin, 1990), pp. 276-278 or Banking and Finance in the
Cayman Islands, (Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 1988). On the other hand, as a result of the depositor
preference provisions of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Eurodollar deposits have a lower
priority in bankruptcy proceedings than domestic deposits, which might be a factor at the margin that would
encourage corporate customers to move overnight Eurodollar deposits back as domestic demand deposits. In
addition, banks may have some incentives to maintain commercial sweep arrangements as well. For example,
RPs and Eurodollar liabilities are not included in the assessment base for deposit insurance premiums while
demand deposit balances are. Also, sweeps into money market mutual funds effectively reduce the size of the
bank’s balance sheet and hence boost its regulatory capital ratios.
15. Of course, the ultimate increase in demand deposits in this scenario could be considerably higher. For
example, interest on demand deposits might cause businesses to shift funds out of savings accounts or money
funds and into demand deposits. In addition, if banks began to pursue overnight RP funding using private
securities as collateral as noted in question 10, aggregate demand deposits would increase. Finally, banks
might convert some of their overnight federal funds sold position to overnight demand deposits. Interbank
deposits are not included in the monetary aggregates, so this conversion would not have any effect on M1 or
M2. However, interbank transaction deposits are reservable so the conversion of overnight federal funds to
overnight demand deposits might boost aggregate required reserves to the extent that the marginal reserve
requirement for banks “lending” overnight demand deposits, and hence able to deduct such "due from" deposits
from reservable liabilities, was lower on average than the marginal reserve requirement for banks receiving
such "due to" demand deposits.

May 1998 Senior Financial Officer Survey

Deposit Ownership Survey and from the January 1988 Senior Financial Officer Survey.16
The remaining 40 percent of business demand deposits, which are not held under some
form of contractual agreement, was about evenly split among small, medium-sized, and
large businesses.
Presumably, banks would not have to pay much if any interest on the 25 percent or so of
demand deposits currently held by individuals because these individuals already have the
option of establishing interest-bearing checking accounts and have simply chosen not to do
so, perhaps because fees would make such a change unattractive. Banks might have to
pay interest on business demand deposits, but they would not incur much of an increased
cost in paying explicit interest on the reported 60 percent of business demand deposits
held under compensating balance arrangements because these balances already earn
implicit interest through earnings credits. Banks might experience some increased costs in
paying interest on the 40 percent or so of business demand deposits that are not held
under compensating balance arrangements. However, as noted above, about 70 percent of
these balances were reported to be held by small and medium-sized businesses. Such firms
probably would not hold very large demand deposit balances and hence probably would
not earn a market rate of interest on their deposits. Even current business savings account
rates, for example, tend to be well below the level of short-term market interest rates.
Presumably, banks would not pay more on a low-balance business demand deposit than
they currently offer on business savings deposits.
In summary, it seems that banks would incur a short-run increase in costs if they were
allowed to pay interest on demand deposits. The extent of this increase, however, would
probably be muted considerably by a tiered-deposit rate schedule and by the fact that a
substantial proportion of demand deposits already earn implicit interest. In the long run,
the effects of allowing banks to pay interest on demand deposits would almost certainly be
salutary by removing a significant regulatory distortion and by encouraging increased
competition and efficiency in the banking industry.

16. In the past, the Federal Reserve obtained information on the holders of demand deposits from the
Demand Deposit Ownership Survey (DDOS), but the DDOS was discontinued in 1990. Results from the
January 1988 Senior Financial Officer Survey were discussed in Patrick I. Mahoney, “The Recent Behavior of
Demand Deposits,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 74, (April 1988), 195-208.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Lagged Reserve Requirements17
(Question 13)

Recently, the Board approved a proposal to implement a system of lagged reserve
requirements effective with the maintenance period beginning July 30, 1998.18 About
three-quarters of the respondents to question 13 indicated that this plan would appreciably
reduce the overall uncertainties involved in managing their reserve position and would be
helpful in managing reserves more effectively with low required Fed account balances.
These responses are consistent with public comments received from banks on the Board’s
proposal to move to a system of lagged reserve requirements. Less than half of the banks
indicated that the reduced uncertainty with lagged reserve requirements might lead them
to hold somewhat lower excess Fed account balances on average over the maintenance
period and would also lead them to meet a larger portion of their reserve requirement
early in the maintenance period.

Lombard Credit Facility
(Question 14)

From time to time, various observers have considered whether the Federal Reserve should
restructure the discount window as a Lombard credit facility.19 The discount rate for such
a facility would be set above the expected typical level of short-term market interest rates,
and banks would be able to borrow from it with relatively few administrative constraints.
This structure would tend to place an upper bound on the federal funds rate because banks
would be unwilling to pay a higher rate on funds purchased in the market than they would
pay in borrowing from the Lombard facility.
About three-quarters of the respondents indicated that they would be quite willing to
borrow from such a facility on any day when the federal funds rate moved above the
Lombard credit rate. However, a few banks indicated that they would not be willing to
use such a facility in these circumstances. Moreover, about one-quarter of the
respondents noted that they would be concerned that borrowing from such a facility might

17. Discussion and debate over the merits of various forms of reserve requirements including lagged and
contemporaneous reserve requirements have a long history. See, for example, Joshua N. Feinman, “Reserve
Requirements: History, Current Practice, and Potential Reform,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 79, (June
1993), 569-89 or William Poole and Charles Lieberman, “Improving Monetary Control,” Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, (1972:2), pp. 293-335.
18. For more information see the notice of final rule in the Federal Register, 63 FedReg 15069 (March 30,
1998), which includes a background discussion.
19. See for example, John Wenninger, “Alternative Approaches to Discount Window Lending,” in Reduced
Reserve Requirements: Alternatives for the Conduct of Monetary Policy and Reserve Management, (Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, 1993), pp. 137-168 or Milton Friedman, “Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice,”
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 14, (February 1982), pp. 98-118.

May 1998 Senior Financial Officer Survey

be viewed negatively by the Federal Reserve. A somewhat smaller proportion indicated
concerns about perceptions by other market participants. Many respondents noted that
their willingness to use such a facility would depend, to varying degrees, on overall
financial conditions in the economy and their bank’s own financial condition.
Judging from these responses, it seems that even if the discount window were restructured
as a Lombard credit facility, there would still be some lingering reluctance to borrow from
the Federal Reserve, weakening its effectiveness in setting an upper bound on the federal
funds rate. In addition, a number of administrative and policy concerns would complicate
the actual implementation of this option. As noted previously, this option is not under
active consideration by the Federal Reserve.

Part III: Effects of Recent and Potential Changes in Payment System
Policies
Part III of the survey focused on banks’responses to certain policy and operational
changes in the payment system. Questions 15 and 16 were aimed at determining the
extent and nature of banks’participation in expanded operating hours of the Fedwire and
Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) large-dollar funds transfer systems.
Questions 17-19 were targeted at banks that participate in both systems and inquired
about the factors that influence whether banks send large-dollar payments on Fedwire or
CHIPS. Questions 20-24 asked about banks’responses to the April 1994 implementation
of the 24 basis point daylight overdraft fee (annual rate) and the fee increase to 36 basis
points in April 1995.20 The May 1996 Senior Financial Officer Survey included a question
about banks’response to the daylight overdraft fee. The 1998 survey obtained more
detailed responses on this topic and also attempted to determine banks’response to a
hypothetical further increase in the daylight overdraft fee.

Expanded Fedwire and CHIPS Operating Hours and Payment System Choice
(Questions 15-19)

On December 8, 1997, the Fedwire funds transfer system and CHIPS began operating at
12:30 a.m. ET. Formerly, the systems opened at 8:30 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. ET,
respectively.21 The Federal Reserve expected that the number of banks sending Fedwire
transfers during expanded hours initially would be limited to a small subset of Fedwire
participants that initiate the bulk of Fedwire dollar value, but that eventually more banks
20. The daylight overdraft fee is often quoted as an effective annual rate. The annual rate is converted to an
effective rate by multiplying it by the fraction of the day that Fedwire operates. The current effective rate is 27
basis points (36 x 18/24).
21. Fedwire and CHIPS closing times (6:30 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. ET, respectively) did not change.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

would elect to send transfers during early hours. The survey responses are consistent with
this expectation. Ten banks, representing about one-quarter of the survey respondents,
indicated that they are sending funds transfers during expanded Fedwire hours (question
15.1).22 Eleven other banks indicated they are considering sending transfers during
expanded hours at some future time (question 16.2). Of the survey banks that are CHIPS
participants, over one-half reported sending transfers during expanded CHIPS hours.
One of the primary determinants of the length of expanded Fedwire operating hours was
the Federal Reserve’s desire to provide sufficient overlap of Fedwire with the banking
days in European and Asian markets. As a result, the Federal Reserve expected that banks
would use expanded hours mainly to send payments related to international transactions,
for example, to settle dollar payment instructions received from international affiliates or
respondent banks. Anecdotal evidence received from a few large Fedwire users in the
weeks following the initial extension of Fedwire hours, however, indicated that a large
number of transfers sent during expanded hours were domestic commercial payments.
The survey results confirm this evidence in that the majority of banks reported that their
expanded hour Fedwire payment activity is characterized by a mix of domestic- and
international-related payments (question 15.2). The same result was reported by the
majority of CHIPS participants, although these banks reported sending a slightly greater
volume of international-related payments (question 15.3).23
Banks’use of expanded hours to conduct a variety of payment activity seems to indicate
that a longer operating day has enhanced processing efficiency for these banks. Indeed,
the banks participating in expanded Fedwire or CHIPS hours rated increased operational
efficiency as a fairly important result of longer operating hours (question 16.1). Banks
also rated enhanced opportunity for payment innovation and the possibility for earlier
settlement of the dollar leg of foreign exchange contracts as important effects of expanded
hours. These effects are consistent with the Federal Reserve’s intended public policy goals
for expanded funds transfer operating hours.24
The degree of substitutability between Fedwire and CHIPS has long been of interest to the
Federal Reserve in the context of payment system risk policy, as the Federal Reserve is
concerned about the extent to which payment system policies increase implicit Fedwire
costs and thus might prompt banks to shift large-dollar payment volume from Fedwire to
systems that do not settle payments on a real-time basis in central bank money. Survey

22. Internal Federal Reserve data indicate that about 100 Fedwire participants, representing about one
percent of all participants, send transfers during expanded Fedwire hours. Of these 100, a core group of about
40 banks send transfers during early hours each day: The remaining banks participate intermittently.
23. This result is consistent with historical payment patterns on CHIPS and Fedwire. Typically, payments
related to international transactions are proportionally more of total transfers on CHIPS than on Fedwire.
24. See 59 FedReg 8981 (February 24, 1994).

May 1998 Senior Financial Officer Survey

questions 17-19 were aimed at determining current usage of Fedwire and CHIPS by banks
that participate on both systems and factors that influence choice of system.
Banks that use Fedwire and CHIPS indicated that they send about two-thirds of their
large-dollar payment value on Fedwire compared with about one-third on CHIPS
(question 17). However, banks in the New York District reported the reverse; they
reported sending one-third of payment dollar value on Fedwire and two-thirds on CHIPS.
These percentages should be interpreted with some degree of caution because banks’
ability to send payments on CHIPS is limited by the extent that receiving banks are CHIPS
participants.
On average, respondents indicated that the most important factors in choice of system are
customer request and type of payment (for example, fed funds payments, commercial
payments, payments for international transactions) (question 18). Banks rated price and
the desire to minimize daylight overdrafts as the least important factors. This ranking
suggests that the distinguishing characteristics of Fedwire and CHIPS, such as real-time
gross settlement versus net settlement and network size, make the systems less than
perfect substitutes. Another distinguishing characteristic may be system-enforced limits on
payment activity, as over one-half of CHIPS participants reported that bilateral and net
debit limits constrain their CHIPS payment activity to some degree (question 19). By
contrast, internal Federal Reserve daylight overdraft data indicate that most large Fedwire
participants rarely reach their debit cap limits on any given day.

Response to Daylight Overdraft Charges
(Questions 20-24)

After the implementation of daylight overdraft charges in April 1994, the aggregate level
of peak and average daylight overdrafts immediately decreased by 40 percent. The most
dramatic and widely expected response to fees came from the primary dealers in
government securities that modified their financing practices. These modifications resulted
in a decrease in the level and duration of securities-related overdrafts in the Fed accounts
of the banks that provide clearance and settlement services to the primary dealers.25 The
Federal Reserve was interested in other actions that banks may have taken in response to
the fee, in particular actions that may have affected overdrafts caused by funds transfer
payments. Therefore, the May 1996 survey asked banks the extent to which they had
taken certain measures to reduce daylight overdrafts. Banks on that survey reported that
they had delayed sending funds transfers and, to a lesser extent, purchased federal funds
earlier in the day as a means of avoiding daylight overdrafts.

25. For further information, see Heidi Willman Richards, “Daylight Overdraft Fees and the Federal
Reserve’s Payment System Risk Policy,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 81 (December 1995), pp. 1065-1077.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Although the 1998 survey contained a longer list of potential actions taken by banks,
responses to the 1998 survey were similar to those in 1996. One-half of the banks stated
that daylight overdraft fees affected their account management practices (question 21) and
that the most significant actions they took in response were to modify federal funds
transactions delivery practices and to delay payments until sufficient account cover is
available (question 22). Also similar to the 1996 survey, other expected responses, such
as increased use of securities netting arrangements, increased use of term or continuing
contract federal funds and RP contracts, and shift of payment volume from Fedwire to
CHIPS, were not reported as significant actions taken in response to daylight overdraft
fees.26
The 1998 survey also asked to what extent banks had taken certain actions in response to
the 50 percent increase in the fee in April 1995. In the weeks following the fee increase,
the impact on aggregate overdrafts was unclear. Subsequent econometric analysis
indicated that while the long-run effect of the fee increase on aggregate overdrafts may
have been more significant than initially thought, the impact was not nearly as large as in
1994.27 The results from the 1998 survey appear to be consistent with that analysis: Banks
reported a slight marginal response to the fee increase in the form of payment delays,
shifting volume from Fedwire to CHIPS, increased use of term or continuing contract
federal funds and RP contracts, and charging customers for overdrafts. Not surprisingly,
banks reported that all of the potential responses to fees identified would be more likely if
the fee were increased by another 50 percent.
Various analysts have hypothesized that an intraday market for funds might develop as a
result of daylight overdraft fees, as banks might find borrowing and returning funds during
the day from private counterparties less costly than charges for Federal Reserve intraday
credit.28 To date, it does not appear that such a market is emerging. Respondents
reported that several factors currently impede an intraday funds market. Concerns about
efficiency, in terms of the ability to ensure timely intraday delivery and receipt of funds,
were rated as the most dominant factors (question 23). Transaction and interest costs
were also rated as fairly important barriers to an intraday market. Respondents indicated
that a relatively large increase in the daylight overdraft fee may lead to the development of
such a market (question 24).

26. In securities netting arrangements, such as those provided by the Government Securities Clearing
Corporation and Delta Clearing Corporation, obligations resulting from the delivery and receipt of securities
transactions among a group of participants are netted down to a single amount owed to or from each participant
in the arrangement.
27. See Diana Hancock and James A. Wilcox, “Intraday Management of Bank Reserves: The Effects of
Caps and Fees on Daylight Overdrafts,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 28(4) part 2 (November
1996), pp. 870-909.
28. See David B. Humphrey, “Payment Systems, Principles, Practice, and Improvements,” Technical Paper
Number 260 (World Bank, February 1995).

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

The Federal Reserve System

May 1998
Senior Financial Officer Survey
This report is authorized by law 12 U.S.C. 225(a), 263, 353 et seq., and 461. Your voluntary
cooperation in submitting this report is needed to make the results comprehensive, accurate, and
timely. The Federal Reserve System regards the individual bank information provided by each
respondent as confidential. If it should be determined subsequently that any information
submitted on this form must be released, respondents will be notified.

Bank Name
Name
Bank Contact

Title
Phone

Date Survey Conducted

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

I. Introduction
In 1996, the Federal Reserve conducted a Senior Financial Officer Survey (SFOS) that
explored a range of issues associated with reserve management, the decline in balances that banks
maintain at the Federal Reserve (hereafter, Fed account balances), and changes in payment system
policies. Since that time, the aggregate level of Fed account balances has dropped further still and
many institutions now have considerable experience in managing their reserve position at low
levels of Fed account balances. Indeed, a number of larger institutions now satisfy their reserve
requirements entirely with vault cash. The current SFOS follows up on the 1996 survey and asks
for updated information on some of the same questions posed in the earlier survey. In addition,
the current survey poses new questions that address recent and proposed changes in reserve
market structure and payment system policies.
Part II provides some definitions of key reserve concepts used in survey. Further
discussion of these concepts is provided in Appendix C.
Part III of the survey seeks to identify ways in which banks might have changed their
reserve management practices in recent years in response to a lower level of Fed account
balances. Questions in this section cover topics including general reserve management strategies,
operating patterns in the federal funds market during the course of a day and over the
maintenance period, and attitudes toward use of the discount window. In addition, this section
asks for certain data on banks' demand deposits in order to update our information on
compensating balance arrangements and to better judge the potential effects of proposed
legislation that would allow banks to pay explicit interest on demand deposits.
Part IV of the survey focuses on the possible effects of various potential changes in
reserve market structure. Although the questions in this section are mostly hypothetical, banks'
responses to such questions in the past have yielded valuable insights. Questions in this part of
the survey cover various scenarios, including the likely outcome if the Federal Reserve were to
pay interest on Fed account balances held to meet reserve requirements or on excess Fed account
balances, if the discount window were restructured as a Lombard credit facility, and if banks were
allowed to pay explicit interest on demand deposits.
Part V of the survey asks questions regarding the effects of changes in the operating hours
of large-value payment systems and changes in the Fedwire daylight overdraft fee on reserve and
clearing account management. The Board is seeking input on whether expanded operating hours
have increased or have the potential to increase payment system efficiency in the manner originally
intended by the Board. In addition, the Board is seeking input on whether the daylight overdraft
fee has encouraged institutions to modify payment practices or to take other steps to reduce their
use of Federal Reserve intraday credit. Responses to this survey may be used as input into future
decisions by the Board on the appropriate level of the daylight overdraft fee.
Appendix B contains a glossary of important terms used in the survey. Each glossary term
is noted in italics when first used in the survey.

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

II. Key Definitions
Parts III and IV of the survey make frequent use of the following terms:
(1) Fed account balance required to satisfy reserve requirements
(2) clearing balance requirements
(3) total required Fed account balance
(4) Fed account balance
(5) Fed account balance applied against reserve requirements
(6) Fed account balance applied against clearing balance requirements
(7) excess Fed account balances
These terms are defined precisely in the glossary and examples illustrating the concepts are
provided in Appendix C. Of course, bank reserve managers are intimately familiar with these
concepts, but we define them here and in the appendices in order to avoid any confusion over
terminology. In brief, the first three terms are measures of Fed account balances that banks are
required to maintain and the last four terms are measures of Fed account balances that banks
actually hold in order to meet their requirements or to carry as excess.
A bank’s Fed account balance required to satisfy reserve requirements (1) is simply the
level of balances it must hold in order to fully satisfy reserve requirements. It is calculated as the
difference between a bank’s total reserve requirement and the amount of vault cash the bank holds
that can be applied against its reserve requirement. A bank’s clearing balance requirement (2) is
an arrangement in which it agrees to hold a specified level of Fed account balances on average
over a maintenance period. Such balances generate earnings credits which may be applied against
Federal Reserve priced services charges. A bank’s total required Fed account balance (3) is
simply the sum of its Fed account balance required to satisfy reserve requirements (1) and its
clearing balance requirement (2).
A bank’s Fed account balance (4) is just the end-of-day balance in its Fed account. This
concept EXCLUDES currency held by banks. Fed account balances are applied first against
reserve requirements and next against clearing balance requirements. Thus, a bank’s Fed account
balance applied against reserve requirements (5) is the lesser of its Fed account balance (4) and
its Fed account balance required to satisfy reserve requirements (1). Fed account balances
exceeding a bank’s Fed account balance required to satisfy reserve requirements are classified as a
Fed account balance applied against clearing balance requirements (6)--up to a maximum of the
bank’s clearing balance requirement. Fed account balances that exceed a bank’s total required
Fed account balance (3) are classified as excess Fed account balances (7).

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

III. The Effects of Recent Changes in Bank Reserves
A. The Impact of Lower Levels of Fed Account Balances
Over the last few years, many banks have reduced their transactions deposits subject to reserve
requirements by implementing retail sweep programs. As their required reserves have fallen,
some of these banks also have sharply reduced their balances at Federal Reserve Banks. The
following questions address your bank’s experience in operating with lower levels of Fed account
balances.
(1) Over the last two years, how would you characterize reserve management at your bank?
(Check one)
Number of Banks
a

Our bank’s average level of Fed account balances has not changed much over the last
two years.

We have reduced our average level of Fed account balances. We have not experienced
any significant difficulties in reserve management as a result.

We have reduced our average level of Fed account balances.
Initially, we experienced some difficulties in managing our reserve position, but our
reserve management practices have evolved and we no longer face any significant
difficulties in reserve management.

We have reduced our average level of Fed account balances.
Initially, we experienced some difficulties in managing our reserve position and we still
find reserve management more difficult today than in the past.

(2) If you checked (b), (c) or (d) in question (1), please rate the significance of the following
actions your bank has taken to better manage its reserve position.
1 = Not Significant (or not used)
.....
5 = Very Significant
Memo:
1

Number of Banks
a

Increased the level of our clearing balance
requirement to provide adequate protection
against daylight and/or overnight overdrafts and
additional flexibility in managing our reserve
position.

Mean
11

2.53

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

Improved our automated systems to provide better
estimates of our daily funding needs.

2.73

Increased our average level of excess Fed account
balances.

1.63

(3) In the current environment of low Fed account balances, please rate the significance of the
following as factors complicating reserve management at your bank.
1 = Not Significant
.....
5 = Very Significant
Memo:
1

Number of Banks

Mean

We would not benefit by establishing a higher
clearing balance requirement because our current
Fed account balance applied against clearing
balance requirements already generates earnings
credits sufficient to cover our typical priced
service charges.

2.73

We considered increasing our clearing balance
requirement but have not done so because the
earnings credit rate on our Fed account balance
applied against clearing balance requirements is
less than the effective federal funds rate in
maintenance periods when we fully satisfy our
reserve requirement with vault cash.

2.11

Our lower total required Fed account balance has
significantly reduced the usefulness of the reserve
carryover provisions.

3.18

Our lower total required Fed account balance has
sometimes made it difficult to fully benefit from
positive as-of adjustments.

3.30

We are often able to satisfy our reserve
requirement entirely with vault cash and, as a
result, are not able to carry over deficiencies in
meeting our clearing balance requirement from
one period to the next.

2.68

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

(4) Please characterize the importance of any changes in your bank’s general strategy for
managing its reserve position across days in the maintenance period that have been associated
with a lower total required Fed account balance.
1 = Unimportant
...
5 = Very Important
Memo:
1

Number of Banks

Mean

A lower total required Fed account balance has
not caused us to change our general strategy in
managing our reserve position across days in the
maintenance period.

2.66

A lower total required Fed account balance has
caused us to want to hold most of our reserves
late in the maintenance period in order to reduce
the risk of accumulating a large cumulative
reserve position early in the period that cannot be
offset in the last days of the maintenance period.

3.34

A lower total required Fed account balance has
caused us to focus more carefully on the level of
Fed account balances we need each day to
facilitate clearing and to avoid overnight
overdrafts.

3.52

B. Daily Funding Strategies
Questions 5-7 address your daily funding strategy in the reserve market on two general
categories of days: (i) "typical" days on which payment volumes and volatility in the federal funds
rate are expected to be fairly normal; (ii) "volatile" days on which payment volumes or volatility
of the federal funds rate might be very high (e.g., maintenance period ends, quarter-ends,
settlement days for Treasury auctions, corporate tax dates, etc.).

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

(5.1) On typical and volatile days, approximately how often is your bank a net buyer or seller of
federal funds (as a percentage of days)?
Percentage
Typical Days

Volatile Days

(percentage of all
typical days)

(percentage of all
volatile days)

Mean Response

net seller of funds to larger banks and brokers

11.3

13.7

net buyer of funds from larger banks and brokers

66.6

65.4

net buyer of funds from smaller banks and respondents,
and net seller to larger banks and brokers

21.7

19.8

neither buy nor sell federal funds

1.0

100

Memo: Total

(5.2) If you buy or sell funds through a broker, approximately what percentage of your bank’s
transactions are arranged during the time periods listed below? All time of day references are
Eastern Time (E.T.).
Percentage
Typical Days
Mean Response

Volatile Days
Mean Response

2 p.m. or earlier (E.T.)

33.8

32.4

2-4:30 p.m. (E.T.)

22.4

21.4

4:30-6 p.m. (E.T.)

27.9

29.2

6-6:30 p.m. (E.T.)

16.0

17.0

Memo: Total

100

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

(5.3) If you have reduced your average level of Fed account balances during the last two years
and you buy or sell funds through a broker, please indicate generally how your actions on typical
days and volatile days have changed. (Check any that apply)
Number of
Banks
a

If your average level of Fed account balances has NOT declined much over the last two
years, check the box to the right and proceed to question 6.1. Otherwise please mark the
appropriate boxes below.

Sales of
federal funds

Purchases of
federal funds

Typical Days

Volatile Days

Number of Banks

Basically unchanged

More heavily weighted toward
early in the day.

More heavily weighted toward
later in the day.

Basically unchanged

More heavily weighted toward
early in the day.

More heavily weighted toward
later in the day.

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

(6.1) What percentage of your bank’s federal funds purchases through a broker would you
estimate is delivered to your Federal Reserve account during the time periods listed below on
both typical and volatile days? All time of day references are Eastern Time (E.T.).
Percentage
Typical Day

Volatile Day

Mean Response

2 p.m. or earlier (E.T.)

13.0

11.1

2-4 p.m. (E.T.)

23.0

21.8

4-6 p.m. (E.T.)

45.7

46.5

6-6:30 p.m. (E.T.)

18.3

20.6

Memo: Total

100

(6.2) Please indicate generally how these patterns of federal funds deliveries may have changed
over the last two years. (Check appropriate boxes in columns 1 and 2).
Typical Days

Volatile Days

Number of Banks

Basically
unchanged

More heavily
weighted toward
early in the day.

More heavily
weighted toward
later in the day.

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

(7.1) How would you characterize your bank’s ability to arrange for an expedited delivery of
federal funds purchased if the funds are needed early in the day? (Choose one)
Number of Banks
a

We almost never have a need for an early delivery of federal funds.

We almost never are able to arrange for an expedited delivery of federal funds purchased
through a broker.

We sometimes are able to arrange for an expedited delivery of federal funds purchased
through a broker.

We frequently are able to arrange for an expedited delivery of federal funds purchased
through a broker.

(7.2) If you answered (c) or (d) in question (7.1), how large a premium (in basis points) must you
typically pay in order to induce federal funds sellers to make an early delivery?
(Choose one)
Number
of Banks
a

0 to 2

2 to 5

5 to 10

10 to 15

15 or more

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

C. Attitudes Toward the Discount Window
(8.1) Please indicate how your bank’s willingness to borrow at the discount window has changed
in the last two years. If you answer “Unchanged,” skip to question (9.1).
1 = Considerably MORE Willing
2 = Somewhat MORE Willing
3 = Unchanged
4 = Somewhat LESS Willing
5 = Considerably LESS Willing
1

Memo:
5

Number of Banks
3

Mean

2.55

(8.2) If you indicated in (8.1) that your bank has become either somewhat or considerably MORE
willing to borrow at the discount window in the last two years, please rate the importance of the
following factors in producing this changed view. Otherwise, skip to (8.3).
1 = Unimportant
.....
5 = Very Important
1

Memo:
5

Number of Banks

Mean

We have become less concerned that
occasional borrowing at the discount
window might be viewed negatively by
federal regulators.

4.18

We have become less concerned that
occasional borrowing at the discount
window might be viewed negatively by
Reserve Bank discount officers.

4.12

We have become less concerned that
occasional borrowing at the discount
window might be viewed negatively if
discovered by private analysts and other
market participants.

3.06

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

(8.3) If you indicated in (8.1) that your bank has become either somewhat or considerably LESS
willing to borrow at the discount window in the last two years, please rate the importance of the
following factors in producing this changed view. (Otherwise, skip to the next question)
1 = Unimportant
.....
5 = Very Important
1

Number of Banks

Memo:
Mean

We have become more concerned that
occasional borrowing at the discount
window might be viewed negatively by
federal regulators.

0.00

We have become more concerned that
occasional borrowing at the discount
window might be viewed negatively by
Reserve Bank discount officers.

0.00

We have become more concerned that
occasional borrowing at the discount
window might be viewed negatively if
discovered by private analysts and other
market participants.

0.00

We want to be conservative now in our use
of the discount window so that we can turn
to the window more readily during any
future periods of funding difficulties.

0.00

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

D. Demand Deposits and Compensating Balance Arrangements
(9.1) What percentage of your bank’s total demand deposits would you estimate is held by the
following categories of owners?
Percentage of Total Demand Deposits Held By:
Mean
Response

Memo:
Number of
Banks
Responding

Individuals

26.7

Businesses
(Excluding Banks and Other Depositories)

59.1

Other
(Includes Banks and Other Depositories, Government, and Non-Profit
Organizations)

14.2

(9.2) What percentage of your bank’s business demand deposits that you reported in 9.1(b)
above would you estimate is in the following form?
Percentage of Non-Depository Business Demand Deposits Held As:
Mean
Response

Memo:
Number of
Banks
Responding

A contractual compensating balance arrangement in which your bank pays
implicit interest in the form of earnings credits that can be applied against
charges the customer incurs for various bank services.

58.2

A contractual balance specified under the terms of a commercial loan
agreement or any other agreement other than a compensating balance
arrangement.

3.7

Balances NOT held under any contractual obligation

38.1

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

(9.3) What percentage of your bank’s business demand deposits that ARE NOT held under a
contractual arrangement (your answer to question 9.2(c) above) would you estimate is held by
businesses in the following size categories in terms of annual sales? (Note: Please provide your
best judgement below if the data necessary to answer this question precisely are not readily
available.)
Percentage of Non-Depository, Non-Contractual
Business Demand Deposits Held By:
Mean
Response

Memo:
Number of
Banks
Responding

Small Businesses
(total annual sales < $1 million)

40.8

Medium-Sized Businesses
(total annual sales between $1 million and $50 million)

29.1

Large Businesses
(total annual sales exceeding $50 million)

30.1

IV. Effects of Possible Changes in Reserve Market Structure
A. Payment of Interest on Fed Account Balances
Congress is currently considering proposals that would allow the Federal Reserve to pay
interest on Fed account balances. For example, under some proposals, the Federal Reserve would
be allowed to pay interest on Fed account balances applied against reserve requirements (interest
would not be paid on vault cash used to meet reserve requirements). Under other proposals, the
Federal Reserve would also be allowed to pay interest on excess Fed account balances. Many of
these proposals have been coupled with plans that would allow depository institutions to pay
explicit interest on demand deposits. The following three questions ask about your bank’s likely
responses to such proposed changes in market structure.

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

(10) If the Federal Reserve remunerated Fed account balances applied against reserve
requirements at a rate set close (say 20 basis points below) the Federal Open Market
Committee’s intended federal funds rate, please indicate how likely your bank would be to take
any of the following actions.
1 = Not Likely
.....
5 = Very Likely
Memo:
1

Number of Banks

Mean

Dismantle our retail sweep program
immediately.

1.52

Dismantle our retail sweep program over
time.

2.26

Continue to seek ways to minimize our
required reserves because the returns on
alternative investments we could make
would exceed that paid by the Federal
Reserve on Fed account balances.

3.93

Attempt to satisfy a larger portion of our
reserve requirement with Fed account
balances by economizing on vault cash.

3.60

Increase the earnings credit rate we pay
on demand deposits held in a
compensating balance arrangement.

2.14

Increase our offering rates on existing
transaction accounts.

2.28

Offer new transaction accounts designed
to attract customers that have shifted
their transaction balances to money
market mutual funds.

2.62

Target a somewhat higher level of
excess Fed account balances because the
incentives to run short on Fed account
balances in order to book alternative
interest-earning assets would be
reduced.

1.88

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses
i

Pursue new funding opportunities by
pledging private securities in RP
transactions because the reserve
requirement cost of such transactions
would be much reduced.

16
3

2.12

(Currently banks that borrow in the RP
market on anything other than
government and agency securities must
classify the liability as a demand deposit
that is subject to reserve requirements).

(11) If the Federal Reserve paid interest on excess Fed account balances at an administered rate
set somewhat below (say 100 basis points) the FOMC’s intended federal funds rate, please
indicate the likelihood that your bank would act in any of the ways listed below.
1 = Not Likely
.....
5 = Very Likely
1

Memo:
4

Number of Banks

Mean

Target a somewhat higher level of
excess Fed account balances on average
over the maintenance period because the
opportunity cost of holding excess Fed
account balances would be reduced.

1.64

Target a much higher level of excess Fed
account balances on average over the
maintenance period because the
opportunity cost of holding excess Fed
account balances would be reduced.

1.34

Meet a larger portion of our desired
maintenance period average reserve
position earlier in the maintenance
period than we do currently because the
possibility of winding up with a large
positive cumulative excess position late
in the period that could not be run off
would be less costly.

2.23

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

Offer more attractive account
arrangements for small banks that make
payments and other transactions through
an account with our bank in order to
deter them from conducting their
business directly through an interestearning account at the Federal Reserve.

2.09

Sell federal funds at a rate below that
paid by the Federal Reserve on excess
Fed account balances if it would reduce
a large positive Fed account balance.
Even with interest paid on excess Fed
account balances, our bank’s senior
management might regard a large
positive Fed account balance as a sign of
poor account management practices.

1.55

Sell federal funds at a rate below that
paid by the Federal Reserve on excess
Fed account balances if it would reduce
a large positive Fed account balance.
Even with interest paid on excess Fed
account balances, our bank’s senior
management might be concerned that
Federal Reserve officials or bank
examiners would regard a large positive
Fed account balance as a sign of poor
account management practices.

1.70

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

(12.1) If Fed account balances applied against reserve requirements were remunerated at close to
a market rate (again, say 20 basis points below the FOMC’s intended federal funds rate) AND
you were allowed to pay explicit interest on demand deposits, please rate the likelihood that your
bank would adopt one of the pricing strategies for demand deposits described below.
Unlikely

Possible

Likely

Number of Banks
a

We would establish a tiered-rate schedule in which demand deposit
accounts with low balances would earn low interest rates while
accounts with high balances would earn somewhat higher rates
(perhaps comparable with our rates on business savings deposits but
considerably below the level of short-term market interest rates).

We would establish a tiered-rate schedule in which demand deposit
accounts with high balances would earn rates close to a short-term
market rate.

We would pay a single rate on all demand deposits that would be
considerably below the level of short-term market interest rates.

We would pay a single rate on all demand deposits close to the level of
short-term market interest rates.

(12.2) On average over the first quarter of this year, approximately what dollar volume of endof-day demand deposit balances held by commercial customers did you sweep into overnight
market instruments such as RPs, Eurodollars, and money market mutual funds?
Approximate Average Dollar Amount of Balances Swept into Overnight Instruments
(RPs, Eurodollars, and money market mutual funds) For Commercial Customers
($ Millions)
Mean

Total

Memo:
Number of Banks
Responding

$2,298

$91,909

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

(12.3) Of the total dollar amount you reported in (12.2), what percentage would you expect
these customers to want to hold instead in the form of interest-earning demand deposits?
Percent of Currently Swept Balances for Commercial Customers That Might
Be Held As Interest-Earning Demand Deposits
Percentage
Unweighted
Mean Response

Mean Response Weighted
by “Swept Balances”
Reported in Question
12.2

Memo:
Number of Banks Responding

36.6

31.3

B. Lagged Reserve Requirements
The Board recently approved a proposal to implement a system of lagged reserve
requirements effective with the reserve maintenance period beginning July 30, 1998. Under this
system, banks will know precisely what their reserve requirement is for any given maintenance
period before the period begins.
(13) Please indicate the extent to which the move to lagged reserve requirements will:
1= Not at all
....
5 = To a large extent
1

Memo:
5

Number of Banks

Mean

Reduce the overall uncertainties
involved in managing your bank’s
reserve position.

3.55

Allow your bank to manage its
reserve position more effectively with
a low total required Fed account
balance.

3.40

Encourage your bank to hold
somewhat lower excess Fed account
balances.

2.21

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses
d

Encourage your bank to run a
somewhat higher cumulative average
reserve position early in the
maintenance period because you no
longer need to worry about an
unexpected drop in reserve
requirements that might leave you
with a large positive excess position.

2.40

C. Lombard Credit Facility
From time to time, various observers have suggested that the Federal Reserve should
restructure its discount window as a Lombard credit facility analogous to the central bank
lending facilities employed in many European countries. In this facility, the Federal Reserve
would stand ready to extend short-term, collateralized loans to banks at a rate that exceeds the
Federal Open Market Committee’s intended federal funds rate by some pre-established margin.
For example, the Lombard credit rate might be set at say 200 basis points above the FOMC’s
intended federal funds rate. Banks could arrange a Lombard credit loan at any point during the
day, but the loan proceeds generally would posted to the institution’s Fed account at the close of
business. Apart from requiring adequate collateral, borrowing from this facility would entail few,
if any, of the conditions that are currently employed by Reserve Banks in administering the
discount window (e.g., expecting banks to first pursue market funding sources before turning to
the discount window, asking banks to explain their reasons for borrowing, and requiring that
banks submit balance sheet data ex-post covering the period of borrowing).

(14) Please indicate how likely your bank would be to respond in any of the ways listed below if
the Federal Reserve were to restructure the discount window as a Lombard credit facility.
1 = Unlikely
.....
5 = Very Likely
1

Memo:
4

Number of Banks
a

Our bank would be quite willing to
make use of such a facility on any
day when the federal funds rate
moved above the Lombard credit
rate.

Mean
10

3.95

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

Our bank’s senior management
would probably need some time
before becoming comfortable with
using such a facility, even on days
when the federal funds rate moved
above the Lombard credit rate.

2.25

Our bank might still be concerned
that borrowing from such a facility
would be viewed negatively by the
Federal Reserve.

2.59

Our bank would probably be
willing to pay a rate above the
Lombard credit rate for federal
funds in the market in order to
avoid any potential for an adverse
market reaction if it became known
that we had borrowed at the
Lombard credit facility.

2.20

Our bank’s willingness to use such
a facility might depend upon the
overall financial conditions
prevailing in the U.S. economy.
For example, we might be less
willing to borrow from such a
facility during periods such as the
early 1990s when markets are
especially focused on the financial
condition of banks and other firms.

2.65

Our bank’s willingness to use such
a facility might depend on our
bank’s own financial condition.
For example, we might be less
willing to borrow at such a facility
during periods when our capital
ratios and other financial ratios had
deteriorated.

2.74

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

V. Effects of Recent and Potential Changes in Payment System Policies
A. Expanded Hours for Fedwire and CHIPS
(15.1) Recently, the opening times for the Fedwire funds transfer system and the Clearing House
Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) were changed from 8:30 a.m. and 7:30 a.m. E.T.,
respectively, to 12:30 a.m. E.T. Is your bank originating payments at any time during these earlier
hours?
Yes

NA - Not a participant

Number of Banks
a

Fedwire

CHIPS

(15.2) If you answered “Yes” for Fedwire in question (15.1), approximately what percentage of
the dollar value of your bank’s payment activity during earlier hours is associated with:
Fedwire payments

Percentage
0 to 25

25 to 50

50 to 75

75 to 100

Number of Banks
a

Payments generated by internal
departments.

Domestic third-party payments.

International payments related to the
settlement of foreign exchange
contracts.

International payments related to
transactions other than the settlement
of foreign exchange contracts.

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

(15.3) If you answered “Yes” for CHIPS in question (15.1), approximately what percentage of
the dollar value of your bank’s payment activity during earlier hours is associated with:

Percentage
CHIPS payments
0 to 25

25 to 50

50 to 75

75 to 100

Number of Banks
a

Payments generated by internal
departments.

Domestic third-party payments.

International payments related to the
settlement of foreign exchange
contracts.

International payments related to
transactions other than the settlement
of foreign exchange contracts.

(16.1) If you answered “Yes” for either Fedwire or CHIPS in question (15.1), how important are
the following effects for your bank of expanded transfer hours?
1=Unimportant
.....
5=Very Important
1

Memo:

Number of Banks

Mean

Increased operational efficiency.

3.11

Enhanced ability to manage Fed account
overdrafts.

1.78

Enhanced ability to accommodate
customer requests and/or design new
payment products.

3.60

Earlier settlement of the dollar leg of
foreign exchange contracts reduces
settlement risk.

3.13

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

(16.2) Regardless of your answer to question (15.1), please indicate whether your bank has taken
any of the following steps in light of expanded Fedwire and CHIPS operating hours:
Yes

Number of Banks
a

Increased our closing reserve or clearing account balance to ensure
sufficient liquidity for early morning payments.

Increased staff for early-hours account management.

Although not currently a participant, our bank is considering sending
transfers during expanded hours at some future time.

If your bank is a participant in both Fedwire and CHIPS, please answer questions (17) and
(18).
(17) Approximately what percentage of the dollar value of your bank’s large-dollar payment
activity that is not conducted by book transfer is conducted on Fedwire and CHIPS? (Total
responses should add to 100 percent)
Percentage
Mean
Response
a

Fedwire

70.8

CHIPS

29.2

Total

100

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

(18) For payments that your bank sends to banks that are also both Fedwire and CHIPS
participants, how important are the following factors in your decision to send the payment on
CHIPS versus Fedwire?
1 = Unimportant
.....
5 = Very important
1

Memo:
5

Number of Banks

Mean

Explicit cost per transfer on CHIPS versus Fedwire

3.00

The desire to minimize daylight overdrafts in our Federal
Reserve account.

3.00

Type of payment, e.g., international payments versus fed funds
deliveries.

3.71

Customer request.

4.44

Payment finality.

3.18

(19) How frequently do CHIPS bilateral and net debit limits constrain the amount of payments
that your institution is able to send on CHIPS on a given day?
1 =Seldom
2 = Occasionally
3=Often
1

Number of Banks
6

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

B. Daylight Overdraft Experience and Fees
(20.1) Does your bank routinely incur daylight overdrafts in its Federal Reserve account?
Yes
(1)

No
(2)
Number of Banks

(20.2) Approximately what percentage of your bank’s daylight overdrafts is associated with
settlement of the following types of payments?
Percentage
Mean
Response
a

Fedwire funds transfers.

59.3

Fedwire securities transfers.

18.3

Settlement of ACH transactions.

9.9

Settlement of check debits.

10.9

Total

100

(21) Have daylight overdraft fees significantly affected your bank’s Federal Reserve account
management practices?
Yes
(1)

No
(2)
Number of Banks

If no, please skip to question 23.

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

(22) If you answered “Yes” in question (21), to what extent has your bank taken any of the
actions indicated below when daylight overdraft fees were first imposed in April 1994 and when
they were increased in April 1995? Similarly, please rate the extent you think your bank might
take such actions in response to a hypothetical fifty percent increase in fees.

1 = Not at All
...
5 = To a Large Extent
Response to
Initial
Imposition of 24
basis point
DLOD Fee in
1994

Response to
Increase in
DLOD Fees in
April 1995 to
36 basis points

Response to
Hypothetical
Fifty Percent
Increase in
DLOD Fee

Rank 1-5

Mean Response

Delay non time-critical payments until sufficient
account cover is available.

3.11

3.21

4.15

Identify payment activity causing the majority of
account overdrafts and modify settlement practices
accordingly.

2.79

2.68

3.65

Arrange payment netting relationships with principal
counterparty banks.

1.44

1.39

2.61

Shift certain payments from Fedwire to CHIPS.

1.82

2.00

2.12

Charge customers whose payment activity causes
Federal Reserve account overdrafts.

1.42

1.47

2.35

Increase the use of securities netting arrangements,
e.g., Government Securities Clearing Corporation.

1.53

1.41

1.94

Modify federal funds transactions delivery practices.

3.47

3.16

3.60

Extend the length of federal funds and RP contracts
from overnight to term or continuing contract.

1.58

1.63

2.40

Impose limitations on draw-down requests by
respondent banks.

1.53

1.35

1.83

Arrange funding from correspondents to cover timespecific settlement obligations (e.g., ACH settlement,
settlement of net positions in clearinghouse
arrangements)

1.18

1.50

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

Modify or enhance internal account balance
monitoring system in order to manage better Federal
Reserve account intraday balance.

2.67

2.44

2.74

Provide an intraday balance monitoring system for
customers in order to assist them in managing better
their intraday account position.

2.47

2.11

2.60

Re-evaluate intraday credit policies for corporate
customers.

2.42

2.37

3.05

Increase capital so as to increase the amount of free
daylight credit available on a given day.

1.53

1.60

(23) Many observers had expected that an intraday federal funds market might develop as a
consequence of the Federal Reserve’s initiatives to charge depositories for daylight overdrafts
incurred in their Federal Reserve account. To date, there appear to be few signs that a true
intraday federal funds market has developed. How would you characterize the importance of the
following factors in explaining the lack of a well-developed intraday federal funds market?
1 = Unimportant
...
5 = Very Important
1

Memo:
5

Number of Banks

Mean

Transaction costs, in terms of either
Fedwire transfer fees or brokers fees, make
it too costly to arrange for intraday federal
funds contracts.

3.07

The explicit interest our bank would have
to pay in order to purchase federal funds
intraday exceeds the Federal Reserve's
current charge for daylight overdraft credit.

3.05

Concerns that any intraday federal funds
purchased might not be delivered at the
agreed upon time.

3.42

Concerns that any intraday federal funds
sold might not be returned at the agreed
upon time.

3.26

Appendix A: Survey Questions and Responses

(24) In light of your answers in question (23), how would you rate the importance of the
following factors as developments that might lead to an active intraday federal funds market?
1 = Unimportant
...
5 = Very Important
1

Memo
5

Number of Banks

Mean

Reductions in transaction costs, e.g., Fedwire
transfer fees or brokers fees.

2.53

Relatively small increases in the daylight
overdraft fee, e.g., 10 to 20 basis points.

2.47

Relatively large increases in the daylight overdraft
fee, e.g., more than 20 basis points.

3.88

Appendix B: Glossary
(1) As-Of Adjustment: Administrative adjustments to an institution’s Fed account position in order to
correct the impact of errors or to recover float.
(2) Bilateral and Net Debit Limits: On the CHIPS system, a bilateral limit is the maximum net amount that
one participant is willing to receive from another participant; a net debit limit is the maximum negative
position that a participant may incur.
(3) Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS): The funds transfers system operated by the
New York Clearing House Association.
(4) Clearing Balance Requirement: A contractual arrangement in which a depository institution agrees to
maintain a specified level of Fed account balances on average over a maintenance period. Such balances
generate earnings credits based upon the effective federal funds rate over the maintenance period and these
credits may be applied against the institution’s charges for various Federal Reserve priced services.
(5) Compensating Balance Arrangement: An arrangement in which demand deposits held by a bank’s
business customers receive implicit interest in the form of earnings credits that can be applied against charges
that the customer incurs in using various bank services. Often the rate at which earnings credit accrue--the
earnings credit rate--is based on the level of a short-term market interest rate such as the three-month
Treasury bill rate with adjustments to reflect the bank’s reserve requirement ratio and deposit insurance
premium rate.
(6) Cumulative Average Reserve Position: On any given day in the maintenance period, the average of
reserve balances held on the current and all previous days in the maintenance period.
(7) Daylight Overdraft: A negative position in a bank’s Federal Reserve account at any time during the
business day.
(8) Daylight Overdraft Fee: Fee charged by the Federal Reserve on all daylight overdrafts incurred in a
bank’s Federal Reserve account, subject to a deductible amount.
(9) Excess Fed Account Balance: Balances held on average over a two-week maintenance period that
exceed the balances a bank must maintain in order to fully satisfy its reserve requirement and clearing
balance requirement. See examples in Appendix C.
(10) Fed Account Balance: Balances maintained in a depository institution’s account at their Federal
Reserve Bank (excludes currency held by depositories). See examples in Appendix C.
(11) Fed Account Balance Required to Satisfy Reserve Requirements: The level of balances that a bank
must maintain on average over the maintenance period in order to fully satisfy reserve requirements. It is
computed as an institution’s reserve requirement less its vault cash eligible to apply against reserve
requirements. (See examples in Appendix C.)

Appendix B: Glossary

(12) Fed Account Balance Applied Against Reserve Requirements: The actual level of balances that a
depository maintains in its Fed account over a maintenance period that is applied against reserve
requirements. (See examples in Appendix C.)
(13) Fed Account Balance Applied Against Clearing Balance Requirements: The actual level of
balances a depository maintains in its Fed account over a maintenance period that is applied against its
clearing balance requirement. (See examples in Appendix C.)
(14) Federal Open Market Committee’s Intended Federal Funds Rate: A level of the federal funds rate
that is announced by the FOMC as consistent with its short-term policy objectives. The Open Market Desk
seeks to promote conditions in the reserve market so that federal funds generally trade in a narrow range
around the FOMC’s intended rate.
(15) Fedwire: The Federal Reserve’s funds and book-entry government securities transfer system.
(16) Overnight Overdraft: A negative end-of-day balance (overdraft) in an institution’s Fed account.
Overdrafts are currently penalized at rate set four percentage points above the effective federal funds rate on
the day of the overdraft.
(17) Payment Netting: An arrangement whereby the value of individual payments destined to or received
from a certain counterparty is netted down to a single amount, which is then paid to or received from the
counterparty.
(18) Reserve Carryover Provision: A provision of the rules governing maintenance of reserves that allows
banks to meet a portion of their current period reserve requirement in the subsequent maintenance period or
to apply a portion of their excess reserves held in the current maintenance period against their reserve
requirement in the subsequent period. Banks that satisfy all of their reserve requirement with vault cash are
not eligible for carryover.
(19) Respondent Bank: A bank that clears some or all of its transactions on the books of another bank (the
correspondent).
(20) Retail Sweep Program: Programs implemented by many commercial banks in recent years that sweep
balances from checking accounts into money market deposit accounts. Such programs have allowed many
banks to significantly reduce their reserve requirements.
(21) Third-Party Payments: Payments made by a bank on behalf of commercial customers.
(22) Tiered-Rate Schedule: A common pricing strategy for retail deposits in which banks offer higher rates
on accounts with larger balances.
(23) Total Required Fed Account Balance: The level of balances that a bank must maintain on average
over a maintenance period in order to fully satisfy its reserve requirement and clearing balance requirement.
(See examples in Appendix C.)

Appendix C: Examples of Key Reserve Concepts
Reserve Concept

Bank A

Bank B

Bank C

(1)

Reserve Requirement

110

(2)

Vault Cash Eligible To Apply Against Reserve
Requirements

Fed Account Balance Required to Satisfy Reserve
Requirement

100

(3) = (1) - (2)
(4)

Clearing Balance Requirement

(5) = (3) + (4)

Total Required Fed Account Balance

150

(6)

Fed Account Balance

125

175

(7)

Fed Account Balance Applied Against Reserve
Requirement

100

(8)

Fed Account Balance Applied Against Clearing
Balance Requirement

(9)

Excess Fed Account Balance

NOTE: For the purposes of this survey, we abstract from complications arising from reserve carryover provisions and from the socalled “penalty free band” associated with clearing balance requirements.

Discussion: All three banks have the same structure of required Fed account balances. Each institution has
a total reserve requirement of 110 and vault cash of 10 available to apply against reserve requirements.
Thus, each institution has a Fed account balance required to satisfy reserve requirements (row 3) of 100. In
addition, each institution has a clearing balance requirement of 50. As a result, each institution as a total
required Fed account balance of 150.
The bottom four rows show the difference between the three banks in the concepts of maintained
balances, rows 6-9. Each bank’s maintained Fed account balance is shown in row 6. Maintained Fed
account balances are first applied against reserve requirements and then against clearing balance
requirements. Thus, Bank A has only 75 in balances applied against reserve requirements (row 7) and has no
balances available to be applied against its clearing balance requirement (row 8) or that would be classified
as excess Fed account balances (row 9). Bank B maintains a balance of 125 and so records the maximum of
100 as balances applied against its reserve requirement. The remaining 25 in maintained Fed account
balances are then applied against the bank’s clearing balance requirement. This bank has no balances that
would be classified as excess Fed account balances. Finally, bank C maintains 175 in Fed account balances
and so records the maximum of 100 in Fed account balances applied against reserve requirements and 50 in
Fed account balances applied against its clearing balance requirement. The remaining 25 in maintained
balances would be classified as excess Fed account balances.

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