4300A Sensitive Systems Policy V12.01 02-12-2016

4300A Sensitive Systems Policy V12.01 02-12-2016.pdf

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4300A Sensitive Systems Policy V12.01 02-12-2016

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DHS Sensitive Systems
Policy Directive 4300A

Version 12.01
February 12, 2016
This Policy implements DHS Management Directive 140-01
“Information Technology System Security,” July 31, 2007

Protecting the Information that Secures the Homeland

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

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FOREWORD
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 4300 series of information security publications
are the official documents that articulate Departmental policies, standards, and guidelines in
accordance with DHS Management Directive 140-01 Information Technology System Security.
Comments concerning DHS Information Security publications are welcomed and should be
submitted to the DHS Director of IT Security Policy and Remediation at
[email protected] or addressed to:
DHS Director of IT Security Policy and Remediation
OCIO CISO Stop 0182
Department of Homeland Security
245 Murray Lane SW
Washington, DC 20528-0182

JEFFREY L
EISENSMITH

Digitally signed by JEFFREY L
EISENSMITH
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government,
ou=Department of Homeland Security,
ou=DHS HQ, ou=People, cn=JEFFREY L
EISENSMITH,
0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1=038790470
7.DHS HQ.1
Date: 2016.02.12 11:15:36 -05'00'

Jeffrey Eisensmith
Chief Information Security Officer
Department of Homeland Security

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0

INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................1
1.1
Information Security Program .................................................................................1
1.2
Authorities................................................................................................................2
1.3
Policy Overview.......................................................................................................2
1.4
Definitions................................................................................................................3
1.4.1 Classified National Security Information ....................................................3
1.4.2 Component ...................................................................................................3
1.4.3 Continuity of Operations..............................................................................3
1.4.4 Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) .......................................................3
1.4.5 DHS System .................................................................................................4
1.4.6 Essential Functions ......................................................................................4
1.4.7 Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) ........................4
1.4.8 Foreign Intelligence Information .................................................................4
1.4.9 General Support System ..............................................................................4
1.4.10 Information Technology ..............................................................................5
1.4.11 Major Application ........................................................................................5
1.4.12 National Intelligence Information ................................................................5
1.4.13 Operational Data ..........................................................................................6
1.4.14 Personally Identifiable Information .............................................................6
1.4.15 Privacy Sensitive System .............................................................................6
1.4.16 Privileged User.............................................................................................6
1.4.17 Public Information .......................................................................................6
1.4.18 Sensitive Information ...................................................................................6
1.4.19 Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (SPII)...................................6
1.4.20 Sensitive System ..........................................................................................7
1.4.21 Strong Authentication ..................................................................................7
1.4.22 Trust Zone ....................................................................................................7
1.4.23 Two-Factor Authentication ..........................................................................7
1.4.24 Visitor ..........................................................................................................7
1.4.25 Vital Records ...............................................................................................8
1.5
Waivers ....................................................................................................................8
1.5.1 Waiver Requests ..........................................................................................8
1.5.2 Requests for Exception to U.S. Citizenship Requirement .........................10
1.6
Digital and Other Electronic Signatures ................................................................11
1.6.1 Digital Signatures and Other Electronic Signature Methods .....................11
1.6.2 Digital Signatures.......................................................................................14
1.7
Information Sharing ...............................................................................................19
1.8
Threats....................................................................................................................20
1.8.1 Insider Threats ...........................................................................................20
1.8.2 Criminal Threats ........................................................................................21
1.8.3 Foreign Threats ..........................................................................................21
1.8.4 Lost or Stolen Equipment ..........................................................................21
1.8.5 Supply Chain Threats.................................................................................21
1.9
Changes to Policy ..................................................................................................22

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2.0

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES ..............................................................................23
2.1
Information Security Program Roles .....................................................................23
2.1.1 DHS Senior Agency Information Security Officer ....................................23
2.1.2 DHS Chief Information Security Officer...................................................24
2.1.3 Component Chief Information Security Officer ........................................26
2.1.4 Component Information Systems Security Manager .................................29
2.1.5 Risk Executive ...........................................................................................30
2.1.6 Authorizing Official ...................................................................................31
2.1.7 Security Control Assessor ..........................................................................32
2.1.8 Information Systems Security Officer .......................................................33
2.1.9 Ongoing Authorization Manager and Operational Risk Management
Board ..........................................................................................................34
2.1.10 DHS Security Operations Center ...............................................................35
2.1.11 DHS Component Security Operations Centers ..........................................36
2.2
Other Roles ............................................................................................................37
2.2.1 Secretary of Homeland Security ................................................................37
2.2.2 Under Secretaries and Heads of DHS Components ...................................38
2.2.3 DHS Chief Information Officer .................................................................39
2.2.4 Component Chief Information Officer ......................................................40
2.2.5 DHS Chief Security Officer .......................................................................42
2.2.6 DHS Chief Privacy Officer ........................................................................42
2.2.7 DHS Chief Financial Officer .....................................................................44
2.2.8 Program Managers .....................................................................................45
2.2.9 System Owners ..........................................................................................45
2.2.10 Common Control Provider.........................................................................46
2.2.11 DHS Employees, Contractors, and Others Working on Behalf of DHS ...47

3.0

MANAGEMENT POLICIES .........................................................................................48
3.1
Basic Requirements ...............................................................................................48
3.2
Capital Planning and Investment Control ..............................................................49
3.3
Contractors and Outsourced Operations ................................................................50
3.4
Performance Measures and Metrics .......................................................................52
3.5
Continuity Planning for Critical DHS Assets ........................................................52
3.5.1 Continuity of Operations Planning ............................................................52
3.5.2 Contingency Planning ................................................................................53
3.6
Systems Engineering Life Cycle ............................................................................55
3.7
Configuration Management ...................................................................................55
3.8
Risk Management ..................................................................................................57
3.9
Security Authorization and Security Control Assessments ...................................58
3.9.1 Ongoing Authorization ..............................................................................61
3.10 Information Security Review and Assistance ........................................................63
3.11 Security Working Groups and Forums ..................................................................63
3.11.1 CISO Council .............................................................................................63
3.11.2 DHS Information Security Training Working Group ................................64
3.11.3 DHS Security Policy Working Group........................................................65
3.11.4 DHS Enterprise Services Security Working Group ...................................65

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3.12
3.13
3.14

3.15
3.16
3.17
3.18
4.0

Information Security Policy Violation and Disciplinary Action ...........................65
Required Reporting ................................................................................................66
Privacy and Data Security ......................................................................................66
3.14.1 Personally Identifiable Information ...........................................................67
3.14.2 Privacy Threshold Analyses ......................................................................70
3.14.3 Privacy Impact Assessments ......................................................................70
3.14.4 System of Records Notices ........................................................................72
3.14.5 Protecting Privacy Sensitive Systems ........................................................74
3.14.6 Privacy Incident Reporting ........................................................................75
3.14.7 E-Authentication ........................................................................................76
3.14.8 Use Limitation and External Information Sharing.....................................77
DHS CFO Designated Systems .............................................................................78
Social Media ..........................................................................................................80
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ............................................81
Cloud Services .......................................................................................................83

OPERATIONAL POLICIES..........................................................................................84
4.1
Personnel ................................................................................................................84
4.1.1 Citizenship, Personnel Screening, and Position Categorization ................85
4.1.2 Rules of Behavior ......................................................................................86
4.1.3 Access to Sensitive Information ................................................................86
4.1.4 Segregation of Duties and Least Privilege .................................................86
4.1.5 Information Security and Privacy Awareness, Training, and Education ...87
4.1.6 Separation from Duty .................................................................................89
4.2
Physical Security....................................................................................................89
4.2.1 General Physical Access ............................................................................89
4.2.2 Sensitive Facility........................................................................................91
4.3
Media Controls.......................................................................................................92
4.3.1 Media Protection ........................................................................................92
4.3.2 Media Marking and Transport ...................................................................93
4.3.3 Media Sanitization and Disposal ...............................................................93
4.3.4 Production, Input/Output Controls ............................................................93
4.4
Voice Communications Security ...........................................................................94
4.4.1 Private Branch Exchange ...........................................................................94
4.4.2 Telephone Communications ......................................................................94
4.4.3 Voice Mail .................................................................................................94
4.5
Data Communications............................................................................................94
4.5.1 Telecommunications Protection Techniques .............................................94
4.5.2 Facsimiles ..................................................................................................95
4.5.3 Video Teleconferencing .............................................................................95
4.5.4 Voice over Data Networks .........................................................................96
4.6
Wireless Network Communications ......................................................................96
4.6.1 Wireless Systems .......................................................................................97
4.6.2 Wireless Mobile Devices ...........................................................................98
4.6.2.1 Cellular Phones ..........................................................................101
4.6.2.2 Pagers ........................................................................................102

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4.7
4.8

4.9

4.10
4.11
4.12
5.0

4.6.2.3 Multifunctional Wireless Devices .............................................102
4.6.2.4 Bluetooth ...................................................................................102
4.6.3 Wireless Tactical Systems .......................................................................103
4.6.4 Radio Frequency Identification................................................................104
Overseas Communications...................................................................................105
Equipment ............................................................................................................105
4.8.1 Workstations ............................................................................................105
4.8.2 Laptop Computers and Other Mobile Computing Devices .....................106
4.8.3 Personally Owned Equipment and Software ...........................................106
4.8.4 Hardware and Software............................................................................108
4.8.5 Personal Use of Government Office Equipment and DHS
Systems/Computers..................................................................................109
4.8.6 Wireless Settings for Peripheral Equipment ............................................111
Department Information Security Operations ......................................................111
4.9.1 Security Incidents and Incident Response and Reporting........................113
4.9.2 Law Enforcement Incident Response ......................................................115
Documentation .....................................................................................................115
Information and Data Backup ..............................................................................116
Converging Technologies ....................................................................................117

TECHNICAL POLICIES .............................................................................................119
5.1
Identification and Authentication ........................................................................119
5.1.1 Passwords.................................................................................................120
5.2
Access Control .....................................................................................................122
5.2.1 Automatic Account Lockout ....................................................................122
5.2.2 Automatic Session Termination ...............................................................123
5.2.3 Warning Banner .......................................................................................123
5.3
Auditing ...............................................................................................................124
5.4
Network and Communications Security ..............................................................125
5.4.1 Remote Access and Dial-In .....................................................................125
5.4.2 Network Security Monitoring ..................................................................126
5.4.3 Network Connectivity ..............................................................................127
5.4.4 Firewalls and Policy Enforcement Points ................................................129
5.4.5 Internet Security .......................................................................................131
5.4.6 Email Security..........................................................................................132
5.4.7 Personal Email Accounts .........................................................................133
5.4.8 Testing and Vulnerability Management...................................................134
5.4.9 Peer-to-Peer Technology .........................................................................135
5.5
Cryptography .......................................................................................................135
5.5.1 Encryption ................................................................................................135
5.5.2 Public Key Infrastructure .........................................................................135
5.5.3 Public Key/Private Key............................................................................144
5.6
Malware Protection ..............................................................................................146
5.7
Product Assurance ...............................................................................................147
5.8
Supply Chain........................................................................................................148
5.8.1 Business Impact .......................................................................................148

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5.8.2

Supply Chain Risk Management Plans ...................................................149

6.0

DOCUMENT CHANGE REQUESTS .........................................................................150

7.0

QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS................................................................................150

APPENDIX A

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ............................................151

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY............................................................................................159

APPENDIX C

REFERENCES.......................................................................................167

APPENDIX D

DOCUMENT CHANGE HISTORY ....................................................171

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1.0

INTRODUCTION

This document articulates the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Information Security
Program policies for sensitive systems. Procedures for implementing these policies are outlined
in a companion publication, DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook. This Policy Directive and
the Handbook serve as the foundation on which Components are to develop and implement their
own information security programs. The Baseline Security Requirements (BLSR) included in
the Handbook must be addressed when developing and maintaining information security
documents.
1.1

Information Security Program

The DHS Information Security Program provides a baseline of policies, procedures, standards,
and guidelines for DHS Components. This Policy Directive provides direction to managers and
senior executives for managing and protecting sensitive systems. It also defines policies relating
to management, operational, and technical controls necessary for ensuring confidentiality,
integrity, availability, authenticity, and nonrepudiation in DHS information system infrastructure
and operations. The policy elements expressed in this Policy Directive are designed to be broad
in scope to accommodate the diverse DHS operating environments. Each Component or Office
is responsible for identifying, developing, and implementing any additional policies needed to
meet their specific requirements. Implementation information can often be found in specific
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) publications, such as NIST Special
Publication (SP) 800-53, Rev 4, “Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations.”
This Policy Directive pertains to DHS Sensitive Systems, as distinct from DHS National Security
Systems (NSS), which are governed by DHS National Security Systems Policy Directive 4300B
series, available on the DHS Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) Web site. The 4300B
series applies to all DHS elements, employees, contractors, detailees, others working on behalf
of DHS, and users of DHS NSS that collect, generate, process, store, display, transmit, or receive
Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret classified national security information.
Policy elements are effective when issued. Failure to implement any policy element within 135
days shall be considered a weakness, and either a system or program Plan of Action and
Milestones (POA&M) must be generated by the Component for the identified weaknesses.
When this Policy Directive is changed, the DHS Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) will
ensure that appropriate tool changes are made available to the Department within 90 days of the
changes.

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1.2

Authorities

The following are authoritative references for the DHS Sensitive Information Security Program.
Additional references are located in Appendix C to this Policy Directive.

1.3

•

E-Government Act of 2002, Public Law 107–347, 116 Stat. 2899, 44 U.S.C. 101

•

Federal Information SecurityModernization Act of 2014 (FISMA), Public Law 113283; 128 Stat 3073

•

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130, “Management of Federal
Information Resources,” Transmittal Memorandum 4, 2010

•

DHS Management Directive MD 140-01, “Information Technology Systems
Security,” July 31, 2007

•

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Federal Information
Processing Standard FIPS 200, “Minimum Security Requirements for Federal
Information and Information Systems,” March 2006

•

NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53, Rev 4, “Security and Privacy Controls for
Federal Information Systems and Organizations,” April 2013, with updates as of
January 22, 2015

•

NIST SP 800-37, Rev 1, “Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to
Federal Information Systems: A Security Life Cycle Approach,” February 2010

Policy Overview

DHS information security policies define the security management structure and foundation
needed to ensure adequate control over DHS sensitive information and systems. Policies in this
document are organized in three sections:
•

Management Controls – These controls focus on managing both system information
security controls and system risk. These controls consist of risk mitigation techniques
normally used by management.

•

Operational Controls – These controls focus on mechanisms primarily implemented
and executed by the people responsible for use of the system. Operational controls
are designed to improve the security of a particular system or group of systems and
often rely on management and technical controls.

•

Technical Controls – These are the security controls executed by the information
systems. Technical controls provide automated protection from unauthorized access
or misuse; facilitate detection of security violations; and support security
requirements for applications and data.

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DHS privacy controls have been added to DHS information security policy documents to comply
with the publication of NIST SP 800-53, Rev.4, Appendix J: “Privacy Control Catalog.” The
privacy controls focus on ensuring information privacy, distinct from, but closely related to
information security. Privacy controls are the administrative, technical, and physical safeguards
employed within organizations to protect and ensure the proper handling of Personally
Identifiable Information (PII).
1.4

Definitions

The definitions in this section apply to the policies and procedures discussed in this document.
In general, the sources for the definitions given in this Section are relevant NIST documents.
Other definitions may be found in Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) Instruction
No. 4009, “National Information Assurance Glossary,” 26 April 2010. Definitions bearing on
Privacy are sourced from Privacy Incident Handling Guidance and the Privacy Compliance
documentation issued by the DHS Privacy Office.
1.4.1

Classified National Security Information

Information that has been determined, pursuant to Executive Order 13526, “Classified National
Security Information,” to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and is marked to
indicate its classified status. [Source: Executive Order 13526]
1.4.2

Component

A DHS Component is any organization which reports directly to the Office of the Secretary
(including the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, the Chief of Staff’s, Counselors, and staff, when
approved as such by the Secretary), including both Operational Components and Support
Components (also known as Headquarters Components). [Source DHS Lexicon and DHS
Management Directive 112-01]
1.4.3

Continuity of Operations

Internal organizational efforts to ensure that a viable capability exists to continue essential
functions across a wide range of potential emergencies, through plans and procedures that:
•

Delineate essential functions and supporting information systems

•

Specify succession of office and the emergency delegation of authority

•

Provide for the safekeeping of vital records and databases

•

Identify alternate operating facilities, if necessary

•

Provide for interoperable communications

•

Validate the capability to recover through tests, training, and exercises

1.4.4

Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)

A predetermined set of instructions or procedures that describe how an organization’s missionessential functions will be sustained within 12 hours and for up to 30 days as a result of a disaster
event before returning to normal operations. [Source NIST SP 800-34]
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1.4.5

DHS System

A DHS system is any information system that transmits, stores, or processes data or information
and is (1) owned, leased, or operated by any DHS Component; (2) operated by a contractor on
behalf of DHS; or (3) operated by another Federal, state, or local Government agency on behalf
of DHS. DHS systems include general support systems and major applications.
1.4.6

Essential Functions

Essential functions are those that enable Executive Branch agencies to provide vital services,
exercise civil authority, maintain the safety and well being of the general populace, and sustain
industrial capability and the national economy base during an emergency.
1.4.7

Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA)

FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide information
security program that will provide a high level of security for the information and information
systems supporting the operations and assets of the agency, including those provided or managed
by another agency, contractor, or other source.
FISMA requires that the Chief Information Officer (CIO) designate a senior agency information
security official who shall develop and maintain a Department-wide information security
program. The designee’s responsibilities include:
•

Developing and maintaining information security policies, procedures, and control
techniques that address all applicable requirements

•

Training and overseeing personnel with significant information security
responsibilities

•

Assisting senior Department officials with respect to their responsibilities under the
statute

•

Ensuring that the Department has sufficient trained personnel to ensure the
Department’s compliance with the statute and related policies, procedures, standards,
and guidelines

•

Ensuring that the Department CIO, in coordination with other senior Department
officials, reports annually to the Secretary on the effectiveness of the Department’s
information security program, including the progress of remedial actions

1.4.8

Foreign Intelligence Information

This type of information relates to the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers,
organizations, or persons, but does not include counterintelligence (CI) except for information on
international terrorist activities.
1.4.9

General Support System

A general support system (GSS) is an interconnected set of information resources that share
common functionality and are under the same direct management control. A GSS normally
includes hardware, software, information, applications, communications, data and users.
Examples of GSSs include local area networks (LAN), including smart terminals that support a
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branch office, Department-wide backbones, communications networks, and Departmental data
processing centers including their operating systems and utilities.
Security for GSSs in use at DHS Headquarters shall be under the oversight of the DHS Office of
the Chief Information Officer (OCIO), with support from the DHS Security Operations Center
(SOC). All other GSSs shall be under the direct oversight of respective Component CISOs, with
support from the Component’s SOC. Every GSS must have an Information Systems Security
Officer (ISSO) assigned.
1.4.10 Information Technology
Division E of the Clinger-Cohen Actof 1996 (Public Law 104-106) defines Information
Technology (IT) as:
“any equipment or interconnected system or subsystem of equipment that is used
in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement,
control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or reception of data or
information”
For purposes of the preceding definition, “equipment” refers to that used by any DHS office,
Component, or contractor, if the contractor requires the use of such equipment in the
performance of a service or the furnishing of a product in support of DHS.
The term information technology includes computers, ancillary equipment, software, firmware,
and similar procedures, services (including support services), and related resources.
The term information system as used in this policy document, is equivalent to the term
information technology system.
1.4.11 Major Application
A major application (MA) is an automated information system (AIS) that OMB Circular A-130
defines as requiring “…special attention to security due to the risk and magnitude of harm
resulting from the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of the information in
the application.”
All Federal applications require some level of protection. Certain applications, because of the
information they contain, however, require special management oversight and should be
classified as MAs. An MA is distinguishable from a GSS by the fact that it is a discrete
application, whereas a GSS may support multiple applications. Each MA must be under the
direct oversight of a Component CISO or Information System Security Manager (ISSM), and
must have an ISSO assigned.
1.4.12 National Intelligence Information
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458, 118 Stat.
3662) amended the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a) to provide the following
definition:
‘‘(5) The terms ‘national intelligence’ and ‘intelligence related to national
security’ refer to all intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and
including information gathered within or outside the United States, that—
(A) pertains, as determined consistent with any guidance issued by the President,
to more than one United States Government agency; and
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(B) that involves—
(i) threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests;
(ii) the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; or
(iii) any other matter bearing on United States national or homeland security.’’.
1.4.13 Operational Data
Operational data is information used in any DHS mission activity.
1.4.14 Personally Identifiable Information
Personally Identifiable Information (PII)” means information that permits the identity of an
individual to be directly or indirectly inferred, including other information that is linked or
linkable to an individual regardless of whether the individual is a United States citizen, legal
permanent resident, or a visitor to the United States. [see also Sensitive Personally Identifiable
Information (SPII)]
1.4.15 Privacy Sensitive System
A Privacy Sensitive System is any system that collects, uses, disseminates, or maintains PII or
Sensitive PII.
1.4.16 Privileged User
A privileged user is a user that is authorized (and therefore, trusted) to perform security-relevant
functions that ordinary users are not authorized to perform. (Source: NISTIR 7298 rev 2.0
1.4.17 Public Information
Public information can be disclosed to the public without restriction, but requires protection
against erroneous manipulation or alteration (e.g., public websites).
1.4.18 Sensitive Information
Sensitive Information is any information, which if lost, misused, disclosed, or, without
authorization is accessed, or modified, could adversely affect the national or homeland security
interest, the conduct of Federal programs, or the privacy of individuals, but which has not been
specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order or an Act of Congress to
be kept secret in the interest of national defense, homeland security or foreign policy.
Sensitive Information includes:
• Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI)
• Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII)
• Sensitive Security Information (SSI)
• Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
1.4.19 Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (SPII)
Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (SPII) is a subset of PII [see definition above],
which if lost, compromised or disclosed without authorization, could result in substantial harm,
embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to an individual. Some forms of PII are sensitive
as stand-alone elements..

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1.4.20 Sensitive System
A sensitive system is any combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and
communications that is integrated for a specific purpose, and that may be vulnerable to an
adversarial attack by an adversary seeking to violate or disrupt the system’s confidentiality,
integrity, or availability.
1.4.21 Strong Authentication
Strong authentication is a method used to secure computer systems and/or networks by verifying
a user’s identity by requiring two-factors in order to authenticate (something you know,
something you are, or something you have). Typically, strong authentication requires
authenticators that are resistant to replay attacks and employ multifactor authentication. Strong
authenticators include, for example, PKI where certificates are stored on a token protected by a
password, passphrase, or biometric. [See the discussion of Level 4 assurance in NIST SP 80063-2, “Electronic Authentication Guideline,” (August 2013)]
1.4.22 Trust Zone
A Trust Zone consists of any combination of people, information resources, IT systems, and
networks that are subject to a shared security policy (a set of rules governing access to data and
services). For example, a Trust Zone may be set up between different network segments that
require specific usage policies based on information processed, such as law enforcement
information.
1.4.23 Two-Factor Authentication
The classic paradigm for authentication systems identifies three factors as the cornerstone of
authentication:
• Something you know (for example, a password or Personal Identification Number
(PIN)
• Something you have (for example, an ID badge or a cryptographic key)
• Something you are (for example, a fingerprint or other biometric data)
The strength of authentication systems is largely determined by the number of factors
incorporated by the system. Implementations that use two factors are considered to be stronger
than those that use only one factor.” A requirement for two of the three factors listed above
constitutes two factor authentication.
1.4.24 Visitor
A guest or temporary employee who presents themselves or is presented by a sponsor, for entry
for less than 6 months to a secured facility that is not their primary work location. (Source:
DHS Lexicon)
The visitor is placed in one of two categorizes, either escort required or no escort required.
Escort required visitors are escorted at all times. No escort required visitors are granted limited
general access to the facility without an escort. Escort procedures for classified areas are
indicated in Management Directive 11051 “SCIF Escort Procedures.” (Source: DHS Lexicon)

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

1.4.25 Vital Records
Vital records are electronic and hardcopy documents, references, databases, and information
systems needed to support essential functions under the full spectrum of emergencies.
Categories of vital records may include:

1.5

•

Emergency operating records: emergency plans and directive(s); orders of
succession; delegations of authority; staffing assignments; selected program records
needed to continue the most critical agency operations; and related policy or
procedural records.

•

Legal and financial rights records: records that protect the legal and financial rights
of the Government and of the individuals directly affected by its activities. Examples
include accounts receivable records, social security records, payroll records,
retirement records, and insurance records. These records were formerly defined as
“rights-and-interests” records.

•

Records used to perform national security preparedness functions and activities in
accordance with Executive Order (EO).

Waivers

When a Component is unable to fully comply with any portion of this Policy Directive, it may
request a waiver. Waiver requests should be routed through the Component’s ISSO for the
system, to the Component’s CISO or ISSM, and then to the DHS CISO. All submitters shall
coordinate with the Authorizing Official (AO) prior to submission.
If a material weakness is reported in an audit report, and the weakness is not scheduled for
remediation within 12 months, the Component must submit a waiver request to the DHS CISO.
If the material weakness exists in a financial system, the Component Chief Financial Officer
(CFO) must also approve the waiver request before sending to the DHS CISO. If the material
weakness exists in a system processing PII, the Component Privacy Officer or Privacy Point of
Contact (PPOC) and DHS Chief Privacy Officer must also approve the waiver request before
sending to the DHS CISO.
An approved waiver does not bring the system into compliance with policy; it is an
acknowledgement by the DHS CISO of the system’s non-compliance with policy and that an
acceptable plan to remediate the weakness has been provided and compensating controls have
been implemented.
In all cases, waivers shall be requested for an appropriate period based on a reasonable
remediation strategy.
1.5.1

Waiver Requests

The Waiver Request Form found in Attachment B of the DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems
Handbook shall be used.
Component ISSOs, audit liaisons, and others may develop the waiver request, but the System
Owner shall submit the request through the Component’s CISO/ISSM. All submitters shall
coordinate with the Authorizing Official (AO) prior to submission
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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Waiver requests shall include documentation of mission impact as operational justification;
mission impact; risk acceptance; risk mitigation measures; and a current POA&M for bringing
the system control weakness into compliance.
Additionally, any waiver requests for financial systems must be submitted to and approved by
the Component’s CFO prior to submission to the DHS CISO. Any waiver request for sensitive
systems with PII information must be submitted to and approved by the Component’s Privacy
Officer or senior PPOC prior to being submitted to the DHS CISO.
Any waiver for compliance with privacy controls must be submitted to and approved by the DHS
Chief Privacy Officer.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

1.5.1.a

This Policy Directive and the DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook apply
to all DHS employees, contractors, detailees, others working on behalf of
DHS, and users of DHS information systems that collect, generate, process,
store, display, transmit, or receive DHS information unless an approved
waiver has been granted. This includes prototypes, telecommunications
systems, and all systems in all phases of the Systems Engineering Life Cycle
(SELC).

SA-3

1.5.1.b

Systems not yet authorized to operate when this policy is issued shall comply
with all of its policy statements or obtain appropriate waivers. Systems with
an Authority to Operate (ATO) shall comply within 135 days of the date of
this Policy is issued or obtain appropriate waivers. (A new ATO is only
required for significant changes.)

PL-1

1.5.1.c

Components shall request a waiver whenever they are unable to comply fully
with any portion of this policy.

CA-2

1.5.1.d

The Component CISO/ISSM shall approve all waiver requests prior to
submitting them to the DHS CISO.

CA-6

1.5.1.e

The Component CIO shall approve any waiver request that results in a total
waiver time exceeding (12 months before sending the request to the DHS
CISO.

1.5.1.f

The Component CFO shall approve all requests for waivers for financial
systems prior to their submission to the DHS CISO.

1.5.1.g

The Component’s Privacy Officer or Senior PPOC shall approve all requests
for waivers for sensitive systems processing PII or SPII prior to their
submission to the DHS CISO.

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CA-6

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID
1.5.1.h

1.5.2

DHS Policy Statements
The DHS Chief Privacy Officer shall approve all requests for waivers for
compliance with any privacy control in Appendix J of NIST SP 800-53 prior
to their submission to the DHS CISO.

Relevant
Controls
---

Requests for Exception to U.S. Citizenship Requirement

Special procedures apply for exception to the requirement that persons accessing DHS systems
be U.S. citizens. Under normal circumstances, only U.S. citizens are allowed access to DHS
systems and networks; but there is a need at times to grant access to foreign nationals. Access
for foreign nationals is normally a long-term commitment, and exceptions to citizenship
requirements are treated differently from security policy waivers. Exceptions to the U.S.
citizenship requirement should be requested by completing a Foreign National Visitor Access
Request, DHS Form 11052-1, which is available online or through the DHS Office of the Chief
Security Officer (OCSO). Components who have access may file their request via the Foreign
National Vetting Management System (FNVMS), a part of the DHS OCSO Integrated Security
Management System’s (ISMS). For further information regarding the citizenship exception
process, contact the DHS OCSO at [email protected].

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

1.5.2.a

Any Person of dual-citizenship (one being a US citizenship) and any Legal
Permanent Resident who requires access to DHS systems as a validated
representative of foreign power shall be processed as indicated in Section
1.5.2.

1.5.2.b

Exceptions to the U.S. Citizenship requirement shall be requested by
submitting a completed Foreign National Visitor Access Request form to the
DHS Office of the OCSO for each foreign national requiring access to DHS
systems and networks.

1.5.2.c

Component CISOs shall select a Foreign Access Coordinator to be the point of
contact to the DHS OCSO for processing requests for exception to the U.S.
Citizenship policy requirement (4.1.1.e). The Component shall notify OCSO of
the selected Foreign Access Coordinator.

--

Foreign Access Coordinators shall, in coordination with the DHS OCSO,
conduct an assessment of the risk of granting access to DHS systems by the
Foreign National specified and provide a recommendation to the Component
CISO regarding the approval or disapproval of the request.

--

1.5.2.d

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

1.6

Digital and Other Electronic Signatures

Pursuant to Sections 1703 and 1705 of the Government Paperwork Elimination Act (GPEA),
OMB Memorandum M-00-10, “Procedures and Guidance on Implementing of the Government
Paperwork Elimination Act” requires executive agencies to provide the option for electronic
maintenance, submission, and disclosure of information when practicable as a substitute for
paper, and to use and accept electronic signatures.
Electronic signatures are essential in the Department’s business processes and IT environments;
reducing reliance on paper transactions improves information sharing, strengthens information
security, and streamlines business processes, while reducing both cost and environmental impact.
Please refer to the “DHS Electronic Signature Policy Guidance” document for guidance on
electronic signature policy
1.6.1

Digital Signatures and Other Electronic Signature Methods

The following DHS Policy Statements are applicable to both digital signatures and
other electronic signature methods.
Policy
ID
1.6.1.a

1.6.1.b

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

Digital signatures or other electronic signature methods shall be used
whenever practical, except where handwritten signatures are required by law,
regulation, Executive Order, or other agency requirement. Digital signature or
other electronic signature methods, when properly executed, shall be accepted
to the maximum extent practicable.

---

Electronic signatures, including digital signatures, shall be implemented by
applications with the necessary security controls and practices such that:
1) the signer cannot successfully repudiate that he/she intended to sign, or
that he/she applied the electronic signature; and
2) the integrity of the signed content cannot be successfully challenged.

---

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID
1.6.1.c

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

When a signature is required on electronic documents, transactions,
communications, etc. for use within DHS, or for use for intra-governmental
transactions, communications, etc., where all potential signers possess a
Personal Identity Verification (PIV) card, Department of Defense (DOD)issued Common Access Card (CAC), or PIV-I card (and the associated card
readers, software, and verification processes are in place), the signing process
shall employ a digital signature created by a properly identified signer through
the use of their PIV card, CAC issued by DOD, or PIV-I card, whenever
possible.
Signers may use their software-based digital signature certificate that meets the
requirements specified in Section 1.6.2.a below for signing when their PIV
card, DOD-issued CAC, or PIV-I card cannot be used.

---

Other electronic signature methods may be used when it is determined that it is
not possible for the signer to use his/her PIV card, DOD-issued CAC, PIV-I
card, or software-based digital signature certificate that meets the requirements
specified in Section 1.6.2.a below. For legally binding signatures, the
determination of what other electronic signature method shall be used must be
based on a risk assessment of the likelihood of a successful challenge to the
enforceability of the signature, and the monetary loss, or other adverse impact
of an unenforceable signature.
1.6.1.d

1.6.1.e

The following requirements shall be met when implementing legally binding
signatures using Digital Signature or an Other Electronic Signature Method:
1) The Signer must use an acceptable electronic form of signature;
2) The electronic form of signature must be executed or adopted by a person
with the intent to sign the electronic record;
3) The electronic form of signature must be attached to or associated with
the electronic record being signed;
4) There must be a means to identify and authenticate a particular person as
the signer; and
5) There must be a means to preserve the integrity of the signed record.

---

When implementing one or more legally binding Digital Signatures in an
electronic document, transaction, communication, etc., and the intent to sign
for each signature is not evidenced by the context of the content being signed,
a clear and conspicuous notice shall be incorporated into that electronic
document, transaction, communication, etc., just prior to the location each
signature, that indicates:
1) That an electronic signature is being created, and what constitutes the
execution of the signature,
2) The reason for signing (for that specific signature), and
3) That when completed, it will constitute the Signer’s legally binding
signature.

---

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID
1.6.1.f

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

When implementing legally binding electronic signatures for a specific use,
where Other Electronic Signature Methods will be used, the risk assessment
process, described in the “DHS Electronic Signature Policy Guidance”
document, Section I.G. “Determining Which Electronic Signature Method to
Use - Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis”, shall be used to determine
the overall level of risk, and the specific approaches to be implemented to meet
each of the following five requirements for legally binding signatures:
1) The Signer must use an acceptable electronic form of signature;
2) The electronic form of signature must be executed or adopted by a person
with the intent to sign the electronic record;

---

3) The electronic form of signature must be attached to or associated with
the electronic record being signed;
4) There must be a means to identify and authenticate a particular person as
the signer;
5) There must be a means to preserve the integrity of the signed record.
1.6.1.g

The date and time a legally binding signature is executed, using Digital
Signature or an Other Electronic Signature Method, shall be captured and
incorporated as part of the record of the signature. The captured date and time
must be accurate and trustworthy.
Within DHS, legally binding signatures using a digital signature or other
electronic signature method shall be executed on systems whose system clocks
have been synchronized via Network Time Protocol (NTP) with DHS
networks, and are managed to prevent unauthorized changes to the system
clock. When the signature is executed, the date and time from the system
clock shall be captured and incorporated as part of the record of the signature.

---

When a legally binding signature must be executed on a system whose system
clock is not synchronized via NTP and not managed to prevent unauthorized
changes to the system clock, the signer is responsible for ensuring that the date
and time incorporated as part of the record of the signature is accurate.
1.6.1.h

The visual context of an electronic signature implemented using digital
signature or other electronic signature method, shall be maintained. The
Relying Parties for the electronically signed document, transaction,
communication, etc. must be able to view the exact format and content of the
document, transaction, communication, etc. that the Signer saw when he or she
signed it.

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID
1.6.1.i

1.6.1.j

1.6.1. k

1.6.1.l

DHS Policy Statements
Where a DHS entity is the Relying Party for an electronic signature executed
on a non-DHS system by an external signer, using a digital signature or other
electronic signature method, the DHS entity shall determine whether the
asserted signing date and time is sufficiently accurate and trustworthy to be
acceptable for the intended use of the signature.

---

Electronically signed records shall be maintained based on operational needs,
perception of risks, and historical value, as formalized through corresponding
Records Disposition Schedules approved by the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA). Operational needs shall be determined on
the basis of the approach taken to ensure the availability, accessibility, and
trustworthiness of electronically signed records over time.

---

The Component CISO shall approve the design, development, resources and
infrastructure for implementations of electronic signatures using Digital
Signatures or Other Electronic Signature Methods. The adoption and
integration of legally binding electronic signature capabilities into workflows,
business processes, specific document types, etc., shall be reviewed and
approved by the Component General Counsel and by the Component Chief
Records Officer. Additional review/endorsement by other cognizant officials
(e.g., Privacy Officer; Chief Financial Officer; Forms Management Officer;
etc.) shall be obtained when appropriate.

---

All implementations of digital signatures or other electronic signature methods
in DHS shall comply with the requirements of DHS Sensitive Systems Policy
Directive 4300A.
Existing (legacy) implementations of electronic signatures shall be brought
into compliance with DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A as soon
as is practical, but in no case later than 12 months, or a waiver must be
obtained.
The waiver shall be requested in writing and submitted to the DHS CISO.

1.6.2

Relevant
Controls

Digital Signatures

The following policy statements are applicable only to digital signatures.

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID
1.6.2.a

DHS Policy Statements
Digital signatures shall not be accepted unless the following conditions are
met:
1) Standard Path Development and Validation (PDVAL) software
verifies the validity of the signer’s signature verification certificate as
of the time the signature was executed; and
2) The certificate is authorized for signature use ( i.e., has the digital
signature and non-repudiation key usage bits set in the keyUsage
extension); and
3) The certificate was;
i)

Issued by DHS Principal Certification Authority (CA) (DHS
CA4) under one of the following U.S. Common Policy
Framework certificate policies,
Policy

Policy Object Identifier

id-fpki-common-policy

::= {2 16 840 1 101 3 2 1 3 6}

id-fpki-common-hardware

::= {2 16 840 1 101 3 2 1 3 7}

id-fpki-common-High

::= {2 16 840 1 101 3 2 1 3 16}

as indicated by the Policy Object Identifier (OID) entered in the
Certificate Policies extension in the certificate; or
ii) Issued by another U.S. Federal Government (CA that is
subordinate to the U.S. Common Root CA under one of the
following U.S. Common Policy Framework certificate policies,
Policy

Policy Object Identifier

id-fpki-common-policy

::= {2 16 840 1 101 3 2 1 3 6}

id-fpki-common-hardware

::= {2 16 840 1 101 3 2 1 3 7}

id-fpki-common-High

::= {2 16 840 1 101 3 2 1 3 16}

as indicated by the Policy OID entered in the Certificate Policies
extension in the certificate; or
iii) Issued by a CA from another PKI cross-certified with the
Federal Bridge Certification Authority (FBCA), where the
certificate is issued under a certificate policy that maps to one of
the following FBCA certificate policies,

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Relevant
Controls
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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Policy

id-fpki-certpcymediumAssurance
id-fpki-certpcymediumHardware
id-fpki-certpcyhighAssurance
id-fpki-certpcy-pivihardware

Relevant
Controls

Policy Object Identifier
::= { 2 16 840 1 101 3 2 1 3 3 }
::= { 2 16 840 1 101 3 2 1 3 12 }
::= { 2 16 840 1 101 3 2 1 3 4 }
::= { 2 16 840 1 101 3 2 1 3 18 }

as indicated by the PolicyMappings extension in the crosscertificate issued by the FBCA to the Root CA for the Signer’s
PKI, mapping an appropriate FBCA policy OID from the table
above to the policy OID in the Certificate Policies extension
from the Signer’s certificate.
1.6.2.b

If a digital signature is time stamped by a Trusted Timestamp Authority
approved by the DHS CISO, DHS relying parties for the signature shall accept
the time stamp as a trustworthy indicator that the digital signature was
executed prior to that time.

---

1.6.2.c

For electronic documents, transactions, communications, etc. containing
legally binding digital signatures, a visible signature block containing
information about the signer and the signature shall be embedded for each
signature, when possible. The visible signature block for each signature shall
be located in proximity to, but after the statement in the document, transaction,
communications, etc. indicating the intent of that signature.

---

The visible signature block shall be formatted to clearly indicate that it is a
block of information about the signature, and shall contain:
1)
2)
3)
4)

The name of the signer (mandatory)
The Role of the signer (mandatory)
The date and time the signature was executed (mandatory)
A graphical depiction or image of the signer’s handwritten
signature (recommended)
5) Additional information as appropriate (optional)
The presence of a visual signature block shall not be used to indicate that a
digital signature has been validated. A relying party must validate a digital
signature using standard Path Development and Validation (PDVAL)
protocols each time they make a determination to trust on not trust the digital
signature.
1.6.2.d

Since any change to a digitally signed record will prevent validation of the
digital signature, the use of stable file formats, with broad product support for

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

backwards compatibility is essential to maintaining digitally signed records.
Electronic documents, transactions, communications, etc. to be digitally signed
shall be limited to file formats that will be stable over the retention period of
the signed record.
Suggested stable standard file formats include, but are not limited to:
1) American Standard Code for Information Exchange
(ASCII)(.txt)
2) Portable Document Format (.pdf), ISO 3200
3) Open Office Extended Markup Language (XML) File Formats,
ECMA-376, ISO/IEC 29500
i) XML Document Format (.docx)
ii) XML Workbook Format (.xlxs)
iii) XML Presentation Format (.pptx)
1.6.2.e

Using a combination of digital signatures and handwritten signatures on a
single document, transaction, message, etc. shall be avoided whenever
possible, to ensure that a single record can be created where all of the
signatures are part of the record and can be validated by Relying Parties.

---

1.6.2.f

In order to facilitate interoperability, DHS implementations of digital
signatures shall comply with the PDF Advanced Electronic Signature (PAdES)
standard or XML Advanced Electronic Signature (XAdES) standard for digital
signature formats.

---

1.6.2.g

For DHS electronic records that are digitally signed, the digital signatures shall
be verifiable by relying parties for the entire retention period of the record.
The digital signatures shall be verifiable using standard PDVAL protocols
(http://www.idmanagement.gov/path-discovery-and-validation).

---

1.6.2.h

When a digital signature is applied to an email by a DHS entity, it shall be for
security purposes only, i.e., to enable the recipient or a third party to determine
the source of the email and its integrity.

---

Email may be used as a transport mechanism to send documents, transactions,
messages, etc., that include legally binding digital signatures, as attachments to
an email.
If an email is received containing a digital signature that is intended to be
legally binding, the source of the email shall be contacted and asked to resubmit the relevant content signed with the legally binding signature as an
email attachment, or via another acceptable means.
1.6.2.i

A public-private key pair is only valid for the uses specified in the public key’s
certificate. Only private keys with an associated public key certificate that
asserts both the digital signature and non-repudiation bits in the keyUsage

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

extension shall be used to execute legally binding digital signatures. Digital
signatures executed with a private key with associated public key certificate
that does not assert both the digital signature and non-repudiation bits in the
keyUsage extension shall be rejected (not accepted).
Key pairs with associated public key certificates intended for authentication or
encryption use shall not be used to execute digital signatures, and digital
signatures generated with them shall not be accepted. Authentication
certificates, such as the PIV Authentication Certificate and PIV Card
Authentication Key certificate, do not assert the non-repudiation key usage bit,
and shall not be used to execute digital signatures. Encryption certificates do
not assert the digital signature bit or the non-repudiation bit and shall not be
used to execute digital signatures.
The three certificate types issued by DHS Principal Certificate Authority (CA)
(DHS CA4) that are authorized for use for traditional human subscriber digital
signatures are:
1) The PIV Digital Signature Certificate,
2) The Non-PIV Human Software Digital Signature Certificate,
and
3) The Non-PIV Human Hardware Digital Signature Certificate.
The following algorithms are currently authorized for digital signature use:
1) RSA 2048 with SHA-1 and PKCS #1 v1.5 padding
2) RSA 2048 with SHA-256 and PKCS #1 v1.5 padding
3) RSA 2048 with SHA-256 and PSS padding
4) ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256 ecdsa-with-SHA256
5) ECDSA P-384 with SHA-384 ecdsa-with-SHA384
The use of SHA-1 shall be abandoned in favor of SHA-256, as soon as
possible.
1.6.2.j

Digital signatures performed from a mobile device shall only be executed
using the Signer’s signature key on their PIV or PIV Derived Credential, in
accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-157.

---

Implementations of digital signatures to be performed from a mobile device,
which are executed using the Signer’s signature key from a software-based
token and its associated public key certificate issued by DHS Principal CA
(DHS CA4), must be authorized by the DHS CISO.
1.6.2.k

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) artifacts (e.g., trust path Certification
Authority Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) or Online
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Responses) are stapled to a digital
signature (i.e., incorporated into the signature data) to ensure that it can be
validated in the future. OCSP Responses shall be used instead of CRLs
whenever possible, to limit the size of digitally signed electronic records.

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

1.6.2.l

PIN caching shall not be used with legally binding digital signatures. In a
session where the user is required to execute multiple legally binding digital
signatures, the user shall be required to authenticate himself/herself
immediately prior to the execution of each legally binding digital signature.

---

1.6.2.m

The key pairs and associated public key certificates issued to Non Person
Entities (NPE) (such as devices, systems, and applications) by the DHS
Principal CA (DHS CA4) or acquired from authorized commercial vendors,
shall not be used to generate legally binding digital signatures.

---

Certificates issued to NPEs by DHS Internal Use NPE CAs shall only be used
for authentication and shall not be used for digital signature.

Implementations of digital signatures should adhere, where possible, to the guidance provided in
the current versions of the following documents, developed by the DHS Enterprise Digital
Signature Capability Integrated Project Team and maintained by the DHS PKI Management
Authority:
1) “Using the PIV Card to Digitally Sign Outlook Emails”
2) “Using the PIV Card to Digitally Sign Adobe Acrobat Documents”
3) “Using the PIV Card to Digitally Sign Microsoft Office Documents”
These documents are available for download from the Enterprise Digital Signature folder in the
DHS PKI SharePoint site.

1.7

Information Sharing

The DHS Security Operations Center (SOC) exchanges information with Component SOCs,
Network Operations Centers (NOC), the Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) SOC, the
Intelligence Community, and with external organizations in order to facilitate the security and
operation of the DHS network. This exchange enhances situational awareness and provides a
common operating picture to network managers. The operating picture is developed from
information obtained from “raw” fault, Configuration Management (CM), accounting,
performance, and security data. This data is monitored, collected, analyzed, processed, and
reported by the NOCs and SOCs.
The DHS SOC is responsible for communicating other information such as incident reports,
notifications, vulnerability alerts and operational statuses to Component SOCs, Component
CISOs/ISSMs and other identified Component points of contact.
The DHS SOC portal implements role-based user profiles that allow Components to use the
website’s incident database capabilities. Users assigned to Component groups shall be able to
perform actions such as:
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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

1.8

•

Entering incident information into the DHS SOC incident database

•

Generating preformatted incident reports

•

Initiating queries of the incident database

•

Viewing FISMA incident reporting numbers

•

Automating portions of the Information Security Vulnerability Management (ISVM)
program

•

Automating portions of the vulnerability assessment program

Threats

Emphasis on e-Government has added the general public to the class of Government computer
users and has transferred the repository for official records from paper to electronic media.
Information systems are often connected to different parts of an organization; interconnected
with other organizations’ systems; and with the Internet. Remote access for telecommuting and
building management services (e.g., badge systems; heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning
(HVAC); and entry) may require additional connections, all of which introduce additional risks.
Wireless mobile systems such as cell phones and pagers, allow personnel to stay in touch with
their offices and wireless local area networks (WLAN) permit connection from various locations
throughout a building. While these technologies provide greater flexibility and convenience,
they also introduce additional risks.
As technologies continue to converge, (cell phones with Internet access, walkie-talkie
communications, and video; low cost Voice over Internet Protocol [VoIP]; copiers that allow
network printing; printing over the Internet; and facsimile [fax] functions) operating costs are
reduced, making their implementation tempting;, but each of these technology advancements
contains inherent security risks and presents challenges to security professionals.
1.8.1

Insider Threats

Managers are generally aware of natural and physical threats, such as earthquakes, tornadoes,
fires, floods, electric outages, and plumbing disasters, but may not have the same level of
awareness regarding threats originating from within their organizations. The threat from DHS
users should not be underestimated. Sensitive information can be lost, corrupted, or
compromised through malicious or careless acts. A malicious user can intentionally cause harm
to the Department’s reputation and data. Uninformed or careless users can inflict similar
damage.
Converging technologies combine the vulnerabilities of the individual technologies, so care must
be taken to ensure that systems are designed with no single points of failure (for example, if the
building HVAC were connected to the data network it would become necessary to ensure that an
outage or attack on the HVAC would not also cause a network outage).

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

1.8.2

Criminal Threats

Malicious code continues to be a threat to DHS systems. Malware and those who employ it have
become very sophisticated. Malicious code can be tailored to the recipient. This code can be
transferred to an unsuspecting user’s machine by various means, including email, visiting
infected websites, or across a network. These capabilities may be used to steal, alter, or destroy
data; export malicious code to other systems; add backdoors that would permit access to data or
network resources; or prevent the legitimate use of the individual computer or network service.
Instructions for exploiting hardware or software vulnerabilities are often available on hacker sites
within hours of discovery. Skilled hackers routinely target e-commerce sites to obtain credit
card numbers. Persons with hacking skills are often hired to perform espionage activities.
1.8.3

Foreign Threats

Foreign Governments routinely conduct espionage activities to obtain information that will be
useful to their own industrial/government base and operations. They also have the resources to
disrupt Internet communications and have launched successful cyber-attacks.
Eavesdropping on wireless communications with commercially available equipment is common;
it is relatively easy to detect and exploit wireless access points. Employees overseas should
assume that their wireless communications (BlackBerry, cell phone, etc.) are being monitored.
Many software manufacturers outsource software code development, which raises concerns
about whether or not malicious code has been inserted. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly
difficult to determine the actual provenance of an organization’s information systems because
code and equipment are assembled from so many sources.

1.8.4

Lost or Stolen Equipment

Lost or stolen equipment also poses a threat. Data on portable computing devices (laptops, smart
phones, etc.) or storage media (Universal Serial Bus (USB) drives, compact disks (CD), etc.) can
reveal sensitive information, such as changes to legislation, investigations, or economic analyses.
Thefts from offices, airports, automobiles, and hotel rooms occur regularly.
1.8.5

Supply Chain Threats

A supply chain threat is a man-made threat achieved through exploitation of the system’s supply
chain or acquisition process.
A system’s supply chain is composed of the organizations, people, activities, information,
resources, and facilities for designing, creating and moving a product or service from suppliers
through to the integrated system (including its sub-Components), and into service by the original
acquirer.

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

1.9

Changes to Policy

Procedures and guidance for implementing this policy are outlined in a companion publication,
DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook and its attachments. The Handbook serves as a
foundation for Components to use in developing and implementing their information security
programs.
For interpretation or clarification of DHS information security policies found in this policy
document and of the procedures and guidance found in the DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems
Handbook, contact the Director of IT Security Policy and Remediation at
[email protected].
Changes to this policy and to the Handbook may be requested by the form included in DHS
4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook, Attachment P, “Document Change Requests.”

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

1.9.a

The DHS CISO shall be the authority for interpretation, clarification, and
modification of the DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A and DHS
4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook (inclusive of all Attachments and
appendices).

PL-1

1.9.b

The DHS CISO shall update the DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive
4300A and the DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook at least annually.

PL-1

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

2.0

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Security is inherently a Government responsibility. Contractors, others working on behalf of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and other sources may assist in the performance of
security functions, but a DHS employee must always be designated as the responsible agent for
all security requirements and functions. This section outlines the roles and responsibilities for
implementing these requirements.
2.1

Information Security Program Roles

Designated personnel play a major role in the planning and implementation of information
security requirements. Roles directly responsible for information system security are described
in the subsections that follow.
2.1.1

DHS Senior Agency Information Security Officer

Policy
ID
2.1.1.a

DHS Policy Statements
The DHS Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) shall perform the duties
and responsibilities of the DHS Senior Agency Information Security Officer
(SAISO).

v12.01, February 12, 2016

23

Relevant
Controls
PL-1,
PM-2

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

2.1.2

DHS Chief Information Security Officer

The DHS CISO shall implement and manage the DHS Information Security Program to ensure
compliance with applicable Federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, and regulations.
The DHS CISO reports directly to the DHS Chief Information Officer (CIO) and is the principal
advisor on information security matters.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

2.1.2.a

The DHS CISO shall implement and manage the DHS-wide Information
Security Program.

2.1.2.b

The DHS CISO will serve as the CIO’s primary liaison with the organization’s
Authorizing Officials (AO), information System Owners (SO) and Information
Systems Security Officers (ISSO).

Relevant
Controls
PL-1,
PM-2
---

The DHS CISO:
•

Implements and manages the Department-wide Information Security Program and
ensures compliance with the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014
(FISMA), Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directives, and other Federal
requirements.

•

Issues Department-wide information security policy, guidance, and architecture
requirements for all DHS systems, networks, and IS-related supply chains. Security
policies shall incorporate National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
guidance, as well as all applicable OMB memorandums and circulars.

•

Facilitates development of subordinate plans for providing adequate information
security for networks, facilities, and systems or groups of information systems.

•

Serves as the principal Departmental liaison with organizations outside DHS in
matters relating to information security.

•

Establishes and institutionalizes contact with selected groups and associations within
the security community:

a. To facilitate ongoing security education and training for organizational personnel;
b. To maintain currency with recommended security practices, techniques, and
technologies; and
c. To share current security-related information including threats, vulnerabilities, and
incidents.
•

Implements a process for ensuring that organizational plans for conducting security
testing, training, and monitoring activities associated with organizational information
systems: (1) are developed and maintained; and (2) continue to be executed in a
timely manner.

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24

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A
•

Reviews testing, training, and monitoring plans for consistency with the
organizational risk management strategy and organization-wide priorities for risk
response actions.

•

Implements a threat awareness program that includes a cross-organization
information-sharing capability.

•

Reviews and approves the tools, techniques, and methodologies planned for use in
certifying and authorizing DHS systems, and for reporting and managing systemslevel FISMA data. This responsibility includes reviews and approval of Security
Control Assessment plans, Contingency Plans, and security risk assessments.

•

Consults with the DHS Chief Security Officer (CSO) on matters pertaining to
physical security, personnel security, information security, investigations, and
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) systems, as they relate to information
security and infrastructure.

•

Develops and implements procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to
information security incidents.

•

Chairs the CISO Council. The Council is composed of all Component CISOs, and is
the Department’s primary coordination body for any issues associated with
information security policy, management, and operations. Component CISOs and
Information Systems Security Managers (ISSM) will be invited to CISO Council
meetings as required.

•

Maintains a comprehensive inventory of all general support systems (GSS) and major
applications (MA) in use within the Department:
o Security management for every GSS shall be under the direct oversight of either
the DHS CISO (for enterprise systems) or a Component CISO/ISSM (for
Component-specific GSSs).
o MAs must be under the direct control of either a Component CISO or Component
ISSM.

•

Maintains a repository for all Information Assurance (IA) security authorization
process documentation and modifications.

•

Performs security reviews for all planned information systems acquisitions over $2.5
million and for additional selected cases.

•

Provides oversight of all security operations functions within the Department.

•

Maintains classified threat assessment capability in support of security operations.

•

Performs annual program assessments for each of the Components.

•

Performs periodic compliance reviews for selected systems and applications

•

Publishes monthly Compliance Scorecards.

•

Delegates specific authorities and assigns responsibilities to Component CISOs and
ISSMs as appropriate for maintaining a high degree of compliance.

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A
•

Reports annually to the Secretary on the effectiveness of the Department information
security program, including progress of remedial actions. The CISO’s annual report
provides the primary basis for the Secretary’s annual report to both OMB and to the
United States Congress that is required by FISMA.

•

Assists senior Department officials concerning their responsibilities under FISMA.

•

Heads an office with the mission and resources to assist in ensuring Department
compliance with information security requirements.

•

Appoints a DHS employee to serve as the Headquarters CISO.

•

Appoints a DHS employee to serve as the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
CISO.

•

Provides operational direction to the DHS Security Operations Center (SOC).

2.1.3

Component Chief Information Security Officer

The Component CISO implements and manages all aspects of the Component Information
Security Program to ensure compliance with DHS policy and guidance implementing FISMA,
other laws, and Executive Orders. The Component CISO shall report directly to the Component
CIO on matters relating to the security of Component information systems. In order to ensure
continuity of operations and effective devolution, large Components should ensure the
designation of a Deputy CISO with full authorities, to include the roles of Risk Executive and
Security Control Assessor upon the absence of the CISO.
Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

2.1.3.a

Component CISOs shall develop and maintain a Component-wide information
security program in accordance with the DHS security program.

2.1.3.b

All Components shall be accountable to the appropriate CISO. Components
without a fulltime CISO shall be responsible to the HQ CISO.

The following Components shall have a fulltime CISO:
•

Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

•

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

•

Transportation Security Administration (TSA)

•

United States Secret Service (USSS)

•

United States Coast Guard (USCG)

•

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

•

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)

•

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)

v12.01, February 12, 2016

26

Relevant
Controls
PL-1,
PM-2
PM-6
---

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A
•

Headquarters, Department of Homeland Security

•

Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)

•

National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD)

•

Science and Technology (S&T)

Component CISOs shall:
•

Serve as principal advisor on information security matters

•

Report directly to the Component CIO on matters relating to the security of
Component information systems

•

Oversee the Component information security program

•

Ensure that information security-related decisions and information, including updates
to the 4300 series of information security publications, are distributed to the ISSOs
and other appropriate persons within their Component

•

Approve and/or validate all Component information system security reporting

•

Consult with the Component Privacy Officer or Privacy Point of Contact (PPOC) for
reporting and handling of privacy incidents

•

Manage information security resources including oversight and review of security
requirements in funding documents

•

Review and approve the security of hardware and software prior to implementation
into the Component SOC

•

Provide operational direction to the Component SOC

•

Periodically test the security of implemented systems

•

Implement and manage a Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) process for
remediation by creating a POA&M for each known vulnerability

•

Ensure that ISSOs are appointed for each information system managed at the
Component level, and review and approve ISSO appointments

•

Ensure that weekly incident reports are submitted to the DHS SOC

•

Acknowledge receipt of Information System Vulnerability Management (ISVM)
messages, report compliance with requirements or notify the granting of waivers

•

Manage Component firewall rule sets

•

Ensure that Interconnection Security Agreements (ISA) are maintained for all
connections between systems that do not have the same security policy

•

Ensure adherence to the DHS Secure Baseline Configuration Guides (DHS 4300A
Sensitive Systems Handbook)

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27

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A
•

Ensure reporting of vulnerability scanning activities to the DHS SOC, in accordance
with DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook Attachment O, “Vulnerability
Management Program.”

•

Develop and maintain a Component-wide information security program in
accordance with Department policies and guidance

•

Implement Department information security policies, procedures, and control
techniques to ensure that all applicable requirements are met

•

Ensure training and oversight of personnel with significant responsibilities for
information security

•

Oversee the Component’s Security Authorization process for GSSs and MAs

•

Maintain an independent Component-wide assessment program to ensure that there is
a consistent approach to controls effectiveness testing

•

Ensure that an appropriate SOC performs an independent network assessment as part
of the assessment process for each authorized application

•

Ensure that enterprise security tools are utilized

•

Oversee all Component security operations functions, including the Component SOCs

•

Ensure that external providers who operate information systems on behalf of the
Component meet the same security requirements as required for government
information and information systems.

•

Ensure an acceptable level of trust for each external service, either by accepting risk
or by using compensating controls to reduce risk to an acceptable level

•

Ensure that systems engineering lifecycle activities implement processes that include
software assurance and supply chain risk management

•

Issue a Component Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) Plan that defines how
Component programs and systems shall develop and execute their individual SCRM
plans or adopt SCRM into Security Plans

Component CISO qualifications include:
•

Training, experience, and professional skills required to discharge the responsibilities
and functions of the position

•

Ability to maintain a Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI)
clearance

•

Ability to perform information security duties as primary duty

•

Ability to participate in the DHS CISO Council

•

Ability to head an office with the mission and resources to ensure the Component’s
compliance with this Policy Directive

•

Ability to coordinate, develop, implement, and maintain an organization-wide
information security program

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A
•

2.1.4

Ability to serve as the Component Risk Executive
Component Information Systems Security Manager

Components that are not required to have a fulltime CISO shall have a fulltime ISSM. The
ISSM is designated in writing by the Component CIO, with the concurrence of the DHS CISO.
Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

2.1.4.a

Component ISSMs shall serve as the principal interface between the HQ
CISO, Component ISSOs and other security practitioners.

---

2.1.4.b

The Component ISSM shall work directly with the HQ CISO.

---

The ISSM plays a critical role in ensuring that the DHS Information Security Program is
implemented and maintained throughout the Component.
Component ISSMs shall:
•

Oversee the Component information security program

•

Ensure that the Component CIO and DHS CISO are kept informed of all matters
pertaining to the security of information systems

•

Ensure that all communications and publications pertaining to information security,
including updates to the 4300 Policies and Handbooks, are distributed to the ISSOs
and other appropriate persons within their Component

•

Validate all Component information system security reporting

•

Consult with the Component Privacy Officer or PPOC for reporting and handling of
privacy incidents

•

Manage information security resources including oversight and review of security
requirements in funding documents

•

Test the security of the Component’s information systems periodically

•

Implement and manage a POA&M process for remediation by creating a POA&M for
each known vulnerability

•

Ensure that ISSOs are appointed for each Component-managed information system

•

Ensure that weekly incident reports are forwarded to the HQ CISO

•

Acknowledge receipt of ISVM messages, report compliance with requirements, or
notify applicants of the granting of waivers

•

Ensure adherence to the DHS Secure Baseline Configuration Guides (DHS 4300A
Sensitive Systems Handbook)

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A
•

Develop and publish procedures for implementation of DHS information security
policy within the Component

•

Implement Department information security policies, procedures, and control
techniques to address all applicable requirements

•

Ensure training and oversight for personnel with significant responsibilities for
information security

•

Oversee the Security Authorization process for the Component’s MAs

•

Maintain an independent Component-wide security control assessment program to
ensure a consistent approach to controls effectiveness testing

•

Ensure that an appropriate SOC performs an independent network assessment as part
of the security control assessment process for each authorized application

•

Ensure that enterprise security tools are used

•

Ensure that ISSOs monitor and manage the information security aspects of supply
chain risks

•

Ensure that ISSOs adopt software assurance principles and tools

2.1.5

Risk Executive

A Risk Executive ensures that risks are managed consistently across the organization. In
keeping with its organizational structure, DHS has two levels of Risk Executive: Departmental
and Component. The risk executive provides a holistic view of risk beyond that associated with
the operation and use of individual information systems. Risk Executive observations and
analyses are documented and become part of the security authorization decision.
DHS Departmental and Component Risk Executives shall:
•

Ensure that management of security risks related to information systems is consistent
throughout the organization; reflects organizational risk tolerance; and is performed as
part of an organization-wide process that considers other organizational risks affecting
mission and business success

•

Ensure that information security considerations for individual information systems,
including the specific authorization decisions for those systems, are viewed from an
organization-wide perspective with regard to the overall strategic goals and objectives
of the organization

•

Provide visibility into the decisions of AOs and a holistic view of risk to the
organization beyond the risk associated with the operation and use of individual
information systems, including those associated with the supply chain

•

Facilitate the sharing of security-related and risk-related information among AOs and
other senior leaders in the organization in order to help those officials consider all
types of risks that could affect mission and business success and the overall interests
of the organization at large

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A
•

Ensure that System Owners, ISSOs and AOs monitor and manage supply chain risks,
as part of the overall Component risk management strategy.

The DHS Risk Executive develops information security policy, establishes the standards for
system security risk, oversees risk management and monitoring, and approves all waivers to
DHS policy.
Component Risk Executives may establish system security risk standards more stringent than
DHS standards. Risk Executives implement the system security risk management and
monitoring program and submit requests for higher-risk deviations from the enterprise standard.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

2.1.5.a

The DHS CIO shall be the DHS Risk Executive. The DHS CIO has delegated
this authority to the DHS CISO.

PL-1,
PM-9

2.1.5.b

Each Component CIO shall be the Risk Executive for his or her Component.
The Component CIO may delegate this authority to the Component CISO.

PL-1,
PM-9

2.1.5.c

The Risk Executive shall perform duties in accordance with NIST Special
Publication (SP) 800-37.

2.1.6

---

Authorizing Official

The AO formally assumes responsibility for operating an information system at an acceptable
level of risk. He or she shall be a senior management official and a Federal employee or member
of the U.S. military. The AO shall assign the Security Control Assessor for the system.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

2.1.6.a

The DHS CIO shall act as the AO for enterprise information systems,
excluding financial systems, or shall designate an AO in writing for DHS
mission systems and for multi-Component systems without a designated AO.

CA-6

2.1.6.b

The Component CIO shall act as the AO for Component information systems,
excluding financial systems, or shall designate an AO in writing all systems
without a designated AO.

CA-6

2.1.6.c

Every system shall have a designated AO. (An AO may be responsible for
more than one system.)

CA-6

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

2.1.6.d

The AO shall be responsible for review and approval of any individual
requiring administrator privileges. The AO may delegate the performance of
this duty to the appropriate system owner or Program Manager.

AC-2

2.1.6.e

The AO shall be responsible for acceptance of remaining risk to organizational
operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

CA-6

2.1.6.f

The AO shall periodically review security status for all systems under his or
her purview to determine if risk remains acceptable.

CA-6

2.1.6.g

The AO shall perform additional duties in accordance with NIST SP 800-37.

CA-6

2.1.7

Security Control Assessor

The Security Control Assessor is a senior management official whose responsibilities include
certifying the results of the security control assessment. A Security Control Assessor is assigned
in writing to each information system by the Component CISO. The Security Control Assessor
and the team conducting a certification must be impartial. They must be free from any perceived
or actual conflicts of interest with respect to the developmental, operational, and or management
chains of command associated with the information system; or with respect to the determination
of security control effectiveness.
For systems with low impact, a Security Control Assessor and/or certifying team does not need
to be independent so long as assessment results are carefully reviewed and analyzed by an
independent team of experts to validate their completeness, consistency, and truthfulness.
The AO decides the required level of assessor independence based on:
•

The criticality and sensitivity of the information system

•

The ultimate risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, and individuals

•

The level of assessor independence required for confidence that the assessment
results are sound and valid for making credible risk-based decisions

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

2.1.7.a

The Component CISO shall serve as Security Control Assessor when no other
person has been officially designated.

CA-2

2.1.7.b

A Security Control Assessor may be responsible for more than one system.

CA-2

2.1.7.c

The Security Control Assessor may take the lead for any or all remedial
actions.

CA-7

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID
2.1.7d

2.1.8

DHS Policy Statements
The Security Control Assessor provides an assessment of the severity of
weaknesses or deficiencies in the information systems, and prepares the final
security control assessment report containing the results and findings from the
assessment but not making a risk determination.

Relevant
Controls
CA-7

Information Systems Security Officer

An ISSO performs security actions for an information system. Only one ISSO is assigned to a
system, but multiple Alternate ISSOs may be designated to assist the ISSO.
While the ISSO performs security functions, responsibility for information system security
always rests with the System Owner.
See DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook, Attachment C, “Information Systems Security
Officer (ISSO) Designation Letter.”

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

2.1.8.a

An ISSO shall be designated for every information system and serve as the
point of contact (POC) for all security matters related to that system.

PL-1

2.1.8.b

An ISSO shall ensure the implementation and maintenance of security controls
in accordance with the Security Plan (SP) and DHS policies.

PL-1

2.1.8.c

ISSOs shall be federal or contractor employees whose background
investigations have been completed in accordance with Section 4 of this
Policy.

PL-1

2.1.8.d

An ISSO may be assigned to more than one system.

PL-1

2.1.8.e

ISSO duties shall not be assigned as collateral duties unless approved by the
Component CISO.

PL-1

2.1.8.f

The ISSO shall have been granted a clearance and access greater than or equal
to the highest level of information contained on the system. It is strongly
encouraged that ISSOs be cleared to the Secret level in order to facilitate
intelligence sharing among information security professionals.

---

2.1.8.g

The ISSO shall ensure that timely responses are provided to Infrastructure
Change Control Board (ICCB) change request packages.

---

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33

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

2.1.9

Ongoing Authorization Manager and Operational Risk Management Board

Each Component shall have an Ongoing Authorization (OA) Manager responsible for evaluating
and tracking security events for systems operating under the DHS OA Program. Component OA
Managers:
•

Account for Component risk threshold

•

Ensure that Component Risk Executives[see Sec. 2.1.5] are made aware of new risks
and security issues

•

Facilitate collaboration of the Component IT Security Subject Matter Experts (SME)
that serve on the Operational Risk Management Board (ORMB). Component ORMBs
determine the criticality of security triggers and the impact of triggers on the security
posture of Component systems that are in OA. The ORMB determines the level of
each trigger’s visibility and recommends to the Component CISO and AO as
adjudicators the actions required to mitigate the risks introduced. Refer to the DHS
Ongoing Authorization Methodology for more information regarding the ORMB.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

2.1.9.a

An OA Manager shall be designated for every Component by the Component
CISO and serve as the Point of Contact (POC) for all ongoing risk
management for all Component systems enrolled in the OA Program.

PL-1

2.1.9.b

OA Manager duties may be assigned as collateral duties for personnel with
existing security responsibilities.

PL-1

2.1.9.c

The OA Manager shall have been granted a security clearance and access
greater than or equal to the highest level of information contained in
Component systems.

---

2.1.9.d

The OA Manager shall ensure that timely analysis (as outlined by the DHS OA
Methodology) of identified security events or triggers is provided to the
Component ORMB in support of an accountable environment between the
ORMB and the OA Manager.

---

2.1.9.e

The Component CISO shall appoint the Chair of the Component ORMB.

---

2.1.9.f

The OA Manager or designee shall be responsible for tracking security events
in the monthly Trigger Accountability Log (TRAL), communicating and
recording recommendations for Component CISO consumption, and ensuring
at least quarterly communication with the AO on system risks.

---

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

2.1.10 DHS Security Operations Center
The DHS Enterprise SOC (DHS SOC) is charged to act as a single point for DHS enterprisewide cyber situational awareness. As such, DHS Enterprise SOC provides incident management
oversight for all incidents detected and reported from all sources. DHS Enterprise SOC also
provides the first line of active defense against all cyber threats by monitoring all perimeter
network gateways. Lastly, DHS Enterprise SOC oversees the department-wide vulnerability
management program.
The DHS SOC has functional, advisory, and reporting responsibilities that include the following:
•

Review all reported incidents and verify that all pertinent information is recorded,
confirmed, and that closure occurs only after all remediation and reporting activities
have occurred in accordance with this Policy Directive.

•

Focus 24x7 monitoring efforts on shared DHS infrastructure such as the Trusted
Internet Connection (TIC), Policy Enforcement Points (PEP), Email Security
Gateway (EMSG), Demilitarized Zones (DMZ), Virtual Private Networks (VPN) and
other devices as required by DHS CISOs to identify security events of interest that
require confirmation, escalation, or declaration as false positive.

•

Create Security Event Notifications (SEN) based on monitoring and analysis
activities when events of interest are identified that require further investigation.

•

Provide oversight on investigational activities and review SENs prior to escalation.
SENs will be escalated when Components have sufficiently demonstrated that
adequate investigation has been performed and that the event is a verified incident.
The Component must provide necessary information regarding the event in
accordance with the escalation criteria outlined in Appendix F3, “Response
Guidelines”.

•

Review all SENs for closure and close SENs after all reasonable investigational
activities have been completed.

•

Conduct operations and maintenance and approve changes on all security monitoring
devices associated with shared DHS infrastructure (such as Intrusion Detection
System (IDS), Data Loss Prevention (DLP).

•

Provide oversight and guidance for all incidents to ensure adherence to DHS
Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A.

•

Serve as the primary clearinghouse and collection point for information related to
incidents involving DHS systems or networks.

•

Coordinate privacy and security incident handling activities with DHS entities such as
the DHS Office of Security and the DHS Privacy Office.

•

Ensure that remediation and all necessary coordination activities are completed before
incident closure.

•

Analyze incidents, identifying and notifying other stakeholders and DHS Components
and Data Center SOCs that may be affected.

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A
•

Provide technical and investigative assistance to Components and Data Center SOCS
as needed.

•

Provide accurate and timely reports to the DHS CISO on significant incidents and on
the status of DHS enterprise computer security.

•

Develop and maintain an incident database that contains information on all
discovered and reported incidents.

•

Provide automated incident notification and reporting to senior DHS and Component
leadership and stakeholders such as the DHS Privacy Office and the DHS Office of
Security, as well as external reporting entities such as the United States Computer
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT).

•

Update US-CERT on incident status as required.

•

Facilitate communications between DHS Components and Data Center SOCS (when
applicable) for those incidents involving more than one Component (i.e., Master
incidents).

•

Provide ad hoc incident trending reports as requested by the DHS CISO.

2.1.11 DHS Component Security Operations Centers
Component SOCs have functional, advisory, and reporting responsibilities in incident response
that include the following:
•

Focus security monitoring efforts on the Component network.

•

Compile and maintain a list of mission-critical systems, financial systems, and
applications. The list will assist in determining the classification of the Component’s
systems, and in prioritization of security incidents.

•

Component SOCs shall develop and publish internal computer security incident
response plans and incident handling procedures, with copies provided to the DHS
Enterprise SOC upon request.

•

Investigate SENS and Incidents created by the DHS Enterprise SOC and comply with
reporting timelines and escalation criteria outlined in DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems
Handbook Attachment F, “Incident Response,” Appendix F3, “Response Guidelines”
to either escalate the SEN or close it.

•

Monitor internal network enclave traffic such as firewall logs and Network IDS) and
host-based security events (e.g. audit logs and Host-based Intrusion Prevention
Systems (IPS) and IDS). This includes workstation activity, internal server enclaves,
Component-managed externally accessible applications and networks (e.g. DMZ,
VPN), and applications hosted by third parties external to DHS.

•

Request SEN escalation by the DHS Enterprise SOC, within the reporting timeframes
and meeting the escalation criteria outlined in DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems
Handbook Attachment F, “Incident Response,” Appendix F3, “Response Guidelines.”

•

Conduct SEN and incident investigation including traceback to the host.

v12.01, February 12, 2016

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

2.2

•

Request closure when a SEN has been identified as inconclusive or as a false positive
after providing adequate explanation of investigational activities via the Enterprise
Operations Center Portal (EOConline).

•

Respond to DHS ENTERPRISE SOC on SEN investigation activities based on the
escalation criteria in DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook Attachment F,
“Incident Response,” Appendix F3, “Response Guidelines.”

•

Ensure 24x7 incident handling function exists for the Component.

•

Lead the Component’s incident handling and response activities, including
identification, investigation, containment, eradication, and recovery. Coordinate
incident response, investigation, and reporting to the DHS Enterprise SOC.
Reporting should include all significant data, such as the who, what, when, where,
why, and how of a given incident. Coordinate incident handling activities with
internal Component entities such as the Component Office of Security, Component
Privacy Office, and Internal Affairs.

•

Coordinate Component-level remediation efforts as mandated by DHS security
policies and communicate remediation activity to DHS Enterprise SOC through
EOConline log entries.

•

Share applicable information Department-wide or Component-wide, for example by
providing network and host-based indicators for malicious logic incidents; such
indicators will facilitate implementation of proactive measures to prevent future
incidents.

•

Provide updates to the DHS Enterprise SOC for significant incidents whenever
additional information becomes available.

•

Request closure of incidents when Component remediation and mitigation actions
have concluded.

•

Assist other Components with technical or investigation assistance as requested by
the DHS Enterprise SOC.

•

Use security automation tools and technologies that facilitate efficient machine and
human data exchange with the DHS SOC, with the National Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), and with peer SOCs to the maximum
extent possible.

Other Roles

Roles related to but not directly responsible for information system security are described in the
subsections that follow.
2.2.1

Secretary of Homeland Security

The Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for fulfilling the Department’s mission,
which includes ensuring that DHS information systems and their data are protected in
accordance with Congressional and Presidential directives. The Secretary’s role with respect to
information system security is to allocate adequate resources.
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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

To that end, the Secretary:
•

Ensures that DHS implements its Information Security Program throughout the life
cycle of each DHS system

•

Submits the following to the Director, OMB:
o

The DHS CIO’s assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of the
Department’s information security procedures, practices, and FISMA compliance

o

The results of an annual independent information security program evaluation
performed by the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG)

o

The Senior Agency Official for Privacy’s (SAOP) annual assessment of the
Department’s privacy policies, procedures, and practices

•

Provides information security protection commensurate with the risk and magnitude
of the harm that could result from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption,
modification, or destruction of information collected or maintained by or on behalf of
the Department, and on information systems used or operated by the Department, or
by a contractor or other organization on behalf of the Department

•

Ensures that an information security program is developed, documented, and
implemented to provide security for all systems, networks, and data that support the
Department’s operations

•

Ensures that information security processes are integrated with strategic and
operational planning processes to secure the Department’s mission

•

Ensures that the Department’s senior officials have the necessary authority to secure
the operations and assets under their control

•

Delegates authority to the CIO to ensure compliance with applicable information
security requirements

2.2.2

Under Secretaries and Heads of DHS Components

The Under Secretaries and Heads of DHS Components are responsible for oversight of their
Components’ information security program, including the appointment of CIOs.
Undersecretaries and Heads of Components allocate adequate resources to information systems
for information system security.

Policy
ID
2.2.2.a

DHS Policy Statements
The Under Secretaries of Homeland Security and Heads of Components shall
ensure that information systems and their data are sufficiently protected.

Under Secretaries and the Heads of DHS Components:
v12.01, February 12, 2016

38

Relevant
Controls
PL-1

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A
•

Appoint CIOs

•

Ensure that an Information Security Program is established and managed in
accordance with DHS policy and implementation directives

•

Ensure that the security of information systems is an integral part of the life cycle
management process for all information systems developed and maintained within
their Components

•

Ensure that adequate funding for information security is provided for Component
information systems and that adequate funding requirements are included for all
information systems budgets

•

Ensure that information system data are entered into the appropriate DHS Security
Management Tools to support DHS information security oversight and FISMA
reporting requirements

•

Ensure that the requirements for an information security performance metrics
program are implemented and the resulting data maintained and reported

2.2.3

DHS Chief Information Officer

The DHS CIO is the senior agency executive responsible for all DHS information systems and
their security as well as for ensuring FISMA compliance.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

2.2.3.a

The DHS CIO shall develop and maintain the DHS Information Security
Program.

PL-1,
PM-7,
PM-8

2.2.3.b

The DHS CIO designates the DHS CISO.

PL-1

The DHS CIO:
•

Heads the office with the mission and resources to assist in ensuring Component
compliance with the DHS Information Security Program

•

Oversees the development and maintenance of a Department-wide information
security program

•

Appoints in writing a DHS employee to serve as the DHS CISO

•

As appropriate, serves as or appoints in writing the AO for DHS enterprise
information systems.

•

Ensures the development of DHS performance plans, including descriptions of the
time periods and budget, staffing, and training resources required to implement the
Department-wide security program

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A
•

Ensures that all information systems acquisition documents, including existing
contracts, include appropriate information security requirements and comply with
DHS information security policies

•

Ensures that DHS security programs integrate fully into the DHS enterprise
architecture and capital planning and investment control processes

•

Ensures that System Owners understand and appropriately address risks, including
supply chain risk and risks arising from interconnectivity with other programs and
systems outside their control

•

Reviews and evaluates the DHS Information Security Program annually

•

Ensures that an information security performance metrics program is developed,
implemented, and funded

•

Reports to the DHS Under Secretary for Management on matters relating to the
security of DHS systems

•

Ensures compliance with applicable information security requirements

•

Implements firewall changes as requested by DHS and Component CISOs

•

Coordinates and advocates resources for enterprise security solutions

•

Leads the DHS Contingency Planning program

2.2.4

Component Chief Information Officer

The Component CIO is responsible for Component information systems and their security as
well as for ensuring FISMA compliance within the Component.

Policy
ID
2.2.4.a

DHS Policy Statements
The Component CIO shall develop and maintain the Component Information
Security Program.

Relevant
Controls
PL-1,
PM-1

Component CIOs:
•

Establish and oversee their Component information security programs

•

Direct a review of the Component information security program plan be performed
with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually

•

Ensure that an AO has been appointed for every Component information system;
serves as the AO for any information system for which no AO has been appointed or
where a vacancy exists

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A
•

Ensure that information security concerns are addressed by Component Configuration
Control Boards, Enterprise Architecture Board (EAB), Acquisition Review Board
(ARB), and Investment Review Board (IRB)

•

Ensure that an accurate information systems inventory is established and maintained

•

Ensure that all information systems acquisition documents, including existing
contracts, include appropriate information security requirements and comply with
DHS information security policies

•

Ensure that System Owners understand and appropriately address risks, including
supply chain risk and risks arising from interconnectivity with other programs and
systems outside their control

•

Ensure that an information security performance metrics program is developed,
implemented, and funded

•

Advise the DHS CIO of any issues regarding infrastructure protection, vulnerabilities
or the possibility of public concern

•

Ensure that incidents are reported to the DHS SOC within the timeframes defined in
Attachment F, “Incident Response” of the DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook

•

Work with the DHS CIO and Public Affairs Office in preparation for public release of
security incident information. The DHS CIO, or designated representative, has sole
responsibility for public release of security incident information.

•

Ensure compliance with DHS information systems security policy

•

Coordinate and advocate resources for information security enterprise solutions

CIOs of the following Components shall appoint a CISO that reports directly to the Component
CIO and shall ensure that the CISO has resources to assist with Component compliance with
policy. CISOs shall be DHS employees.
•

CBP

•

FEMA

•

FLETC

•

ICE

•

TSA

•

USCIS

•

USCG

•

USSS

CIOs of all other Components shall:
•

Ensure that Component ISSMs have been appointed

•

Provide the resources and qualified personnel to ensure Component compliance with
DHS security policy

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

2.2.5

DHS Chief Security Officer

The DHS CSO implements and manages the DHS Security Program for DHS facilities and
personnel.
The CSO is a senior agency official who reports directly to the Deputy Secretary on all matters
pertaining to facility and personnel security within the DHS.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

2.2.5.a

DHS information systems that control physical access shall be approved by the
DHS CSO to operate in accordance with this policy document, whether they
connect to other DHS information systems or not.

CA-1

2.2.5.b

The DHS CSO shall be the AO for all systems automating or supporting
physical access controls or shall appoint an AO for each of those systems.

CA-6

2.2.6

DHS Chief Privacy Officer

The DHS Chief Privacy Officer is the head of the DHS Privacy Office and is responsible for
establishing, overseeing the implementation of, and issuing guidance on DHS privacy policy.
The DHS Chief Privacy Officer ensures that the Department’s use of technology sustains, and
does not erode, privacy protections relating to the collection, use, maintenance, disclosure,
deletion, and/or destruction of Personally Identifiable Information (PII). The responsibilities of
the DHS Chief Privacy Officer include oversight of all privacy activities within the Department,
and ensuring compliance with privacy laws, regulations, and policies.
The DHS Chief Privacy Officer coordinates with the CIO and the CISO to provide guidance
regarding information technology and technology-related programs and to develop and
implement policies and procedures to safegaurd PII used or maintained by the Department in
accordance with federal law and policy.
The DHS Chief Privacy Officer coordinates with Component Privacy Officers and Privacy
PPOC with policy compliance at the Component level.

Policy
ID
2.2.6.a

DHS Policy Statements
The DHS Chief Privacy Officer shall review all Privacy Threshold Analyses
(PTA), Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA), and System of Records Notices
(SORN), providing approval as appropriate.

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42

Relevant
Controls
AR-2,
PL-1,

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

2.2.6.b

The DHS Chief Privacy Officer shall lead and oversee the implementation of
and compliance with the NIST SP 800-53 Appendix J, “Privacy Control
Catalog.” Implementation of Appendix J controls is in coordination with the
CIO, CISO, program officials, legal counsel, and others as appropriate. No
Authority to Operate (ATO) shall be issued without the DHS Chief Privacy
Officer’s approval signifying that a system is in compliance with NIST SP
800-53 Appendix J.

AR-1

2.2.6.c

The DHS Chief Privacy Officer shall establish and chairs a Data Integrity
Board to review all Computer Matching Agreements (CMA).

DI-2

2.2.6.d

The DHS Chief Privacy Officer shall ensure that the public has access to
information about DHS privacy activities and is able to communicate with
DHS Privacy Officials; and shall ensure that privacy practices are publicly
available through DHS’ public facing website.

TR-3

2.2.6.e

The DHS Chief Privacy Officer monitors and audits privacy controls and
internal privacy policy during the privacy compliance process to ensure
effective implementation.

AR-4

2.2.6.f

The DHS Chief Privacy Officer implements a process for receiving and
responding to complaints, concerns, or questions from individuals about DHS’
privacy practices.

IP-4

The DHS Chief Privacy Officer, as the SAOP:
•

Develops, implements, and maintains a Department-wide governance and privacy
program to ensure compliance with all applicable laws and regulations regarding the
collection, use, maintenance, sharing, and disposal of PII by programs and
information systems

•

Monitors federal privacy laws and policy for changes that affect the privacy program

•

Allocates sufficient resources to implement and operate the Department-wide privacy
program

•

Develops a strategic Department privacy plan for implementing applicable privacy
controls, policies, and procedures

•

Develops, disseminates, and implements operational privacy policies and procedures
that govern the appropriate privacy and security controls for programs, information
systems, or technologies involving PII

•

Updates privacy plans, policies, and procedures biennially

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43

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A
•

Oversees privacy incident management, to include providing guidance to
Components, and where appropriate coordination with Components responding to
suspected or confirmed privacy incidents

•

Coordinates with the DHS CIO, DHS CISO, the DHS SOC, and senior management
regarding privacy incidents

•

Convenes and chairs incident response teams, such as the Privacy Incident Response
Team (PIRT) and the Core Management Group (CMG)

•

Reviews and approves all Department Privacy Compliance Documentation,
including PTAs, PIAs, and SORNs

•

Designates Privacy Sensitive Systems as part of the Risk Management Framework
based on approved PTAs. Privacy Sensitive Systems are those that maintain PII

•

Ensures that the Department meets all reporting requirements mandated by Congress
or OMB regarding DHS activities that involve PII or otherwise impact privacy

•

Provides department-wide annual and refresher privacy training

2.2.7

DHS Chief Financial Officer

The DHS Chief Financial Officer (CFO) implements and manages the DHS Financial Program,
including oversight of DHS financial systems. The DHS CFO designates financial systems and
oversees security control definitions for financial systems.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

2.2.7.a

The DHS CFO, or their designee, shall be the AO for applicable financial
systems or mixed financial systems and oversee security control definitions for
those systems.

CA-6

2.2.7.b

The DHS CFO has directed that the Component CFO shall be the AO for all
applicable financial mission applications managed at the Component level.

CA-6

2.2.7.c

The DHS CFO shall designate the financial systems that fall under the DHS
CFO-mandated policy statements.

CA-6

2.2.7.d

The DHS CFO shall publish a comprehensive list of designated financial
systems during the fourth quarter of every fiscal year. (This list shall be
referred to as the CFO Designated Systems List.)

CA-6

All systems on the CFO Designated Systems List are required to comply with the policies
defined in Sections 3.5.1 and 3.15.

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

2.2.8

Program Managers

Program Managers ensure compliance with applicable Federal laws and DHS policy directives
governing the security, operation, maintenance, and privacy protection of information systems,
information, projects, and programs under their control.
Program Managers are responsible for program-level POA&Ms that may impact one or more
systems.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

2.2.8.a

Program Managers shall ensure that program POA&Ms are prepared and
maintained.

CA-5,
PM-4

2.2.8.b

Program Managers shall prioritize security weaknesses for mitigation.

CA-5

2.2.8.c

Program Managers shall provide copies of program POA&Ms to affected
System Owners.

CA-5,
PM-4

2.2.8.d

Program Managers shall ensure that POA&Ms address the following:
 known vulnerabilities in the information system
 the security categorization of the information system
 the specific weaknesses or deficiencies in the information system
security controls
 the importance of the identified security control weakness or
deficiencies
 the Component’s proposed risk mitigation approach, while addressing
the identified weaknesses or deficiencies in the security controls and
the rationale for accepting certain weaknesses or deficiencies in the
security controls

CA-5
PM-4

2.2.8.e

Program Managers shall determine and document the legal authority that
permits the collection, use, maintenance, and sharing of PII, either generally or
in support of a specific program or information system need.

AP-1

2.2.8.f

Program Managers shall ensure compliance with SCRM Plans and consider
supply chain risks, as identified by the System Owner, when prioritizing
security weaknesses for mitigation.

2.2.9

---

System Owners

System Owners use Information Technology (IT) to help achieve the mission needs within their
program area of responsibility. They are responsible for the successful operation of the
information systems and programs within their program area and are ultimately accountable for
their security. For proper administration of security, an shall be designated in writing for each
system by the AO.
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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

2.2.9.a

System Owners shall ensure that each of their systems is deployed and
operated in accordance with this policy document.

PL-1

2.2.9.b

System Owners shall ensure that an ISSO is designated in writing for each
information system under their purview.

PL-1

2.2.9.c

There shall be only one System Owner designated for each DHS system.

PL-1

2.2.9.d

The System Owner shall ensure information security compliance, development
and maintenance of security plans, user security training, notifying officials of
the need for security authorization and need to resource.

CA-2

2.2.9.e

System Owners shall ensure development of a POA&M to address weaknesses
and deficiencies in the information system and its operating environment.

CA-2

2.2.9.f

The DHS CIO shall designate a System Owner in writing for DHS mission
systems and for multi-Component systems.

---

2.2.9.g

The Component CIO shall designate an AO in writing for Component systems.

---

2.2.9.h

Where systems or programs provide common controls, the System Owners
shall ensure that a security control assessment is completed in the Information
Assurance Compliance System (IACS) for those common controls.

---

2.2.9.i

System Owners shall ensure that risk management activities include addressing
supply chain risks for the system’s current and all subsequent lifecycle phases
and documenting this activity in the SCRM Plan.

---

2.2.10 Common Control Provider
The Common Control Provider is an organizational official responsible for planning,
development, implementation, assessment, authorization, and maintenance of common controls.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

2.2.10.a

The Common Control Provider shall document all common controls and
submit them to the AO.

PM-1

2.2.10.b

The Common Control Provider ensures that required assessments of common
controls are carried out by qualified assessors with the appropriate level of
independence.

PM-1

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46

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

2.2.10.c

The Common Control Provider documents assessment findings in a Security
Assessment Report (SAR).

PM-1

2.2.10.d

The Common Control Provider ensures that POA&Ms are developed for all
controls having weaknesses or deficiencies.

PM-4

2.2.10.e

The Common Control Provider shall make available security plans, SARs, and
POA&Ms for common controls to information System Owners inheriting
those controls after the information is reviewed and approved by a senior
official.

PM-1,
PM-4

2.2.11 DHS Employees, Contractors, and Others Working on Behalf of DHS
DHS employees, contractors, and others working on behalf of the DHS or its agencies shall
follow the appropriate set(s) of rules of behavior.
Policy
ID
2.2.11.a

DHS Policy Statements
DHS users shall follow prescribed rules of behavior. (See DHS 4300A
Sensitive Systems Handbook, Attachment G, “Rules of Behavior.”

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47

Relevant
Controls
PL-4

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

3.0

MANAGEMENT POLICIES

3.1

Basic Requirements

Basic security management principles must be followed in order to ensure the security of
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) information resources. These principles are applicable
throughout the Department and form the cornerstone of the DHS Information Security Program.
Component Chief Information Security Officers (CISO) and Information Systems Security
Managers (ISSM) shall submit all security reports concerning DHS systems to the Component
senior official or designated representative. Component CISOs/ISSMs shall interpret and
manage DHS security policies and procedures to meet Federal, Departmental, and Component
requirements. Component CISOs/ISSMs shall also answer data queries from the DHS CISO and
develop and manage information security guidance and procedures unique to Component
requirements.
Information Systems Security Officers (ISSO) are the primary points of contact for the
information systems assigned to them. They develop and maintain Security Plans (SP) and are
responsible for overall system security.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.1.a

Every DHS computing resource (desktop, laptop, server, wireless mobile
device, etc.) shall be individually accounted for as part of a FISMA 1Inventoried information system.

CM-8

3.1.b

The Component Chief Information Officer (CIO), in cooperation with each of
the Component’s senior officials, shall ensure that every DHS computing
resource is identified as an information system or as a part of an information
system, either as an Major Application (MA) or as a General Support System
(GSS).

CM-8

3.1.c

The System Owner or designee shall develop and maintain a Security Plan
(SP) for each information system. Component Authorizing Officials (AO)
shall review and approve SPs.

PL-2

3.1.d

An ISSO shall be designated for every information system and serve as the
Point of Contact (POC) for all security matters related to that system.

PL-1

3.1.e

Component information security programs shall be structured to support DHS
and applicable FISMA, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and other
Federal requirements.

PL-1

1 FISMA: Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, Public Law 113-283
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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

3.2

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.1.f

Information security reports regarding DHS systems shall be submitted to the
Senior Component official or designated representative.

---

3.1.g

Component CISOs/ISSMs shall ensure that their information systems comply
with the DHS Enterprise Architecture (EA) Technical Reference Model
(TRM) and Security Architecture (SA) or, for deviations, maintain a waiver
approved by the DHS CIO or CISO.

PL-1,
PM-1
SA-1

3.1.h

The DHS CISO shall issue department-wide information security policy,
guidance, and information security architecture requirements for all DHS
systems.

CM-2,
CM-6

3.1.i

Component CISOs shall implement DHS information security policies,
procedures, and control techniques to meet all applicable requirements.

PL-1,
PM-1

3.1.j

Component CISOs shall develop and manage information security guidance
and procedures unique to Component requirements.

PL-1,
PM-1

3.1.k

Security-relevant management processes and tools shall comply with
applicable NIST-standard protocols and conventions as described in NIST SP
800-126, The Technical Specification for the Security Content Automation
Protocol (SCAP), including the Common Platform Enumeration (CPE),
Common Configuration Enumeration (CCE), and Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVE)

RA-5,
SI-2,
CM-6

Capital Planning and Investment Control

Information security is a business driver and any risks found through security testing are
ultimately business risks. Information security personnel should be involved, to the maximum
extent possible, in all aspects of the acquisition process, including drafting contracts, and
procurement documents. DHS Management Directive (MD) 102-01 Rev. 2, Acquisition
Management Directive and DHS MD 4200.1, IT Capital Planning and Investment Control
(CPIC) and Portfolio Management provide additional information on these requirements.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.2.a

System Owners shall include information security requirements in their CPIC
business cases for the current budget year and for the Future Years Homeland
Security Program (FYHSP) for each DHS system.

PM-3,
PM-11,
SA-1

3.2.b

System Owners or AOs shall ensure that information security requirements
and Plans of Action and Milestones (POA&M) are adequately funded,
resourced and documented in accordance with current OMB budgetary
guidance.

PM-3,
PM-4,
SA-2

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

3.3

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.2.c

Component Investment Review Boards (IRB) and Acquisition Review Boards
(ARB) shall not approve any capital investment in which the information
security requirements, including those that address supply chain threats, are
not adequately defined and funded.

PM-3,
SA-2

3.2.d

The DHS CISO shall perform security reviews for planned information system
acquisitions over $2.5 million, and in selected additional cases.

SA-1

3.2.e

Components shall ensure that information security requirements as described
in this Policy Directive are met in the acquisition of all DHS systems and
services used to input, process, store, display, or transmit sensitive
information.

SA-4

3.2.f

Procurement authorities throughout the Department shall enforce the
provisions of the Homeland Security Acquisition Regulation (HSAR).

SA-1,
SA-4

3.2.g

Procurements for services and products involving facility or system access
control shall be in accordance with DHS guidance regarding Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12) implementation.

---

Contractors and Outsourced Operations

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.3.a

All Statements of Work (SOW) and contract vehicles shall identify and
document the specific security requirements for information system services
and operations required of the contractor.

SA-4

3.3.b

Contractor information system services and operations shall adhere to all
applicable DHS information security policies.

SA-9

3.3.c

Requirements shall address how sensitive information is to be handled and
protected at contractor sites, including any information stored, processed, or
transmitted using contractor information systems. Requirements shall also
include requirements for personnel background investigations and clearances,
and facility security.

SA-9

3.3.d

SOWs and contracts shall include a provision stating that, when the contract
ends, the contractor shall return all information and information resources
provided during the life of the contract and certify that all DHS information
has been purged from any contractor-owned system(s) that have been used to
process DHS information.

SA-4

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.3.e

Components shall conduct reviews to ensure that information security
requirements and provisions to address supply chain risk are included in
contract language and that the requirements and provisions are met throughout
the life of the contract.

SA-1

3.3.f

Security deficiencies in any outsourced operation shall require creation of a
program-level POA&M.

SA-9,
PM-4

3.3.g

Components shall require contractors to apply information system security
engineering principles in the specification, design, development,
implementation, and modification of information systems, in accordance with
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication
(SP) 800-27, Engineering Principles for Information Technology Security.

SA-8

3.3.h

For systems with high or moderate impact for any of the Federal Information
Processing Standard 199 (FIPS 199) security objectives, Components shall
require developers of an information system, system Components, or
information system services to:

SA-10

a. Perform Configuration Management (CM) during system, system
Component, or service development and implementation
b. Document, manage, and control the integrity of changes to items under
CM
c. Implement only organization-approved changes to the system, system
Component, or service
d. Document approved changes to the system, system Component, or
service and the potential security impacts of such changes
e. Track security flaws and flaw resolution within the system, system
Component, or service and report findings to the DHS SOC.
3.3.i

For systems with high or moderate impact for any of the FIPS 199 security
objectives, Components shall require developer of information systems,
system Components, or information system services to:
a. Create and implement a security assessment plan
b. Perform: unit; integration; system; regression testing/evaluation
commensurate with the volume and complexity of modifications and
the impact to the system risk made by those modifications
c. Produce evidence of the execution of the security assessment plan and
the results of the security testing/evaluation
d. Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process
e. Correct flaws identified during security testing/evaluation.

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SA-11

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID
3.3.j

3.4

DHS Policy Statements
All SOW, contract vehicles, and other acquisition-related documents shall
include privacy requirements and establish privacy roles, responsibilities, and
access requirements for contractors and service providers.

AR-3

Performance Measures and Metrics

Policy
ID

3.5

Relevant
Controls

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.4.a

The DHS CISO shall define performance measures to evaluate the
effectiveness of the DHS information security program.

---

3.4.b

Components shall provide OMB FISMA data at least monthly to the DHS
Compliance Officer.

---

3.4.c

The DHS CISO shall report annually to the Secretary on the effectiveness of
the DHS information security program, including the progress of remedial
actions.

---

3.4.d

Components shall use the automated tool specified by the DHS CISO for
Performance Plan reporting.

---

3.4.e

The DHS CISO shall collect OMB FISMA data from Components at least
quarterly and provide FISMA reports to OMB.

AR-6

Continuity Planning for Critical DHS Assets

The Continuity Planning for Critical DHS Assets Program is vital to the success of the DHS
Information Security Program. The Business Impact Assessment (BIA) is essential in the
identification of critical DHS assets. Once critical systems are identified, continuity planning
shall address the following two different but complementary elements:
•

Continuity of Operations Planning (COOP)

•

Contingency Planning (CP)

3.5.1

Continuity of Operations Planning

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.5.1.a

When available, a DHS-wide process for continuity of operations planning
shall be used in order to ensure continuity of operations under all
circumstances.

CP-2

3.5.1.b

Components shall develop, test, implement, and maintain comprehensive
COOPs to ensure the recovery and continuity of essential DHS functionalities.

CP-2,
CP-4

3.5.1.c

All CISOs/ISSMs shall ensure that all COOPs under their purview are tested
and exercised annually.

CP-4

3.5.1.d

All Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Designated Systems requiring high
availability shall be identified in COOP plans and exercises.

CP-1

3.5.1.e

All personnel involved in COOP efforts shall be identified and trained in the
procedures and logistics of COOP development and implementation.

AT-3,
CP-3

3.5.1.f

To ensure that accounts can be created in the absence of the usual account
approval authority, systems that are part of the Critical DHS Assets Program
shall have provisions to allow a Component CISO/ISSM or Component CIO to
approve new user accounts as part of a COOP scenario.

AC-2

3.5.1.g

Each Component shall compile and maintain a list of mission essential
information systems in support of COOP.

CM-8,
CP-1

3.5.1.h

The DHS and Component CISOs/ISSMs shall ensure preparation and
maintenance of plans and procedures to provide continuity of operations for
information systems.

CP-1

3.5.1.i

DHS information systems that are part of the DHS Continuity Planning for
Critical DHS Assets Program shall be provided requirements for system-level
contingency planning by a Component Contingency Planning Program Office
or by a DHS Contingency Planning Program Office.

3.5.2

Contingency Planning

Policy
ID
3.5.2.a

---

DHS Policy Statements
The DHS CIO shall provide guidance, direction, and authority for a standard
DHS-wide process for contingency planning for information systems.

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Relevant
Controls
CP-1

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.5.2.b

System Owners shall develop and document information system Contingency
Plans (CPs) for their information systems, manage plan changes, and distribute
copies of the plan to key contingency personnel. Component CIOs shall
review and approve Component-level information system CPs.

CP-1,
CP-2

3.5.2.c

Components shall ensure implementation of backup policy and procedures for
every Component information system.

CP-9

3.5.2.d

The DHS CIO shall ensure that each DHS system has contingency capabilities
commensurate with the availability security objective. The minimum
contingency capabilities for each impact level are as follows:

CP-1

High impact – System functions and information have a high priority for
recovery after a short period of loss.
Moderate impact – System functions and information have a moderate
priority for recovery after a moderate period of loss.
Low impact – System functions and information have a low priority for
recovery after prolonged loss.
3.5.2.e

CPs shall be developed and maintained by all DHS Components in accordance
with the requirements for the FIPS 199 potential impact level for the
availability security objective. These plans shall be based on three essential
phases: Activation/Notification, Recovery, and Reconstitution. Components
shall review the CP for the information system at least annually and revise the
plan to address system/organizational changes or problems encountered during
plan implementation, execution, or testing.

CP-1,
CP-2

3.5.2.f

The DHS CIO shall ensure that CP testing is performed in accordance with the
availability security objective. The minimum contingency testing for each
impact level follows:

CP-4,
CP-7

High impact – System recovery roles, responsibilities, procedures, and
logistics in the CP shall be tested within a year prior to authorization to recover
from a simulated contingency event at the alternate processing site. The
system recovery procedures in the CP shall be exercised at least annually to
simulate system recovery in a test facility.
Moderate impact – The CP shall be tested at least annually by reviewing and
coordinating with organizational elements responsible for plans within the CP.
This may be achieved by performing a walk-through/tabletop exercise.
Low impact – CP contact information shall be verified at least annually.

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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.5.2.g

The DHS CIO shall ensure that contingency training is performed in
accordance with the availability security objective. The minimum
contingency planning for each impact level follows:
High impact – All personnel involved in contingency planning efforts shall be
identified and trained in their contingency planning and implementation roles,
responsibilities, procedures, and logistics. This training shall incorporate
simulated events. Refresher training shall be provided at least annually.
Moderate impact – All system personnel involved in contingency planning
efforts shall be trained. Refresher training shall be provided at least annually.
Low impact – There is no training requirement.

CP-3

3.5.2.h

Components shall coordinate CP testing and/or exercises as appropriate, using
COOP-related plans for systems with moderate and high availability FIPS 199
categorization.

CP-4

3.6

Systems Engineering Life Cycle

The DHS Systems Engineering Life Cycle (SELC) is detailed in MD 102-01, “Acquisition
Management Directive,” Rev.2, Appendix B.

Policy
ID

3.7

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.6.a

Components shall ensure that system security is integrated into all phases of
SELC.

SA-3

3.6.b

Components shall ensure that security requirements for sensitive information
systems are incorporated into life-cycle documentation.

SA-3

3.6.c

The Program Manager shall review, approve, and sign all custom-developed
code prior to deployment into production environments. The Program
Manager may delegate this authority in writing to another DHS employee.
The authority shall not be delegated to contractor personnel.

RA-5

Configuration Management

Configuration Management (CM) includes management of all hardware and software elements of
information systems and networks. CM within DHS consists of a multi-layered structure – policy,
procedures, processes, and compliance monitoring. Each Component shall use an appropriate
level of CM.

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CM applies to all systems, subsystems, and components of the DHS infrastructure, and ensures
implementation and continuing life-cycle maintenance. CM begins with baselining of
requirements documentation and ends with decommissioning of items no longer used for
production or support.
The CM discipline applies to hardware, including power systems, software, firmware,
documentation, test and support equipment, and spares. A CM Process ensures that
documentation associated with an approved change to a DHS system is updated to reflect the
appropriate baseline, including an analysis of any potential security implications. The initial
configuration must be documented in detail and all subsequent changes must be controlled
through a complete and robust CM process.
CM has security implications in three areas:
•

Ensuring that the configuration of subordinate information system elements is
consistent with the Security Authorization Process requirements of the parent system

•

Ensuring that any subsequent changes (including an analysis of any potential security
implications) are approved

•

Ensuring that all recommended and approved security patches are properly installed

The DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook includes the DHS Secure Baseline Configuration
Guides.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.7.a

Components shall develop and maintain a Configuration Management Plan
(CMP) for each information system as part of its system Security Plan (SP).
All DHS systems shall be under the oversight of the officer responsible for
CM.

CM-1,
CM-9

3.7.b

Components shall establish, implement, and enforce CM controls on all
information systems and networks and address significant deficiencies as part
of a POA&M.

CA-5,
CM-3,
PM-4

3.7.c

Information security patches shall be installed in accordance with CM plans
and within the timeframe or direction stated in the Information Security
Vulnerability Management (ISVM) message published by the DHS Security
Operations Center (SOC).

SI-2

3.7.d

System Owners shall document initial system configuration in detail and shall
control all subsequent changes in accordance with the CM process.

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CM-2,
CM-3,
CM-9

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID
3.7.e

3.7.f

3.8

DHS Policy Statements
Workstations shall be configured in accordance with DHS guidance on the U.S
Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) (formerly known as the Federal
Desktop Core Configuration [FDCC]). Configuration shall include installation
of the DHS Common Policy Object identifier (OID), Common Policy
Framework Root CA certificate, and the DHS Principal CA certificate.
Components shall monitor USGCB (or DHS-approved USGCB variant)
compliance using a (NIST)-validated SCAP tool.

Relevant
Controls
CM-2,
CM-6,
CM-9

---

3.7.g

The System Owner shall request a waiver for information systems that use
operating systems or applications that are not hardened or do not follow
configuration guidance identified in the DHS Secure Baseline Configuration
Guides included in the DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook. Requests
shall include a proposed alternative secure configuration.

CM-2,
CM-6

3.7.h

Components shall ensure that CM processes under their purview include and
consider the results of a security impact analysis when considering proposed
changes.

CM-4

3.7.i

Users shall report known or suspected implementations of unauthorized IT
changes to DHS Enterprise Configuration Management
([email protected]). For more information regarding how
unauthorized changes are addressed, refer to the DHS ICCB Unauthorized
Change Tracking Process.

---

Risk Management

Risk management is a process that allows System Owners to balance the operational and
economic costs of protective measures to achieve gains in mission capability by protecting the
information systems and data that support their organization’s missions.

Policy
ID
3.8.a

DHS Policy Statements
Components shall establish a risk management program in accordance with
NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-30 Rev 1, “Guide for Conducting Risk
Assessments,” and with other applicable Federal guidelines.

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Relevant
Controls
RA-1

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

3.9

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.8.b

Component CISOs/ISSMs shall ensure that a risk assessment is conducted
whenever major modifications that have the potential to significantly impact
risk are made to sensitive information systems, or to their physical
environments, interfaces, or user community. The risk assessment shall
consider the effects of the modifications on the operational risk profile of the
information system. SPs shall be updated and re-certifications conducted if
warranted by the results of the risk assessment.

RA-3

3.8.c

Each Component CISO/ISSM shall establish an independent Component-wide
Security Authorization program to ensure a consistent approach to testing the
effectiveness of controls.

RA-1

3.8.d

Risk Executives shall review recommendations for risk determinations and risk
acceptability and may recommend changes to the AO and appropriate CIO.

RA-3

3.8.e

Component SOCs shall deploy a Component-wide network scanning program.

RA-5

3.8.f

Special rules apply to CFO-designated systems. See Section 3.15 for
additional information.

---

Security Authorization and Security Control Assessments

DHS periodically assesses the selection of security controls to determine their continued
effectiveness in providing an appropriate level of protection.
It is recommended that Components pursue Type Security Authorization for information
resources that are under the same direct management control; have the same function or mission
objective, operating characteristics, security needs, and that reside in the same general operating
environment, or in the case of a distributed system, reside in various locations with similar
operating environments.
Type Security Authorization shall consist of a master security authorization package describing
the common controls implemented across sites and site-specific controls and unique
requirements that have been implemented at the individual sites.
The DHS Security Authorization Process Guide describes detailed processes governing security
authorizations.
Detailed information for creating and managing POA&Ms is published in DHS 4300A Sensitive
Systems Handbook, Attachment H, “Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) Process Guide.”

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.9.a

Components shall assign an impact level (high, moderate, low) to each security
objective (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) for each DHS information
system. Components shall apply NIST SP 800-53 and NIST SP 800-161
controls as tailored specifically to the security objective and impact level
determined as described in Attachment M to DHS 4300A, Sensitive Systems
Handbook, “Tailoring the NIST SP 800-53 Security Controls.”

PM-10,
RA-2

3.9.b

Components shall implement NIST SP 800-53 and NIST SP 800-161 security
controls, using the FIPS Pub 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal
Information and Information Systems methodology, based on the FIPS 199
impact level established for each separate security objective (confidentiality,
integrity, availability).

---

3.9.c

It is recommended that Components pursue Type Security Authorization for
information resources that are under the same direct management control; have
the same function or mission objective, operating characteristics, security
needs, and that reside in the same general operating environment, or in the case
of a distributed system, reside in various locations with similar operating
environments. Type Security Authorization shall consist of a master Security
Authorization package describing the common controls implemented across
sites and site-specific controls and unique requirements that have been
implemented at the individual sites.

---

3.9.d

The AO for a system shall be identified in the Information Assurance
Compliance System (IACS). The Component CIO shall serve as the AO
whenever the System Owner or an appropriate program official has not been
named as the AO.

---

3.9.e

Component CISOs shall ensure that all information systems are formally
assessed through a comprehensive evaluation of their management,
operational, and technical security controls.

CA-2,
PM-10

3.9.f

As part of the authorization process, a supporting assessment shall determine
the extent to which a particular design and implementation plan meets the
DHS required set of security controls.

PM-10

3.9.g

Component CISOs/ISSMs shall ensure that a risk assessment is conducted
whenever modifications are made to sensitive information systems, networks,
or their physical environments, interfaces, or user community. SPs shall be
updated and systems re-authorized if warranted.

PM-9,
RA-3

3.9.h

Components shall authorize systems at Initial Operating Capability (IOC) and
every three (3) years thereafter, or whenever a major change occurs, whichever
occurs first. An Authority to Operate (ATO) of six (6) months or less shall
receive an ATO authorization period waiver from the DHS CISO before
submission to the AO for a final authorization decision.

CA-6,
PM-10

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.9.i

AOs may grant an Interim Authorization to Operate (IATO) for systems that
are undergoing development testing or are in a prototype phase of
development. A system shall be assessed and authorized in an ATO letter
prior to passing the Acquisition Decision Event 2C milestone in the SELC.
IATOs shall not be used for operational systems. The AO may grant an IATO
for a maximum period of 6 (six) months and may grant 1 (one) 6 (six) month
extension. Systems under an IATO shall not process sensitive information but
may attach to system networks for testing.

PL-1,
PM-10

3.9.j

If the system is not fully authorized and has not received a full ATO by the end
of the second and final IATO, the system shall not be deployed as an
operational system.

PL-1,
PM-10

3.9.k

Components shall request concurrence from the DHS CISO for all
authorizations for 6 (six) months or less.

3.9.l

The DHS CISO shall specify tools, techniques, and methodologies used to
assess and authorize DHS information systems, report and manage FISMA
data, and document and maintain POA&Ms.

CA-1,
PM-4

3.9.m

Currently, all DHS systems shall be authorized using the automated IACS
tools that have been approved by the DHS CISO.

CA-1,
CA-2,
PM-10

3.9.n

The DHS CISO shall maintain a repository for all Security Authorization
Process documentation and modifications.

CA-1

3.9.o

Component CISOs shall establish processes to ensure that the Security
Authorization Process is used consistently for all Component systems.

CA-1,
PM-10

3.9.p

System Owners shall use the POA&M process to document the control
deficiencies or vulnerabilities, and shall use the plans to correct the
deficiencies and vulnerabilities.

CA-5,
PM-4

3.9.q

The AO shall formally assume responsibility for operating an information
system at an acceptable level of risk. Operating any system with sensitive
information is prohibited without an ATO.

CA-6,
PM-10

3.9.r

ATOs shall only be provided for systems that fully comply with policy or have
been granted appropriate waivers.

CA-6,
PM-10

3.9.s

Artifacts in support of new ATOs shall not be older than 13 months. Older
artifacts remain valid during the life of a current ATO.

3.9.t

The DHS CIO may revoke the ATO of any DHS information system.

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---

---

CA-6

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.9.u

The Component CIO may revoke the ATO of any Component-level
information system.

3.9.v

Components shall assign a common control provider to share controls between
systems (e.g., at hosting centers). The authorization package of those common
controls must be shared with those operating under the controls.

---

3.9.w

DHS enterprise services shall be required to provide a catalog of common
controls that have been assessed and authorized by the AO of that service.

---

3.9.x

An Enterprise System Security Agreement (ESSA) shall be developed for all
enterprise services.

---

3.9.1

CA-6

Ongoing Authorization

The DHS Ongoing Authorization (OA) Program builds upon an information system’s existing
Security Authorization. The purpose of the OA Program is continuous evaluation of security
controls, based on system-specific information, and timely action in response to changes to
information systems and risk posture.
OA enhances the information assurance life cycle process by replacing the periodic three-year
assessment cycle with ongoing security assessments that are driven by risk as opposed to time.
The DHS Ongoing Authorization Methodology describes detailed processes governing the OA
Program’s requirements and entrance criteria for a Component and for a Component’s systems.
The OA Methodology defines the deliverables and templates required for maintaining
compliance with OA as well as required and recommended internal procedures.
Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

3.9.1.a

Components shall be accepted into the DHS OA Program only with
concurrence of the DHS CISO and the Component’s AO and/or CIO. All
submissions will be considered by DHS CISO using objective eligibility
requirements as outlined in the DHS OA Methodology.

3.9.1.b

Eligible Components may submit requests for systems to join the DHS OA
Program. Systems submitted must have a valid ATO at least 60 days from
expiration at date of submission (further details are found in the latest version
of the DHS Ongoing Authorization Methodology).

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Relevant
Controls
---

CA-6,
PM-10

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.9.1.c

The DHS CISO shall specify requirements, tools, techniques, and
methodologies used to assess and authorize DHS information systems within a
Component OA Program.

CA-1,
PM-4

3.9.1.d

All DHS systems within the OA Program shall be monitored using the
automated Information Assurance Compliance System tools currently in use
and approved by the DHS CISO.

CA-1,
CA-2,
PM-10

3.9.1.e

The DHS OCISO shall maintain a repository for all OA Process
documentation and modifications and will communicate changes through the
Component CISOs.

CA-1

3.9.1.f

Components shall adhere to established processes and requirements outlined in
the DHS Ongoing Authorization Methodology to ensure that the OA process is
consistent across all DHS Component systems.

CA-1,
PM-10

3.9.1.g

The DHS CISO shall review monthly OA deliverables for Component IT
systems security compliance for quality and for deficiencies periodically in
order to allow continued participation in the DHS OA Program.

CA-6

The DHS CISO may require information systems to revert to previous steps of
the NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF), RMF Steps 1-6, in response
to OA and/or general information security deficiencies found during periodic
quality assurance reviews.
Components found unable to sustain OA requirements, or maintain sound
security practices (as specified in the Component OA eligibility details of the
DHS OA Methodology), shall be required to have all or some of their
information systems revert to previous steps of the NIST RMF in order to
mitigate or compensate for deficiencies found during periodic quality
assurance reviews.
3.9.1.h

The Component Authorizing Official shall require any of their information
systems participating in the DHS OA Program to revert to previous steps of the
NIST RMF in order to mitigate or compensate for deficiencies found during
periodic quality assurance reviews, in response to system Triggers, changes in
supply chain risk, or due to other circumstances which supplies the Component
CIO with knowledge of risk to the system or the Component.

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CA-6

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID
3.9.1.i

3.10

DHS Policy Statements
Component CISOs shall designate qualified personnel to fulfill the function of
the Operational Risk Management Board (ORMB). The ORMB shall be
considered a board of experts representing technical and operational expertise
as it relates to Information Security and the Component’s information systems,
data, and networks. Ideal ORMB roles are detailed in the DHS OA
Methodology.

Relevant
Controls
---

Information Security Review and Assistance

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.10.a

Components shall submit their information security policies to the DHS CISO
for review.

PL-1

3.10.b

Each Component shall establish an information system security review and
assistance program within its respective security organization in order to
provide System Owners with expert review of programs; to assist in
identifying deficiencies; and to provide recommendations for bringing systems
into compliance.

CA-7,
PL-1,
PM-10

3.10.c

Components shall conduct their information systems security reviews in
accordance with both FIPS 200 and NIST SP 800-53, for specification of
security controls. NIST SP 800-53A shall be used for assessing the
effectiveness of security controls and for quarterly and annual FISMA
reporting.

CA-7,
PL-1

3.10.d

The DHS CISO shall conduct information security reviews and assistance
visits across the Department in order to monitor the effectiveness of
Component security programs.

CA-2

3.11

Security Working Groups and Forums

Working groups and other forums representing various functional security areas convene on a
regular basis.
3.11.1 CISO Council
The CISO Council and ISSMs constitute the management team responsible for ensuring the
development and implementation of the DHS Information Security Program. The Council is
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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

responsible for implementing a security program that meets DHS mission requirements, and also
for reviewing specific topic areas assigned by the DHS CIO or the DHS CISO.
The CISO Council is also responsible for establishing and implementing significant security
responsibilities; promoting communications between security programs; implementing
information systems security acquisition requirements; and for developing security best practices
in all enterprise and Component information security programs.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.11.1.a

Component CISOs shall actively participate in the CISO Council.

PL-1,
PM-11

3.11.1.b

Members of the CISO Council shall ensure that the DHS CISO is kept
apprised of all matters pertinent to the security of information systems.

PL-1,
PM-11

3.11.1.c

Members of the CISO Council shall ensure that security-related decisions and
information, including updates to the 4300 series of security publications, are
distributed to the ISSOs and other appropriate persons.

PL-1,
PM-11

Note: Periodically, the CISO Council shall be convened to include Component ISSMs.
3.11.2 DHS Information Security Training Working Group
The DHS Information Security Training Working Group is established to promote collaboration
on information security training efforts throughout the Department and to share information on
Component-developed training activities, methods, and tools, thereby reducing costs and
avoiding duplication of effort. The Information Security Training Working Group is chaired by
the DHS Program Director for Information Security Training.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.11.2.a

Each Component shall appoint a representative to the DHS Information
Security Training Working Group.

---

3.11.2.b

Component representatives shall actively participate in the DHS Information
Security Training Working Group.

---

3.11.2.c

Components shall abide by the security training requirements listed in the
Information Security Awareness, Training, and Education section of this
policy.

---

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3.11.3 DHS Security Policy Working Group
The OCISO Director responsible for Policy shall chair or appoint the chair for the Security
Policy Working Group. The DHS Security Policy Working Group is established to promote
collaboration between the Components and Headquarters in the maintenance of DHS
information security policy.
Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.11.3.a

Each Component CISO shall appoint a representative to the DHS Security
Policy Working Group.

---

3.11.3.b

The DHS Security Policy Working Group chair shall ensure that a report on
representative attendance is made available to Component and Department
CISOs.

---

3.11.4 DHS Enterprise Services Security Working Group
The DHS Enterprise Services Security Working Group (ESSWG) ensures the development,
review and vetting of proposed security documents for current and proposed enterprise service
solutions and service offerings. It also provides recommendations to the CISO Council for
review and approval. The ESSWG is chaired by the DHS CISO, the DHS Headquarters CISO,
and Executive Director of Enterprise Systems Development Office or their delegates.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.11.4.a

Each Component CISO shall appoint a representative to the DHS ESSWG.

---

3.11.4.b

Component representatives shall actively participate in the DHS ESSWG.

---

3.12

Information Security Policy Violation and Disciplinary Action

Individual accountability is a cornerstone of an effective security policy. Component Heads are
responsible for taking corrective actions whenever security incidents or violations occur and for
holding personnel accountable for intentional violations. Each Component must determine how
to best address each individual case.

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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.12.a

Violations related to information security are addressed in Standards of Ethical
Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch; DHS employees may be
subject to disciplinary action for failure to comply with DHS security policy
whether or not the failure results in criminal prosecution.

PS-8

3.12.b

Non-DHS Federal employees, contractors, or others working on behalf of DHS
who fail to comply with Department security policies are subject to
termination of their access to DHS systems and facilities whether or not the
failure results in criminal prosecution.

PS-8

3.12.c

Any person who improperly discloses sensitive information is subject to
criminal and civil penalties and sanctions.

PS-8

3.13

Required Reporting

FISMA requires that the status of the DHS Information Security Program be reported to OMB on
a recurring basis.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.13.a

Components shall collect and submit quarterly and annual information security
program status data as required by FISMA.

CA-2
AR-6

3.13.b

Components shall use the automated tool approved by the DHS CISO for the
systems authorization process and report generation.

CA-2
AR-6

3.14

Privacy and Data Security

The DHS Privacy Office is responsible for privacy compliance across the Department, including
assuring that technologies used by the Department sustain and do not erode privacy protections
relating to the use of personal and Departmental information. The DHS Chief Privacy Officer
has exclusive jurisdiction over the development of policy relating to Personally Identifiable
Information (PII) and to privacy-sensitive programs, systems, or initiatives. Questions from
Components concerning privacy-related policy should be directed to the Component Privacy
Office or Privacy Point of Contact (PPOC). If the Component does not have a Privacy Office or
PPOC, then please contact the DHS Privacy Office ([email protected]; 202-343-1717) or refer to
the DHS Privacy Office Web page at www.dhs.gov/privacy for additional information.
The privacy controls in NIST SP 800-53 Rev 4, Appendix J are primarily for use by an
organization’s Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP) and Chief Privacy Officer when
working with program managers, mission and business owners, information owners and
stewards, Chief Information Officers, Chief Information Security Officers, information system
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developers and integrators, and risk executives to incorporate effective privacy protections and
practices (i.e., privacy controls) within organizational programs and information systems and the
environments in which they operate. The privacy controls facilitate DHS efforts to comply with
privacy requirements affecting those department-wide and Component programs and systems
that collect, use, maintain, share, or dispose of PII or other activities that raise privacy risks.
Unlike the security controls in NIST SP 800-53 Rev 4, Appendix F, which are allocated to the
low, moderate, and high baselines given in Appendix D, the privacy controls in Appendix J are
selected and implemented based on DHS privacy requirements and the need to protect the PII
collected and maintained by DHS information systems and programs, in accordance with Federal
privacy legislation, policies, directives, regulations, guidelines, and best practices.
3.14.1 Personally Identifiable Information
Various regulations place restrictions on the Government’s collection, use, maintenance, and
release of information about individuals. Regulations require agencies to protect PII, which is
any information that permits the identity of an individual to be directly or indirectly inferred,
including any information which is linked or linkable to that individual regardless of whether or
not the individual is a U.S. citizen, lawful permanent resident, visitor to the U.S., or Department
employee or contractor.
Sensitive PII is PII which if lost, compromised, or disclosed without authorization, could result
in substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to an individual. Examples of
Sensitive PII include Social Security numbers, Alien Registration Numbers (A-number), medical
information, and criminal history. The sensitivity of this data requires that stricter handling
guidelines be applied. For more information on handling Sensitive PII see: Handbook for
Safeguarding Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information at the Department of Homeland
Security.
Consistent with the DHS Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPS), PII collected and
maintained by DHS should be accurate, relevant, timely, and complete for the purpose for which
it is to be used, as specified in public notices. In addition, DHS adheres to data minimization and
retention requirements to collect, use, and retain only PII that is relevant and necessary for the
purpose for which it was originally collected. Programs will retain PII for only as long as
necessary to fulfill the purpose(s) specified in public notices and in accordance with a record
retention schedule approved by National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

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Policy
ID
3.14.1.a

DHS Policy Statements
When collecting PII, programs shall:

Relevant
Controls
DI-1

a. Confirm to the greatest extent practicable upon collection or creation of
personally identifiable information (PII), the accuracy, relevance,
timeliness, and completeness of that information;
b. Collect PII directly from the individual to the greatest extent practicable;
and
c. Check for, and correct as necessary, any inaccurate or outdated PII used
by its programs or systems through the Privacy Threshold Analysis (PTA)
process.
3.14.1.b

3.14.1.c

DHS shall issue guidelines ensuring and maximizing the quality, utility,
objectivity, and integrity of disseminated information.
Prior to the collection of PII, all programs shall:

DI-1

DM-1

a. Identify the minimum PII elements that are relevant and necessary to
accomplish the legally authorized purpose of collection; and
b. Limit the collection and retention of PII to the minimum elements
identified for the purposes described in the notice and for which the
individual has provided consent.
3.14.1.d

DHS shall conduct an initial evaluation of PII holdings and establish and
follow a schedule for regularly reviewing those holdings through the privacy
compliance process. The objective of this evaluation is to ensure that only PII
that is identified in privacy compliance documentation and other public notices
is collected and retained, and that the PII continues to be necessary for
accomplishment of a legally authorized purpose.

DM-1

3.14.1.e

Programs and systems that maintain PII shall:

DM-2

a. Retain each collection of PII for the minimum amount of time necessary
to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law;
b. Dispose of, destroy, erase, and/or anonymize the PII, regardless of the
method of storage, in accordance with a NARA-approved record retention
schedule and in a manner that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized
access; and
c. Ensure secure deletion or destruction of PII (including originals, copies,
and archived records).
3.14.1.f

DHS shall develop policies and procedures that protect and minimize the use
of any PII used for testing, training, and research,

DM-3

Additional PII and Sensitive PII-related guidance is included in the following sections of the
DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook.
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•

Section 3.9, Security Authorization Process, and Security Control Assessments – For
Privacy Sensitive Systems, the confidentiality security objective shall be assigned an
impact level of at least moderate.

•

Section 4.8.2, Laptop Computers and Other Mobile Computing Devices – All
information stored on any laptop computer or other mobile computing device is to be
encrypted using mechanisms that comply with Section 5.5, Encryption, of this policy.

•

Section 5.2.2, Automatic Session Termination – Sessions on workstations and on laptop
computers and other mobile computing devices are to be terminated after twenty (20)
minutes of inactivity.

•

Section 5.3, Auditing – DHS defines computer-readable data extracts as “any Federal
record or collection of records containing sensitive PII that is retrieved from a DHSowned database, through a query, reporting tool, extract generation tool, or other means
that is then saved into removable media and/or a separate computer-readable device or
application such as another database, a spreadsheet, or a text file." (Attachment S1, DHS
4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook).

•

Section 5.4.1, Remote Access and Dial-in – Remote access of PII must be approved by
the AO. Strong authentication via virtual private network (VPN) or equivalent
encryption (e.g., https) and two-factor authentication is required. DHS has an immediate
goal that remote access should only be allowed with two-factor authentication where one
of the factors is provided by a device separate from the computer gaining access.
Restrictions are placed on the downloading and remote storage of PII accessed remotely,
as noted below in this document.

•

Attachment S, “Compliance Framework for Privacy Systems.”

The DHS Privacy Office works with Component Privacy Officers, PPOCs, Program Managers,
System Owners, and information systems security personnel to ensure that sound privacy
practices and controls are integrated into the Department’s operations. The DHS Privacy Office
implements three types of documents for managing privacy practices and controls for
information systems:
•

A Privacy Threshold Analysis (PTA) provides a high level description of an information
system including the information it contains and how it is used. The PTA is used to
determine and document whether or not a PIA and/or SORN are required.

•

A Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) is a publicly released assessment of the privacy impact
of an information system and includes an analysis of the PII that is collected, stored, and
shared.

•

A System of Records Notice (SORN) describes the categories of records within a system of
records and describes the routine uses of the data and how individuals can gain access to
records and correct errors.

To promote privacy compliance within the Department, the Office has published official
Department guidance regarding the requirements and content for PTAs, PIAs, and SORNs.
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Privacy Compliance Guidance can be found on the DHS Privacy Office website at
www.dhs.gov/privacy.
3.14.2 Privacy Threshold Analyses
The PTA provides a high-level description of the system, including the information it contains
and how it is used. PTAs are required whenever a new information system is being developed or
an existing system is significantly modified. System Owners and Program Managers are
responsible for writing the PTA as part of the SELC process. The Component Privacy Officer or
PPOC reviews the PTA and forwards it to the DHS Privacy Office, who determines whether a
PIA and/or SORN are required. PTA artifacts expire after three (3) years. DHS Instruction 04701-001 defines the PTA requirements.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.14.2.a

A PTA shall be conducted as part of new information system development or
whenever an existing system is significantly modified. PTA artifacts expire
after three years and a new PTA must be submitted.

AR-2

3.14.2.b

A PTA shall be conducted whenever an information system undergoes security
authorization.

---

3.14.2.c

The DHS Chief Privacy Officer shall evaluate the PTA and determine if it is a
Privacy Sensitive System and if the system requires a PIA and SORN.

AR-2

3.14.2.d

Information systems shall not be designated operational until the DHS Privacy
Office approves the PTA.

AR-2

3.14.2.e

For Privacy Sensitive Systems, the confidentiality security objective shall be
assigned an impact level of moderate or higher.

RA-2

3.14.2.f

The PTA process shall be used to maintain a current inventory that contains a
listing of all programs and information systems identified as collecting, using,
maintaining, or sharing PII.

SE-1

3.14.2.g

The PTA process shall be used to ensure that DHS designs information
systems to support privacy by automating privacy controls, to the greatest
extent feasible.

AR-7

3.14.3 Privacy Impact Assessments
A Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) is a publicly released assessment of the privacy impact of an
information system and includes an analysis of the PII that is collected, stored, and shared. PIAs
are required (as determined by the PTA) whenever a new information system is being developed
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or an existing system is significantly modified. PIAs are the responsibility of the System Owner
and the Program Manager as part of the SELC process. OMB Memorandum M-03-22, DHS MD
0470.1, and the Official DHS Privacy Impact Assessment Guidance discuss the requirements for
conducting PIAs at DHS.

Policy
ID
3.14.3.a

DHS Policy Statements
PIAs are required (as determined by the PTA) as part of new information
system development or whenever an existing system is significantly modified.

Relevant
Controls

AR-2

3.14.3.b

Information systems for which the DHS Privacy Office requires a PIA (as
determined by the PTA) shall not be designated operational until the DHS
Privacy Office approves the PIA for that system.

AR-2

3.14.3.c

Programs shall use the PIA process to document the means (where feasible and
appropriate) for individuals to:

IP-1

1. Authorize the collection, use, maintaining, and sharing of PII prior to
its collection;
2. Understand the consequences of decisions to approve or decline the
authorization of the collection, use, dissemination, and retention of
PII;
3. Provide consent prior to any new uses or disclosure of previously
collected PII; and
4. Consent to all uses of PII not initially described in the public notice
that was in effect at the time the organization collected the PII.
3.14.3.d

Programs shall provide effective notice to the public and to individuals
regarding:
1. Activities that impact privacy, including its collection, use, sharing,
safeguarding, maintenance, and disposal of PII;
2. Authority for collecting PII;
3. The choices, if any, individuals may have regarding how the program
uses PII and the consequences of exercising or not exercising those
choices; and
4. The ability to access and have PII amended or corrected if necessary.

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3.14.3.e

Through effective public notice, programs shall describe:

TR-1

1. The PII the program collects and the purpose(s) for which it collects
that information;
2. How the program uses PII internally;
3. Whether the program shares PII with external entities, the categories
of those entities, and the purposes for such sharing;
4. Whether individuals have the ability to consent to specific uses or
sharing of PII and how to exercise any such consent;
5. How individuals may obtain access to PII; and
6. How the PII will be protected.
3.14.3.f

Programs shall revise all public notices to reflect changes in practice or policy
that affect PII or changes in their activities that impact privacy, before or as
soon as practicable after any change.

TR-1

PIAs are one tool that DHS uses to convey public notice of information practices and the privacy
impact of Department programs and activities. The Department also uses web privacy policies,
System of Records Notices (SORN), and Privacy Act Statements to provide effective public
notice of program privacy practices. PIAs also document how DHS makes individuals active
participants in the decision-making process regarding the collection and use of their PII.
3.14.4 System of Records Notices
The Privacy Act of 1974 requires a SORN when PII is maintained by a Federal agency in a
system of records and the PII is retrieved by a personal identifier. A system of records is “a
group of any records under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the
name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular
assigned to the individual” 2. The SORN describes the categories of records and individuals in
the system of record; the routine uses of the data; how individuals can gain access to records
pertaining to them and correct errors. The term “system of records” is not synonymous with
“information system” and can include paper as well as electronic records. SORNs can be written
to cover the records in a single group of records or a single information system or they can be
written to cover multiple groups of records or multiple information systems.
Information systems that are considered a system of record may not be designated operational
until a SORN has been published in the Federal Register for thirty days. OMB has issued the
benchmark references for development of SORNs: Privacy Act Implementation, Guidelines and
Responsibilities, July 9, 1975; and Appendix I, “Federal Agency Responsibilities for Maintaining

2 5 U.S.C. §552a(a)(5) Italics added.
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Records About Individuals” to Circular A-130. DHS has published MD 047-01-001, “Privacy
Policy and Compliance,” October 6, 2005; and Official DHS Guidance on System of Records and
System of Records Notices. Information systems that are considered a System of Records must
keep an accurate accounting of disclosures of information shared outside of the system.
OMB requires each SORN to be reviewed every two (2) years to ensure that it accurately
describes the system of records. This process is called the Biennial SORN Review Process. The
DHS Privacy Office works with Components to ensure that SORN reviews are conducted every
two years following publication in the Federal Register.
Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.14.4.a

A SORN is required when PII is maintained by a Federal agency in a system of
records where information about an individual is retrieved by a unique
personal identifier. SORNs are published in the Federal Register.

TR-2

3.14.4.b

Information systems containing PII shall not be designated operational until a
SORN has been published in the Federal Register for 30 days.

CA-6

3.14.4.c

Components shall review and republish SORNs every two years as required by
OMB Circular A-130.

TR-2

3.14.4.d

Components shall in their privacy notices, including SORNS, describe the
purpose(s) for which PII is collected, used, maintained, and shared.

AP-2

3.14.4.e

Components shall include Privacy Act Statements on all forms that collect PII,
or on separate forms that can be retained by individuals, to provide additional
formal notice to individuals from whom the information is being collected.

TR-2

3.14.4.f

Programs shall provide individuals the ability to have access to their PII
maintained in its system(s) of records.

IP-2

3.14.4.g

DHS publishes rules and regulations governing how individuals may request
access to records maintained in a System of Records.

IP-2

3.14.4.h

Programs shall publish access procedures in SORNs.

IP-2

3.14.4.i

DHS shall adhere to Privacy Act requirements and OMB policies and guidance
for the proper processing of Privacy Act requests.

IP-2

3.14.4.j

DHS shall provide a process for individuals to have inaccurate PII maintained
by the Department corrected or amended, as appropriate.

IP-3

3.14.4.k

Components shall establish a process for disseminating corrections or
amendments of the PII to other authorized users of the PII (such as external
information-sharing partners) and, where feasible and appropriate, notifies
affected individuals that their information has been corrected or amended.

IP-3

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Policy
ID
3.14.4.j

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

Components shall:

AR-8

1. Keep an accurate accounting of disclosures of information held in each
system of records under its control, including;
a. Date, nature, and purpose of each disclosure of a record; and
b. Name and address of person or agency to which the disclosure was
made;
2. Retain the accounting of disclosures for the life of the record or five
years after the disclosure, whichever is longer; and
3. Make the accounting of disclosures available to the person named in
the record upon request.

3.14.5 Protecting Privacy Sensitive Systems
OMB M-06-16, Protection of Sensitive Agency Information requires that agencies protect PII
that is physically removed from Department locations or is accessed remotely. Physical removal
includes both removable media and media in mobile devices (e.g., laptop hard drives). Refer to
the following documents for additional information and policies on protecting PII and Sensitive
PII at DHS:
•

Handbook for Safeguarding Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information at the
Department of Homeland Security

•

DHS 4300A Sensitive System Handbook, Attachment S: “Compliance Framework for
Privacy Sensitive Systems”

•

DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook, Attachment S1: “Managing ComputerReadable Extracts Containing Sensitive PII.”

In addition, see Section 5.3 of this Policy Directive for PII auditing requirements and Section
5.4.1 for remote access requirements.
Policy ID

3.14.5.a

3.14.5.b

DHS Policy Statements
PII and Sensitive PII removed from a DHS facility on removable media,
equipment or mobile devices shall be encrypted unless the information is
being sent to an individual as part of a Privacy Act or Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) request.
If PII and Sensitive PII can be physically removed from an information
system (e.g., printouts, CDs), the Security Plan (SP) shall document the
specific procedures, training, and accountability measures in place to ensure
that remote use of the data does not bypass the protections provided by the
encryption.

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74

Relevant
Controls
MP-5
SC-13

MP-5

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.14.5.c

Systems that as part of routine business remove Sensitive PII in the form of a
Computer-Readable Extract (CRE), for example routine system-to-system
transmissions of data (routine CREs) shall address associated risks in the
system SP.

MP-5

3.14.5.d

Sensitive PII contained within a non-routine or ad hoc CRE (e.g., CREs not
included within the boundaries of a source system’s SP) shall not be removed,
physically or otherwise, from a DHS facility without written authorization
from the Data Owner responsible for ensuring that disclosure of the CRE data
is lawful and in compliance with this Policy Directive and with applicable
DHS privacy and security policies.

---

3.14.5.e

All ad hoc CREs must be documented, tracked, and validated every 90 days
after their creation to ensure that their continued authorized use is still
required or that they have been appropriately destroyed or erased.

---

3.14.5.f

Ad hoc CREs shall be destroyed or erased within 90 days unless the
information included in the extracts is required beyond that period.
Permanent erasure of the extracts or the need for continued use of the data
shall be documented by the Data Owner and audited periodically by the
Component Privacy Officer or Privacy Point of Contact (PPOC).

---

3.14.6 Privacy Incident Reporting
The DHS Privacy Office is responsible for implementing the Department’s privacy incident
response program based on requirements outlined in OMB Memorandum 07-16, Safeguarding
Against and Responding to the Breach of Personally Identifiable Information, May 22, 2007.
Through close collaboration, the DHS Chief Privacy Officer, the DHS CIO, the DHS CISO, the
DHS SOC, and Components must ensure that all DHS privacy and computer security incidents
are identified, reported, and appropriately responded to, in order to mitigate harm to DHSmaintained assets, information, and personnel. Incidents involving (or that may involve) PII are
subject to strict reporting standards and timelines.
Policy
ID
3.14.6.a

DHS Policy Statements
Any Component discovering a suspected or confirmed privacy incident shall
immediately coordinate with the Component Privacy Officer or PPOC and
Component CISO/ISSM to evaluate and subsequently report the incident to the
DHS SOC upon discovery. The DHS SOC will then transmit the report to the
United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) within one
(1) hour.

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Relevant
Controls
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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.14.6.b

The Component Privacy Officer or PPOC, in cooperation with the Component
CISO/ISSM, shall jointly evaluate the incident, but the Component
CISO/ISSM is responsible for reporting the incident to the Component SOC,
or directly to the DHS SOC if the Component does not have its own SOC.

IR-4

3.14.6.c

For Components without Privacy Officers or PPOCs, the Component
CISO/ISSM shall report all types of privacy incidents, whether or not they
involve information resources. This unitary reporting process shall remain in
effect until each Component has a Privacy Officer or PPOC who can fulfill the
reporting duties.

IR-6

3.14.6.d

DHS personnel shall also report suspected or confirmed privacy incidents to
their Program Manager immediately upon discovery/detection, regardless of
the manner in which it might have occurred.

IR-6

3.14.6.e

Components shall follow the DHS Privacy Incident Handling Guidance.

---

3.14.7 E-Authentication
Identity verification or authentication (e-authentication) is needed to ensure that online
Government services are secure and that individual privacy is protected. Each DHS system must
be evaluated to determine whether e-authentication requirements apply. Only federated identity
providers approved through the Federal CIO Council’s Identity, Credentialing, and Access
Management’s (ICAM) Trust Framework Provider Adoption Process (TFPAP) should be used.
Components should see www.IDmanagement.gov for details regarding the Federal Identity,
Credentialing, and Access Management (FICAM) initiative.
E-authentication guidance is provided in the following:
•

OMB M-04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies

•

NIST SP 800-63, Electronic Authentication Guideline

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.14.7.a

For systems that allow online transactions, Components shall determine
whether e-authentication requirements apply.

IA-2

3.14.7.b

Components shall determine the appropriate assurance level for eauthentication by following the steps described in OMB M-04-04, EAuthentication Guidance for Federal Agencies.

IA-2

3.14.7.c

Components shall implement the technical requirements described in NIST SP
800-63, Electronic Authentication Guideline, at the appropriate assurance level
for those systems with e-authentication requirements.

IA-2

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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.14.7.d

Components shall ensure that each SP reflects the e-authentication status of the
respective system.

IA-2,
PL-2

3.14.7.e

Programs considering the use of e-authentication are required to consult their
Privacy Officer to determine whether a change is significant enough to warrant
a new or updated PTA, thus initiating the review of privacy risks and how they
will be mitigated.

AR-2

3.14.7.f

Existing physical and logical access control systems shall be upgraded to use
Personal Identification Verification (PIV) credentials, in accordance with
NIST and DHS guidelines.

---

3.14.7.g

All new systems under development shall be enabled to use PIV credentials, in
accordance with NIST and DHS guidelines, prior to being made operational.

---

3.14.7.h

All new DHS information systems or those undergoing major upgrades shall
use or support DHS PIV credentials.

---

3.14.7.i

For systems with high or moderate impact for any of the FIPS 199 security
objectives information systems shall uniquely identify and authenticate
network devices before establishing a network connection.

IA-3

3.14.8 Use Limitation and External Information Sharing
Programs may use PII either as specified in public notices, in a manner compatible with those
specified purposes, or as otherwise permitted by law. Any PII shared outside the Department
MUST be for a purpose compatible with the purpose for which the PII was collected.
DHS uses PII only for legally authorized purposes and in a manner compatible with uses
identified in the Privacy Act or in other public notices. The DHS Chief Privacy Officer and,
where appropriate, legal counsel review and approve any proposed external sharing of PII,
including with other public, international, or private sector entities, for consistency with uses
described in the existing privacy compliance documentation such as PIAs and SORNs or other
public notice(s). When a proposed new instance of external sharing of PII is not currently
authorized by the Privacy Act or specified in a notice, the Chief Privacy Officer evaluates
whether the proposed external sharing is compatible with the purpose(s) specified in the notice.
If the proposed sharing is compatible, program owners review, update, and republish their PIAs,
SORNs, website privacy policies, and other public notices, if any, to include specific
descriptions of the new uses(s) and obtain consent where appropriate and feasible. Informationsharing agreements also include security protections consistent with the sensitivity of the
information being shared.
DHS programs that engage in Computer Matching Agreements (CMA) must follow established
DHS guidance for ensuring that controls are in place to maintain both the quality and integrity of
data shared under CMAs. See DHS MD 262-01 Computer Matching Agreement and the Data
Integrity Board.
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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.14.8.a

Programs use PII within DHS only for the authorized purpose(s) identified in
the Privacy Act or in public notices such as PIAs and SORNs.

UL-1

3.14.8.b

Programs share PII outside of DHS only for the authorized purposes identified
in the Privacy Act or described in PUBLIC notice(s) such as PIAs and SORNs
or for a purpose that is compatible with those purposes.

UL-2

3.14.8.c

Components, where appropriate, enter into Memorandums of Understanding,
Memorandums of Agreement, Letters of Intent, CCMAs, or similar
agreements, with third parties that specifically describe the PII covered and
specifically enumerate the purposes for which the PII may be used.

UL-2

3.14.8.d

Component Privacy Officers monitor, audit, and train their staff on the
authorized sharing of PII with third parties and on the consequences of
unauthorized use or sharing of PII.

UL-2

3.14.8.e

Component Privacy Officers evaluate any proposed new instances of sharing
PII with third parties to assess whether the sharing is authorized and whether
new or updated public notice is required.

UL-2

3.14.8.f

All Computer Matching Agreements shall be reviewed by the Data Integrity
Board, chaired by the DHS Chief Privacy Officer.

DI-2

3.15

DHS CFO Designated Systems

DHS CFO-designated systems are systems that require additional management accountability to
ensure effective internal control exists over financial reporting. The DHS CFO publishes the
approved list of CFO-designated systems annually. This section provides additional
requirements for these systems based on Appendix A to OMB Circular A-123, Management’s
Responsibility for Internal Control. Controls required to be assessed annually for CFO
Designated Systems may be found documented in Attachment R, “Compliance Framework for
CFO Designated Financial Systems” to the DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook.
Attachment R is limited to the controls that must be reviewed annually (and does not contain the
requirements of OMB Circular 123).
These requirements are in addition to both the other security requirements established in this
Policy Directive and to other system Line of Business requirements developed by the CFO.
Wherever there is a conflict between this section and other sections of this Policy Directive
regarding requirements for CFO-designated systems, this section shall take precedence.
These additional requirements provide a strengthened assessment process and form the basis for
management’s assurance of internal control over financial reporting. The strengthened process
requires management to document the design and test the operating effectiveness of controls for
CFO-designated systems. The System Owner is responsible for ensuring that all requirements,
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including security requirements, are implemented on DHS systems. Component CISOs/ISSMs
must coordinate with their CFO organization to ensure that these requirements are implemented.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.15.a

System Owners are responsible for ensuring that security control assessments
of key security controls (i.e., Security Control Assessment and Security
Assessment Report [SAR]) for CFO-designated systems are completed
annually in IACS. This includes updating the security control assessment and
SAR annually.

CA-2,
CA-7

3.15.b

The DHS CFO shall designate the systems that must comply with additional
internal controls and the Office of the CFO shall review and publish the CFO
Designated System List annually.

CA-2

3.15.c

Component CISOs/ISSMs shall ensure that vulnerability assessments and
verification of critical patch installations are conducted on all CFO-designated
systems. Vulnerability assessments shall be performed at least annually.

RA-5

3.15.d

All CFO-designated systems shall be assigned a minimum impact level of
“moderate” for confidentiality, integrity, and availability. If warranted by a
risk based assessment, the integrity objective shall be elevated to “high.”

RA-2

3.15.e

All Component security authorizations for CFO-designated systems shall be
approved and signed by the Component CFO.

CA-6

3.15.f

System Owners shall ensure that Contingency plans are created for all CFO
Designated Systems requiring moderate availability and that Disaster
Recovery Plans are created for all CFO-designated systems requiring high
availability and that each plan is tested annually, and results with lessons
learned annually.

CP-2,
CP-4

3.15.g

Component CISOs/ISSMs shall ensure that weekly incident response tracking
is performed for all of their respective CFO-designated systems.

IR-5

3.15.h

Component CISOs/ISSMs shall ensure that incidents related to their respective
CFO-designated systems are reported to the Component CFO.

IR-4,
IR-6

3.15.i

The SP shall be updated for CFO-designated systems at least annually. Key
controls prescribed in Attachment R, Compliance Framework for CFOdesignated systems shall be identified in the SP.

PL-2

3.15.j

Component CISOs/ISSMs must request a waiver from the DHS CISO if a key
control weakness is identified for a CFO-designated System and not
remediated within 12 months.

CA-5,
CA-7

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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.15.k

Component CFOs shall ensure that a full time dedicated ISSO is assigned to
each CFO-designated System. CFO-designated System ISSOs may be
assigned to more than one CFO Designated System.

3.15.l

CFO Designated System ATOs shall be rescinded if Components fail to
comply with testing and reporting requirements established within this policy.

CA-1,
CA-6

3.15.m

Component CFOs shall work with their Component CISOs/ISSMs to approve
any major system changes to CFO-designated systems identified in the DHS
inventory.

CA-1,
CM-8

3.16

---

Social Media

Due to the high threat of malware, Social Media host sites have been blocked at the Trusted
Internet Connection (TIC). Social Media hosts are public content sharing websites that allow
individual users to upload, view, and share content such as video clips, press releases, opinions
and other information. The DHS Office of Public Affairs (OPA) will publish Terms of Service
(TOS) and guidelines for posting to these sites. In some cases the Department will develop its
own TOS, and in other cases it will endorse those of other Federal agencies such as the General
Services Administration (GSA) or Office of Personnel Management (OPM).
Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.16.a

Only OPA-designated Content Managers (Department level and Component
level) may post content on behalf of DHS or representing DHS, and only those
individuals designated by OPA for this purpose shall be granted access on a
continuing basis.

3.16.b

Posted content shall be in alignment with the Department’s Terms of Service
(TOS) and guidelines for a given social media host (e.g., YouTube, Twitter).
This condition is also met if the Department endorses another appropriate
Federal agency’s guidance or TOS (e.g., GSA, OPM).

---

3.16.c

Under no circumstances shall sensitive information be posted to social media
sites.

--

3.16.d

Content shall not be posted to any social media site for which the Department
has not approved and published both final posting guidelines and TOS.

CM-10

3.16.e

Content Managers shall review and understand the appropriate Departmentlevel TOS for the appropriate social media host.

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CM-10

---

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID
3.16.f

3.17

DHS Policy Statements
Content Managers shall make a risk decision prior to posting any information
and shall recognize that social medial hosts are not DHS information systems
and therefore subject only to the DHS TOS and not to DHS policy. Once
released, information is no longer under DHS control.

Relevant
Controls
---

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) 3 addresses the
privacy of individuals’ health information by establishing a Federal privacy standard for health
information and how it can be used and disclosed.
HIPAA prohibits the use or disclosure without the authorization of the individual or as part of an
exception contained in HIPAA of Protected Health Information (PHI), electronic or otherwise,
for any purpose other than treatment, payment, or health care operations for that individual.
Because of the diverse mission of DHS, it may be necessary for some Components to collect PHI
as part of a larger mission requirement (for example detainee processing, disaster relief, etc.).
This section applies to all Components and personnel who collect, process, or store PHI (refer to
NIST SP 800-66 Rev 1, An Introductory Resource Guide for Implementing the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule, for further information).

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.17.a

Components whose systems collect, process, or store Protected Health
Information (PHI) shall ensure that the stored information is appropriately
protected in compliance with HIPAA and that access or disclosure is limited to
the minimum required.

---

3.17.b

Affected Components shall work with the DHS Privacy Office, Component
Privacy Office, or PPOC to ensure that privacy and disclosure policies comply
with HIPAA and privacy requirements.

---

3.17.c

Affected Components shall ensure that employees with access to DHS systems
that collect, process, or store PHI are trained in HIPAA requirements.

---

3 Public Law 104-191
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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

3.17.d

Affected Components shall establish administrative processes for responding
to complaints; requesting corrections to health information; and tracking of
PHI disclosures.

---

3.17.e

When collecting PHI, Components shall issue a privacy notice to individuals
concerning the use and disclosure of their PHI.

---

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3.18

Cloud Services

Cloud computing technologies allow DHS to address demands for better information services;
conserve resources; consolidate systems; and improve security. The essential characteristics of
cloud computing (on-demand provisioning, resource pooling, elasticity, network access, and
measured services) provide the potential for DHS to reduce procurement and operating costs and
increase service efficiency.
The Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) is a government-wide
program that provides a standardized approach to security assessment, authorization, and
continuous monitoring for cloud products and services. This approach uses a “do once, use
many times” framework that will save cost, time, and staff required to conduct redundant agency
security assessments. The Federal CIO Memorandum “Security Authorization of Information
Systems in Cloud Computing Environments,” issued on December 8, 2011, established
FedRAMP to provide a cost-effective risk-based approach for the adoption and use of cloud
services.
The purposes of FedRAMP are:
•
•
•

•

To improve the consistency and quality of information security in the cloud
To ensure trustworthy and re-usable documentation and assessment of security
controls
To provide ongoing assurance and risk assessment of select cloud services. Cloud
services are discussed on the FedRAMP Web site at
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/category/102371 .
To enable rapid and cost-effective procurement of information systems and services
for Federal agencies.

DHS is a key participant in FedRAMP. Other major participants are:
•

•

Federal agency customers
Cloud Service Providers (CSP)
Joint Authorization Board (JAB)
Third Party Assessors (3PAO)
FedRAMP Program Management Office (PMO)

•

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

•
•
•

NIST SP 800-144 states, “Organizations are ultimately accountable for the security and privacy
of data held by a cloud provider on their behalf.” All uses of cloud computing by DHS will
follow DHS security authorization processes and procedures to include a completed security
authorization package and an ATO signed by the appropriate Authorizing Official. Those cloud
systems and services which are not exempt from FedRAMP requirements will use the FedRAMP

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process as required by OMB. Organizations should also review Section 3.14 for applicability in
cloud environments if they are dealing with privacy data.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

3.18.a

Components shall leverage cloud services with FedRAMP Provisional
Authority to Operate (P-ATO) whenever available when authorizing cloud
systems or services. When a P-ATO is not available, Components shall
leverage FedRAMP compliant Agency ATO packages whenever available to
the fullest extent possible.

3.18.b

All DHS cloud services of FIPS Moderate categorization or higher, consumed
by or intended to be consumed by multiple government organizations outside
of DHS, shall submit to FedRAMP for JAB Provisional Authorization.

3.18.c

The use of cloud systems and services shall follow existing DHS security
authorization processes and procedures to include a completed security
authorization package and an ATO signed by the Component or DHSdesignated Authorizing Official.

3.18.d

All DHS cloud systems and services not exempt from FedRAMP shall use
appropriate FedRAMP documentation templates, be assessed using the JABapproved security-control baselines and additional DHS requirements, and be
categorized in the FISMA inventory as either a General Support System or a
Major Application. DHS cloud systems and services shall not be categorized
as External Information Systems (EIS).

3.18.e

All DHS cloud systems and services not exempt from FedRAMP shall use the
FedRAMP process and security authorization requirements when initiating,
reviewing, granting and revoking risk assessments and security authorizations.

4.0

OPERATIONAL POLICIES

4.1

Personnel

Relevant
Controls
---

---

---

---

---

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) systems face threats from a myriad of sources. The
intentional and unintentional actions of system users can potentially harm or disrupt DHS
systems and facilities and could result in destruction or modification of the data being processed,
denial of service, and unauthorized disclosure of data. It is thus highly important that stringent
safeguards be in place to reduce the risk associated with these types of threats.

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4.1.1

Citizenship, Personnel Screening, and Position Categorization

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.1.1.a

Components shall designate the position sensitivity level for all Government
and contractor positions that use, develop, operate, or maintain information
systems and shall determine risk levels for each contractor position. Position
sensitivity levels shall be reviewed annually and revised as appropriate.

PS-2,
PS-3,
PS-7

4.1.1.b

Components shall ensure that the incumbents of these positions have favorably
adjudicated background investigations commensurate with the defined position
sensitivity levels.

PS-2,
PS-3,
PS-7

4.1.1.c

Components shall ensure any Federal employee granted access to any DHS
system has a favorably adjudicated Tier 2 Investigation (formerly Moderate
Risk Background Investigation [MBI]) as defined in DHS Instruction 121-01007, Personnel Suitability and Security Program, Chapter 2, Federal
Employee/Applicant Suitability Requirements. In cases where non-DHS
Federal employees have been investigated by another Federal agency, DHS
Component personnel security organizations may, whenever practicable, use
these investigations to reduce investigation requests, associated costs, and
unnecessary delays (Chapter 2, paragraph G). Active duty United States Coast
Guard (USCG) and other personnel subject to the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) shall be exempt from this requirement.

PS-3

4.1.1.d

Components shall ensure that no contractor personnel are granted access to
DHS systems without having a favorably adjudicated Background
Investigation (BI) as defined in Department of Homeland Security Acquisition
Regulation (HSAR) and the DHS Instruction 121-01-007, Personnel
Suitability and Security Program, Chapter 3, Excepted Service Federal
Employee and Contractor Employee Fitness Requirements. In cases where
contractor personnel have been investigated by another Federal agency, DHS
Component personnel security organizations may, whenever practicable, use
these investigations to reduce investigation requests, associated costs, and
unnecessary delays (Chapter 3, paragraph G).

PS-3

4.1.1.e

Components shall ensure that only U.S. Citizens are granted access to DHS
systems and networks. Exceptions to the U.S. Citizenship requirement may be
requested by submitting a completed Foreign National Visitor Access Request
form for each foreign national to the DHS Office of the Chief Security Officer
(OCSO), in accordance with Section 1.5.2, of this policy, “Requests for
Exception to U.S. Citizenship Requirement.”

PS-3

4.1.1.f

Components shall ensure that no temporary employee is granted access to any
DHS system without having met the review and investigation standard defined
in DHS Instruction 121-01-007, “Personnel Suitability and Security Program,”
Chapter 2: “Federal Employee/Applicant Suitability Requirements.”

--

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4.1.2

Rules of Behavior

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.1.2.a

Components shall ensure that rules of behavior contain acknowledgement that
the user has no expectation of privacy (a “Consent to Monitor” provision) and
that disciplinary actions may result from violations.

PL-4

4.1.2.b

Components shall ensure that DHS users are trained regarding rules of
behavior and that each user signs a copy prior to being granted user accounts
or access to information systems or data.

AT-1,
AT-2,
PL-4

4.1.3

Access to Sensitive Information

Policy
ID
4.1.3.a

4.1.4

DHS Policy Statements
System Owners shall ensure that users of the information systems supporting
their programs have a valid requirement to access these systems.

Relevant
Controls
AC-2

Segregation of Duties and Least Privilege

Segregation of duties is intended to prevent a single individual from being able to disrupt or
corrupt a critical security process.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.1.4.a

Components shall divide and separate duties and responsibilities of critical
information system functions among different individuals to minimize the
possibility of any one individual having the necessary authority or system
access to be able to engage in fraudulent or criminal activity.

AC-2,
AC-5

4.1.4.b

All individuals requiring administrator privileges shall be reviewed and
approved by the appropriate Authorizing Official (AO). The AO may delegate
this duty to the appropriate System Owner or Program Manager.

AC-2

4.1.4.c

Individuals requiring administrator privileges shall be assigned administrator
accounts separate from their normal user accounts.

AC-6

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Policy
ID
4.1.4.d

4.1.5

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

Administrator accounts shall be used only for performing required
administrator duties. Individuals shall use their regular user accounts to
perform all other functions not directly tied to administrator duties (checking
email, accessing the Internet).

AC-6

Information Security and Privacy Awareness, Training, and Education

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.1.5.a

Components shall establish an information security training program for users
of DHS information systems.

AT-1

4.1.5.b

DHS personnel, contractors, or others working on behalf of DHS (i.e.
employees, detailees, military) accessing DHS systems shall receive initial
training and annual refresher training in security awareness and accepted
security practices. Personnel shall complete security awareness training within
24 hours of being granted a user account. If a user fails to meet this training
requirement, user access shall be suspended.

AT-1,
AT-4

4.1.5.c

DHS personnel, contractors, or others working on behalf of DHS (i.e.
employees, detailees, military) with significant security responsibilities (e.g.,
Information Systems Security Officers (ISSO), system administrators) shall
receive initial specialized training and thereafter annual refresher training
specific to their security responsibilities.

AT-3

4.1.5.d

Components shall maintain awareness training records to include: Component
name, name of trainee, training course title, type of training received, and
completion date of training.

AT-4

4.1.5.e

Components shall maintain role-based training records to include Component
name, name of trainee, security role of trainee, training course title, type of
training received, completion date of training, and cost of training.

AT-4

4.1.5.f

User accounts and access privileges, including access to email, shall be
disabled for those DHS employees who have not received annual refresher
training, unless a waiver is granted by the Component’s Chief Information
Security Officer (CISO) or Information Systems Security Manager (ISSM).

AT-1

4.1.5.g

Components shall prepare and submit an annual security awareness and rolebased training plan, as specified by the DHS Information Security Training
Program Office.

AT-1

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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.1.5.h

Components shall prepare and submit information security awareness reports
with content, frequency, format, and distribution at the request of the DHS
CISO.

AT-1

4.1.5.i

Components shall at the request of the DHS Information Security Training
Program Office provide evidence of training by submitting copies of training
schedules, training rosters, and training reports.

AT-4

4.1.5.j

The DHS CISO shall review Component information security awareness and
role-based training programs annually.

AT-1

4.1.5.k

Components shall submit a roster during the first month and during the seventh
month of each fiscal year identifying all significant information security
personnel, including full name, security role, employment status (federal
employee, military, contractor), and work location (state). At a minimum, the
roster will include all standard information security roles: Chief Information
Officer, Chief Information Security Officer, Authorizing Official, Program
Manager, System Owner, Information System Security Officer, Security
Operations Center Manager, System Administrator (Windows-based), and
Contracting Officer/Contracting Officer Representative.

AT-3

4.1.5.l

The annual security awareness training shall include incident response training
to information system users consistent with assigned roles and responsibilities.
(Initial training shall be completed within twenty-four (24) hours of assuming
an incident response role or responsibility. Out of cycle refresher training shall
be conducted as required due to information system changes)

IR-2

4.1.5.m

Components shall develop, implement, and update a comprehensive training
and awareness strategy aimed at ensuring that personnel understand privacy
responsibilities and procedures.

AR-5

4.1.5.n

Components shall administer basic privacy training annually and targeted,
role-based privacy training for personnel having responsibility for PII or for
activities that involve PII annually.

AR-5

4.1.5.o

Components shall ensure that personnel annually certify (manually or
electronically) acceptance of responsibilities for privacy requirements.

AR-5

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4.1.6

Separation from Duty

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.1.6.a

Components shall implement procedures to ensure that system access is
revoked for DHS employees, contractors, or others working on behalf of DHS
who leave the Component, are reassigned to other duties, or no longer require
access.

AC-2,
PS-5

4.1.6.b

Components shall establish procedures to ensure that all DHS property and
assets related to information systems are recovered from the departing
individual and that sensitive information stored on any media is transferred to
an authorized individual.

PS-4

4.1.6.c

Accounts for personnel on extended absences shall be temporarily suspended.

AC-2

4.1.6.d

System Owners shall review information system accounts supporting their
programs at least annually.

AC-2

4.1.6.e

Components shall develop and document access agreements for information
systems and ensure that individuals requiring access to information and
information systems sign appropriate access agreements prior to being granted
access, and re-sign whenever access agreements have been updated. Access
agreements shall be reviewed at least annually,

PS-6

4.2

Physical Security
4.2.1

General Physical Access

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.2.1.a

Access to DHS buildings, rooms, work areas, spaces, and structures housing
information systems, equipment, and data shall be limited to authorized
personnel.

PE-2

4.2.1.b

Controls for deterring, detecting, restricting, and regulating access to sensitive
areas shall be in place and shall be sufficient to safeguard against possible loss,
theft, destruction, damage, hazardous conditions, fire, malicious actions, and
natural disasters.

PE-3

4.2.1.c

Controls shall be based on the level of classification and risk, determined in
accordance with Departmental security policy as reflected in this and other
relevant documents.

PE-1,
PM-9

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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.2.1.d

Visitors shall sign in upon entering DHS facilities that house information
systems, equipment, and data. They shall be escorted during their stay and
sign out upon leaving. Access by non-DHS contractors or vendors shall be
limited to those work areas requiring their presence. Visitor logs shall be
maintained and available for review for one (1) year.

4.2.1.e

These requirements shall extend to DHS assets located at non-DHS facilities or
non-DHS assets and equipment that host DHS data.

4.2.1.f

Components shall control physical access to transmission medium that
transmits unencrypted data within Component facilities using DHS SOCapproved safeguards.

PE-4

4.2.1.g

Components shall control physical access to information system output devices
to prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining the output.

PE-5

4.2.1.h

Components shall:
a. Protect power equipment and power cabling for the information
systems from damage and destruction
b. Provide capability to shut off power to the information system or
individual system Components in emergency situations
c. Place emergency shutoff switches or devices to facilitate safe and easy
access for personnel
d. Protect emergency power shutoff capability from unauthorized
activation
e. Provide a short-term uninterruptible power supply to facilitate either
an orderly shutdown of the information system or a transition of the
information system to long-term alternate power in the event of a
primary power source loss.

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PE-2,
PE-3,
PE-6,
PE-8

---

PE-9,
PE-10,
PE-11

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID
4.2.1.i

DHS Policy Statements
Components shall:
a. Employ and maintain automatic emergency lighting for the
information system that activates in the event of a power outage or
disruption and that covers emergency exits and evacuation routes
within the facility
b. Employ and maintain fire suppression and detection devices/systems
for the information system that are supported by an independent
energy source
c. Maintain and monitor temperature and humidity levels within the
facility where information systems reside
d. Protect information systems from damage resulting from water
leakage by providing master shutoff or isolation valves that are
accessible, working properly, and known to key personnel.

Relevant
Controls
PE-12,
PE-13,
PE-14,
PE-15

4.2.1.j

Components shall authorize, monitor, control and maintain records of the
delivery and removal of hardware and software that enters and exits a facility.

PE-16

4.2.1.k

Components shall:

PE-17

a. Employ security at an alternate work site that is commensurate with
the security categorization level of the information processed and that
supports an organizational risk assessment
b. Assess as feasible, the effectiveness of security controls at alternate
work sites
c. Provide a means for employees to communicate with information
security personnel in case of security incidents or problems.

4.2.2

Sensitive Facility

Policy
ID
4.2.2.a

DHS Policy Statements
Facilities processing, transmitting, or storing sensitive information shall
incorporate physical protection measures based on the level of risk. The risk
shall be determined in accordance with Departmental security policy as
reflected in this and other relevant documents.

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Relevant
Controls
PE-1,
PM-9

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

4.3

Media Controls
4.3.1

Media Protection

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.3.1.a

Components shall ensure that all media containing sensitive information,
including hard copy media, backup media, and removable media such as
Universal Serial Bus (USB) drives, are stored when not in use in a secure
location (e.g., a locked office, room, desk, bookcase, file cabinet, locked tape
device, or in other storage that prohibits access by unauthorized persons).

MP-2,
MP-4,
PE-1

4.3.1.b

Components shall ensure that all offsite backup media are protected as per
guidance in this section.

CP-6

4.3.1.c

DHS personnel, contractors, and others working on behalf of DHS are
prohibited from using any non-Government-issued removable media (such as
USB drives) and from connecting them to DHS equipment or networks or
using them to store DHS sensitive information.

MP-2

4.3.1.d

All USB drives shall use encryption in compliance with Section 5.5.1 of this
Policy Directive.

IA-7,
SC-13

4.3.1.e

DHS-owned removable media shall not be connected to any non-DHS
information system unless the AO has determined that the risk is acceptable
based on compensating controls and published acceptable use guidance that
has been approved by the respective CISO or Information Systems Security
Manager (ISSM). (The respective CISO is the CISO with that system in his or
her inventory.)

AC-20,
MP-2,
PM-9

4.3.1.f

Components shall follow established procedures to ensure that paper and
electronic outputs from systems containing sensitive information are protected.

MP-1

4.3.1.g

Users shall ensure proper protection of printed output. Printing of sensitive
documents shall occur only when a trusted person is attending the printer.

SI-12

4.3.1.h

Components shall follow the procedures established by DHS Management
Directive (MD) 11042.1, Safeguarding Sensitive But Unclassified (For Official
Use Only) Information, for the transportation or mailing of sensitive media.

MP-5

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4.3.2

Media Marking and Transport

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.3.2.a

Media determined by the information owner to contain sensitive information
shall be appropriately marked in accordance with DHS MD 11042.1,
Safeguarding Sensitive But Unclassified (For Official Use Only) Information.

MP-3

4.3.2.b

Components shall control the transport of information system media
containing sensitive information, outside of controlled areas and restrict the
pickup, receipt, transfer, and delivery to authorized personnel.

MP-5

4.3.3

Media Sanitization and Disposal

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.3.3.a

Components shall ensure that any information systems storage medium
containing sensitive information is sanitized using approved sanitization
methods before it is disposed of, reused, recycled, or returned to the owner or
manufacturer.

MP-6

4.3.3.b

Components shall maintain records of the sanitization and disposition of
information systems storage media.

MP-6

4.3.3.c

Components shall periodically test degaussing equipment to verify that the
equipment is functioning properly.

MP-6

4.3.4

Production, Input/Output Controls

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.3.4.a

Components shall follow established procedures to ensure that sensitive
information cannot be accessed or stolen by unauthorized individuals.

SI-12

4.3.4.b

These procedures shall address not only the paper and electronic outputs from
systems but also the transportation or mailing of sensitive media.

SI-12

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4.4

Voice Communications Security
4.4.1

Private Branch Exchange

Policy
ID
4.4.1.a

4.4.2

DHS Policy Statements
Components shall provide adequate physical and information security for all
DHS-owned Private Branch Exchanges (PBX). (Refer to NIST Special
Publication (SP) 800-24, PBX Vulnerability Analysis, for guidance on
detecting and fixing vulnerabilities in PBX systems.)

4.4.3

--

Telephone Communications

Policy
ID
4.4.2.a

Relevant
Controls

DHS Policy Statements
Components shall develop guidance for discussing sensitive information over
the telephone. Guidance shall be approved by a senior Component official and
is subject to review and approval by the DHS CISO. Under no circumstances
shall classified national security information be discussed over unsecured
telephones.

Relevant
Controls
PL-4

Voice Mail

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.4.3.a

Sensitive information shall not be communicated over nor stored in voice mail.

PL-4

4.5

Data Communications
4.5.1

Telecommunications Protection Techniques

Policy
ID
4.5.1.a

DHS Policy Statements
Components shall carefully select the telecommunications protection
techniques that meet their information security needs in the most cost-effective
manner, consistent with Departmental and Component information system
security policies. Approved protected network services (PNS) may be used as

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Relevant
Controls
CM-2

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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

cost-effective alternatives to the use of encryption for sensitive information
requiring telecommunications protection.

4.5.1.b

4.5.2

In cases with high impact and moderate impact for any of the FIPS 199
security objectives, Components shall establish alternate telecommunications
services including necessary agreements to permit the resumption of specified
operations for essential missions and business functions within a Componentdefined time period when the primary telecommunications capabilities are
unavailable at either the primary or alternate processing or storage sites.

CP-8

Facsimiles

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.5.2.a

Components shall implement and enforce technical controls for fax technology
and systems (including fax machines, servers, gateways, software, and
protocols) that transmit and receive sensitive information.

SC-1,
SC-7,
SC-8

4.5.2.b

Components shall configure fax servers to ensure that incoming lines cannot
be used to access the network or any data on the fax server.

AC-4

4.5.3

Video Teleconferencing

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.5.3.a

Components shall implement controls to ensure that only authorized
individuals are able to participate in each video conference.

AC-3,
PE-3

4.5.3.b

Components shall ensure that appropriate transmission protections,
commensurate with the highest sensitivity of information to be discussed, are
in place throughout any video teleconference.

SC-8

4.5.3.c

Video teleconferencing equipment and software shall be disabled when not in
use.

AC-3,
PE-3

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4.5.4

Voice over Data Networks

Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and similar technologies move voice over digital networks.
These technologies use protocols originally designed for data networking. Such technologies
include Voice over Frame Relay, Voice over Asynchronous Transfer Mode, and Voice over
Digital Subscriber Line (refer to National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 80058 for further information).

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.5.4.a

Prior to implementing voice over data network technology, Components shall
conduct rigorous risk assessments and security testing and provide a business
justification for its use. Any systems that employ this technology shall be
authorized for this purpose with residual risks clearly identified.

SC-19,
PM-9

4.5.4.b

Voice over data network implementations shall have sufficient redundancy to
ensure network outages do not result in the loss of both voice and data
communications.

SC-19

4.5.4.c

Components shall ensure appropriate identification and authentication
controls, audit logging, and integrity controls are implemented on every
element of their voice over data networks.

SC-19

4.5.4.d

Components shall ensure that physical access to voice over data network
elements is restricted to authorized personnel.

SC-19

4.6

Wireless Network Communications

Wireless network communications technologies include the following:
•

Wireless systems (e.g., Wireless Local Area Networks [WLAN], Wireless Wide Area
Networks [WWAN], Wireless Personal Area Networks [WPAN], peer-to-peer
wireless networks, information systems that leverage commercial wireless services).
Wireless systems include the transmission medium, stationary integrated devices,
firmware, supporting services, and protocols

•

Wireless mobile devices capable of storing, processing, or transmitting sensitive
information (e.g., Personal Digital Assistants [PDA], smart telephones, two-way
pagers, handheld radios, cellular telephones, Personal Communications Services
[PCS] devices, multifunctional wireless devices, portable audio/video recording
devices with wireless capability, scanning devices, messaging devices)

•

Wireless tactical systems, including mission-critical communication systems and
devices (e.g., include Land Mobile Radio [LMR] subscriber devices and
infrastructure equipment, remote sensors, technical investigative communications
systems)

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•

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

4.6.a

Components shall not introduce new wireless network communications
technologies into the enterprise unless the appropriate AO specifically
approves a technology and application.

4.6.b

Components using Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)-based encryption on any
wireless device shall implement and maintain a key management plan
approved by the DHS PKI Policy Authority.

4.6.1

Relevant
Controls
AC-18

IA-5,
SC-12

Wireless Systems

Wireless system policy and procedures are described more completely in Attachment Q1
(Wireless Systems) to the DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.6.1.a

Annual information security assessments shall be conducted on all approved
wireless systems. Wireless information security assessments shall enumerate
vulnerabilities, risk statements, risk levels, and corrective actions.

CA-2,
PM-9

4.6.1.b

Plans of Action and Milestones (POA&M) shall be developed to address
wireless information security vulnerabilities. Plans shall prioritize corrective
actions and implementation milestones in accordance with defined risk levels.

CA-5,
PM-4,
PM-9

4.6.1.c

Components shall identify countermeasures to denial-of-service attacks and
complete a risk based evaluation prior to approving the use of any non-GFE
wireless device.

AC-19,
PM-9,
SC-5

4.6.1.d

SPs shall adopt a defense-in-depth strategy that integrates firewalls, screening
routers, wireless intrusion detection systems, antivirus software, encryption,
strong authentication, and cryptographic key management to ensure that
information security solutions and secure connections to external interfaces are
consistently enforced.

SI-3

4.6.1.e

A Migration Plan shall be implemented for legacy wireless systems that are not
compliant with DHS information security policy. The migration plan shall
outline the provisions, procedures, and restrictions for transitioning the legacy
systems to DHS-compliant security architectures. Operation of these
noncompliant systems before and during the migration requires an approved
waiver to policy from the DHS CISO.

CA-5

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Policy
ID

Relevant
Controls

DHS Policy Statements

4.6.1.f

Component CISOs shall review all system applications for wireless usage,
maintain an inventory of systems, and provide that inventory to the DHS CISO
annually.

AC-18,
PM-5

4.6.1.g

Component CISOs shall (1) establish usage restrictions and implementation
guidance for wireless technologies; and (2) authorize, monitor, and control
wireless access to DHS information systems.

AC-18

4.6.2

Wireless Mobile Devices

Wireless mobile devices include any wireless clients capable of storing, processing, or
transmitting sensitive information.
Biometrics may be harvested and are not a secret (in cryptographic terms). For this reason,
biometrics should not be utililzed as a single-factor authentication mechanism for sensitive
information. Component AO’s and CISO’s should carefully assess the residual risks when
authorizing biometric use in mobile device operations.
Guidance applicable to wireless mobile devices is detailed in DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems
Handbook Attachment Q2, “Mobile Devices.”
Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.6.2.a

Components shall ensure that neither personally-owned wireless mobile
devices nor Government-owned wireless mobile devices are permitted in
conference rooms or secure facilities where classified information is discussed.
Wireless mobile devices and accessories are prohibited in areas where
unclassified, sensitive information is discussed, maintained, or distributed
unless specifically authorized in writing by the AO(s) for the system(s) used in
the area.

AC-19, PL4; PE-18

4.6.2.b

Wireless mobile devices shall not be tethered or otherwise physically or
wirelessly connected to the DHS-wired core network without written consent
from the AO.

AC-18, AC19

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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.6.2.c

Wireless mobile devices that store, process, or transmit sensitive information
shall implement full-disk encryption using NIST FIPS 140-2 Validated
encryption modules 4 and strong complex passwords prior to receiving
sensitive information. A strong complex password shall be required to
decrypt after any power cycling or restart.

AC-19, IA5, IA-7

4.6.2.d

The AO shall approve the use of wireless mobile devices or software
applications used to process, store, or transmit sensitive information from the
NSA Commercial Solutions for Classified (CSFC) Program components list 5;
FIPS 201 Approved Products List (APL) 6; or the National Information
Assurance Partnership (NIAP) Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme (CCEVS) product list 7. Mobile devices approved by the AO must be
posted in the DHS Enterprise Architecture (EA) Approved Products List (APL)
of the Technical Reference Model (TRM).

AC-19,
CA-6, IA-7,
SC-8,
SC-9,
SC-13

4.6.2.e

Device mobile code will be downloaded and installed only as approved by the
AO. Mobile code approved by the AO must be posted in the DHS Enterprise
Architecture (EA) Approved Products List (APL) of the Technical Reference
Model (TRM).

SC-18

4.6.2.f

Wireless mobile device operation is permitted only when Component CISO approved anti-malware software and software patches are current. Antimalware and software patch versions approved by the Component CISO must
be posted in the DHS Enterprise Architecture (EA) Approved Products List
(APL) of the Technical Reference Model (TRM).

SI-3

4.6.2.g

The AO will approve appropriate cost-effective countermeasures against
denial-of-service attacks prior to wireless device operation.

SC-5

4.6.2.h

Components shall maintain a current inventory of all approved wireless mobile
devices in operation. The inventory must be posted in the DHS inventory
management system.

SC-7
PM-5

4 A list of FIPS 140-2 validated encryption is located at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html
5 A list of NSA CSFC Program components is located at

https://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/csfc_program/component_list.shtml.
6 The FIPS-201 Approved Products List is located at http://www.idmanagement.gov/approved-products-list
7 A list of NIAP-CCEVS products is located at https://www.niap-ccevs.org/CCEVS_Products
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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.6.2.i

Wireless mobile devices shall be sanitized of all information before being
reused by another individual, office, or Component within DHS or before they
are retired. Wireless mobile devices that are disposed of, recycled, or returned
to the owner or manufacturer shall first be sanitized using procedures approved
by the AO using NSA-approved media destruction methods as appropriate 8.

MP-6

4.6.2.j

Wireless mobile devices not compliant with DHS information security policy
require a migration plan outlining the provisions, procedures, and plans for
transitioning these wireless mobile devices to meet 4300A requirements.
Operation of these non-compliant systems requires an approved waiver from
the DHS CISO.

CA-5
CA-6

4.6.2.k

AOs may authorize use of Biometric tokens as an authentication factor when
the mobile device implements physical isolation of secure memory for storage
of biometric data and trusted execution environment for reading and processing
biometrics

4.6.2.l

If authorized for use, fingerprint sensors must be touch-based (vs. swipe-based)
and must read and process data in a trusted execution environment separated
from access by other processes

4.6.2.m

The use of add-on devices, such as cameras and video/voice recorders, is not
authorized unless approved by the AO. Functions that can record or transmit
sensitive information via audio, video, Infrared (IR), or Radio Frequency (RF)
shall be disabled or powered off in areas where sensitive information is
discussed.

AC-19,
CM-7,
PE-18,
SC-7

4.6.2.n

When Biometric fingerprint technology is used as a subsequent unlock method
on a mobile device; it shall be configured to allow no more than five (5)
consecutive failed fingerprint attempts and upon failure of these attempts
require entering the complex password.

AC-19,
IA-7,
SC-8,
SC-9,
SC-13

4.6.2.o

Mobile devices shall be configured to lock after a maximum of 10 minutes idle.

4.6.2.p

Mobile devices shall be configured to lock after a maximum of 10 sequential
unsuccessful attempts to gain access.

8 The NSA Media Destruction guidance is located at

https://www.nsa.gov/ia/mitigation_guidance/media_destruction_guidance/index.shtml
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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

4.6.2.q

Components shall ensure that use of a device’s native biometric fingerprint
authentication technology is permitted by and in compliance with the published
DHS Configuration Guide for the device.

4.6.2.r

When derived PIV credentials are utilized and stored in a FIPS 140-2 validated
(a) native device hardware keystore or (b) Mobile Device Manager’s (MDMs)
software-based keystore; the credential shall be activated by either a
knowledge-based or biometric token.

4.6.2.1

Cellular Phones

Policy
ID
4.6.2.1.a

Relevant
Controls

DHS Policy Statements
Components shall develop guidance for discussing sensitive information on
cellular phones. Guidance shall be approved by a senior Component official
and is subject to review by the DHS CISO. Under no circumstances shall
classified information be discussed on cellular phones.

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Relevant
Controls
PL-4

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

4.6.2.2

Pagers

Policy
ID
4.6.2.2.a

4.6.2.3

DHS Policy Statements
Pagers shall not be used to transmit sensitive information.

Relevant
Controls
PL-4

Multifunctional Wireless Devices

Wireless devices have evolved to be multifunctional (cell phones, pagers, and radios can surf the
Internet, retrieve email, take and transmit pictures). Most of these functions do not have
sufficient security.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.6.2.3.a

Functions that cannot be encrypted using approved cryptographic modules
shall not be used to process, store, or transmit sensitive information.

AC-19,
SC-8,
SC-12

4.6.2.3.b

Functions that transmit or receive video, IR, or RF signals shall be disabled in
areas where sensitive information is discussed.

AC-19,
PE-18

4.6.2.3.c

Short Message Service (SMS) and Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS)
shall not be used to process, store, or transmit sensitive information, and shall
be disabled whenever possible.

---

4.6.2.4

Bluetooth

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

4.6.2.4.a

Bluetooth functionality shall be disabled when not in use.

4.6.2.4.b

Master devices (those that have unidirectional control over one or more other
devices, such as a smartphone and headset combination) shall include link
activity status indicators such as icons or LEDs.

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Relevant
Controls
AC-18
CM-6
SC-8
SC-13
AC-18
CM-6
SC-8
SC-13

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls
AC-18
CM-6
SC-8
SC-13
AC-4
PE-3
PE-18
PE-19
AC-18
CM-6
SC-8
SC-13
AC-18
CM-6
SC-8
SC-13
AC-3
AC-18

4.6.2.4.c

Pairing shall be performed as infrequently as possible.

4.6.2.4.d

Devices shall use low power to minimize the range of communication.

4.6.2.4.e

Devices shall be configured for manual pairing and shall prompt the user to
authorize any incoming connection requests; auto pairing shall not be used.

4.6.2.4.f

Devices shall be maintained in non-discoverable mode except during device
pairing.

4.6.2.4.g

Multiple or split communication paths shall not be used on devices.

4.6.2.4.h

Pairings shall only be made between approved devices. Devices may be paired
to receivers in personally owned vehicles for voice communication as
approved by the AO.

AC-18
AC-19
AC-20

4.6.2.4.i

Profiles shall be deleted for devices no longer in service.

AC-18
CM-6
SC-8
SC-13

4.6.2.4.j

Devices shall be transported and stored securely at all times.

---

For additional information, please refer to “Bluetooth Security,” Attachment Q 6 to DHS 4300A
Sensitive Systems Handbook.
4.6.3

Wireless Tactical Systems

Wireless tactical systems include LMR subscriber devices, infrastructure equipment, remote
sensors, and technical investigative communications systems. Because they are often deployed
under circumstances in which officer safety and mission success are at stake, wireless tactical
systems require even greater security measures. To ensure secure tactical communications,
Components must implement strong identification, authentication, and encryption protocols
designed specifically for each wireless tactical system.
Wireless tactical system policy and procedures are described more completely in Attachment Q3,
“Wireless Tactical Systems” to the DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook.

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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.6.3.a

AOs shall be immediately notified whenever any security feature is disabled in
response to time-sensitive, mission-critical incidents.

CM-3

4.6.3.b

Wireless tactical systems shall implement strong identification, authentication,
and encryption.

IA-2,
IA-7,
SC-8

4.6.3.c

Cost-effective countermeasures to denial-of-service attacks shall be identified
and implemented prior to a wireless tactical system being approved for use.

SC-5

4.6.3.d

Components shall maintain a current inventory of all approved wireless
tactical systems in operation.

PM-5

4.6.3.e

A Migration Plan shall be implemented for legacy tactical wireless systems
that are not compliant with DHS information security policy. The migration
plan will outline the provisions, procedures, and restrictions for transitioning
the legacy systems to DHS-compliant security architectures. Operation of
these noncompliant systems requires an approved waiver from the DHS CISO,
as appropriate.

---

4.6.3.f

The security configuration of LMR subscriber units shall be validated via overthe-air-rekeying (OTAR) or hard rekey using a crypto-period no longer than
180 days.

SC-12

4.6.3.g

All LMR systems shall comply with Project 25 (P25, EIA/TIA-102) security
standards where applicable.

CM-2

4.6.4

Radio Frequency Identification

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) enables wireless identification of objects over significant
distances. Because of the computing limitations of RFID tags, it often is not feasible to
implement many of the security mechanisms, such as cryptography and strong authentication,
that are commonly supported on personal workstations, servers, and network infrastructure
devices. RFID security controls can support Departmental and Component privacy objectives,
mitigate risks to business processes, and prevent the disclosure of sensitive information.
RFID procedures are described in “Sensitive RFID Systems,” Attachment Q4 to DHS 4300A
Sensitive Systems Handbook.

Policy
ID
4.6.4.a

DHS Policy Statements
Components implementing RFID systems shall assess hazards of

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Relevant
Controls
PE-18

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

electromagnetic radiation to fuel, ordnance, and personnel before deployment
of the RFID technology.
4.6.4.b

Components shall limit data stored on RFID tags to the greatest extent
possible, recording information beyond an identifier only when required for
the application mission. When data beyond an identifier is stored on a tag, the
tag’s memory shall be protected by access control.

AR-2,
AC-6

4.6.4.c

Components shall develop a contingency plan, such as the use of a fallback
identification technology, to implement in case of an RFID security breach or
system failure.

---

4.6.4.d

Components shall identify and implement appropriate operational and
technical controls to limit unauthorized tracking or targeting of RFID-tagged
items when these items are expected to travel outside the Component’s
physical perimeter.

AC-14

4.6.4.e

When an RFID system is connected to a DHS data network, Components shall
implement network security controls to segregate RFID network elements such
as RFID readers, middleware, and databases from other non-RFID network
hosts.

CM-6

4.6.4.f

Components implementing RFID technology shall determine whether or not
tag cloning is a significant business risk. If such a significant risk exists, then
tag transactions shall be cryptographically authenticated.

IA-7,
PM-9,
RA-3

4.7

Overseas Communications

Policy
ID
4.7.a

4.8

DHS Policy Statements
Where required or appropriate, all communications outside of the United
States and its territories shall be in accordance with the Department of State
Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM), 12 FAM 600, Information Security
Technology.

Equipment
4.8.1

Workstations

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Relevant
Controls
---

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.8.1.a

Components shall configure workstations to either log off, or activate a
password-protected lock, or password-protected screensaver after 15 minutes
of user inactivity.

4.8.1.b

Components shall ensure that workstations are protected from theft.

PE-3

4.8.1.c

Users shall either log off or lock their workstations when unattended.

---

4.8.2

AC-11,
CM-6

Laptop Computers and Other Mobile Computing Devices

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.8.2.a

Information stored on any laptop computer or other mobile computing device
that may be used in a residence or on travel shall use encryption in accordance
with Section 5.5.1, Encryption, for data at rest and in motion. Passwords,
tokens and Smart Cards shall not be stored on or with the laptop or other
mobile computing device.

AC-19,
IA-2,
SC-12,
SC-28

4.8.2.b

Laptop computers shall be powered down when not in use (due to volatile
memory vulnerabilities).

AC-19,
PL-4

4.8.2.c

When unattended, laptop computers and other mobile computing devices shall
be secured using one of the following methods:
• a locked office
• a locking cable
• a locked cabinet
• a locked desk

AC-19,
PE-3,
PL-4

4.8.2.d

Users shall obtain the written approval of the office director before taking a
laptop computer or other mobile computing device outside of the United States
or its territories.

AC-19,
PL-4

4.8.3

Personally Owned Equipment and Software

Policy
ID
4.8.3.a

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

Personally owned equipment and software shall not be used to process, access,
or store sensitive information without the written prior approval of the AO.

CM-10,
CM-11

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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

4.8.3.b

Equipment that is not owned or leased by the Federal Government, or operated
by a contractor on behalf of the Federal Government, shall not be connected to
DHS equipment or networks without the written prior approval of the
Component CISO/ISSM.

4.8.3.c

Any device that has been obtained through civil or criminal asset forfeiture
shall not be used as part of a DHS information system nor used to process
DHS data.

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Relevant
Controls
SA-9

AC-20

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

4.8.4

Hardware and Software

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.8.4.a

Components shall ensure that DHS information systems follow the hardening
guides for operating systems and the configuration guides for applications
published by the DHS CISO. DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook
includes the DHS Secure Baseline Configuration Guides.

CM-2,
CM-6

4.8.4.b

Components shall limit access to system software and hardware to authorized
personnel.

AC-3,
CM-5

4.8.4.c

Components shall test, authorize, and approve all new and revised software
and hardware prior to implementation in accordance with their CM Plan.

CM-2,
CM-3

4.8.4.d

Components shall manage systems to reduce vulnerabilities through
vulnerability testing and management, promptly installing patches, and
eliminating or disabling unnecessary services. When the technology is
available, Components shall ensure that their systems are protected
against pass-the-hash and lateral movement vulnerabilities.

CM-3,
RA-5

4.8.4.e

Components shall ensure that maintenance ports are disabled during normal
system operation and enabled only during approved maintenance activities.

MA-1

4.8.4.f

System libraries shall be managed and maintained to protect privileged
programs and to prevent or minimize the introduction of unauthorized code.

SI-7

4.8.4.g

Components shall develop maintenance policy and procedures.

MA-1

4.8.4.h

If cleared maintenance personnel are not available, a trusted DHS employee
with sufficient technical knowledge to detect and prevent unauthorized
modification to the information system or its network shall monitor and escort
the maintenance personnel during maintenance activities. This situation shall
only occur in exceptional cases. Components shall take all possible steps to
ensure that trusted maintenance personnel are available.

MA-5

4.8.4.i

Maintenance using a different user’s identity may be performed only when the
user is present. The user shall log in and observe the maintenance actions at
all times. Users shall not share their authentication information with
maintenance personnel.

MA-5

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Policy
ID
4.8.4.j

DHS Policy Statements
Components shall define and utilize a process for the scheduling, performance,
approvals, documenting, testing, and clearing of equipment requiring
maintenance. The process shall protect sensitive information by requiring
authorized personnel to explicitly:

Relevant
Controls
MA-2

a. Approve the removal of an information system or system Components
from organizational facilities for off-site maintenance or repairs;
b. Sanitize equipment to remove all information from associated media
prior to removal from organizational facilities for off-site maintenance
or repairs; and
c. Check all potentially impacted security controls to verify that the
controls are still functioning properly following maintenance or repair
actions.
4.8.4.k

Components shall approve, control, and monitor information system
maintenance tools.

MA-3

4.8.4.l

Components shall obtain information system maintenance support and/or spare
parts within a Component-defined time period after failure.

MA-6

4.8.4.m

Components shall include requirements for software assurance and supply
chain risk management prior to acquisition of any hardware or software
products. Components shall ensure that commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
hardware and software products in use by or being considered for use in
moderate and high criticality systems, shall be analyzed for supply chain risk
prior to acquisition activities that procure new products, upgrade existing
products, or that will integrate these products with commercial services.

4.8.5

Personal Use of Government Office Equipment and DHS Systems/Computers

Policy
ID
4.8.5.a

DHS Policy Statements
DHS employees may use Government office equipment and DHS
systems/computers for authorized purposes only. “Authorized use” includes
limited personal use as described in DHS MD 4600.1, Personal Use of
Government Office Equipment, and DHS MD 4900, Individual Use and
Operation of DHS Information Systems/Computers.

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Relevant
Controls
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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.8.5.b

Limited personal use of DHS email and Internet services is authorized for
DHS employees as long as this use does not interfere with official duties,
inhibit the security of information and information systems, or cause
degradation of network services. Specifically prohibited activities include
streaming of audio or video, social networking, peer-to-peer networking,
software or music sharing/piracy, online gaming, Webmail, Instant Messaging
(IM), hacking, and the viewing of pornography or other offensive content.
DHS users shall comply with the provisions of DHS MD 4500.1, DHS Email
Usage, and DHS MD 4400.1, DHS Web and Information Systems.

---

4.8.5.c

Anyone granted user account access to any DHS information system
(including DHS employees, contractors, and others working on behalf of DHS)
shall have no expectations of privacy associated with its use. By completing
the authentication process, the user acknowledges his or her consent to
monitoring.

AC-8

4.8.5.d

The use of Government office equipment and DHS systems/computers
constitutes consent to monitoring and auditing of the equipment/systems at all
times. Monitoring includes the tracking of internal transactions and external
transactions such as Internet access. It also includes auditing of stored data on
local and network storage devices as well as removable media.

AC-8

4.8.5.e

DHS users are required to sign rules of behavior prior to being granted system
accounts or access to DHS systems or data. The rules of behavior shall contain
a “Consent to Monitor” provision and an acknowledgement that the user has
no expectation of privacy.

PL-4

4.8.5.f

Contractors, others working on behalf of DHS, or other non-DHS employees
are not authorized to use Government office equipment or information
systems/computers for personal use, unless limited personal use is specifically
permitted by the contract or memorandum of agreement. When so authorized,
the limited personal use policies of this section and the provisions of DHS MD
4600.1, DHS MD 4900, DHS MD 4400.1, and DHS MD 4500.1 shall apply.

---

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4.8.6

Wireless Settings for Peripheral Equipment

Peripheral equipment (printers, scanners, fax machines) often includes capabilities, intended to
allow wireless access to these devices. Although convenient, wireless access comes with
additional risks. In general, wireless access is not allowed on DHS networks.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.8.6.a

Components shall ensure that wireless capabilities for peripheral equipment
are disabled. This applies all to peripherals connected to any DHS network or
to systems processing or hosting DHS sensitive information.

CM-7

4.8.6.b

In cases where valid mission requirements or equipment limitations prevent
disabling wireless capabilities, Components shall comply with all requirements
outlined in Section 4.6, Wireless Communication and obtain a waiver in
accordance with this policy.

CM-7,
IR-4,
IR-6

4.9

Department Information Security Operations

The DHS Security Operations Center (SOC) is the central coordinating and reporting authority
for all Sensitive and National Security computer security incidents throughout the Department.
The Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) Security Operations Center (SOC) shall report
incidents to the DHS SOC through appropriate channels to protect data classification. The
HSDN SOC is subordinate to the DHS SOC, acting as the central coordinating and reporting
authority for all SECRET computer security incidents throughout the Department.
The CIO is responsible for implementing firewall changes in a timely manner.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

4.9.a

It is the policy of DHS that employees, contractors, or others working on
behalf of DHS have no privacy expectations associated with the use of any
DHS network, system, or application. This policy is further extended to
anyone who is granted account access to any network, system, or application
in use in the Department. By completing the account login process the account
owner acknowledges their consent to monitoring.

4.9.b

Component SOCs shall be operationally subordinate to the DHS SOC, which
shall provide them operational oversight and guidance. HSDN SOC will
oversee the handling of all incidents occurring on HSDN and coordinate the
sharing of incident information with DHS SOC.

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Relevant
Controls
AC-8,
PL-4

IR-1,
IR-4,
IR-6

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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.9.c

The DHS SOC or Component SOCs shall lead the coordination and
administration of Department and Component policy enforcement points, such
as firewalls.

SC-7

4.9.d

The DHS SOC shall implement the Department logging strategy, coordinated
with Component SOCs, to enable endpoint visibility and Departmental
situational awareness. DHS SOC is responsible for monitoring shared
infrastructure such as the Trusted Internet Connection (TIC), Policy
Enforcement Points (PEP), and Email Secure Gateway (EMSG). Component
SOCs are responsible for monitoring at a minimum internal enclave network
traffic and internal host network and host-based activity.

---

4.9.e

All SOCs shall have the capability to process intelligence information at the
collateral level or above. The DHS SOC and Component SOCs shall have the
ability to process SECRET level information continuously and shall have the
capability to receive Top Secret / Sensitive Compartmented Information
(TS/SCI) information.

IR-4

4.9.f

SOCs shall ensure that personnel are appropriately cleared to access the DHS
C-LAN. SOC managers are free to determine the number and type of
personnel to be cleared, but at least one cleared person shall be available per
shift (this person may be on call). A Government officer shall be available
continuously for incident response and management.

IR-4

4.9.g

All Department SOCs shall establish and maintain a Digital Malware Analysis
(DMA) capability as outlined in the DHS Security Operations Concept of
Operations (SOC CONOPS).

IR-7

4.9.h

Department information security operations shall provide a vulnerability
management capability. DHS SOC provides Information Security
Vulnerability Management (ISVM) messages and vulnerability assessment
capabilities. Components are required to comply with the ISVMs released by
the DHS SOC. Component SOCs shall develop a robust vulnerability
management capability to compliment the DHS SOC.

SI-5

4.9.i

Component CISOs shall ensure that the DHS CISO is kept apprised of all
pertinent matters involving the security of information systems and that
security-related decisions and information are distributed to the ISSOs and
other appropriate persons.

SI-5

4.9.j

Component SOCs shall report operationally to their respective Component
CISO. Each CISO shall exercise oversight over their Component’s
information security operations functions, including the Component SOCs.

IR-1

4.9.k

The DHS SOC shall report operationally to the DHS CISO.

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Policy
ID
4.9.l

4.9.1

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

The NOC/SOC shall be under the direction of a Government employee who
shall be present at all times.

Security Incidents and Incident Response and Reporting

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.9.1.a

Components shall establish and maintain a continuous 24x7 incident response
capability.

IR-1

4.9.1.b

Component SOCs shall report significant incidents to the DHS SOC via
EOCOnline (https://eoconline.dhs.gov) as soon as possible but not later than
one hour after the DHS SOC report. Other means of reporting, such as calling
1-877-DHS1NET (1-877-347-1638) or emailing [email protected] are
acceptable, but the Component shall positively verify that notification, if not
submitted via EOConline, is acknowledged by the DHS SOC.

IR-6

4.9.1.c

Significant HSDN incidents shall be documented with an initial detailed report
to the HSDN Government Watch Officer and to the DHS SOC via secure
communications, via HSDN or Secure Terminal Equipment (STE) cleared to
the level commensurate with the incident being reported, as soon as possible
but not later than one hour after the DHS SOC report. Subsequent updates and
status reports shall be provided to the HSDN SOC and to the DHS SOC via
secure email whenever new information is discovered. Significant incidents
are reported individually and shall not be reported in the monthly summary
report.

IR-6

4.9.1.d

Components shall report minor incidents via the DHS SOC portal
(https://eoconline.dhs.gov) within 24 hours of validation. Components without
portal access shall temporarily report minor incidents via email to
[email protected]. HSDN incidents or incidents involving SECRET
information shall be documented in a summary report and sent via secure
email to the HSDN SOC.

IR-6

4.9.1.e

DHS personnel shall follow DHS CISO procedures for detecting, reporting,
and responding to information security incidents in accordance with the DHS
SOC CONOPS. Reports shall be classified at the highest classification level of
the information contained in the document. Unsanitized reports shall be
marked and handled appropriately.

IR-1

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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.9.1.f

The DHS SOC shall report incidents to the United States Computer
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) in accordance with the DHS SOC
CONOPS. Components shall not send incident reports directly to US-CERT.

IR-6

4.9.1.g

The DHS SOC shall receive classified spillage incident reports, and support
the DHS CSO for containment and cleanup. All classified spillages are
significant incidents.

IR-6

4.9.1.h

The DHS SOC shall maintain information security “playbooks” that
implement procedures and provide guidance on how to respond rapidly to
developing incidents.

IR-1

4.9.1.i

The DHS SOC shall respond to cyber-attacks, events, and incidents pertaining
to DHS assets. When an external organization is involved, the DHS SOC will
coordinate with the external organization through US-CERT, except in timesensitive cases where a response requires direct contact with the external
organization.

IR-1

4.9.1.j

Components shall maintain a full SOC capability or outsource SOC capability
to the DHS SOC. The DHS SOC shall provide SOC services to Components
in accordance with formal agreements. Information regarding incident
response capability is available in “Incident Response,” Attachment F to the
DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook.

IR-7
IR-8

4.9.1.k

Components shall develop and publish internal computer security incident
response plans and incident handling procedures, and make copies available to
the DHS SOC upon request. Each procedure shall include a detailed
Configuration Management (CM) process for modification of security device
configurations.

IR-1

4.9.1.l

Component Heads shall ensure that corrective actions are taken when security
incidents and violations occur, and shall hold personnel accountable for
intentional misconduct.

IR-1

4.9.1.m

The DHS SOC shall monitor and report incident investigation and incident
remediation activities to the DHS Chief Information Officer (CIO) and CISO
in accordance with the DHS SOC CONOPS until the incident is closed.

IR-5

4.9.1.n

The DHS CISO shall determine the frequency and content of security incident
reports.

IR-6

4.9.1.o

The Component SOC shall report incidents only to the DHS SOC and to no
other external agency or organization.

IR-6

4.9.1.p

The DHS CISO shall publish Incident Response Testing and Exercise
scenarios as required.

IR-1

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Policy
ID
4.9.1.q

4.9.2

DHS Policy Statements
The Component CISO for each Component that provides an incident response
capability shall ensure Incident Response Testing and Exercises are conducted
annually in coordination with the DHS CISO.

Relevant
Controls
IR-3

Law Enforcement Incident Response

The DHS SOC shall notify the DHS Chief, Internal Security and Investigations Division, Office
of Security (CISID-OIS) whenever an incident requires law enforcement involvement. Law
enforcement shall coordinate with the DHS SOC, the CISID-OIS, the Component, and other
appropriate parties whenever a crime is committed or suspected.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.9.2.a

Components shall coordinate all external Law Enforcement (LE) involvements
through the DHS SOC and obtain guidance from the DHS SOC before
contacting local law enforcement. Exceptions are only made during
emergencies where there is risk to life, limb, or property. In cases of
emergency notification, the Component shall notify the DHS SOC as soon as
possible, by the most expedient means available.

IR-6

4.9.2.b

Security incidents may include law enforcement (LE) or counterintelligence
(CI) elements, such as maintaining a chain of custody. All incidents
containing a LE/CI aspect shall be coordinated with the DHS CSO through the
DHS SOC.

IR-6

4.10

Documentation

Policy
ID
4.10.a

DHS Policy Statements
Components shall ensure that information systems and networks are
appropriately documented in such a way as to allow others to understand
system operation and configuration.

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Relevant
Controls
CM-8

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.10.b

System Owners shall update system documentation annually or whenever
significant changes occur. Changes that may require updates include:
• New threat information
• Weaknesses or deficiencies discovered in currently deployed security
controls after an information system breach
• A redefinition of mission priorities or business objectives resulting in a
change to the security category of the information system
• A change in the information system (e.g., adding new hardware,
software, or firmware; or establishing new connections) or the
system’s environment of operation

CM-3,
CM-8,
SA-5

4.10.c

Documentation shall be kept on hand and shall be accessible to authorized
personnel (including auditors) at all times.

CM-3,
SA-5

4.10.d

System documentation may be categorized as Sensitive if deemed appropriate
by the Component CISO/ISSM. This category shall not be used as a means of
restricting access to auditors or other authorized personnel.

CM-3

4.11

Information and Data Backup

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.11.a

The policies in this document, including Security Authorization Process
requirements, apply to any devices that process or host DHS data.

---

4.11.b

Component CISOs/ISSMs shall determine whether or not automated process
devices shall be included as part of an information system’s Security
Authorization Process requirements.

---

4.11.c

Components shall implement and enforce backup procedures as part of their
contingency planning.

CP-9

4.11.d

All portable backup media in transit shall use encryption in compliance with
Section 5.5.1 of this Policy Directive.

CP-9

4.11.e

Components shall follow the procedures established by DHS Management
Directive (MD) 11042.1, Safeguarding Sensitive But Unclassified (For
Official Use Only) Information, for the transportation or mailing of backup
media.

MP-5

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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.11.f

Backup media shall be shipped using an accountable delivery service (e.g. U.S.
Postal Service First Class Mail, Federal Express, United Parcel Service) and
shall be properly inventoried.

CP-9,
MP-5

4.11.g

Every information system shall have a documented chain of custody process
for the handling and transportation of portable backup media.

MP-5

4.12

Converging Technologies

Advances in technology have resulted in the availability of devices that offer multiple functions.
Many devices such as multifunctional desktop computers, copiers, facsimile machines, and
heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems may contain sensitive information and
may also be connected to data communications networks.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.12.a

The policies in this document apply to any networked devices that contain
Information Technology (IT), including copiers, facsimile machines, and alarm
control systems.

4.12.b

Components shall ensure that network printers and facsimile machines are
updated to the latest version of their firmware/software at least annually.

CM-2

4.12.c

Components shall ensure that network printers, copiers, and facsimile
machines are configured for least required functionality.

CM-7

4.12.d

Components shall ensure that each network printer, copier, and facsimile
machine is within the system definition of a DHS information system that has
a current ATO.

4.12.e

Components shall ensure that remote maintenance of network printers, copiers,
and facsimile machines is conducted only from within DHS networks. If
maintenance planning does not include performing remote maintenance,
Components shall ensure that remote maintenance capabilities are disabled.

MA-4

4.12.f

Components shall ensure that network printers, copiers, and facsimile
machines are configured to restrict administrator access to authorized
individuals or groups.

MA-5

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---

CM-8,
PL-2

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

4.12.g

Components shall ensure that maintenance or disposal of network printers,
copiers, or facsimile machines, approved for sensitive reproduction, is
performed only while escorted by a properly cleared person with knowledge to
detect any inappropriate action.

MA-5

4.12.h

Components shall ensure that memory and hard drives do not leave the
facility; they are to be replaced and the old part destroyed as sensitive media.

MP-6

4.12.i

Components shall locate network printers, copiers, and facsimile machines
approved to process sensitive information in areas where access can be
controlled when paper output is being created.

PE-18

4.12.j

Any multifunction device connected to a DHS network or other information
system containing sensitive information shall have the inbound dial in
capabilities disabled.

AC-17

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5.0

TECHNICAL POLICIES

The design of information systems that process, store, or transmit sensitive information shall
include the automated security features discussed in this section. Security safeguards shall be in
place to ensure that each person having access to sensitive information systems is individually
accountable for his or her actions while utilizing the system.
5.1

Identification and Authentication

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

5.1.a

Components shall ensure that user access is controlled and limited based on
positive user identification and authentication mechanisms that support the
minimum requirements of access control, least privilege, and system integrity.

IA-1,
IA-2

5.1.b

For information systems requiring authentication controls, Components shall
ensure that the information system is configured to require that each user be
authenticated before information system access occurs.

IA-1,
IA-2

5.1.c

For systems with low impact for the confidentiality security objective,
Components shall disable user identifiers after 90 days of inactivity; for
systems with moderate and high impacts for the confidentiality security
objective, Components shall disable user identifiers after 45 days of inactivity.
This policy applies to anyone who is granted account access to any network,
system, or application in use in the Department.

IA-4

5.1.d

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) users shall not share identification or
authentication materials of any kind, nor shall any DHS user allow any other
person to operate any DHS system by employing the user’s identity.

IA-5

5.1.e

All user authentication materials shall be treated as sensitive material and shall
carry a classification as high as the most sensitive information to which that
user is granted access using that authenticator.

IA-7

5.1.f

Components shall implement strong authentication on servers, for system
administrators and personnel with significant security responsibilities, within
six (6) months of the Component’s implementation of HSPD-12 9.

IA-2

9 HSPD = Homeland Security Presidential Directive
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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

5.1.g

Personal Identification Verification (PIV) credentials or alternative solutions
that provide NIST SP 800-63-2 Level of Assurance (LOA) 4 of the user's
identity shall be used as the primary means of logical authentication for DHS
sensitive systems. Per NIST SP 800-63-2, "Electronic Authentication
Guideline,” a username, password and single factor one-time password (e.g.
RSA SecurlD) is not LOA 4-compliant.

---

5.1.h

Mandatory smart card logon shall be implemented by means of Identity (user)
Based Enforcement

IA-2

5.1.i

Privileged network users shall use the DHS HSPD-12 credential for
authentication to all DHS Privileged network user accounts.

IA-2

5.1.j

Only approved DHS Privileged Network User Management solutions shall be
employed. A waiver request will be required for use of any other solution(s).

---

5.1.k

Systems shall prompt privileged users to enter the PIV PIN to initiate an
encrypted authenticate session.

---

5.1.l

Password authentication shall be disabled for all accounts. Where
applicable, all password-based authentication modules shall be disabled.
This policy applies to all IP-addressable devices.

---

IA-2

5.1.m

All system access shall be by use of the user’s PIV card.

5.1.n

Users shall report lost, stolen, or inadvertently destroyed PIV cards to
the Help Desk, who shall supply for logon a temporary password
account that shall expire within 5 days of creation.

---

5.1.o

Users shall report forgotten or misplaced PIV cards to the Help Desk,
who shall supply for logon a temporary password account that shall
expire 24 hours after creation.

---

5.1.1

Passwords

The least expensive method for authenticating users is a password system in which authentication
is performed each time a password is used. More sophisticated authentication techniques, such as
Smart Cards and biological recognition systems (e.g., retina scanner, handprint, voice
recognition), shall be cost-justified through the risk assessment process.
Guidance for the creation of strong passwords is available in Section 5.1.1.1 of the DHS 4300A
Sensitive Systems Handbook.

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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

5.1.1.a

In those systems where user identity is authenticated by password,
Components shall ensure that DHS information systems follow the hardening
guides for operating systems (found at
http://dhsconnect.dhs.gov/org/comp/mgmt/cio/iso/Pages/sscg.aspx) and the
configuration guides for applications promulgated by the DHS CISO to
determine and enforce appropriate measures to ensure that strong passwords
are used. In the absence of appropriate password complexity guidance, the
system Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO) shall determine and
enforce appropriate measures to ensure that strong passwords are used.

IA-5

5.1.1.b

The ISSO shall determine and enforce the appropriate frequency for changing
passwords in accordance with appropriate guidance documentation (if
published). In the absence of specific guidance documentation, passwords
shall not remain in effect longer than ninety (90) days.

IA-5

5.1.1.c

DHS users shall not share personal passwords.

IA-5

5.1.1.d

Use of group passwords is limited to situations dictated by operational
necessity or critical for mission accomplishment. Use of a group User ID and
password shall be approved by the appropriate Authorizing Official (AO).

IA-4

5.1.1.e

Components shall prohibit passwords from being embedded in scripts or
source code.

IA-5

5.1.1.f

Components shall ensure that all passwords are stored in encrypted form.

IA-5

5.1.1.g

Systems shall obscure feedback of authentication information during the
authentication process to protect the information from possible
exploitation/use by unauthorized individuals.

IA-6

The use of a personal password by more than one individual is prohibited throughout DHS. It is
recognized, however, that, in certain circumstances such as the operation of crisis management
or operations centers, watch team and other duty personnel may require the use of group User
IDs and passwords.

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5.2

Access Control

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

5.2.a

Components shall implement access control policy and procedures that provide
protection from unauthorized alteration, loss, unavailability, or disclosure of
information.

5.2.b

Access control shall follow the principles of least privilege and segregation of
duties and shall require users to use unique identifiers. Social Security
Numbers shall not be used as login IDs.

5.2.c

Users shall not provide their passwords to anyone, including system
administrators.

IA-5

5.2.d

Emergency and temporary access authorization shall be strictly controlled and
shall be approved by the Component Chief Information Security Officer
(CISO) or Information Systems Security Manager (ISSM) or his/her designee
prior to being granted.

AC-2

5.2.e

System Owners shall ensure that users are assigned unique account identifiers.

IA-4

5.2.f

DHS systems with a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 199
confidentiality categorization of high shall limit the number of concurrent
sessions for any user to one (1) unless strong authentication is used.

5.2.g

Components and Programs shall ensure that all data-at-rest, particularly in
cloud or other virtual environments, preserves its identification and access
requirements (anyone with access to data storage containing more than one
type of information must have specific access authorization for every type of
data in the data storage).

5.2.1

AC-1

AC-5
AC-6

AC-10

---

Automatic Account Lockout

Components shall configure each information system to lock a user’s account for a specified
period following a specified number of consecutive failed logon attempts. Users shall be locked
from their account for a period of 20 minutes after three consecutive failed logon attempts. All
failed logon attempts must be recorded in an audit log and periodically reviewed.

Policy
ID
5.2.1.a

DHS Policy Statements
Components shall configure accounts to automatically lock a user’s account
after three consecutive failed logon attempts.

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Relevant
Controls
AC-7

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

5.2.1.b

The automatic lockout period for accounts locked due to failed login attempts
shall be set for 20 minutes.

AC-7

5.2.1.c

Components shall establish a process for manually unlocking accounts prior to
the expiration of the 20 minute period, after sufficient user identification is
established. This may be accomplished through the help desk.

AC-7

5.2.2

Automatic Session Termination

The term session refers to a connection between a terminal device (workstation, laptop, mobile
device) and a networked application or system. The term also refers to accessing an application
or system such as a database or networked application through the DHS network. The term does
not apply to a direct connection to a DHS network, as when authenticating from a device that is
directly connected to a DHS network. When a session is locked, the user may resume activity by
reauthenticating.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

5.2.2.a

Components shall configure networked applications or systems to
automatically lock any user session in accordance with the appropriate
configuration guide. In the absence of configuration guidance, the session
shall lock following 20 minutes of inactivity.

AC-11

5.2.2.b

Locked sessions shall remain locked until the user re-authenticates.

AC-11

5.2.2.c

Sessions shall be automatically terminated after 60 minutes of inactivity.

SC-10

5.2.3

Warning Banner

The DHS CISO stipulates that a warning banner statement be displayed on all DHS systems
during logon. The most current language can be found on the DHS CISO Web page.
Please note that the current warning banner was developed specifically for use on DHS
workstations. Due to differing functions, purposes and situations, and to length requirements,
warning banners for other environments, such as routers, switches and public-facing websites,
will be developed and included in a future version of the DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems
Handbook.
The use of the warning banner serves as a reminder to all users that the computers they are
accessing are Government computers.
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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

5.2.3.a

Systems internal to the DHS network shall display a warning banner specified
by the DHS CISO.

AC-8

5.2.3.b

Systems accessible to the public shall provide both a security and a privacy
statement at every entry point.

AC-8

5.3

Auditing

Policy
ID
5.3.a

DHS Policy Statements
Audit records shall be sufficient in detail to facilitate the reconstruction of
events if compromise or malfunction occurs or is suspected. Audit records
shall be reviewed as specified in the SP. The audit record shall contain at least
the following information:
-

Identity of each user and device accessing or attempting to access the
system

-

Time and date of the access and the logoff

-

Activities that might modify, bypass, or negate information security
safeguards

-

Security-relevant actions associated with processing

-

All activities performed using an administrator’s identity

Relevant
Controls
AU-3,
AU-12

When the technology is available, Components shall ensure implementation of
enterprise auditing and recording of sessions (keystroke and graphical).
5.3.b

Audit records for financial systems or for systems hosting or processing
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) shall be reviewed each month.
Unusual activity or unexplained access attempts shall be reported to the
System Owner and to the Component CISO/ISSM.

AU-6

5.3.c

Components shall ensure that their audit records and audit logs are protected
from unauthorized access, modification, or destruction.

AU-9

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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

5.3.d

Components shall ensure that audit logs are recorded and retained in
accordance with the Component’s Record Schedule or with the DHS Records
Schedule. At a minimum audit trail records shall be maintained online for at
least 90 days. Audit trail records shall be preserved for a period of three years
as part of managing records for each system to allow audit information to be
placed online for analysis with reasonable ease. Components shall allocate
appropriate audit record storage capacity in accordance with these
requirements.

AU-4,
AU-11

5.3.e

Components shall evaluate the system risks associated with extracts of PII
from databases. If the risk is determined to be sufficiently high, a procedure
shall be developed for logging computer-readable data extracts. If logging
these extracts is not possible, this determination shall be documented, and
compensating controls identified in the SP.

AU-1,
AU-2,
AU-3,
PM-9

5.3.f

Component Security Operations Centers (SOC) shall implement both general
and threat-specific logging.

AU-1,
AU-2

5.3.g

Components shall ensure that information systems alert the Component or
DHS SOC in the event of an audit processing failure and overwrite the oldest
audit records, if an analysis of the mission needs and the risk to the system
preclude system shutdown.

AU-5

5.3.h

Components shall ensure that information systems provide an audit reduction
and report generation capability that:

AU-7

a. Supports on-demand audit review, analysis, and reporting
requirements and after-the-fact investigations of security incidents
b.

5.3.i

5.4

Does not alter the original content or time ordering of audit records.
(This capability could be as simple as a text editor that allows the
administrator to produce a sorted text file, or extract data from an audit
log.)

Components shall ensure that audit logs employ a consistent time stamp across
all systems.

AU-8

Network and Communications Security
5.4.1

Remote Access and Dial-In

Remote access technology allows trusted employees to access DHS networks by dialing in via
modem or accessing the DHS network via the Internet. This allows mobile employees to stay in
touch with the home office while traveling. There are significant security risks, however,
associated with remote access and dial-in capabilities. Proper procedures can help mitigate these
risks.
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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

5.4.1.a

Data communication connections via modem shall be limited and shall be
tightly controlled, as such connections can be used to circumvent security
controls intended to protect DHS networks. Data communication connections
are not allowed unless they have been authorized by the Component
CISO/ISSM. Approved remote access to DHS networks shall only be
accomplished through equipment specifically approved for that purpose.
Tethering with wireless devices is prohibited unless approved by the
appropriate AO.

AC-17,

5.4.1.b

Components shall centrally manage all remote access and dial-in connections
to their systems and shall ensure that remote access and approved dial-in
capabilities provide strong two-factor authentication, audit capabilities, and
protection for sensitive information throughout transmission. DHS has an
immediate goal that remote access shall only be allowed with two-factor
authentication where one of the factors is provided by a device separate from
the computer gaining access. Any two-factor authentication shall be based on
Department-controlled certificates or hardware tokens issued directly to each
authorized user. Remote access solutions shall comply with the encryption
requirements of FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules. See Section 3.14 of this Policy Directive, “Privacy and Data
Security” for additional requirements involving remote access of PII.

AC-4,
AC-17,
AU-2,
SC-7,
SC-8,

5.4.1.c

Remote access of PII shall comply with all DHS requirements for sensitive
systems, including strong authentication. Strong authentication shall be
accomplished by means of Virtual Private Network (VPN) or equivalent
encryption and two-factor authentication. The Risk Assessment and Security
Plan (SP) shall document any remote access of PII, and the remote access shall
be approved by the AO prior to implementation.

AC-4,
AC-17,
AU-2,
SC-7,
SC-8,

5.4.1.d

Remote access of PII shall not permit the download and remote storage of
information unless the requirements for the use of removable media with
sensitive information have been addressed. All downloads shall follow the
concept of least privilege and shall be documented in the SP.

5.4.2

---

Network Security Monitoring

Security monitoring, detection, and analysis are key functions and are critical to maintaining the
security of DHS information systems. Network monitoring and analysis is limited to observing
network activity for anomalies, malicious activities and threat profiles. Content analysis is not
within the scope of network monitoring.

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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

5.4.2.a

Components shall provide continuous monitoring of their networks for security
events, or outsource this requirement to the DHS Security Operations Center
(SOC). Monitoring includes interception and disclosure as to the extent
necessary for rendering service or to protect Department or Component rights
or property as well as properly identified and categorized information of third
parties when required by the Department or a Component. Here rights refers
to ownership or entitlements or to property or information as in intellectual
property. Service observation or random monitoring shall not be used except
for mechanical or service quality control checks in accordance with the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act.

SI-4

5.4.2.b

The DHS SOC shall administer and monitor DHS intrusion detection system
(IDS) sensors and security devices.

SI-4

5.4.2.c

Component SOCs shall administer and monitor Component IDS sensors and
security devices.

SI-4

5.4.2.d

Components shall establish monitoring scope at least as comprehensive and
stringent as described in Attachment F, “Incident Response,” to DHS 4300A
Sensitive Systems Handbook.

---

5.4.3

Network Connectivity

A system interconnection is the direct connection of two or more information systems for the
purpose of sharing data and other information resources by passing data between each other via a
direct system-to-system interface without human intervention. Any physical connection that
allows other systems to share data (pass thru) also constitutes an interconnection, even if the two
systems connected do not share data between them. System interconnections include
connections that are permanent in nature, connections that are established by automated scripts at
prescribed intervals, and/or connections which utilize Web and Service Oriented Architecture
(SOA) services. System interconnections do not include instances of a user logging on to add or
retrieve data, nor users accessing Web-enabled applications through a browser. External
connections are defined as system(s) or IP addressable end points that are not under the direct
control of DHS, systems that have IP addressing not in the DHS addressing scheme (routable and
non-routable), or systems that have an authorizing official who is not a DHS employee.

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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

5.4.3.a

Components shall ensure that appropriate identification and authentication
controls, audit logging, and access controls are implemented on every network
element.

AC-1,
AC-2,
AU-1,
AU-2,
IA-1,
IA-2

5.4.3.b

Interconnections between DHS and non-DHS systems shall be established only
through the Trusted Internet Connection (TIC) and by approved service
providers. The controlled interfaces shall be authorized at the highest security
level of information on the network. Connections with other Federal agencies
shall be documented based on interagency agreements, memorandums of
understanding, Service Level Agreements (SLA) or Interconnection Security
Agreements (ISA).

CA-3

5.4.3.c

Components shall document all interconnections to the DHS OneNet with an
ISA signed by the OneNet AO and by each appropriate AO. Additional
information on ISAs is published in, “Preparation of Interconnection Security
Agreements,” Attachment N to the DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook.

CA-3

5.4.3.d

ISAs shall be reissued every three years or whenever any significant changes
have been made to any of the interconnected systems.

CA-3

5.4.3.e

ISAs shall be reviewed and updated as needed as a part of the annual Federal
Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) self-assessment.

CA-3

5.4.3.f

Components may complete a master Interconnection Security Agreement
(ISA) that includes all transitioning systems as part of their initial OneNet
transition. After transition, each additional system or General Support System
(GSS) shall be required to have a separate ISA. Interconnections between
DHS Components (not including DHS OneNet) shall require an ISA whenever
there is a difference in the security categorizations for confidentiality,
integrity, and availability between the systems or when the systems do not
share the same security policies. (In this context, security policies refers to the
set of rules that controls a system’s working environment, and not to DHS
information security policy). ISAs shall be signed by the appropriate AO.

---

5.4.3.g

Components shall document interconnections between their own and external
(non-DHS) networks with an ISA for each connection.

CA-3

5.4.3.h

The DHS Chief Information Officer (CIO) shall approve all interconnections
between DHS enterprise-level information systems and non-DHS information
systems. The DHS CIO shall ensure that connections with other Federal
Government agencies are properly documented. A single ISA may be used for
multiple connections provided that the security authorization is the same for all
connections covered by that ISA.

CA-3

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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

5.4.3.i

The Department and Components shall implement Trust Zones by means of
Policy Enforcement Points (PEP), as defined in the DHS Security Architecture
Framework.

SC-7

5.4.3.j

DHS OneNet shall provide secure Name/Address resolution service. Domain
Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) has been designated as the DHS
service solution.

SC-20,
SC-21,
SC-22

5.4.3.k

All DHS systems connected to OneNet and operating at moderate or high level
shall utilize secure Name/Address resolution service provided by DHS
OneNet.

SC-20,
SC-21,
SC-22

5.4.3.l

The appropriate Change Control Board (CCB) shall ensure that documentation
associated with an approved change to an information system is updated to
reflect the appropriate baseline. DHS systems that interface with OneNet shall
also be subject to the OneNet CCB.

CM-3

5.4.3.m

Interconnections between two authorized DHS systems do not require an ISA
if the interface characteristics, security requirements, nature of information
communicated and monitoring procedures for verifying enforcement of
security requirements are accounted for in the SPs or are described in another
formal document, such as an SLA or contract, and the risks have been assessed
and accepted by all involved AOs.

CA-3

5.4.3.n

Granting the ability to log into one DHS system through another DHS system
(such as through OneNet trust) does not require an ISA, when the requirements
from Section 5.4.3.m are met.

---

5.4.3.o

The information system shall protect the authenticity of communications
sessions.

SC-23

5.4.3.p

For systems with high or moderate impact for any of the FIPS 199 security
objectives, system resource sharing shall be limited to an operational need. The
information system shall prevent unauthorized and unintended information
transfer via shared system resources. All information transfer is limited to that
information which has been included in the SP and has been analyzed in the
risk assessment for the system.

SC-4

5.4.4

Firewalls and Policy Enforcement Points

Policy Enforcement Points (PEP) separate Trust Zones as defined in the DHS Security
Architecture. Boundary protection between DHS and external networks is implemented by
firewalls at the TICs and other approved direct system interconnections. DHS TICs are provided
by OneNet and monitored by the DHS SOC. Component SOCs may protect DHS-internal
boundaries across Trust Zones.
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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

5.4.4.a

Components shall restrict physical access to firewalls and PEPs to authorized
personnel.

5.4.4.b

Components shall implement identification and strong authentication for
administration of the firewalls and PEPs.

5.4.4.c

Components shall encrypt remote maintenance paths to firewalls and PEPs.

5.4.4.d

Components shall conduct quarterly firewall and PEP testing to ensure that the
most recent policy changes have been implemented and that all applied
policies and controls are operating as intended.

SC-7

5.4.4.e

Component SOCs shall ensure that reports on information security operations
status and incident reporting are provided to the DHS CISO as required by this
Policy Directive.

IR-6

5.4.4.f

All Department and Component firewalls and PEPs shall be administered in
coordination with DHS security operation capabilities, through the DHS SOC
or Component SOC.

SC-7

5.4.4.g

All DHS PEPs shall provide protection against denial-of-service attacks.

SC-5

5.4.4.h

Components shall determine protocols and services permitted through their
Component-level PEPs. Components may restrict traffic sources and
destinations at their Component-level PEPs.

SC-7

5.4.4.i

The DHS CISO shall establish policy to block or allow traffic from sources
and to destinations at the DHS TIC PEPs. The DHS CISO policy shall prevent
traffic as directed by the DHS CIO.

SC-7

5.4.4.j

The DHS SOC shall oversee all enterprise PEPs.

5.4.4.k

Components shall ensure each information system separates user functionality
(including user interface services) from information system management
functionality. User interface services (e.g., public web pages) are separated
physically and logically from information storage and management services
(e.g., database management). The separation may be accomplished through the
use of different computers, different central processing units, different
instances of operating systems, different network addresses, or a combination
of these or other techniques. (Isolation of a public Web page in a Demilitarized
Zone (DMZ) is an example of this separation.)

SC-2,
SC-32

5.4.4.l

For high impact systems, the information system isolates security functions
from other functions.

SC-3

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130

AC-4,
SC-7
--

MA-4,
SC-7

---

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

5.4.4.m

For high impact systems, the information system shall fail to a known-state
while preserving system state information in failure.

5.4.4.n

For high impact systems, the information system shall:

Relevant
Controls
SC-24

SI-6

a. Verify the correct operation of related security functions
b. Perform this verification upon reboot, or command by user with
appropriate privilege
c. Notify an authorized person of failed security verification tests
d.

5.4.5

Provide for a Component-defined action (e.g., shut the information
system down, or restart the information system) when anomalies are
discovered.

Internet Security

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

5.4.5.a

Any direct connection of OneNet, DHS networks, or DHS mission systems to
the Internet or to extranets shall occur through DHS TIC PEPs. The Public
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) shall not be connected to OneNet at any
time.

SC-7

5.4.5.b

Firewalls and PEPs shall be configured to prohibit any protocol or service that
is not explicitly permitted.

CM-7,
SC-7,
SC-8

5.4.5.c

Components shall ensure that all executable code, including mobile code (e.g.,
ActiveX, JavaScript), is reviewed and approved by the Program Manager prior
to the code being allowed to execute within the DHS environment. [Note:
When the technology becomes available and code can be vetted for security,
the policy will be “Ensure that all approved code, including mobile code (e.g.,
ActiveX, JavaScript), is digitally signed by the designated DHS authority and
that only signed code is allowed to execute on DHS systems.”]

SC-18

5.4.5.d

Telnet shall not be used to connect to any DHS computer. A connection
protocol such as Secure Shell (SSH) that employs secure authentication (two
factor, encrypted, key exchange) and is approved by the Component shall be
used instead.

CM-7,
SC-7,
SC-8

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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

5.4.5.e

File Transfer Protocol (FTP) shall not be used to connect to or from any DHS
computer. A connection protocol that employs secure authentication (two
factor, encrypted, key exchange) and is approved by the Component shall be
used instead.

CM-7,
SC-7,
SC-8

5.4.5.f

Remote Desktop connections, such as Microsoft’s Remote Desktop Protocol
(RDP), shall not be used to connect to or from any DHS computer without the
use of an authentication method that employs secure authentication (twofactor, encrypted, key exchange).

AC-17,
IA-2

5.4.5.g

In order to ensure the security and availability of DHS information and
information systems, the DHS CIO or DHS CISO may direct that specific
Internet websites or categories be blocked at the DHS TICs, on advice from
the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), the
DHS SOC, or other reputable sources.

5.4.6

---

Email Security

The DHS email gateway Steward provides email monitoring for spam and virus activity at the
gateway.
DHS SOC personnel shall be trained to respond to incidents pertaining to email security and
shall assist the email gateway Steward as necessary. Components shall provide appropriate
security for their email systems.

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

5.4.6.a

Components shall correctly secure, install, and configure the underlying email
operating system.

---

5.4.6.b

Components shall correctly secure, install, and configure mail server software.

---

5.4.6.c

Components shall secure and filter email content.

---

5.4.6.d

Components shall deploy appropriate network protection mechanisms, such as:
- Firewalls
- Routers
- Switches
- Intrusion detection systems

---

5.4.6.e

Components shall secure mail clients.

---

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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

5.4.6.f

Components shall conduct mail server administration in a secure manner. This
includes:
- Performing regular backups
- Performing periodic security testing
- Updating and patching software
- Reviewing audit logs at least weekly

---

5.4.6.g

The DHS email gateway Steward shall provide email monitoring for malware
activity at the gateway.

SI-3

5.4.6.h

The DHS email gateway Steward shall provide email monitoring for spam at
the gateway.

SI-8

5.4.6.i

Auto-forwarding or redirecting of DHS email to any address outside of the
.gov or .mil domain is prohibited and shall not be used. Users may manually
forward individual messages after determining that the risks or consequences
are minimal.

---

5.4.6.j

All DHS email systems are required to use the common naming convention
with distinguishing identifiers for military officers, contractors, foreign
nationals, and U.S. Government personnel from other Departments and
agencies.

---

5.4.6.k

When sending email containing any unencrypted sensitive information,
particularly sensitive PII, users should use caution. When sending such
information outside the dhs.gov domain, users shall ensure that the information
is encrypted.

5.4.6.l

Only Government email accounts shall be used to perform Government
business.

5.4.7

Personal Email Accounts

Policy
ID
5.4.7.a

DHS Policy Statements
The use of Internet Webmail (e.g., Gmail, Yahoo, AOL) or other personal
email accounts is not authorized over DHS furnished equipment or network
connections.

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Relevant
Controls
---

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

5.4.8

Testing and Vulnerability Management

The DHS SOC takes a proactive approach to vulnerability management including detecting
vulnerabilities through testing, reporting through Information System Vulnerability Management
(ISVM) messages, and conducting Vulnerability Assessments.
Vulnerability management is a combination of detection, assessment, and mitigation of
weaknesses within a system. Vulnerabilities may be identified from a number of sources,
including reviews of previous risk assessments, audit reports, vulnerability lists, security
advisories, and system security testing such as automated vulnerability scanning or security
control assessments.
Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

5.4.8.a

Components shall conduct vulnerability assessments and/or testing to identify
security vulnerabilities on information systems containing sensitive
information annually or whenever significant changes are made to the
information systems. This shall include scanning for unauthorized wireless
devices on the network. Evidence that annual assessments have been
conducted shall be included in SARs and with annual security control
assessments.

---

5.4.8.b

Component CISOs/ISSMs shall approve and manage all activities relating to
requests for Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) assistance in support of
incidents, internal and external assessments, and on-going SLC support.

---

5.4.8.c

Component CISOs/ISSMs or their designated representatives shall
acknowledge receipt of ISVM messages.

SI-5

5.4.8.d

Components shall report compliance with the ISVM message within the
specified time. Components not able to do so shall submit documentation of a
waiver request via the DHS SOC Online Portal (https://eoconline.dhs.gov).

SI-5

5.4.8.e

When vulnerability assessment responsibilities encompass more than one
Component, Component CISOs/ISSMs shall coordinate with the relevant
Component SOC and the DHS SOC.

5.4.8.f

The DHS SOC shall be notified before any ISVM scans are run.

5.4.8.g

System Owners shall report the security alert and advisory status of the
information system to the AO, Component CISO/ISSM, and DHS CISO upon
request and on a periodic basis.

RA-3,
AU-2Re

RA-3,
RA-5
SI-5

Core elements of vulnerability management include continuous monitoring and mitigating the
discovered vulnerabilities, based on a risk management strategy. This strategy accounts for
vulnerability severity, threats, and assets at risk.
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5.4.9

Peer-to-Peer Technology

Policy
ID
5.4.9.a

5.5

DHS Policy Statements
Peer-to-peer software technology is prohibited on any DHS information
system.

Relevant
Controls
CM-7,
CM-10

Cryptography

Cryptography is a branch of mathematics that deals with the transformation of data.
Cryptographic transformation converts ordinary text (plaintext) into coded form (ciphertext) by
encryption; and ciphertext into plaintext by decryption.
5.5.1

Encryption

Encryption is the process of changing plaintext into ciphertext for the purpose of security or
privacy.

Policy
ID
5.5.1.a

DHS Policy Statements
Systems requiring encryption shall comply with the following methods:
•

Products using FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
algorithms with at least 256 bit encryption that has been validated
under FIPS 140-2

•

National Security Agency (NSA) Type 2 or Type 1 encryption

Relevant
Controls
IA-7,
SC-13

(Note: The use of triple Data Encryption Standard [3DES] and FIPS 140-1 is
no longer permitted.)
5.5.1.b

Components shall develop and maintain encryption plans for sensitive
information systems.

5.5.1.c

Components shall use only cryptographic modules that are FIPS 197 (AES256) compliant and have received FIPS 140-2 validation at the level
appropriate to their intended use.

5.5.2

IA-7,
SC-13
IA-7, SC13

Public Key Infrastructure

A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is an architected set of systems and services that provide a
foundation for enabling the use of public key cryptography. This is necessary in order to
implement strong security services and to allow the use of digital signatures.

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The principal Components of a PKI are the public key certificates, registration authorities (RA),
certification authorities (CA), directory, certificate revocation lists (CRL), and a governing
certificate policy.

Policy
ID
5.5.2.a

DHS Policy Statements
DHS shall implement two distinct PKIs:

Relevant
Controls
SC-17

DHS Federal PKI (FPKI):
DHS shall implement a DHS Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that is part of the
FPKI to facilitate the use of PKI within DHS, and to facilitate the interoperable
use of PKI between DHS and its external mission and business partners, such
as other Federal agencies; state, local and tribal governments; public and
private sector entities; and U.S. citizens.
DHS Internal Use NPE PKI:
At the DHS Enterprise-level, a single DHS Enterprise Internal Use Non-Person
Entity (NPE) PKI may be implemented to issue certificates to DHS NPEs to
support NPE-to-NPE authentication across DHS networks, where the
certificates have no external relying parties.
At the DHS Component-level, a DHS Component may implement one or more
DHS Internal Use Non-Person Entity (NPE) PKIs for use solely by that
Component to issue certificates to that Component’s NPEs to support NPE-toNPE authentication on that Component’s networks, where the certificates have
no external relying parties.
5.5.2.b

The DHS CISO shall be the DHS PKI Policy Authority (PKIPA) to provide
PKI policy oversight for all DHS PKIs.
DHS FPKI:
A detailed description of DHS PKIPA roles and responsibilities is provided in
the Registration Practice Statement for the DHS Principal Certification
Authority.
DHS Internal Use NPE PKI:
A detailed description of DHS PKIPA roles and responsibilities is provided in
the DHS Internal Use NPE PKI Configuration and Operation Practices
Guidelines.

SC-17

5.5.2.c

The DHS CISO shall represent DHS on the Federal PKI Policy Authority
(FPKIPA).

SC-17

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Policy
ID
5.5.2.d

DHS Policy Statements
The DHS PKIPA shall appoint a PKI Management Authority (PKIMA) to
provide management and operational oversight for all DHS PKIs.

Relevant
Controls
SC-17

DHS FPKI:
A detailed description of DHS PKIMA roles and responsibilities is provided in
the Registration Practice Statement for the DHS Principal Certification
Authority.
DHS Internal Use NPE PKI:
A detailed description of DHS PKIMA roles and responsibilities is provided in
the DHS Internal Use NPE PKI Configuration and Operation Practices
Guidelines.

5.5.2.e

DHS FPKI:
The DHS FPKI shall be governed by the U.S. Common Policy Framework
certificate policy approved by the FPKIPA, and by the relevant portions of the
Department of the Treasury Infrastructure (PKI) X.509 Certificate Policy
approved by the Department of the Treasury Policy Management Authority
(PMA).

SC-17

DHS Internal Use NPE PKI:
DHS Internal Use NPE PKIs shall be governed by the DHS Internal Use NPE
PKI Configuration and Operation Practices Guidelines approved by the DHS
PKIPA.
5.5.2.f

DHS FPKI:
DHS shall have a single DHS Principal CA (i.e. named DHS CA4) that has the
U.S. Common Policy Root CA as its trust anchor. The DHS Principal CA
shall be operated for DHS by the Department of Treasury under the Federal
Shared Service Provider (SSP) program.

SC-17

5.5.2.g

DHS FPKI:
The DHS Principal CA shall be the only DHS CA subordinated to the Treasury
Root CA. Additional DHS CAs subordinate to the DHS Principal CA are not
permitted.

SC-17

DHS Internal Use NPE PKI:
A single DHS Enterprise Internal Use Non-Person Entity (NPE) PKI may be
implemented.
A DHS Component may implement one or more DHS Internal Use NPE PKIs.
Each PKI shall be a hierarchical PKI with one or more levels.
• For a single-level hierarchy, the PKI shall consist of a single selfsigned Internal Use NPE CA.
• For a two-level hierarchy, the PKI shall consist of a single self-signed
Internal Use NPE Root CA at the top level, and one or more Internal
Use NPE CAs that are each directly subordinated to the Internal Use
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Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

•

Relevant
Controls

NPE Root CA.
Additional Internal Use NPE CAs may be directly subordinated to an
existing subordinate Internal Use NPE CA, thereby adding an
additional level to the hierarchy.

The requirements and process for implementing a DHS Enterprise Internal Use
Non-Person Entity (NPE) Root and Subordinate CAs, and for implementing a
DHS Component Internal Use NPE Root and Subordinate CAs shall be
specified in the NPE PKI Configuration and Operation Practices Guidelines.
5.5.2.h

DHS FPKI:
The DHS Principal CA shall have a trust path resolving to the U.S. Common
Policy Root CA via the Treasury Root CA. Establishing direct trust
relationships with any other CAs is not permitted.
The U.S. Common Policy Root CA is cross-certified with the Federal Bridge
CA at the high, medium hardware, and medium assurance levels.
DHS Internal Use NPE PKI:
If a DHS Internal Use NPE PKI consists of a single NPE CA, the CA shall be
self-signed and function as its own trust anchor.
If a DHS Internal Use NPE PKI is a multi-level hierarchical PKI, with a Root
and subordinate CAs, the trust path from the subordinate CAs shall resolve to
the Root CA as the PKI’s trust anchor.
A request to implement trust relationships between DHS Component Internal
Use Non-Person Entity (NPE) PKIs, or between the DHS Enterprise Internal
Use Non-Person Entity (NPE) PKI and a DHS Component Internal Use NonPerson Entity (NPE) PKI must be submitted to the DHS PKIMA for review
and approved by the DHS PKIPA.

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SC-17

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID
5.5.2.i

DHS Policy Statements
DHS FPKI:
The DHS Principal CA shall operate under an X.509 Certification Practice
Statement (CPS). The CPS shall comply with the U.S. Common Policy
Framework and the Treasury Certificate Policy. Since the Department of the
Treasury, as the SSP for DHS, operates the DHS Principal CA, the Department
of the Treasury PKI Policy Management Authority, shall approve the CPS for
the DHS Principal CA.
DHS shall operate two Registration Authorities for the DHS Principal CA
(PC4). The DHS PCA Registration Authority (DHS PCA RA) shall be
responsible for performing the life-cycle administration for non-PIV
certificates, and the DHS PCA PIV Registration Authority (DHS PCI PIV RA)
shall be responsible for performing the life-cycle administration of PIV
certificates.
The two DHS Registration Authorities for the DHS Principal CA shall operate
under the Registration Practice Statement for the DHS Principal Certification
Authority (RPS). The RPS shall be approved by the DHS PKIMA and the
DHS PKIPA, and shall be approved for conformance to the U.S. Common
Policy Framework and the Treasury Certificate Policy by the Department of
the Treasury PKI Policy Management Authority.

Relevant
Controls
SC-17

DHS Internal Use NPE PKI:
DHS Internal Use NPE CAs shall operate under the DHS Internal Use NPE
PKI Configuration and Operation Practices Guidelines, which shall be
approved by the DHS PKIPA.
5.5.2.j

DHS FPKI:
The DHS PKIMA shall ensure that the DHS PCA Registration Authority
(DHS PCA RA) operates in compliance with the RPS.
The DHS PIV Card Issuer (PCI) Organization Identity Management Official
(DHS OIMO) shall ensure that the DHS PCA PIV Registration Authority
(DHS PCI PIV RA) operates in compliance with the RPS.
DHS Internal Use NPE PKI:
The DHS PKIMA shall ensure that every DHS Internal Use NPE CA operates
in compliance with the DHS Internal Use NPE PKI Configuration and
Operation Practices Guidelines.

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SC-17

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID
5.5.2.k

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls
SC-17

DHS FPKI:
The DHS Principal CA shall undergo regular PKI compliance audits as
required by the U.S. Common Policy Framework. The audit findings, report,
and Plans of Action and Milestones (POA&Ms) that address deficiencies
found shall be provided to the DHS PKIPA and DHS PKIMA.
DHS Internal Use NPE PKI:
Every DHS Internal Use NPE CA shall undergo regular PKI compliance
assessments as required by the DHS Internal Use NPE PKI Configuration and
Operation Practices Guidelines. The assessment report, findings, and Plans of
Action and Milestones (POA&Ms) that address the deficiencies found, shall be
provided to the DHS PKIPA and DHS PKIMA.

5.5.2.l

DHS FPKI:
The DHS Principal CA shall archive records as required by the U.S. Common
Policy Framework, the Treasury Certificate Policy, and the DHS Principal CA
CPS.

SC-17

DHS Internal Use NPE PKI:
Every DHS Internal Use NPE CA (Root and Subordinates) shall archive
records as required by the DHS Internal Use NPE PKI Configuration and
Operation Practices Guidelines.
5.5.2.m

SC-17

DHS FPKI:
All operational PKI facilities shall be established in accordance with U.S.
Common Policy Framework physical security requirements based on the CA’s
assurance level and its intended use. Location/protection of the CA shall be
determined by its level of assurance. Measures taken to ensure the continuity
of PKI operations shall provide at least the same level of PKI Services
availability as the individual and composite availability requirements of the
systems and data protected by the certificates.

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Policy
ID
5.5.2.n

DHS Policy Statements
DHS FPKI:
The DHS Principal CA shall only issue certificates to internal DHS entities,
e.g., Person Entities (PEs) such as employees, contractors, affiliates, roles,
groups, and NPEs such as hardware devices, systems, and applications.
External entities that require certificates to securely interact with DHS shall
acquire the certificates from: (1) another Federal Agency’s PKI or SSP PKI
operating under the U.S. Common Policy Framework or (2) a non-Federal
Agency PKI that is cross-certified with the FBCA at medium, medium
Hardware, PIV-I, or high assurance level).
DHS Internal Use NPE PKI:
DHS Enterprise Internal Use Non-Person Entity (NPE) CAs shall only
issue authentication certificates to DHS NPEs (i.e., hardware devices
and systems) when all of the following conditions apply:
• There are no relying parties for the certificates external to DHS
• The certificates shall only be used for authentication
• The certificates are explicitly authorized to be issued by the DHS
Internal Use NPE PKI Configuration and Operation Practices
Guidelines
DHS Component Internal Use NPE CAs shall only issue authentication
certificates to DHS Component NPEs (i.e., hardware devices and
systems) when all of the following conditions apply:
• There are no relying parties for the certificates external to the
DHS Component
• The certificates shall only be used for authentication
• The certificates are explicitly authorized to be issued by the DHS
Internal Use NPE PKI Configuration and Operation Practices
Guidelines
A DHS Enterprise Internal Use NPE Root CA may issue a CA certificate to
subordinate a DHS Enterprise Internal Use NPE CA to the Root CA.
A DHS Component Internal Use NPE Root CA may issue a CA certificate to
subordinate a DHS Component Internal Use NPE CA for that Component to
the Root CA.
A DHS Enterprise Internal Use NPE CA may issue a CA certificate to
subordinate a DHS Enterprise Internal Use NPE CA to itself.
A DHS Component Internal Use NPE CA may issue a CA certificate to
subordinate a DHS Component Internal Use NPE CA for that Component to
itself.

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Relevant
Controls
SC-17

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID
5.5.2.o

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls
SC-17

DHS FPKI:
Only the DHS Principal CA shall issue certificates to DHS PEs, i.e., DHS
employees, contractors, affiliates, roles and group entities. Types of PE
certificates that may be issued include authentication, digital signature
verification and encryption certificates, including certificates for DHS HSPD12 Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Cards, code signing and content
signing, as well as all other types of certificates allowed under the U.S.
Common Policy.
Only the DHS Principal CA shall issue certificates to DHS NPEs, i.e.,
hardware devices, systems and applications, when any of the following
conditions apply:
• There are external relying parties for the certificates
• The certificates will be used to protect sensitive DHS data or to
authenticate to operational systems containing sensitive information,
and
•

5.5.2.p

The certificates are not explicitly authorized to be issued by DHS
Internal Use NPE CAs in the DHS X.509 Internal Use NPE Certificate
Policy.

DHS FPKI:
The Treasury Root CA shall be used by Relying Parties in DHS as the trust
anchor for the validation of certificates issued by the DHS Principal CA (DHS
CA4).

SC-17

The U.S. Common Root CA shall be used by Relying Parties external to DHS
as the trust anchor for the validation of certificates issued by the DHS Principal
CA (DHS CA4).
The U.S. Common Root CA shall also be used by Relying Parties in DHS as
the trust anchor for the validation of certificates issued by CAs external to DHS.
5.5.2.q

The use by DHS of any non-DHS PKI provider for CA or PKI services is
prohibited unless approved by the DHS CISO on a case-by-case basis.

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID
5.5.2.r

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls
SC-17

DHS FPKI:
Only certificates that are issued by the DHS Principal CA under the U.S.
Common Policy Framework at medium assurance or above shall be used to
protect sensitive DHS data or to authenticate to operational systems containing
sensitive data.
Certificates issued by test, pilot, third party, self-signed or other CAs shall not
be used to protect sensitive information, or to authenticate to DHS operational
systems containing sensitive information.
DHS Internal Use NPE PKI:
Certificates issued by DHS Internal Use NPE CAs, shall only be used for
authentication.

5.5.2.s

5.5.2.t

SC-17

DHS FPKI:
For an external-facing DHS web server, where the browsers used by external
relying parties are unable to validate DHS Secure Socket Layer/Transport
Layer Security (SSL/TLS) certificates, the use of an Extended Validation (EV)
SSL/TLS certificate acquired from a major U.S. commercial certificate
provider may be used, if approved by the DHS CISO on a case-by-case basis.
Commercial applications or appliances used by DHS that require the use of
PKI certificates shall obtain those certificates from the DHS Principal CA or a
DHS Component Internal Use NPE CA, as appropriate.

SC-17

Commercial applications or appliances, that require the use of a proprietary
CA implemented as an internal feature, shall not be acquired or used, unless
prior concurrence by the DHS PKIMA and approval by the DHS PKIPA are
obtained.
5.5.2.u

DHS FPKI:
Certificate trust stores contain root certificates, each of which is the trust
anchor for a PKI. Certificates in trust stores are implicitly trusted by
certificate validation software. Vendors’ products come pre-populated with
many root certificates in their trust stores, including certificates for PKIs that
DHS does not want to implicitly trust.
DHS Components shall manage the content of installed product’s trust stores,
including:
• Leveraging automated management, such as with Microsoft Group
Policy Objects (GPOs)
• Removing all certificates that have passed their expiration date
• Removing all certificates that are no longer trusted
• Removing all certificates that are no longer required

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID
5.5.2.v

DHS Policy Statements
DHS FPKI:
Commercial products used by DHS and applications developed by DHS that
enable the use of PKI shall at a minimum support the following
cryptographic algorithms and associated key sizes:
• SHA 1 and SHA 256
• RSA 1024 and 2048
• AES 128 and 256
Whenever possible, they should also support use of the following
algorithms and associated key sizes, to ensure future interoperability across
the Federal PKI and PKIs cross-certified with the Federal Bridge
Certification Authority.
• SHA 384 and 512
• RSA 3072
• Elliptic Curve 224, 256, and 384
• ECDSA 224 and 256

Relevant
Controls
SC-17

(Note: Older algorithms and smaller key sizes (e.g., SHA 1 and RSA 1024)
should continue to be supported since they may be required to validate
digital signatures executed in the past and to decrypt objects encrypted in
the past using the older algorithms and key sizes.)

5.5.3

Public Key/Private Key

A public key certificate is used to obtain subscribers’ public keys in a trusted manner. Once a
certificate is obtained, the public key can be used:
•

To encrypt data for that subscriber so that only that subscriber can decrypt it

•

To verify that digitally signed data was signed by that subscriber, thereby authenticating the
identity of the signing subscriber, and the integrity of the signed data
Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

5.5.3.a

DHS FPKI:
Any key pair and associated certificate issued to a human subscriber to support
digital signature use, shall not be used to support any other use.

SC-12

5.5.3.b

DHS FPKI:
A single public/private key pair and its associated certificate issued to an NPE
may be used for signing (including authentication), key management (for
encryption), or both. Device certificates shall not assert non-repudiation.

SC-12

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID
5.5.3.c

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls
SC-12

DHS FPKI:
An authorized human sponsor shall represent each role, group, code-signer,
system, application and device subscriber when the subscriber applies for one
or more certificates from a DHS CA.

5.5.3.d

DHS FPKI:
An authorized DHS employee shall sponsor DHS contractors or other affiliates
who apply for one or more certificates from a DHS CA.

SC-12

5.5.3.e

DHS FPKI:

SC-12

A mechanism shall be provided for each DHS CA to enable PKI registrars to
determine the eligibility of each proposed human, role, group, code signer,
system, application, or device to receive one or more certificates.
5.5.3.f

SC-12

DHS FPKI:
A mechanism shall be provided for each DHS CA to enable PKI registrars to
determine and verify the identity of the authorized human sponsor for each
DHS contractor, affiliate, role, group, code signer, system, application, or
device.

5.5.3.g

DHS FPKI:
Human subscribers shall not share their private keys and shall be responsible
for their security and use. If a human subscriber discloses or shares his or her
private key, the subscriber shall be accountable for all transactions signed with
the subscriber’s private key.

SC-12

5.5.3.h

DHS FPKI:
Sponsors for non-human subscribers (systems, application and devices,) shall
be responsible for the security of and use of the subscriber’s private keys.
Every sponsor shall read, understand, and sign a “DHS PKI Device Sponsor
Acknowledgement of Responsibilities” as a pre-condition for sponsoring nonhuman subscribers.

SC-12

5.5.3.i

DHS FPKI:
Subscriber private keys shall not be used by more than one entity, with the
following exceptions:
• Authorized members of a Group Subscriber, may use the Group’s
private keys.

SC-12

•

v12.01, February 12, 2016

Multiple systems or devices in a high availability configuration may
use a single Key pair providing the Subject Alternative Name (SAN)
field within the SSL certificate identifies all of the devices with which
the key is to be shared.

145

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID
5.5.3.j

5.6

DHS Policy Statements
DHS FPKI:
Every human subscriber shall read, understand, and sign a “DHS PKI Human
Subscriber Acknowledgement of Responsibilities” as a pre-condition for
receiving certificates from a DHS CA. Signed PKI Human Subscriber
Agreements shall be maintained by the DHS PKI Registrar.

Relevant
Controls
SC-12

Malware Protection

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

5.6.a

Component CISOs/ISSMs shall establish and enforce Component-level
malware protection control policies.

SI-3

5.6.b

Components shall implement a defense-in-depth strategy that:

SI-3

-

5.6.c

Installs anti-malware software on desktops and servers
Configures anti-malware software on desktops and servers to check all
files, downloads, and email
Installs updates to anti-malware software and signature files on desktops
and servers in a timely and expeditious manner without requiring the end
user to specifically request the update
Installs security patches to desktops and servers in a timely and
expeditious manner

System Owners shall develop and enforce procedures to ensure proper
malware scanning of media prior to installation of primary hard drives,
software with associated files, and other purchased products.

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AC-20,
SI-3

DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

5.7

Product Assurance

Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

5.7.a

Information Assurance (IA) shall be considered a requirement for all systems
used to input, process, store, display, or transmit sensitive or national security
information. IA shall be achieved through the acquisition and appropriate
implementation of evaluated or validated commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) IA
and IA-enabled Information Technology (IT) products. These products shall
provide for the availability of systems. The products also shall ensure the
integrity and confidentiality of information and the authentication and
nonrepudiation of parties in electronic transactions.

---

5.7.b

Strong preference shall be given to the acquisition of COTS IA and IAenabled IT products (to be used on systems entering, processing, storing,
displaying, or transmitting sensitive information) that have been evaluated and
validated, as appropriate, in accordance with the following:

---

-

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) FIPS
validation program

-

The NSA/NIST National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)
Evaluation and Validation Program

-

The International Common Criteria for Information Security Technology
Evaluation Mutual Recognition Agreement

5.7.c

The evaluation and validation of COTS IA and IA-enabled products shall be
conducted by authorized commercial laboratories or by NIST.

---

5.7.d

Components shall use only cryptographic modules that meet the requirements
set forth in Section 5.5, Cryptography.

---

5.7.e

Transaction-based systems (e.g., database management systems and
transaction processing systems) shall implement transaction rollback and
transaction journaling, or technical equivalents.

CP-10

For systems with moderate or high impact for the integrity security objective,
Components shall perform a risk-based analysis to determine any data inputs
that are critical to the system mission or the correct handling of the security
controls, which should be checked for accuracy, completeness, and validity of
the information as close to the input point (e.g., user interface) as possible.
Inputs that go through interpreters should be prescreened.

SI-10

For systems with moderate or high impact for the integrity security objective,
the information system shall check the validity of these Component-defined
information inputs.

SI-10

5.7.f

5.7.g

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID
5.7.h

5.7.i

5.8

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

For systems with moderate or high impact for any of the FIPS 199 security
objectives, Components shall perform a risk-based analysis to determine what
error conditions should be identified and how expeditiously they should be
handled.

SI-11

For systems with moderate or high impact for any of the FIPS 199 security
objectives, the information system shall generate error messages that provide
information necessary for corrective actions without revealing information that
could be exploited by adversaries. Error messages shall be revealed only to
authorized personnel.

SI-11

Supply Chain

Supply chain threats shall be considered during every sensitive system acquisition and
throughout those systems’ life cycle.
Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

5.8.a

Components shall assign an impact level (high, moderate, low) to each security
objective (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) for each DHS information
system. Components shall apply NIST SP 800-161 controls as tailored
specifically to the security objective at the determined impact level.

SA-12

5.8.b

Components shall implement NIST SP 800-161security controls, using the
FIPS Pub 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and
Information Systems methodology, based on the FIPS 199 impact level
established for each separate security objective (confidentiality, integrity,
availability).

SA-12

5.8.1

Business Impact

DHS depends on numerous external supply chains for the hardware, software, and services
needed in order to accomplish its missions effectively. Many of these supply chains are
independent of one-another and come with their own set of risks. All program risk owners need
to make risk management decisions on how best to manage these risks. It is often no longer
enough for acquisition staff to perform due diligence at the beginning of an acquisition.
Effective Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) requires the analysis of the Business Impact
Assessment (BIA) to determine if supply chain threats represent unacceptable business or
mission risk and the optimal countermeasures.

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

Policy
ID
5.8.1.a

5.8.2

DHS Policy Statements
A Business Impact Assessment (BIA) shall be used to determine the level of
risk introduced to the system by the supply chain and whether supply chain
threats introduce sufficient risk to require the implementation of
countermeasures.

Relevant
Controls
SA-12

Supply Chain Risk Management Plans

For the development of SCRM plans, no prescriptive set of mitigations can be provided; rather, it
is necessary for organizations across DHS to consider the range of countermeasures which could
be selected. It will be up to individual programs to establish the appropriate supply chain risk
reduction strategies and determine the best way to implement them.
Policy
ID

DHS Policy Statements

Relevant
Controls

5.8.2.a

DHS Components shall develop, document, and disseminate requirements for
all programs under their control to develop a plan to address supply chain risk.

SA-1
SA-12

5.8.2.b

DHS Components shall assess supply chain threats for risks associated with all
hardware, software, and services acquired or projected to be acquired with the
goal of mitigating those risks to the greatest extent possible.

SA-12

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

6.0

DOCUMENT CHANGE REQUESTS

Changes to DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A and to the DHS 4300A Sensitive
Systems Handbook may be requested in accordance with Section 1.9, Changes to Policy.
7.0

QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS

For clarification of DHS information security policies or procedures, contact the DHS Director
for Information Systems Security Policy at [email protected].

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

APPENDIX A

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACRONYM

MEANING

3DES

Triple Data Encryption Standard

3PAO

Third Party Assessors

AES

Advanced Encryption Standards

AIS

Automated Information System

A-Number

Alien Registration Number

AO

Authorizing Official

ARB

Acquisition Review Board

ASCII

American Standard Code for Information Interchange

ATO

Authority to Operate

BI

Background Investigation

BIA

Business Impact Assessment

BLSR

Baseline Security Requirements

CA

Certification Authority

CAC

Common Access Card

CBP

Customs and Border Protection

CCB

Change Control Board

CCE

Common Configuration Enumeration

CD

Compact Disc

CFO

Chief Financial Officer

CI

Counterintelligence

CIO

Chief Information Officer

CISID

Chief, Internal Security and Investigations Division

CISID-OIS

Chief, Internal Security and Investigations Division, Office of Security

CISO

Chief Information Security Officer

CM

Configuration Management

CMA

Computer Matching Agreements

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

ACRONYM

MEANING

CMG

Core Management Group

CMP

Configuration Management Plan

CNSS

Committee on National Security Systems

CONOPS

Concept of Operations

COOP

Continuity of Operations Plan
Continuity of Operations Planning

COTS

Commercial-off-the-shelf

CP

Contingency Plan
Contingency Planning

CPE

Common Platform Enumeration

CPIC

Capital Planning and Investment Control

CRE

Computer-Readable Extract

CRL

Certificate Revocation List

CSO

Chief Security Officer

CSP

Cloud Service Provider

CUI

Controlled Unclassified Information

CVE

Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures

DHS

Department of Homeland Security

DLP

Data Loss Prevention

DMZ

Demilitarized Zone

DNSSEC

Domain Name System Security Extensions

DOD

Department of Defense

EA

Enterprise Architecture

EAB

Enterprise Architecture Board

EMSG

Email Security Gateway

EO

Executive Order

EOC

Enterprise Operations Center 2,

ESSA

Enterprise System Security Agreement

ESSWG

Enterprise Services Security Working Group

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

ACRONYM

MEANING

EV

Extended Validation

FAM

Foreign Affairs Manual

FBCA

Federal Bridge Certification Authority

FDCC

Federal Desktop Core Configuration

FedRAMP

Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program

FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency

FICAM

Federal Identity, Credentialing, and Access Management

FIPS

Federal Information Processing Standard

FIPPS

Fair Information Practice Principles

FISMA

Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014

FLETC

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

FNVMS

Foreign National Vetting Management System

FOIA

Freedom of Information Act

FOUO

For Official Use Only

FPKI

Federal Public Key Infrastructure

FPKI PA

Federal PKI Policy Authority

FTP

File Transfer Protocol

FYHSP

Future Years Homeland Security Program

GPEA

Government Paperwork Elimination Act

GSA

General Services Administration

GSS

General Support System

HIPAA

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act

HQ

Headquarters

HSAR

Homeland Security Acquisition Regulations

HSDN

Homeland Secure Data Network

HSPD

Homeland Security Presidential Directive

HVAC

Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning

I&A

Intelligence and Analysis

IA

Identification and Authentication

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DHS SENSITIVE SYSTEMS POLICY DIRECTIVE 4300A

ACRONYM

MEANING
Information Assurance

IACS

Information Assurance Compliance System

IATO

Interim Authority to Operate

ICAM

Identity, Credentialing, and Access Management

ICCB

Infrastructure Change Control Board

ICE

Immigration and Customs Enforcement

IDS

Intrusion Detection System

IOC

Initial Operating Capability

IPS

Intrusion Prevention System

IPT

Integrated Project Team

IR

Infrared

IRB

Investment Review Board

ISA

Interconnection Security Agreement

ISMS

Integrated Security Management System

ISO

Information Security Office

ISSM

Information Systems Security Manager

ISSO

Information Systems Security Officer

ISVM

Information System Vulnerability Management

IT

Information Technology

JAB

Joint Authorization Board

JWICS

Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System

LAN

Local Area Network

LE

Law Enforcement

LMR

Land Mobile Radio

MA

Major Application

MBI

Moderate Risk Background Investigation

MD

Management Directive

MMS

Multimedia Messaging Service

NARA

National Archives and Records Administration

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ACRONYM

MEANING

NCCIC

National Cybersecurity and Communications Information Center

NIAP

National Information Assurance Partnership

NIST

National Institute of Standards and Technology

NOC

Network Operations Center

NPPD

National Protection and Programs Directorate

NPE

Non-person Entity

NSA

National Security Agency

NSS

National Security System(s)

NTP

Network Time Protocol

OA

Ongoing Authorization

OCIO

Office of the Chief Information Officer

OCSO

Office of the Chief Security Officer

OCSP

Online Certificate Status Protocol

OID

Object identifier

OIG

Office of Inspector General

OIMO

Organization Identity Management Official

OMB

Office of Management and Budget

OPA

Office of Public Affairs

OPM

Office of Personnel Management

ORMB

Operational Risk Management Board

OTAR

Over-The-Air-Rekeying

PA

Policy Authority

PAdES

PDF Advanced Electronic Signatures

P-ATO

Provisional Authority to Operate

PBX

Private Branch Exchange

PCI

PIV Card Issuer

PCS

Personal Communications Services

PDVAL

Path Development and Validation

PEP

Policy Enforcement Point

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ACRONYM

MEANING

PHI

Protected Health Information

PIA

Privacy Impact Assessment

PII

Personally Identifiable Information

PIN

Personal Identity Number

PIRT

Privacy Incident Response Team

PIV

Personal Identity Verification

PIV-I

Personal Identity Verification - Interoperable

PKI

Public Key Infrastructure

PKI PA

PKI Policy Authority

PKI MA

PKI Management Authority

PM

Program Manager

PMA

Policy Management Authority

PMO

Program Management Office

PNS

Protected Network Services

POA&M

Plan of Action and Milestones

POC

Point of Contact

PPOC

Privacy Point of Contact

PSTN

Public Switched Telephone Network

PTA

Privacy Threshold Analysis

RDP

Remote Desktop Protocol

RF

Radio Frequency

RFID

Radio Frequency Identification

RMS

Risk Management System Term superseded by IACS

RMF

Risk Management Framework

RPS

Principal Certification Authority

S&T

Science and Technology [Component of DHS]

SA

Security Architecture

SAISO

Senior Agency Information Security Officer

SAN

Subject Alternative Name

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ACRONYM

MEANING

SAOP

Senior Agency Official for Privacy

SAR

Security Assessment Report

SCAP

Security Content Automation Protocol

SCI

Sensitive Compartmented Information

SCRM

Supply Chain Risk Management

SELC

Systems Engineering Life Cycle

SEN

Security Event Notification

SLA

Service Level Agreement

SME

Subject Matter Expert

SMS

Short Message Service

SOA

Service Oriented Architecture

SOC

Security Operations Center

SOC CONOPS

Security Operations Center Concept of Operations

SORN

System of Records Notice

SOW

Statement of Work

SP

Special Publication
Security Plan

SSH

Secure Shell

SSL

Secure Socket Layer

SSP

Shared Service Provider

Stat.

Statute (refers to a law found in U.S. Statutes at Large)

STE

Secure Terminal Equipment

TAF

Trusted Agent FISMA Term superseded by IACS

TFPAP

Trust Framework Provider Adoption Process

TIC

Trusted Internet Connections

TLS

Transport Layer Security

TOS

Terms of Service

TRAL

Trigger Accountability Log

TRM

Technical Reference Model

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ACRONYM

MEANING

TS

Top Secret

TS/SCI

Top Secret, Sensitive Compartmented Information

TSA

Transportation Security Administration

UCMJ

Uniform Code of Military Justice

U.S.C.

United States Code

US-CERT

United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team

USB

Universal Serial Bus

USCG

United States Coast Guard

USCIS

United States Citizenship and Immigration Service

USGCB

U.S. Government Configuration Baseline

USSS

United States Secret Service

VAT

Vulnerability Assessment Team

VoIP

Voice over Internet Protocol

VPN

Virtual Private Network

WLAN

Wireless Local Area Network

WPAN

Wireless Personal Area Network

WWAN

Wireless Wide Area Network

XML

Extended Markup Language

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APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY

The following definitions apply to the policies and procedures outlined in this document. Other
definitions may be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) IR 7298,
Glossary of Key Information Security Terms and the National Information Assurance (IA)
Glossary.

TERM

MEANING

Acceptable Risk

Mission, organizational, or program-level risk deemed tolerable by the Risk
Executive after adequate security has been provided.

Adequate Security

Security commensurate with the risk and the magnitude of harm resulting
from the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of
information. [OMB Circular A-130, Appendix III]

Annual Assessment

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) activity for meeting the annual
Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) selfassessment requirement.

Authorization Package

The documents submitted to the AO for the Authorization Decision. An
Authorization Package consists of:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Security Plan
Security Assessment (SPR) Plan
Security Assessment Report (SAR)
Signed Accreditation Decision Letter/ATO
Contingency Plan (CP)
Contingency Plan Test (CPT)

Authorizing Official
(AO)

An official within a Federal Government agency empowered to grant
approval for a system to operate.

Certification/ Certifying
Agent

A contractor that performs certification tasks as designated by the CO.

Certificate Authority
(CA)

A trusted third party that issues certificates and verifies the identity of the
holder of the digital certificate.

Chief Information
Officer (CIO)

The executive within a Federal Government agency responsible for its
information systems.

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TERM

MEANING

Compensating
Control

An internal control intended to reduce the risk of an existing or potential
control weakness.

Component

A DHS Component is any organization which reports directly to the Office
of the Secretary (including the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, the Chief of
Staff’s, Counselors, and staff, when approved as such by the Secretary),
including both Operational Components and Support Components (also
known as Headquarters Components). [Source DHS Lexicon and DHS
Management Directive 112-01]

Computer Security
Incident Response
Center (CSIRC)

DHS organization that responds to computer security incidents.

Designated Approval
Authority (DAA)

Obsolete term; see Authorizing Official (AO).

Digital Signature

Cryptographic process used to assure data object originator authenticity,
data integrity, and time stamping for prevention of replay.

Electronic Signature

The process of applying any mark in electronic form with the intent to sign
a data object. See also digital signature.

For Official Use Only
(FOUO)

The marking instruction or caveat “For Official Use Only” will be used
within the DHS community to identify sensitive but unclassifed information
that is not otherwise specifically described and governed by statute or
regulation.
Note: The term sensitive information as well as others such as For Official
Use Only (FOUO) and Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) will no longer be
used upon implementation of 32 CFR 2002, which will require use of the
term Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI).

General Support
System (GSS)

Information and
Communications
Technology (ICT)

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A general support system (GSS) is an interconnected set of information
resources that share common functionality and are under the same direct
management control. [expanded definition in the Section 1.4,
“Definitions”]
Encompasses the capture, storage, retrieval, processing, display,
representation, presentation, organization, management, security, transfer,
and interchange of data and information. Source: NIST IR 7622, Notional
Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems

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TERM
ICT Supply Chain

MEANING
The organizations, people, activities, information, and resources for
creating and moving a product or service (including its sub-elements) from
suppliers through to an organization’s customers. Source: National Defense
Industry Association (NDIA), Engineering for System Assurance,
September 2008

Information Security
Vulnerability
Management (ISVM)

A DHS system that provides notification of newly discovered
vulnerabilities, and tracks the status of vulnerability resolution.

Information System

Any information technology that is (1) owned, leased, or operated by any
DHS Component, (2) operated by a contractor on behalf of DHS, or (3)
operated by another Federal, state, or local Government agency on behalf
of DHS. Information systems include general support systems and major
applications (MA).

Information System
Security Officer (ISSO)

A Government employee or contractor who implements and/or monitors
security for a particular system.

Information Technology

Any equipment or interconnected system or subsystem of equipment that is
used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management,
movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or
reception of data or information. [Source: Clinger-Cohen Actof 1996
(Public Law 104-106), Division E]

Major Application
(MA)

An automated information system (AIS) that requires special attention to
security due to the risk and magnitude of harm that can result from the
loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of the information
in the application. [Source: OMB Circular A-130]
An MA is a discrete application, whereas a GSS may support multiple
applications.

Management Controls

The security controls for an information system that focus on the
management of risk and the management of information system security.

Operational Controls

The security controls for an information system that are primarily
implemented and executed by people (as opposed to being executed by
systems).

Operational Risk

The risk contained in a system under operational status. It is the risk that an
AO accepts when granting an ATO.

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TERM

MEANING

Personally Identifiable
Information (PII)

Any information information that permits the identity of an individual to be
directly or indirectly inferred, including other information that is linked or
linkable to an individual regardless of whether the individual is a United
States citizen, legal permanent resident, or a visitor to the United States.
[see also Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information]

Pilot

A test system in the production environment that may contain operational
data and may be used to support DHS operations, typically in a limited
way.

Policy Enforcement
Point (PEP)

A firewall or similar device that can be used to restrict information flow.

Policy Statement

A high-level rule for guiding actions intended to achieve security
objectives.

Privacy Sensitive
System

Any system that collects, uses, disseminates, or maintains PII or sensitive
PII.

Production

The applications and systems that DHS end users access and use
operationally to execute business transactions.

Privileged Network
User

A user that is authorized (and, therefore, trusted) to perform securityrelevant functions for purposes including but not limited to network system
administration, security policy and procedure management, and system
maintenance and controls.

Prototype

A test system in a test environment that must not contain operational data
and must not be used to support DHS operations.

Remote Access

Access to a DHS information system by a user (or an information system)
communicating through an external, non-DHS-controlled network (e.g., the
Internet).

Residual Risk

The risk remaining after security controls have been applied.

Risk Executive (RE)

An individual who ensures that risks are managed consistently across the
organization. An RE can be at the Departmental or Component level.

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TERM

MEANING

Security Assessment
Plan

The security assessment plan and privacy assessment plan provide the
objectives for the security and privacy control assessments, respectively,
and a detailed roadmap of how to conduct such assessments. These plans
may be developed as one integrated plan or as distinct plans, depending
upon organizational needs. [per NIST SP 800-53A]

Security Control

A particular safeguard or countermeasure to protect the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of a system and its information.

Security Control
Assessor

A senior management official who certifies the results of the security
control assessment. He or she must be a Federal Government employee.

Security Incident

An occurrence that actually or potentially jeopardizes the confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of an information system or the information the
system processes, stores, or transmits, or that constitutes a violation or
imminent threat of violation of security policies, security procedures, or
acceptable use policies.

Security Operations
Center (SOC)

The DHS SOC coordinates security operations for the DHS enterprise.
Each Component also has a SOC that coordinates Component security
operations.

Security Requirement

A formal statement of action or process applied to an information system
and its environment in order to provide protection and attain security
objectives. Security requirements for any given system are contained in its
Security Plan.

Senior Agency
Information Security
Official (SAISO)

The point of contact within a Federal Government agency responsible for
its information system security.

Sensitive But
Unclassified

Obsolete designation; see Sensitive Information.

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Note: The term sensitive information as well as others such as For Official
Use Only (FOUO) and Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) will no longer be
used upon implementation of 32 CFR 2002, which will require use of the
term Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI).

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TERM
Sensitive Information

MEANING
Any information, which if lost, misused, disclosed, or, without
authorization is accessed, or modified, could adversely affect the national
or homeland security interest, the conduct of Federal programs, or the
privacy of individuals, but which has not been specifically authorized under
criteria established by an Executive Order or an Act of Congress to be kept
secret in the interest of national defense, homeland security or foreign
policy.
Note: The term sensitive information as well as others such as For Official
Use Only (FOUO) and Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) will no longer be
used upon implementation of 32 CFR 2002, which will require use of the
term Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI).

Sensitive Personally
Identifiable Information
(SPII)

Sensitive PII is Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (SPII)” is a
subset of PII, which if lost, compromised or disclosed without
authorization, could result in substantial harm, embarrassment,
inconvenience, or unfairness to an individual. Some forms of PII are
sensitive as stand-alone elements. [see also Personally Identifiable
Information]

Significant Incident

A computer security-related incident that represents a meaningful threat to
the DHS mission and requires immediate leadership notification.

Spam

Emails containing unwanted commercial solicitation, fraudulent schemes,
and possibly malicious logic.

Strong Authentication

A method used to secure computer systems and/or networks by verifying a
user’s identity by requiring two-factors in order to authenticate (something
you know, something you are, or something you have). Typically, strong
authentication requires authenticators that are resistant to replay attacks and
employ multifactor authentication. Strong authenticators include, for
example, PKI where certificates are stored on a token protected by a
password, passphrase, or biometric. [See the discussion of Level 4
assurance in NIST SP 800-63-2, “Electronic Authentication Guideline,”
(August 2013)]

Supply Chain

A system of organizations, people, activities, information, and resources,
possibly international in scope, that provides products or services to
consumers. Source: CNSSI 4009

Supply Chain Risk
Management

A decision making process, usually supported by imperfect or incomplete
information, undertaken for the purpose of prioritizing actions related to
procuring ICT in support of the mission. Source: DHS SCRM PMO

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TERM

MEANING

System

A discrete set of information system assets contained within the
authorization boundary.

System Owner

The agency official responsible for the development, procurement,
integration, modification, operation and maintenance, and/or final
disposition of an information system.

Technical Controls

The security controls for an information system that are primarily
implemented and executed by the information system through mechanisms
contained in system hardware, software, or firmware.

Two-Factor
Authentication

The classic paradigm for authentication systems identifies three factors as
the cornerstone of authentication:
• Something you know (for example, a password or Personal
Identification Number (PIN)
• Something you have (for example, an ID badge or a
cryptographic key)
• Something you are (for example, a fingerprint or other
biometric data)
The strength of authentication systems is largely determined by the number
of factors incorporated by the system. Implementations that use two factors
are considered to be stronger than those that use only one factor.” A
requirement for two of the three factors listed above constitutes two factor
authentication.

Unclassified
Information

Information that has not been determined to be classified pursuant to
Executive Order 13526, as amended.

USB Device

A device that can be connected to a computer via a USB port.

USB Drive

A memory device small enough to fit into a pocket that connects to a
computer via a USB port.

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TERM
Visitor

MEANING
A guest or temporary employee who presents themselves or is presented by
a sponsor, for entry for less than 6 months to a secured facility that is not
their primary work location. [Source: DHS Lexicon]
The visitor is placed in one of two categorizes, either escort required or no
escort required. Escort required visitors are escorted at all times. No escort
required visitors are granted limited general access to the facility without
an escort. Escort procedures for classified areas are indicated in
Management Directive 11051 “SCIF Escort Procedures.” [Source: DHS
Lexicon]

Vulnerability Scanning

An automated scan for potential security vulnerabilities.

Waiver

Temporary dispensation of a policy requirement, granted to a Component
to operate a system while working toward compliance.

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APPENDIX C

REFERENCES

The DHS information security program and organization are based upon public laws, executive
orders, national policy, external guidance, and internal DHS guidance.
Public Laws and U.S. Code
•

Privacy Act of 1974, As Amended. 5 United States Code (U.S.C.) 552a, Public Law 93579, Washington, DC, July 14, 1987

•

Computer Security Act of 1987, as amended, codified at 40 U.S.C. 759 , Public Law 100235

•

Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106

•

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Public Law 104191

•

E-Government Act of 2002, Public Law 107–347, 116 Stat. 2899, 44 U.S.C. 101

•

Freedom of Information Act of 2002, as amended, 5 U.S.C 552, Public Law 93-579

•

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 118 Stat. 363

•

Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA), Public Law 113-283,
128 Stat 3087

•

5 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) §2635, Office of Government Ethics, “Standards of
Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch”

Executive Orders
•

Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” December 29, 2009

•

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12, “Policy for a Common Identification
Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors,” August 27, 2004

Office of Management and Budget Directives
•

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130, “Management of Federal
Information Resources, Transmittal Letter No. 4,” 2010

•

OMB Bulletin 06-03, “Audit Requirements for Federal Financial Statements,” August 23,
2203

•

OMB Memorandum M-04-04, “E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies,”
December 16, 2003

•

OMB Memorandum M-06-15, Safeguarding Personally Identifiable Information,” May
22, 2006

•

OMB Memorandum M-06-16, “Protection of Sensitive Agency Information,” June 23,
2006

•

OMB Memorandum M-07-16, “Safeguarding Against and Responding to the Breach of
Personally Identifiable Information,” May 22, 2007

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•

OMB Memorandum M-09-02, “Information Technology Management Structure and
Governance Framework,” October 21, 2008

•

OMB Memorandum 12-20, “FY 2012 Reporting Instructions for the Federal Information
Security Management Act and Agency Privacy Management,” September 27, 2012

•

OMB Memorandum 10-28, “Clarifying Cybersecurity Responsibilities and Activities of
the Executive Office of the President and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),”
July 6, 2010

•

OMB Memorandum 11-06, “WikiLeaks - Mishandling of Classified Information,”
November 28, 2010

Other External Standards and Guidance
•

Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 503 “”Intelligence Community Information
Technology Systems Security: Risk Management, Certification and Accreditation,”
September 15, 2008

•

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Federal Information Processing
Standards (FIPS), including:
o NIST FIPS 199, “Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information
and Information Systems,” February 2004
o NIST FIPS 200, “Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and
Information Systems,” March 2006

•

NIST Information Technology Security Special Publications (SP) 800 series, including:
o NIST SP 800-16, “Information Technology Security Training Requirements: A
Role- and Performance-Based Model,” April 1998
o NIST SP 800-34, Rev 1, “Contingency Planning Guide for Information
Technology Systems,” May, 1010
o NIST SP 800-37, Rev 1, “Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework
to Federal Information Systems: A Security Life Cycle Approach,” February 2010
o NIST SP 800-39, “Integrated Enterprise-Wide Risk Management: Organization,
Mission, and Information System View,” March 2011
o NIST SP 800-50, “Building an Information Technology Security Awareness and
Training Program,” October 2003
o NIST SP 800-52, Rev 1, “Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations,” April 2014
o NIST SP 800-53, Rev 4, “Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information
Systems and Organizations,” April 2013, with updates as of January 22, 2015
o NIST SP 800-53A, Rev 4, “Assessing Security and Privacy Controls in Federal
Information Systems and Organizations: Building Effective Assessment Plans,”
December 2014

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o NIST SP 800-60, Rev 1, “Guide for Mapping Types of Information and
Information Systems to Security Categories: (2 Volumes) - Volume 1: Guide
Volume 2: Appendices,” August 2008
o NIST SP 800-63-2, “Electronic Authentication Guideline,” August 2013
o NIST SP 800-65, Integrating IT Security into the Capital Planning and Investment
Control Process (CPIC),” January 2005
o NIST SP 800-88 Rev 1, “Guidelines for Media Sanitization,” December 2014
o NIST SP 800-92, “Guide to Computer Security Log Management,” September
2006
o NIST SP 800-94, “Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS),”
February 2007
o NIST SP 800-95, “Guide to Secure Web Services,” August 2007
o NIST SP 800-100, “Information Security Handbook: A Guide for Manager,”
October 2006 (Including updates as of 03-07-2007)
o NIST SP 800-115, “Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and
Assessment,” November 2008
o NIST SP 800-118, Draft, “Guide to Enterprise Password Management (Draft),”
April 21, 2009
o NIST SP 800-122, “Guide to Protecting the Confidentiality of Personally
Identifiable Information (PII),” April 2010
o NIST SP 800-123, “Guide to General Server Security,” July 2008
o NIST SP 800-124, Rev 1, “Guidelines for Managing the Security of Mobile
Devices in the Enterprise,” June 2013
o NIST SP 800-128, “Guide for Security-Focused CM of Information Systems,”
August 2011
o NIST SP 800-137, “Information Security Continuous Monitoring for Federal
Information Systems and Organizations,” September 2011
o NIST SP 800-160, “DRAFT Systems Security Engineering: An Integrated
Approach to Building Trustworthy Resilient Systems,” May 2014
o NIST SP 800-161, “Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal
Information Systems and Organizations,” April 2015
•

NIST IR 7298 Rev 2, “Glossary of Key Information Security Terms,” May 2013

•

CNSS Instruction No. 1001, “National Instruction on Classified Information Spillage,”
February 2008

•

CNSS Instruction No. 4009 (Revised), “National Information Assurance Glossary,” April
2015

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Internal Guidance
•

Department of Homeland Security Acquisition Regulation (HSAR)

•

DHS Management Directives (MD), especially:
o MD 140-01, “Information Technology Security Program,” July 6, 2014
o MD 11042.1, “Safeguarding Sensitive but Unclassified (For Official Use Only)
Information,” January 6, 2005
o MD 102-01a, “Acquisition Management Directive Rev01,” January 20, 2010
o MD 102-01b, “Acquisition Management Directive Rev02,” February 21, 2013
o MD 1030, “Corrective Action Plans,” May 15, 2006
o MD 4400.1, “DHS Web (Internet, Intranet, and Extranet Information) and
Information Systems,” March 1, 2003
o MD 4500.1, “DHS Email Usage,” March 1, 2003
o MD 4600.1,” Personal Use of Government Office Equipment,” April 14, 2003
o MD 4900,” Individual Use and Operation of DHS Information
Systems/Computers

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APPENDIX D
Version

DOCUMENT CHANGE HISTORY

Date

Description

0.1

December 13, 2002

Draft Baseline Release

0.2

December 30, 2002

Revised Draft

0.5

January 27, 2003

Day One Interim Policy

1.0

June 1, 2003

Department Policy

1.1

December 3, 2003

Updated Department Policy

2.0

March 31, 2004

Content Update

2.1

July 26, 2004

Content Update

2.2

February 28, 2005

Content Update

2.3

March 7, 2005

Content Update

3.0

March 31, 2005

Includes updates to PKI, Wireless Communications, and Media Sanitization
(now Media Reuse and Disposition) sections

3.1

July 29, 2005

New policies: 3.1b,e,f, 3.1g. 4.1.5b, 4.8.4a. Modified policies: 3.7b, c,
3.9b,g, 3.10a, 4.3.1b, 4.8.2a, 4.8.5e, 5.1.1b, 5.2.2a, 5.3a, c, 5.4.1a, 5.4.5d,
5.4.8c, 5.5.1a, 5.7d. Policies relating to media disposal incorporated into
policies within Media Reuse and Disposition section. Deleted policy
regarding use of automated DHS tool for conducting vulnerability
assessments.

3.2

October 1, 2005

Modified policies 3.8b, 4.8.1a, 5.2.1a&b, 5.2.2a, and 5.4.3c; combined (with
modifications) policies 4.1e and 4.1f; modified Section 1.5

3.3

December 30, 2005

New policies: policies 3.9a–d; 3.11.1b; 4.3.1a; 4.6c; 5.4.3d&e. Modified
policies: policies 3.9i&j; 4.3.2a; 4.6a, b; 4.6.1e; 4.6.2j; 4.6.2.1a; 4.6.3e;
5.4.3c; 5.5.2k. Modified sections: 2.5, 2.7, 2.9, 2.11, 3.9, 5.5.2.

4.0

June 1, 2006

New policies: 3.5.3.c&g, 4.6.2.3.c, 5.1.c, 5.2.c, 5.4.1.a. Modified policies:
3.5.1.c, 3.5.3.d–f, 3.7.a&b, 3.9.a&b, d, 4.1.4.b&c, 4.2.1.a, 4.3.1.a, 4.6.c,
4.6.1.a, 4.6.2.f, 4.10.3.a, 5.2.1.b, 5.3.a&b, 5.4.1.b, 5.4.3.c, 5.4.5.d.
Modified section: Section 2.9.

4.1

September 8, 2006

New policies: 3.14.1.a–c; 3.14.3.a–c; 4.10.1.c; 5.3.d&e; 5.4.1.c–e.
Modified policies: 3.9.b; 4.6.2.d; 4.8.2.a–c; 4.10.1.b; 5.1.c; 5.3.c; 5.4.1.b.
New sections: 3.14, 3.14.1, 3.14.3. Modified sections: 2.9, 4.8.2.

4.2

September 29, 2006

New policies: 4.6.4.a–f. Modified policies: 4.3.3.a–c. New section:
4.6.4.

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5.0

March 1, 2007

New policies: 4.1.5.h. Modified policies: 3.10.c, 4.1.1.d, 4.1.5.a,b,f, &g,
4.6.2.d, 4.6.3.f, 5.2.c, 5.4.8.a, 5.6.b. New sections: 4.1.1. Modified
sections: 1.2, 1.4.2, 1.4.3, 2.9, 3.12, 4.1 and subsections, 4.6.1–4.6.4, 4.9,
5.2.1. Renumbered sections: 4.1.2–4.1.6, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12.

5.1

April 18, 2007

Update based on SOC CONOPS, Final Version 1.4.1, April 6, 2007; Adds
DHS Chief Financial Officer – Designated Financial Systems; Updates the
term, Sensitive But Unclassified to For Official Use Only

5.2

June 1, 2007

Updates Sections 2.7, 2.9, 2.12, 3.3, 3.5.1, 3.5.3, 3.6, 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, 3.14,
3.15, 4.1.5, 4.1.6, 4.10, 4.12, 5.1.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4.1, 5.4.3, 5.4.4, 5.4.8, 5.5.1,
5.7

5.3

August 3, 2007

Revised policy in Sections 3.5.1 and 5.5.1, and removed Section 3.5.2.
Removed Sections 3.11.2 and 3.11.4

5.4

October 1, 2007

Content update, incorporation of change requests

5.5

September 30, 2007

Section 1.0: 1.1 – Added text regarding policy implementation and DHS
security compliance tool updates. 1.2 – Removed two references from list;
deleted "various" from citation of standards.
Section 2.0: 2.0 – Insert the following after the first sentence in the second
paragraph: “Security is an inherently governmental responsibility.
Contractors and other sources may assist in the performance of security
functions, but a government individual must always be designated as the
responsible agent for all security requirements and functions.” 2.3 –
Removed parentheses from "in writing."
Section 3.0: 3.9 – Inserted new policy element “l” regarding CISO
concurrence for accreditation. 3.15 – Added text regarding Component
CFOs and ISSMs.
Section 4.0: 4.1.1 – Capitalized “Background,” and added "(BI)." 4.3.1 –
Two new elements were added to the policy table. 4.7 – Inserted "where
required or appropriate" before the sentence. 4.8.3 – Title changed to
“Personally Owned Equipment and Software (not owned by or contracted
for by the Government).” 4.8.6 – Included new section regarding wireless
settings for peripheral equipment.
Section 5.0: 5.1c – Changed inactive accounts to “disable user identifiers
after forty-five (45) days of inactivity.” 5.1.1 – First sentence of the second
paragraph was rewritten to prohibit use of personal passwords by multiple
individuals. 5.2.2 – Title changed to “Automatic Session Termination.”

6.0

May 14, 2008

Global change
“Shoulds” changed to “shalls” throughout the document. Replaced certain
instances of “will” with “shall” throughout document to indicate compliance
is required.
Various changes were made throughout the document to ensure that the
4300A Policy and Handbook align with the 4300B Policy and Handbook.
“ISSM” changed to “CISO/ISSM” throughout the document.

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"CPO" changed to "Chief Privacy Officer" throughout the document.
“IT Security Program” changed to “Information Security Program”
throughout the document.”
“System Development Life Cycle” changed to “System Life Cycle” and
“SDLC” changed to “SLC” throughout the document.
Title Page
Title page of 4300A Policy - Language on the Title Page was reworded.
“This is the implementation of DHS Management Directive 4300.1.”
Section 1.0
1.1 – Updated to clarify 90 day period in which to implement new policy
elements.
1.2 – Added OMB, NIST, and CNSS references.
1.4 – Added reference and link to Privacy Incident Handling Guidance and
the Privacy Compliance documentation.
1.4.2 – Added definition of National Intelligence Information.
1.4.3 – Inserted definition of National Security Information to align with
4300B Policy.
1.4.8.1 – Definition of General Support System was updated.
1.4.8.2 – Definition of Major Application was updated.
1.4.10 – Section was renamed “Trust Zone.”
1.4.16 – Inserted new definition for FISMA.
1.5 – Language was updated to increase clarity for financial system owners
for waivers and exceptions.
Section 2.0
2.3 – Added a new responsibility for DHS Chief Information Officer (CIO).
2.4 – Added a new responsibility for Component CIOs.
2.5 - Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) renamed DHS Chief
Information Security Officer (CISO). Updated to include privacy-related
responsibilities.
2.6 – Added a new section in Roles and Responsibilities called “Component
CISO.”
2.7 – Updated Component ISSM Role and Responsibilities.
2.8 – Changed name of the section from "Office of the Chief Privacy Officer
(CPO)" to "The Chief Privacy Officer". Updated to include privacy-related
responsibilities.
2.9 – Added a new role for DHS CSO.
2.10 – Updated to include privacy-related responsibilities.
2.11 - Added privacy-related responsibilities.

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2.12 – Added a new section, “OneNet Steward.”
2.13 – Added a new section, “DHS Security Operations Center (DHS SOC)
and Computer Security Incident Response Center (CSIRC).”
2.14 – Added a new section, “Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN)
Security Operations Center (SOC).”
2.16 – Added a new section, “Component-level SOC.”
2.18 – Updated to include privacy-related responsibilities.
2.19 – Last sentence of first paragraph has been updated to say: “ISSO
Duties shall not be assigned as a collateral duty. Any collateral duties shall
not interfere with their ISSO duties.”
2.20 – Updated to include privacy-related responsibilities.
Section 3.0
3.9 – Added C&A information for unclassified, collateral classified and SCI
systems. Also, prior to DHS Policy table, included sentence regarding
C&A.
3.9.b – Language updated to clarify that a minimum impact level of
moderate is required for confidentiality for CFO designated financial
systems.
3.9.h – New guidance is provided to clarify short term ATO authority.
3.11.1 – Added new section discussing the CISO Board.
3.11.3 – Removed DHS Wireless Security Working Group.
3.14.1 – Added new text defining PII and sensitive PII. At the end of bullet
#4, added definition of computer-readable data extracts. Updated 3.14.1.a
and 3.14.1.b based on input from the Privacy Office. Added sentence “DHS
has an immediate goal that remote access should only be allowed with twofactor authentication where one of the factors is provided by a device
separate from the computer gaining access.
3.14.2 - Added new section called "Privacy Threshold Analyses."
3.14.3 - Updated Privacy Impact Assessment Responsibilities table.
3.14.4 - Added new section called "System of Record Notices."
Section 4.0
4.1.5.c – Updated to address training requirements.
4.1.5.g – Deleted “Training plans shall include awareness of internal threats
and basic IT security practices.”
4.1.5.h (now 4.1.5.g) – Updated to include the following sentence:
“Components shall account for Contingency Plan Training, and Incident
Response Training conducted for Moderate and High IT Systems.”
4.3.1.d – FIPS 140-2 compliance language was updated.
4.8.1.a and 4.8.1.c – Language has been updated to provide clarification of
timeout values.

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4.8.2.a – FIPS 140-2 compliance language was updated.
4.8.2.b – Added a new policy element regarding powering down laptops
when not in use.
4.9 – Section was renamed “Department Information Security Operations.”
4.9, 4.9.1, 4.9.2 – Updated policy elements to support Department security
operations capabilities, based on the SOC CONOPS.
4.9.2.b – Updated to say “Components shall obtain guidance from the DHS
SOC before contacting local law enforcement except where there is risk to
life, limb, or destruction of property.”
4.12.a – Added policy element to align with Handbook.
Section 5.0
5.2.1.a, 5.2.1.b, and 5.2.1.c – Language has been updated to provide
clarification of timeout values.
5.2.2 Introductory language, 5.2.2.a, 5.2.2.b, and 5.2.2.c – Language and
policy updated to clarify the meaning of a session termination.
5.3.f - Updated to clarify responsibilities of the System Owner regarding
computer-readable data extracts.
5.4.1.d – Added sentence “DHS has an immediate goal that remote access
should only be allowed with two-factor authentication where one of the
factors is provided by a device separate from the computer gaining access.”
5.4.3.a through i – New guidance is provided regarding the preparation of
ISAs for interconnections to the DHS OneNetwork.
5.4.3.g – Replaced “interconnect service agreements” with “interconnection
security agreements.”
5.4.4.f - New guidance is provided regarding internal firewalls.
5.4.5.f – New guidance is provided regarding the use of the RDP protocol.
5.4.6 – Added text “NOTE: Due to many attacks that are HTML-based,
please note that DHS will be following the lead of the DoD and moving to
text based email.”
5.4.8.a – Language updated to reflect that annual vulnerability assessments
should be conducted.
5.4.8.f – Policy updated to clarify automated system scanning.
5.5.1.c – Updated element to specify usage of cryptographic modules that
“are FIPS 197 compliant and have received FIPS 140-2 validation.”
5.5.2.f – Policy updated to clarify hosting of DHS Root CA.

6.1

September 23, 2008

Global Changes
Replaced all instances of “CISO/ISSM” with “Component CISO/ISSM.”
Replaced all DHS-related instances of “agency/agency-wide” with
“Department/Department-wide.”
Replaced all instances of “24x7” with “continuous” or “continuously,” as

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appropriate.
Replaced all instances of “IT security” with “information security.”
Various minor editorial and grammatical changes were made throughout the
document.
Section 1.0
1.2 – Added reference to E-Government Act of 2002, January 7, 2003.
1.4 – Replaced “National InfoSec Glossary” with “National Information
Assurance (IA) Glossary.”
1.4.5 – Replaced third sentence with “System vulnerability information
about a financial system shall be considered Sensitive Financial
Information.”
1.5.2 – Added text regarding acceptance of resulting risk by the Component
CFO for financial systems.
1.5.3 – Corrected the title and location of Attachment B. Added text
regarding PTA requirements.
Section 2.0
2.1 – Updated to clarify Secretary of Homeland Security responsibilities.
2.2 – Updated to clarify Undersecretaries and Heads of DHS Components
responsibilities.
2.3 – Updated to clarify DHS CIO responsibilities.
2.4 – Updated to clarify Component CIO responsibilities.
2.5 – Updated to clarify DHS CISO responsibilities.
2.6 – Updated to clarify Component CISO responsibilities.
2.8 – Moved “The Chief Privacy Officer” section to 2.9.
2.11 – Updated to clarify Program Managers’ responsibilities.
2.14 – Updated to clarify HSDN SOC responsibilities. Updated HSDN
SOC unclassified email address.
2.19 – Updated to clarify ISSO responsibilities and the assignment of ISSO
duties as a collateral duty.
2.20 – Updated to clarify System Owners’ responsibilities.
2.23.2 – Updated to clarify DHS CIO responsibilities for financial systems.
Section 3.0
3.1.e – Replaced “FISMA and OMB requirements” with “FISMA, OMB,
and other Federal requirements.”
3.1.h – Replaced “maintain a waiver” with “maintain a waiver or
exception.”
3.14.1 – Included text regarding the type of encryption needed for laptops.
3.14.3 – Included text stating that the PTA determines whether a PIA is
conducted.

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3.14.4 – Moved first sentence of second paragraph to be the first sentence of
the first paragraph. Included “that are a system of record” after “IT
Systems” in the second sentence of the first paragraph.
Section 4.0
4.3.1.a – Included “locked tape device” in media protection.
4.3.1.d – Updated to clarify that AES 256-bit encryption is mandatory.
4.8.2.a – Updated to clarify that AES 256-bit encryption is mandatory.
4.8.3.c – Included new policy element regarding use of seized IT equipment.
4.8.4.f – Included new policy element regarding management and
maintenance of system libraries.
4.8.5.b – Policy updated to clarify limited personal use of DHS email and
Internet resources.
4.9 – First paragraph updated to clarify DHS SOC and HSDN SOC
responsibilities.
4.9.b – Updated to specify that the HSDN SOC is subordinate to the DHS
SOC.
4.9.1 – First two paragraphs updated to clarify relationship between the
DHS SOC and the HSDN SOC.
4.9.1.a – Removed the words “Component SOC.”
4.9.1.b – Updated to clarify means of communication for reporting
significant incidents.
4.9.1.c – Updated to clarify the length of time by which significant HSDN
incidents must be reported.
4.9.1.d. – Updated to clarify reporting for HSDN incidents.
Section 5.0
5.2.d – Replaced “Component CISO/ISSM” with “Component CISO/ISSM
or his/her designee.”
5.2.1 – Changed “48 hour time period” to “24 hour time period.”
5.4.5.g – Included new policy element regarding blocking of specific
Internet websites or categories.
5.4.7 – Updated the policy element to prohibit use of Webmail and other
personal email accounts.
5.5.1.c – Updated to clarify that AES 256-bit encryption is mandatory.
5.7.d – Included new policy element regarding use of cryptographic modules
in order to align with 4300A Handbook.
5.7.e – Included new policy element regarding rollback and journaling for
transaction-based systems.

6.1.1

October 31, 2008

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July 31, 2009

General Updates
Added section and reference numbers to policy elements
Added NIST 800-53 reference controls to policy elements
Added hyperlinks to most DHS references
Introduced new terminology Senior Agency Information Security Officer,
Risk Executive, and Authorizing Official (AO) – replaces DAA, as per
NIST 800-37 and 800-53
Added Appendix A – Acronyms
Added Appendix B – Glossary
Added Appendix C – References list has been updated and moved to
Appendix C. (these are detailed references, an abbreviated list is still found
at the beginning of the document)
Added Appendix D – Change History (This was moved from the front of the
document)
Specific Updates
Section 1.1 – Information Security Program Policy – Added the
statement, “Policy elements are designed to be broad in scope. Specific
implementation information can often be found in specific National Institute
for Standards and Technology (NIST) publications, such as NIST Special
Publication (SP) 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal
Systems.”
Section 1.4.17-19 – Privacy – Added definitions for PII, SPII, and Privacy
Sensitive Systems
Section 1.5 – Exceptions and Waivers – Updated this section, clarified
policy elements, and consolidated all exceptions and waivers requirements.
Section 1.5.4 – U.S. Citizen Exception Requests – Updated section to
include policy elements:
1.5.4.a – Persons of dual citizenship, where one of the citizenships includes
U.S. Citizenship, shall be treated as U.S. Citizens for the purposes of this
directive.
1.5.4.b – Additional compensating controls shall be maintained for foreign
nationals, based on nations lists maintained by the DHS CSO.
Section 1.6 – Information Sharing and Communication Strategy –
Added policy element:
1.6.a - For DHS purposes, electronic signatures are preferred to pen and ink
or facsimile signatures in all cases except where pen & ink signatures are
required by public law, Executive Order, or other agency requirements.
Section 1.7 – Changes to Policy – Updated entire section
Section 2.0 – Roles and Responsibilities – Reformats entire section.
Places emphasis on DHS CISO and Component-level Information Security
Roles. Secretary and senior management roles are moved to the end of the
section. Some specific areas to note include:
Section 2.1.1 – DHS Senior Agency Information Security Officer –
Introduces this term and assigns duties to DHS CISO
Section 2.1.2 – Chief Information Security Officer – Adds the following

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responsibilities:
-

Appoint a DHS employee to serve as the Headquarters CISO
Appoint a DHS employee to serve as the National Security Systems
(NSS) CISO

Section 2.1.3 – Component Chief Information Security Officer – Adds
policy element:
2.1.3.b - All Components shall be responsible to the appropriate CISO.
Components without a fulltime CISO shall be responsible to the HQ CISO.
Adds 4 additional CISOs to the list of Component CISOs:
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
Office of the Inspector General
Headquarters, Department of Homeland Security
The DHS CISO shall also appoint an NSS CISO
Section 2.1.4 – Component Information Systems Security Manager –
Component CISO now works directly with the HQ CISO, rather than with
the DHS CISO.
Section 2.1.5 – Risk Executive – Introduces this term as per NIST.
Assigns responsibilities to CISOs (already performing these functions)
Section 2.1.6 – Authorizing Official – Introduces this term as per NIST.
Replaces the term Designated Approval Authority (DAA)
Section 2.2.10 – DHS Employees, Contractors, and Vendors – Adds the
requirement for vendors to follow DHS Information Security Policy
Section 3.2 – Capital Planning and Investment Control – Adds policy
element:
3.2.f – Procurement authorities throughout DHS shall ensure that Homeland
Security Acquisition Regulation (HSAR) provisions are fully enforced.
Section 3.3 – Contractors and Outsourced Operations – Adds policy
element:
3.3.g – Procurement authorities throughout DHS shall ensure that Homeland
Security Acquisition Regulation (HSAR) provisions are fully enforced.
Section 3.5.2 – Contingency Planning – Updates and expands entire
section.
Section 3.7 – CM – Adds policy elements
Section 3.7.f – If the information system uses operating systems or
applications that do not have hardening or do not follow configuration
guidance from the DHS CISO, the System Owner shall request an
exception, including a proposed alternative secure configuration.
Section 3.7.g – Components shall ensure that CM processes under their
purview include and consider the results of a security impact analysis when
considering proposed changes.
Section 3.9 – Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments –
Updates entire section
Section 3.11.1 – CISO Council – Updates the term from CISO Board
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Section 3.14-3.14.6 – Privacy Sections – Updates all sections pertaining to
privacy and privacy information, adds section 3.14.5 – Protecting Privacy
Sensitive Systems
Section 3.14.7 – E-Authentication – Renumbers this section from 3.14.6
(due to adding of privacy section 3.14.5
Section 3.15 – DHS Chief Financial Officer Designated Systems –
Section renamed from DHS Chief Financial Officer Designated Financial
Systems
Section 3.16 – Social Media – Added Social Media section to provide
guidelines and address the Federal Government’s (including DHS) use of
social media sites (You Tube, Twitter)
Section 4.1.2 – Rules of Behavior – Added policy element:
4.1.2.b – Components shall ensure that DHS users are trained regarding
rules of behavior and that each user signs a copy prior to being granted user
accounts or access to information systems or data.
Section 4.1.5 – IT Security Awareness, Training, and Education –
Updates entire section
Section 4.1.6 – Separation from Duty – Updates policy element to require
that all assets and data are recovered from departing individuals
4.1.6.b – Components shall establish procedures to ensure that all DHS
information system-related property and assets are recovered from the
departing individual and that sensitive information stored on any media is
transferred to an authorized individual.
Adds policy elements:
4.1.6.c - Accounts for personnel on extended absences shall be temporarily
suspended.
4.1.6.d – System Owners shall review information system accounts
supporting their programs at least annually.
Section 4.3.2 – Media Marking and Transport – Adds “Transport” to
section title and adds policy element:
4.3.2.b – Components shall control the transport of information system
media containing sensitive data, outside of controlled areas and restrict the
pickup, receipt, transfer, and delivery to authorized personnel.
Section 4.6 – Wireless Network Communications – Updated section title
from “Wireless Communication” and specifies “network communication”
technologies in policy, rather than the more general “Wireless.” Removes
references to the defunct “WMO.”
Section 4.6.1 – Wireless Systems – Adds policy elements:
4.6.1.f – Component CISOs shall review all system applications for wireless
usage, maintain an inventory of systems, and provide that inventory to the
DHS CISO at least annually.
4.6.1.g – Component CISOs shall (i) establish usage restrictions and
implementation guidance for wireless technologies; and (ii) authorize,

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monitor, and control wireless access to DHS information systems.
4.9.1 – Security Incidents and Incident Response and Reporting – Adds
requirement for Components to maintain full SOC and CSIRC capability
(May outsource to DHS SOC). Adds policy elements:
4.9.1.k – Components shall maintain a full SOC and CSIRC capability or
outsource this capability to the DHS SOC. The DHS SOC shall provide
SOC and CSIRC services to Components in accordance with formal
agreements. Information regarding incident response capability is available
in Attachment F of the DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook.
4.9.1.q – The DHS CISO shall publish Incident Response Testing and
Exercise scenarios as required.
4.9.1.r – The Component CISO for each Component providing an incident
response capability shall ensure Incident Response Testing and Exercises
are conducted annually in coordination with the DHS CISO.
Section 5.1 – Identification and Authentication – Adds requirement for
strong authentication following HSPD-12 implementation.
5.1.f – Components shall implement strong authentication on servers, for
system administrators and significant security personnel, within six (6)
months of the Component’s implementation of HSPD-12.
Section 5.4.1 – Remote Access and Dial-In – Updates section and adds
policy element:
5.4.1.f – The Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) shall not be
connected to OneNet at any time.
5.4.3 – Network Connectivity – Requires DHS CIO approval for all
network connections outside of DHS. Also specifies requirement for CCB.
5.4.3.g – The DHS CIO shall approve all interconnections between DHS
information systems and non-DHS information systems. Components shall
document interconnections with an ISA for each connection. The DHS CIO
shall ensure that connections with other Federal Government Agencies are
properly documented. A single ISA may be used for multiple connections
provided that the security accreditation is the same for all connections
covered by that ISA.
5.4.3.l - The appropriate CCB shall ensure that documentation associated
with an approved change to an information system is updated to reflect the
appropriate baseline. DHS systems that interface with OneNet shall also be
subject to the OneNet CCB.
Section 5.4.4 – Firewalls and Policy Enforcement Points – Updates
language to include Policy Enforcement Points. Adds policy elements:
5.4.4.i – The DHS CISO shall establish policy to block or allow traffic
sources and destinations at the DHS TIC PEPs. The DHS CISO policy will
prevent traffic as directed by the DHS CIO.
5.4.j – The DHS SOC shall oversee all enterprise PEPs.
Section 5.4.5 – Internet Security – Prohibits Public Switched Telephone
Network (PSTN) connection to OneNet.

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5.4.5.a – Any direct connection of OneNet, DHS networks, or DHS mission
systems to the Internet or to extranets shall occur through DHS Trusted
Internet Connection (TIC) PEPSs. The PSTN shall not be connected to
OneNet at any time.
Section 5.5.3 – Public Key/Private Key – Assigns responsibility for nonhuman use of PKI to sponsors.
5.5.3.g – Sponsors for non-human subscribers (organization, application,
code-signing, or device) shall be responsible for the security of and use of
the subscriber’s private keys. Every sponsor shall read, understand, and sign
a “DHS PKI Subscriber Agreement for Sponsors” as a pre-condition for
receiving certificates from a DHS CA for the non-human subscriber.
Section 5.4.6 – Email Security – Prohibits auto-forwarding of DHS email
to other than .gov or .mil addresses.
5.4.6.i - Auto-forwarding or redirecting of DHS email to address outside of
the .gov or .mil domain is prohibited and shall not be used. Users may
manually forward individual messages after determining that the risk or
consequences are low.
Section 5.4.7 – Personal Email Accounts – Requires use of encryption
when sending sensitive information to email addresses other than .gov or
.mil addresses.
5.4.7.b - When sending email to an address outside of the .gov or .mil
domain, users shall ensure that any sensitive information, particularly
privacy data, is attached as an encrypted file.
Section 5.6 – Malware Protection – Updates term from “Virus.”

7.1

September 30, 2009

General Updates
Standardized the term “IT system” to “information system”
Standardized the term “DHS IT system” to “DHS information system”
Updated the term “DHS Security Operations Center” to “DHS Enterprise
Operations Center” and added definition in glossary
Replaced “must” with “shall” in all policy statements
Replaced “vendors” with “others working on behalf of DHS”
Specific Updates
Section 1.4.20 – Strong Authentication – Added definition for Strong
Authentication
Section 1.4.21 – Two-Factor Authentication – Added definition for TwoFactor Authentication
Section 2.2.4 – Component Chief Information Officer – Alleviated
confusion regarding Component CIO responsibilities
Section 2.2.5 – Chief Security Office – Removed erroneous CSO
responsibilities which belong to Component CIOs
Section 2.2.7 – DHS Chief Financial Officer – Updated policy elements to
clarify applicable policies

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Section 3.1 – Basic Requirements (3.1.d, 3.1.g-j) – Updated policy elements
to CISO/ISSM/ISSO responsibilities
Section 3.7.f – Clarified Operating system exception requirements
Section 3.9.l-m – Clarified requirements regarding TAF/RMS
Section 3.15 – CFO Designated Systems – Major revisions to this section
Section 4.6.2 and 5.4.1.a – Prohibits tethering to DHS devices
Section 5.4.3.g-h – Clarifies interconnection and ISA approval
Section 5.5 – Cryptography – Removed unnecessary elements from
introductions and updated entire section with input from DHS PKI Steward

7.2

May 17, 2010

General Updates
No general updates with this revision. Specific updates are listed below.
Specific Updates
Section 1.4.8 – Added FISMA language (transmits, stores, or processes data
or information) to definition of DHS System
Section 1.5.3.k – Removed requirement for Component Head to make
recommendation regarding waivers; removed requirement to report
exceptions on FISMA report.
Section 2.1.6 – Adds requirement for AO to be a Federal employee
Section 2.1.7 – Clarifies that CO is a senior management official; stipulates
that CO must be a Federal employee
Section 2.2.5 – Updated CSO role
Section 3.2 – Added intro to CPIC section and link to CPIC Guide
Section 3.5.2.h – Added requirement to coordinate CP and COOP testing
moderate and high FIPS categorizations
Section 3.15.a – Added requirement for CFO Designated Systems security
assessments for key controls be tracked in TAF and adds requirement for
tracking ST&E and SAR annually.
Section 3.15.c – Remaps control from RA-4 to RA-5
Section 3.15.h – Adds mapping to IR-6
Section 3.15.i – Remaps control from PL-3 to PL-2
Section 3.17 – Added requirement to protect HIPAA information
Section 4.1.l.a – Added requirement for annual reviews of position
sensitivity levels
Section 4.1.1.c – Exempts active duty USCG and other personnel subject to
UCMJ from background check requirements
Section 4.1.4.c-d – Adds additional separation of duties requirements and
restricts the use of administrator accounts
Section 5.2.f – Limits the number of concurrent connections for FIPS-199
high systems

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Date

Description
Section 5.4.2.a – Limits network monitoring as per the Electronic
Communications Act
Section 5.4.3 – Added introduction to clarify ISA requirements
Section 5.4.3.f – Clarifies the term “security policy” in context
Section 5.4.3.m – Clarifies that both AOs must accept risk for
interconnected systems that do not require ISAs.
Section 5.4.3.m-n – Adds stipulations to ISA requirements
Section 5.5 – Updates language in entire section
Section 5.5.3.j – Assigns the DHS PKI MA responsibility for maintaining
Human Subscriber agreements

7.2.1

August 9, 2010

General Updates
No general updates with this revision. Specific updates are listed below.
Specific Updates
Section 1.1 – Removes reference to 4300C
Section 1.4.1/3 – Updates Executive Order reference from 12958 to 13526
Section 1.4.17 – Updates the PII section
Section 1.4.18 – Updates SPII section
Section 1.5.3 – Adds requirement for Privacy Officer/PPOC approval for
exceptions and waivers pertaining to Privacy Designated Systems
Section 1.6.b/c – Requires installation and use of digital signatures and
certificates
Section 2.1.6.d – Allows delegation of AO duty to review and approve
administrators
Section 2.2.6 – Updates DHS Chief Privacy Officer description
Section 3.7.e – Adds requirement to include DHS certificate as part of
FDCC
Section 3.14 – Updates Privacy and Data Security section
Section 3.14.1 – Updates PII section
Section 3.14.2 – Updates PTA section
Section 3.14.2.e – Updates impact level requirements for Privacy Sensitive
Systems
Section 3.14.3 – Updates PIA section
Section 3.1.4.4 – Updates SORN section
Section 3.14.4.a – Exempts SORN requirements
Section 3.14.5 – Updates Privacy Sensitive Systems protection requirements
Section 3.14.6.a – Updates privacy incident reporting requirements

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Description
Section 3.14.7 – Updates privacy requirements for e-Auth
Section 3.14.7.e – Adds PIA requirements for e-Auth
Section 4.1.1.e – Expands U.S. citizenship requirement for access to all
DHS systems and networks
Section 4.1.4.b – Allows delegation of AO duty to review and approve
administrators
Section 4.6.2.3.c – Clarifies prohibited use of SMS
Section 4.8.4.h – Updates the term “trusted” to “cleared” maintenance
personnel
Section 4.12.i – Updates escort requirements for maintenance or disposal
Section 4.12.j – Requires disabling of dial up on multifunction devices
Section 5.4.3 – Clarifies definition of Network Connectivity
Section 5.4.3.m/n – Clarifies requirement for ISA
Section 5.4.6.j – Requires DHS email systems to use a common naming
convention
Section 5.5.3.g – Prohibits sharing of personal private keys

7.2.1.1

January 19, 2011

General Updates
No general updates with this revision. Specific updates are listed below.
Specific Updates
Section 4.8.1.a – Changes requirement for screensaver activation from five
(5) to fifteen (15) minutes of inactivity.

8.0

March 14, 2011

General Updates
Update date and version number
Replace “certification and accreditation” and “C&A” with “security
authorization process”.
Replace “Certifying Official” with “Security Control Assessor”.
Replace “ST&E Plan” with “security control assessment plan”.
Replace “ST&E” with “security control assessment”
Replace “system security plan” with “security plan” and “SSP” with “SP”.
Specific Updates
Section 1.4.8.1: Change definition to specify that a GSS has only one ISSO.
Section 1.4.8.2: Change definition to specify that an MA has only one
ISSO.
Section 1.5.1: Include language requiring waiver submissions to be
coordinated with the AO.
Section 1.5.2: Include language requiring waiver submissions to be
coordinated with the AO.
Section 1.5.3: Clarify language regarding submission of waivers and
exceptions for CFO designated systems.

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Description
Section 1.6.d: Added new policy element, “DHS and Component systems
shall be able to verify PIV credentials issued by other Federal agencies.”
Section 2.1.2: Add DHS CISO role as primary liaison to Component
officials, and to perform periodic compliance reviews for selected systems.
Section 2.13: Update Component CISO duties and add to implement
POA&M process and ensure that eternal providers who operate information
systems meet the same security requirements as the Component.
Section 2.1.4: Update list of Component ISSM duties and create a POA&M
for each known vulnerability.
Section 2.1.5: Add significantly expanded Risk Executive duties.
Section 2.1.6: Add significantly expanded Authorizing Official duties.
Section 2.2.8: Add Program Manager responsibility for POA&M content.
Section 2.2.9: Add expanded System Owner duties.
Section 2.2.11: Renumber 2.2.10 as 2.2.11.
Section 2.2.10: Add a new 2.2.10 to introduce and describe duties of
Common Control Provider.
Section 3.2.g: Added new policy element, “Procurements for services and
products involving facility or system access control shall be in accordance
with the DHS guidance regarding HSPD-12 implementation.”
Section 3.5.2.c: Updated language to clarify requirements for backup policy
and procedures.
Section 3.5.2.f: Updated language to require table-top exercises for testing
the CP for moderate availability systems.
Section 3.7.f: Added new policy element, “Components shall monitor
USGCB (or DHS-approved USGCB variant) compliance using a NISTvalidated Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) tool.”
Section 3.9: Add requirement for Components to designate a Common
Control Provider.
Section 3.10.b: Policy element language was updated to clarify the function
of information system security review and assistance programs.
Section 3.14: Language updated for readability.
Section 3.14.4.c: Added new policy element, “Components shall review and
republish SORNs every two (2) years as required by OMB A-130.”
Section 3.14.7.f: Added new policy element, “Existing physical and logical
access control systems shall be upgraded to use PIV credentials, in
accordance with NIST and DHS guidelines.”
Section 3.14.7.g: Added new policy element, “All new systems under
development shall be enabled to use PIV credentials, in accordance with
NIST and DHS guidelines, prior to being made operational.”
Section 3.17: Added reference to NIST SP 800-66 for more information on
HIPAA.
Section 4.1.4.d: Language updated to clarify usage of administrator
accounts.
Section 4.1.5.f: Language updated to clarify requirements for security

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Description
awareness training plan.
Section 4.3.1.b: Language updated to clarify protection of offsite backup
media.
Section 4.5.4: Added reference to NIST SP 800-58 for more information on
VoIP.
Section 4.9.j: Language updated to require that Component SOCs report
operationally to the respective Component CISO.
Section 4.9.k: New policy element added, “The DHS EOC shall report
operationally to the DHS CISO.”
Section 4.10: Revise list of annual system documentation updates.
Section 4.12.c: Policy element replaced with new one stating that the policy
applies “to all DHS employees, contractors, detailees, others working on
behalf of DHS, and users of DHS information systems that collect, generate,
process, store, display, transmit, or receive DHS data.”
Section 5.4.1.e: Policy element removed.
Section 5.4.1.f: Policy element removed.
Appendix A: Include new acronyms
Appendix B: Revise definition of Accreditation Package to reflect new list
of documentation.
Appendix C: Update references

9.0

October 11, 2011

General Updates
Various minor grammatical and punctuation changes were made throughout
the document.
Control references updated
Specific Updates
Section 1.5.3.a: New policy element added to state that the 4300A Policy
and Handbook apply to all DHS systems unless a waiver or exception has
been granted.
Section 2.1.3: NPPD added to the list of Components having a fulltime
CISO.
Section 2.1.8.g: New policy element added to ensure ISSO responsibility
for responding to ICCB change request packages.
Section 3.14.7.e: Policy element revised to require consultation with a
privacy officer to determine if a change requires an updated PTA.
Section 3.14.7.h: New policy element added to ensure that all new DHS
information systems or those undergoing major upgrades shall use or
support DHS PIV credentials.
Section 4.1.5.d: Policy element revised to clarify awareness training
records requirements.
Section 4.1.5.e: Policy element revised to clarify role-based training
records requirements.
Section 4.1.5.g: Policy element revised to require submission of an annual
role-based training plan.

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Date

Description
Section 4.1.5.j: Policy element revised to require annual DHS CISO review
of role-based training programs.
Section 4.1.5.k: Policy element revised to require biannual submission of
roster of significant information security personnel and to specify the
standard information security roles.
Section 4.3.1.f: Policy element prohibiting connection of DHS removable
media to non-DHS systems. It was already stated in 4.3.1.e.
Section 4.12.c: Policy element was moved to 1.5.3.a.
Section 5.2.f: Policy element revised to allow concurrent sessions to one if
strong authentication is used.
Section 5.2.g: New policy element added to ensure preservation of
identification and access requirements for all data-at-rest.

9.0.1

March 5, 2012

Section 2.1.3: Includes language to address the designation of a Deputy
CISO by the Component CISO. Add two new responsibilities for
Component CISO: Serve as principal advisor on information security
matters; Report to the Component CIO on matters relating to the security of
Component information Systems.
Section 2.2.4: Includes new language stating that the Component CISO
reports directly to the Component CIO.
Section 4.1.1.c: Includes new language to give Components the option to
use background investigations completed by another Federal agency when
granting system access to Federal employees.
Section 4.1.1.d: Includes new language to give Components the option to
use background investigations completed by another Federal agency when
granting system access to contractor personnel.

9.0.2

March 19, 2012

Throughout the document: EOC and Enterprise Operations Center
replaced with SOC and Security Operations Center respectively
Section 1.6: Section 1.6, Information Sharing and Electronic Signature was
divided into two sections – Section 1.6, Electronic Signatures, and Section
1.7, Information Sharing.
Section 1.8: Section 1.8, Threats, was added to the policy.
Section 3.9.w: Policy element added to require common control catalogs for
DHS enterprise services.
Section 3.9.x: Policy element added to require the development of
Enterprise System Security Agreements for enterprise services.
Section 5.1.g: Policy element added to require use of PIV credentials for
logical authentication where available.

July 17, 2012

General Changes
Style, grammar, and diction edited.
Updated control references.
Updated links.

9.1

Specific Changes
Section 1: Updated citations.
Section 1.6.b: Changed to require use of electronic signatures where
practicable.
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Description
Section 1.8.5: Section added defining supply chain threat and supply chain.
Section 2.1.3: Added Science and Technology (S&T) to the list of
Components that shall have fulltime CISOs.
Section 2.1.6.a: Clarified language (designation of AOs at Department
level).
Section 2.1.6.b: Clarified language (designation of AOs at Component
level).
Section 3.1.k: Added policy statement requiring SCAP compliance.
Section 3.11.3: Added section, including two policy statements, relative to
Security Policy Working Group.
Section 3.14.6.e: Updated reference title and hyperlink.
Section 3.18: Section added containing Cloud Services policy.
Section 4.10: Policy statements revised.
Section 4.1.1.c: Changed “Minimum Background Investigation (MBI)” to
“Moderate Risk Background Investigation (MBI).”
Section 4.1.5.k: Changed “Contracting Officer Technical Representative” to
“Contracting Officer Representative.”
Section 4.3.1.d: Changed policy statement to pertain only to USB drives.
Section 4.9.1[four.nine.ell]: Added policy statement requiring the
NOC/SOC to be under the direction of a Government employee who shall
be present at all times.
Sections and subsections 4.10 renumbered 4.91 and subsections
Sections 4.11 through 4.13 renumbered 4.10 through 4.12
Section 4.9.1.b: Revised with clarification of reporting means and
requirements.
Section 4.9.1.c: Revised with clarification of reporting means and
requirements.
Section 5.4.6.k: Added policy statement moved from 5.4.7.b.
Section 5.4.7.b: Deleted and becomes new policy statement 5.4.6.k.
Section 5.5.2 Section 5.5.2: Revised to address the two DHS PKIs now
functioning: DHS FPKI and DHS Internal NPE PKI.
Section 5.5.3 Section 5.5.2: Revised to address the two DHS PKIs now
functioning: DHS FPKI and DHS Internal NPE PKI.
Section 5.8: Added new section, including two policy statements, relative to
IT supply chain risks and protection against supply chain threats.
Appendix A, Acronyms and Abbreviations: Additions and updates.

10.0

May 20, 2013

v12.01, February 12, 2016

General: Changed version numbering system; all instances of “TAF” and
“RMS” replaced with “IACS” throughout the document.
Section 1.5.3.n: Included new policy element regarding expiration for
exceptions.
Section 2.2.7.a: Revised DHS CFO responsibility as AO for financial and
mixed financial systems.
Section 3.11.4: Included section on the ESSWG
Section 3.18: Revised policy on cloud services/FedRAMP
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Description
Section 4.11: Revised policy on backup media protection.
Section 5.4.3: Included new TIC traffic requirements.

11.0

April 30, 2014

General: Removed language regarding exceptions to policy from the
document.
Section 1.5.2 and 4.1.1.e: Revised to transfer responsibility to OCSO for
granting access to IT systems by non-U.S. citizens.
Section 1.6: Revised to align with NARA and OMB requirements and
guidance on Electronic Signatures.
Section 3.18: Revised policy on cloud services/FedRAMP
Section 4.62 (principally) and throughout: “PED,” “PDA,” and “wireless
PDA” have been replaced with the words “wireless mobile devices.”
Section 5.5.2: PKI policy element revisions throughout. Element 5.5.2.w,
requiring appointment of Component PKI Managers, is rescinded.
Section 5.8: Revised policy on supply chain

12.0

September 21, 2015

General: Updated FISMA references (“Federal Information Security
Management Act “ to “Federal Information Security Modernization Act of
2014”).
Section 1.4: Alphabetized definition entries.
Section 1.4.7: Removed statutory requirements language from FISMA
definition
Section 1.4.14: Revised definition of Personally Identifiable Information
(PII)
Section 1.4.16: Added definition of “privileged user” based on
Cybersecurity Sprint communication
Section 1.4.19: Revised definition of Sensitive Personally Identifiable
Information.
Section 1.4.20: Added definition of “Sensitive System” in response to
Deputy CISO request
Section 1.4.21: Revised definition of Strong Authentication based on
Cybersecurity Sprint communication
Section 1.4.24: Added definition of “visitor” in response to an OIG
recommendation
Section 1.5.1.c: Removed because the statement was procedure, not policy
Section 1.5.1.e: Removed because the statement was procedure, not policy
Section 1.5.1.g: Removed because the statement was procedure, not policy
Section 1.5.1.h: Removed to align policy with actual procedure
Section 1.5.1.j: Removed to align policy with actual procedure
Section 1.6: Renamed to “Digital and Other Electronic Signatures”; section
underwent major revision
Section 2.1.2: Removed responsibilities related to COOP planning, security
awareness training, and insider threat and Info Sec workforce development
programs; added supply chain responsibilities
Section 2.1.3: Removed responsibility related to execution of DHS Logging
Strategy, which no longer exists
Section 2.1.4: Added supply chain and software assurance responsibilities

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Description
Section 2.1.5: Added supply chain responsibilities
Section 2.1.7: Security control assessor is assigned in writing by
Component CISO or ISSM
Section 2.1.8: Updated to require BIs for ISSOs; removed Secret clearance
requirement
Section 2.2.3: Added supply chain responsibilities
Section 2.2.4: Added supply chain responsibilities
Section 2.2.8: Added supply chain responsibilities and requirement to
complete security control assessment for common controls
Section 2.2.9: Added supply chain responsibilities
Section 3.7.i: Added requirement for users to report IT changes to DHS
Enterprise Configuration Management
Section 3.9.a: Updated to include NIST SP 800-161 security controls in
security authorization process
Section 3.9.b: Updated to include NIST SP 800-161 security controls in
security authorization process
Section 3.9.1: Various changes throughout section
Section 3.14.1: Per direction of the DHS Privacy Office, removed text
following policy table
Section 3.14.1.g: Removed; policy was incorporated into 3.14.1.f
Section 3.15.n: Added supply chain responsibilities
Section 3.16: Removed text following policy table
Section 4.1.4: Replaced “separation of duties” with “segregation of duties”
Section 4.6.2.d: Updated to include requirement for password complexity
Section 4.6.2.n: Added to allow local access to mobile devices using
fingerprint technology
Section 4.6.2.4: Added new “Bluetooth” section
Section 4.8.4.d: Revised to add requirement to protect against pass-the-hash
& lateral movement vulnerabilities
Section 4.8.4.m: Added requirement to include software assurance and
supply chain in acquisition decisions
Section 4.8.4.n: Added requirement to analyze COTS hardware and
software for supply chain risk prior to procurement and upgrading
Section 5.1.c: Updated to clarify policy related to disabling inactive user
identifiers applies to all users
Section 5.1.g: Revised based on Cybersecurity Sprint communication
Section 5.1.h: Revised based on Cybersecurity Sprint communication
Section 5.1.k: Added based on Cybersecurity Sprint communication
Section 5.1.l: Added based on Cybersecurity Sprint communication
Section 5.3.j: Added based on Cybersecurity Sprint communication
Section 5.4.2.a: Updated continuous monitoring requirements to include
information of third parties
Section 5.5.1.m: Added to clarify PIV requirement
Section 5.5.1.n: Added to clarify PIV requirement

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Version

Date

Description
Section 5.5.1.o: Added to clarify PIV requirement
Section 5.5.2: Various changes throughout section
Section 5.5.3: Various changes throughout section
Section 5.8.a: Added to include NIST SP 800-161 security controls in
security authorization process
Section 5.8.b: Added to include NIST SP 800-161 security controls in
security authorization process

12.01

February 12, 2016

v12.01, February 12, 2016

Section 1.6.2.c: Updated to make the role of the signer mandatory in the
visible signature block.
Section 5.4.6.l: Added requirement for use of Government email accounts
for Government business.

192


File Typeapplication/pdf
File TitleDHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A
AuthorTanyette Miller
File Modified2016-02-12
File Created2016-02-12

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