FRA Safety Advisory 2015-01

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only one method. The Commission will
post all comments on the Commission’s
Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the
submission, all subsequent
amendments, all written statements
with respect to the proposed rule
change that are filed with the
Commission, and all written
communications relating to the
proposed rule change between the
Commission and any person, other than
those that may be withheld from the
public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be
available for Web site viewing and
printing in the Commission’s Public
Reference Room, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549 on official
business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of such
filing also will be available for
inspection and copying at the principal
offices of the Exchange. All comments
received will be posted without change;
the Commission does not edit personal
identifying information from
submissions. You should submit only
information that you wish to make
available publicly. All submissions
should refer to File Number SR–BX–
2015–022, and should be submitted on
or before May 18, 2015.

Federal Aviation Administration
Notice of Intent To Rule on Request To
Release Airport Property at the St.
George Airport, St. George, Utah
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of request to release
airport property.
AGENCY:

For the Commission, by the Division of
Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated
authority.19
Jill M. Peterson,
Assistant Secretary.

The FAA proposes to rule and
invite public comment on the release of
land at St. George Airport under the
provisions of Section 125 of the
Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment
Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR
21), now 49 U.S.C. 47107(h)(2).
DATES: Comments must be received on
or before May 27, 2015.
ADDRESSES: Comments on this
application may be mailed or delivered
to the FAA at the following address: Mr.
John P. Bauer, Manager, Federal
Aviation Administration, Northwest
Mountain Region, Airports Division,
Denver Airports District Office, 26805 E.
68th Avenue, Suite 224, Denver,
Colorado 80249–6361.
In addition, one copy of any
comments submitted to the FAA must
be mailed or delivered to Mr. Gary
Esplin, City Manager, City of St. George,
Utah, at the following address: Mr. Gary
Esplin, City Manager, City of St. George,
175 East 200 North, St. George, Utah
84770.

[FR Doc. 2015–09628 Filed 4–24–15; 8:45 am]

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

BILLING CODE 8011–01–P

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
Military Reservist Economic Injury
Disaster Loans; Interest Rate for Third
Quarter FY 2015
In accordance with the Code of
Federal Regulations 13—Business Credit
and Assistance § 123.512, the following
interest rate is effective for Military
Reservist Economic Injury Disaster
Loans approved on or after April 20,
2015.
Military Reservist Loan Program—
4.000%
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Dated: April 16, 2015.
Joseph P. Loddo,
Acting Associate Administrator for Disaster
Assistance.
[FR Doc. 2015–09637 Filed 4–24–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
19 17

CFR 200.30–3(a)(12).

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SUMMARY:

Mr.
Marc Miller, Colorado Engineer/
Compliance Specialist, Federal Aviation
Administration, Northwest Mountain
Region, Denver Airports District Office,
26805 E. 68th Avenue, Suite 224,
Denver, Colorado 80249–6361.
The request to release property may
be reviewed, by appointment, in person
at this same location.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA
invites public comment on the request
to release property at the St. George
Airport under the provisions of the AIR
21 (49 U.S.C. 47107(h)(2)).
On April 20, 2015, the FAA
determined that the request to release
property at the St. George Airport
submitted by the City of St. George
meets the procedural requirements of
the Federal Aviation Administration.
The following is a brief overview of
the request:
The City of St. George is proposing
the release from the terms, conditions,
reservations, and restrictions on the
remaining approximate 223 acres of the
former airport. A 40 acre parcel of
airport property had previously been

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released by an instrument of release
dated June 11, 2013. Physical
constraints of the airport site required
the construction and opening of the
Replacement Airport in 2011,
approximately 15 miles to the east. The
former St. George Airport was
decommissioned on January 15, 2011.
The former airport is no longer needed
for aviation purposes and the release is
to allow for the sale of the property so
the proceeds from the sale can be used
towards payment of the City’s share of
the costs associated with the
Replacement Airport. The property will
be sold as the market improves, at fair
market value. Any person may inspect,
by appointment, the request in person at
the FAA office listed above under FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.
In addition, any person may, upon
appointment and request, inspect the
application, notice and other documents
germane to the application in person at
the St George Airport.
Issued in Denver, Colorado on April 20,
2015.
John P. Bauer,
Manager, Denver Airports District Office .
[FR Doc. 2015–09759 Filed 4–24–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
[Safety Advisory 2015–01]

Mechanical Inspections and Wheel
Impact Load Detector Standards for
Trains Transporting Large Amounts of
Class 3 Flammable Liquids
Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.
AGENCY:

Recent derailments have
occurred involving trains transporting
large quantities of petroleum crude oil
and ethanol. Preliminary investigation
of one of these recent derailments
involving a crude oil train indicates that
a mechanical defect involving a broken
tank car wheel may have caused or
contributed to the incident. FRA is
issuing this Safety Advisory to make
recommendations to enhance the
mechanical safety of the cars in trains
transporting large quantities of
flammable liquids. This Safety Advisory
recommends that railroads use highly
qualified individuals to conduct the
brake and mechanical inspections and
recommends a reduction to the impact
threshold levels the industry currently
uses for wayside detectors that measure

SUMMARY:

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wheel impacts to ensure the wheel
integrity of tank cars in those trains.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ron
Hynes, Director, Office of Safety
Assurance and Compliance, Office of
Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590,
telephone (202) 493–6404; or, Thomas
Herrmann, Assistant Chief Counsel for
Safety, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202)
493–6036.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

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Background
The overall safety of railroad
operations, including shipments of
hazardous materials, has improved in
recent years. However, the July 2013
derailment in Lac-Me´gantic, Quebec,
Canada, demonstrates the potentially
catastrophic consequences of a railroad
accident resulting in the sudden release
of large quantities of Class 3 flammable
liquids. Since that accident, there have
been a number of derailments with
subsequent fires and evacuations in the
United States involving trains
transporting large quantities of Class 3
flammable liquids (specifically, crude
oil and ethanol). Although none of the
recent derailments in this country have
resulted in the tragic loss of life that
occurred as a result of the Lac-Me´gantic
derailment, recent events have led DOT
and FRA to thoroughly evaluate and
address the unique risks associated with
the growing reliance on trains to
transport large quantities of Class 3
flammable liquids.
For example, in the last two years,
DOT (including FRA and the Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA)) has taken
numerous actions to address the safe
transportation by rail of Class 3
flammable liquids. Among other
actions, DOT has issued three
emergency orders 1 and several safety
advisories, reached voluntary
agreements with the railroad industry,2
and undertaken several separate
rulemaking proceedings to address the
transportation and handling of trains
transporting large quantities of Class 3
flammable liquids. Notably, PHMSA, in
cooperation with FRA, is nearing
completion of a comprehensive final
rule that will enhance the safe
1 DOT Emergency Restriction/Prohibition Order,
Docket No. DOT–OST–2014–0067 (May 7, 2014);
DOT Amended and Restated Emergency
Restriction/Prohibition Order, Docket No. DOT–
OST–2014–0025 (March 6, 2014); and, FRA
Emergency Order No. 28, 78 FR 48218, Aug. 2,
2013.
2 http://www.dot.gov/briefing-room/letterassociation-american-railroads.

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transportation of large quantities of
Class 3 flammable liquids by rail. The
final rule will build on proposals
contained in the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) in the HM–251
rulemaking proceeding (79 FR 45016,
Aug. 1, 2014).3 The final rule was
submitted to the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) for review pursuant
to Executive Order 12866 on February 5,
2015 (http://www.reginfo.gov/public). A
chronology of various DOT actions to
address safe transportation of flammable
liquids is listed on PHMSA’s Internet
Web site.4
Despite ongoing efforts by DOT, the
railroad industry, tank car
manufacturers, and other interested
parties, the United States has
experienced the derailment of several
trains transporting large quantities of
Class 3 flammable liquids (i.e., ‘‘highhazard flammable trains’’ or HHFTs)
over just the past three months. (For
purposes of this Safety Advisory a
HHFT is a train comprised of 20 or more
loaded tank cars of a Class 3 flammable
liquid in a continuous block or 35 or
more loaded tank cars of a Class 3
flammable liquid across the entire
train.) These incidents occurred in Iowa,
West Virginia, and Illinois. FRA’s
preliminary investigation indicates that
the recent derailment in Illinois may
have occurred as a result of a wheel
break occurring on a railroad tank car
loaded with petroleum crude oil.

outlet valves, and two cars released
product from their top fittings. The
derailment occurred in a rural area only
a few hundred feet from the Mississippi
River. FRA’s preliminary investigation
indicates that a broken wheel on one of
the loaded tank cars in the train may
have caused the derailment.
In addition to the above-described
incident, previous publicized
derailments resulting in releases of
crude oil or ethanol and/or resulting
fires have occurred with increasing
frequency (e.g., Dubuque, Iowa; Mt.
Carbon, West Virginia; Casselton, North
Dakota; Aliceville, Alabama; Lynchburg,
Virginia; Columbus, Ohio; Cherry
Valley, Illinois; Arcadia, Ohio; New
Brighton, Pennsylvania). Since February
2015, an additional three incidents
occurred in Ontario, Canada, two of
which involved HHFTs.
In light of FRA’s preliminary findings
with respect to the Galena, Illinois
derailment (described further below),
FRA believes that further industry
action is necessary to ensure public
safety. One area that FRA believes needs
further industry consideration is the
general mechanical condition of the
equipment used in HHFTs. Thus, FRA
is issuing this Safety Advisory to
recommend that railroads take certain
actions to ensure the safe mechanical
condition of the tank cars used in
HHFTs to prevent or identify defects
that could lead to derailments.

Galena, Illinois Derailment
The following is an overview of the
circumstance surrounding the most
recent notable derailment involving a
HHFT. The probable cause of this
derailment has not yet been established
by FRA. Accordingly, nothing in this
Safety Advisory is intended to attribute
a definitive cause(s) to this incident, or
to place responsibility for the incident
on the acts or omissions of any specific
person or entity.
On March 5, 2015, an eastbound
BNSF Railway Co. (BNSF) train
consisting of 103 tank cars loaded with
Bakken crude oil (petroleum crude oil,
UN 1267, 3, PG I) derailed near Galena,
Illinois, resulting in a fire. The train was
traveling from North Dakota to
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The train
was traveling at an approximate speed
of 23 mph when 21 loaded tank cars
derailed. As a result of the derailment,
petroleum crude oil was released and a
fire ensued. Seven cars experienced
catastrophic thermal tears, three cars
released product through their bottom

Derailment Causes
As discussed above, the most recent
crude oil derailment occurred in March
near Galena, Illinois. FRA’s preliminary
investigation indicates that a broken
wheel on a tank car loaded with
petroleum crude oil may have caused
that derailment. Federal railroad safety
regulations prohibit the use of railroad
freight cars with certain wheel defects.
49 CFR 213.103. For example, flat spots
on any freight car wheel that exceeds
2.5″ in length, or with two adjoining flat
spots, each of which is more than two
inches in length, would prohibit that car
from being placed in a train and
transported. 49 CFR 215.103(f). This
safety requirement is intended to
prevent derailments and damage to
other mechanical or track components
that might occur as a result of moving
a railroad car with flat spots in a
wheel(s).
With regard to wheels with flat spots,
wheels with that particular defect
impact the rail each time the flat portion
of the wheel meets the rail as the wheel
rotates. Flat spots or other wheel defects
(built up tread) cause freight car wheels
to be out-of-round and may ultimately
cause a wheel to break. Further,

3 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-08-01/
pdf/2014-17764.pdf.
4 http://phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/osd/chronology.

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excessive wheel impacts caused by outof-round wheels can cause rails to crack
or break. Track defects are one of the
leading causes of derailments. Several
other notable derailments involving
large quantities of flammable liquids
that have occurred in this country so far
this year (near Dubuque, Iowa and Mt.
Carbon, West Virginia, respectively) are
believed to have been track-caused, as
was the 2014 crude oil train derailment
that occurred in Lynchburg, Virginia.
FRA is not asserting that these incidents
were caused by flat spots on wheels or
other mechanical defects, but only that
that wheel defects can cause
derailments and can damage track to the
point that a rail breaks and causes a
derailment. FRA’s intent in publishing
this Safety Advisory is to address the
mechanical condition of tank cars used
in HHFTs to avoid or identify
mechanical defects that may lead to
derailments, regardless of whether the
ultimate cause of an accident is the
result of a mechanical, track, or other
defect.
Wheel Impact Load Detectors
Technology has enabled railroads to
use additional means to learn of defects
to freight cars and railroad track
structures than were previously
available. In relation to the issues in this
Safety Advisory, the use of wayside
detectors has specifically enabled
railroads to identify certain wheel
defects and prevent derailments before
they occur. For example, hot wheel/box
detectors have long been used to alert
railroads and their train crews about
potential wheel or axle problems while
a train is enroute, such that the train can
be inspected and cars with dangerous
conditions removed from the train.
Railroads also employ Wheel Impact
Load Detectors (WILD) along their rights
of way. These detectors identify wheels
on a railcar that may have flat spots or
other defects before a wheel can cause
damage to railroad track structures.5
The Association of American
Railroads (AAR) has established
industry-wide standards regarding how
freight cars with wheels that have peak
vertical load (kips) above certain
thresholds should be handled. See e.g.,
2015 Field Manual of the AAR
Interchange Rules. AAR guidance (Rule
41) states that when a freight car’s wheel
registers an impact on a wayside WILD
of 65 kips or more, that the car’s owner
receives notification of that reading.
When a wheel registers from 80 to 89
kips on a WILD, that wheel is
condemnable and may be replaced
5 See http://freightrailworks.org/wp-content/
uploads/safety2.pdf.

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when the car is on a shop or repair track
for any other reason. Any wheel that
registers over 90 kips is condemnable
and may be replaced at any time. FRA
also understands that some railroads
have adopted procedures that set an
additional upper threshold whereby a
reading above a certain level (140 kips)
would require the train in which the car
is traveling to be stopped, and the car
removed from the train to be repaired
immediately before further movement.
FRA’s investigation of the recent
incident near Galena, Illinois indicates
that the train in question had passed
over a WILD within approximately 130
miles before derailing. It appears that
the car that potentially caused the
derailment registered 83.87 kips on that
WILD (while another car in the train
registered 96 kips). A month earlier, on
February 2, 2015, the car that
potentially caused the derailment also
registered over 80 kips while passing
over two separate WILDs. Under AAR
interchange rules, the option existed for
the car to have had a problematic wheel
replaced when the car was next on a
repair track, while the car that registered
96 kips could have continued in
transportation but been replaced at any
time.
FRA continues to encourage the
industry to implement this type of
advanced wayside detection equipment
and applauds the industry for its
continued efforts to utilize the
technology across the rail network.
However, in light of the significant
increases in the amount of Class 3
flammable liquids being transported by
rail over the last few years and because
wheel defects are known not only to
cause derailments but also to cause
significant damage to rails, FRA is
recommending that railroads (and AAR
via amendment to its interchange rules)
lower the impact threshold for action to
replace the wheels on any car in a
HHFT specified below. FRA is
recommending adjustment to the
following threshold levels:
• 60 kips—issue maintenance
advisory for the affected car;
• 70 kips—change the wheel at the
tank car’s next visit to a repair or shop
track;
• 80 kips—condemn the wheel and
replace at the first opportunity; and
• 120 kips—immediately stop the
train to inspect the wheel and remove
the car from service at the first available
location.
FRA believes that in light of the
significant increase in the number of
HHFTs and the catastrophic
consequences that can result when one
of these trains experience a derailment,
the industry needs to provide special

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attention to the mechanical condition of
the tank cars being hauled in these
trains. This is especially important
while newer, more robust tank car
standards are being developed. The
adjustments recommended above may
enable railroads to identify and replace
wheel defects that could cause
derailments much sooner than under
the existing industry guidelines. FRA
also continues to encourage the
installation of additional WILD and
other wayside detectors that might help
prevent train derailments.
FRA is aware that the speed at which
a train travels over a WILD may impact
the readings that are generated (e.g., a
car traveling at lower speed may result
in a much lower WILD reading than
when the same car travels over a WILD
at a higher speed). However, railroads
should not operate HHFTs over a WILD
below normal operating speeds to avoid
an elevated WILD reading. FRA also
encourages railroads to use electronic
data interchange so that a railroad
transporting a tank car in an affected
train would have access to WILD
readings generated by other railroads
that have previously transported that
car.
Mechanical Inspections
Another area FRA believes industry
could address to ensure the safe
mechanical condition of rail cars used
in HHFTs is mechanical inspections.
Existing Federal railroad safety
regulations that address mechanical and
inspection requirements for freight cars
are primarily found in 49 CFR parts 215
and 232. To detect mechanical defects
such as wheels defects (before trains
depart a terminal or point of origin)
railroads are required to inspect railroad
freight cars prior to transporting them in
a train. 49 CFR 215.13. These
inspections are referred to as predeparture inspections and are typically
performed by a designated inspector
under § 215.11. Section 215.11 requires
that a designated inspector demonstrate
the knowledge and ability to inspect
railroad freight cars to determine
compliance with 49 CFR part 215,
including the ability to detect wheel
defects under § 215.103. However, if a
designated inspector is not on duty, a
railroad may use another person, often
a train crew member, to perform an
abbreviated inspection intended to
detect readily discoverable defects (such
as a cracked or broken wheel). These
inspections are often referred to as
‘‘Appendix D’’ inspections. See
appendix D to 49 CFR part 215.
In light of recent derailments
involving HHFTs and the potential
consequences of any future derailments,

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 80 / Monday, April 27, 2015 / Notices
FRA is recommending that any HHFT
traveling long distances have a predeparture inspection performed by a
designated inspector. Designated
inspectors are typically mechanical
employees. Unlike train crew members
or other railroad employees, designated
inspectors’ duties primarily relate to the
detection and remedy of mechanical
defects on railroad rolling equipment.
FRA believes that designated inspectors
are better trained, equipped, and
experienced to detect mechanical
defects on rail cars that may lead to
derailments than railroad employees
whose duties primarily involve other
tasks, such as operating trains. Thus,
FRA believes safety is improved by
using only designated inspectors to
perform pre-departure inspections of
HHFTs.
In addition to the required predeparture inspection that is performed
on trains to determine compliance with
part 215, trains also must undergo an
air-brake and other mechanical-related
inspections prior to transportation
under 49 CFR part 232. In 2001, FRA
promulgated a final rule (66 FR 4104)
that established minimum inspection
standards for ‘‘extended haul’’ trains
that travel long distances (up to 1,500
miles). 49 CFR 232.213. Railroads
typically use the standards in § 232.213
to identify, inspect, and operate unit
trains that travel long distances across
the United States, such as coal trains
and high priority intermodal trains. FRA
believes that trains can be transported
safety over such long distances if,
among other requirements, quality
mechanical inspections are performed
to ensure that all air brakes in a train are
operative at the point of origin, and that
no mechanical defects exist prior to the
train’s departure. As explained in the
final rule, § 232.213 contains ‘‘stringent
inspection requirements, both brake and
mechanical, by highly qualified
inspectors’’ that ensure the safety of
trains operated over long distances
under that section’s requirements. 66 FR
4121.
The brake inspection applicable to an
extended haul train must be performed
by a ‘‘qualified mechanical inspector’’
(QMI) as defined by § 232.5, while the
part 215 inspection is required to be
performed by a designed inspector
under § 215.11 as discussed above. A
QMI is required to receive instruction
and training on the ‘‘troubleshooting,
inspection, testing, maintenance or
repair of the specific train brake
components and systems for which the
person is assigned responsibility.’’ 49
CFR 232.5. FRA believes that QMIs
(versus other employees such as train
crew members) possess the skill to

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perform high quality inspections and
can identify defective conditions, know
how those defects might affect other
parts of the freight car’s brake or
mechanical systems, and know how
such defects might be caused. 66 FR
4148.
In evaluating the recent incidents
involving HHFTs, many of the trains
were traveling uninterrupted (such as
for reclassification at a yard) for long
distances. For example, the recent crude
oil derailments have involved trains
transporting product from its source in
North Dakota to refineries on the
coasts—in some instances distances of
well over 1,000 miles. FRA recognizes
that many railroads already move these
long distance trains as extended haul
trains and conduct the mechanical and
brake inspections discussed above. To
assure the safety of HHFTs that might
travel long distances, FRA recommends
that such trains receive mechanical and
brake inspections conducted by QMIs
and designated inspectors. FRA believes
that having these critical inspections
conducted by highly qualified
inspectors at the point where such
trains are initiated will help ensure the
safe mechanical condition of these
trains.
In seeking the appropriate approach
to ensuring safety, FRA has also limited
the recommendations in this Safety
Advisory to HHFTs only and would
have applied to all of the recent
incidents described above. This
threshold ensures that FRA is focusing
on the highest risk shipments and not
unnecessarily making safety-related
recommendations that would impose
undue burdens on lesser risks that do
not represent the same safety and
environmental concerns. However, FRA
also supports additional safety-related
inspections or measures that railroads
wish to adopt, irrespective of
commodity being hauled or the type of
operation.
Recommended Railroad Action: In
light of the above discussion, FRA
recommends for any HHFT that
railroads:
(1) Continue to install and maintain
Wheel Impact Load Detectors (WILD)
along routes traveled by affected trains,
and adjust the existing industry
standards for actions to be taken when
wayside WILDs detect an impact above
a certain threshold for an affected train.
If a railroad receives notification of a
wheel impact for a car in an affected
train above the below-listed thresholds,
at a minimum, take the following
actions:
• 60 kips—issue maintenance
advisory to the car owner of the affected
car;

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• 70 kips—change the wheel at the
tank car’s next movement onto a repair
or shop track;
• 80 kips—condemn the wheel and
replace it at the first opportunity; and
• 120 kips—immediately stop the
train to inspect the wheel and remove
the car from service at the first available
location.
(2) Conduct initial terminal brake
inspections by qualified mechanical
inspectors as defined in 49 CFR 232.5
and conduct freight car inspections at
initial terminals with designated
inspectors under 49 CFR 215.11 for any
affected train that will travel 500 miles
or more from its initial terminal to
destination.
FRA encourages railroad industry
members to take actions that are
consistent with the preceding
recommendations and to take other
complementary actions to help ensure
the safety of the Nation’s railroad
employees. FRA may modify this Safety
Advisory, issue additional safety
advisories, or take other appropriate
actions necessary to ensure the highest
level of safety on the Nation’s railroads,
including pursuing other corrective
measures under its rail safety authority.
Sarah Feinberg,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2015–09612 Filed 4–24–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–06–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
[FRA Emergency Order No. 30, Notice
No. 1]

Emergency Order Establishing a
Maximum Operating Speed of 40 mph
in High-Threat Urban Areas for Certain
Trains Transporting Large Quantities
of Class 3 Flammable Liquids
FRA is issuing this
Emergency Order (E.O. or Order) to
require that trains transporting large
amounts of Class 3 flammable liquid
through certain highly populated areas
adhere to a maximum authorized
operating speed limit. FRA has
determined that public safety compels
issuance of this Order. This Order is
necessary due to the recent occurrence
of railroad accidents involving trains
transporting petroleum crude oil and
ethanol and the increasing reliance on
railroads to transport voluminous
amounts of those hazardous materials in
recent years. Under the E.O., an affected
train is one that contains: (1) 20 or more
loaded tank cars in a continuous block,
or 35 or more loaded tank cars, of Class

SUMMARY:

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