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Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 72 / Monday, April 15, 2019 / Proposed Rules
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 401, 404, 413, 414, 415,
417, 420, 431, 433, 435, 437, 440, and
450
[Docket No.: FAA–2019–0229; Notice No.
19–01]
RIN 2120–AL17
Streamlined Launch and Reentry
Licensing Requirements
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
AGENCY:
This rulemaking would
streamline and increase flexibility in the
FAA’s commercial space launch and
reentry regulations, and remove obsolete
requirements. This action would
consolidate and revise multiple
regulatory parts and apply a single set
of licensing and safety regulations
across several types of operations and
vehicles. The proposed rule would
describe the requirements to obtain a
vehicle operator license, the safety
requirements, and the terms and
conditions of a vehicle operator license.
DATES: Send comments on or before
June 14, 2019.
ADDRESSES: Send comments identified
by docket number FAA–2019–0229
using any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
http://www.regulations.gov and follow
the online instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
Mail: Send comments to Docket
Operations, M–30; U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Room W12–140, West
Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC
20590–0001.
Hand Delivery or Courier: Take
comments to Docket Operations in
Room W12–140 of the West Building
Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
Fax: Fax comments to Docket
Operations at 202–493–2251.
Privacy: In accordance with 5 U.S.C.
553(c), DOT solicits comments from the
public to better inform its rulemaking
process. DOT posts these comments,
without edit, including any personal
information the commenter provides, to
www.regulations.gov, as described in
the system of records notice (DOT/ALL–
14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at
www.dot.gov/privacy.
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SUMMARY:
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Docket: Background documents or
comments received may be read at
http://www.regulations.gov at any time.
Follow the online instructions for
accessing the docket or go to the Docket
Operations in Room W12–140 of the
West Building Ground Floor at 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington,
DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
questions concerning this action,
contact Randy Repcheck, Office of
Commercial Space Transportation,
Federal Aviation Administration, 800
Independence Avenue SW, Washington,
DC 205914; telephone (202) 267–8760;
email [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Authority for This Rulemaking
The Commercial Space Launch Act of
1984, as amended and codified at 51
U.S.C. 50901–50923 (the Act),
authorizes the Department of
Transportation, and the FAA through
delegation, to oversee, license, and
regulate commercial launch and reentry
activities, and the operation of launch
and reentry sites as carried out by U.S.
citizens or within the United States.
Section 50905 directs the FAA to
exercise this responsibility consistent
with public health and safety, safety of
property, and the national security and
foreign policy interests of the United
States. In addition, section 50903
requires the FAA encourage, facilitate,
and promote commercial space
launches and reentries by the private
sector.
If adopted as proposed, this
rulemaking would consolidate and
revise multiple regulatory parts to apply
a single set of licensing and safety
regulations across several types of
operations and vehicles. It would also
streamline the commercial space
regulations by, among other things,
replacing many prescriptive regulations
with performance-based rules, giving
industry greater flexibility to develop
means of compliance that maximize
their business objectives while
maintaining public safety. Because this
rulemaking would amend the FAA’s
launch and reentry requirements, it falls
under the authority delegated by the
Act.
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
Frequently Used in This Document
AC—Advisory Circular
CEC—Conditional expected casualty
EC—Expected casualty
ELOS determination—Equivalent-level-ofsafety determination
ELV—Expendable launch vehicle
FSA—Flight safety analysis
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FSS—Flight safety system
PC—Probability of casualty
PI—Probability of impact
RLV—Reusable launch vehicle
Table of Contents
I. Overview of Proposed Rule
II. Background
A. History
B. Licensing Process
C. National Space Council
D. Streamlined Launch and Reentry
Licensing Requirements Aviation
Rulemaking Committee
III. Discussion of the Proposal
A. The FAA’s Approach To Updating and
Streamlining Launch and Reentry
Regulations
B. Single Vehicle Operator License
C. Performance-Based Requirements and
Means of Compliance
D. Launch From a Federal Launch Range
E. Safety Framework
Flight Safety
A. Public Safety Criteria
1. Neighboring Operations Personnel
2. Property Protection (Critical Assets)
3. Consequence Protection Criteria for
Flight Abort and Flight Safety System
B. System Safety Program
1. Safety Organization
2. Procedures
3. Configuration Management and Control
4. Post-Flight Data Review
C. Preliminary Safety Assessment for Flight
D. Hazard Control Strategy
E. Flight Abort
1. Flight Safety Limits and Uncontrolled
Areas
2. Flight Abort Rules
3. Flight Safety System
F. Flight Hazard Analysis
G. Computing Systems and Software
Overview
H. Hybrid Launch Vehicles
I. Flight Safety Analysis Overview
J. Safety-Critical Systems
1. Safety-Critical Systems Design, Test, and
Documentation
2. Flight Safety System
K. Other Prescribed Hazard Controls
1. Agreements
2. Safety-Critical Personnel Qualifications
3. Work Shift and Rest Requirements
4. Radio Frequency Management
5. Readiness: Reviews and Rehearsals
6. Communications
7. Preflight Procedures
8. Surveillance and Publication of Hazard
Areas
9. Lightning Hazard Mitigation
10. Flight Safety Rules
11. Tracking
12. Launch and Reentry Collision
Avoidance Analysis Requirements
13. Safety at End of Launch
14. Mishaps: Definition, Plan, Reporting,
Response, Investigation, Test-Induced
Damage
L. Pre- and Post-Flight Reporting
1. Preflight Reporting
2. Post-Flight Reporting
Ground Safety
A. Definition and Scope of Launch
B. Ground Safety Requirements
Process Improvements
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A. Safety Element Approval
B. Incremental Review of a License
Application
C. Time Frames
D. Continuing Accuracy of License
Application and Modification of License
Other Changes
A. Pre-Application Consultation
B. Policy Review and Approval
C. Payload Review and Determination
D. Safety Review and Approval
E. Environmental Review
F. Additional License Terms and
Conditions, Transfer of a Vehicle
Operator License, Rights Not Conferred
by a Vehicle Operator License
G. Unique Safety Policies, Requirements,
and Practices
H. Compliance Monitoring
I. Registration of Space Objects
J. Public Safety Responsibility, Compliance
With License, Records, Financial
Responsibility, and Human Spaceflight
Requirements
K. Applicability
L. Equivalent Level of Safety
Additional Technical Justification and
Rationale
A. Flight Safety Analyses
1. Scope and Applicability
2. Flight Safety Analysis Methods
3. Trajectory Analysis for Normal Flight
4. Trajectory Analysis for Malfunction
Flight
5. Debris Analysis
6. Flight Safety Limits Analysis
7. Gate Analysis
8. Data Loss Flight Time and Planned Safe
Flight State Analyses
9. Time Delay Analysis
10. Probability of Failure
11. Flight Hazard Areas
12. Debris Risk Analysis
13. Far-Field Overpressure Blast Effects
14. Toxic Hazards for Flight
15. Wind Weighting for the Flight of an
Unguided Suborbital Launch Vehicle
B. Software
C. Changes to Parts 401, 413, 414, 420, 437,
440
1. Part 401—Definitions
2. Part 413—Application Procedures
3. Part 414—Safety Element Approvals
4. Part 420—License To Operate a Launch
Site
6. Part 437—Experimental Permits
7. Part 440—Financial Responsibility
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
A. Regulatory Evaluation
B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination
C. International Trade Impact Assessment
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
F. International Compatibility
G. Environmental Analysis
V. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations
That Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use
C. Executive Order 13609, International
Cooperation
D. Executive Order 13771, Reducing
Regulation and Controlling Regulatory
Costs
VI. Additional Information
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A. Comments Invited
B. Availability of Rulemaking Documents
The Proposed Amendment
I. Overview of Proposed Rule
The FAA commercial space
transportation regulations protect public
health and safety and the safety of
property from the hazards of launch and
reentry. In addition, the regulations
address national security and foreign
policy interests of the United States,
financial responsibility, environmental
impacts, informed consent for crew and
space flight participants, and, to a
limited extent, authorization of
payloads not otherwise regulated or
owned by the U.S. Government. The
FAA is proposing this deregulatory
action consistent with President Donald
J. Trump’s Space Policy Directive—2
(SPD–2) ‘‘Streamlining Regulations on
Commercial Use of Space.’’ 1 The
directive charged the Department of
Transportation with revising regulations
to require a single license for all types
of commercial space flight operations
and replace prescriptive requirements
with performance-based criteria.
Streamlining these regulations would
lower administrative burden and
regulatory compliance costs and bolster
the U.S. space commercial sector and
industrial base.
Additionally, this proposed rule
incorporates industry input and
recommendations provided primarily by
the Streamlined Launch and Reentry
Licensing Requirements Aviation
Rulemaking Committee (ARC). The
subject proposed rule would implement
the applicable section of SPD–2 and
address industry. The recommendation
report is provided in the docket for this
rulemaking.
Current regulations setting forth
application procedures and
requirements for commercial space
transportation licensing were based
largely on the distinction between
expendable and reusable launch
vehicles. Specifically, title 14 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR)
parts 415 and 417 address the launch of
expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) and
are based on the Federal launch range
standards developed in the 1990s. Part
431 addresses the launch and reentry of
reusable launch vehicles (RLVs), and
part 435 addresses the reentry of reentry
vehicles other than RLVs. Parts 431 and
435 are primarily process-based, relying
on a license applicant to derive safety
requirements through a ‘‘system safety’’
1 Space Policy Directive—2, Streamlining
Regulations on Commercial Use of Space; May 24,
2018 (https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidentialactions/space-policy-directive-2-streamliningregulations-commercial-use-space/).
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process. That being said, the FAA has
used the more detailed part 417
requirements to inform parts 431 and
435. While these separate regulatory
parts and requirements satisfied the
need of the commercial space
transportation industry at the time they
were issued,2 the industry has changed
and continues to evolve.
The FAA proposes to consolidate,
update, and streamline all launch and
reentry regulations into a single
performance-based part to better fit
today’s fast-evolving commercial space
transportation industry. Proposed part
450 would include regulations
applicable to all launch and reentry
vehicles, whether they have reusable
components or not. The FAA looked to
balance the regulatory certainty but
rigidity of current ELV regulations with
the flexibility but vagueness of current
RLV regulations. As a result, these
proposed regulations are flexible and
scalable to accommodate innovative
safety approaches while also protecting
public health and safety, safety of
property, and the national security and
foreign policy interests of the United
States.
The FAA proposes to continue
reviewing licenses in five component
parts: Policy review, payload review,
safety review, maximum probable loss
determination, and environmental
review. However, after consulting with
the FAA, applicants would have the
option of submitting portions of
applications for incremental review and
approval by the FAA. In terms of the
applications themselves, the FAA has
streamlined and better defined
application requirements.
In terms of safety requirements, the
FAA would maintain a high level of
safety. Neighboring operations
requirements would result in a minimal
risk increase compared to current
regulations, offset by operational
benefits. The FAA would anchor the
proposed requirements on public safety
criteria. The FAA would continue to use
the current collective and individual
risk criteria. However, this proposal
would implement risk criteria for
neighboring operations personnel,
critical asset protection, and conditional
risk to protect from an unlikely but
catastrophic event.3 In particular, the
2 The current 14 CFR parts 415, 417, 431, and 435
regulatory text can be found at https://
www.ecfr.gov/ under their respective links. The
eCFR contains Federal Register citations for each
time a regulation is modified by rulemaking.
3 As will be discussed later, ‘‘neighboring
operations personnel’’ would be defined as those
members of the public located within a launch or
reentry site, or an adjacent launch or reentry site,
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conditional risk would be used to
determine the need for a flight safety
system 4 and the reliability of that
system. To meet these public safety
criteria, most operators would have the
option of using traditional hazard
controls or to derive alternate controls
through a system safety approach. These
rules would also revise quantitative
flight safety analyses to better define
their applicability and to reduce the
level of prescriptiveness. In terms of
ground safety, the FAA has scoped its
oversight to better fit the safety risks and
to increase operator flexibility.
To satisfy the proposed performancebased regulations, operators would be
able to use a means of compliance that
has already been accepted by the FAA
or propose an alternate approach. To
retain the maximum flexibility to adjust
to dynamic industry changes, the FAA
would continue to offer operators the
choice to request waivers of regulations
and equivalent level of safety
determinations.
The proposed rule is a deregulatory
action under Executive Order 13771.5
This deregulatory action would
consolidate and revise multiple
commercial space regulatory parts to
apply a single set of licensing and safety
regulations across several types of
operations and vehicles. It would also
replace many prescriptive regulations
with performance-based regulations,
giving industry greater flexibility to
develop a means of compliance that
maximizes their business objectives.
This proposed rule would result in net
cost savings for industry and enable
future innovation in U.S. commercial
space transportation.
who are not associated with a specific hazardous
licensed or permitted operation currently being
conducted but are required to perform safety,
security, or critical tasks at the site and are notified
of the operation. ‘‘Critical asset’’ means an asset that
is essential to the national interests of the United
States. Critical assets include property, facilities, or
infrastructure necessary to maintain national
defense, or assured access to space for national
priority missions. For ‘‘conditional risk,’’ the FAA
would require that operators quantify the
consequence of a catastrophic event, by calculating
the conditional risk as conditional expected
casualties for any one-second period of flight.
Unlike collective risk that determines the expected
casualties factoring in the probability that a
dangerous event will occur, conditional risk
determines the expected casualties assuming the
dangerous event will occur.
4 The FAA proposes to revise the definition in
§ 401.5 of ‘‘flight safety system’’ to mean a system
used to implement flight abort. A human can be a
part of a flight safety system. The proposed
definition is discussed later in this preamble.
5 Executive Order 13771, Reducing Regulation
and Controlling Regulatory Costs, January 30, 2017,
(https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/
presidential-executive-order-reducing-regulationcontrolling-regulatory-costs/).
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At the time of writing, the FAA
estimates this proposed rule would
affect 12 operators that have an active
license or permit to conduct launch or
reentry operations. In addition, the FAA
estimates this proposed rule would
affect approximately 276 launches over
the next 5 years (2019 through 2023).
The FAA anticipates this proposed rule
would reduce the costs of current and
future launch operations by removing
prescriptive requirements that are
burdensome to meet or require a waiver.
The FAA expects these changes would
lead to more efficient launch operations
and have a positive effect on expanding
the number of future launch and reentry
operations.
Based on the preliminary analysis, the
FAA estimates industry stands to gain
about $19 million in discounted present
value net savings over 5 years or about
$5 million in annualized net savings
(using a discount rate of 7 percent). In
addition, the FAA will save about $1
million in the same time period. The
FAA expects industry will gain
additional unquantified savings and
benefits as the proposed rule is
implemented, since it would provide
flexibility and scalability through
performance-based requirements that
would reduce the future cost of
innovation and improve the efficiency
and productivity of U.S. commercial
space transportation.6
Throughout this document, the FAA
uses scientific notation to indicate
probabilities. For example, 1 × 10¥2
means one in a hundred and 1 × 10¥6
means one in a million.
II. Background
A. History
As noted earlier, the Act authorizes
the Secretary of Transportation to
oversee, license, and regulate
commercial launch and reentry
activities and the operation of launch
and reentry sites as carried out by U.S.
citizens or within the United States. The
Act directs the Secretary to exercise this
responsibility consistent with public
health and safety, safety of property,
and the national security and foreign
policy interests of the United States, and
to encourage, facilitate, and promote
commercial space launches by the
private sector. The FAA carries out the
Secretary’s responsibilities under the
Act.
In the past 30 years, the Department
of Transportation (DOT) regulations
6 51 U.S.C. 50904 grants the FAA authority to
oversee, license, and regulate commercial launch
and reentry activities, and the operation of launch
and reentry sites as carried out by U.S. citizens or
within the United States.
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addressing launch and reentry have
gone through a number of iterations
intended to be responsive to an
emerging industry while at the same
time ensuring public safety. A review of
this history is provided to put this
rulemaking in perspective.
1. First Licensing Regulations in 1988
DOT’s first licensing regulations for
commercial launch activities became
effective over 30 years ago, on April 4,
1988. The regulations replaced previous
guidance and constituted the procedural
framework for reviewing and
authorizing all proposals to conduct
non-Federal launch activities, including
the launching of launch vehicles,
operation of launch sites, and payload
activities that were not licensed by other
federal agencies. They included general
administrative procedures and a revised
compilation of DOT’s information
requirements.
No licensed launches had yet taken
place when DOT initially issued these
regulations. Accordingly, DOT
established a flexible regime intended to
be responsive to an emerging industry
while at the same time ensuring public
safety. This approach worked well
because all commercial launches at the
time took place from Federal launch
ranges where safety practices were well
established and had proven effective in
protecting public safety. In 1991, when
the industry reached about ten launches
a year, DOT took further steps designed
to simplify the licensing process for
launch operators with established safety
records by instituting a launch operator
license, which allowed one license to
cover a series of launches where the
same safety resources support identical
or similar missions.
2. Licensing Changes in 1999
On June 21, 1999,7 the FAA amended
its commercial space transportation
licensing regulations to clarify its
license application process generally,
and for launches from Federal launch
ranges specifically. The FAA intended
the regulations to provide an applicant
or an operator with greater specificity
and clarity regarding the scope of a
license and to codify and amend
licensing requirements and criteria.
Notable changes were dividing launch
into preflight and flight activities;
defining launch to begin with the arrival
of the launch vehicle or its major
components at a U.S. launch site;
separating what had been a safety and
mission review into a safety, policy, and
7 Commercial Space Transportation Licensing
Regulations, Final Rule. 64 FR 19586 (April 21,
1999).
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payload review; and the addition of a
specific requirement to ‘‘passivate’’ any
vehicle stage left on orbit to avoid the
potential of creating orbital debris
through a subsequent explosion.
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3. Reusable Launch Vehicle Regulations
in 2000
In the mid-1990s, prospective RLV
operators identified the absence of
adequate regulatory oversight over RLV
operations, particularly their reentry, as
an impediment to technology
development. The need for a stable and
predictable regulatory environment in
which RLVs could operate was
considered critical to the capability of
the emerging RLV industry to obtain the
capital investment necessary for
research and development and
ultimately vehicle operations. The
Commercial Space Act of 1998, Public
Law 105–303, extended DOT’s licensing
authority to the reentry of reentry
vehicles and the operation of reentry
sites by non-Federal entities. In
September 2000, the FAA amended the
commercial space transportation
licensing regulations by establishing
requirements for the launch of an RLV,
the reentry of a reentry vehicle, and the
operation of launch and reentry sites.8
At the time, the FAA believed that the
differences between ELVs and RLVs
justified a different regulatory approach.
There was a long history of successful
ELV launches from Federal launch
ranges using detailed prescriptive
regulations, encouraging the FAA to
follow suit. Also, ELVs and RLVs used
different means of terminating flight.
ELV launches typically relied on flight
safety systems (FSS) that terminated
flight to ensure flight safety by
preventing a vehicle from traveling
beyond approved limits. Unlike an ELV,
the FAA contemplated that an RLV
might rely upon other means of ending
vehicle flight, such as returning to the
launch site or using an alternative
landing site, in case the vehicle might
not be able to safely conclude a mission
as planned. Importantly, other than
NASA’s Space Shuttle, there was little
experience with RLVs. For these
reasons, the FAA decided to enact
flexible process-based regulations for
RLVs and other reentry vehicles. These
regulations reside in 14 CFR parts 431
and 435.
4. Further Regulatory Changes in 2006
The last major change to FAA launch
regulations occurred in 2006.9 The FAA
8 Commercial Space Transportation Reusable
Launch Vehicle and Reentry Licensing Regulations,
Final Rule. 65 FR 56617 (September 19, 2000).
9 Licensing and Safety Requirements for Launch,
Final Rule. 71 FR 50508 (August 25, 2006).
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believed that it would be advantageous
for its ELV regulations to be consistent
with Federal launch range requirements
and worked with the United States Air
Force (Air Force) and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) to codify safety practices for
ELVs. Those regulations reside in 14
CFR parts 415 and 417. The 2006 rule
also codified safety responsibilities and
requirements that applied to any
licensed launch, regardless of whether
the launch occurs from a Federal launch
range or a non-Federal launch site.
In developing the technical
requirements, the FAA built on the
safety success of Federal launch ranges
and sought to achieve their same high
level of safety by using Federal launch
range practices as a basis for FAA
regulations consistent with its authority.
The regulations specified detailed
processes, procedures, analyses, and
general safety system design
requirements. For safety-critical
hardware and software, where
necessary, the rule provided design and
detailed test requirements. The FAA
attempted to provide flexibility by
allowing a launch operator the
opportunity to demonstrate an
alternative means of achieving an
equivalent level of safety.
5. Evolution of Launch Vehicles and the
Need for Updated and Streamlined
Regulations
Since 2006, the differences between
ELVs and RLVs have blurred. Vehicles
that utilize traditional flight safety
systems now are partially reusable. For
example, the Falcon 9 first stage,
launched by Space Exploration
Technologies Corporation (SpaceX),
routinely returns to the launch site or
lands on a barge, and other operators are
developing launch vehicles with similar
return and reuse capabilities. Although
the reuse of safety critical systems or
components can have public safety
implications, labeling a launch vehicle
as expendable or reusable has not
impacted the primary approach
necessary to protect public safety,
certainly not to the extent suggested in
the differences between part 431 and
parts 415 and 417.
Moreover, the regulations for ELV
launches in parts 415 and 417 have
proven to be too prescriptive and onesize-fits-all, and the significant detail
has caused the regulations to become
obsolete in many instances. For
example, part 417 requires all launch
operators to have at least 11 plans that
define how launch processing and flight
of a launch vehicle will be conducted,
each with detailed requirements. This
can lead an operator to produce
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15299
documents that are not necessary to
conduct safe launch operations. In
contrast, the regulations for RLV
launches have proven to be too general,
lacking regulatory clarity. For example,
part 431 does not contain specificity
regarding the qualification of flight
safety systems, acceptable methods for
flight safety analyses, and ground safety
requirements. This lack of clarity can
cause delays in the application process
to allow for discussions between the
FAA and the applicant. Operators
frequently rely upon the requirements
in part 417 to demonstrate compliance.
Since 2015, the launch rate has only
increased, from 9 licensed launches a
year to 33 licensed launches in 2018.
Beginning in 2016, the FAA developed
a comprehensive strategy to consolidate
and streamline the regulatory parts
associated with commercial space
launch and reentry operations and
licensing of space vehicles. Actions by
the National Space Council confirmed
and accelerated FAA rulemaking plans
regarding launch and reentry licenses.
B. Licensing Process
When it issues a license, the Act
requires the FAA to do so consistent
with public health and safety, safety of
property, and national security and
foreign policy interests of the United
States.10 The FAA currently conducts its
licensing application review in five
component parts: Policy Review,
Payload Review, Safety Review,
Maximum Probable Loss Determination,
and Environmental Review. The license
application review is depicted in figure
1. A policy review, in consultation with
other government agencies, determines
whether the launch or reentry would
jeopardize U.S. national security or
foreign policy interests, or international
obligations of the United States. A
payload review, also in consultation
with other government agencies,
determines whether the launch or
reentry of a payload would jeopardize
public health and safety, safety of
property, U.S. national security or the
foreign policy interests, or international
obligations of the United States. A safety
review examines whether the launch or
reentry would jeopardize public health
and safety and safety of property, and
typically is the most extensive part of
FAA’s review. The Act also requires the
FAA to determine financial
responsibility of the licensee for third
party liability and losses to U.S.
Government property based on the
maximum probable loss. Lastly, the
National Environmental Policy Act
requires the FAA to consider and
10 51
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U.S.C. 50905(a).
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document the potential environmental
effects associated with issuing a launch
or reentry license.
effects associated with issuing a launch
or reentry license.
This proposal would not alter this 5pronged approach to licensing.
Although the FAA usually evaluates
components concurrently, as noted later
in this preamble, the FAA may make
separate determinations after
considering the interrelationship
between the components. For instance,
this proposal would allow an applicant
to apply for a Safety Review component
in an incremental manner. This
preamble will discuss the proposed
incremental review process in further
detail later.
Intelligence, and the NASA
Administrator.
On June 30, 2017, President Donald J.
Trump signed Executive Order 13803,
which reestablished the National Space
Council to provide a coordinated
process for developing and monitoring
the implementation of national space
policy and strategy. The newlyreinstituted body met for the first time
on October 5, 2017. As Chair of the
Council, the Vice President directed the
Secretaries of Transportation and
Commerce, and the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, to
conduct a review of the U.S. regulatory
framework for commercial space
activities and report back within 45
days with a plan to remove barriers to
commercial space enterprises. The
assigned reports and recommendations
for regulatory streamlining were
presented at the second convening of
the National Space Council on February
21, 2018. The Council approved four
recommendations, including DOT’s
recommendation that the launch and
reentry regulations should be reformed
into a consolidated, performance-based
licensing regime.
On May 24, 2018, the Council
memorialized its recommendations in
SPD–2. SPD–2 instructed the Secretary
of Transportation to publish for notice
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C. National Space Council
The National Space Council was
established by President George H.W.
Bush on April 20, 1989 by Executive
Order 12675 to have oversight of U.S.
national space policy and its
implementation. Chaired by Vice
President Dan Quayle until its
disbanding in 1993, the first National
Space Council consisted of the
Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense,
Commerce, Transportation, Energy, the
Director of the Office of Management
and Budget, the Chief of Staff to the
President, the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, the
Assistant to the President for Science
and Technology, the Director of Central
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and comment proposed rules rescinding
or revising the launch and reentry
licensing regulations, no later than
February 1, 2019. SPD–2 charged the
Department with revising the
regulations such that they would require
a single license for all types of
commercial space flight operations and
replace prescriptive requirements with
performance-based criteria. SPD–2
further commended the Secretary to
coordinate with the members of the
National Space Council, especially the
Secretary of Defense and the NASA
Administrator, to minimize
requirements associated with
commercial space flight launch and
reentry operations from Federal launch
ranges as appropriate.
D. Streamlined Launch and Reentry
Licensing Requirements Aviation
Rulemaking Committee
On March 8, 2018, the FAA chartered
the Streamlined Launch and Reentry
Licensing Requirements Aviation
Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to
provide a forum to discuss regulations
to set forth procedures and requirements
for commercial space transportation
launch and reentry licensing. The FAA
tasked the ARC to develop
recommendations for a performancebased regulatory approach in which the
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regulations set forth the safety objectives
to be achieved while providing the
applicant with the flexibility to produce
tailored and innovative means of
compliance.
The ARC’s membership represented a
broad range of stakeholder perspectives,
including members from aviation and
space communities. The ARC was
supported by the FAA and other federal
agency subject matter experts. The
following table identifies ARC
participants from the private sector:
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Aerospace industries association.
Airlines for America.
Alaska Aerospace Corporation.
Astra Space.
Blue Origin.
Boeing.
Coalition for Deep Space Exploration.
Commercial Spaceflight Federation.
Exos Aerospace Systems & Technologies,
Inc.
Generation Orbit.
Lockheed Martin Corporation.
MLA Space, LLC.
Mojave air and spaceport.
Orbital ATK.
RocketLab.
Sierra Nevada Corp.
Spaceport America.
SpaceX.
Space Florida.
Stratolaunch.
United Launch Alliance.
Vector Launch, Inc.
Virgin Galactic/Virgin Orbit.
World View Enterprises.
On April 30, 2018, the ARC produced
its final recommendation report, which
has been placed in the docket to this
rulemaking.11 The ARC recommended
that the proposed regulations should—
1. Be performance-based, primarily
based upon the ability of the applicant
to comply with expected casualty limits.
2. Be flexible.
i. Adopt a single license structure to
accommodate a variety of vehicle types
and operations and launch or reentry
sites.
ii. Allow for coordinated
determination of applicable regulations
prior to the application submission.
iii. Develop regulations that can be
met without waivers.
iv. Use guidance documents to
facilitate frequent updates.
3. Reform the pre-application
consultation process and requirements.
i. Use ‘‘complete enough’’ as the real
criterion for entering application
evaluation and remove the requirement
for pre-application consultation.
ii. Use a level-of-rigor approach to
scope an applicant-requested pre11 Streamlined Launch and Reentry Licensing
Requirements ARC, Recommendations Final Report
(April 30, 2008). The ARC Report is available for
reference in the docket for this proposed rule.
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application consultation process as the
basis for a ‘‘complete enough’’
determination, considering both an
applicant’s prior experience and
whether the subject vehicle is known or
unknown.
4. Contain defined review timelines.
i. Support significantly-reduced
timelines and more efficient review.
ii. Increase predictability for industry.
iii. Create reduced review timelines
for both new and continuing accuracy
submissions.
5. Contain continuing accuracy
requirements. Continuing accuracy
submissions should be based upon
impact to public safety as measured by
the Expected Casualty (EC).
6. Limit FAA jurisdiction.
i. Limit FAA jurisdiction to activities
so publicly hazardous as to warrant
FAA-oversight.
ii. Identify well-defined inspection
criteria.
7. Eliminate duplicative jurisdiction
on Federal launch ranges.
The FAA will address these
recommendations in more detail
throughout the remainder of this
document.
During the course of the ARC,
volunteer industry members formed a
Task Group to provide draft regulatory
text reflecting proposed revisions to the
commercial space transportation
regulations. The volunteer industry
members of the Task Group were Blue
Origin, Sierra Nevada Corporation,
Space Florida, and SpaceX. The
majority of the ARC opposed the
formation of this Task Group and
disagreed with including the proposed
regulatory text into the ARC’s
recommendation report. The FAA will
not specifically address the proposed
regulatory text in this document because
it did not receive broad consensus
within the ARC.
III. Discussion of the Proposal
A. The FAA’s Approach To Updating
and Streamlining Launch and Reentry
Regulations
The FAA’s approach to meeting SPD–
2’s mandate is to consolidate, update,
and streamline all launch and reentry
regulations into a single performancebased part. Pursuant to SPD–2, and in
the interest of updating the FAA’s
regulations to reflect the current
commercial space industry, the FAA
proposes to consolidate requirements
for the launch and reentry of ELVs,
RLVs, and reentry vehicles other than
an RLV.12 The FAA would also update
a number of safety provisions, including
12 These requirements currently appear in parts
415, 417, 431, and 435.
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areas such as software safety and flight
safety analyses (FSA), to reflect recent
advancements. Finally, the FAA
proposes to streamline its regulations by
designing them to be flexible and
scalable, to reduce timelines, to remove
or minimize duplicative jurisdiction,
and to limit FAA jurisdiction over
ground safety to operations that are
hazardous to the public. This
streamlining was the focus of the ARC.
The FAA proposal would follow the
ARC recommendations to enable greater
regulatory flexibility. First, the proposed
rule would be primarily performancebased, codifying performance standards
and relying on FAA guidance or other
standards to provide acceptable means
of compliance. This would allow the
regulations to better adapt to
advancements in the industry. Second,
the FAA proposes to change the
structure of its launch and reentry
license to be more flexible in the
number and types of launches and
reentries one license can accommodate.
Third, as the ARC suggested, system
safety principles would be prominent.
All applicants would need to comply
with core system safety management
principles and conduct a preliminary
safety assessment. Some applicants may
also be required to use a flight hazard
analysis to derive hazard controls
particular to their operation. Lastly, for
any particular requirement, the FAA
would maintain the ability for an
applicant or operator to propose an
alternative approach for compliance,
and then clearly demonstrate that the
alternative approach would provide an
equivalent level of safety to the
requirement.
The ARC recommended that the level
of rigor of an applicant’s safety
demonstration vary based on vehicle
history, company history, and the
relative risk of the launch or reentry. It
also recommended that the FAA not
always require a flight safety system.
The FAA recognizes that different
operations require different levels of
rigor, and is proposing a more scalable
regulatory regime. Given performancebased regulations are inherently
scalable, the FAA proposal is consistent
with the ARC recommendation, even
though it does not explicitly account for
vehicle or operator history as a means
of scaling requirements. In addition to
performance-based requirements, this
proposal would implement a specific
level-of-rigor approach to ensure safety
requirements are proportionate to the
public safety risk in the need for a flight
safety system and its required
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reliability, in flight safety analysis,13
and in software safety. These are all
discussed in greater detail later in this
preamble.
Because the rulemaking process is
time-consuming and labor intensive, the
FAA seeks to minimize the need for
regulatory updates to proposed part 450
through the proposed performancebased regulations which would allow
for a variety of FAA-approved means of
compliance. Approving new means of
compliance creates flexibility for
operators without reducing safety.
Additionally, approving new means of
compliance is easier to accomplish than
updating regulatory standards through
the rulemaking process. Thus, the
proposed regulatory scheme would be
more adaptable to the fast-evolving
commercial space industry.
The ARC recommended that the FAA
should design a modular approach to
application submittal and evaluation
and significantly reduce FAA review
timelines. This proposal would allow an
applicant to apply for a license in an
incremental manner,14 to be developed
on a case-by-case basis during preapplication consultation. Most timelines
in the proposal would have a default
value, followed by an option for the
FAA to agree to a different time frame,
taking into account the complexity of
the request and whether it would allow
sufficient time for the FAA to conduct
its review and make its requisite
findings. Lastly, the FAA proposes to
make it easier for a launch or reentry
operator to obtain a safety element
approval, which would reduce the time
and effort of an experienced operator in
a future license application. Although
these provisions should reduce the time
for experienced operators, the FAA does
not propose to reduce by regulation the
statutory review period of 180 days to
make a decision on a license
application.
It might be useful to provide some
perspective concerning the time the
FAA actually takes to make license
determinations. The average of the last
ten new license determinations through
calendar year 2018 was 141 days; the
median was 167 days. The FAA strives
to expedite determinations when
possible to accommodate launch
schedules. In three of these ten, the FAA
made determinations in 54, 73, and 77
days, all without tolling. Three
determinations were tolled for 73, 77,
and 171 days. The lengthy tolling was
13 For flight safety analyses, various levels of rigor
would be outlined in ACs.
14 In this rulemaking, the term ‘‘incremental’’
would be synonymous with the ARC’s proposed
term of ‘‘modular.’’
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the result of a software issue concerning
a flight safety system that the applicant
needed to resolve. To our knowledge, a
launch has never been delayed as a
result of the time it took the FAA to
make a license determinations.
The ARC recommended that the FAA
propose rules that eliminate duplicative
U.S. Government requirements when an
operator conducts operations at a
Federal launch range. The FAA’s
proposal would allow for varying levels
of Federal launch range involvement,
including a single FAA authorization. It
would also minimize duplicative work
by a launch or reentry operator. This
issue is discussed in more detail later in
this preamble.
Also, the ARC recommended that the
FAA limit its jurisdiction over ground
operations to activities so publicly
hazardous as to warrant the FAA’s
oversight. This proposal would scope
ground activities overseen by FAA to
each operation. It would also permit
neighboring operations personnel to be
present during launch activities in
certain circumstances.
The ARC also recommended that the
FAA require the pre-application process
only for new operators or new vehicle
programs, and that pre-application
occur at the operator’s discretion for all
other operations.15 The FAA proposes
to retain the requirement for preapplication consultation because of the
various flexibilities proposed in this
rule. These include incremental review,
timelines, and the performance-based
nature of many of the regulatory
requirements. Pre-application
consultation would assist operators with
the licensing process and accommodate
all operators, including those that
choose to avail themselves of the
flexibilities provided in this proposal.
The FAA acknowledges, however, that
pre-application consultation can be
minimal for operators experienced with
FAA requirements. In such cases,
consultation may consist of a telephone
conversation.
B. Single Vehicle Operator License
As part of its streamlining effort, the
FAA proposes in § 450.3 (Scope of
Vehicle Operator License) to establish
one license, a vehicle operator license,
for commercial launch and reentry
activity. A vehicle operator license
would authorize a licensee to conduct
one or more launches or reentries using
the same vehicle or family of vehicles
and would specify whether it covers
launch, reentry, or launch and reentry.
The FAA would eliminate the current
limitation in § 415.3 specifying a launch
15 ARC
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license covers only one launch site, and
would eliminate the designations of
launch-specific license and launch
operator license, mission-specific
license and operator license, and
reentry-specific license and reentryoperator license. The proposal would
also allow the FAA to scope the
duration of the license to the operation.
Although the FAA has not defined a
‘‘family of vehicles,’’ launch operators
often do so themselves. Usually, the
vehicles share a common core, i.e., the
booster and upper stage. Sometimes
multiple boosters are attached together
to form a larger booster. Historically,
solid rocket motors have been attached
to core boosters to enhance capability.
There has never been an issue
concerning what operators and the FAA
consider to be members of the same
family. It is merely a convenient way to
structure licenses.
SPD–2 directed the DOT to revise the
current launch and reentry licensing
regulations with special consideration
to requiring a single license for all types
of commercial launch and reentry
operations. Similarly, the ARC
recommended that the FAA adopt a
single license structure to accommodate
a variety of vehicle types, operations,
and launch and reentry sites. In
accordance with these
recommendations, the FAA proposes a
single vehicle operator license that
could be scoped to the operation. In
order to accommodate the increasingly
similar characteristics of some ELVs and
RLVs, as well as future concepts, these
proposed regulations would no longer
distinguish between ELVs and RLVs.
Rather, this proposal would consolidate
the licensing requirements for all
commercial launch and reentry
activities under one part, and applicants
would apply for the same type of
license.
In addition to accommodating
different vehicles and types of
operations, this proposal would allow
launches or reentries under a single
vehicle operator license from or to
multiple sites. Under the current
regulations, in order for an operator to
benefit from using multiple sites for
launches authorized by a part 415
license, the operator must apply for a
new license.16 This process is
unnecessarily burdensome. This
16 For example, in 2018, a launch operator held
a launch license under part 415 that authorized it
to launch from Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in
Florida; however, the operator contemplated
launching from a nearby launch site, Cape
Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS). Under
current part 415, in order to launch from CCAFS
instead of KSC, the operator has to file a separate
application for a license to launch from CCAFS.
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proposed change would facilitate the
application process because an operator
would no longer be required to apply for
a separate license to launch or reenter
from a launch site other than that
specified by the license.
In order to apply for a license that
includes multiple sites, an applicant
would need to provide the FAA with
application materials that would allow
the FAA to conduct separate reviews for
each site to determine, for example:
Maximum probable loss required by
part 440; public risk to populated areas,
aircraft, and waterborne vessels; and the
environmental impacts associated with
proposed launches or reentries. The
FAA foresees that a license that
authorizes launches or reentries at more
than one site would make it
administratively easier for an operator
to change sites for a particular
operation. For example, an operator
could move a launch from one site to
another due to launch facility
availability. A launch might move from
CCAFS to KSC. Additionally, FAA
foresees multiple sites will be utilized
by operators of hybrid vehicles at
launch sites with runways as well as
vehicles supporting operationally
responsive space missions such as
DARPA Launch Challenge. Under this
proposed licensing regime, an applicant
should be prepared to discuss its intent
to conduct activity from multiple sites
during pre-application consultation.
This discussion would give both the
applicant and the agency an opportunity
to scope the application and identify
any potential issues early on when
changes to the application or proposed
licensed activities would be less likely
to cause additional issues or significant
delays. The launch operator would not
need to specify the specific launches
that would be planned for each site. The
FAA would continue its current practice
for operator licenses of requiring a
demonstration that a proposed range of
activities, not every trajectory variation
within that range, can be safely
conducted in order to scope the license.
The license would not need to be
modified unless the proposed operation
fell outside the authorized range.
The FAA further notes that under
§ 413.11, after an initial screening the
FAA determines whether an application
is complete enough to begin its review.
If an application that includes multiple
launch sites is complete enough for the
FAA to accept it and begin its review,
the 180-day review period under
§ 413.15(a) would begin. However, if
during the FAA’s initial review it
determines that an application is
sufficiently complete to make a license
determination for at least one launch
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site but not all launch sites included in
the application, the FAA would have
the option to toll the review period, as
provided in § 413.15(b). Alternatively,
the FAA could continue its review of
the part of the application with
complete enough information and toll
the portion involving any launch site
with insufficient information to make a
licensing determination. In either case,
the FAA would notify the applicant as
required by § 413.15(c).
Finally, the FAA proposes a more
flexible approach to the duration of a
vehicle operator license under § 450.7
(Duration of a Vehicle Operator
License). Specifically, the FAA would
determine, based on information
received from an applicant, the
appropriate duration of the license, not
to exceed five years. In making this
determination, the FAA would continue
its current practice of setting the
duration of a license for specified
launches to be approximately one year
after the expected date of the activity.
Currently, a launch-specific license
expires upon completion of all launches
authorized by the license or the
expiration date stated in the license,
whichever occurs first. An operator
license remains in effect for two years
for an RLV and five years for an ELV
from the date of issuance. The FAA
considered setting all license durations
to five years, but rejected this option to
allow an applicant to obtain a license
for a limited specific activity rather than
for a more general range of activities. An
applicant may prefer a shorter license
duration for a specific activity because
a licensee has obligations under an FAA
license, such as the requirements to
demonstrate financial responsibility and
allow access to FAA safety inspectors,
and a shorter license duration would
relieve an applicant of compliance with
these requirements after the activity has
ended. Unless an operator requests an
operator license, currently good for
either two or five years, the operator
does not typically request a license
duration. The FAA initially sets the
duration to encompass the authorized
activity. The FAA plans to continue its
current practice of extending licenses
through renewals or modifications to
accommodate delays in authorized
launches or reentries.
C. Performance-Based Requirements
and Means of Compliance
SPD–2 directs the FAA to consider
replacing prescriptive requirements in
the commercial space flight launch and
reentry licensing process with
performance-based criteria. The ARC
echoed the SPD–2 recommendation for
performance-based requirements that
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allowed varying means of compliance
proposed by the operator.17 In response
to SPD–2 and the ARC
recommendations, the FAA is proposing
to replace many of the prescriptive
licensing requirements with
performance-based requirements. These
performance-based requirements would
provide flexibility, scalability, and
adaptability as discussed in the
introduction. An operator would be able
to use an acceptable means of
compliance to demonstrate compliance
with the requirements.
Currently, the FAA uses both
prescriptive and performance-based
requirements for launches and reentries
respectively.18 Parts 415 and 417
provide detailed prescriptive
requirements for ELVs. Although these
requirements provide regulatory
certainty, they have proven inflexible.
As the industry grows and innovates,
ELV operators have identified alternate
ways of operating safely that do not
comply with the regulations as written.
This has forced operators to request
waivers or equivalent-level-of safetydeterminations (ELOS determinations),
often close to scheduled launch dates.
On the other hand, the performancebased regulations in parts 431 and 435
lack the detail to efficiently guide
operators through the FAA’s regulatory
regime. Indeed, the FAA often fills these
regulatory gaps by adopting part 417
requirements in practice. The process of
adding regulatory certainty to these
performance-based regulations by
adopting part 417 requirements has
been frustrating and contentious for
both operators and the FAA.
Adopting performance-based
requirements that allow operators to use
an acceptable means of compliance
would decrease the need for waivers or
ELOS determinations to address new
technology advancements. An
acceptable means of compliance is one
means, but not the only means, by
which a requirement could be met. The
FAA would set the safety standard in
regulations and identify any acceptable
means of compliance currently
available. The FAA would provide
public notice of each means of
compliance that the Administrator has
accepted by publishing the acceptance
17 ARC
Report, at p. 7.
415 and 417, and their associated
appendices, provide primarily prescriptive
requirements for licensing and launch of an ELV.
Part 431 provides primarily performance- and
process-based requirements for a launch and
reentry of a reusable launch vehicle. Part 435
provides similar requirements to part 431 for the
reentry of a reentry vehicle other than a reusable
launch vehicle. Parts 431 and 435 rely on a system
safety process performed by an operator in order to
demonstrate adequate safety of the operation.
18 Parts
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on its website, for example. This
notification would communicate to the
public and the industry that the FAA
has accepted a means of compliance or
any revision to an existing means of
compliance. A consensus standards
body, any individual, or any
organization would be able to submit
means of compliance documentation to
the FAA for consideration and potential
acceptance.
An operator could also develop its
own means of compliance to
demonstrate it met the safety standard.
Once the Administrator has accepted a
means of compliance for that operator,
the operator could use it in future
license applications. The FAA would
not provide public notice of individual
operator-developed means of
compliance. If any information
submitted to the FAA as part of a means
of compliance for acceptance is
proprietary, it would be afforded the
same protections as are applied today to
license applications submitted under
§ 413.9.
For five of the proposed requirements,
an operator would have to demonstrate
compliance using a means of
compliance that has been approved by
the FAA before an operator could use it
in a license application. These five
requirements are flight safety systems
(proposed § 450.145), FSA methods
(proposed § 450.115), lightning flight
commit criteria (proposed § 450.163(a)),
and airborne toxic concentration and
duration thresholds (proposed
§§ 450.139 and 450.187). The FAA has
developed Advisory Circulars (ACs) or
identified government standards that
discuss an acceptable means of
compliance for each of these
requirements, and has placed these
documents in the docket for the public’s
review and comment. If an operator
wishes to use a means of compliance
not previously accepted by the FAA to
demonstrate compliance with one of the
five requirements, the FAA would have
to review and accept it prior to an
operator using that means of compliance
to satisfy a licensing requirement.
If an operator is interested in applying
for the acceptance of a unique means of
compliance, it should submit any data
or documentation to the FAA necessary
to demonstrate that the means of
compliance satisfies the safety
requirements established in the
regulation. An operator should note that
the FAA will take into account such
factors as complexity of the means of
compliance; whether the means of
compliance is an industry, government,
or voluntary consensus standard; and
whether the means of compliance has
been peer-reviewed during its review
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and determination. These factors may
affect how quickly the FAA is able to
review and make a determination. The
time could range from a few days to
many weeks.
Although applying for the acceptance
of a new means of compliance may take
time, once an operator’s unique means
of compliance is accepted by the FAA,
the operator can use it in future license
applications. The FAA also anticipates
that this process will result in flexibility
for industry and will encourage
innovation as industry and consensus
standards bodies 19 develop multiple
ways for an operator to meet the
requisite safety standards. The FAA
believes this is the best approach to
enabling new ways of achieving
acceptable levels of safety through
industry innovation, and seeks public
comment on whether this approach may
induce additional innovation through
industry-developed consensus
standards.
D. Launch From a Federal Launch
Range
Both industry and the National Space
Council have urged government
agencies involved in the launch and
reentry of vehicles by commercial
operators to work towards common
standards and to remove duplicative
oversight. The ARC recommended an
end goal of either exclusive FAA
jurisdiction over commercial launches
at a range, or a range adopting the same
flight safety regulations used by the
FAA. SPD–2 directed the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of
Transportation, and the NASA
Administrator to coordinate to examine
all existing U.S. Government
requirements, standards, and policies
associated with commercial space flight
launch and reentry operations from
Federal launch ranges and minimize
those requirements, except those
necessary to protect public safety and
national security, that would conflict
with the efforts of the Secretary of
19 The FAA intends to rely increasingly on
voluntary consensus standards as means of
compliance. Section 12(d) of the National
Technology Advancement Act (Pub. L. 104–113; 15
U.S.C. 3701, et seq.) directs federal agencies to use
voluntary consensus standards in lieu of
government-unique standards except where
inconsistent with law or otherwise impractical.
Because voluntary consensus bodies are made up of
a wide selection of industry participants, and often
also include FAA participation, the FAA expects its
review of a means of compliance developed by a
voluntary consensus standards body would be more
expeditious than a custom means of compliance.
Unlike means of compliance developed by a
voluntary consensus standards body, a custom
means of compliance would not be subject to peer
review or independent review of the viability of the
technical approach.
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Transportation in implementing the
Secretary’s responsibilities to review
and revise its launch and reentry
regulations.20 Most recently, the John S.
McCain National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2019 includes a
provision stating that the Secretary of
Defense may not impose any
requirement on a licensee or transferee
that is duplicative of, or overlaps in
intent with, any requirement imposed
by the Secretary of Transportation under
51 U.S.C. chapter 509, unless imposing
such a requirement is necessary to avoid
negative consequences for the national
security space program.21
Currently, the FAA issues a safety
approval to a license applicant
proposing to launch from a Federal
launch range if the applicant satisfies
the requirements of part 415, subpart C,
and has contracted with the range for
the provision of safety-related launch
services and property, as long as an
FAA Launch Site Safety Assessment
(LSSA) 22 shows that the range’s launch
services and launch property satisfy part
417. The FAA assesses each range and
determines if the range meets FAA
safety requirements. If the FAA assessed
a range, through its LSSA, and found
that an applicable range safety-related
launch service or property satisfies FAA
requirements, then the FAA treats the
range’s launch service or property as
that of a launch operator’s, and there is
no need for further demonstration of
compliance to the FAA. The FAA
reassesses a range’s practices only when
the range chooses to change its practice.
The ARC recommended that ranges
and the FAA have common flight safety
regulations and guidance documents. To
address this recommendation, the FAA
proposes performance-based
requirements for both ground and flight
safety that an operator could meet using
Air Force and NASA practices as a
means of compliance. The FAA expects
that there will be few, if any, instances
where Air Force or NASA practices do
not satisfy the proposed performancebased requirements. Additionally, the
proposed requirements should provide
enough flexibility to accommodate
changes in Air Force and NASA
practices in the future. The FAA expects
that range services that a range applies
to U.S. Government launches and
20 SPD–2; May 24, 2018 (https://
www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/spacepolicy-directive-2-streamlining-regulationscommercial-use-space).
21 Section 1606(2)(A), John S. McCain National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019,
Public Law 115–232 (amending 51 U.S.C. 50918
note).
22 LSSA is an FAA evaluation of Federal range
services and launch property.
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to eliminate duplicative approvals.
Instead, the FAA will continue to work
with the appropriate agencies to
streamline commercial launch and
reentry requirements at ranges and
Federal facilities by leveraging the
Common Standards Working Group
(CSWG).23
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reentries will almost invariably satisfy
the FAA’s proposed requirements. The
FAA currently accepts flight safety
analyses performed by Air Force on
behalf of an operator without additional
analysis and anticipates that it would
give similar deference to other analyses
by federal agencies once it established
that they meet FAA requirements.
The FAA developed this approach to
reduce operator burden to the largest
extent possible. The FAA is bound to
execute its statutory mandates and may
do so only to the extent authorized by
those statutes. Although federal entities
often have complimentary mandates
and statutory authorities, they are rarely
identical. That is, each federal
department or agency has been given
separate mission. Federal entities
establish interagency processes to
manage closely related functions in as
smoothly and least burdensome manner
possible. Coordinating FAA
requirements, range practices, and those
practices implemented at other Federal
facilities is largely an interagency issue,
this proposal does not include language
E. Safety Framework
In addition to proposing a single
vehicle operator license and replacing
prescriptive requirements with
performance-based requirements, this
rule would rely on a safety framework
that provides the flexibility needed to
accommodate current and future
operations and the regulatory certainty
lacking in some of the current
regulations.
This proposal would consolidate the
launch and reentry safety requirements
in subpart C. Figure 2 depicts the safety
framework on which the FAA relied in
developing its proposed safety
requirements. In developing this
framework, the FAA considered
following the approach taken in parts
431 and 435 and relying almost
exclusively on a robust systems safety
approach. As noted earlier, experience
has shown that part 431 does not offer
enough specificity and, as a result, it has
been unclear to operators what safety
measures the FAA requires to achieve
an acceptable level of safety. In
particular, there are no explicit
requirements for ground safety, flight
safety analysis, or flight safety systems.
On the other hand, part 417 is too
prescriptive, particularly regarding
design and detailed procedural
requirements for ground safety, detailed
design and test requirements for flight
safety systems, and numerous plans that
placed needless burden on operators
and impeded innovation. Thus, the
framework described below is designed
to strike a balance between these two
parts. The proposed regulations clearly
lay out FAA expectations, but should
provide a launch or reentry operator
with flexibility on how it achieves
acceptable public safety. The framework
also seeks to allow operators that wish
to conduct operations using proven
hazard control strategies to do so.
System Safety Program. All operators
would be required to have a system
safety program that would establish
system safety management principles
for both ground and flight safety
throughout the operational lifecycle of a
launch or reentry system. The system
safety program would include a safety
organization, procedures, configuration
control, and post-flight data review.
Preliminary Flight Safety Assessment.
For flight safety, an operator would
conduct a preliminary flight safety
assessment to identify public hazards
and determine the appropriate hazard
control strategy for a phase of flight or
an entire flight. An operator could use
traditional hazard controls such as
physical containment, wind weighting,
or flight abort to mitigate hazards.
Physical containment is when a launch
vehicle does not have sufficient energy
for any hazards associated with its flight
to reach the public or critical assets.
23 The CSWG consists of range safety personnel
from the Air Force and NASA, and was chartered
in the early 2000’s to develop and maintain
common launch safety standards among agencies.
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Wind weighting is when the operator of
an unguided suborbital launch vehicle
adjusts launcher azimuth and elevation
settings to correct for the effects of wind
conditions at the time of flight to
provide a safe impact location for the
launch vehicle or its components. Flight
Abort is the process to limit or restrict
the hazards to public health and safety
and the safety of property presented by
a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle,
including any payload, while in flight
by initiating and accomplishing a
controlled ending to vehicle flight.
Flight abort as a hazard control strategy
would be required for a phase of flight
that is shown by a consequence analysis
to potentially have significant public
safety impacts. Otherwise, an operator
would be able to bypass these
traditional hazard control strategies and
conduct a flight hazard analysis.
Flight Hazard Analysis. As an
alternative to traditional hazard control
measures, an operator would be able to
conduct a flight hazard analysis to
derive hazard controls. Hazard analysis
is a proven engineering discipline that,
when applied during system
development and throughout the
system’s lifecycle, identifies and
mitigates hazards and, in so doing,
eliminates or reduces the risk of
potential mishaps and accidents. In
addition, a separate hazard analysis
methodology is outlined for computing
systems and software.
Flight Safety Analysis. Regardless of
the hazard control strategy chosen or
mandated, an operator would be
required to conduct a number of flight
safety analyses. At a minimum, these
analyses would quantitatively
demonstrate that a launch or reentry
meets the public safety criteria for
debris, far-field overpressure, and toxic
hazards. Other analyses support flight
abort and wind weighting hazard
control strategies and determine flight
hazard areas.24 For a detailed
discussion, please see the ‘‘Additional
Technical Justification and Rationale’’
discussion later in the preamble.
Derived Hazard Controls. An operator
would derive a number of hazard
controls through its conduct of a flight
hazard analysis and flight safety
analyses.
Prescribed Hazard Controls.
Regardless of the hazard controls
24 Note that flight hazard analysis and flight safety
analysis are interdependent in that each can help
inform the other. Flight safety analysis quantifies
the risks posed by hazards, which are typically
identified and mitigated during the flight hazard
analysis, by using physics to model how the vehicle
will respond to specific failure modes. The FSA is
also useful to define when operational restrictions
are necessary to meet quantitative risk
requirements.
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derived from a flight hazard analysis
and flight safety analyses, the FAA
would require a number of other hazard
controls that have historically been
necessary to achieve acceptable public
safety. These include requirements for
flight safety and other safety critical
systems, agreements, safety-critical
personnel qualifications, crew rest,
radio frequency management, readiness,
communications, preflight procedures,
surveillance and publication of hazard
areas, lightning hazard mitigation, flight
safety rules, tracking, collision
avoidance, safety at the end of launch,
and mishap planning.
Acceptable Flight Safety. All elements
of the safety framework combine to
provide acceptable public safety during
flight. In proposed § 450.101 (Public
Safety Criteria), the FAA would outline
specific public safety criteria to clearly
define how safe is safe enough. Section
450.101 is discussed in detail later in
this preamble.
Ground Safety. With respect to
ground safety, an operator would
conduct a ground hazard analysis to
derive ground hazard controls. Those,
along with prescribed hazard controls,
would provide acceptable public safety
during ground operations.
Flight Safety
A. Public Safety Criteria
Proposed § 450.101 would consolidate
all public safety criteria for flight into
one section. It would contain the core
performance-based safety requirements
to protect people and property on land,
at sea, in the air, and in space. All other
flight safety requirements in proposed
part 450 subpart C would support the
achievement of these criteria. The
§ 450.101 requirements would define
how safe is safe enough for the flight of
a commercial launch or reentry vehicle.
Proposed § 450.101(a) contains launch
risk criteria, or the risk thresholds an
operator may not exceed during flight.
An operator would be permitted to
initiate the flight of a launch vehicle
only if the collective, individual,
aircraft, and critical asset risk satisfy the
proposed criteria. The criteria would
apply to every launch from liftoff
through orbital insertion for an orbital
launch, and through final impact or
landing for a suborbital launch, which
is the same scope used for current
launch risk criteria in parts 417 and 431.
Each measure of risk serves a different
purpose. Collective risk addresses the
risk to a population as a whole, whereas
individual risk addresses the risk to
each person within a population. The
measure of aircraft risk is unique, due
to the difficulty of modeling collective
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and individual risk for aircraft in flight.
Lastly, critical asset risk addresses the
loss of functionality of an asset that is
essential to the national interests of the
United States. Critical assets include
property, facilities, or infrastructure
necessary to maintain national defense,
or assured access to space for national
priority missions.
Proposed § 450.101(a)(1) would
establish the collective risk criteria for
flight, measured by expected casualties
(EC). The proposal would define EC as
the mean number of casualties predicted
to occur per flight operation if the
operation were repeated many times.
The term casualties refers to serious
injuries or worse, including fatalities. It
would require the risk to all members of
the public, excluding persons in aircraft
and neighboring operations personnel,
to not exceed an expected number of 1
× 10¥4 casualties, posed by impacting
inert and explosive debris, toxic release,
and far field blast overpressure.25 With
two exceptions, this is the same criteria
currently used in §§ 417.107(b)(1) and
431.35(b)(1)(i). The first exception
applies to people on waterborne vessels,
who would now be included in the
collective risk criteria to all members of
the public. The second exception
applies to neighboring operations
personnel. This proposal would require
the risk to all neighboring operations
personnel not exceed an expected
number of 2 × 10¥4 casualties. Both of
these topics are discussed separately
later in this preamble.
Proposed § 450.101(a)(2) would
establish the individual risk criteria for
flight, measured by probability of
casualty (PC). The proposal would
define PC as the likelihood that a person
will suffer a serious injury or worse,
including a fatal injury, due to all
hazards from an operation at a specific
location. It would require the risk to any
individual member of the public,
excluding neighboring operations
personnel, to not exceed a PC of 1 ×
10¥6 per launch, posed by impacting
inert and explosive debris, toxic release,
and far field blast overpressure. With
one exception, this is the same criteria
currently in §§ 417.107(b)(2) and
431.35(b)(1)(iii). The exception is
neighboring operations personnel would
have separate individual risk criteria,
which is discussed later in this
preamble.
Proposed § 450.101(a)(3) would set
aircraft risk criteria for flight. It would
25 Far field blast overpressure is a phenomenon
resulting from the air blast effects of large
explosions that may be focused by certain
conditions in the atmosphere through which the
blast waves propagate. Population may be at risk
from broken window glass shards.
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require a launch operator to establish
any aircraft hazard areas necessary to
ensure the probability of impact with
debris capable of causing a casualty for
aircraft does not exceed 1 × 10¥6. This
is the same requirement as current
§ 417.107(b)(4). Part 431 does not have
aircraft risk criteria, although the FAA’s
current practice is to use the part 417
criteria for launches licensed under part
431. With this proposal, the FAA would
expressly apply this criterion to all
launches. The FAA does not propose
any other changes for the protection of
aircraft at this time. The FAA has an
ongoing Airspace Access ARC,
composed of commercial space
transportation and aviation industry
representatives, whose
recommendations may inform a future
rulemaking on protection of aircraft.
Proposed § 450.101(a)(4) would set
the launch risk criteria for critical
assets. It would require the probability
of loss of functionality for each critical
asset to not exceed 1 × 10¥3, or some
other more stringent probability if
deemed necessary to protect the
national security interests of the United
States. This would be a new
requirement and is discussed separately
later in this preamble.
Proposed § 450.101(b) would define
risk criteria for reentry. These would be
the same as the risk criteria for launch,
except that the proposed criteria would
apply to each reentry, from the final
health check prior to the deorbit burn
through final impact or landing. The
same discussion earlier regarding
collective risk, individual risk, aircraft
risk, and risk to critical assets would
apply to the reentry risk criteria.
Proposed § 450.101(c) would set the
flight abort criteria for both launch and
reentry. It represents the most
significant change to public safety
criteria in this proposed rule. It would
require that an operator use flight abort
as a hazard control strategy if the
consequence of any reasonably
foreseeable vehicle response mode,26 in
any one-second period of flight, is
greater than 1 × 10¥3 conditional
expected casualties (CEC) for
uncontrolled areas.27 CEC is the
consequence, measured in terms of EC,
without regard to the probability of
failure, and will be discussed in the
Consequence Protection Criteria for
Flight Abort and Flight Safety System
26 Vehicle response mode means a mutually
exclusive scenario that characterizes foreseeable
combinations of vehicle trajectory and debris
generation.
27 Uncontrolled Area is an area of land not
controlled by a launch or reentry operator, a launch
or reentry site operator, an adjacent site operator,
or other entity by agreement.
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section. Flight abort with the use of an
FSS and applying the CEC criteria in
proposed part 450 is discussed later in
this preamble. Proposed § 450.101(c)
would apply to all phases of flight,
unless otherwise agreed to by the FAA
based on the demonstrated reliability of
the launch or reentry vehicle during that
phase of flight. The flight of a
certificated aircraft that is carrying a
rocket to a drop point is an example of
when the use of an FSS would likely not
be necessary even though the CEC could
be above the threshold, because the
aircraft would have a demonstrated high
reliability.
Proposed § 450.101(d) would
establish disposal 28 safety criteria. It
would require that an operator
conducting a disposal of a vehicle stage
or component from Earth orbit either
meet the criteria of § 450.101(b)(1), (2),
and (3), or target a broad ocean area.
Because a launch vehicle stage or
component will not survive a disposal
substantially intact, disposal is not
considered a reentry.29 Disposal is an
effective method of orbital debris
prevention because it eliminates the
vehicle stage or component as a piece of
orbital debris and as a risk for future
debris creation through collision. The
FAA is not proposing to require that a
launch operator dispose of any upper
stage or component in this rulemaking.
The current proposal would only apply
if a launch operator chooses to dispose
of its upper stage or other launch
vehicle component. Although an
operator could choose to demonstrate
that the proposed collective and
individual risk criteria are met for a
disposal, the FAA expects most, if not
all, disposals to target a broad ocean
area.30 This is consistent with current
practice and NASA Technical
Standards.31 Because the broad ocean
28 The FAA proposes to define ‘‘disposal’’ in
§ 401.5 to mean the return or attempt to return,
purposefully, a launch vehicle stage or component,
not including a reentry vehicle, from Earth orbit to
Earth, in a controlled manner. The proposed
definition is discussed later in this preamble.
29 A ‘‘reentry’’ is defined in 51 U.S.C. 50902, as
‘‘to return or attempt to return, purposefully, a
reentry vehicle and its payload or human beings, if
any, from Earth orbit or from outer space to Earth.’’
A ‘‘reentry vehicle’’ is defined as ‘‘a vehicle
designed to return from Earth orbit or outer space
to Earth, or a reusable launch vehicle designed to
return from Earth orbit or outer space to Earth,
substantially intact.’’
30 A disposal that ‘‘targets a broad ocean area’’
would wholly contain the disposal hazard area
within a broad ocean area.
31 NASA–STD–8715.14A, paragraph 4.7.2.1.b,
states, ‘‘For controlled reentry, the selected
trajectory shall ensure that no surviving debris
impact with a kinetic energy greater than 15 joules
is closer than 370 km from foreign landmasses, or
is within 50 km from the continental U.S.,
territories of the U.S., and the permanent ice pack
of Antarctica.’’
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area has such a low density of people
that are exposed almost exclusively in
large waterborne vessels, objects that
survive reentry to impact in these areas
produce an insignificant PC. Therefore,
operators disposing a vehicle stage or
component into a broad ocean area
would not need to demonstrate
compliance with the collective,
individual, or aircraft risk criteria. For
purposes of this proposal, the FAA
considers ‘‘broad ocean’’ as an area 200
nautical miles (nm) from land. Two
hundred nm is also the recognized limit
of exclusive economic zones (EEZ),
which are zones prescribed by the
United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea 32 over which the owning
state has exclusive exploitation rights
over all natural resources. Disposal
beyond an EEZ further reduces the
chance of disrupting economic
operations such as commercial fishing.
Proposed § 450.101(e) would address
the protection of people and property
on-orbit, through collision avoidance
requirements during launch or reentry
and through requirements aimed at
preventing explosions of launch vehicle
stages or components on-orbit.
Specifically, proposed § 450.101(e)(1)
would require a launch or reentry
operator to prevent the collision
between a launch or reentry vehicle
stage or component, and people or
property on-orbit, in accordance with
the requirements in proposed
§ 450.169(a) (Launch and Reentry
Collision Avoidance Analysis
Requirements). Proposed § 450.101(e)(2)
would require that a launch operator
prevent the creation of debris through
the conversion of energy sources into
energy that fragments the stage or
component, in accordance with the
requirements in proposed § 450.171
(Safety at End of Launch). Proposed
§ 450.171 would contain the same
requirements as in §§ 417.129 and
431.43(c)(3). Both §§ 450.169(a) and
450.171 are addressed in greater detail
later in the preamble.
Proposed § 450.101(f) would require
that an operator for any launch, reentry,
or disposal notify the public of any
region of land, sea, or air that contains,
with 97 percent probability of
containment, all debris resulting from
normal flight events capable of causing
a casualty. The requirement to notify the
public of planned impacts is currently
in §§ 417.111(i)(5) and 431.75(b). The
calculation of such hazard areas is
discussed later in this preamble in the
32 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. Although the
United States has not ratified UNCLOS, its
comprehensive legal framework codifies customary
international law governing uses of the ocean.
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discussion of proposed § 450.133 (Flight
Hazard Areas). Notification of planned
impacts would be included in proposed
§ 450.101 because it is not tied to risk
and is therefore not covered by the other
public safety criteria of proposed
§ 450.101.
In proposed § 450.101(g), the FAA
would establish performance level
requirements for the validity of analysis
methods. Specifically, consistent with
the existing language in § 417.203(c) and
current practice for launch and reentry
assessments, an operator’s analysis
method would have to use accurate data
and scientific principles and be
statistically valid. ‘‘Accurate data’’
would continue to refer to
completeness, exactness, and fidelity to
the maximum extent practicable. In this
context, ‘‘scientific principles’’ would
continue to refer to knowledge based on
the scientific method, such as that
established in the fields of physics,
chemistry, and engineering. An analysis
based on non-scientific principles, such
as astrology, would not be consistent
with this standard. A ‘‘statistically
valid’’ analysis would be the result of a
sound application of mathematics and
would account for the uncertainty in
any statistical inference due to sample
size limits, the degree of applicability of
data to a particular system, and the
degree of homogeneity of the data.
1. Neighboring Operations Personnel
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Two of the proposed requirements in
§ 450.101 that do not exist in the current
regulations carve out separate
individual and collective risk criteria for
neighboring operations personnel. With
the increase in operations and launch
rate, the Air Force, NASA, and the
industry have expressed concerns about
the FAA’s public risk criteria because in
certain circumstances they force an
operator to clear or evacuate any other
launch operator and its personnel not
involved with a specific FAA-licensed
operation from a hazard area or safety
clear zone during certain licensed
activities.33 The clearing or evacuation
of other launch operator personnel,
which can range from a handful of
workers to over a thousand for a
significant portion of a day, results in
potential schedule impacts and lost
productivity costs to other range users.
These impacts will increase as the
33 To illustrate the problematic nature of the
current risk requirements as they are applied to the
public, flybacks and landings of reusable boosters
at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station conducted
under an FAA license are causing operational
impacts to other range users due to FAA
requirements to clear the public, including range
users not involved with the launch, to meet public
safety criteria.
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launch tempo increases and similar
operations are conducted at other sites.
The Air Force, NASA, and industry
have recommended that the FAA treat
certain personnel of other launch
operators, referred to in this proposed
rulemaking as ‘‘neighboring operations
personnel,’’ differently than the rest of
the public who are typically visitors,
tourists, or people who are located
outside a launch site and are not aware
of the hazards nor trained and prepared
to respond to them. Specifically, they
recommend that the FAA characterize
neighboring operations personnel who
work at a launch site as either nonpublic or subject to a higher level of risk
than the rest of the public, to minimize
the need to evacuate them during
certain licensed operations.34
The ARC recommended: (1)
Excluding permanently badged
personnel and neighboring launch
operations from the definition of
‘‘public’’; (2) revising the definition of
‘‘public safety’’ because the current
definition is overly broad, ambiguous,
and inconsistent with other federal
agencies, including the Air Force; (3)
distinguishing between ‘‘public’’ (i.e.,
those uninvolved individuals located
outside the controlled-access
boundaries of a launch or reentry site or
clustered sites within a defined Federal
or private spaceport) and people who
work regularly within the controlledaccess boundaries of a Federal or private
spaceport or an operator’s dedicated
launch or reentry site; 35 and (4)
employing mitigation measures for
uninvolved neighboring operations
personnel when a hazardous operation
or launch is scheduled.36
34 The Air Force requested that the FAA propose
an approach that allows certain neighboring
operations personnel during an FAA-licensed
launch to be assessed at the Air Force’s higher
launch essential risk criteria of 10 × 10¥6
individual probability of casualty. Also, Air Force
and NASA members of the CSWG have asked for
increased flexibility with the collective risk EC for
flight to accommodate neighboring operations
personnel. As one of its recommendations to the
National Space Council in November 2017, NASA
suggested a change to operational requirements to
clear employees from hazard areas during
commercial operations under an FAA license.
35 According to the ARC, these individuals who
work regularly within the boundaries of a federal
range or private spaceport are industry workers who
know and accept the risks associated with the
hazardous environment in which they work.
36 These mitigations might include: facility
separation distances (e.g., separation between
launch points on a multi-user spaceport) that
anticipate and allow for safe concurrent operations;
terms in site and use agreements with the Federal
or non-Federal property owner that indemnify and
hold harmless the government or other landlord;
and potential reciprocal waivers (not required by
regulation) that may be entered into among
neighboring operations to share risks of hazards to
each other’s property and personnel.
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i. FAA Proposed Definitions of Public
and Neighboring Operations Personnel
in § 401.5
To address these concerns, the FAA
proposes to add two definitions to
§ 401.5. The first is ‘‘public,’’ which the
FAA would define in § 401.5, for a
particular licensed or permitted launch
or reentry, as people and property that
are not involved in supporting the
launch or reentry. This would include
those people and property that may be
located within the launch or reentry
site, such as visitors, individuals
providing goods or services not related
to launch or reentry processing or flight,
and any other operator and its
personnel. This language is similar to
the current definition of ‘‘public safety’’
in § 401.5, which the FAA proposes to
delete, except that the FAA has
included reentry and permitted
activities in the definition.37
The second is the definition of
‘‘neighboring operations personnel,’’
which the FAA would define in § 401.5
as those members of the public located
within a launch or reentry site, as
determined by the Federal or licensed
launch or reentry site operator,38 or an
adjacent launch or reentry site, who are
not associated with a specific hazardous
licensed or permitted operation
currently being conducted but are
required to perform safety, security, or
critical tasks at the site and are notified
of the hazardous operation. While
neighboring operations personnel would
still fall under the proposed definition
of public, this proposal would apply
different individual and collective risk
criteria to them. The FAA seeks
comment on this approach.
In developing its proposal, the FAA
looked to NASA and Air Force
requirements, which treat a portion of
the public differently than the FAA
regulations by allowing some other
launch operators and their personnel,
referred to as ‘‘neighboring operations
personnel’’ by the Air Force 39 and
37 The FAA would also delete the definition of
‘‘public’’ in § 420.5 for launch sites, which means
people and property that are not involved in
supporting a licensed or permitted launch. The new
definition of public in § 401.5 will apply to all
parts, including part 420.
38 Since neighboring operations personnel, as
defined in this proposal, work at a launch or reentry
site, the FAA expects that the site operator (i.e., an
operator of a Federal site or FAA-licensed launch
or reentry site), not the launch operator, would
identify these personnel.
39 The Air Force has two sub-categories of public:
Neighboring operations personnel and the general
public. For a specific launch, the general public
includes all visitors, media, and other non-essential
personnel at the launch site, as well as persons
located outside the boundaries of the launch site.
For the Air Force, neighboring operations personnel
are individuals, not associated with the specific
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‘‘critical operations personnel’’ by
NASA,40 to be subjected to a higher
level of risk than the rest of the public.
This approach lessens the impact to
multiple users and enables concurrent
operations at a site. The FAA’s proposed
definition more closely aligns with the
definitions of neighboring operations
personnel and critical operations
personnel adopted by the Air Force and
NASA, respectively, because it
distinguishes neighboring operations
personnel as personnel required to
perform safety, security, or critical tasks
and who are notified of neighboring
hazardous operations. Critical tasks may
include maintaining the security of a
site or facility or performing critical
launch processing tasks such as
monitoring pressure vessels or testing
safety critical systems of a launch
vehicle for an upcoming mission.
Because of these specific duties,
neighboring operations personnel are
operation or launch currently being conducted,
required to perform safety, security, or critical tasks
at the launch base, and who are notified of a
neighboring hazardous operation and are either
trained in mitigation techniques or accompanied by
a properly trained escort. In accordance with
guidance information in AFSPCMAN 91–710V1,
neighboring operations personnel may include
individuals performing launch processing tasks for
another launch, but do not include individuals in
training for any job or individuals performing
routine activities such as administrative,
maintenance, support, or janitorial. AFSPCMAN
91–710V1 can be found at https://static.epublishing.af.mil/production/1/afspc/publication/
afspcman91-710v1/afspcman91-710v1.pdf. The Air
Force may allow neighboring operations personnel
to be within safety clearance zones and hazardous
launch areas, and neighboring operations personnel
would not be evacuated with the general public.
The Air Force includes neighboring operations
personnel in the same risk category as launchessential personnel. The allowable collective
aggregated risk for launch essential personnel is 300
× 10¥6 and the allowable individual risk for launch
essential personnel is 10 × 10¥6.
40 NASA, for the purposes of range safety risk
management, defines public as visitors and
personnel inside and outside NASA-controlled
locations who are not critical operations personnel
or mission essential personnel and who may be on
land, on waterborne vessels, or in aircraft. Similar
to the Air Force’s definition of neighboring
operations personnel, NASA considers critical
operations personnel to include persons not
essential to the specific operation (launch, reentry,
flight) being conducted, but who are required to
perform safety, security, or other critical tasks at the
launch, landing, or flight facility; are notified of the
hazardous operation and either trained in
mitigation techniques or accompanied by a properly
trained escort; are not in training for any job or
individuals performing routine activities such as
administrative, maintenance, or janitorial activities;
and may occupy safety clearance zones and
hazardous areas, and are not evacuated with the
public. NASA includes critical operations
personnel in the same risk category as mission
essential personnel. For flight, the allowable
collective aggregated risk for the combination of
mission essential personnel and critical operations
personnel is 300 × 10¥6 and the allowable
individual risk for mission essential or critical
operations personnel is 10 × 10¥6.
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more likely than the rest of the public
to be specially trained and prepared to
respond to hazards present at a launch
or reentry site. Those hazards include
exposure to debris, overpressure, toxics,
and fire. The Air Force and NASA
definitions specify that these personnel
are either trained in mitigation
techniques or accompanied by a
properly trained escort. Note, however,
that the FAA would not require that
neighboring operations personnel be
trained or accompanied by a trained
escort. It would be burdensome to
require a licensee to ensure neighboring
operations personnel are trained, and
training is not necessary to justify the
slight increase in risk allowed for
workers performing safety, security, or
critical tasks.
The FAA proposal would not include
all permanently badged personnel on a
launch or reentry site as neighboring
operations personnel. While
neighboring operations personnel are
permanently-badged personnel,
including all permanently-badged
personnel as neighboring operations
personnel could then include
individuals performing routine
activities such as administrative,
maintenance, or janitorial duties. These
individuals are not necessary for critical
tasks. Unlike for neighboring operations
personnel, the disruption to routine
activities does not sufficiently justify
allowing these individuals to remain on
site during hazardous operations.
ii. Individual Risk Level for Neighboring
Operations Personnel
Currently, for ELVs, the individual
risk criterion for the public in
§ 417.107(b)(2) allows a launch operator
to initiate flight only if the risk to any
individual member of the public does
not exceed 1 × 10¥6 per launch for each
hazard. Part 431 is similar for an RLV
mission. Thus, any person not involved
in supporting a launch or reentry,
whether within or outside the bounds of
the launch or reentry site, are required
to have a risk of casualty no higher than
1 × 10¥6 per launch or reentry for each
hazard.
The FAA proposes in § 450.101(a)(2)
a higher individual risk criterion of 1 ×
10¥5 for neighboring operations
personnel compared to 1 × 10¥6 for the
rest of the public for launch and reentry.
Although neighboring operations
personnel would still fall under the
FAA’s definition of public, this proposal
would establish a higher risk threshold
for neighboring operations personnel as
compared to other members of the
public. This proposal would permit
neighboring operations personnel to
remain on site because—unlike other
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members of the public such as visitors
or tourists—the presence of these
personnel at a launch or reentry site is
necessary for security or to avoid the
disruption of launch or reentry activities
at neighboring sites. In addition, the
proposed increased risk to which these
personnel would be exposed is minimal.
iii. Collective Risk Level for
Neighboring Operations Personnel
Sections 417.107(b)(1) and
431.35(b)(1)(i) and (ii) currently require
that for each proposed launch or
reentry, the risk level to the collective
members of the public, which would
include neighboring operations
personnel but exclude persons in waterborne vessels and aircraft, must not
exceed an expected number of 1 × 10¥4
casualties from impacting inert and
explosive debris and toxic release
associated with the launch or reentry.
Similar to individual risk, the FAA
proposes a separate collective risk
criterion for neighboring operations
personnel in § 450.101(a)(1). This
proposal would permit a launch
operator to initiate the flight of a launch
vehicle only if the total risk associated
with the launch to all members of the
public, excluding neighboring
operations personnel and persons in
aircraft, does not exceed an expected
number of 1 × 10¥4 casualties.
Additionally, a launch operator would
be permitted to initiate the flight of a
launch vehicle only if the total risk
associated with the launch to
neighboring operations personnel did
not exceed an expected number of 2 ×
10¥4 casualties. These risk criteria
would also apply to reentry.
These proposed requirements would
enable neighboring operations
personnel to remain within safety clear
zones and hazardous launch areas
during flight. Additionally, neighboring
operations personnel would not be
required to evacuate with the rest of the
public as long as their collective risk
does not exceed 2 × 10¥4. The rationale
is the same as that for individual risk.
While the FAA proposal would add a
separate collective risk limit for
neighboring operations personnel, the
collective risk limit for the public other
than neighboring operations personnel
would not be able to exceed 1 × 10¥4
for flight.
iv. Maximum Probably Loss (MPL)
Thresholds for Neighboring Operations
Personnel
Under a license, an operator must
obtain liability insurance or
demonstrate financial responsibility to
compensate for the maximum probable
loss from claims by a third party for
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death, bodily injury, or property damage
or loss.41 For financial responsibility
purposes under 14 CFR part 440,
neighboring operations personnel
qualify as third parties.42 Thus, allowing
neighboring operations personnel to
remain within hazard areas has the
potential to increase the maximum
probable loss, and therefore the amount
of third party liability insurance that a
licensee would be required to obtain.
However, this would be fully or
partially mitigated by changing the
threshold value used to determine MPL
for neighboring operations personnel.
The MPL is the greatest dollar amount
of loss that is reasonably expected to
result from a launch or reentry. Current
regulations define what is reasonable by
establishing probability thresholds:
• Losses to third parties that are
reasonably expected to result from a
licensed or permitted activity are those
that have a probability of occurrence of
no less than one in ten million.
• Losses to government property and
government personnel involved in
licensed or permitted activities that are
reasonably expected to result from
licensed or permitted activities are those
that have a probability of occurrence of
no less than one in one hundred
thousand.
Therefore, for any launch or reentry,
there should only be a 1 in 10,000,000
(1 × 10¥7) chance that claims from third
parties would exceed the MPL value,
and a 1 in 100,000 (1 × 10¥5) chance
that claims from the government for
government property loss would exceed
the MPL value. Because it is much less
likely that claims from third parties
would exceed the MPL value, the FAA’s
calculation of MPL takes into account a
larger number of rare events that could
result in a third party claim than could
result in a government property claim.
And, because the MPL calculation for
third party liability involves
consideration of more events related to
non-government personnel third party
losses than events related to government
personnel losses, non-government third
party losses are more likely to influence
the MPL calculation. The difference in
41 An operator must also obtain liability insurance
or demonstrate financial responsibility to
compensate the U.S. Government for damage or loss
to government property, but this is not affected by
the neighboring operations personnel proposal.
42 Title 51 U.S.C. 50902 defines third party as a
person except the U.S. Government or its
contractors or subcontractors involved in the
launch or reentry services; a licensee or transferee
under Chapter 509 and its contractors,
subcontractors or customers involved in launch or
reentry services; the customer’s contractors or
subcontractors involved in launch or reentry
services; or crew, government astronauts, or space
fight participants. Section 440.3 incorporates this
definition into the regulations.
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thresholds reflects the government’s
acceptance of greater risk in supporting
launch and reentry activities than that
accepted by the uninvolved public.43
The FAA proposes, for the purpose of
determining MPL, that the threshold for
neighboring operations personnel be the
same as the threshold for losses to
government property and involved
government personnel, such that losses
to neighboring operations personnel
would have a probability of occurrence
of no less than 1 × 10¥5. This approach
would be appropriate because unlike
other third parties, except for involved
government personnel, the presence of
neighboring operations personnel at a
launch or reentry site is necessary for
security or to avoid the disruption of
launch or reentry activities at
neighboring sites. The presence of
neighboring operations personnel
during licensed activities would not
influence the MPL value for third-party
liability in most cases because, as
discussed above, the 1 × 10¥5 threshold
would capture fewer events and
therefore have less of an influence on
MPL. The FAA seeks comment on this
approach.
v. Ground Operations Pertinent to
Neighboring Operations Personnel
For ground operations, the FAA
currently does not have, nor is it
proposing at this time, quantitative
public risk criteria for neighboring
operations personnel or the rest of the
public. As will be discussed in greater
detail later, an operator would conduct
a ground hazard analysis to derive
ground hazard controls. This analysis
would be a qualitative, not quantitative.
Thus, there would be no quantitative
criteria to treat neighboring operations
personnel differently than other
members of the public during ground
operations. An operator would be
expected to use hazard controls to
contain hazards within defined areas
and to control public access to those
areas. An operator may use industry or
government standards to determine
proper mitigations to protect the public,
including neighboring operations
personnel, from hazards. The impact on
neighboring operations personnel
during ground activities should be
minimal.
Additionally and as discussed later,
the FAA is proposing that launch would
43 Subject to congressional appropriation, the
Federal Government indemnifies a launch or
reentry operator for claims above the insured
amount up to $1.5 billion, adjusted for inflation
from January 1989 (approximately $3 billion as of
2016). The lower the threshold used for calculating
MPL, the greater chance that the Federal
Government may need to indemnify a licensee.
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begin at the start of preflight ground
operations that pose a threat to the
public, which could be when a launch
vehicle or its major components arrive
at a U.S. launch site, or at a later point
as agreed to by the Administrator.44
Scoping preflight ground operations to
only those that require FAA oversight
would alleviate many of the previouslydiscussed issues associated with
neighboring operations personnel.
2. Property Protection (Critical Assets)
Another proposed requirement in
§ 450.101 that does not exist in the
current regulations is the proposal to
adopt a critical asset protection criterion
in proposed § 450.101. To better inform
this proposed requirement, the FAA
would also amend § 401.5 to add a
definition of critical asset. Specifically,
the probability of loss of functionality
for each critical asset would not be able
to exceed 1 × 10¥3, or a more stringent
probability if the FAA determines, in
consultation with relevant federal
agencies, it is necessary to protect the
national security interests of the United
States. This requirement is necessary to
ensure a high probability of the
continuing functionality of critical
assets. A critical asset would be defined
as an asset that is essential to the
national interests of the United States,
as determined in consultation with
relevant federal agencies. Critical assets
would include property, facilities, or
infrastructure necessary to maintain
national defense, or assured access to
space for national priority missions.
Critical assets would also include
certain military, intelligence, and civil
payloads, including essential
infrastructure when directly supporting
the payload at the launch site. Under
this proposal, the FAA anticipates that
it would work with relevant authorities,
including a launch or reentry site
operator or Federal property owner, to
identify each ‘‘critical asset’’ and its
potential vulnerability to launch and
reentry hazards.
44 The clause ‘‘as agreed to by the Administrator’’
is used throughout the proposed regulations,
particularly in relation to timeframes discussed in
detail later in this preamble. Where the clause is
used, it means that an operator may submit an
alternative to the proposed requirement to the FAA
for review. The FAA must agree to the operator’s
proposal in order for the operator to use the
alternative. By whatever means the FAA’s
agreement to an alternative is communicated to the
operator, the agreement means that the alternative
does not jeopardize public health and safety and the
FAA has no objection to the submitted alternative.
Unless the context of the situation clearly provides
otherwise, ‘‘as agreed to by the Administrator’’ does
not simply mean receipt by the FAA (i.e., that the
item was given to a representative of the FAA and
that person received it on behalf of the FAA).
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The FAA’s existing risk criteria,
currently found in §§ 417.107(b) and
431.35(b), do not explicitly set any limit
on the probability of loss of
functionality for any assets on the
surface of the Earth due to launch or
reentry operations. An example of loss
of functionality would be if a launch
vehicle crashed on a nearby launch
complex and resulted in damage that
prevented the use of the launch
complex until repaired. Currently, FAA
requirements provide some protection
for the safety of property during launch
or reentry by limiting individual and
collective risks because people are
generally co-located with property.
However, no protection is afforded for
assets within areas that are evacuated.
The proposed property protection
criteria would be consistent with
current practice at Federal launch
ranges. Launch operations from NASAoperated ranges are subject to
requirements that limit the probability
of debris impact to less than or equal to
1 × 10¥3 for designated assets. While
the Air Force does not have a formal
requirement, in practice, launch
operations from Air Force-operated
ranges have adopted the NASA
standard. In the past, Federal launch
ranges have, on occasion, applied a
more stringent requirement limiting the
probability of debris impact caused by
launch or reentry hazards to less than or
equal to 1 × 10¥4 for national security
payloads, including essential
infrastructure when directly supporting
the payload at the launch site. The FAA
is looking to extend the protection of
critical assets to non-Federal launch or
reentry sites. The Pacific Spaceport
(located on Kodiak Island, Alaska) is an
example of a non-Federal launch or
reentry site that is a dual-use
commercial and military spaceport
(meaning that commercial missions
have been conducted there, as well as
missions for the Department of Defense),
which has no regulatory assurance of
protection from loss of functionality of
critical assets.
For these reasons, the FAA has
determined that a requirement to
maintain a high probability of
continuing functionality of critical
assets at a launch site is necessary to
ensure the safety of property and
national security interests of the United
States. Launch and reentry
infrastructure used for commercial
operations are increasingly in close
proximity to critical assets, such as
infrastructure used to support the
national interests of the United States.
The national interests of the U.S.
relevant to this proposal go beyond
national security interests, and include
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infrastructure used to serve high priority
NASA missions as well. For example,
the FAA considers launch and reentry
services to deliver cargo to and from the
International Space Station as national
priority missions. As another example,
the launch infrastructure used by
SpaceX to launch the Falcon 9 from
Kennedy Space Center is within 2 nm
of the launch infrastructure used by
ULA to launch the Atlas V, which are
both used to support commercial
operations and operations that serve the
national interests of the United States.
The FAA coordinated the development
of this proposed critical asset protection
requirement with NASA, the
Department of Defense, and the
Intelligence Community.
Furthermore, the proposed property
protection requirement would also help
achieve the goal of common standards
for launches from any U.S. launch site,
Federal or non-Federal. Common
standards are public safety related
requirements and practices that are
consistently employed by the Air Force,
the FAA, and NASA during launch and
reentry activities. Common standards
would provide launch and reentry
operators certainty in planning and
enable a body of expertise to support
those standards.
Finally, the proposed property
protection standards would apply to all
FAA-licensed launches, whether to or
from a Federal launch range or a nonFederal launch or reentry site. Applying
the provision to non-Federal sites would
ensure continuity in the protection of
critical assets and that the probability of
loss of functionality of critical assets is
the same for all commercial launch and
reentry operations. The FAA sees no
reason for imposing different standards
of safety for critical assets based on
whether a launch takes place from a
non-Federal launch site or from a
Federal launch range, especially in light
of the fact that some non-Federal sites
are dual use, supporting both
commercial and military operations.
During the interagency review
process, the Department of Defense
requested and the FAA considered
specifying a more stringent criterion for
certain critical assets of utmost
importance. This subcategory of critical
assets would be known as critical
payloads. Specifically, the FAA
considered requiring the probability of
loss of functionality for critical
payloads, including essential
infrastructure when directly supporting
the payload at the launch site, not
exceed 1 × 10¥4. The FAA considered
defining a critical payload as a critical
asset that (1) is so costly or unique that
it cannot be readily replaced, or (2) the
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time frame for its replacement would
adversely affect the national interests of
the United States. Critical payloads may
include vital national security payloads,
and high-priority NASA and NOAA
payloads. For example, a payload such
as NASA’s Curiosity rover would likely
be afforded this protection. The higher
protection criterion would have
safeguarded those payloads of utmost
importance to the United States
meriting a greater degree of protection
than other critical assets. The specific 1
× 10¥4 criterion would apply to those
national priority payloads at a launch or
reentry site, including essential
infrastructure when directly supporting
the payload. A federal agency would
identify payloads meeting the definition
of ‘‘critical payload’’ as warranting
protection at the 1 × 10¥4 level. These
may include commercial payloads that
meet the national interest described
above.
The FAA opted to not include this
higher protection criterion due to
uncertainty about its impact on future
launch or reentry operations. Therefore,
in order to properly analyze this
request, the FAA requests comment on
the following:
(1) If the FAA adopted the morestringent 1 × 10¥4 criterion for critical
payloads, what impacts would it have
on your operation?
(2) Should FAA consider applying
this more-stringent criterion to any
commercial payload? Please provide
specific examples and rationale.
(3) If this criterion is applied to
commercial space launch and reentry
operations, what would be the
additional, incremental costs and
benefits on your current and future
operations compared to the proposed 1
× 10¥3 criterion? Specifically, the FAA
requests information and data to
quantify additional costs and benefits of
this criterion compared to the proposed
1 × 10¥3 criterion. Please provide
sources for information and data
provided.
3. Consequence Protection Criteria for
Flight Abort and Flight Safety System
This proposal would expand the
FAA’s use of consequence criteria to
protect the public from an unlikely but
catastrophic event. Proposed
§ 450.101(c) would require that
operators quantify the consequence of a
catastrophic event by calculating CEC
for any one-second period of flight.
Unlike EC that determines the expected
casualties factoring in the probability
that a dangerous event will occur, CEC
determines the expected casualties
assuming the dangerous event will
occur. In essence, it represents the
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consequence of the worst foreseeable
events during a launch or reentry. The
FAA proposes to use CEC to determine
the need for flight abort with a reliable
FSS as a hazard control strategy, to set
reliability standards for any required
FSS, and to determine when to initiate
a flight abort. In other words, the more
severe the potential consequences from
an unplanned event, the more stringent
the flight abort requirements.
The current ELV flight abort
regulations are essentially a one-sizefits-all approach. In practice, the current
requirement in § 417.107(a) requires an
FSS for any orbital launch vehicle to
prevent hazards from reaching protected
areas at all times during flight.
Regardless of the individual and
collective risks, or the consequences in
the case of a catastrophic event, all FSSs
must satisfy part 417, subparts D and E,
requirements.45 These include
reliability requirements (0.999 reliable
at 95 percent confidence) 46 and
extensive testing requirements. Besides
requiring a potentially expensive FSS,
the part 417 hazard control approach
also has the potential to limit vehicle
flight paths unnecessarily, even when
those flight paths would produce low
public risks and consequences. This
preamble will discuss these areas in
further detail later.
The FAA also recognizes
shortcomings in its current part 431
hazard control approach. Part 431 does
not expressly require the use of an FSS
to manage hazards. Rather, § 431.35(c)
requires a system safety process to
identify hazards and assess the risk to
public health and safety and the safety
of property. The system safety approach
has consistently resulted in the use of
an FSS as a hazard control strategy. In
practice, the FAA has applied part 417
FSS requirements to part 431 to ensure
proper reliability and flight abort rules.
Part 417 FSS requirements have
proven difficult to scale to different
operations. Indeed, the FAA has had to
45 Part 417 sets specific FSS requirements
covering general command control system
requirements, command control system testing, FSS
support systems, FSS analysis, and flight safety
crew roles and qualifications.
46 Section 417.309 requires that each onboard
flight termination system and each command
control system must have a predicted reliability of
0.999 at the 95 percent confidence level when
operating, as well as predicted reliability of 0.999
at the 95 percent confidence for multiple
component systems such as the ordnance train to
propagate a charge, any safe-and-arm device, and
ordinance interrupters and initiators. As these
component systems define the reliability of the FSS
and approximate the design reliability of the entire
flight safety system, for the purpose of the preamble
the current requirements are discussed as requiring
an FSS to have predicted reliability of 0.999 at a
95 percent confidence level. This will be discussed
later in the preamble in further detail.
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issue numerous waivers to these
requirements to accommodate the fastevolving commercial space industry.
The need for waivers has been partially
driven by changes to Air Force
requirements, which diverged from FAA
regulations beginning in 2013.47 For
example, the FAA has repeatedly
waived its requirement to activate an
FSS to ensure no debris greater than 3
pounds per square foot (psf) ballistic
coefficient 48 reaches protected areas.49
In granting these waivers, the FAA has
adopted the conditional risk
management approach, noting that the
predicted consequence was below a
threshold of 1 × 10¥2 CEC. The FAA has
concluded that measuring the
consequence from reasonably
foreseeable, albeit unlikely, failures is
an appropriate metric to assess prudent
mitigations of risks to public health and
safety and the safety of property.50
The ARC also made recommendations
with respect to flight abort and FSS
requirements. It recommended the FAA
tier the level of rigor for FSSs into three
risk categories. In relevant part, ARC
members proposed that the lowest risk
category not require an FSS, that the
medium risk category require
streamlined FSS test requirements (e.g.,
reduce from three to one qualification
units) and not require configuration and
risk management, and the highest risk
category require a Range Commanders
Council (RCC) 51 319-compliant FSS. It
also suggested the highest risk category
could use another operational or design
47 The FAA regulations and Air Force
requirements regarding flight abort were virtually
identical from the time part 417 was promulgated
in 2006 until 2013 when the Air Force provided
permanent relief from the requirement for impact
limit lines to bound where debris with a ballistic
coefficient greater than 3 pounds per square foot
can impact if the FSS works properly. The Air
Force cited an ELOS determination when it issued
the permanent relief, stating that the public risk
criteria would still apply.
48 Ballistic coefficient is a measure of an object’s
ability to overcome air resistance, and it is defined
as the gross weight in pounds divided by the frontal
area of the vehicle (in square feet) times the
coefficient of drag.
49 Waiver of Debris Containment Requirements
for Launch. 81 FR 1470, 1470–1472 (January 12,
2016).
50 Using consequence as safety criteria in FAA
commercial space regulations is not without
precedent. Section 431.43(d) sets a limit for
foreseeable public consequences in terms of CEC,
but only for an unproven RLV. Section 431.43(d)
provides that an unproven RLV may only be
operated so that during any portion of flight, the
expected number of casualties does not exceed 1 ×
10¥4 given assuming a vehicle failure will occur at
any time the instantaneous impact point is over a
populated area.
51 The Range Commanders Council addresses the
common concerns and needs of operational ranges
within the United States. It works with other
government departments and agencies to establish
various technical standards to assist range users.
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approach proven to address concerns of
low probability/high consequence
event. The ARC only identified risk as
a means of scaling FSS requirements
and did not recommend specific risk
thresholds.52
In light of the shortcomings identified
by the FAA and ARC recommendations,
the FAA agrees that the FAA’s FSS
requirements should be scaled. For that
reason, the FAA proposes to use
consequence to determine the need for
an FSS, the required FSS reliability, and
when to activate an FSS.
To determine whether or not an FSS
is needed, an operator would be
required to calculate CEC in any one
second period of flight. The calculation
of CEC can range from a straightforward
product of the effective casualty area
and the population density to a high
fidelity analysis.53 Proposed
§ 450.101(c) would require, at a
minimum, that an operator compute the
effective casualty area and identify the
population density that would be
impacted for each reasonably
foreseeable vehicle response mode in
any one-second period of flight in terms
of CEC. The casualty area, population
density, and predicted consequence for
each vehicle response mode are
intermediate quantities that are
necessary to demonstrate compliance
with the individual and collective risk
criteria currently, thus these new
requirements would not necessarily
impart significant additional burden on
operators.
The FAA is proposing to rely on CEC
rather than EC to determine whether or
52 ARC
Report at p. 12.
FAA referenced the need to prevent a high
consequence event in its evaluation of a 2016
waiver request, which enabled the first Return to
Launch Site (RTLS) mission (Orbcomm-2).
Specifically, the FAA noted that the 3 psf ballistic
coefficient requirement of § 417.213(d) was
intended to (1) capture the current practice of the
U.S. Air Force, (2) provide a clear and consistent
basis to establish impact limit lines to determine
the occurrence of an accident as defined by § 401.5,
and (3) help prevent a high consequence to the
public given FSS activation. As part of the waiver
rationale, the FAA cited the longstanding governing
principle applied to launch safety: ‘‘to provide for
the public safety, the Ranges, using a Range Safety
Program, shall ensure that the launch and flight of
launch vehicles and payloads present no greater
risk to the general public than that imposed by the
over-flight of conventional aircraft.’’ (Eastern and
Western Range 127–1, Range Safety Requirements,
Oct. 31, 1997) The waiver rationale also cited an
analysis of 30 years of empirical evidence provided
by the NTSB that showed that the public safety
consequence associated with general aviation
accidents is 1 × 10¥2 expected fatalities. The FAA’s
analysis demonstrated that the consequence of
events that could produce debris outside of the
impact limit lines was consistent with the threshold
of 1 × 10¥2 CEC, even with input data
corresponding to the worst-case weather conditions.
Thus, the FAA concluded that the waiver would
not jeopardize public health and safety or the safety
of property.
53 The
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not an FSS is needed because FAA
believes it is the best approach to
implement the ARC’s recommendation
that the FAA treat high consequence
events differently than lower
consequence events. As noted earlier,
the ARC recommended a three tiered
approach—high risk would require a
highly reliable FSS, medium risk would
require an FSS with more streamlined
requirements, and low risk would
require no FSS. The FAA’s approach of
using a consequence analysis instead of
a risk analysis would use the same
factors as used in a risk analysis, such
as casualty area, population density,
and predicted consequence for each
vehicle response.
Proposed § 450.145 (Flight Safety
System), in paragraph (a), would require
an operator to employ an FSS with
design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent
confidence and commensurate design,
analysis, and testing if the consequence
of any vehicle response mode is 1 ×
10¥2 CEC or greater, consistent with the
current FSS requirements in part 417.54
If the consequence of any vehicle
response mode is between 1 × 10¥2 and
1 × 10¥3 CEC, the required design
reliability would be relaxed to no lower
than 0.975 at 95 percent confidence 55
with commensurate design, analysis,
and testing requirements necessary to
support this reliability. If the CEC is less
than 1 × 10¥3, and the individual and
collective risk criteria are met, an
operator would not be required to have
an FSS. The FAA coordinated with
NASA and the Department of Defense in
the Common Standards Working Group
to arrive at this proposal.
An RCC 319-compliant FSS would
only be required for any phase of flight
in which the CEC exceeds 1 × 10¥2. This
threshold is consistent with past
precedent, FAA waivers, and U.S.
Government consensus standards. Other
government entities use a consequence
threshold of 1 × 10¥2 to protect against
explosive hazards.56 This threshold is
54 Sections
417.303 and 417.309.
statistics, a confidence interval is the range
of values that includes the true value at a specified
confidence level. A confidence level of 95% is
commonly used which means that there is a 95%
chance that the true value is encompassed in the
interval.
56 The Department of Defense, NASA, and the
FAA use quantity-distance limits originally
designed to limit conditional individual risk of
fatality to 1 × 10¥2 from inert debris fragment
impacts. They define minimum separation
distances between potential sources of high speed
fragments (propelled by accidental explosions) and
areas with exposed personnel to ensure no more
than one hazardous fragment impact per 600 sqft,
with the assumption that any exposed person has
a vulnerable area of 6 sqft. NASA only permits
inhabited buildings at closer distances if proved
sufficient to limit hazardous debris to 1/600 sqft,
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55 In
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also rooted in the longstanding and
often cited principle that launch and
reentry should present no greater risk to
the public than that imposed by the
over-flight of conventional aircraft. The
Air Force, the RCC, and an American
National Standard (ANSI/AIAA S–061–
1998) 57 58 have identified the public
risks posed by conventional aircraft as
an important benchmark for the
acceptable risks posed by launch
vehicles. Like commercial space
operations, civil aviation poses an
involuntary hazard to the public on the
ground. Therefore, the FAA looked to
this risk to the public on the ground to
derive consequence limits for
commercial space activities. The FAA
analyzed National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) aviation accident data
and determined that the average
consequences on the ground from all
fatal civil aviation accidents are 0.06
casualties and 0.02 fatalities. The
average ground fatality of an airline
crash is 1, and of a general aviation
crash is 0.01.59 The proposed threshold
appears reasonable given this range of
aviation related accident consequences.
The FAA proposes a threshold of 1 ×
10¥3 CEC as a metric for determining
the need for any FSS. This is an order
of magnitude less than the threshold
that determines the need for a highlyreliable FSS, and which is scaled to the
reliability of the required FSS.
Combined with the individual risk and
cumulative risk thresholds, the FAA
believes that this proposed threshold
would ensure public safety.
The use of a consequence metric is
consistent with the ARC comments. The
ARC suggested that an FSS with a
reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent
confidence is appropriate for high
consequence, low probability events
and a lower reliability could be
acceptable under the right
circumstances. The FAA notes that the
ARC did not identify any threshold
values to define ‘‘high consequence’’;
however, the proposal does identify
specific quantitative consequence
thresholds in terms of CEC. The FAA
and thus enforces a consequence limit of no more
than 1 × 10¥2 conditional expected fatalities
(NASA–STD–8719.12A—2018–05–23, p. 63).
57 Waiver of Debris Containment Requirements
for Launch. 81 FR 1470 (January 12, 2016), at 1470–
1472.
58 According to ANSI/AIAA S–061–1998, ‘‘during
the launch and flight phase of commercial space
vehicle operations, the safety risk for the general
public should be no more hazardous than that
caused by other hazardous human activities (e.g.,
general aviation over flight).’’
59 The FAA looked at NTSB data on injuries and
fatalities of people on the ground from fatal civil
aviation accidents (where an occupant of the
aircraft died) for the 30-year period between 1984
and 2013.
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invites comments on this approach in
general, as well as the specific
thresholds proposed.
Lastly, proposed § 450.125 (Gate
Analysis), in paragraph (c), would limit
the predicted average consequence from
flight abort resulting from a failure in
any one-second period of flight to 1 ×
10¥2 CEC. Flight abort will be discussed
in more detail later in the preamble.
B. System Safety Program
Proposed § 450.103 (System Safety
Program) would require an operator to
implement and document a system
safety program throughout the lifecycle
of a launch or reentry system that
includes at least the following: (1)
Safety organization, including a mission
director and safety official; (2)
procedures to evaluate the operational
lifecycle of the launch or reentry system
to maintain current preliminary safety
assessments and any flight hazard
analyses; (3) configuration management
and control; and (4) post-flight data
review. Due to the complexity and
variety of vehicle concepts and
operations, a system safety program
would be necessary to ensure that an
operator considers and addresses all
risks to public safety.
Currently, parts 415 and 417 have a
more prescriptive philosophy of flight
safety hazard mitigation. While the
requirements ensure safety, they neither
provide the flexibility needed to address
the diverse and dynamic nature of
today’s commercial space transportation
industry nor address the unique aspects
of non-traditional launch and reentry
vehicles. For example, except for
unguided suborbital launch vehicles, it
is virtually impossible for operations
that can reach populated areas but that
do not use an FSS to comply with parts
415 and 417.
Regulations applicable to reentry and
RLVs in part 431 expressly established
system safety requirements as a flexible
approach to approving a safety process
that encompasses design and operation.
Section 431.33 sets the requirements for
the maintenance and documentation of
a safety organization. Specifically, it
requires: (1) The identification of lines
of communication and approval
authority for all mission decisions
possibly affecting public safety
including internal and external lines of
communication with the launch or
reentry site to ensure compliance with
required plans and procedures; (2) the
designation of a person responsible for
conducting all licensed RLV mission
activities; and (3) designation of a
qualified safety official by name, title,
and qualifications.
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Section 431.35(c) specifically requires
the use of a system safety process to
identify hazards and assess the risks to
public health and safety and the safety
of property and to demonstrate
compliance with the acceptable risk
criteria.60 It also incorporates core
components of a hazard analysis.
Section 431.35(d) requires several
deliverables to demonstrate compliance
with acceptable risk criteria and a
compliant system safety process.
Despite the explicit deliverables, the
structure of the regulation has proved to
be confusing for applicants. For
instance, some system safety analysis
element requirements are intermixed
with vehicle design element
requirements. Similarly, general
information requirements such as the
identification of hazardous material can
be found listed with unrelated
requirements such as the description of
the RLV. The inclusion of these
elements in the section governing
system safety has led applicants to
produce application deliverables that
were scattered and not easily
understood by the FAA. Also, some less
experienced applicants did not
understand that the regulation required
a system safety analysis and provided
general information and an informal
assessment of how that general
information may have affected public
safety.
The ARC made specific suggestions
on the role of system safety in the FAA’s
safety regulatory scheme. It
recommended the FAA use a system
safety process at the core of its safety
requirements to identify hazards and
develop hazard control strategies that
are verified by means of an FSA,
relevant operational constraints, and
means of meeting those constraints. It
noted the FAA could provide better
detail on its safety requirements. For
instance, § 431.35(c) could be expanded
to include risk-informed decision
making and continuous risk
management requirements. It further
suggested the FAA incorporate varying
levels of rigor that would scale required
verification requirements, like test plans
and performance results, by vehicle,
operator category, and relative risk as a
60 Section 431.35(c) also fails to provide a
detailed description of the composition of a
compliant system safety process. This lack of detail
has often led to the submission of deficient
applications because the applicant failed to
demonstrate that the system safety process was
adequate to meet public safety requirements and
therefore the FAA did not find the application to
be complete enough for acceptance. The ARC noted
the confusion around the FAA’s evaluation of an
application’s system safety submission and
recommended changing the regulation to increase
regulatory certainty.
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means of scoping requirements to
vehicle hazards and potential
population exposure. The FAA agrees
that the system safety process should
form the core of its safety requirements
as a means of making the safety
requirements more flexible for novel
operations and processes.
Proposed § 450.103 lists the minimum
components all operators would be
required to have in their system safety
programs to protect public health and
safety and the safety of property. Part
431 established a process-based
requirement for a system safety program
but did not define its components or a
safety standard. This lack of definition
has led to many operators establishing
system safety programs that are missing
components necessary for public safety.
This lengthened some applicants’ preapplication consultation and the license
application evaluation process. The
FAA intends to further define the
system safety program to lessen the
potential for misunderstandings
between applicants and the FAA. This
proposal should allow potential
operators to design system safety
programs that better address public
safety concerns prior to license
application submittal.
1. Safety Organization
Proposed § 450.103(a) would require
an operator to maintain and document
a safety organization with clearly
defined lines of communication and
approval authority for all public safety
decisions. This safety organization
would include at least two positions,
referred to as a mission director and a
safety official. The mission director
would be responsible for the safe
conduct of all licensed activities and
authorized to provide final approval to
proceed with licensed activities. The
safety official 61 would be required to
communicate potential safety and noncompliance matters to the mission
director during flight and ground
operations. The safety official would
also be authorized to examine all
aspects of an operator’s ground safety
and flight safety operations. It is
common practice in any safety
organization, including those within the
commercial space industry, to establish
who will be responsible for ensuring
safety and to have clear processes for
61 In 1999, the FAA added the requirement for a
safety official possessing authority to examine
launch safety operations and to monitor
independently personnel compliance with safety
policies and procedures. The FAA stated in the
preamble to the final rule that the person
responsible for safety should have the ability to
perform independently of those parts of the
applicant’s organization responsible for mission
assurance. 64 FR 19604 (April 21, 1999).
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communicating safety concerns
effectively throughout the organization.
This proposal would allow for one
person, or several, to perform the safety
official’s functions. Unlike current
regulations, an operator would not have
to name a specific safety official in its
license application. Instead, an operator
would be required to designate a
position to accomplish the necessary
tasks of a safety official. The FAA seeks
comment on this approach, and whether
it provides an appropriate level of
flexibility to industry.
Many operators have complained
about the burden of naming a specific
safety official in a license application.
One challenge is that, in many cases, an
operator applies for a license before
selecting a safety official. As such, many
operators must submit a modification of
their application once they have chosen
a safety official. Another issue is that
operators that conduct activities at a
frequent rate must employ several
persons that serve as safety officials to
keep pace with their operations. These
persons may serve as safety officials on
several different types of operations on
multiple licenses. Therefore, the
operator must frequently submit license
application modifications every time it
selects a new person to serve in that
capacity. An operator is further
burdened when safety officials leave the
launch operator’s organization or
assume a new role within the
organization that would prohibit them
from serving as a safety official. The
FAA believes a safety organization that
includes a safety official is essential to
public safety; however, identifying that
individual by name is not necessary.
Under the proposal, the operator
would still be required to designate a
safety official for any licensed activity
prior to the start of that activity. The
FAA has previously noted that licensed
ground operations have commenced
without designating a safety official.
Many applicants mistakenly assumed
the safety official was only necessary for
flight operations. These operators
conducted preflight ground operations
in advance of flight without a safety
official monitoring the operation. This
proposal would require a safety official
for all licensed operations to
independently monitor licensed activity
to ensure compliance with the
operator’s safety policies. Additionally,
the safety official would report directly
to the mission director. The absence of
a safety official could result in a lack of
independent safety oversight and a
potential for a break down in
communications of important safetyrelated information. The FAA would
continue to inspect licensed operations
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to ensure that a safety official is in place
throughout the course of the licensed
activity.
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2. Procedures
Proposed § 450.103(b) would require
that an operator establish procedures to
evaluate hazards throughout the
complete operational lifecycle of a
program. This is important because
design and operational changes to a
system can have an impact on public
safety. This proposed requirement was
implied in § 431.35(c) but was not
explicitly stated. Specifically,
§ 450.103(b) would require the operator
to implement a process to update the
preliminary safety assessment and any
flight hazard analysis to reflect the
knowledge gained during the lifecycle
of the system. To accomplish this, an
operator would be required to establish
methods to review and assess the
validity of the preliminary safety
assessment and any flight hazard
analysis throughout the operational
lifecycle of the launch or reentry
system. An operator would also need to
have methods for updating the
assessment or analysis, and to
communicate the updates throughout its
organization. For any flight hazard
analysis, an operator would also have to
have a process for tracking hazards,
risks, mitigation and hazard control
measures, and verification activities.
3. Configuration Management and
Control
Proposed § 450.103(c) would lay out
configuration management and control
requirements. The FAA has chosen to
consolidate configuration management
and control requirements within the
system safety program requirements.
Requirements addressing configuration
control were previously scattered
throughout the regulations, including in
§§ 417.111(e), 417.123(e)(2), 417.303(e),
and 417.407(c). Operators frequently
make changes to their vehicles, such as
new manufacturing techniques for a
component or changes to the materials
on key structures. Operators may also
make operational changes such as new
analysis techniques, automating
processes that were previously
conducted by personnel, or changing
the surveillance techniques in hazard
areas. These types of changes can have
significant impacts on public safety.
This proposal would require an
operator to track configurations of all
safety-critical systems and
documentation, ensure the correct and
appropriate versions of the systems and
documentation are used, and maintain
records of system configurations and
versions used for each licensed activity.
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The FAA expects that an operator
would design configuration
management and control into its
operations. The FAA also expects that
an operator would provide the
capability to both alert responsible
individuals when key documentation
must be updated and ensure that all
stakeholders—internal and external to
the launch operator’s organization—are
using current and accurate information.
4. Post-Flight Data Review
Proposed § 450.103(d) would require
that an applicant conduct a post-flight
data review. The proposed requirements
in § 450.103(d) are not explicitly
contained in part 415, 417 or 431.
However, it is industry practice to
review post-flight data to address
vehicle reliability and mission success,
so any added burden from proposed
§ 450.103(d) would be minimal.
Operator review of post-flight data
provides valuable safety information on
future operations, particularly the
identification of anomalies. At a
minimum, proposed § 450.103(d)(1)
would require that an operator employ
a process for evaluating post-flight data
to ensure consistency between the
assumptions used for the preliminary
safety assessment, any flight hazard or
flight safety analysis, and associated
mitigation and hazard control measures.
Proposed § 450.103(d)(2) would
require that an operator resolve any
inconsistencies identified in proposed
§ 450.103(d)(1) prior to the next flight of
the vehicle. The FAA expects that the
operator would address any
inconsistencies by updating analyses
using the best available data for the
upcoming mission, or documenting the
rationale explaining how changes to the
data inputs would not have an impact
on the results of the analysis for a
proposed mission. The FAA would add
this requirement to ensure that the
operator makes all appropriate updates
to the analysis identifying all public
safety impacts in order to avoid
inconsistencies in future missions that
could jeopardize public safety.
Proposed § 450.103(d)(3) would
require that an operator identify any
anomaly that may impact the flight
hazard analysis, flight safety analysis,
safety critical system, or is otherwise
material to public safety and safety of
property. An examination and
understanding of launch or reentry
vehicle system and subsystem
anomalies throughout the lifecycle of
the vehicle system can alert an operator
of an impending mishap. An operator
should review post-flight data to
identify unexpected issues or critical
systems that are operating outside of
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predicted limits. Flight safety systems
are examples of safety-critical systems
that could jeopardize public safety if
they do not perform nominally.
Proposed § 450.103(d)(4) would
require an operator to address any
anomaly identified in proposed
§ 450.103(d)(3). Prior to the next flight,
an operator would be required to
address each anomaly by, at a
minimum, updating any flight hazard
analysis, flight safety analysis, or safety
critical system.
The FAA seeks comment on whether
proposed § 450.103(d) would change an
operator’s approach to reviewing postflight data.
5. Application Requirements
Proposed § 450.103(e) would set the
system safety program application
requirements. An applicant would be
required to provide a summary of how
it plans to satisfy the system safety
program requirements. It is currently
common practice for applicants to
provide the FAA with a system safety
program plan or documents containing
the necessary information to determine
compliance with the system safety
program requirements in § 431.35(c). A
system safety program plan that covers
the elements in § 450.103(e) would
satisfy the proposed application
requirements. The FAA also
recommends an applicant consult with
the FAA during the development of its
system safety program prior to
implementation.
With respect to the safety
organization, an applicant would be
required to describe the applicant’s
safety organization, identifying the
applicant’s lines of communication and
approval authority, both internally and
externally, for all public safety decisions
and the provision of public safety
services. In the past, many applicants
have chosen to provide an organization
chart depicting the safety organization.
The FAA encourages the continuation of
this practice. However, the applicant
would be required to provide a
sufficient narrative describing the
organization, particularly the lines of
communication. For example, if an
engineer in the safety organization
becomes aware of a hazard, the
applicant should describe how that
engineer would communicate that
hazard to the safety official.
An applicant would also be required
to provide a summary of the processes
and products identified in the system
safety program requirements. The FAA
expects that processes would be scalable
based on the size of the operation or the
potential public safety impacts of the
proposed operation. For example, an
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applicant with a dozen employees and
a relatively small launch or reentry
vehicle may use meetings or less formal
ways to develop its preliminary hazard
list. However, an applicant with a larger
vehicle operating from multiple sites
and hundreds of employees would need
a more formal means of tracking
information and developing the
required analyses.
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C. Preliminary Safety Assessment for
Flight
Under proposed § 450.105
(Preliminary Safety Assessment for
Flight), every operator would be
required to conduct and document a
preliminary safety assessment (PSA) for
the flight of a launch or reentry vehicle.
The PSA would identify operationspecific information relevant to public
safety and would help the operator
scope the analyses that must be
conducted to ensure that the operation
satisfies the public safety criteria in
proposed § 450.101. An operator could
use the knowledge obtained from the
PSA to identify the effect of design and
operational decisions on public safety
and thus determine potential hazard
control strategies. The products of the
PSA are consistent with products that
are currently produced for preliminary
flight safety analyses and preliminary
system safety analyses. The PSA will
allow operators to quickly identify and
demonstrate the hazard control strategy
appropriate for their proposed
operation.
The FAA intends the PSA to be a toplevel assessment of the potential public
safety impacts identifiable early in the
design process. This assessment should
be broad enough that minor changes in
vehicle design or operations would not
have a significant impact on, or
invalidate the products produced by,
the PSA. At the same time, the PSA
should be detailed enough to identify
the public safety and hazard control
implications associated with key design
trade studies. The FAA recommends
that an operator perform an initial PSA
at the outset of the design phase of a
proposed operation. Thereafter, the
operator should update the assessment
as needed in accordance with the
launch operator’s established
procedures to evaluate the complete
operational lifecycle of a launch or
reentry system. The results of the PSA
would provide the operator with an
appropriate hazard control strategy for
its proposed operation.62
62 As mentioned previously and discussed in
greater detail in the next section, traditional hazard
controls include physical containment, wind
weighting, or flight abort.
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Under proposed § 450.105(a), an
acceptable PSA would identify at least
the following key elements: (1) The
vehicle response modes; (2) the types of
hazards associated with the vehicle
response modes; (3) the geographical
area where the public may be exposed
to a hazard; (4) the population of the
public exposed to the hazard; (5) the
CEC; (6) a preliminary hazard list which
documents all causes of vehicle
response modes that, excluding
mitigation, have the capability to create
a hazard to the public; (7) safety-critical
systems; and (8) the timeline identifying
all safety critical events. The FAA
expects that an operator would use
many of these PSA elements in
subsequent analyses. For instance,
population data, vehicle response
modes, and the associated effects are
part of a valid quantitative risk analysis.
These items could also be useful for a
flight hazard analysis.
A vehicle response mode is a
mutually exclusive scenario that
characterizes foreseeable combinations
of vehicle trajectory and debris
generation. Examples include ontrajectory explosion, on-trajectory loss
of thrust, and tumble turns. The types
of hazards associated with any vehicle
response mode can include inert and
explosive debris, overpressure, and
toxics. By understanding the potential
vehicle response modes and the hazards
associated with those vehicle response
modes, an operator can then determine
the geographical areas where the public
may be exposed to a hazard. This
information, along with the population
of the public exposed to the hazard,
would allow an operator to begin to
characterize the potential risk during
any particular phase of flight.
Calculating CEC as discussed earlier, is
important to understand the need for an
FSS and its required reliability. All of
these elements, which comprise
§ 450.105(a)(1) through (5), are
important to develop hazard control
strategies.
Proposed § 450.105(a)(6) would
require an operator to produce a
preliminary hazard list. The operator
would be required to review the
operation to determine what hazards
exist in order to generate the
preliminary hazard list. This assessment
is different from the quantitative risk
analysis and is meant to give an
operator an understanding of how
public safety is affected at the
subsystem or component level of the
operation. An operator should use
common system safety tools such as
Fault Trees, Failure Modes and Effects
Analyses (FMEA), safety panels, and
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engineering judgement to develop the
preliminary hazard list.
An operator should describe hazards
in terms that identify each potential
source of harm, the mechanism by
which the harm may be caused, and the
potential outcome if the harm were to
remain unaddressed.63 The operator
should ensure that the hazard is
described in enough detail so that the
safety critical personnel within the
operator’s organization would be able to
review the hazard and easily ascertain
the source, mechanism, and the public
safety-related outcome of the hazard. In
developing the preliminary hazard list,
an operator would not be required to
assess the risk associated with each
hazard or potential mitigation measures.
These items would be determined in the
flight hazard analysis, if required, as
discussed in the ‘‘Flight Hazard
Analysis’’ section of this preamble.
When developing the preliminary
hazard list, the operator would also be
required to address items that are not
specific to the vehicle hardware but
necessary for the launch or reentry
system. These items would include
things like human factors, training, and
other operational concerns.
The FAA believes the preliminary
hazard list is critical as the regulatory
approach changes from narrowly
prescribed methods to performancebased standards that focus on the
applicant demonstrating safety through
system safety management and
engineering. As the industry moves
toward to a more performance-based
regime, there is a growing need for
operators to produce the analyses
specific to their unique operations in
order to ensure public safety and detail
the appropriate hazard mitigation
strategies for their proposed operation.
Additionally, an operator that makes
changes to its operation could
potentially move from a regulatory
pathway that does not require a hazard
analysis to one that does. The existence
of a preliminary hazard list should
alleviate some of the existing burdens
on operators by requiring only those
analyses necessary to ensure the safety
of a particular operation.
It would also more quickly facilitate
analyses demonstrating public safety,
thus creating the potential for
operational changes closer to flight of
the vehicle. For example, consider an
operation where a flight hazard analysis
63 For example, a potential source of harm could
be a leak in a rocket engine fuel system line caused
by a manufacturing defect, overpressure, or
improper installation. The mechanism for harm
could be a fire resulting from that leak. The
outcome could be loss of the vehicle with impact
on population.
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was unnecessary because of the use of
an FSS under proposed § 450.145(a)(1).
In that case, a change in FSS design,
testing or qualification, or disabling the
abort system during some phases of
flight, could result in the need for a
flight hazard analysis. Because the
operator would be required to generate
a preliminary hazard list, it would
already have the initial step of the flight
hazard analysis completed, excluding
any impacts of the change. The operator
would then be required to complete the
final steps of the hazard analysis to
complete its safety documentation.
Proposed § 450.105(a)(7) would
require an operator to identify safetycritical systems. A safety critical system
would be a system that is essential to
safe performance or operation. A safetycritical system, subsystem, component,
condition, event, operation, process, or
item, is one whose proper recognition,
control, performance, or tolerance, is
essential to ensuring public safety. It is
important for an operator to clearly
identify safety critical systems because
many requirements in proposed part
450 relate to these systems.
Proposed § 450.105(a)(8) would
require an operator to identify a
timeline identifying all safety critical
events. This timeline is important to
identify the potential public safety
consequences during any particular
phase of flight.
Proposed § 450.105(b) would set the
PSA application requirements. The
applicant would be required to provide
the results of the preliminary safety
assessment in its application. The
applicant would be required to provide
information for every requirement listed
under § 450.105(a). These application
requirements are consistent with those
currently in part 431. Although these
specific system safety requirements
would be new for ELV operators, the
FAA does not expect they would add a
substantial burden given that part 417
operators were performing similar work,
albeit not under the system management
umbrella. ELV operators must already
identify vehicle failure modes; debris,
toxics, distant-focusing overpressure,
and other hazards; geographical
containment and overflight trajectories;
consequences that determine flight
limits; and all safety critical systems
and events. The PSA codifies these
concerns as primary to safety and the
development of hazard control strategies
and requires all vehicle operators to
document such considerations.
Development of the PSA would allow
the operator to determine whether they
must perform a flight hazard analysis.
The operator would be required to
assess each phase of flight to determine
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how public safety hazards are mitigated.
If there is a phase of flight where all
identified public safety hazards are not
mitigated using physical containment,
wind weighting, or flight abort, the
operator would be required to perform
a flight hazard analysis, discussed later
in this preamble, for that particular
phase of flight.
D. Hazard Control Strategy
Proposed § 450.107 (Hazard Control
Strategies) would provide options for
hazard control strategies that an
operator could use to meet the public
safety criteria in proposed § 450.101 for
each phase of a launch or reentry
vehicle’s flight. An operator could use
physical containment, wind weighting,
or flight abort and would not be
required to conduct a flight hazard
analysis. Alternatively, an operator
could conduct a flight hazard analysis to
derive hazard controls. As part of its
application, an operator would be
required to identify the selected hazard
control strategy for each phase of flight.
The use of a flight hazard analysis to
derive hazard controls provides the
most flexibility of any of the hazard
control strategies. The ARC
recommended this approach and stated
that the system safety process should be
used to identify hazards and develop
control strategies, which would then be
verified by means of flight safety
analysis and relevant operational
constraints and means of meeting those
constraints.64 In certain circumstances,
however, historical methods may also
provide an acceptable level of safety. If
the public safety hazards identified in
the preliminary safety assessment can
be mitigated adequately to meet the
public safety requirements of proposed
§ 450.101 using physical containment,
wind weighting, or flight abort with a
highly reliable FSS, an operator would
not need to conduct a flight hazard
analysis for that phase of flight. This
proposal is different than current
regulations, where the option of
conducting a hazard analysis to derive
hazard controls is only available to
reusable launch vehicles. Under
proposed part 450, the option to use a
flight hazard analysis would not rest on
whether a vehicle is expendable or
reusable.
Under proposed § 450.107(b), an
operator could use physical
containment to satisfy the public safety
requirements of proposed § 450.101
when an operator’s launch vehicle does
not have sufficient energy for any
hazards associated with its flight to
reach an area where it exposes the
64 ARC
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public or critical assets to a hazard.
These launches can take place from any
launch site, depending on the size of the
launch vehicle, the expected trajectory,
and other factors. The more remote a
launch site is, the greater its capacity to
accommodate a launch using physical
containment.
This approach is consistent with
current practice because the FAA has
always accepted a demonstration of
physical containment as a means of
satisfying risk requirements. The use of
physical containment as a hazard
control strategy is the easiest way to
meet the public safety requirements of
proposed § 450.101 and may, in a
remote location, involve a simple
showing that the maximum distance
vehicle hazards can reach defines an
area that is unpopulated and does not
contain any critical assets. Because
physical containment precludes the
need for an FSS, an operator would not
be required to meet any requirements
relevant to an FSS. If an operator shows
its vehicle does not have sufficient
energy for any of its associated hazards
to reach outside the flight hazard area,
the operator would not have to perform
a flight hazard analysis. Further, many
other requirements would be either not
applicable or easily met. Because
physical containment may also involve
visitor control, wind constraints, realtime toxic analysis, and other mitigation
measures, the FAA would require an
operator to apply other mitigation
measures to ensure no public exposure
to hazards, as agreed to by the
Administrator on a case-by-case basis.
Under proposed § 450.107(c), an
operator could use wind weighting to
satisfy the public safety requirements of
proposed § 450.101 when an operator
uses launcher elevation and azimuth
settings to correct for wind effects that
an unguided suborbital launch vehicle,
typically called a sounding rocket,
would experience during flight. Due to
its relative simplicity and effectiveness,
wind weighting has historically been
used by NASA, the Department of
Defense, and commercial operators as
the primary method to ensure public
safety for the launch of a sounding
rocket. This approach is currently
codified in part 417. Under part 431, an
operator can use wind weighting as an
acceptable hazard mitigation measure
determined through the system safety
process. Under proposed part 450, an
operator launching a sounding rocket
could use wind weighting or it could
propose other hazard controls in its
application through a flight hazard
analysis. The specific wind weighting
requirements are discussed in the
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‘‘Additional Technical Justification and
Rationale’’ section.
Under proposed § 450.107(d), an
operator could use flight abort to satisfy
the public safety requirements of
proposed § 450.101 when an operator
limits or restricts the hazards to the
public or critical assets presented by a
launch vehicle or reentry vehicle,
including any payload, while in flight
by initiating and accomplishing a
controlled ending to vehicle flight,
when necessary. This is discussed in
more detail in the ‘‘Flight Abort’’
section.
If the public safety hazards identified
in the preliminary safety assessment
cannot be mitigated adequately to meet
the public risk criteria of proposed
§ 450.101 using physical containment,
wind weighting, or flight abort, an
operator would be required to conduct
a flight hazard analysis in accordance
with proposed § 450.109 (Flight Hazard
Analysis) to derive hazard controls for
that phase of flight. The use of a flight
hazard analysis to derive hazard
controls is the primary approach used in
current parts 431, 435, and 437. The
FAA has previously required the use of
a flight hazard analysis for reentry, for
the captive carry portion of an airlaunched vehicle, and for piloted
suborbital vehicles. A detailed
discussion of flight hazard analysis is
included later in this preamble.
In its application, an applicant would
be required to describe its hazard
control strategy for each phase of flight.
An applicant may elect to use different
hazard control strategies for different
phases of flight, depending on risks
associated with those phases. For
example, an applicant using an airlaunched system might use a flight
hazard analysis during the captive carry
phase of flight, and flight abort during
the rocket-powered phase of flight.
Additionally, if using physical
containment as a hazard control
strategy, an applicant would be required
to demonstrate that the launch vehicle
does not have sufficient energy for any
hazards associated with its flight to
reach outside the flight hazard area. The
applicant would also be required to
describe the methods used to ensure
that flight hazard areas are cleared of the
public and critical assets.
E. Flight Abort
As discussed earlier, flight abort is a
hazard control strategy to limit or
restrict the hazards to the public or
critical assets presented by a launch
vehicle or reentry vehicle, including any
payload, while in flight. Flight abort is
a controlled ending to vehicle flight and
is initiated by an operator when ending
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flight poses less risk to public safety and
the safety of property than continued
flight without a safety intervention.
Flight abort is the primary hazard
control strategy used today for orbital
expendable launch vehicles under part
417, and under Air Force and NASA
launch range requirements.
The FAA proposes to require this
approach, with a reliable FSS, only
when certain conditional risks are
present. Specifically, proposed
§ 450.101(c) would require an operator
to use flight abort with an FSS that
meets the requirements of § 450.145 as
a hazard control strategy if the
consequence of any reasonably
foreseeable vehicle response mode, in
any one-second period of flight, is
greater than 1 × 10¥3 conditional
expected casualties for uncontrolled
areas.65 The basis for this number is
discussed in the ‘‘Consequence
Protection Criteria for Flight Abort and
Flight Safety System’’ section. Under
this test, a typical orbital launch from
the Air Force Eastern and Western
ranges would require an FSS capable of
initiating flight abort. Small orbital
launch vehicles launched from more
remote locations, however, would not
normally be required to use flight abort
as a hazard control strategy. The FAA
seeks comment on this approach.
To implement flight abort as a hazard
control strategy, an operator would
establish flight safety limits and gates in
accordance with proposed §§ 450.123
(Flight Safety Limits Analysis) and
450.125, establish flight abort rules in
accordance with § 450.165 (Flight Safety
Rules), and employ an FSS in
accordance with § 450.145 and software
in accordance with § 450.111.
Flight abort as a hazard control
strategy can be used by an operator,
even if it is not required under
§ 450.101(c), as a hazard mitigation
measure derived from the flight hazard
analysis. For example, a piloted vehicle
with low conditional expected casualty
during powered flight may use an FSS
in combination with other measures,
such as propellant dumping, to keep
vehicle hazards from reaching a
populated area.
1. Flight Safety Limits and Uncontrolled
Areas
An operator would have to identify
the location of uncontrolled areas and
65 The proposed requirement to use flight abort as
a hazard control strategy is less restrictive than
§ 417.107(a), which requires a launch operator to
use an FSS in the vicinity of the launch site if any
hazard from a launch vehicle, vehicle component,
or payload can reach any protected area at any time
during flight, or if a failure of the launch vehicle
would have a high consequence to the public.
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establish flight safety limits that define
when an operator must initiate flight
abort to:
• Prevent debris capable of causing a
casualty from impacting in uncontrolled
areas if the vehicle is outside the limits
of a useful mission, and
• Ensure compliance with the public
safety criteria of § 450.101.
The FAA would define debris capable
of causing a casualty with kinetic energy
or other thresholds as will be discussed
later. The public safety criteria that
would go into determining flight safety
limits would be collective risk,
individual risk, risk to critical assets,
and conditional risk. An uncontrolled
area would be an area of land not
controlled by a launch or reentry
operator, a launch or reentry site
operator, an adjacent site operator, or
other entity by agreement. Under
current regulations, these areas are
referred to as ‘‘protected areas.’’
Importantly, as discussed earlier, the
conditional risk criteria would not
apply to controlled areas, which are
areas that are controlled by any of the
entities listed earlier, because by
exercising control over these areas the
entity would have a greater ability to
ensure that catastrophic risk is mitigated
by other means.
In addition to establishing flight
safety limits, an operator would
establish gates, if the vehicle would
need to overfly a landmass during its
flight. A gate is an opening in a flight
safety limit through which a vehicle
may fly, provided the vehicle meets
certain pre-defined conditions such that
the vehicle performance indicates an
ability to continue safe flight. If the
vehicle fails to meet the required
conditions to pass a gate, then flight
abort would occur at the flight safety
limit. In other words, the gate would be
closed.
Flight safety limits and gates are
discussed in greater detail later in this
preamble.
2. Flight Abort Rules
An operator would identify the
conditions under which the FSS,
including the functions of any flight
abort crew, must abort the flight to
ensure compliance with § 450.101. An
operator would be required to abort a
flight if a flight safety limit is violated,
or if some condition exists that could
lead to a violation, such as a
compromised FSS or loss of data.
Flight abort rules are discussed in
greater detail later in this preamble.
3. Flight Safety System
To enable flight abort, an operator
must use an FSS. An FSS is an integral
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part of positive control of a launch or
reentry vehicle because it allows an
operator to destroy the vehicle,
terminate thrust, or otherwise achieve
flight abort to limit or restrict the
hazards to public health and safety and
the safety of property presented by a
vehicle while in flight. Traditional FSSs
are comprised of an onboard flight
termination system, a ground-based
command and control system, and
tracking and telemetry systems.
Historically, the flight safety crew
monitoring the course of a vehicle
would send a command to the vehicle
to terminate flight if the vehicle violated
a flight abort rule. Recently, operators
are favoring autonomous FSSs, negating
the need for a ground-based command
and control system or flight abort crew.
As discussed earlier, the CEC would
establish whether an FSS is required,
and if so, its reliability.
• If the consequence of any vehicle
response mode is 1 × 10¥2 conditional
expected casualties or greater for
uncontrolled areas, an operator would
be required to employ an FSS with
design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent
confidence and commensurate design,
analysis, and testing; or
• If the consequence of any vehicle
response mode is between 1 × 10¥2 and
1 × 10¥3, an operator would be required
to employ an FSS with a design
reliability of 0.975 at 95 percent
confidence and commensurate design,
analysis, and testing.
Note that if the consequence of any
vehicle response mode is less than 1 ×
10¥3, the FAA would not require an
FSS or mandate its reliability if an
operator chooses to use one.
Unlike part 417, the FAA would not
propose specific design or testing
requirements for an FSS. Instead, the
FAA would accept specified
government or industry standards as
meeting the FSS reliability
requirements. At this time, only one
government standard would meet the
requirement for a design reliability of
0.999 at 95 percent confidence and
commensurate design, analysis, and
testing, and that is RCC 319.66
The FSS requirements codified in part
417, including component performance
requirements and acceptance and
qualification testing, were originally
written to align FAA launch licensing
requirements with the Federal launch
range standards in RCC 319. Like part
417, RCC 319 requires qualification tests
to demonstrate reliable operation in
66 RCC 319 can be found at http://
www.wsmr.army.mil/RCCsite/Documents/319-14_
Flight_Termination_Systems_Commonality_
Standard/RCC_319-14_FTS_Commonality.pdf.
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environments exceeding the expected
operating environment for the system
components, acceptance tests to
demonstrate that the selected batch of
components meets the requirements of
the design specifications, and other
preflight testing at the system or
subsystem level to demonstrate
functionality after installation.
In the short term, the FAA expects
individual applicants to create their
own FSS requirements based on RCC
319 and have them approved as an
accepted means of compliance by the
FAA prior to application submittal. This
would be akin to ‘‘tailoring’’ RCC 319,
which is current practice at the Federal
launch ranges. In the long run, the FAA
expects the industry to develop
voluntary consensus standards for FSSs,
particularly for those FSSs that are only
required to have a design reliability of
0.975 at 95 percent confidence. By
removing detailed design and testing
requirements from FAA regulations and
relying on standards to meet reliability
thresholds, the FAA would encourage
innovation in flight abort. The FAA
seeks comment on whether this
approach would encourage innovation
and more rapid evolution of FSS
designs.
F. Flight Hazard Analysis
Proposed § 450.109 would require
that an operator conduct and document
a flight hazard analysis and continue to
maintain the flight hazard analysis
throughout the lifecycle of the launch or
reentry system unless an operator uses
proven hazard control strategies such as
physical containment, wind weighting,
or flight abort. At its most basic, a flight
hazard analysis identifies all reasonably
foreseeable hazards and the necessary
measures to eliminate or mitigate that
risk. A flight hazard analysis would be
required only for those phases of flight
for which the operator does not employ
a traditional hazard control (e.g.,
physical containment). As noted earlier,
the use of a flight hazard analysis to
derive hazard controls would provide
flexibility that does not currently exist
under the prescriptive requirements in
part 417 67 and is broadly consistent
with the practice in parts 431 and 435.68
Proposed § 450.109(a) would require
that an operator further refine the flight
67 The current ELV regulatory scheme in parts 415
and 417 mitigates flight hazards for all launches by
requiring a reliable FSS and prescriptive flight abort
requirements.
68 Current RLV and reentry vehicle regulations in
parts 431 and 435 do not specifically require a flight
hazard analysis. However, § 431.35(c) and (d)
require a system safety process to identify hazards,
assess the risks, and the elimination or mitigation
of the risk. In practice, the FAA has interpreted this
broad section to require a flight hazard analysis.
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hazard list developed during the earlier
PSA, including verifying the list of
items identified in § 450.109 and any
new hazards identified since completing
the PSA. A hazard is a real or potential
condition that could lead to an
unplanned event or series of events
resulting in death, serious injury, or
damage to or loss of equipment or
property. The list of items in proposed
§ 450.109(a)(1) is a list of hazard
categories that exist in all commercial
space operations and must therefore be
eliminated or mitigated to acceptable
levels.
After identifying and describing
hazards, proposed § 450.109(a)(2) would
require that an operator assess each
hazard’s likelihood and severity. This
assessment would be used to establish
mitigation priorities. The operator
would then determine the severity of
the specific potential hazardous
condition with respect to public safety.
An operator should determine the
severity for a specific hazard by
identifying the worst credible event that
may result from the hazard. For
example, if an operator identifies a
hazard such as incorrect vehicle
position data due to inertial
measurement unit (IMU) drift leading to
an off nominal trajectory, the operator
would determine the public impact
using the greatest off nominal vehicle
trajectory and the worst credible public
safety outcome. Meaning, if the vehicle
would break up aerodynamically due to
an off nominal trajectory caused by IMU
drift, the operator should base its
severity assessment on the debris event
generated by the break up taking into
account the population in the area. If
the vehicle operates in a remote area the
severity may be low; however, if the
operation occurs within the reach of the
population, the severity would be
catastrophic.
After severity and likelihood are
assessed, proposed § 450.109(a)(3)
would require that an operator ensure
that any hazard that may cause a
casualty is extremely remote, and any
hazard that can cause major damage to
public property or critical assets is
remote. If a particular hazard source has
been observed in a similar operation
under similar conditions, it will be
difficult to justify that the likelihood of
the reoccurrence of the event will
qualify as remote or extremely remote.
This requirement is substantively the
same as current practice under
§ 431.35(c) and is specifically called out
in § 437.55(a)(3) for experimental
permits. Examples of suggested
likelihood categories for remote and
extremely remote are provided in FAA’s
Advisory Circular (AC) 437.55–1
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‘‘Hazard Analyses for the Launch or
Reentry of a Reusable Suborbital Rocket
Under an Experimental Permit’’ as 1 ×
10¥5 and 1 × 10¥6, respectively.
The operator would then need to
identify and describe risk elimination
and mitigation measures as required by
proposed § 450.109(a)(4). The operator
should always consider whether the risk
mitigation measures introduce new
hazards. This proposed section codifies
current practice under the § 431.35(c)
broad system safety analysis
requirement. Although not required,
system safety standards and advisory
material such as MIL–STD–882E, AC
437.55–1, and AC 431.35–2A ‘‘Reusable
Launch and Reentry Vehicle System
Safety Process’’ recommend that
operators develop risk elimination or
mitigation approaches in the following
order:
1. Design for minimum risk. The first
priority should be to eliminate hazards
through appropriate design or
operational choices.69 If an operator
cannot eliminate a risk, it should
minimize it through design or
operational choices.
2. Incorporate safety devices. If an
operator cannot eliminate hazards
through design or operation selection,
then an operator should reduce risks
through the use of active or passive
safety devices.70
3. Provide warning devices. When
neither design nor safety devices can
eliminate or adequately reduce
identified risks, the operator should use
a device to detect and warn of the
hazardous condition to minimize the
likelihood of inappropriate human
reaction and response.71
4. Implement procedures and
training. When it is impractical to
eliminate risks through design or safety
and warning devices, the operator
should develop and implement
procedures and training that mitigate
the risks.72
Proposed § 450.109(a)(5) would
require that the risk elimination and
mitigation measures achieve the
proposed risk levels in § 450.109(a)(3)
through verification and validation.
Verification ensures the measures
69 An example of designing out risk to the public
would be to operate in an unpopulated area.
70 An example of an active safety device would
be a computing system that automatically shuts
down the rocket engine when a sensor detects high
thrust chamber temperatures. A passive safety
device might be a firewall to prevent a fire from
reaching a pilot.
71 An example of a warning device would be an
abort indicator such as a flashing light or a message
on a cockpit instrument panel.
72 An example of risk mitigation procedures and
training are abort procedures and rehearsals of
those procedures.
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themselves are properly developed and
implemented while validation ensures
the measures will actually achieve the
desired outcome. Verification takes
place while developing the measures
and validation after development and
implementation. This requirement is
substantively the same as current
practice under § 431.35(c). The
acceptable methods of verifying safety
measures are:
1. Analysis: Technical or
mathematical evaluation, mathematical
models, simulations, algorithms, and
circuit diagrams.
2. Test: Actual operation to evaluate
performance of system elements during
ambient conditions or in operational
environments at or above expected
levels. These tests include functional
tests and environmental tests.
3. Demonstration: Actual operation of
the system or subsystem under specified
scenarios, often used to verify
reliability, transportability,
maintainability, serviceability, and
human engineering factors.
4. Inspection: Examination of
hardware, software, or documentation to
verify compliance of the feature with
predetermined criteria.
An operator could use methods
separately or combine them depending
on the feasibility of the methods and the
maturity of the vehicle and operation.
Proposed § 450.109(b) would require
that an applicant establish and
document the criteria and techniques
for identifying new hazards throughout
the launch or reentry system lifecycle.
Development, implementation, and
continued operation of any system
requires that changes be made
throughout the lifecycle. Changes to the
vehicle, especially to safety-critical
systems and operations, can have
significant impacts on public safety and
will result in changes to the hazard
analysis. Anomalies and failures can
also identify unknown hazards. This
requirement is substantively the same as
the FAA’s current practice under
§ 431.35(c). Parts 415 and 417 do not
have a flight hazard analysis
requirement.
Proposed § 450.109(c) would require
that the flight hazard analysis be
updated and complete for every launch
or reentry. In other words, the analysis
must be applicable to the specific
mission. A hazard analysis for a
previous mission may be used only if
the vehicle and operational details of
the mission do not impact the validity
of any aspect of the hazard analysis. The
FAA has not prescribed the
methodology that an operator must
follow to ensure the accuracy of a flight
hazard analyses. However, this item is
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key to ensuring that the operator is
aware of the hazards in the proposed
operation.
Proposed § 450.109(d) requires that an
operator continually update the flight
hazard analysis throughout the
operational lifecycle of the launch or
reentry system. This requirement is
substantively the same as current FAA
practice under § 431.35(c).
Proposed § 450.109(e) establishes the
flight hazard analysis application
requirements. An applicant would be
required to submit a flight hazard
analysis in its application to provide the
FAA with sufficient detail to evaluate
the applicant’s flight hazard analyses
and its criteria and techniques for
identifying new hazards throughout the
lifecycle of the launch or reentry
system. The FAA recommends that the
applicant provide at a minimum a
hazard table that provides a description
of each hazard identified, associated
severity and likelihood of each hazard,
the mitigation measures identified for
each hazard, and a summary of the
validation and verification of each
hazard. For hazards that require
mitigation, the applicant would also be
required to provide the data showing
the verification of those mitigations
measures. The FAA expects the results
of any testing or analysis associated
with the verification to be in a format
that is easily understood by an
experienced technical evaluator. For
items verified by analysis, the applicant
should provide the assumptions and
methodology used to conduct the
analyses if it is not easily understood by
evaluating the results. These application
requirements would not require more
than the current practices under
§ 431.35(c) and (d).
G. Computing Systems and Software
Overview
The FAA is proposing to address
hazards associated with computing
systems and software separate from
flight hazard analysis. The FAA would
consolidate all software safety
requirements applicable to launch or
reentry operations in a single section, in
proposed § 450.111 (Computing Systems
and Software).73 These proposed
regulations address both software and
how the software operates on the
intended hardware and computing
systems.74 While the FAA discusses
73 For the purpose of this discussion, the phrase
‘‘software safety requirements’’ refers to software
safety regulations and ‘‘software requirements’’
refers to the specifications that define a software
component’s intended functionality.
74 The FAA understands software to mean a
combination of computer instructions and
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hardware requirements elsewhere under
the safety-critical systems requirements,
it is important to recognize that software
safety cannot be evaluated outside of the
computing system in which it
operates.75 A computing system is a
complete system made up of the central
processing unit, memory, related
electronics, and peripheral devices.
These proposed software safety
requirements would streamline the
software safety evaluation process by
adding detail to the performance-based
requirements in the existing rules. The
software safety requirements in the
proposed rule are levied in proportion
to the potential software hazards and
the degree of control over those
hazards.76 In other words, software
safety requirements would increase in
rigor with the rise in potential safety
risks and degree of autonomy.
Conversely, software safety
requirements would decrease in rigor
with reductions in the potential safety
risk or degree of autonomy.77 This
approach would codify existing FAA
practice of modulating the stringency of
review commensurate with the level of
public risk. The FAA would also add
more clarity to the software scaled
requirements to guide applicants to
appropriate and predictable engineering
judgments when determining the proper
depth and breadth of software
development, analysis, and verification
activities. The FAA expects these
changes would enable innovation by
setting predictable safety requirements
based on knowable characteristics of
new software systems and in proportion
to the risks involved with the
innovation. For a detailed discussion,
please see the Additional Technical
Justification and Rationale discussion
later in the preamble.
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H. Hybrid Launch Vehicles
Hybrid vehicles are vehicles that have
some characteristics of aircraft and other
characteristics of traditional launch or
reentry vehicles. This proposal would
allow an operator to forego the use of
flight abort as a hazard control strategy
during certain phases of flight if the
hybrid launch or reentry vehicle has a
computer data that enables a computer to perform
computational and control functions.
75 Hardware is the collection of physical parts of
a computer system, including memory storage
devices, power sources, and processors that execute
software.
76 For the purpose of this rulemaking, software
hazards are those hazardous conditions created by
the execution of software, or for which software is
used as a mitigation or control.
77 The FAA uses the phrase ‘‘level of rigor’’ to
describe the amount of precision and effort applied
by an applicant to address the severity of a hazard
and associated software autonomy.
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high demonstrated reliability during
those phases of flight. The FAA would
make these determinations on a case-bycase basis based on a vehicle’s
demonstrated reliability.
The FAA may regulate hybrid
vehicles under either the commercial
space transportation or the civil aircraft
regulations, depending on the operation.
For a flight of a hybrid vehicle where a
carrier aircraft has been modified to
carry a rocket and the operator intends
to ignite the rocket, the FAA considers
the aircraft a component of the launch
vehicle.78 The combination launch
vehicle system is authorized solely by a
vehicle operator license or experimental
permit under Title 51. The FAA
currently authorizes the operation of
hybrid vehicles using a license or
permit for the entire mission from
preflight ground activities through taxi,
take off, flight, landing, wheel stop, and
post-flight safing for all components of
the combined launch vehicle system.
The FAA has granted a license to hybrid
vehicles such as the Stargazer/Pegasus,
WhiteKnightOne/SpaceShipOne,
WhiteKnightTwo/SpaceShipTwo, and
Cosmic Girl/LauncherOne
combinations. In addition to carrier
aircraft models, hybrid vehicles may
also include future concepts such as a
single vehicle with both air-breathing
and rocket engines, winged launch or
reentry vehicles, balloon-launched
rockets, and other concepts that may
have characteristics of both aviation and
traditional launch or reentry vehicles.79
The FAA will work with applicants
using hybrid vehicles during preapplication to identify the appropriate
regulatory path. To date, the FAA has
issued guidance in two legal
interpretations on the process for
determining whether flights or portions
of flights of hybrid vehicles are
78 ‘‘Chapter 509 applies when [a hybrid] system
operates as a launch vehicle from the flight of the
carrier aircraft, through ignition of the rocket, to the
return and landing of the carrier aircraft and the
suborbital rocket. For a mission that does not entail
ignition of the rocket, the FAA’s aviation statute
and regulations apply.’’ See Legal Interpretation to
Pamela L. Meredith from Mark W. Bury (September
26, 2013).
79 An example of a hybrid vehicle that does not
use a carrier aircraft is the World View capsule.
This capsule is not a rocket, but it meets the
definition of a launch vehicle because it operates
at an altitude where it needs to be designed, built,
and tested to operate in outer space. See Legal
Interpretation to Pamela L. Meredith from Mark W.
Bury, September 26, 2013; (https://www.faa.gov/
about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agc/practice_
areas/regulations/interpretations/data/interps/
2013/meredith-zuckertscoutt&rasenberger%20%20(2013)%20legal%20interpretation.pdf). Similar
to other hybrid vehicles, when not operating as a
launch vehicle, World View will operate under the
appropriate aviation provisions of title 49.
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15321
regulated under title 49 or Title 51.80 As
new hybrid concepts are unveiled, the
FAA anticipates issuing additional
guidance to assist operators.
The FAA has worked with and
received input from industry on how to
regulate hybrid vehicles. For instance,
in 2017 and 2018, the FAA convened a
Safety Risk Management (SRM) panel
consisting of FAA and industry
representatives to review and assess
hazards associated with captive carry
operations.81 The panel recommended
dispensing with any aircraft hazard area
requirement during the captive carry
phase of flight for previously licensed
hybrid vehicles with fixed-wing carrier
aircraft. The ARC also recommended
that the FAA set a different standard for
hybrid vehicles, specifically that the
FAA not require an FSA for operations
where the agency has already
considered impacts to public safety
during the airworthiness certification
process. Additionally, the ARC
recommended that an operator only be
required to conduct an FSA for those
portions of flight when the hazardous
configuration of the hybrid system
differs from that approved under an
experimental airworthiness certificate or
equivalent authorization.
As discussed earlier, the FAA
proposes to provide flexibility for
certain phases of flight with respect to
FSA (proposed § 450.113(a)(5)) and FSS
(proposed § 450.101(c)) requirements.
This is consistent with the ARC’s
recommendation. The FAA recognizes
that airworthiness certificates and
licenses, when developed
collaboratively between the Aviation
Safety and Commercial Space
Transportation lines of business,
sufficiently protect the public. In these
cases, the FAA would include a license
term and condition for a current
airworthiness certificate. Specifically,
the license would impose terms and
conditions such as compliance with
certain part 91 (General Operating and
80 Legal Interpretation to Kelvin B. Coleman from
Lorelei Peter, July 23, 2018; (https://www.faa.gov/
about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agc/practice_
areas/regulations/interpretations/data/interps/
2018/coleman-ast-1%20-%20(2018)%20legal%
20interpretation.pdf); Legal Interpretation to Pamela
L. Meredith from Mark W. Bury, Sept. 26, 2013;
(https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/
headquarters_offices/agc/practice_areas/
regulations/interpretations/data/interps/2013/
meredith-zuckertscoutt&rasenberger%20-%
20(2013)%20legal%20interpretation.pdf).
81 The SRM panel members included FAA
representatives from the Air Traffic Organization,
Aviation Safety, and the Office of Commercial
Space Transportation. The panel also included civil
aviation and commercial space participants such as
the Air Line Pilots Association, the National Air
Traffic Controllers Association, Orbital ATK, Virgin
Galactic, Virgin Orbit, and Mojave Air and Space
Port.
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Flight Rules) requirements and
airworthiness operating limitations, not
including any restrictions on
compensation or hire. This blended
approach of combining airworthiness
with part 450’s system safety
requirements would ensure public
safety without the need for an FSA.
This proposal would reduce FSA,
CEC, and FSS requirements for phases of
flight such as the captive carry phase,
the carrier-vehicle-alone phase, and any
rocket component glide back. The
captive carry phase of flight starts when
the carrier vehicle takes off carrying the
rocket aloft and transports it to the
rocket release location. The carriervehicle-alone phase starts when the
carrier vehicle releases the rocket, and
includes all flight activities in support
of the mission until the carrier vehicle
lands and is safed. During the carriervehicle-alone phase, the rocket
component is conducting its rocketpowered and coast phases. The rocket
coast phase occurs immediately after the
rocket engine shuts down, and is not
considered an aviation-like glide phase
because the pilot does not have
significant control authority over the
instantaneous impact point (the
predicted impact point following thrust
termination of a vehicle). For returning
rockets, there may be a glide phase
which begins at a point to be
determined on a case-by-case basis after
the vehicle completes any
reconfiguration necessary and
demonstrates non-rocket powered
control authority and ends when the
vehicle lands.
The FAA would work with hybrid
vehicle applicants during preapplication consultation to determine
the applicability of FSA, CEC, and FSS
requirements. For example, the FAA
might determine the quantitative FSA
requirement for those portions of a
mission where the vehicle operates as a
civil aviation aircraft governed by civil
aviation regulations (as incorporated
into the license) is unnecessary because
the vehicle has demonstrated reliability
during that phase as indicated by the
issuance of an airworthiness certificate.
Thus, an applicant would not have to
conduct the quantitative FSA for the
aircraft-like controllable phases of flight,
such as the captive carry phase or for
phases with non-rocket powered or
glide phases previously authorized
under an airworthiness certificate. This
would not normally be the case during
the rocket-powered, coast, reentry, or
glide back phases of flight that are
unique to space flight. All other
regulatory requirements, including
system safety requirements, would
apply to the entire mission. Due to the
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unknown operating characteristics of
future hybrid vehicles, the FAA is not
proposing to provide a blanket FSA
exemption for all hybrid systems.
I. Flight Safety Analysis Overview
For purposes of this proposed rule, a
flight safety analysis consists of a set of
quantitative analyses used to determine
flight commit criteria, flight abort rules,
flight hazard areas, and other mitigation
measures, and to verify compliance with
the public safety criteria in proposed
§ 450.101. The FAA proposes 15
sections for flight safety analysis. The
analyses are described here briefly
because of their overall importance to
the regulation and are discussed in
greater detail in the ‘‘Additional
Technical Justification and Rationale’’
section. Furthermore, the FAA plans to
publish updated ACs and guidelines to
describe acceptable means to conduct
these analyses.
The first two sections for FSA would
outline the scope, applicability, and
methods for conducting FSAs:
1. Flight Safety Analysis
Requirements—Scope and Applicability
(§ 450.113). This section would
establish the portions of flight for which
an operator would be required to
perform and document an FSA and
would identify the analyses required for
each type of operation.
2. Flight Safety Analysis Methods
(§ 450.115). This section would set
methodology requirements for FSAs,
including level of fidelity.
Three sections would require
fundamental flight safety analyses:
1. Trajectory Analysis for Normal
Flight (§ 450.117). All the FSAs depend
on some form of analysis of the
trajectory under normal conditions,
referred to as a normal trajectory.
2. Trajectory Analysis for Malfunction
Flight (§ 450.119). A malfunction
trajectory analysis is necessary to
determine how far a vehicle can deviate
from its normal flight path in case of a
malfunction. This analysis helps
determine impact points in case of a
malfunction and is therefore a vital
input for the analyses needed to
demonstrate compliance with risk
criteria.
3. Debris Analysis (§ 450.121). A
debris analysis is necessary to
characterize the debris generated in
various failure scenarios, including
those that could produce an intact
vehicle impact.
Four analyses would produce
information necessary to implement
flight abort as a hazard control strategy:
1. Flight Safety Limits Analysis
(§ 450.123). A flight safety limit analysis
is necessary to identify uncontrolled
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areas and establish flight safety limits
that define when an operator must
initiate flight abort to (1) ensure
compliance with the public safety
criteria of proposed § 450.101, and (2)
prevent debris capable of causing a
casualty from impacting in uncontrolled
areas if the vehicle is outside the limits
of a useful mission.
2. Gate Analysis (§ 450.125). A gate
analysis is necessary to determine
necessary openings in a flight safety
limit through which a vehicle may fly,
provided the vehicle meets certain predefined conditions indicating an ability
to continue safe flight.
3. Data Loss Flight Time and Planned
Safe Flight State Analyses (§ 450.127). A
data loss flight time analysis is
necessary to establish when an operator
must abort a flight following the loss of
vehicle tracking information. A planned
safe flight state analysis is necessary to
determine when an FSS is no longer
necessary.
4. Time Delay Analysis (§ 450.129). A
time delay analysis is necessary to
establish the mean elapsed time
between the violation of a flight abort
rule and the time when the flight safety
system is capable of aborting flight for
use in establishing flight safety limits.
One section addresses probability of
failure analysis:
1. Probability of Failure Analysis
(§ 450.131). During any particular flight
or phase of flight, an estimated
probability of failure, and how that
probability is allocated across flight
time and vehicle response mode, is
necessary to support the determination
of hazard areas and risk.
One section addresses the
determination of flight hazard areas:
1. Flight Hazard Area Analysis
(§ 450.133). This analysis is necessary to
determine any region of land, sea, or air
that must be surveyed, publicized,
controlled, or evacuated in order to
protect the public health and safety, and
safety of property.
Three sections would be necessary to
determine whether risk criteria are met
for different types of hazards:
1. Debris Risk Analysis (§ 450.135). A
debris risk analysis is necessary to
determine whether the individual and
collective risks of public casualties, due
to inert and explosive debris hazards
meets public safety criteria.
2. Far-field Overpressure Blast Effects
Analysis (§ 450.137). This analysis is
necessary to determine whether the
potential public hazard from broken
windows as a result of impacting
explosive debris, including impact of an
intact launch vehicle, meets public
safety criteria.
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3. Toxic Hazards for Flight
(§ 450.139). This analysis is necessary to
determine whether hazards associated
with toxic release meet public safety
criteria.
Lastly, one section is necessary for the
launch of an unguided suborbital
launch vehicle using wind weighting as
a hazard control strategy. A launch
vehicle using other mitigations would
not be required to conduct this analysis:
1. Wind Weighting for the Flight of an
Unguided Suborbital Launch Vehicle
(§ 450.141). This section would outline
a wind weighting analysis that is
required to ensure that the launch of an
unguided suborbital launch vehicle
using wind weighting as a hazard
control strategy meets public safety
criteria.
J. Safety-Critical Systems
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1. Safety-Critical Systems Design, Test,
and Documentation
The FAA proposes to consolidate the
design, test, and documentation
requirements for safety-critical
components in proposed § 450.143
(Safety-Critical System Design, Test, and
Documentation). A common set of
requirements is needed for clarity and
consistency.
Safety-critical systems or components
include those systems or components
whose performance is essential to
ensuring public safety. Historically, the
FAA has considered the FSS to be the
only safety-critical system on an ELV.
For RLVs and reentry vehicles, the use
of a systematic, logical, and disciplined
system safety process is meant to
identify safety-critical systems and the
extent of prudent operational controls.82
If a system failure would cause any
hazards and those hazards could reach
a populated area, then the system is
likely a safety-critical system. Generally,
RLV operators incorporate FSSs,
although they may also incorporate
other safety-critical elements of risk
mitigation and hazard control. Non-RLV
reentry vehicles also require a thorough
system safety process to identify safetycritical hardware.
The current rules for ELV, RLV, and
reentry vehicle safety-critical systems
are quite different. However, in practice,
the evaluation of the safety of such
systems is very similar. Parts 415 and
82 Some of the more commonly used
methodologies include Preliminary Hazard Lists
(PHL), Preliminary Hazard Analyses (PHA), Event
Tree Analyses (ETA), Fault Tree Analyses (FTA),
FMEAs, and FMECAs. Generally, these
methodologies help operators determine whether a
system failure could cause a loss of vehicle control,
a vehicle breakup or other creation of uncontrolled
debris, a discharge of hazardous material, or would
prevent safe landing.
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417 require ELVs to have very reliable
hazard-constraining FSSs that ensure
public safety. These FSSs are subject to
design requirements, extensive design
qualification testing, and acceptance
testing of all components. RLVs and
reentry vehicles are required to undergo
a comprehensive system safety
engineering process that, in part,
identifies and eliminates hazards to
reduce the associated risk to acceptable
levels by defining safety-critical systems
and identifying associated hazards and
risks. Under system safety, an operator
develops design-level safety
requirements and provides evidence for
verification and validation of safetycritical systems and requirements. For
safety-critical systems this serves the
purpose of design qualification and
acceptance. Given that RLVs are built to
experience multiple flights, the
lifecycle 83 of safety-critical systems
must also be considered as part of the
design, testing, and documentation.
i. Current Qualification and Acceptance
Testing Requirements
Qualification testing is an assessment
of a prototype or other structural article
to verify the structural integrity of a
design. Generally, qualification testing
involves testing the design under a
number of different environmental
factors to stress the design, with a
multiplying factor applied to the
expected environmental testing limit.
This qualification testing is conducted
for temperatures, tensile loads, handling
shocks, and other expected
environmental stressors.
Unlike qualification testing that is
performed on qualification units,
acceptance testing is performance
testing conducted on the actual
hardware to be used on a vehicle after
the completion of the manufacturing
process. Generally, acceptance tests are
performed on each article of the safetycritical flight hardware to verify that it
is free of defects, free of integration and
workmanship errors, and ready for
operational use. Acceptance testing
includes testing for defects, along with
environmental testing similar to the
qualification testing described earlier.
For ELVs, qualification and
acceptance testing are important
verification of the reliability of all FSSs
at the subsystem and component level,
and ensures the safe operability of the
only safety-critical system on any given
83 Many operators seek to refurbish or otherwise
reuse safety-critical systems for multiple flights.
Operators must design, test, and document safetycritical systems to demonstrate their safety-critical
systems can continue to operate reliably throughout
the component life in all predicted operating
environments.
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ELV. For ELVs, current qualification
and acceptance testing requirements
and procedures for FSS subsystems and
components are listed in §§ 417.305,
417.307, and appendix E of part 417
(E417). As FSSs are the only safetycritical systems on traditional ELVs, the
component-level testing requirements in
part 417 describe the testing of specific
possible components in great detail,
going so far as to differentiate testing
requirements for silver-zinc batteries in
E417.21 from nickel-cadmium batteries
in E417.22. While the FAA has
approved alternative FSSs, the
prescription level of the current
requirements discourages significant
innovation.
The same emphasis on validation of
design and verification of hardware
tolerances applies to components that
have been identified as safety-critical
during a system safety process. For
RLVs and reentry vehicles, a system
safety process is required by
§ 431.35(c).84 Under the system safety
process, a vehicle designer must assess
nominal and non-nominal flight
scenarios of the vehicle and must
account for any possible safety-critical
system failures during flight that could
result in a casualty to the public. Those
vehicle operators are required, by
§ 431.35(d)(3), to identify all safetycritical systems and are required by
§ 431.35(d)(7) to demonstrate the risk
elimination in relation to those safetycritical systems. While not explicitly
called out in the current part 431 or 435,
qualification and acceptance testing are
the widely accepted standards for
demonstrating that safety-critical
systems, subsystems, and components
are not at risk of failing during flight.
Current regulations are undefined
with respect to the applicability of
qualification and testing of safetycritical components that are not listed in
§§ 417.301(b), 417.305 and 417.307, or
appendix E of part 417. The regulations
are similarly ambiguous if the vehicle
does not have a traditional FSS but still
has components that are considered
safety-critical, like many vehicles
licensed under part 431. This ambiguity
has led to regulatory uncertainty, which
in turn has resulted in lengthy
exchanges between the FAA and license
applicants about what components and
systems needed to be tested, what
testing would be acceptable to the FAA,
and why that testing was necessary to be
compliant. Testing is currently generally
required for safety-critical systems
across all vehicle types, either explicitly
or as verification and validation in the
84 Section 431.35(c) is required for reentry
vehicles by § 435.33.
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system safety process, but this is often
not well-reflected in the current
regulations. As a result, applicants often
are confused by qualification testing
requirements asserted by the FAA for
RLVs when there are no explicit
qualification testing requirements in
part 431.
ii. Current Fault Tolerance
Requirements
Fault-tolerance is the idea that a
system must be designed so that it is
able to perform its function in the event
of a failure of one or more of its
components. In a fault-tolerant design of
a safety-critical system, no single
credible fault should be capable of
increasing the risk to public safety
beyond that of a nominal operation.
Typically, a fault-tolerant design applies
redundancy or a system of safety
barriers to ensure the system can
function, though perhaps with reduced
performance. An example of a faulttolerant design is an aircraft with
multiple engines that can continue
flying even if one of the engines fails.
The current part 417 regulations cover
fault-tolerant design of FSS components
as a set of explicit prescriptive
requirements. For instance, § 417.303(d)
specifically lists fault-tolerance as a
requirement of an FSS command control
system design, requiring that no single
failure point be able to inhibit the
system’s function or inadvertently
transmit a flight termination command.
An operator must demonstrate that the
command system, in accordance with
§ 417.309(c), is fault tolerant through
analysis, identification of possible
failure modes, implementation of
redundant systems or other mitigation
measures, and verification that the
mitigation measures will not fail
simultaneously. Appendix D of part 417
(section D417.5) further details single
fault tolerance and prescribes
redundancy of command strings that are
structurally, electrically, and
mechanically separated to ensure that
any failure that would damage, destroy,
or otherwise inhibit the operation of one
redundant component would not inhibit
the operation of the other redundant
component.
The current ELV regulations are
prescriptive and often dictate specific
implementations of fault-tolerance
where other forms may be adequate. For
instance, a fail-safe approach has been
used in the rationale of past applicants
that use thrust termination systems to
protect public safety. A fail-safe design
is a system that can fail in a controlled
way, such that the failure will still
ensure public safety, like elevator brakes
held open by the tension of the elevator
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cable such that if the cable snaps the
brakes engage and stop the elevator from
falling. The FAA has granted waivers to
the redundancy requirement of section
D417.5(c) for fail-safe safety-critical
systems that have been integrated in
such a way that a loss of power to that
system would result in direct thrust
termination of the launch vehicle
though deactivation of normally-closed
valves. Also, ELOS determinations have
been issued for flight termination
receivers that have fail-safe commands
that are issued on signal loss because
the failure of the system automatically
results in termination of the flight and
the constraint of flight hazards. Less
prescriptive fault-tolerant design
regulations could enable such designs
instead of requiring waivers or ELOS
determinations.
Operations licensed under parts 431
and 435 may not have traditional FSSs,
but the need for fault-tolerance is
implicitly derived from the system
safety process of § 431.35(c) and (d), as
it is often a necessary control for an
identified hazard. The FAA views faulttolerance as a necessary characteristic of
any reliable system.
The current fault tolerance provisions
lack clarity in the scope of their
applicability to RLVs and reentry
vehicles because they are implicit in the
system safety processes of hazard
identification and mitigation. As with
the testing requirements, a lack of
regulatory clarity is detrimental to both
applicants and the FAA, leading to
confusion, a drawn-out application
acceptance process, and lengthy
discussions to arrive at a clear
understanding of how fault tolerance is
applicable to a proposed operation.
iii. Current Reuse Requirements
Safety-critical FSSs of ELVs generally
undergo a single flight. Therefore, very
little life-cycle planning is required for
them unless an operator seeks to reuse
certain safety-critical components.
However, ELV operators must still
account for environments that the FSS
is expected to encounter throughout the
lifecycle of the system, including
storage, transportation, installation, and
flight, which generally are built into
qualification and acceptance testing
levels. Lifecycle planning is a more
significant concern for reusable safetycritical systems because near-total reuse
is an expected part of their operation.
Current parts 415 and 417 contain
requirements for the reuse of ELV FSS
components. To be a licensed ELV
operator, an applicant must submit to
the FAA any reuse qualification testing,
refurbishment, and acceptance testing
plans, in accordance with § 415.129(f).
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Those test plans must show that any
FSS component is still capable of
performing as required when subjected
to the qualification test environmental
levels plus the total number of
exposures to the maximum expected
environmental levels for each of the
flights to be flown. Previously flown
FSSs must also abide by § E417.13(a)(3),
and the components must undergo one
or more reuse acceptance tests before
each flight to demonstrate that the
component still satisfies all its
performance specifications when
subjected to each maximum predicted
environment. Additionally, tests for
reuse must compare performance
measurements to all previous tests to
ensure no trends emerge that indicate
performance degradation in the
component that could prevent the
component from satisfying all its
performance specifications during
flight. As the lines have blurred between
ELVs with significantly reusable safetycritical systems and RLVs, these
requirements still contain good safety
policy, but they are constrained by their
limited coverage of only traditional
FSSs.
While operations licensed under part
431 are focused on RLVs, neither part
431 nor part 435 contain any explicit
requirements placed on reuse. Like all
other aspects of safety-critical system
requirements, reuse under these parts is
governed by the system safety process of
§ 431.35. Safety-critical systems that do
not account for expected lifecycle,
refurbishment, and reuse do not
adequately meet the hazard
identification and risk mitigation of the
system safety requirements. Implicit in
the system safety requirements,
commensurate testing is required to
demonstrate that the planned lifecycle
performance remains accurate. Reuse of
safety-critical components is a potential
hazard that needs to be mitigated.
Reuse induces stress on components
and systems that can degrade
operational performance if not
accounted for in design and testing.
Additionally, ‘‘reuse’’ implies multiple
uses of a component after its initial
intended lifetime or outside of its initial
intended operating environments. Based
on industry best practices, intended use
and lifetime should be designed into
components initially; qualification and
acceptance testing should be based on
predicted operating environments that
encompass the entire lifetime of a
system; and lifecycle management
practices should be used to refine initial
predictions. The current lack of a clear,
unified, and simple requirement that
explicitly covers reuse for all safetycritical systems leads to prescriptive
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constraints on ELV operators and
regulatory confusion for RLV and
reentry operators who are unfamiliar
with the implicit requirements of a
system safety process.
iv. Consolidation of Design, Test and
Documentation Requirements
The FAA proposes to consolidate the
design, test and documentation
requirements for safety-critical systems
and components, both identified by a
system safety process and as part of an
FSS, currently found in parts 415 and
417, 431, and 435. Specifically, the FAA
proposes to provide performance-based
requirements for safety-critical systems,
including fault tolerant design, design
qualification testing, hardware
acceptance testing, and the verification
of flight environments to assess the lifecycle of safety-critical systems for reuse
purposes.
Under proposed § 450.143, all safetycritical systems would be required to
meet these requirements, including a
FSS that also would be required to meet
the additional requirements of proposed
§ 450.145. By having a consistent set of
overarching requirements regulating the
design, testing, and documentation of
safety-critical systems and hardware,
the FAA anticipates that applicants
would be enabled to implement new
risk-mitigating design strategies under a
clear and consolidated regulatory
regime. New technologies that emerge
would be covered by the general
requirements without causing regulatory
delays due to confusion, increasing
paperwork burdens required for
requesting waivers, or waiting for future
rulemaking changes necessary to allow
emerging technologies. These criteria
would be the standards for
demonstrating that such systems can
survive and perform to an adequate
level of safety in all operating
environments.
The ARC recommended that better
standards need to be developed
regarding safety-critical systems. The
ARC pointed out that there is no single
process or procedure that documents an
acceptable way to go through a system
design and determine safety-criticality,
and it asked for better guidance on
safety-criticality, given that usually
industry views criticality more from a
mission assurance point of view. More
generally, the ARC requested a more
performance-based regulatory regime,
with a clearer focus on safety and
greater flexibility for novel operations.
In regards to reuse and maintenance, the
ARC suggested that requirements should
be focused on maintaining reliability of
inputs. The ARC specifically called out
the section E417.13 requirement to
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remove and recomplete acceptance
testing prior to reuse of flight safety
system components between each flight
as an untenable burden both in terms of
cost and time. Furthermore, the ARC
also noted that continued acceptance
testing of flight hardware to predict
environmental levels plus margins puts
undue strain on flight systems and can
significantly reduce their lifespan.
To remedy the confusion resulting
from a current lack of regulatory clarity
for RLVs and reentry vehicles, proposed
§ 450.143(c) and (d) would explicitly
require qualification testing of the
design and acceptance testing of the
safety-critical flight hardware. To
remedy the implied design constraints
of current detailed requirements for
ELVs, proposed § 450.143(c) and (d)
would be general, high-level
requirements for demonstrating the
performance of safety-critical system
design, and that the system is
operational and free from defects and
errors.
Specifically, proposed § 450.143(c)
would require an operator to
functionally demonstrate 85 the design
of a vehicle’s safety-critical systems at
conditions beyond its predicted
operating environment. The design
qualification tests should include
enough margin beyond predicted
operating environments to demonstrate
that the system design can tolerate
manufacturing variance or
environmental uncertainties without
performance degradation.
Proposed § 450.143(d)(1) would
require operators to perform a
functional demonstration of any safetycritical systems by exposing them to
their predicted operating environment
with margin. The performance of the
flight hardware during the test would be
required to demonstrate that the flight
units are free of defects, integration or
workmanship errors, and are ready for
operational use. Alternatively, an
applicant would be able to comply with
proposed § 450.143(d)(2) instead of
proposed § 450.143(d)(1). If an applicant
chooses to comply with proposed
§ 450.143(d)(2), it would be required to
ensure functional capability and that the
flight hardware remains free from error
and defect during its service life through
a combination of in-process controls
and a quality assurance process. This
flexible approach to acceptance testing
would relieve some of the burdens of a
traditional acceptance testing regime
and would add clarity that these
demonstrations are required for all
safety-critical flight hardware.
85 Functional demonstration is generally achieved
through testing.
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Proposed § 450.143 would clearly
state the requirements for all safetycritical system components and
eliminate the ambiguity that exists in
the current regulations regarding
required testing of safety-critical system
components that are not a part of an
FSS. While FSSs are safety-critical
systems, their criticality requires
additional requirements beyond
proposed § 450.143. The consolidated
performance requirements for FSS
components are detailed in proposed
§ 450.145, and are discussed in the
‘‘Flight Safety System’’ section of this
preamble.
As the proposed rule seeks to make
the safety requirements of § 450.143
applicable to all commercial space
launch and reentry vehicles, there
should be better clarity across the
industry and the government regarding
what is required of safety-critical
systems for both design qualification
testing and flight hardware acceptance
testing. Also, as recommended by the
ARC, the FAA’s proposal would allow
for the possibility of other forms of
acceptance testing methodologies and
quality controls, subject to approval of
the FAA, for safety-critical components
that are not directly covered by the
flight safety system requirements. This
option should enable new business
practices but maintain the safety
verification necessary to ensure public
safety.
The ARC did not speak specifically to
fault tolerant design but did indicate
that vehicle reliability and architecture
should be considerations in the FAA’s
evaluation of novel systems. Proposed
§ 450.143(b) would require an
applicant’s safety-critical system to be
designed so that no single credible fault
would impact public safety. This
proposal would provide clarity to the
scope of the requirement of faulttolerance by defining it as an explicit
design performance requirement. It
would replace many specific
prescriptive requirements in part 417’s
subpart D and appendices D and E with
a single general performance
requirement and clarify the scope of
applicability for RLV and reentry
vehicle applicants. Additionally, by
requiring only that the safety-critical
systems be designed to be fault tolerant
so that no single credible fault can lead
to increased risk to public safety, the
proposed regulations would allow
flexibility as to the method an operator
uses to comply with the requirements.
For example, the FAA anticipates that
an operator might choose to comply
with proposed § 450.143(b) with a
design that provides for redundancy for
systems that can be duplicated or
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through damage-tolerant design for
those safety-critical systems (like
primary structures) that cannot be
redundant. It is expected that this
flexibility would accommodate
technical innovation. Additionally, an
operator would be able to satisfy the
fault-tolerance requirement by fail-safe
designs that have traditionally been
approved through ELOS determinations,
eliminating the need for applicants to
apply for additional FAA review and
evaluation.
The ARC advised the FAA to focus on
verifying the veracity of maintenance
processes for reuse, combined with
alternatives to acceptance testing on per
flight basis. The FAA believes it has
addressed the testing alternatives in this
NPRM and agrees that the processes and
procedures to ensure safety-critical
systems are safe for reuse are an
important part of lifecycle validation.
Given safety-critical systems are
essential to public safety, the FAA
proposes that an operator would be
required to validate predicted operating
environments against actual operating
environments and assess component life
throughout the lifecycle of the safetycritical unit. This validation can be
done through an initial fatigue life
assessment and continual accounting of
remaining components life or through a
comprehensive inspection and
maintenance program that accounts for
damage accumulation and fault
detection.
Proposed § 450.143(e) would require
that predicted operating environments
be based on conditions expected to be
encountered in all phases of flight,
recovery, preparation, and
transportation. It would also require an
operator to monitor the environments
experienced by safety-critical systems in
order to validate the predicated
operating environment and assess the
actual component life left or to adjust
inspection periods. While the system
safety and FSS approaches to reuse can
further define specific requirements, the
FAA proposes more general
requirements on the operator to account
for the complete lifecycle of each safetycritical system, considering the design,
testing, and use of safety-critical
components. Allowing operators to
determine a proposed lifecycle for a
safety-critical system, to demonstrate
operational capabilities and
environmental endurance through
testing, to devise processes for
monitoring the lifecycle of the safetycritical system, and setting criteria and
procedures for refurbishment or
replacement allows operators flexibility
in their business plans. Having this
flexibility would allow applicants to
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demonstrate to the FAA how they
would ensure reused safety-critical
components will not degrade in
performance. The FAA anticipates that
such a demonstration would include
elements such as qualification of the
design for its intended lifetime;
acceptance testing to screen
components; monitoring of
environmental levels during use; and
monitoring component health through
inspections for either disposal or
refurbishment.
While the lifecycle management
requirement would give the applicant
flexibility on implementation, the
proposed rule would require applicants
to consider the implementation details
such as maintenance, inspection, and
consumable replacement. With the
flexibility of the top-level requirement,
applicants could continue to employ
rigorous, per flight acceptance testing of
safety-critical components, or with
enough flight data they may be able to
employ a system more similar to
commercial aviation where flown
components can be assessed in light of
the actual operating environment and
planned component reuse does not
require component testing on a per
flight basis. Monitoring of environments
and assessment of safety-critical
hardware for reuse is expected to affect
the probability of failure that would
feed back into FSAs as a check that risk
to public safety is not increased. These
flexible, top-level requirements for
safety-critical systems would make
explicit the currently implicit reuse
requirements of parts 431 and 435’s
system safety process, improving
regulatory clarity and operational
flexibility, while still requiring the
important planning, monitoring, and
assessments necessary to ensure public
safety.
To demonstrate compliance with the
proposed performance requirements, the
FAA proposes clear application
requirements in § 450.143(f). As in the
current § 431.35(d)(3) and (5), an
applicant would have to describe and
diagram all safety-critical systems in its
application. Similar requirements exist
for ELV flight safety systems of part
§ 415.127(b) and (c). Section
450.143(f)(3) also would require a
summary of the analysis detailing how
applicants arrived at the predicted
operating environment and duration for
all qualification and acceptance testing.
This is current practice, and proposed
§ 450.143(e) makes this requirement
explicit for RLVs and reentry vehicles.
The proposed requirements are also
more generalized and adaptable than the
current component-level requirements
for ELVs. Under proposed
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§ 450.143(f)(4) and (5), applicants would
be required to detail their plans for
lifecycle monitoring by describing any
instrumentation or inspection processes
used to assess reused safety-critical
systems, and the criteria and procedures
for any service life extension proposed
for those system components. Much like
the rest of the FAA’s proposal,
applicants of any vehicle type are
already expected to provide this
information, but the requirements have
been distilled into high-level,
generalized requirements to allow for
maximum operational flexibility while
still identifying the inputs the FAA
needs to verify compliance with the safe
performance and operation
requirements. While FSSs are
additionally subject to the requirements
of proposed § 450.145, the proposed
requirements for safety-critical systems
would clarify existing practice and
enable novel concepts of safety and
safety-critical design.
2. Flight Safety System
An FSS is an integral tool to protect
public health and safety and the safety
of property from hazards presented by a
vehicle in flight. An FSS allows an
operator to exercise positive control of
a launch or reentry vehicle, allowing an
operator to destroy the vehicle,
terminate thrust, or otherwise achieve
flight abort. An extremely reliable FSS
that controls the ending of vehicle flight
according to properly established rules
nearly ensures containment of hazards
within acceptable limits. For that
reason, the FAA considers an FSS a
safety-critical system. The FAA
currently requires an FSS for ELVs.
Most RLVs—aside from unguided
suborbital vehicles utilizing a wind
weighting system or certain vehicles
where the vehicle’s operation is
contained by physics—derive from the
system safety process the need for some
FSS to mitigate flight hazards.
Traditional FSSs for ELVs are
comprised of an onboard flight
termination system (FTS), a groundbased command and control system,
and tracking and telemetry systems.
Historically, the flight safety crew
monitoring the course of a vehicle
would send a command to self-destruct
if the vehicle crossed flight safety limit
lines and in doing so threatened a
protected area. Redundant transceivers
in the launch vehicle would receive the
destruct command from the ground, set
off charges in the vehicle to destroy the
vehicle and disperse the propellants so
that an errant vehicle’s hazards would
not impact populated areas. While this
method of flight abort through ordnance
is conventional, the FAA currently does
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not require an FSS to be destructive, as
made explicit in the definitions of FSS
in both §§ 401.5 and 417.3.
There has been some innovation in
FSSs—thrust termination systems are
used frequently and most RLVs can
demonstrate regulatory compliance with
part 431 with a safety system that
achieves a controlled landing in the
event of an aborted flight. As the
commercial space transportation
industry has matured, operators have
proposed FSS alternatives. These
alternative approaches include fail-safe
single string systems that trade off
mission assurance and redundancy,
other fail-safe consequence mitigation
systems, and dual purpose systems such
as FSSs that reuse the output of safetycritical GPS components for primary
navigation avionics. These alternative
approaches are not well governed by the
existing regulations.
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i. Current Regulatory Framework for
FSS
The present ELV licensing
requirements in parts 415 86 and 417
include lengthy and detailed
requirements for the performance of an
FSS and its components, as well as
detailed testing and reporting
requirements. These requirements were
originally adopted to match current
practices at Federal ranges. Section
417.107(a) identifies the need for an FSS
while subpart D (§§ 417.301–417.311)
identifies the performance requirements
of an FSS and its component systems.
Appendices D 87 and E 88 include
86 Part 415 contains the application requirements
to demonstrate compliance with part 417 and the
test report requirements to demonstrate compliance
with the relevant appendices of part 417.
Specifically, § 415.127 requires detailed
descriptions and diagrams of the FSS and
subsystems, a list of all system components that
have a critical storage or service life, detailed
descriptions of controls and displays, the system
analyses of § 417.309, demonstration of compliance
with the performance requirements, installation
procedures, and tracking and monitoring validation
procedures. Applicants must file all preliminary
design data no later than 18 months before bringing
any launch vehicle to a proposed launch site.
87 Appendix D lists very detailed performance
requirements and design reliability requirements
including fault tolerance and redundancy,
environment survivability requirements, radio
command destruct parameters, remote and
redundant safing mechanisms, positively controlled
arming mechanisms, installation procedures, and
system health monitoring. It also requires vehicles
to have an automatic or inadvertent separation
destruct system for any stage that does not possess
a complete command destruct system but is capable
of reaching a protected area before the planned safe
flight state.
88 Appendix E to part 417 contains the tests and
analysis requirements to verify the performance
requirements of FTSs and their components. It
contains detailed component level charts for
acceptance and qualification performance testing,
including the number of samples (or percentage of
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prescriptive FSS design, performance,
testing, and analysis requirements.
Under part 417, an FSS must consist of
an FTS, a command and control
system,89 support systems (like tracking
and telemetry),90 and identification of
the functions of any personnel who
operate FSS hardware or software.91
Together, these requirements allow for a
very limited range of FSS concepts
because they are primarily focused on
containment of hazards by destruction
of the vehicle or stage.
Section 417.301(b) permits applicants
to propose alternative FSSs, which do
not need to satisfy one or more of the
prescriptive requirements of subpart D
of part 417. This provision is intended
to enable greater flexibility for
innovation without negatively
impacting safety. The FAA approves an
alternative FSS if an operator
establishes through a clear and
convincing demonstration that a launch
would achieve an equivalent level of
safety to an operation that satisfies all of
the existing FSS requirements.
Alternative FSS, like traditional FSS,
must still undergo rigorous analysis and
testing to demonstrate the system’s
reliability to perform each intended
function.
Unlike ELVs, RLVs are not explicitly
required to have an FSS, but the
requirement for an FSS and its
reliability requirement is derived as an
essential hazard mitigation from a
robust system safety process under part
431. This requirement falls under the
§ 431.35(c) requirement for applicants to
use a system safety process to identify
the hazards and mitigate risks to public
health and safety under non-nominal
flight of the vehicle and payload. An
the lot) that must undergo each test type. The
testing plans must detail the environment,
equipment, pass/fail criteria, measurements, other
testing parameters, and any analyses planned in
lieu of testing.
89 A command control system transmits a
command signal that has the radio frequency
characteristics and power needed for receipt of the
signal by the flight termination system onboard the
launch vehicle. The command control system must
include equipment to ensure that an onboard flight
termination system will receive a transmitted
command signal and must meet specific
performance requirements in § 417.303.
90 Currently, under § 417.307 an FSS must
include two independent tracking sources and
provide the launch vehicle position and status to
the flight safety crew from liftoff until the vehicle
reaches its planned safe flight state. Additionally,
data processing, display, and recording systems
must display, and record, raw input and processed
data at no less than 0.1 second intervals.
91 As part of the current requirements for an FSS,
§ 417.311(a) requires human intervention capability
for flight termination to be initiated by flight safety
crew. Therefore, § 417.307 requires design, test, and
functional requirements for systems that support
the functions of a flight safety crew, including any
vehicle tracking system.
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acceptable system safety analysis
identifies and assesses the probability
and consequences of any reasonably
foreseeable hazardous event and safetycritical system failures during launch
flight that could result in a casualty to
the public. Based on current practice,
most RLVs must have some method to
reliably achieve flight abort to fully
mitigate flight risks and consequences,
either in the form of a pilot that can
safely abort flight using system controls,
a more traditional FSS that is designed
and tested in the same manner as is
required for ELVs, or a system that can
meet the requirements for an alternative
FSS under § 417.301(b). The lack of an
explicit requirement for an FSS in part
431 often leads to confusion regarding
what is expected for applicants
mitigating hazards through flight abort.
Reentry vehicles under part 435 are
also subject to a system safety process
to identify hazards and mitigate risks to
public health and safety under nonnominal flight of the reentry vehicle and
any payload. Because § 435.33 points to
part 431, an acceptable system safety
analysis for reentry also assesses the
probability and consequences of any
reasonably foreseeable hazardous events
during the reentry flight that could
result in a casualty to the public. Unlike
part 431, most part 435 reentries do not
require an FSS because it is generally
accepted that, if controlled reentries
become uncontrolled, the vehicle is
unlikely to substantially survive reentry.
Due to the nature of the hazards
associated with reentry, and since
breakup is expected for non-nominal
reentries, an FSS often cannot
significantly ameliorate a reentry flight’s
risk or consequence. A reentry applicant
must still account for the possibility of
a random reentry in its risk analysis
after attempting a reentry burn.
ii. Autonomous Systems
Current regulations do not allow an
operator to rely solely on an
autonomous system to terminate a
flight. At the time of their publication,
human control capability was
considered critical to safety because
neither software nor hardware had been
proven reliable to make flight
termination decisions. Since that time,
the FAA has approved the use of
autonomous FSSs for ELVs by finding
that they can meet the requirements of
an alternative FSS under § 417.301(b).
Applicants were able to demonstrate
that the autonomous FSS achieved an
equivalent level of safety to a launch
with a human-in-the-loop as the risk to
public safety was extremely low and the
autonomous system had been flight
tested in shadow mode. In past
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rulemakings, the FAA has made clear
that, in requiring human intervention
capability for activation of an FSS, the
FAA did not intend to foreclose
development or use of autonomous
systems. However, despite those
assurances and the FAA findings of
equivalent safety, current FAA
regulations still expressly require that a
capability exist for a person to intervene
and make decisions for FSS activation.
The FAA is proposing to update the
regulations to match the current practice
of allowing autonomous FSSs. By
removing the outdated requirements for
a human in-the-loop, the FAA believes
that it would encourage further
innovation without negatively
impacting safety. The consequence
analysis and reliability thresholds
would continue to hold any potential
autonomous FSS to the rigorous
standards previously required of a
human-initiated FSS, and the software
as part of the autonomous FSS must be
demonstrated to meet reliability
requirements. With the recent
advancements of the requisite
technology and the performance
constraints of the FSS, the FAA is
confident that it is beneficial both to the
commercial space transportation
industry and public safety to explicitly
allow flight abort to be governed by
capable autonomous systems.
iii. Current Requirement for Reliability
of a FSS
Each FTS and command and control
system must satisfy the predicted
reliability requirement of 0.999 at the 95
percent confidence level. For FSSs on
both ELVs and RLVs, there are
effectively only two methods of
currently demonstrating that a system
meets reliability standards. The first
method is to test 2,995 units at expected
operating environment levels with 0
failures to demonstrate a 0.999 design
reliability at a 95 percent confidence
level. Given the cost of FSS
components, the cost of testing, and the
time required to conduct such tests, this
is not practicable.
The second method arises out of RCC
319. The FSS requirements codified in
part 417, including component
performance requirements, and
acceptance and qualification testing,
were originally written to align FAA
launch licensing requirements with the
Federal launch range standards in RCC
319. Like part 417, RCC 319 requires
qualification tests to demonstrate
reliable operation in environments
exceeding the expected operating
environment for the system
components, acceptance tests to
demonstrate that the selected batch of
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components meets the requirements of
the design specifications, and other
preflight testing at the system or
subsystem level to demonstrate
functionality after installation.
The benefit of the part 417 and RCC
319 method is that for qualification
tests, generally only three test units are
required. Three units are required
instead of many more because the units
are tested with margin above their
predicted operating environment.
Testing three units with the margin
specified achieves the required
reliability and confidence levels of
0.999 design reliability at 95 percent
confidence level, rather than having to
test 2,995 units at the predicted
operating environment with no margin.
iv. Proposed Reliability Standards for
FSS
Given the FAA anticipates that most
commercial space vehicles will
continue to control flight hazards
through the use of FSSs, the FAA
proposes in § 450.145 to continue to
require a very reliable FSS in most
instances. Under the current
regulations, FSS not only enable an
operation to meet the collective and
individual risk criteria during flight but
also protect against low-probability but
high-consequence events near the
launch site or when flying over
populated areas. As previously
discussed, the FAA’s proposal to
quantify these low-probability but highconsequence events as CEC in proposed
§ 450.101(c) would clearly delineate
which operations are required to use an
FSS to control for risks and
consequences.92 The CEC calculation is
the consequence, measured in terms of
EC, without regard to the probability of
failure.
The underlying intent of the current
prescriptive requirements was to have
an FSS that could reliably perform flight
abort to restrict hazards from reaching
populated or otherwise protected areas.
The FAA also recognizes that vehicles
operating in remote areas are less likely
to have significant consequences in the
case of a flight failure. For operations
where the consequence of a flight failure
is less, the FAA has determined that,
while still being highly reliable, the FSS
may not need to be as highly reliable as
92 As noted earlier, only operations that have a
predicted consequence of 1 × 10¥3 CEC or above for
uncontrolled areas for each reasonably foreseeable
vehicle response mode in any one-second period of
flight would be required to implement an FSS to
abort flight as a hazard control strategy. An FSS
would not be required for operations that can be
shown to have a predicted consequence of less than
1 × 10¥3 CEC; however, a hazard analysis would be
required for any operations without a FSS or
demonstrable physical containment.
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an FSS for a vehicle operating in an area
where the consequence of a flight failure
is higher. Generally, this proposed
relaxation of the FSS reliability
requirement—based on reduced
potential consequence—is expected to
be applicable to operations launching or
reentering in remote locations or for
stages that do not overfly population
centers. In order to achieve these
scalable, performance-based
requirements, proposed § 450.145(a)
would contain two reliability standards
for an FSS.
Proposed § 450.145(a)(1) would
require any operator with a consequence
of 1 × 10¥2 CEC or greater in any
uncontrolled area for any vehicle
response mode to employ an FSS with
the standard design reliability of 0.999
at 95 percent confidence and
commensurate design, analysis, and
testing. This reliability standard would
be consistent with various sections of
part 417, in particular § 417.309(b)(2),
that require major FSS component
systems, such as onboard flight
termination systems and ground-based
command control systems, to be tested
to demonstrate 0.999 design reliability
at 95 percent confidence. This reliability
threshold would have to be
demonstrated for the operation of the
entire system, including any systems
located on-board the launch or reentry
vehicle, any ground-based systems, and
any other component or support
systems.
Alternatively, in order to make
regulations adaptable to innovative
operations while maintaining
appropriate levels of safety, operations
with lower potential consequences
would require an FSS with less
demonstrated design reliability at the
same confidence. Proposed
§ 450.145(a)(2) would require any
operator with a consequence of between
1 x 10¥2 and 1 × 10¥3 CEC in any
uncontrolled area for any vehicle
response mode to only employ an FSS
with design reliability of at least 0.975
at 95 percent confidence and
commensurate testing. The FAA
considered simply setting the proposed
§ 450.145(a)(2) threshold an order of
magnitude lower, at 0.99 design
reliability with a 95 percent confidence,
to reflect the order of magnitude less
CEC from the consequence analysis.
Absent other standards to demonstrate
compliance with the reliability
threshold, that would mean testing 299
units with 0 failures, instead of testing
2,995 units with 0 failures. However, in
consultation with NASA and Air Force
representatives in the CSWG, the FAA
has elected to propose that the reduced
reliability threshold should be set at
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0.975 design reliability with a 95
percent confidence for lower
consequence vehicles.
While there are no established
standards to demonstrate the 0.975
reliability number, that threshold is
consistent with reliability parameters in
RCC 324 and represents existing single
string flight reliability requirements.
The FAA is confident that industry
associations will develop consensus
standards regarding design and testing
that sufficiently demonstrate that a
novel FSS design meets this reliability
threshold. Until such time as an
industry standard is established,
proposed § 450.145(a)(2) in practice may
result in single string or equivalent FSSs
being approved for operations in remote
areas or for phases of flight that do not
overfly populated areas. Similar to FSS
that must meet the more reliable
threshold, all means of compliance
would be required to be accepted by the
FAA in accordance with proposed
§§ 450.145(b) and 450.35.
These proposed reliability
requirements would replace the existing
launch and reentry FSS licensing
requirements on all commercial space
transportation missions. However, the
FAA anticipates that, with the
consequence analysis driving the
requirement to have an FSS, most
reentry operations would continue to
not require an FSS as is the current case
under part 435. For launch operators,
applicants would still be required to
demonstrate the reliability by
submitting to review of their design,
testing, and analysis. Operators would
still be required to monitor the flight
environments actually experienced by
their FSSs in accordance with proposed
§ 450.145(c) to corroborate the
qualification test data submitted to the
FAA.
Proposed part 450 would consolidate
and clarify the performance
requirements for future FSSs. In doing
so, the FAA anticipates that some
operations will be relieved of the
burden of unnecessarily stringent FSS
reliability requirements and that some
operations will be able to utilize
innovative concepts to achieve flight
abort. By appropriately scaling FSS
reliability to consequence analysis, the
FAA expects to see the emergence of
new industry standards, increased use
of autonomous FSSs, and no measurable
adverse impact to public health and
safety or the safety of property. There is
expected to be no measurable adverse
impact to public health and safety or the
safety of property because the lowered
reliability threshold will only apply to
launches and reentries which would not
create significant consequences, given a
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flight failure. Furthermore, while
rigorous tests and analysis should still
be expected for most FSSs, FAA
regulations would no longer prescribe a
particular form of FSS. The proposed
performance measure of reliability to
achieve safe flight abort to meet
collective and individual risk limits and
to mitigate the possibility of low
probability but high consequence events
is the best method for maintaining
safety while scoping FAA regulations to
govern only the function, not the form,
of FSSs.
v. FSS Design, Testing, and
Documentation Requirements
Applicants using a FSS of any
reliability threshold would be required
to meet the proposed § 450.143 safetycritical system design, test, and
documentation requirements discussed
previously. As an FSS will always be
considered a safety critical system, any
operator utilizing an FSS must comply
with the requirements to design their
system as fault tolerant, conduct
qualification and acceptance testing,
and provide evidence to validate
predicted operating environments and
component life.
Proposed § 450.145(d) would include
the application requirements for an FSS.
Similar to the current part 415
requirements, proposed § 450.145
would require applicants to describe the
FSS, including its proposed operation,
and diagram the FSS in detail. The
FAA’s intent is to make these
requirements less prescriptive than
current regulations and also to allow
more flexible time frames. Proposed
§ 450.145(d) would require applicants to
submit any analyses reports and
acceptance, qualification, and preflight
test plans used to demonstrate that the
reliability and confidence levels are
met. Any test plans or documentation
would be required to detail the planned
test procedures and the test
environments. Further, an applicant
would have to submit procedures for
validating the accuracy of any vehicle
tracking data utilized by the flight safety
crew or the FSS to make the decision to
abort flight. While proposed
§ 450.145(d) consolidates these
application requirements and removes
prescriptive component-level design
requirements, the proposed regulations
would not require substantially different
information than the FAA requires
today to demonstrate that FSSs meet
performance standards and will undergo
the required testing prior to flight.
vi. Reporting Requirements
Under the preflight reporting
requirements in proposed § 450.213(d),
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operators would be required to submit,
or to provide the FAA access to, any test
reports associated with the flight safety
system test plans approved during the
application process. These reports must
be submitted or made available no less
than 30 days before flight unless the
Administrator agrees to a different time
frame under § 404.15. In the reports,
licensees would have to clearly show
that the testing results demonstrate
compliance with the reliability
requirements in proposed § 450.145(a).
This is current practice under
§ 417.17(c)(1) and (4) through (6).
To show the FSS is in compliance and
can support the mission as intended,
FSS reports would continue to be
required to include testing reports that
detail the results of the approved
subsystem and component-level testing,
including any failures, any actions
necessary to correct for any failures,
actual testing environment showing
sufficient margin to predicted operating
environments, and a comparison matrix
of the actual qualification and
acceptance test levels used for each
component compared against the
predicted flight levels for each
environment. Proposed § 450.213(d)(4)
would require licensees to report any
components qualified by similarity
analysis or some combination of
analysis and testing. Preflight reporting
is necessary to demonstrate compliance
with the test plans approved in the
application and to demonstrate that the
FSS meets the reliability threshold prior
to flight.
Proposed § 450.215 (Post-Flight
Reporting) would continue to require
licensees to submit a post-flight report
no later than 90 days after an operation
if there were any anomalies in the flight
environment material to public health
and safety and the safety of property,
including those experienced by any FSS
components; a practice currently
required by § 417.25(c). RLV operators
licensed under part 431 are not
currently required to submit a postflight report identifying anomalies that
are material to public safety and
corrective actions, but the added burden
is expected to be minimal. To accurately
report any such anomalies so that they
may be corrected in future flights,
operators would also be required to
monitor the FSS during each flight, in
accordance with proposed § 450.145(c).
Any anomalies experienced by the FSS
would be considered material to public
health and safety and the safety of
property and, therefore, would need to
be included in post-flight reporting.
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vii. ARC Recommendations
The ARC suggested that, in a
performance-based licensing scheme,
the regulations should be flexible with
regard to FSSs and allow an operator to
propose a means of achieving the
performance metric without dictating a
specific hardware approach. For
example, the ARC recommended that an
operator should be able to propose an
alternative to having a destruct flight
termination system. While, the FAA
believes that the current regulations
allow for non-destructive FSSs, it
acknowledges that the preponderance of
the existing prescriptive requirements
address FSSs that terminate flight
through destructive means. The ARC
recommended the current prescriptive
requirements be moved to a guidance
document. As discussed previously, the
FAA intends to recognize RCC 319 as
the accepted means of compliance in
demonstrating that a FSS has a design
reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent
confidence. The RCC 319 document
would maintain the common standards
between all Federal launch and reentry
safety authorities but also would be
updated periodically to address the
evolving space transportation industry.
Industry could also develop new means
of compliance in the future, as
discussed below.
The ARC also recommended that an
FSS should not be required, proposing
instead that an operator should only be
required to meet risk calculations in the
FSA and may do so by utilizing a FSS.
The FAA disagrees that an FSS should
not be required, as there are other safety
factors to be considered beyond simple
individual or collective risk, namely,
the consequence of a failure as
discussed earlier. However, the FAA has
attempted to propose more flexible
regulations that would allow some
operations to be licensed without an
FSS, or with novel concepts of FSS, or
an FSS that may require less extensive
demonstration of reliability. In
quantifying the low probability but high
consequence events that necessitate an
FSS beyond collective and individual
risk limits, the FAA intends to more
clearly delineate when it would be
appropriate for an operation to forego an
extremely reliable FSS or an FSS
completely. If an FSS is not required,
the applicant would be required to
demonstrate that hazards are contained
or mitigated through a hazard analysis
and system safety principles. In
addition to proposing the acceptability
of FSSs with a design reliability of 0.975
at 95 percent confidence, under certain
situations, the FAA proposes to indicate
more clearly that FSS concept and
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design is flexible and open to
innovation as long as the reliability
thresholds for flight abort are met.
The ARC also discussed a number of
concepts that industry believes should
be considered in scaling an FSS’s
necessary reliability as determined
through the FSA. The ARC pointed
specifically to population density, the
realm of reasonably foreseeable failures,
trajectory, size, and explosive
capabilities of the vehicle. The FAA
proposes that these factors would be
contemplated as a part of the
consequence analysis required in the
public safety criteria of proposed
§ 450.101(c), alongside traditional
measures of risk. In identifying FSS
reliability thresholds pegged to potential
consequence, or CEC, the reliability of
FSSs is determined through analysis
that accounts for factors such as what
population centers a vehicle or debris
can reach and potential failure modes.
The FAA anticipates that this would
address the ARC’s recommendation that
vehicles with low risk to the public,
especially vehicles operating in remote
and sparsely populated areas, may
require a lower demonstrated reliability.
To the question of how an applicant
might demonstrate the reliability of an
FSS with a less than extremely reliable
design that does not otherwise meet
current common standards like RCC
319, such as the FAA proposed
threshold of 0.975 at 95 percent
confidence, the ARC advised that
several approaches may already exist.
As previously discussed, the less
reliable FSS can be demonstrated by
testing several hundred units under
expected environments, instead of the
2,995 tests required to demonstrate
design reliability of 0.999 at 95
percent—but it is still likely that neither
is practical or viable for most operators.
In their place, alternative standards are
necessary to approximate the
demonstration of the reliability
threshold through less burdensome
means. The ARC report pointed to the
Air Force Space Command’s Space and
Missile Systems Center Standard SMC–
S–016, ‘‘Test Requirements For Launch,
Upper-Stage and Space Vehicles,’’ as an
example of a standard that allows for
one unit of qualification testing, instead
of the standard three units required by
RCC–319.93 The ARC noted that
standard may be useful for heritage
93 As one company pointed out in the ARC report,
SMC–S–016 and similar standards are for general
vehicle testing and do not consider the higher
reliability required for FSS, whereas RCC 319 and
AFSPCMAN91–710 require additional margins and
certainty. The company believes that testing a
single unit is not sufficient, unless there was a
tradeoff that increased the required test margin.
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systems that are already considered
reliable. The FAA maintains that for
0.999 design reliability at 95 percent,
the qualification testing of three or more
units may be required to reduce the
likelihood of either anomalous test
passes or failures. The FAA seeks
comment on this approach. The FAA
also seeks comment on how SMC–S–
016 could be incorporated as an
accepted means of compliance for
reliability demonstration of the lower
reliability criteria.
In discussions with Federal launch
range personnel, it has been suggested
that testing and analysis requirements in
RCC 324 may be a more appropriate
basis for evaluating a FSS meeting the
lower reliability threshold. The FAA
remains interested in identifying
standards that are applicable or could be
drawn upon to develop means of
compliance to the proposed regulations.
The FAA is also not foreclosing the
idea that vehicles can demonstrate the
reliability of the FSS or vehicle through
flight history. The ARC pointed out in
their report that certain aspects of FSSs
can be tested in flight—for example
using an autonomous FSS in ‘‘shadow
mode’’ on-board a vehicle and testing
the system’s function with no ordnance
or other active destruct capabilities. The
FAA ultimately decided to not propose
any explicit requirements pertaining to
acceptable flight testing as a means of
allowing industry applicants and the
FAA to develop new accepted means of
compliance in the demonstration of
reliability. While the FAA wishes to
encourage the innovation and
development of novel reliability
demonstration standards, the FAA also
recognizes that such standards are not
currently developed and would require
extensive evaluation before they could
be accepted as demonstrating fidelity
and safety. Because the FSS is so critical
to flight safety in the instances where it
is required, new reliability and
compliance demonstration strategies
must be accepted by the FAA prior to
application acceptance.
In discussing the scalability of FSS
requirements, the ARC proposed that
the FAA delineate categories of
operators and vehicles. The suggested
categories included a new vehicle by a
new operator, a proven vehicle by an
experienced operator, a derived vehicle
by an experienced operator, and
considerations for vehicle hazard class
and population density in operating
areas. The FAA considered operator and
vehicle categories as a means of scaling
FSS reliability requirements as an
alternative to consequence analysis, but
determined that the relevant measure of
public protection indicating the need for
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an FSS is not experience, but risk and
possible consequence. While less
experienced operators will likely pose a
higher risk, as accounted for in the
probability of failure, experience does
not account for the potential
consequences of a vehicle failure.
Experienced operators with experienced
vehicle designs can propose operations
that still pose a high risk to the public,
or an operation with low risk but high
potential consequences in the event of
a failure. The FAA seeks comment on
the proposal to use consequence, not
operator experience, as a factor in levelof-rigor.
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K. Other Prescribed Hazard Controls
1. Agreements
The FAA proposes to streamline the
existing agreement requirements by
removing specific requirements for a
variety of agreements and procedures
and allowing an operator to determine
what agreements would be needed for
its particular operation. In § 450.147
(Agreements), a vehicle operator would
be required to have written agreements
with any entity that provides a service
or use of property to meet a requirement
in part 450.
Current § 417.13 requires a launch
operator to enter into an agreement with
a Federal launch range to have access to
and the use of U.S. Government
property and services required to
support a licensed launch from the
facility and for public-safety related
operations and support before
conducting a licensed launch from a
Federal launch range. The Federal
launch range arranges for the issuances
of notifications to mariners and airmen.
Currently, for launches from a nonFederal launch site in the United States,
a launch operator must ensure that
launch processing at the launch site
satisfies the requirements of part 417.
For a launch from a launch site licensed
under part 420, a launch operator must
conduct its operations in accordance
with any agreements that the launch site
operator has entered into with any
Federal and local authorities. These
include agreements with the local U.S.
Coast Guard district to establish
procedures for the issuance of a Notice
to Mariners (NTM) prior to a launch and
with the FAA air traffic control (ATC)
facility having jurisdiction over the
airspace through which the launch will
take place to establish procedures for
the issuance of a Notice to Airmen
(NOTAM) prior to the launch and for
the closing of air routes during the
launch window. For a launch from an
exclusive-use site, where there is no
licensed launch site operator, a launch
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operator must satisfy the requirements
of part 420. In addition, a launch
operator must: (1) Describe its
procedures for informing local
authorities of each designated hazard
area near the launch site associated with
a launch vehicle’s planned trajectory
and any planned impacts of launch
vehicle components and debris; (2)
provide any hazard area information to
the local U. S. Coast Guard, or
equivalent local authority, for the
issuance of NTMs and to the FAA ATC
office, or equivalent local authority, that
have jurisdiction over the airspace
through which the launch will take
place for the issuance of NOTAMs; and
(3) coordinate with any other local
agency that supports the launch, such as
local law enforcement agencies,
emergency response agencies, fire
departments, the National Park Service,
and the Mineral Management Service.
For launches of RLVs under part 431
and reentries under part 435, an
operator must enter into launch and
reentry site use agreements with a
Federal launch range or a licensed
launch or reentry site operator that
provide for access to and the use of
property and services required to
support a licensed RLV mission or
reentry and public safety-related
operations and support. Additionally,
an operator must enter into agreements
with the U.S. Coast Guard and the FAA
regional office that has jurisdiction over
the airspace through which a launch
and reentry will take place to establish
procedures for the issuance of NTMs
and NOTAMs.
As discussed earlier, there are
currently similar requirements under
parts 417 and 431 and, by reference,
part 435, for agreements to ensure that
NTMs and NOTAMs are implemented.
Part 417 references part 420, which also
contains requirements for these notices
and requires operators to describe
procedures to ensure that these and
other notifications are accomplished.
Part 417 requires an operator to execute
agreements with multiple entities. None
of the current requirements adequately
addresses NTMs and NOTAMs when
the U.S. Coast Guard or the FAA does
not have jurisdiction, such as with
launches or reentries from or to foreign
or international territories. Currently,
these agreements must be in place
before a license is issued. However, in
practice, the FAA sometimes accepts
draft agreements or makes the
submission of the executed agreements
a condition of the license.
Under proposed § 450.147, a vehicle
operator would be required to enter into
a written agreement with any entity that
provides a service or property that
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meets a requirement in part 450. Such
entities would include a Federal launch
range operator, a licensed launch or
reentry site operator, any party that
provides access to or use of property
and services required to support a safe
launch or reentry under part 450, the
U.S. Coast Guard, and the FAA. Other
entities that provide a service or
property could also include local, state,
or federal agencies, or private parties.
For instance, a local fire department
might provide a standby service to
control a possible fire, a state agency
could provide any number of services
such as road closures, and NASA might
provide telemetry capability. Although
agreements with local agencies, for
example, may be necessary to ensure
public safety, the FAA believes that it is
overly prescriptive to list in regulation
the specific entities with which each
operator must enter into an agreement.
This proposal would require an
operator to enter into only those
agreements necessary for its particular
operation. If an operator works with
multiple entities to satisfy requirements
in proposed part 450, it would need
multiple agreements. However, if
agreements required under this
proposed section are already addressed
in agreements executed by the site
operator, an operator would only need
to enter into agreements with either the
Federal launch range or other site
operator and any entity with which the
site operator does not perform the
necessary coordination. In particular,
Federal launch ranges almost always
arrange for the issuance of NTMs and
NOTAMs for launches.94
The proposal also contemplates
agreements between a maritime or
aviation authority other than the U.S.
Coast Guard or the FAA. Unless
otherwise addressed in agreements with
the site operator, the proposed rule
would require an operator to enter into
such agreements for a launch or reentry
that crosses airspace or impacts water
not under the jurisdiction or authority
of the U.S. Coast Guard or the FAA.
Section 450.147(b) would require all
agreements to clearly delineate the roles
and responsibilities of each party in
order to avoid confusion concerning
responsibility for executing safetyrelated activities. Section 450.147(c)
would require all agreements to be in
effect before a license can be issued.
However, as noted earlier, the FAA
recognizes that agreements might not be
finalized by the time the FAA is
94 Typically, Federal ranges do not arrange for the
issuance of NTMs and NOTAMs for the disposal of
a launch vehicle from orbit or the reentry of a
reusable launch or reentry vehicle.
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prepared to make a licensing
determination. Therefore, the regulation
would allow an operator to request a
later effective date, contingent upon the
Administrator’s approval. An operator
could do this by providing the FAA the
status of the negotiations involving the
agreement including any significant
issues that require resolution and the
expected date for its execution.
Under proposed § 450.147(d), an
applicant would be required to describe
each agreement in its vehicle operator
license application. An applicant
should clearly delineate the roles and
responsibilities of each party to the
agreement to support a safe launch or
reentry. The applicant would also need
to provide a copy of any agreement, or
portion thereof, to the FAA upon
request. The FAA recognizes that some
portions of agreements may contain
business-related provisions that do not
pertain to FAA requirements. Those
portions would not be required. The
FAA seeks comment on its proposed
approach to agreements.
2. Safety-Critical Personnel
Qualifications
The FAA proposes to remove the
certification requirements found in
§§ 417.105, 417.311, and 415.113 and
replace them with performance-based
requirements in § 450.149 (SafetyCritical Personnel Qualifications).
Section 450.149 would require qualified
personnel to perform safety-critical
tasks for launch and reentry operations.
The FAA also proposes to expand
personnel qualification requirements to
ensure that safety-critical personnel are
qualified to perform their assigned
safety tasks.
An operator must qualify and train its
safety-critical personnel in performing
their safety-critical tasks for all vehicle
and license types because training
mitigates the potential for human error
during safety-critical operations.
Currently, the FAA requires a personnel
certification program in part 417 for
personnel that perform safety-related
tasks. Specifically, § 417.105 requires
that a launch operator employ a
personnel certification program that
documents the qualifications, including
education, experience and training, for
each member of the launch crew. The
launch operator’s certification program
must include annual reviews and
revocation of certifications for
negligence or failure to satisfy
certification requirements. Section
415.113 requires an operator to submit
a safety review document that describes
how the applicant will satisfy the
personnel certification program
requirements of § 417.105 and identify
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by position individuals who implement
the program. The document must also
demonstrate how the launch operator
implements the program, contain a table
listing each hazardous operation or
safety critical task certified personnel
must perform, and include the position
of the individual who reviews personnel
qualifications and certifies the
personnel performing the task. In
§ 417.105(b), an operator is required to
review personnel qualifications and
issue individual certifications. The
intent behind this requirement was to
ensure that qualified people perform the
required safety tasks.
Neither part 431 nor part 435 have a
personnel certification program
requirement or any personnel training
requirement; however, the need for
personnel qualifications is a natural
outcome of the system safety process.
The FAA recognizes that the current
regulations in part 417 are inflexible
and that using a certification program is
not the only method to ensure qualified
personnel perform safety-critical tasks.
Operators may use other methods to
verify all training and experience
required for personnel to perform a task
is current. For example, an operator may
maintain training records to document
internal training and currency
requirements or completion standards
for its safety critical personnel. An
operator’s issuance of individual
certifications does not itself enhance
public safety. If the personnel are
qualified through training and
experience for each safety task
performed, additional certification is
unnecessary because no additional
training is required for an individual to
be issued a certification. Removing the
certification requirement would also
reduce cost to the industry by removing
the two-step process to allow qualified
personnel to perform safety-related
tasks.
Additionally, the flight safety crew
roles and qualifications requirements in
§ 417.311, are prescriptive. Section
417.311(a) requires a flight safety crew
to document each position description
and maintain documentation of
individual crew qualifications,
including education, experience, and
training, as part of the personnel
certification program of § 417.105.
Section 417.311(b) describes the roles of
the flight safety crew and explicitly
states subjects and tasks that the crew
must be trained in and references the
certification program. Finally,
§ 417.311(c) requires the flight safety
crew members to complete a training
and certification program to ensure
familiarization with launch site, launch
vehicle, and FSS functions, equipment,
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and procedures related to a launch prior
to being called on to support a launch.
It also requires a preflight readiness
training and certification program be
completed and prescribes the content
that must be included in such training.
The current regulations are a burden to
operators because they focus on FSSs
and do not account for evolving
technologies, including autonomous
FSSs. Removing the prescriptive
requirements in § 417.311 and replacing
them with performance-based
requirements would alleviate this
burden.
The ARC recommends that the
proposed regulation ensure that the
applicant has a structure in place to
protect public safety, and that the FAA
use current requirements as guidelines
for evaluation and approval when
necessary. The FAA agrees that the
regulations should ensure that
personnel performing tasks that impact
public safety are qualified to perform
those tasks. As the industry grows and
operations become more frequent and
varied, operators need greater flexibility
in operational practices. Employing a
qualification program to ensure
personnel performing safety-critical
tasks are trained is one factor in
protecting safety of public and public
property.
Therefore, the FAA proposes to
remove the requirements for a
certification program described in
§§ 415.113 and 417.105 and replace the
prescriptive requirements of § 417.311
with performance-based requirements
that capture the intent of the current
regulations—to ensure that an operator’s
safety-critical personnel are trained,
qualified, and capable of performing
their safety critical tasks, and that their
training is current. Under proposed
§ 450.149, an applicant would be
required to identify in its application
the safety-critical tasks that require
qualified personnel and provide its
internal training and currency
requirements, completion standards, or
any other means of demonstrating
compliance with proposed § 450.149(a).
The proposed performance-based
requirements would allow each operator
to identify the safety-critical operations
and personnel needed for the operation.
It would also allow an operator to
determine what training, experience,
and qualification should be required for
each safety-critical task. The FAA
would consider any task that may have
an effect on public safety and meets the
definition of safety-critical found in
§ 401.5 subject to the requirements of
§ 450.149. These tasks would include,
but are not limited to, operating and
installing flight safety system hardware,
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operating safety support systems,
monitoring vehicle performance,
performing flight safety analysis,
conducting launch operations,
controlling public access, surveillance,
and emergency response. With the many
different kinds of operations currently
underway, an operator is in the best
position to identify the operations,
personnel, and training needed for its
operation.
The FAA would also require that an
operator ensure personnel are qualified,
and that those qualifications are current,
without requiring certification. The
regulation would require proper training
of personnel and verification that each
person performing safety critical tasks is
qualified. Under § 450.149, an applicant
would be required to document all
safety-critical tasks and internal
requirements or standards for personnel
to meet prior to performing the
identified tasks during the application
phase. The applicant would be required
to provide internal training and
currency requirements, completion
standards, or any other means of
demonstrating compliance with the
requirements of § 450.149 in its
application. The applicant would also
be required to describe the process for
tracking training currency. In the event
that a person’s qualification was not
current, either because their
qualification does not meet the training
currency requirements detailed in the
application or because a new process or
procedure has been instituted that has
made the training inaccurate or
incomplete, the individual would not be
qualified to perform safety-related tasks
specific to the expired qualification.
Lastly, part 460 contains training and
qualification requirements for flight
crew. Compliance with these
requirements would meet the training
and qualification requirements in
proposed § 450.149 for flight crew.
3. Work Shift and Rest Requirements
The FAA proposes to combine the rest
requirements of §§ 417.113(f) and
431.43(c)(4)(i) through (iv) into
proposed § 450.151 (Work Shift and
Rest Requirements) which would
require an applicant to document and
implement rest requirements that ensure
personnel are physically and mentally
capable of performing tasks assigned.
An applicant would be required to
submit its rest rules during the
application phase.
Personnel involved in the launch or
reentry of expendable and reusable
vehicles need to be physically and
mentally capable of performing their
duties, especially those people making
decisions or performing operations that
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affect public safety. Fatigue can degrade
a person’s ability to function and make
the necessary decisions to conduct a
safe launch or reentry operation. Since
the FAA started requiring rest rules,
there have been no incidents resulting
from fatigue during a licensed launch or
reentry. To maintain this level of safety,
the FAA proposes to continue requiring
rest rules in order to prevent fatigue and
ensure operator personnel can perform
their duties safely.
A 1993 NTSB investigation of an
anomaly that occurred during a
commercial launch from a Federal
launch range found a high probability
that fatigue and lack of rest prior to
launch operations contributed to
mistakes that resulted in the vehicle
initiating flight while the range was in
a no-go condition.95 Launching in a nogo condition increases risk to the public
because the vehicle operates outside of
established boundaries and analysis.
The NTSB found that the person who
decided to proceed with the launch was
not given enough time to rest after
working extra hours the previous day. In
addition, the launch was scheduled for
early in the morning so the on-console
time was around 2:00 a.m. The NTSB
report recommended instituting rest
rules that allow for sufficient rest before
the launch operation.
As a result of the 1993 NTSB report,
the FAA issued rest rules in its 1999
final rule. The 1999 final rule required
an applicant to ensure that its flight
safety personnel adhere to Federal
launch range rest rules. In its 2000 final
rule for RLVs, the FAA required rest
rules, in § 431.43(c)(4), similar to the Air
Force work and rest standards for
launches and the FAA’s ELV
requirements.96 The specific and
detailed requirements set forth in
§ 431.43(c)(4) fail to account for the
various factors that can affect crew rest
such as the time of day of an operation,
length of preflight operations, and travel
to and from the launch or reentry site.
95 Special Investigation Report: Commercial
Space Launch Incident, Launch Procedure Anomaly
Orbital Sciences Corporation, Pegasus/SCD–1, 80
Nautical Miles East of Cape Canaveral, Florida,
February 9, 1993. Report PB 93–917003/NTSB/
SIR93–02, July 23, 1993; (https://www.ntsb.gov/
safety/safety-studies/Documents/SIR9302.pdf).
96 Section 431.43(c)(4) contains requirements that
are detailed and prescriptive. It requires vehicle
safety operations personnel to adhere to specific
work and rest standards. These requirements
prescribe the maximum length of workshift and the
minimum rest period after such work shift
preceding initiation of an RLV reentry mission or
during the conduct of the mission. It also prescribes
the maximum hours permitted to be worked in the
7 days preceding initiation of an RLV mission, the
maximum number of consecutive work days, and
the minimum rest period after 5 consecutive days
of 12-hour shifts.
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The 2006 final rule adopted the
current § 417.113(f), which is more
performance-based than § 431.43(c)(4).
Section 417.113(f) requires that for any
operation that has the potential to have
an adverse effect on public safety, the
launch rules must ensure that the
launch crew is physically and mentally
capable of performing all assigned tasks.
It also requires those rules to govern the
length, number, and frequency of work
shifts, and the rest afforded to launch
crew between shifts.
The ARC recommended the FAA use
the § 417.113(f) approach as a basis for
the proposed rest rules. The ARC
recommended that the regulations
should require each license applicant
and operator to establish crew rest
requirements applicable to their
individual operation and suggested that
the FAA consider each operator’s rules
through the application review and
approval process. The FAA agrees with
this approach. Additionally, the ARC
suggested that the rest rules apply to
specific personnel with direct control of
the vehicle or launch or reentry decision
making. While the FAA agrees with the
intent of requiring all safety critical
personnel to adhere to rest rules, it does
not want to limit safety critical
personnel to the roles the ARC
identified because it is prescriptive and
does not allow for operational
flexibility.
The FAA also agrees with the ARC
that it is up to the company to monitor
compliance with its rest rules. The FAA
does not have an explicit requirement
for an operator to monitor its
employees, only that it documents and
implements rest requirements. The FAA
seeks comment on whether a specific
requirement for operator monitoring
would be necessary. Regardless, the
FAA would monitor compliance on
occasion with its inspection program, as
it does today with current crew rest
rules.
The FAA recognizes that launch and
reentry operations are varied. The FAA
considered using prescriptive
requirements like those in § 431.43(c)(4)
to address rest rules. However, there are
many factors that can affect crew rest
that make a prescriptive regulation
impracticably complex and inflexible
for allowing alternate methods of
compliance that take into account
mitigations and unique circumstances.
Section 450.151 would retain the
current performance-based requirements
of § 417.113(f) with modifications to
include launch and reentry operations.
The proposed requirements would cover
operations of expendable, reusable, and
reentry vehicles and allow an operator
flexibility to employ rest rules that fit
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the particular operations. Current
§ 417.113(f) requires that crew rest rules
govern the length, number, and
frequency of work shifts, including the
rest afforded the launch crew between
shifts. Similarly, proposed § 450.151(a)
would require an operator to document
and implement rest requirements that
ensure safety-critical personnel are
physically and mentally capable of
performing all assigned tasks. Proposed
§ 450.151(b) would provide additional
requirements regarding the aspects of
work shifts and rest periods critical to
public safety, and would add a process
for extending work shifts.
Proposed § 450.151(b)(1) would
require an operator’s rest rules to
include the duration of each work shift
and the process for extending this shift;
including the maximum allowable
length of any extension. This
requirement would provide each
operator with the flexibility to identify
the duration of each work shift most
suited to the operation such that safetycritical personnel are physically and
mentally capable of performing all
assigned tasks. It would also require a
process for extending a work shift. Work
shift length is important because
performance decreases and fatigue
increases as the length of the work shift
increases. An operator should determine
the optimum length for a work shift that
ensures personnel are capable of
performing their assigned tasks.
Unforeseen circumstances can require
personnel to work beyond the
established work shift length. In such
cases, under this proposal, the operator
would be required to have a process for
extending the work shift length up to a
limit where personnel are no longer
considered capable of performing their
duties.
Proposed § 450.151(b)(2) would
require an operator’s rest rules to
include the number of consecutive work
shift days allowed before rest is
required. This requirement would
provide each operator with the
flexibility to identify the number of
consecutive work shift days safetycritical personnel may work such that
they remain physically and mentally
capable of performing all assigned tasks.
Proposed § 450.151(b)(3) would require
an operator’s rest rules to include the
minimum rest period required between
each work shift, including the period of
rest required immediately before the
flight countdown work shift. An
operator would also be required to
identify the minimum rest period
required after the maximum number of
work shift days allowed. Having enough
rest between work shifts is important to
ensure personnel are able to perform
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critical tasks. The rest period before a
countdown is particularly important
because it can be affected by time of
launch, reviews, and work needed to get
a vehicle ready for operation.
The FAA also proposes to remove the
term ‘‘crew’’ from the rest requirements.
The use of ‘‘crew’’ can be misleading
and limiting. Operators could interpret
crew to be flight crew only, whereas the
rest rules are intended to apply to any
position affecting public safety. Under
this proposal, an applicant would be
required to submit rest rules to the FAA
that demonstrate compliance with
proposed § 450.151. The FAA would
evaluate an operator’s rest rules in the
same way as it currently does under
§ 417.113(f) to ensure that personnel
affecting public safety are mentally and
physically capable of performing their
duties during launch or reentry
operations, and that the rest rules satisfy
the requirements of proposed § 450.151.
While an operator would be able to
create its own rest rules under proposed
§ 450.151, an applicant would also be
able to use current rest rules. That is,
§ 431.43(c)(4) would be an acceptable
means of compliance to proposed
§ 450.151. The FAA would evaluate
other rest rules against this benchmark
and relevant standards.
4. Radio Frequency Management
The FAA proposes to maintain the
current substantive requirements of
§ 417.111(f) for radio frequency
management and to expand the
applicability of these requirements to
RLVs and reentry vehicles in proposed
§ 450.153 (Radio Frequency
Management). The FAA also would
remove the current requirements to
implement a frequency management
plan and to identify agreements for
coordination of use of radio frequencies
with any launch site operator and local
and federal authorities.
Under § 415.119 and appendix B of
part 415, an applicant for a launch
license is required to include a
frequency management plan 97 in its
application, and that plan must satisfy
the requirements of § 417.111(f).
Specifically, current § 417.111(f)
requires an operator to implement a
frequency management plan that
identifies each frequency, all allowable
frequency tolerances, and each
frequency’s intended use, operating
power, and source. The plan must also
provide for the monitoring of frequency
usage and enforcement of frequency
allocations and identify agreements and
97 A radio frequency management plan describes
how an operator manages radio frequencies to meet
termination or tracking requirements.
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procedures for coordinating use of radio
frequencies with any launch site
operator and any local and Federal
authorities, including the FCC.
While parts 431 and 435 do not
contain explicit frequency management
requirements, an operator is required to
identify and mitigate hazards, including
hazards associated with frequency
management as part of the system safety
process in § 431.35(c) and (d). Section
431.35(c) requires operators to perform
a hazard analysis and identify,
implement, and verify mitigations are in
place.98
Section 450.153 would replace the
current requirement in § 417.111(f) to
implement a frequency management
plan. In proposed § 450.153(a), the FAA
proposes to make these radio frequency
management requirements applicable to
any radio frequency used. This
proposed requirement would include
radio frequencies used not only in
launch vehicles, but also in RLVs and
reentry vehicles. Because radio
frequency requirements are a mitigation
for hazards associated with frequency
management, the proposed
requirements would not necessarily be
new requirements for RLVs or reentry
vehicles but would codify the need for
radio frequency management for RLVs
and reentry vehicles.
The FAA also proposes to maintain
the substantive radio frequency
requirements of current § 417.111(f) in
proposed § 450.153(a). Although the
increased use of autonomous
termination systems makes frequency
management less critical for flight
termination, there are still many
operators that use command termination
systems. Moreover, these requirements
remain applicable to autonomous
termination systems because operators
still need to allocate radio frequencies to
telemetry and tracking. There are also
other hazards, such as electromagnetic
interference and induced currents, that
can result from radio frequency
interference and that require mitigation.
Therefore, an operator would continue
to be required to: (1) Identify each
frequency, all allowable frequency
tolerances and each frequency’s
intended use, operating power and
source; (2) provide for monitoring of
frequency usage and enforcement of
frequency allocations; and (3)
98 One such hazard is radio interference that
could disable a commanded FSS. An operator might
mitigate such a hazard by ensuring that the power
level of the command transmitter is sufficient to
ensure termination with high reliability (i.e., 0.999
at 95 percent). For reentry vehicles, radio
frequencies for tracking are coordinated to ensure
there is coverage where needed as well as
communication with the vehicle.
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coordinate the use of radio frequencies
with any site operator and any local and
Federal authorities.
While no substantive changes are
proposed to the radio frequency
requirements, this proposal would
remove the current requirement that an
operator’s frequency management plan
identify agreements and procedures for
coordinating the use of radio
frequencies with any launch site
operator and any local or federal
authorities. Many of the agreements
necessary for radio frequency
management would be covered in
proposed § 450.147.
In proposed § 450.153(b), an applicant
would be required to submit procedures
or other means to demonstrate
compliance with the requirements of
§ 450.153(a) as part of its application.
This requirement would provide an
applicant flexibility in the manner of
demonstrating compliance, such as
using checklists or continuing to use a
frequency management plan.
5. Readiness: Reviews and Rehearsals
The FAA proposes to revise and
consolidate the readiness requirements
of parts 417 and 431 into a performancebased regulation that would require an
operator to document and implement
procedures to assess readiness to
proceed with the flight of a launch or
reentry vehicle. The FAA currently
requires an operator to be ready to
perform launch or reentry operations.
Readiness, which is currently addressed
through readiness reviews and
rehearsals, has three components—
readiness of the vehicle, of the
personnel, and of the equipment. In
consolidating these parts, the FAA
proposes to remove the current
requirements to conduct rehearsals, to
poll the FAA at the launch readiness
review, and to provide a signed written
decision to proceed. The FAA also
proposes to eliminate the specific
review requirements of §§ 417.117 and
431.37.
Launch rates have increased
substantially since the adoption of parts
417 and 431. In 2007, an operator might
only launch one to three times a year.
Currently, there are operators that have
launch rates exceeding 20 launches per
year. Readiness requirements have
become overly burdensome as operators
spend time on rehearsals and reviews
that were meant to ensure readiness.
Timing requirements have resulted in
additional reviews or non-compliances.
Operators in a high launch rate
environment may not benefit much from
rehearsals and added reviews.
Currently, § 417.117 requires that a
launch operator (1) review the status of
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operations, systems, equipment and
personnel required by part 417, (2)
maintain and implement documented
criteria for successful completion of
each review, (3) track and document
corrective actions or issues identified
during the review, and (4) ensure that
launch operator personnel overseeing
the review attest to successful
completion of the reviews criteria in
writing. Section 417.117(b)(3) requires
an operator to conduct a launch
readiness review for flight within 48
hours of flight. The decision to proceed
with launch must be in writing and
signed by the launch director and any
launch site operator or Federal launch
range. The launch operator must also
poll the FAA to verify that the FAA has
not identified any issues related to the
launch operator’s license.
For RLV operations, § 431.37 requires
an applicant to submit procedures that
ensure readiness of the vehicle,
personnel, and equipment as part of the
application process. These procedures
must involve the vehicle safety
operations personnel and the launch
site and reentry site personnel involved
in the mission. The procedures must
include a mission readiness review and
specify that the individual responsible
for the conduct of the licensed activities
is provided specific information upon
which he or she can make a judgement
as to mission readiness.
Additionally, as part of the readiness
requirements, § 417.119 requires an
operator to rehearse its launch crew and
systems to identify corrective actions
necessary to ensure public safety that
cover the countdown, communications,
and emergency procedures, and it
specifically directs the launch operator
in how to conduct its rehearsals. Section
431.33(c)(1) similarly requires an
applicant to monitor and evaluate
operational dress rehearsals to ensure
they are conducted in accordance with
procedures required by § 431.37 to
ensure the readiness of vehicle safety
operations personnel.
The requirements of both parts 417
and 431 are prescriptive and do not
provide an operator with much
flexibility as to compliance. The lack of
flexibility is evidenced by the issuance
of waivers and documentation of noncompliances. This requirement has
created a burden on operators because
they must spend extra resources
requesting waivers and responding to
enforcement actions. Processing waivers
and conducting additional reviews costs
time and money for the FAA, as well.
For example, § 417.117(b)(3) requires a
flight operator to hold a launch
readiness review no earlier than 48
hours before flight. Since 2007, the FAA
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has processed over 20 waivers to the 48hour requirement. In situations where
ELV operators have not requested a
waiver to the timing requirement, they
have held additional reviews just to
meet the timing requirement of the
flight readiness review. Additionally,
the FAA has issued at least three
enforcement letters because operators
did not meet the timing requirement.
The ARC recommended that the FAA
distill reviews down to intent, list the
minimum items the FAA reviews, and
let the operator inform the FAA in the
license application where those items
are and how they would be reported.
The FAA agrees that specific reviews
are not required and proposes a list of
items required to address readiness. The
FAA also agrees that specific rehearsals
are not required because there are a
variety of methods by which an operator
could meet readiness requirements. As
discussed later, the FAA proposes to
remove the specific requirement for
rehearsals.
The FAA proposes to revise and
consolidate the readiness requirements
of parts 417 and part 431 into proposed
§ 450.155, which would require an
operator to document and implement
procedures to assess readiness to
proceed with the flight of a launch or
reentry vehicle. The FAA anticipates
that under this proposal an operator
would be able to achieve readiness by
various methods including, but not
limited to, readiness meetings, tests,
rehearsals, static fire tests, wet dress
rehearsals,99 training, and experience.
While current regulations require
specific readiness reviews, proposed
§ 450.155 (Readiness) would remove the
requirement for flight readiness reviews,
including the requirements for a launch
readiness review no earlier than 15 days
before flight and the flight readiness
review no earlier than 48 hours before
flight. The FAA proposes to remove
these requirements because it has found
that multiple readiness reviews may not
be necessary to demonstrate readiness.
For instance, readiness can be
determined by a single meeting close
enough in time to the launch or reenty
to ensure there have been no material
changes to readiness, such as failure of
a radar or telemetry system. Under the
proposed rule, it would be up to the
operator to propose how it would
ensure readiness, and whether such
procedures would include one or more
readiness reviews, testing, or some other
means. By eliminating the timing
requirements, operators with high
launch rates could propose how they
99 A wet dress rehearsal includes at least a partial
fueling of a vehicle with a liquid propellant.
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will ensure they are ready for launch
and whether that involves one or more
readiness reviews held close enough in
time to the launch to ensure no
significant changes occur between the
review and the launch. Removing the
specific requirements for reviews and
tests would not relieve the operator
from having to perform a test or hold a
review that is necessary for determining
readiness, rather it would provide the
operator with flexibility to develop and
propose those tests and reviews most
suitable for the operation in order to
ensure readiness. The FAA would
evaluate and make a determination on
the adequacy of the proposed
procedures during the licensing process.
The FAA plans to publish a draft
means-of-compliance guide with the
publication of the proposed rule, which
should include acceptable approaches.
In the long term, the FAA plans to refer
to an AC or standard for every
performance-based requirement.
Instead of requiring specific readiness
reviews, proposed § 450.155 would
require that an operator document and
implement procedures to assess
readiness to proceed with the flight of
a launch or reentry vehicle. As part of
the application requirements, the
operator would be required to
demonstrate compliance with the
requirements of proposed § 450.155
through procedures that may include a
readiness meeting close in time to flight.
Unlike §§ 417.117 and 431.37, proposed
§ 450.155 would not specify particulars
of what the procedures must contain.
However, the operator would be
required to document and implement
procedures that at a minimum address:
(1) Readiness of vehicle and launch,
reentry, or landing site, including any
contingency abort location; (2) readiness
of safety-critical personnel, systems,
software, procedures, equipment,
property and services; and (3) readiness
to implement a mishap plan. The FAA
proposes to require that the procedures
address these particular areas because
the FAA has determined that a safe
launch or reentry, at a minimum,
requires the vehicle, site, and safety
personnel to be ready and all safety
systems and safety support equipment
to be working properly. Additionally,
being prepared to implement a mishap
plan would ensure that public safety is
maintained during a mishap because
personnel would be familiar with their
roles and ready to perform their duties
in order to return the vehicle and site to
a safe condition after the mishap.
The FAA also proposes to remove the
requirement that an operator poll the
FAA at the launch readiness review and
provide a signed certificate of the
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decision to proceed contained in
§ 417.117. This polling is unnecessary
because the FAA will always inform the
operator of any licensing issues as soon
as the FAA becomes aware of them. The
FAA also proposes to remove the
requirement that an operator provide a
signed certificate of the decision to
proceed with launch or reentry
operations because the FAA has not
used any signed certificate required
under § 417.117 for any launch or
reentry. All the certificates have been
filed and have not served any purpose
other than to comply with the
requirement under § 417.117. The FAA
believes that removing the requirements
to poll the FAA and to have a signed
certificate to proceed would not affect
public safety and would relieve burdens
to comply with those requirements from
the operator and the FAA.
The FAA proposes to remove the
requirements in § 417.119 because
rehearsals are not always needed to
achieve readiness. It is important that
the launch team be familiar with
operations. Rehearsals are a good way to
ensure proficiency with procedures,
exercise communications and critical
safety positions as a team, and identify
areas where the operator needs to
improve. However, the FAA
acknowledges that rehearsals are not the
only way to ensure the readiness
performance requirement is met. This
proposal would allow an operator to
determine what methods would be best
suited to ensure readiness for its
operation. Operators that have high
launch rates may not need to rehearse
personnel that were involved in a
similar launch days or weeks earlier.
However, licensees that have not
launched for a long time or that are
launching for the first time may need
rehearsals to meet some of the readiness
requirements. Operators with high
launch rates could demonstrate
readiness with a readiness review and
would not have to hold rehearsals, and
training could fill gaps where actual
operations do not provide familiarity
with certain aspects of operations. For
example, if no anomalies are
experienced during actual operations,
the operator could hold a rehearsal or
provide additional training to exercise
the anomaly resolution process.
Current § 417.117(b)(3)(xi) requires an
operator to review launch failure initial
response actions and investigation roles
and responsibilities and § 417.119(c)
requires an operator to have a mishap
plan rehearsal; current § 431.45 contains
the requirements for a mishap plan for
RLVs. Section 450.155(a)(3) would
require an operator to document and
implement procedures to ensure
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readiness to implement a mishap plan
in the event of a mishap. The proposal
would allow flexibility to meet the
readiness requirement for implementing
a mishap plan by allowing an operator
to propose a procedure acceptable to the
FAA. Thus, an operator would have the
ability to develop procedures to ensure
readiness through training, rehearsals,
or other means that might be more
applicable to its vehicle and mission.
The FAA would still expect an operator
to review any lesson learned, corrective
action, or changes to procedures
resulting from any mishap plan
rehearsals or mishap investigations.
Under § 450.155(b), an applicant
would need to demonstrate compliance
with the requirements through
procedures that may include a readiness
meeting close in time to flight and
describe the criteria for establishing
readiness to proceed with the flight of
a launch or reentry vehicle.
6. Communications
Currently, the FAA requires operators
to implement communications plans to
ensure that clear lines of authority and
situational awareness are maintained
during countdown operations. The
communications plan was the result of
a 1993 NTSB investigation discussed
earlier. One of the contributing factors
identified in the investigation was the
lack of clear communications between
different ranges and the operator. The
FAA requirements for communications
plans are currently found in
§§ 417.111(k) and 431.41 and are nearly
identical. Currently, §§ 417.111(k) and
431.41 require an operator to implement
a communications plan. Part 435
requires a reentry vehicle operator to
comply with the safety requirements of
part 431, including § 431.41. Both
§§ 417.111(k) and 431.41 require an
operator’s communications plan to
define the authority of personnel, by
individual or position title, to issue
‘‘hold/resume,’’ ‘‘go/no-go,’’ and abort
commands; assign communication
networks so that personnel have direct
access to real-time safety-critical
information required to issue ‘‘hold/
resume,’’ ‘‘go/no-go,’’ and any abort
decisions and commands; ensure
personnel monitor common intercom
channels during countdown and flight;
and implement a protocol for using
defined radio telephone
communications terminology.
Additionally, § 431.41(b) requires that
the applicant submit procedures to
ensure that the licensee and reentry site
personnel receive copies of the
communications plan, and that the
reentry site operator concurs with the
plan. For launches from a Federal
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launch range, § 417.111(k) also requires
the Federal launch range to concur with
the communications plan.
Operators launching from Federal
launch ranges comply with § 417.111(k).
Operators submit a communications
plan during the application process and
coordinate with the Air Force. The
communications plan includes lines of
authority, identification of who has
access to which channels, protocols for
communication and procedures for
decision processes. Often, the
communication plan is not fully
developed at the time the operator
applies for a license, so operators often
submit a representative plan during the
application process and then provide a
final plan prior to the first launch under
a license.
The FAA proposes to retain the
substantive communications
requirements in §§ 417.111(k) and
431.41 in § 450.157 (Communications),
in paragraph (a), and remove the
specific requirement to implement a
communications plan. Section
450.157(b) would also require an
operator to ensure currency of the
communication procedures, similar to
the current requirement in § 417.111(e).
The FAA would preserve these
requirements because all key
participants must work from the same
communications procedures in order to
avoid miscommunication that could
lead to a mishap.100
Section 450.157(c) would require an
operator during each countdown to
record all safety-critical
communications network channels that
are used for voice, video, or data
transmissions to support safety-critical
systems. This is substantially the same
requirement as in §§ 417.111(l)(5)(vii)
and 431.41. The FAA would retain this
requirement because communications
recording is often critical to mishap
investigations.
Lastly, the FAA would not require
operators to submit communication
procedures during the application
process because generally such
procedures are not mature at the time of
application, and hence are unlikely to
be the ones used during the actual
countdown. Under the proposal, the
FAA would not approve the
communications procedures prior to
licensing and would rely instead on an
inspection process that ensures the
operator is following the requirements
for communications procedures. These
inspections would be consistent with
100 NTSB Special Investigation Report:
Commercial Space Launch Incident, Launch
Procedure Anomaly Orbital Science Corporation,
Pegasus/SCD–1, 80 Nautical Miles East of Cape
Canaveral, Florida (February 9, 1993); at p. 53.
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current practice, where FAA inspectors
often review the operator’s final
communications procedures. Given that
the FAA would no longer require
demonstrations of compliance at the
application stage for communications
and preflight procedures, operators may
be required to make revisions to those
procedures to resolve issues identified
during compliance monitoring.
7. Preflight Procedures
Under § 417.111(l), an operator is
required to develop and implement a
countdown plan that verifies each
launch safety rule and launch commit
criterion is satisfied, personnel can
communicate during the countdown,
the communication is available after the
flight, and a launch operator will be able
to recover from a launch abort or delay.
This countdown plan must cover the
period of time when any launch support
personnel are required to be at their
designated stations through initiation of
flight. It also must include procedures
for handling anomalies that occur
during countdown and any constraints
to initiation of flight, for delaying or
holding a launch when necessary, and
for resolving issues. It must identify
each person by position who approves
the corrective actions, and each person
by position who performs each
operation or specific action. It also must
include a written countdown checklist
that must include, among other items,
verification that all launch safety rules
and launch commit criteria have been
satisfied. In case of a launch abort or
delay, the countdown plan must
identify each condition that must exist
in order attempt another launch,
including a schedule depicting the flow
of tasks and events in relation to when
the abort or delay occurred and the new
planned launch time, and identify each
interface and entity needed to support
recovery operations. Currently
§ 415.37(a)(2) requires that the applicant
file procedures that ensure mission
constraints, rules and abort procedures
are listed and consolidated in a safety
directive or notebook. Similarly, the
mission readiness requirements of
§ 431.37(a)(2) require that procedures
that ensure mission constraints, rules,
and abort plans are listed and
consolidated in a safety directive
notebook.
Currently some operators have paper
notebooks containing all the checklists
and countdown plans. These notebooks
are updated frequently, even up to the
day before a launch with change pages
by every member of the launch team.
This process can sometimes lead to
confusion and configuration issues.
Other operators have electronic systems
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that contain all the checklists and
countdown procedures. There are many
advantages to electronic records, such as
ease of dissemination and configuration
control. As electronic file use becomes
more common, the need for a physical
notebook becomes unnecessary. What is
critical for safety is that all launch
personnel have the same set of
procedures. Due to the dynamic nature
of countdown procedures, operators
provide checklists and procedures used
in prior launches to meet the
application requirements. The FAA
evaluates these checklists and
procedures during the license
evaluation. However, because the
checklists and procedures being
evaluated are not final, operators must
submit all updates to these documents
as part of the continuing accuracy of the
license requirements. FAA inspectors
ensure the checklists and procedures are
the most current, and that configuration
control is maintained.
The FAA proposes to streamline the
current countdown procedures and
requirements in §§ 415.37(a)(2),
417.111(l), and 431.39(a)(2) and replace
them in § 450.159 (Preflight
Procedures). In doing so, the FAA
proposes to remove the requirements for
safety directives or safety notebooks and
for a countdown plan, and the
requirement to file such plans because
there are many methods of documenting
the preflight procedures that do not
involve a plan or notebook. Although
the proposed preflight procedures
would not be required to be submitted
as part of the license application
process, FAA inspectors would still
ensure that such preflight procedures
are implemented.
Unlike the current regulations, the
FAA proposes a performance-based
requirement where an operator would
need to implement preflight procedures
would verify that all flight commit
criteria are satisfied before flight and
that ensure the operator is capable of
returning the vehicle to a safe state after
a countdown abort or delay.101 This
aligns with the intent of current
regulations while permitting flexibility
on how the safety goal is achieved. As
a result, there would be no impact on
safety resulting from the removal of the
current prescriptive requirements.
Additionally, proposed § 450.159(b)
would require an operator to ensure the
currency of the preflight procedures,
and that all personnel are working with
the approved version of the preflight
101 A countdown abort includes launch scrubs,
recycle operations, hang-fires, or any instance in
which the launch vehicle does not lift-off after a
command to initiate flight has been sent.
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procedures, similar to the current
requirement in §§ 415.37(a)(3) and
431.39(c). The FAA would preserve
these requirements because all key
participants must work from the same
preflight procedures in order to avoid a
mishap.
The FAA anticipates that the current
requirements of § 417.111(l)(1) through
(6) would be a means of compliance
under the proposal, but not the only
means of compliance. By allowing
alternative means of compliance, the
proposed regulations would provide
greater operational flexibility and
procedure streamlining across all
operation types.
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8. Surveillance and Publication of
Hazard Areas
The FAA proposes to adopt
surveillance of a flight hazard area
regulations based on recent granted
waivers and to better align with current
practices at the Federal launch ranges,
where most commercial launches take
place, and to codify current practice that
eliminates unnecessary launch delays
while maintaining public safety. This
proposal would only alter the
substantive requirements applicable to
the surveillance of ship (waterborne
vessel) hazard areas not the surveillance
of land or aircraft hazard areas.
Therefore, this discussion will focus
primarily on the proposal’s effect on the
surveillance of waterborne vessel hazard
areas. The specific requirements for
conducting a flight hazard area analysis
are discussed later in the preamble.
Current regulations on establishing
and surveilling hazard areas, including
ship hazard areas, for ELVs are found in
§§ 417.205 102 and 417.223 103 and part
417, appendix B.104 Part 431 does not
set explicit requirements for the
surveillance of waterborne vessel hazard
areas, and the FAA has not yet issued
a license under part 431 over water.
However, both §§ 417.107(b)(2) and
431.35(b)(1)(ii) require that an operator
ensure all members of the public are
cleared of all regions, whether land, sea,
or air, where any individual would be
exposed to more than 1 × 10¥6 PC.
102 Section 417.205 requires the flight safety
analysis to employ risk assessment, hazard
isolation, or a combination of risk assessment and
partial isolation of the hazards to demonstrate
control of risk to the public.
103 Section 417.223 requires, in part, that an FSA
include a flight hazard area analysis that identifies
any regions of land, sea, or air that must be
surveyed, publicized, controlled, or evacuated in
order to control the risk to the public from debris
impact hazards.
104 Section B417.5(a) of appendix B to part 417
states that a launch operator must perform a launch
site hazard area analysis that protects the public,
aircraft, and ships from the hazardous activities in
the vicinity of the launch site.
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Although not explicit, the current
regulations for ELV and RLV operations
effectively require surveillance and
evacuation of all regions where the
individual risk criterion would be
violated by the presence of any member
of the public.
The net effects of the current ELV
regulations are: (1) An operator must
establish a ship hazard area sufficient to
ensure the PI for any ship does not
exceed 1 × 10¥5 for any debris that
could cause a casualty, (2) an operator
must monitor the ship hazard area prior
to initiating the flight operation, and (3)
if a large enough ship enters the
waterborne vessel hazard area to exceed
the 1 × 10¥5 PI criterion, then the
launch must be scrubbed or delayed
until the ship exits the hazard area.
Appendix B to part 417 directs a launch
operator to evacuate and monitor each
launch site hazard area to ensure
compliance with the risk criteria in
§ 417.107(b)(2) and (3) and provide an
adequate methodology to achieve this
end. The FAA designed this
methodology to be consistent with Air
Force range safety requirements in 2006
and to ensure that the cumulative PI to
any ships would not exceed 1 × 10¥5 for
any debris expected to exceed the
kinetic energy or overpressure
thresholds established by § 417.107(c).
Current § 417.223(b) requires public
notices for flight hazard areas. A flight
hazard area analysis must establish the
ship hazard areas for notices to mariners
that encompass the three-sigma impact
dispersion area for each planned debris
impact.105 Section 417.121(e) contains
procedural requirements for issuing
notices to mariners (and airmen).
Furthermore, § 417.111(j) requires a
launch operator to implement a plan
that defines the process for ensuring
that any unauthorized persons, ships,
trains, aircraft or other vehicles are not
within any hazard areas identified by
the FSA or the ground safety analysis.
In the plan, the launch operator must
list each hazard area that requires
surveillance to meet §§ 417.107 and
417.223, as well as describe how the
launch operator will provide for day-offlight surveillance of the flight hazard
area to ensure that the presence of any
member of the public in or near a flight
hazard area is consistent with flight
commit criteria developed for each
launch. In practice, these regulations
have been comprehensive enough to
105 In addition, a flight hazard area analysis must
establish the aircraft hazard areas for notices to
airmen that encompass the 3-sigma impact
dispersion volume for each planned debris impact.
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ensure public safety, but at times overly
prescriptive and unduly conservative.
The FAA has waived several
waterborne vessel protection
requirements 106 in light of advanced
ship monitoring technology and risk
calculation models. The FAA’s first
waiver of the § 417.107(b)(3)
requirement illustrates the need for this
proposed change.107 In approving the
first waiver and numerous subsequent
waivers to enable the proposed option,
the FAA assessed the technological
advances previously discussed. In this
assessment, the FAA reviewed the
Federal launch range input data and
probabilistic casualty models that the
Air Force at the 45th Space Wing uses
to quantify individual and collective
risks to people on waterborne vessels
during the launch countdown for space
launch missions. The FAA found that
the 45th Space Wing’s public risk
analyses use accurate data and scientific
methods that are mathematically valid,
with reasonably conservative
assumptions applied in areas where
significant uncertainty exists. In that
instance, the FAA performed
independent analyses using alternative
methods to estimate the casualty risks
for multiple foreseeable scenarios
involving debris impacts on various
types of waterborne vessels and found
that large passenger vessels anywhere
between the launch point and the first
stage disposal zone can contribute
significantly to the estimated EC from a
launch. The FAA also found that small
boats (too small to have Automatic
Identification System (AIS) required 108)
located close to the launch point should
not produce significant individual risks.
However, no past waivers involved
changes in the areas where surveillance
was mandatory in current practice, only
where ships were allowed to be present
in order for the launch to proceed.
Section 450.161 (Surveillance and
Publication of Hazard Areas) would
require an operator to publicize, survey,
and evacuate each flight hazard area
before initiating flight or reentry, to the
extent necessary to ensure compliance
with proposed § 450.101. Proposed
§ 450.161(a) does not change the need
for surveillance relative to the current
requirements in parts 417 or 431 for
people on land or aircraft because the
proposal would continue to require that
106 For example, see Waivers of Ship Protection
Probability of Impact Requirement, 81 FR 28930
(May 10, 2016).
107 81 FR 28930 (May 10, 2016).
108 AIS is required on commercial vessels 65 feet
in length or more, towing vessels 26 feet in length
or more, and other self-propelled vessels certified
to carry more than 150 passengers or carrying
dangerous cargo.
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an operator ensure all regions where any
individual member of the public would
be exposed to more than 1 × 10¥6 PC are
evacuated. However, the proposal
would remove the requirement to
evacuate and monitor areas where a
waterborne vessel would be exposed to
greater than 1 × 10¥5 PI currently
required by Appendix B to part 417,
paragraph 417.5(a).
The FAA proposal to include people
on ships in the collective risk
computation (see proposed
§ 450.101(a)(1) and (b)(1)) would
explicitly allow the application of risk
management principles to protect
people on waterborne vessels. For
example, an applicant could apply
conservative estimates of the ship traffic
and vulnerability to demonstrate
acceptable public risks. In proposed
§ 450.161(a), surveillance would only be
required to the extent necessary to
ensure compliance with the public
safety criteria, including individual and
collective risks as well as notification of
planned impacts from normal flight
events capable of causing a casualty. For
instance, an operator would not need to
perform surveillance of areas where the
risk to any individual would be no more
than 1 × 10¥6 PC, unless surveillance
was necessary to ensure acceptable
collective risks.
The proposal would generally allow
operators the option to use the current
approach in part 417, where
surveillance is required to ensure no
ship is exposed to more than 1 × 10¥5
PI, because that would generally be
sufficient to ensure compliance with
proposed § 450.101. In addition, the
proposal would also provide the option
for launch and reentry operators to use
the new technology, including modern
surveillance techniques, and include
people in waterborne vessels as part of
the collective risk calculation as
approved by previous waivers.109
Current practice is to issue waivers to
operators as an alternative to scrubbing
or delaying a launch or reentry due to
waterborne vessels in an area where the
PI exceeds 1 × 10¥5. Thus, the proposal
would curtail the need for waivers.
While the proposal would relax the
current part 417 requirement to ensure
that no ship is exposed to more the 1 ×
10¥5 PI, the FAA notes that the
requirement to ensure no ships are
present in areas where the individual
risk exceeds 1 × 10¥6 PC is consistent
with international guidelines. The
International Maritime Organization
(IMO) is the United Nations
organization for safety and
environmental protection regulations for
109 81
FR 28930 (May 10, 2016).
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maritime activities. The IMO has
developed a risk-based approach to
safety and environmental protection
regulations, which identifies a key
threshold of one in a million (1 × 10¥6)
probability of fatality per year for
individual crewmembers, passengers,
and members of the public ashore
(considered third parties by the IMO).
The IMO guidelines equate individual
risks at the 1 × 10¥6 probability of
fatality per year as broadly acceptable
for maritime activities, and specifically
state that individual risks below this
level are negligible and no risk
reduction required. The proposed
§ 450.101(a)(2) and (b)(2) requirements
would ensure that no person will be
present on ships where the individual
risk exceeds 1 × 10¥6 PC . This
requirement is consistent, and
reasonably conservative, with respect to
the IMO guidelines as explained in the
RCC 321–07 Supplement.110 Thus, the
FAA proposes to codify requirements
for the development and surveillance of
ship hazard area that are reasonably
consistent with IMO guidelines for
formal safety assessments.
As previously discussed, there were
important advances in ship surveillance
techniques in recent years. In the past,
observation techniques posed
significant risks to launch operators. For
example, the only known deaths related
to launch operations at Cape Canaveral
were five occupants of a helicopter that
crashed at sea shortly after 2 a.m. on
April 7, 1984, while flying surface
surveillance for the scheduled launch of
a Trident 1 missile from the USS
Georgia.111 In many cases, the proposal
would relieve the requirement for the
type of surveillance that posed
significant risks to launch operators in
the past.
Section 450.161(b) would require
surveillance sufficient to verify or
update the assumptions, input data, and
results of the flight safety analyses.
Given there are numerous assumptions
and input data that are critical to the
validity of the flight safety analyses, this
requirement could have a variety of
surveillance implications beyond the
surveillance necessary to ensure the
public exposure at the time of the
operation is consistent with the
assumptions and input data for the
flight safety analyses. For example, an
FSA could assume that a jettisoned
stage remains intact to impact or breaks
up into numerous pieces that are all
110 Range Commanders Council Risk Committee
of the Range Safety Group, Common Risk Criteria
for National Test Ranges: Supplement. RCC 321–07
Supplement, White Sands Missile Range, New
Mexico, 2007, p. 5–50.
111 Air Force News Print Today (Apr. 8, 2011).
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capable of causing casualties to people
in a class of aircraft (e.g., business jets).
An operator would be required to
employ some type of surveillance (e.g.,
telemetry data, or remote sensors such
as a camera or radar) to verify that the
jettisoned stage behaves as assumed by
the FSA if that behavior is germane to
the size of the aircraft hazard area.
Additionally, § 450.161(c) would
require an applicant to publicize
warnings for each flight hazard area,
except for regions of land, sea, or air
under the control of the vehicle or site
operator or other entity by agreement. If
the operator relies on another entity to
publicize these warnings, the proposal
requires the operator to verify that the
warnings have been issued. The FAA
notes that some operators already follow
this practice. The proposed
requirements would allow warnings that
are consistent with current practice but
would also allow more flexibility for
warnings to mariners in accordance
with proposed § 450.133(b). Notably,
§ 450.133(b)(1) would be consistent with
current practice at the Federal launch
ranges based on input from the CSWG,
and § 450.133(b)(2) and (3) are based on
current U.S. Government consensus
standards).112 Proposed § 450.161(d)
would also require an applicant to
describe how it will provide for day-offlight surveillance of flight hazard areas,
if necessary, to ensure that the presence
of any member of the public in or near
a flight hazard area is consistent with
flight commit criteria developed for
each launch or reentry.
This proposal is consistent with the
executive branch policy to replace
prescriptive requirements with
performance-based criteria.113
Specifically, the FAA proposes to
replace the ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ approach
to ship protection that effectively
prevents launch or reentry operations to
proceed if ships are in identified hazard
areas irrespective of the estimated risks
posed to people on those vessels. For
example, during the launch of the
Falcon 9 from CCAFS to deliver the
SES–9 payload to orbit, SpaceX was
delayed by the presence of a tug boat
towing a large barge inside the ship
hazard area in compliance with the
FAA’s requirement in § 417.107(b) to
limit the PI for waterborne vessels to 1
× 10¥5.114 Under the proposal, delays
such as this would be avoided without
the need for waivers. The FAA proposes
to replace the ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’
approach with the performance-based
criteria of the collective and individual
112 RCC
321–17 Standard.
(May 24, 2018), at Section 2b.
114 81 FR 28930 (May 10, 2016).
113 SPD–2
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risk limits in proposed § 450.101, and in
doing so would require an operational
delay only when necessary to ensure
acceptable individual and collective
risks. This approach was safely and
successfully used, by waiver, for all
Falcon 9 launches from the CCAFS and
KSC starting in 2016. The FAA seeks
comment on the proposed approach.
Application of public risk
management for the protection of people
in waterborne vessels has the potential
for reducing launch costs by reducing
the number of operational delays and
scrubs due to ships in areas where the
individual and collective risks are
nevertheless acceptable. Because it is a
major procurer of launch services,
reduced launch costs would be of direct
benefit to the U.S. Government. It would
also help to make the U.S. launch
industry more competitive
internationally by reducing launch
delays and scrubs.
9. Lightning Hazard Mitigation
The FAA proposes to remove
appendix G to part 417 and replace it
with the performance-based
requirements of § 450.163 (Lightning
Hazard Mitigation). The current
requirements in appendix G to part 417
are outdated, inflexible, overly
conservative, and not explicitly
applicable to many RLVs and reentry
vehicles.
Lightning is an atmospheric discharge
of electricity, and can either occur
naturally or be ‘‘triggered.’’ Triggered
lightning can be initiated as a result of
a launch vehicle and its electricallyconductive exhaust plume passing
through a strong pre-existing electric
field.115 However, the triggering
phenomenon is unpredictable because
there are many conditions that must
occur in order for the breakdown of the
electric field resulting in a lightning
strike to occur. One condition is the
enhancement factor of the launch or
reentry vehicle that acts as a conductor.
The extremities of the vehicle, such as
the nose radius of curvature coupled
with the effective length of the vehicle
(taking into account the plume length)
will establish the viability of a lightning
strike. Furthermore, a launch vehicle’s
propellants will have different
conductivity characteristics, leading to
varying lengths; 116 as a result, not every
vehicle will trigger a lightning strike
115 Roeder, William P. and Todd M. McNamara,
A Survey Of The Lightning Launch Commit Criteria,
American Meteorological Society, Aviation Range
and Meteorology Conference.
116 E. P. Krider, M. C. Noogle, M. A. Uman, and
R. E. Orville. ‘‘Lightning and the Apollo 17/Saturn
V Exhaust Plume,’’ Journal of Spacecraft and
Rockets, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1974), p. 72–75.
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under the same environmental
conditions. This unpredictability is
exacerbated further by the fact that a
triggered lightning strike can occur even
when the vehicle is penetrating a benign
cloud, or is outside a cloud that is not
producing lightning.
Lightning can and has caused or
necessitated the destruction of launch
and reentry vehicles in flight. This
destruction may occur both by physical
damage (direct effect) to structural or
electronic components from lightning
attachment to the vehicle and by
damage or upset to electronic systems
from a nearby discharge (indirect effect).
The direct and indirect effects of a
lightning discharge pose hazards to the
safety critical systems of launch and
reentry vehicles, such as the FSS. If
damage to the vehicle’s safety critical
components renders it inoperable or
causes safety-critical systems to
malfunction, there may be no way to
stop the vehicle from reaching the
public. For example, the damage may
cause the command signal that instructs
the vehicle to stop thrusting, or to abort
the mission, to not be received.
Two such triggered lightning events
occurred in 1969 and 1987, during
ascent. In 1969, when a manned Apollo
XII 117 vehicle lost power to its
Command Module, the launch was
seconds away from beginning initiation
of its abort command. In 1987, an
unmanned ELV lost its guidance,
navigation and control 118 and began
careening towards the range safety
impact limit lines. The range safety
officer had to terminate its flight.
These two incidents led to the
establishment of the present-day
lightning launch commit criteria
(LLCC), which the Air Force and NASA
adhere to for all launches from a Federal
launch range. The Lightning Advisory
Panel (LAP),119 an advisory body to the
Air Force and NASA, is responsible for
reviewing and proposing modifications
to the LLCC. Adherence to the LLCC has
resulted in zero lightning-caused launch
incidents for over thirty years.
The FAA codified the LLCC into
Appendix G to part 417 to address
117 Merceret et al., ed., A History of the Lightning
Launch Commit Criteria and the Lightning Advisory
Panel for America’s Space Program. NASA/TP–
2010–216283, 10, Section 2.3 (August 2010).
118 Merceret et al., ed., A History of the Lightning
Launch Commit Criteria and the Lightning Advisory
Panel for America’s Space Program. NASA/TP–
2010–216283, 31, Section 4.3.2 (August 2010).
119 The LAP’s expertise range from in-depth
knowledge of the physics of lightning, electric
fields, and clouds, to lightning impacts on launch
vehicles and statistics of electric field strength in
specific environmental conditions. Its membership
is primarily academia, although the Air Force and
NASA fund this organization.
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concerns that the direct and indirect
effects of a natural or triggered lightning
strike may disable a vehicle’s FSS such
that the launch operator could not stop
the vehicle if it veered outside the
impact limit lines (i.e., due to degraded
signal). The FAA renamed these
requirements to ‘‘Lightning Flight
Commit Criteria’’ (LFCC).
The LFCC in appendix G to part 417
consist of 10 natural and triggered
lightning avoidance rules that provide
criteria to minimize the risk of a launch
vehicle being struck by lightning or
triggering lightning. One rule contains
criteria for avoiding natural lightning,
the remaining nine contain avoidance
criteria for triggering or initiating
lightning when flying through, or near,
specific cloud types or phenomena
known to produce natural or triggered
lightning. Taking into account the
electrification process and the
properties of electric fields within
clouds, the triggered lightning rules
establish time and distance
requirements for distinct cloud types
(e.g., cumulus cloud, attached or
detached anvil cloud, thick clouds)
believed to contain the necessary
environmental conditions to produce
elevated electric fields. These time and
distance criteria help mitigate the threat
of triggering lightning by increasing the
probability that the electric field, at a
given distance or after a length of time,
will be below the threshold needed to
produce lightning. Other rules contain
prescriptive requirements and
thresholds for not launching if there are
high-surface electric fields as measured
by a ground-based field mill, or if there
is a threat of a vehicle becoming charged
if it penetrates a cloud that contains
frozen precipitation.120
Unfortunately, codifying the LLCC
into appendix G of part 417 has led to
two major challenges. First, because the
science behind triggering lightning is
not fully known, the criteria were
developed with a margin of safety for
large ELVs, such as the Titan IV. As a
consequence, the criteria may be overly
conservative for certain types of
vehicles. While the LAP has updated
the LLCC to keep pace with the
advances in science and technology, the
FAA rulemaking process is lengthy, and
does not permit appendix G to be
updated with the frequency necessary to
keep up with the changes to the LLCCs.
Revisions to appendix G are likely to be
120 Triboelectrification is a phenomenon that can
occur when a launch vehicle flies through a region
in a cloud that contains frozen precipitation. Under
the right conditions, frozen precipitation can
deposit a charge on the vehicle. If the launch
vehicle is not treated, an electrostatic discharge
could result.
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out-of-date by the time they are
finalized and published. As a result,
appendix G preserves much of the
original LLCCs outdated standards,
which leaves a discrepancy between the
LLCC and appendix G.
In an effort to address this issue, the
FAA made four ELOS determinations.
The first ELOS determination permitted
the use of a new maximum radar
reflectivity method 121 to determine
whether the radar reflectivity values
were below the risk threshold for
triggering lightning in the cloud.
Because this new measurement
technique was not in appendix G, the
launch operator could not benefit from
this improvement unless it requested
and received approval to use this
technique rather than follow the criteria
currently in appendix G. The ELOS
determination relieved the burden on
the operator to seek approval to use a
different radar reflectivity measurement
process; therefore, allowing more
opportunity for the launch operator to
take advantage of the improvement
rather than wait until a final rulemaking
incorporated the change.
When the LAP updated the LLCCs
again, the FAA issued a second ELOS
determination reducing the distance
requirement for the flight path of the
launch vehicle in relation to a thick
cloud, if the radar reflectivity thresholds
were satisfied.122 The issuance of this
ELOS determination was necessary to
enable operators to use the most recent
thick cloud rule without needing to seek
individual ELOS determinations from
the FAA or waiting for the FAA to
update appendix G through a
rulemaking.
The third ELOS determination also
resulted from an update to the LLCCs
and allowed for use of a shorter radar
wavelength to measure radar reflectivity
if the criteria for attenuation due to
rainfall and beam spreading were met.
This modification allowed a launch
operator to make use of weather radars
that have wavelengths between 3 and 5
cm, in addition to radars with
wavelengths of 5 cm or greater. Similar
to the other ELOS determinations, this
121 This radar reflectivity method allowed
measurement of a hydrometeor by a radar with a
wavelength of less than 5 centimeters but greater
than 3 centimeters if: (1) The surface of the radome
of the radar was hydrophobic and the precipitation
rate at the radar site was less than 15 mm/hr (0.59
in/hr) rainfall equivalent, and (2) For each point
that was measured, the horizontal extent of
composite radar reflectivity greater than lOdBZ
along the line of sight between the radar and the
point did not exceed the reflectivity extent in
kilometers for a 3 cm radar due to radar beam
attenuation.
122 The Launch operator can launch within 5nm
of a thick cloud layer if the radar reflectivity is
below 0 dBZ.
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relieved the burden from the operator to
seek approval from the FAA, and
allowed the operator to immediately use
different radar wavelengths or wait until
the FAA updated appendix G.
The fourth ELOS determination
informed the launch operator that
satisfying NASA–STD–4010 would meet
the requirements of appendix G to part
417.123 This ELOS determination
enabled an operator to use the more upto-date LLCC in place of the outdated
LFCC in appendix G. It also recognized
that the NASA–STD–4010 contained the
most current LLCCs and removed the
burden from the FAA to issue an ELOS
determination for every new update to
the LLCC.
The FAA only codified the LFCCs
into part 417, and not parts 431 and 435.
While the LFCCs are not explicitly
included in part 431 or 435, § 431.35(c)
requires an applicant to employ a
system safety process to identify and
mitigate hazards, including lightning.
Additionally, while not all launch and
reentry vehicles have the same
threshold to trigger lightning, they do
have the potential to incur direct or
indirect effects that may impact their
safety critical systems. Therefore, in
order to protect public health and
safety, the LFCCs are an appropriate
mitigation strategy for suborbital RLVs
and reentry vehicles that can induce
lightning that could affect public safety.
In 2006, the FAA sponsored a study to
conduct a triggered lightning risk
assessment for five different concept
suborbital RLVs, from two different
launch sites, to gain an understanding of
the potential risk of triggering lightning
for these new categories of vehicles.124
The study took into account the vehicle
design, mission profile, and propellants,
as well as the lightning climatology of
a given launch site. In 2010,125 a followon study was performed for four
concept vehicles at a total of four
different launch sites.126 The study
showed that all concept vehicles had a
123 The NASA–STD–4010 has been adopted by
both NASA and the Air Force. When NASA
published the LLCCs in a NASA Standard
document it provided uniform engineering and
technical requirements in one location lessening
confusion to which version of the LLCCs were
currently being applied.
124 Krider, Phil, E. et al., Triggered Lightning Risk
Assessment for Reusable Launch Vehicles at the
Southwest Regional and Oklahoma Spaceports,
Report No: ATR–2006(5195)–1, Jan 30, 2006
(https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/
headquarters_offices/ast/reports_studies/media/
ATR-2006(5195)-1.pdf).
125 Krider, Phil, E., et al., Triggered Lightning Risk
Assessment for Reusable Launch Vehicles at Four
Regional Spaceports, Report No: ATR–2010(4387)–
1, Apr 30, 2010. (https://www.faa.gov/about/office_
org/headquarters_offices/ast/reports_studies/
media/ATR-2010%20(5387)-1.pdf).
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much higher triggering threshold (i.e., it
was harder to initiate lightning) than
that of a Titan IV ELV and that they each
had different triggering thresholds
within each concept vehicle and phase
of mission. For instance, the glide phase
was shown to have a higher triggering
threshold than a powered phase. On the
other hand, the study noted that many
uncertainties remain with
understanding the triggering conditions.
Therefore, the results of the study
recommended that until more accurate
triggering thresholds for the differing
vehicle concepts can be quantified, the
avoidance criteria should be followed.
The FAA requests comments on this
proposal.
The ARC recommended the intent or
performance goal of the current LFCC be
captured into performance-based
requirements that allow for the
consideration of each launcher’s
mission profile, general vehicle and
flight safety system components, and
other factors that may reduce the
currently-required 30-minute wait.127
The ARC also recommended that the
prescriptive requirements in Appendix
G be placed in a guidance document
that provides acceptable means of
meeting the performance-based
requirements. Finally, the ARC
estimated that launch and site operators
could save hundreds of thousands of
dollars, or more, for each avoidance of
launch scrubs and no-go calls due to
unnecessarily conservative weather
restrictions.
The FAA generally agrees with the
ARC’s recommendation and proposes to
replace the detailed prescriptive LFCC
in appendix G with performance-based
requirements in proposed § 450.163. It
would also provide an AC that contains
an accepted means of compliance with
the proposed § 450.163(a)(1), including
reference to NASA–STD–4010 128 and
would also include other relevant
standards for the design of a vehicle to
withstand the direct and indirect effects
of a lightning discharge. The FAA seeks
comment on this approach.
The FAA anticipates that a
performance-based regulation,
accompanied by an associated AC and
government standards, would resolve
127 The ARC stated, ‘‘intent or performance goal,
of the stated requirements.’’ The FAA has
interpreted the phrase ‘‘of the stated requirements’’
to mean of the current LFCC found in appendix G
to part 417.
128 NASA–STD–4010 is the current lighting
launch commit criteria employed by NASA and the
Air Force. The FAA uses this standard as its basis
for the requirements in Appendix G and has issued
a broad-based ELOS determination allowing an
operator to comply with the current NASA–STD–
4010 instead of the existing Appendix G which is
outdated.
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many of the issues with the current
Appendix G. While a thorough
understanding of whether a given
launch vehicle and its mission profile
will trigger lightning is far from being
understood, a performance-based
requirement for mitigating natural and
triggered lightning strikes or
encountering a nearby lightning
discharge would allow an operator to
use up-to-date lightning avoidance
criteria without having to wait for the
regulation to be updated, or for the FAA
to issue an ELOS determination or a
waiver.
The intent of the current requirements
found in Appendix G to part 417 is to
avoid and mitigate natural and triggered
lightning. Under the proposed
regulations, the FAA would require
operators to avoid and mitigate the
potential for intercepting or initiating
lightning strike or encountering
discharge through implementation of
flight commit criteria. Alternatively, an
operator would be able to use a vehicle
designed to continue safe flight if struck
by lightning or encountering a nearby
discharge. Finally, an operator would be
able to comply with the proposed
regulation by ensuring that compliance
with public safety criteria would be met
in the event of a lightning strike on the
vehicle.
Proposed § 450.163(a)(1), would
require an operator to mitigate the
potential for a vehicle to intercept or
initiate a lightning strike or encounter a
nearby discharge through flight commit
criteria using a means of compliance
accepted by the Administrator.
Currently, the FAA is only aware of one
standard, NASA–STD–4010, that is
currently acceptable and would satisfy
the requirements of proposed
§ 450.163(a)(1). While FAA anticipates
that industry might develop new
standards as technology advances, such
standards would be required to be
submitted as alternative means of
compliance under § 450.35 (Accepted
Means of Compliance) paragraph (c) and
accepted by the Administrator prior to
use. If an operator were to submit an
alternative means of compliance to
NASA–STD–4010, the proposed
lightning standard would need to be
evaluated and accepted by the FAA,
including any consultation with outside
expert, prior to being used in any
license application using the new
standard.
The FAA anticipates that this revision
would provide more flexibility to an
operator than the current appendix G,
which prescribes the specific lightning
flight commit criteria that an operator
must use. While the only method
currently accepted by the Administrator
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is NASA–STD–4010, operators would
have the flexibility to propose lightning
flight commit criteria based on a certain
vehicle’s mission profile (e.g., whether
it is a piloted RLV launching a payload
to low Earth orbit, or a piloted
suborbital reusable launch vehicle with
spaceflight participants on board).129
However, as previously discussed, such
a proposed means of compliance would
need to be accepted prior to being used
in a license application to satisfy
proposed § 450.165(a)(1).
An operator may choose instead to
mitigate lightning strikes and the
initiation of lighting by using a vehicle
designed to continue safe flight in the
event of a lightning strike, in accordance
with proposed § 450.163(a)(2). To
accomplish this, an operator would
need to demonstrate that the vehicle
design adheres to design standards for
lightning protection of the vehicle and
its safety critical systems. The FAA is
currently evaluating current aircraft
lightning protection standards, such as
AC 20–136B and AC20–107B, to
determine whether a launch or reentry
vehicle designed to those standards
would allow for the continued safe
flight of the vehicle.130 The FAA
anticipates that it would accept other
industry standards for lightning
protection or certification standards
during vehicle design, such as SAE
Aerospace Recommended Practices, or
European Organization for Civil
Aviation Equipment, as an acceptable
means of compliance to proposed
§ 450.163(a)(2).
Finally, an operator would be able to
choose to comply with proposed
§ 450.163(c) by ensuring that it would
be in compliance with the public safety
criteria of proposed § 450.101 should it
encounter discharge or take a direct
lightning strike. The use of physical
containment as a hazard control strategy
would be a prime example, but other
scenarios may also apply.
Section 450.163 would apply to all
launch and reentry vehicles, including
ELVs, RLVs, hybrids, and reentry
vehicles. Because the proposed
requirement is performance based, each
operator would be able to provide
lightning mitigation methods designed
for a specific vehicle’s mission profile.
Under § 450.163, the FAA anticipates
129 The piloted vehicles can control and
maneuver the vehicle leading up the release point
or area thus limiting the exposure of the vehicle to
elevated electric fields upon its launch.
130 AC 20–136B, Aircraft Electrical and Electronic
Lightning System Lightning Protection, provides
information and guidance on the protection of
aircraft electrical and electronic systems from the
effects of lightning. AC 20–107B, provides
information and guidance on composite aircraft
structure.
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that an operator would be able to apply
new research findings or methodologies
in a more timely manner than under
appendix G. Further, the FAA would be
able to update guidance materials in a
timely manner to include those means
of compliance that result from advances
in science, information, or technology.
Additionally, the FAA believes that, by
providing an operator with the
flexibility to mitigate natural and
triggered lightning strikes through
standards and best practices, the
operators could avoid costly delays
resulting from compliance with the
requirements in the current appendix G.
Section 450.163(b) would establish
application requirements. To comply
with proposed § 450.163(a)(1), an
applicant would be required to submit
lightning flight commit criteria that
mitigate the potential for a launch or
reentry vehicle intercepting or initiating
a lightning strike, or encountering a
nearby discharge using a means of
compliance accepted by the
Administrator. As previously discussed,
the only current method to comply with
§ 450.165(a)(1) would be to use NASA–
STD–4010. If an applicant chooses
instead to comply with § 450.163(a)(2),
it would be required to provide
documentation demonstrating that the
vehicle is designed to protect safety
critical systems, such as electrical and
electronic systems, or FSSs. The FAA
anticipates that this documentation
would include proof and validation that
the vehicle has followed lightning
protections standards that would protect
the vehicle’s safety critical systems from
a direct or indirect lightning discharge.
If an applicant chooses to comply with
§ 450.163(a)(3), it would be required to
provide documentation demonstrating
compliance with § 450.101 in the event
of a lightning discharge. As previously
discussed, the FAA expects that this
would be demonstrated through any
number of analyses that validate that the
vehicle is able to control individual and
collective risk to the public,
The FAA considered using direct
measurement of the electric field within
a cloud as an option for a launch
operator to comply with proposed
§ 450.163. However, it is the FAA’s
understanding that there is currently no
consensus among the scientific
community on the electric field value
threshold to initiate lightning. Without
a definite threshold value, the FAA
would not be able to make a safety
determination if an operator were to
take direct measurements of the electric
field. In addition, further research and
data is required to establish procedures
for measuring within the cloud, for how
many measurements to make within a
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period of time or distance from the
cloud, and such other considerations.
Nevertheless, given the performancebased nature of § 450.163, it is possible
that in the future, an accepted means for
obtaining real time electric field
readings along the flight profile could
lead to less restrictive criteria.
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10. Flight Safety Rules
In proposed § 450.165, an operator
would be required to establish and
observe flight safety rules that govern
the conduct of each launch or reentry.
These would include flight commit
criteria and flight abort rules.
i. Flight Commit Criteria
The FAA proposes to consolidate the
flight-commit criteria requirements
currently contained in parts 417, 431,
and 435. Flight-commit criteria are
conditions necessary prior to the flight
of a launch vehicle or the reentry of a
reentry vehicle to ensure that the launch
or reentry does not exceed the public
safety criteria in proposed § 450.101.
Although this proposal restates flightcommit requirements differently than
the current regulations, the changes
would not alter substantive
requirements, and are intended solely
for clarification purposes.
The ELV launch requirements for
flight readiness are contained in
§§ 415.37 and 417.113. Section 415.37
requires an applicant to file procedures
for verifying readiness for safe flight,
which result in flight-commit criteria.
Section 417.113(c) requires that the
launch safety rules include flightcommit criteria that identify each
condition that must be met in order to
initiate flight. The flight-commit criteria
must implement the FSA; for a launch
that uses an FSS, must ensure that the
FSS is ready for flight; and for each
launch, must document the actual
conditions used for the flight-commit
criteria at the time of lift-off and verify
whether the flight-commit criteria are
satisfied.
Flight-commit criteria for launch and
reentry of a reusable launch vehicle are
contained in §§ 431.37 and 431.39, and
by extension in § 435.33 for the reentry
of a reentry vehicle other than a RLV.
Unlike part 417, the parts 431 and 435
requirements are performance-based
and required as part of the system safety
analysis requirements.
Flight-commit criteria-related
requirements appear throughout
proposed part 450. The main
requirements would be found in
§§ 450.155, 450.159, and 450.165.
Section 450.155 would require an
operator to document and implement
procedures to assess readiness to
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proceed with the flight of a launch or
reentry vehicle. Proposed § 450.159
would require an operator to implement
preflight procedures to verify that each
flight-commit criterion has been met
before initiating flight.
Proposed § 450.165 would mandate
that an operator’s flight safety rules
include flight-commit criteria
identifying each condition necessary
prior to initiating flight to satisfy
proposed § 450.101. These commit
criteria would include surveillance,
monitoring of meteorological
conditions, implementing window
closures for the purpose of collision
avoidance, monitoring the status of any
flight safety system, and any other
hazard controls derived from system
safety, software safety, or flight safety
analyses. Also, for any reentry vehicle,
the commit criteria would include
monitoring the status of safety-critical
systems before enabling reentry flight.
Part 450 also includes requirements to
develop flight-commit criteria based on
the results of various analysis. For
instance, § 450.135 (Debris Risk
Analysis) would require operators to
demonstrate compliance with public
safety criteria in proposed § 450.101. In
§ 450.137, the far-field overpressure
blast effect analysis would have to
demonstrate compliance with public
safety criteria in proposed § 450.101.
Sections 450.139 (Toxic Hazards for
Flight) and 450.187 (Toxic Hazards
Mitigation for Ground Operations)
would require an operator to derive
flight-commit criteria based on the
results of its toxic release hazard
analysis, containment analysis, or toxic
risk assessment to ensure any necessary
evacuation of the public from any toxic
hazard area prior to flight. Proposed
§ 450.141 (Wind Weighting for the
Flight of an Unguided Suborbital
Launch Vehicle) would require an
operator to establish flight-commit
criteria that control the risk to the
public from potential adverse effects
from normal and malfunctioning flight.
Proposed § 450.161 would require an
applicant to describe how it will
provide for day-of-flight surveillance of
flight hazard areas, if necessary, to
ensure that the presence of any member
of the public in or near a flight hazard
area is consistent with flight-commit
criteria. Section 450.163 would require
an operator to derive flight-commit
criteria that mitigate the potential for a
launch or reentry vehicle intercepting or
initiating a lightning strike, or
encountering a nearby discharge.
Finally, § 450.169 (Launch and Reentry
Collision Avoidance Analysis) would
require an operator use the results of the
collision avoidance analysis to develop
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flight-commit criteria for collision
avoidance.
ii. Flight Abort Rules
The FAA proposes to include flight
abort rules as part of proposed flight
safety rules in § 450.165. Flight abort
rules apply to a vehicle that uses an FSS
and are the conditions under which an
FSS must abort the flight to ensure
compliance with flight safety criteria.
Current regulations in parts 417 and 431
address flight abort rules.
Section 417.113(d) sets flight
termination rules for ELVs. It requires
operators to identify the conditions
under which the FSS, including the
functions of the flight safety system
crew, must terminate flight to ensure
public safety. The flight termination
rules must implement the FSA, and
specifically requires operators to
terminate flight in the following six
scenarios:
1. When real-time data indicate a
flight safety limit has been reached.
2. At the straight-up time if the
vehicle flies straight up.
3. If the vehicle becomes erratic and
may endanger protected areas, while
potentially losing control of the flight
safety system.
4. No later than at the expiration of
the data loss flight time if tracking data
is lost.
5. If a vehicle is performing erratically
prior to entering an overflight gate, or if
the vehicle is not flying parallel to or
converging to the nominal trajectory
prior to entering a gate.
6. If a vehicle is performing erratically
prior to entering a hold gate, or if the
vehicle is not flying parallel to or
converging to the nominal trajectory
prior to entering a hold gate.
Some of these current requirements
may be overly prescriptive. For
example, flight abort at the straight-up
time is only one method of mitigating
risk to the launch area in the event of
a vehicle that fails to program and flies
straight up. Although other methods
may mitigate risk to an acceptable level,
under the current requirements, an
operator would be forced to abort flight
at the straight up time. Also, the rules
for allowing vehicles to enter gates are
too subjective and not easily tied to
specific hazards.
Part 431, applicable to RLVs, does not
impose specific flight abort rules.
However, § 431.39(a) requires an
applicant to submit mission rules and
contingency abort plans that ensure safe
conduct of mission operations during
nominal and non-nominal vehicle flight.
These would encompass flight abort
rules because § 401.5 defines
contingency abort as the cessation of
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vehicle flight during ascent or descent
in a manner that does not jeopardize
public health and safety and the safety
of property, in accordance with mission
rules and procedures. Part 431 requires
flight abort when needed to mitigate risk
and a set of rules to that end, yet does
so without following part 417’s more
detailed and prescriptive approach. In
practice, orbital rockets licensed under
part 431 have used an AFSS with flight
abort rules that are conservatively
consistent with the six scenarios
identified in 417.113(d), when
applicable (e.g., no straight-up time for
a horizontal launch).
Section 450.165(c) lays out the
proposed consolidation and clarification
of flight abort rules. Although the FAA
would maintain much of § 417.113(d)’s
structure and requirements, the FAA
looked for opportunities to replace
prescriptive requirements with outcome
objectives. The FAA would require
operators to develop flight abort rules to
comply with the public safety criteria of
§ 450.101, as well as to prevent debris
capable of causing a casualty from
impacting in uncontrolled areas if the
vehicle is outside the limits of a useful
mission. Operators would also need to
identify the functions of any flight abort
crew, as specifically required in part
417. This is also consistent with the
FAA’s practice in implementing part
431. Although not specifically stated in
§ 431.39(a), the FAA has required
operators to identify crew functions.
The FAA proposes to eliminate the
straight-up rule, as it is not reasonable
to include the rule at the exclusion of
other existing mitigation options. Also,
the FAA proposes to simplify the
current requirements for gate passage to
allow a vehicle to pass through a gate if
it can achieve a useful mission. This
would allow the operator to specify
which vehicle parameters are the most
useful for determining whether a
vehicle should be allowed to enter a
gate. For orbital launches, vehicles
unable to achieve orbit cannot achieve
a useful mission and should be
terminated. The FAA would delete
separate requirements for hold-andresume gates, as analysis should show
which types of gates are most effective
for the proposed flight, and those
should be implemented.
These proposed rules, which would
be similar to those from part 417, were
chosen over the generic requirement for
mission rules from part 431 because
they correspond to other sections in the
proposed rule describing flight safety
limits, gates, and other requirements.
This is consistent with the ARC’s
recommendation to change part 431 to
better capture the intent of the flight
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abort rules. An operator should balance
potentially competing objectives as
necessary to minimize risk when
writing specific flight abort rules. For
example, if there is a rule to destruct a
vehicle to prevent an intact impact in
order to reduce distant focused
overpressure risk, the operator should
also consider the resulting risk to
aircraft when establishing the timing of
the destruct action.
Proposed § 450.165(d) lays out the
application requirements for flight
safety rules. For flight commit criteria,
the FAA would require an applicant to
provide a list of all flight commit
criteria. These would include any
criteria related to surveillance,
monitoring of meteorological
conditions, implementation of launch or
reentry windows closures for the
purpose of collision avoidance,
confirmation that any safety-critical
system is ready for flight, monitoring of
safety-critical systems prior to enabling
re-entry flight, and any other hazard
controls. For flight abort rules, the FAA
would require an applicant to provide a
description of each rule, and the
parameters that will be used to evaluate
each rule, as well as a list that identifies
the rules necessary for compliance with
each requirement in § 450.101. All
conditions in which flight abort action
would be taken must be described, as
well as rules and conditions allowing
flight to continue past a gate. Lastly, the
FAA would require an applicant to
provide a description of the vehicle data
that will be available to evaluate flight
abort rules across the range of normal
and malfunctioning flight. This
information is necessary to ensure that
compliance with the flight abort rules is
achievable.
11. Tracking
The FAA proposes to adopt vehicle
tracking requirements. Specifically,
proposed § 450.167 (Tracking) would
require an operator to measure and
record in real time the position and
velocity of the vehicle. The system used
to track the vehicle would be required
to provide data to determine the actual
impact locations of all stages and
components, and to obtain vehicle
performance data for comparison with
the preflight performance predictions.
The proposed requirements would be
consistent with current practice for a
wide variety of vehicles, including the
widespread use of telemetry data, and
various requirements of parts 417, 431,
and 437.
Current regulations for ELVs require a
vehicle tracking system as part of the
FSS. For example, in § 417.113(c), as
part of the flight commit criteria for a
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launch that uses an FSS, readiness for
flight includes that the launch vehicle
tracking system has no less than two
tracking sources prior to lift-off. Also,
the launch vehicle tracking system must
have no less than one verified tracking
source at all times from lift-off to orbit
insertion for an orbital launch, to the
end of powered flight for a suborbital
launch. Of course, the need for tracking
is implicit in other requirements for
launch of a vehicle with an FSS,
including the requirements regarding
data loss flight times in § 417.219.
Section § 417.125 also requires an
operator of an unguided suborbital
launch vehicle to track the flight of its
vehicle. Specifically, § 417.125(f)
requires an operator to provide data to
determine the actual impact locations of
all stages and components, to verify the
effectiveness of a launch operator’s
wind weighting safety system, and to
obtain rocket performance data for
comparison with the preflight
performance predictions.
Part 431 has no explicit requirements
related to tracking. However, currently
every operation licensed under part 431
is required to employ a telemetry system
that provides, among other safety
critical information, data on the position
and velocity of the vehicle in real-time.
In addition, the one orbital RLV
operation licensed to date employed an
FSS and established data loss flight
times. The use of data loss flight times
is an explicit recognition that a vehicle
without tracking poses a potential
hazard to the public.
Tracking is also required under
Experimental Permit regulations. Under
§ 437.67, an operator must, during
permitted flight, measure in real-time
the position and velocity of its reusable
suborbital rocket. The requirements for
an operator to measure in real time the
position and velocity of its rocket,
coupled with the requirement to
communicate with ATC during all
phases of flight, are intended (among
other things) to provide ATC with
enough information to protect the
public if the vehicle flies outside its
planned trajectory envelope.
Tracking data sufficient to identify the
location of any vehicle impacts
following an unplanned event are
necessary to ensure a proper response to
an emergency. Specifically, a launch
operator must implement its mishap
response plan if an unplanned event
occurring during the flight of a launch
vehicle results in the impact of a launch
vehicle, its payload or any component
thereof outside designated impact limit
lines for an expendable launch vehicle;
and, for an RLV, outside a designated
landing site. More generally, vehicle-
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tracking data provide a level of
awareness that enables an appropriate
response to an off-nominal situation,
such as knowing where to apply fire
suppression resources or where to
evacuate the public to protect against
predicted toxic plumes. More
specifically, tracking data are an
important element of current U.S.
Government consensus standards, in
accordance with RCC 321, to ensure the
safety of people in aircraft. Specifically,
since 2007, RCC 321 has included a
requirement (in paragraph 3.3.4) to
coordinate with the FAA to ensure
timely notification of any expected air
traffic hazard associated with range
activities. In the event of a mishap, RCC
321 requires that the operator must
immediately inform the FAA of the
volume and duration of airspace where
an aircraft hazard is predicted.131
Tracking data are also necessary to
evaluate vehicle safety performance,
even for normal flight. For example,
§ 417.125(g)(3) requires a launch
operator of an unguided suborbital
launch vehicle to compare the actual
and predicted nominal performance
(i.e., trajectory) of the vehicle. Accurate
data to describe the vehicle normal
trajectory envelope are necessary for
valid quantitative public risk
assessments.
Current practice demonstrates that
tracking data will help facilitate safe
and efficient integration of launch and
reentry operations into the NAS. The
increasingly congested and constrained
NAS creates a need to transition from
segregation, to full integration of space
vehicles. The FAA has several efforts
underway to ensure the safe and
efficient transition of launch and reentry
vehicles through the NAS, while
minimizing the effects of these
operations on other users of the NAS.
The FAA has contemplated the need to
obtain real time data tracking data,
including vehicle state vectors, reports
of mission events, and indications of
vehicle status, to help accomplish this.
However, the FAA is deferring that
discussion until after the Airspace
Access Priorities ARC.132
Proposed § 450.167(a) would require
an operator to measure and record in
real time the position and velocity of the
vehicle. The system used to track the
vehicle would need to provide data to
determine the actual impact locations of
all stages and components, and to obtain
vehicle performance data for
comparison with the preflight
performance predictions. The proposed
requirements are consistent with current
practice for a wide variety of vehicles,
including the widespread use of
telemetry data, and various
requirements levied under parts 417,
431, and 437.
Proposed § 450.167(a) would
consolidate and standardize the current
regulatory requirements for vehicle
tracking-related information. Vehicletracking data facilitate appropriate
emergency responses, and an ability to
determine the actual vehicle impact
locations due to an unplanned event is
critical to evaluate the class of mishap.
Comparison of the actual vehicle safety
performance, such as the trajectory,
with preflight predictions helps ensure
the continued accuracy of the FSA
input, and thus the validity of the
public risk assessments and hazard
areas. A comparison of the actual
vehicle safety performance data to
predict performance provides the FAA
with a means to evaluate an operator’s
understanding of its safety margins,
which is a measure of maturity of the
operation and thus a potential factor in
the probability of failure analysis.
Proposed § 450.167(b) would require
an applicant to identify and describe
each method or system used to meet the
tracking requirements of proposed
§ 450.167(a) of this section. Because the
proposed requirements are consistent
with current practice, and in some cases
less restrictive, the application
requirements would not increase burden
on license applicants.
The FAA proposes to modernize the
launch and reentry collision avoidance
analysis criteria to match current
common practice and provide better
protection for inhabitable and active
orbiting objects. It would also allow
launch and reentry operators to obtain
a launch collision avoidance analysis
from Federal entities identified by the
FAA. Previously, the FAA established
identical rules for expendable launches
from Federal and non-Federal launch
ranges, RLV operations, and permitted
launch operations. The proposed rule
would consolidate launch and reentry
collision avoidance analysis
requirements from these three different
parts into a single safety rule.
The FAA anticipates that proposed
changes to the collision avoidance
analysis criteria would not significantly
affect operators. The changes would
capture current practice, provide
alternative means of meeting existing
requirements, and clarify the time
period that the analysis must address.
Launch and reentry collision
avoidance measures are necessary
actions for responsible and safe
launches and reentries. Under current
regulations, a launch collision
avoidance analysis is performed prior to
each launch to protect against collision
with only inhabitable objects, including
the International Space Station, as
required screening objects. It is
important to avoid collisions during
launches because the energy released
through an impact during launch would
most likely be catastrophic for the
launch vehicle and the object it
impacted.
In addition to mission assurance, to
ensure the successful launch of an
object, there are significant reasons to
mitigate debris creation through
collision avoidance. Launch collision
avoidance analysis occurs prior to
launch and entails the determination of
times when a launch should not be
initiated. There is a balance between
launch opportunities and orbital safety
that must be established to protect both
the launch vehicle and on-orbit objects.
Reentry collision avoidance analysis
occurs prior to the initiation of a reentry
maneuver and provides for the review of
the maneuver trajectory to establish
when reentry should not be initiated.
Section 431.43(c)(1)(ii) documents the
requirement for reentry collision
avoidance.
The creation of orbital debris is an
expected result of a collision during
launch or reentry.133 As stated earlier,
limiting orbital debris is a vital part of
protecting the space environment and is
a national objective. Therefore, the FAA
believes it is paramount to avoid all
collisions during launch and reentry.
The Department of Defense created a
tiered level of separation distance to
avoid collisions and still allow ample
opportunity for launch. The FAA agrees
with the tiers, identified in the chart
below. This chart excludes the object
launching or reentering, which would
be damaged or destroyed in all cases.
131 Range Commanders Council, Common Risk
Criteria for National Test Ranges, RCC 321–07,
White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, 2007.
132 Information regarding the Airspace Access
Priorities ARC is available at https://www.faa.gov/
regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/
documents/index.cfm/document/information/
documentID/3443.
133 Orbital debris is all human-generated debris in
Earth orbit that is greater than 5 mm in any
dimension. This includes, but is not limited to,
payloads that can no longer perform their mission,
rocket bodies and other hardware (e.g., bolt
fragments and covers) left in orbit as a result of
normal launch and operational activities, and
fragmentation debris produced by failure or
collision. Gases and liquids in free state are not
considered orbital debris.
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12. Launch and Reentry Collision
Avoidance Analysis Requirements
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FIGURE 2—LAUNCH COLLISION AVOIDANCE JUSTIFICATIONS AND TIERS
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Inhabitable Objects .....
Active Satellites ..........
Trackable Debris >10
cm2 (LEO).
Un-trackable Debris
<10 cm 2 (LEO).
Separation
distance
Protect public health
and safety
Safety of property
200 km .....................
25 km .......................
2.5 km ......................
Yes ...........................
..................................
..................................
Yes ...........................
Yes ...........................
..................................
Not applicable ..........
..................................
..................................
With space becoming more congested
every year, it is vitally important for
launch or reentry collision avoidance to
extend beyond inhabitable objects to
include all active orbiting objects and
trackable orbital debris. Records from a
recent Intelsat launch showed that if the
launch occurred 35 minutes into the 2hour launch window, the launch
vehicle could have passed by a defunct
but still orbiting COSMOS navigation
satellite by only 600 meters. The FAA
believes not proposing launch collision
avoidance in this instance is
unnecessarily hazardous.
Sections 417.107(e), 417.231, and
437.65 require launch operators to
ensure that the launch vehicle does not
pass closer than 200 km (approximately
124 statute miles) to a manned or
mannable orbital object to avoid
collisions during launch. A collision
avoidance analysis must be obtained
through a Federal entity. The analysis
must be used to determine any launch
holds to avoid potential collisions.
In § 417.107(e), a launch operator
must ensure that a launch vehicle, any
jettisoned component, and its payload
do not pass closer than 200 km to a
manned or mannable orbital object
throughout a sub-orbital launch, and for
an orbital launch, during ascent to
initial orbital insertion and through at
least one complete orbit, and during
each subsequent orbital maneuver or
burn from initial park orbit, or direct
ascent to a higher or interplanetary
orbit, or until clear of all manned or
mannable objects, whichever occurs
first. A launch operator is also required
under § 417.107(e) to obtain a collision
avoidance analysis for each launch from
United States Strategic Command or
from a Federal launch range having an
approved launch site safety assessment.
The detailed requirements for obtaining
a collision avoidance analysis are found
in § 417.231 and section A417.31 of
appendix A to part 417. The results of
the collision avoidance analysis must be
used to develop flight commit criteria
for collision avoidance as required by
§ 417.113(c).
These requirements and processes for
ascertaining launch collision avoidance
are unnecessarily complicated and are
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U.S. national security
or foreign policy interests
International obligations
Yes ...........................
Yes ...........................
Yes, if it creates significant debris.
..................................
Yes ...........................
Yes ...........................
Yes, if it creates significant debris.
..................................
inconsistent with the current practices
executed at Federal launch ranges that
provides an equivalent level of safety.
The current practice is to use a common
analysis time frame instead of a single
orbit as identified in the current
regulations. The safety standard for the
standoff distance of 200 km remains
consistent throughout launch (and
reentry) requirements for launches of
expendable and reusable launch
vehicles and for launches from both
Federal launch ranges as well as nonFederal launch sites.
Section 417.231 requires a launch
operator to include in its flight safety
analysis a collision avoidance analysis
that (1) establishes each launch wait in
a planned launch window during which
a launch operator must not initiate a
flight in order to protect any manned or
mannable orbiting object, and (2)
accounts for uncertainties associated
with launch vehicle performance and
timing and ensures that any calculated
launch waits incorporate additional
time periods associated with such
uncertainties. It also requires the launch
operator to implement any launch waits
into its flight commit criteria under
§ 417.113(c) to ensure that the operator’s
launch vehicle, any jettisoned
components, and its payload do not
pass closer than 200 km to a manned or
mannable orbiting object during ascent
to initial orbital insertion through one
complete orbit. Further, under § 417.231
no collision avoidance analysis is
required if the maximum altitude
attainable, using an optimized
trajectory, assuming 3-sigma maximum
performance, by a launch operator’s
unguided suborbital launch vehicle is
less than the altitude of the lowest
manned or mannable orbiting object.
Appendices A, section A417.31, and C,
section C417.11, of part 417 provide
constraints for performing the collision
avoidance analysis as part of the flight
safety analysis required by § 417.231.
Section 437.65 establishes the minimum
required altitude as 150 km, which is
the current standard practice.
Section 431.43(c)(1) and (3) also
requires a collision avoidance analysis
for RLVs to be performed to maintain at
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Avoid debris generation
Yes.
Yes.
Yes.
Protect with shielding
& design.
least a 200 km separation from any
inhabitable orbiting object during
launch and reentry. It requires the
analysis to address closures in a
planned launch window for ascent to
outer space for an orbital RLV to initial
orbit through at least one complete
orbit; for reentry, the reentry trajectory;
and expansions for the closure period.
For reentry of vehicles not part of a
reusable system, § 435.33 refers to part
431, subpart C, including § 431.43(c)(1)
as a requirement.
Appendix A to part 415 contains a
worksheet for the data input for launch.
However, Appendix A to part 415 is a
U.S. Space Command form that is no
longer in use.134 The current practice is
to submit the launch collision
avoidance analysis data prior to launch
in a form and manner accepted by the
Administrator, which is currently the
R–15 launch plan worksheet. The data
collected on the R–15 launch plan
worksheet are detailed in sections
A417.31 and C417.11 and are used by
the agency performing the launch
collision avoidance analysis.
A number of issues are unclear or
outdated under section A417.31. In
section A417.31(c)(8), the option to use
an ellipsoidal screening method does
not identify the size of the ellipsoid
required. Section A417.31(b)(3) limits
an operator to use collision avoidance
analysis (COLA) products to 12 hours
from when ‘‘manned’’ objects were last
tracked. This information is not
provided to launch or reentry operators
and therefore is not implemented in the
current practices. Section A417.31(b)(4)
and (c)(7) also includes two expansions
of window closures. The first expansion
is for every 90 minutes, a 15 second
buffer should be added before and after
the provided window closures, and the
second is a 10-minute addition to the
screening time. Neither of these
practices are currently implemented at
Federal launch ranges or non-Federal
launch sites.
With proposed § 450.169 and
appendix A to part 450, the FAA would
align the collision avoidance analysis
134 The U.S. Space Command was deactivated in
2002.
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criteria with current practice and
provide better protection for inhabitable
and active orbiting objects. The FAA
also proposes to allow a launch operator
to obtain a collision avoidance analysis
from a Federal entity identified by the
FAA. The proposed changes balance
increased options and additional
requirements and would allow more
flexibility and accuracy in avoiding
collision with orbiting objects.
The FAA also proposes to remove
appendix A to part 415 in its entirety
because the Launch Notification Form is
no longer used by the FAA or launch
operators. The data is currently
collected via the R–15 work sheet and
associated trajectory files and is detailed
in sections A417.31 and C417.11.
Sections A417.31 and C417.11 would be
replaced with appendix A to part 450,
which would contain the Collision
Analysis Worksheet information
requirements and captures current
practice.
The FAA proposes a few format and
editorial changes in the collision
avoidance requirements of proposed
§ 450.169. First, the proposal would
refer to ‘‘inhabitable’’ rather than
‘‘manned or mannable’’ objects for
greater simplicity and ease of
understanding. Similarly, the proposal
would refer to ‘‘separation distances’’
rather than ‘‘miss distances,’’ as this
terminology is more accurate and better
connotes the FAA’s goal of maintaining
a safe separation of objects on orbit.
Finally, the proposal would refer to
‘‘window closures’’ for launch and
reentry rather than ‘‘waits’’ in a launch
or reentry window to provide a more
cogent and accurate description. These
updated terms would have the same
meaning as the terms they replace.135
Substantively, the FAA proposes to
consolidate the launch and reentry
collision avoidance analysis
requirements into proposed § 450.169.
Proposed § 450.169(a) would require, for
orbital or suborbital launch or reentry,
an operator to establish any window
closures needed to ensure that the
vehicle, any jettisoned components, or
payload meet the specified requirements
of that section. When performing a
launch or reentry collision avoidance
analysis for inhabitable objects, under
proposed § 450.169(a)(1), an operator
would have two alternatives in addition
to maintaining a spherical separation
distance. An operator would be able to
135 The FAA recognizes reentry windows as a
number of discrete or short duration windows
during which a reentry may be commanded. Past
experience shows window closures are insignificant
for reentry. The safety requirements for launch or
reentry window management are intended to be
equitable.
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stipulate an ellipsoidal rather than a
spherical separation distance between
its vehicle and an inhabitable object or
satisfy a probability of collision
threshold rather than calculating a
separation distance. The FAA also
would maintain the current requirement
to maintain a spherical separation
distance as a third option. These
proposed requirements are discussed
more fully later in this section.
The FAA also proposes to require that
a collision avoidance analysis address
other orbiting objects, such as active
spacecraft and tracked debris. The
uninhabitable active objects would be
protected with significantly less
restrictive clearance distances than
provided to inhabitable objects. This
would require no extra work from the
operators, including those from nonFederal launch sites. Additionally, no
launches have been scrubbed for COLA
closures, and the FAA does not
anticipate any impact to future
operations due to this requirement.
Proposed § 450.169(b) would require
an operator to ensure that the
requirements of proposed § 450.169(a)
are met for the durations specified.
Specifically, proposed § 450.169(b)(1)
would require screening through the
entire flight of a suborbital vehicle.
Proposed § 450.169(b)(2) would
standardize the time period of the
launch collision avoidance analysis for
an orbital launch to ascent from a
minimum of 150 km to initial orbital
insertion and for a minimum of 3 hours
from liftoff. Proposed § 450.169(b)(3)
would identify the screening time frame
for reentry as the time frame from initial
reentry burn to an altitude of 150 km.
Similarly, proposed § 450.169(b)(4)
would cover a disposal reentry with the
same altitude.
Proposed § 450.169(c) would establish
that planned rendezvous operations that
occur within the screening time frame
are not considered a violation of
collision avoidance if the involved
operators have pre-coordinated the
rendezvous or close approach.
Proposed § 450.169(d) would
establish the exclusion of collision
avoidance for launch vehicles that do
not reach a maximum altitude of 150
km. The FAA also proposes to change
from a 3-sigma maximum performance
established in current § C417.11 and
replace it with maximum performance
within 99.7% confidence level,
extended through fuel exhaustion of
each stage. The intention of the 3-sigma
rule was the use of a 99.7% confidence
level. However, the 3-sigma rule does
not hold true (the same percentage
confidence level) when the analysis
adds multiple dimensions. Therefore,
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the FAA proposes the requirement with
99.7% confidence level instead of the 3sigma rule in the existing regulation.
In proposed § 450.169(e) an operator
would be required to obtain a collision
avoidance analysis for each launch or
reentry from a Federal entity identified
by the FAA. An operator would be
required to use the results of the
collision avoidance analysis to establish
flight commit criteria for collision
avoidance, account for uncertainties
associated with launch or reentry
vehicle performance and timing, and
ensure that each window closure
incorporates all additional time periods
associated with such uncertainties. This
latter proposed requirement would
remove outdated practices from the
launch collision avoidance
requirements that are currently found in
sections A417.31(c)(7)(iv) and
C417.11(d)(7)(iv), which require adding
10 minutes to the screen duration time,
sections A417.31(b)(4) and C417.11(c)(4)
and § 431.43(c)(1)(iii) which require
adding 15-second buffers to the launch
window closures, and appendix A to
part 415 which is a redundant form to
the worksheet specified in sections
A417.31 and C417.11. The current
practices no longer require a 10-minute
extra pad as the screening time is no
longer a single orbit. Also, the 15second buffers are no longer required
because the service provider accounts
for the accuracy of the result products
and the 15-second buffers were based
upon the last time the orbital objects
were tracked. The launch operator is not
responsible for tracking orbital objects
and is not provided data on when the
orbital objects were last tracked making
the existing requirement difficult to
apply. The launch or reentry operator
would only be required to account for
uncertainties associated with launch or
reentry vehicle performance and timing
in accordance with proposed
§ 450.169(e)(2). This is consistent with
the existing requirement in § 417.231(a).
In proposed § 450.169(f), the FAA
would require an operator to prepare a
collision avoidance analysis worksheet
for each launch or reentry using a
standardized format that contains the
input data required by appendix A to
part 450. Proposed § 450.169(f)(1) would
require an operator to file the input data
with a Federal entity identified by the
FAA and the FAA at least 15 days
before the first attempt at the flight of a
launch vehicle or the reentry of a
reentry vehicle or in a different time
frame in accordance with proposed
§ 404.15. The FAA anticipates that it
initially would identify the Air Force
Space Command (AFSPC) as an entity
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with whom to file the collision
avoidance analysis inputs.
The FAA also proposes to maintain
the current 15-day requirement of
sections A417.31(b)(1) and C417.11(c)(1)
in proposed § 450.169(f)(1). The 15-day
requirement is necessary for federal
agencies to evaluate the content of the
submission and ensure the trajectory
files and data provide acceptable data
and can be processed successfully. It
would also allow federal agencies to
determine early potential conjunctions
with national systems or human space
flight activities, and would provide
adequate time for federal agencies to
develop a strategy for early orbit
detection and tracking including
taskings to global sensors and expected
trajectories for sensors to aid in initial
acquisition.
Proposed § 450.169(f)(2) would
require an operator to obtain a collision
avoidance analysis performed by a
Federal entity identified by the FAA 6
hours before the beginning of a launch
or reentry window. This is consistent
with existing sections A417.31(b)(2) and
C417.11(c)(2).
Consistent with current sections
A417.31(b)(3) and C417.11(c)(3),
proposed § 450.169(f)(3) would require
an operator that needs an updated
collision avoidance analysis due to a
launch or reentry delay to file the
request with the Federal entity and the
FAA at least 12 hours prior to the
beginning of the new launch or reentry
window. Additionally, the current
regulations, sections A417.31(b)(3) and
C417.11(c)(3), limit the use of products
to 12 hours from the time U.S. Strategic
Command determines the state vectors
of manned or mannable objects. The
FAA intends to remove this limitation,
as launch or reentry operators are not
provided with the last time of
observation of inhabitable objects and
therefore cannot determine a 12-hour
expiration time. The removal of this
requirement would place the
responsibility on the service provider to
provide the time frame that the analysis
is valid. For most cases, the analysis
would be valid for the entire launch or
reentry window. However, an extremely
long launch window or sporadic reentry
window may require additional
analysis. The service provider would
identify to an operator when its analysis
in no longer valid, which is similar in
intent to the original 12-hour expiration
time, but more flexible in its
application.
i. Inhabitable Objects
Inhabitable objects are those that are
or may be occupied by persons. An
inhabitable object need not be
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inhabited, and the FAA views the term
as encompassing any object that may be
inhabited, regardless of whether it is at
the time of launch. One point that
merits clarification in light of inquiries
the FAA has received—a launch
operator’s own vehicle, if it is
inhabitable, does not impose a
corresponding obligation on a space
station to keep away from it. A launch
operator whose vehicle carries people
should not construe the requirement to
mean that the operator must always
keep the vehicle 200 km away from any
other object. Current FAA regulations
do not protect persons on board a
launch or reentry vehicle.
Vehicles deliberately approaching
each other for rendezvous or docking
purposes will have to get within 200 km
of each other. In these instances,
collision avoidance remains paramount
for those orbital objects other than the
intended rendezvous spacecraft. Under
proposed § 450.169(c), planned close
approaches for rendezvous would not be
considered violations of collision
avoidance if the involved operators have
previously coordinated the rendezvous.
The proposed requirement to perform
collision avoidance would apply during
launches that have a rendezvous within
the screening period and for licensed
reentries that originate from orbiting
spacecraft or objects. For planned
reentry, coordinated close approaches
and departures would not be considered
violations of collision avoidance
requirements if the involved operators
have previously coordinated the
operation.
ii. Probability of Collision
The FAA also proposes to amend the
collision avoidance screening methods
to include new options for analysis. The
current regulation offers spherical or
ellipsoidal screening, however, it fails to
provide distances for ellipsoidal
screening and identifies a spherical
distance of 200 km as default. The FAA
proposes an additional option of
collision probability screening using a
covariance matrix. A covariance matrix
is a mathematical construct that
describes the upper stage’s position and
the uncertainty of that position in all
dimensions.
In proposed § 450.169(a)(1)(i), the
FAA would permit a launch operator to
employ a probability of collision of 1 ×
10¥6, consistent with current Air Force
practice, rather than relying solely on
the spherical or ellipsoidal separation
distance of 200 km currently required
by section A417.31(c)(8)(i) and (ii) and
§ 431.43(c)(1). The spherical separationdistance option is the most conservative
option and requires the least detail
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about the location of the launch vehicle
and therefore results in the largest
window closures. If launch operators
have covariance—that is, uncertainty—
information applicable to their nominal
trajectories, the option of limiting the
probability of collision allows for
greater fidelity in avoiding a collision
with inhabitable objects.
For collision probability screening,
proposed § 450.169(a)(1)(i) would
require a covariance information,
typically provided in a matrix, that
identifies the uncertainty of the launch
vehicle trajectory. When an operator can
provide sufficient covariance (as
identified in proposed appendix A to
part 450, paragraph (d)(3)), the
probability of its collision with an
inhabitable object can be accurately
calculated and launch window closures
can be limited to only those times where
actual high risk exists. In essence, this
fine-tuned launch collision avoidance
would provide assurance against
collisions while minimizing potential
launch window closures.
The FAA proposes to allow the use of
a probability of collision because the
18th Space Control Squadron’s (SPCS)
use of the proposed probability
threshold has prevented collisions
while still allowing for maximum
availability of launch windows. The
FAA agrees that using probability
assessment adequately protects
inhabitable spacecraft while maximizing
the time available for launch.
Probability of collision is also the
preferred analysis method for reentry
collision avoidance.
According to NASA,136 the
Department of Defense’s 18th SPCS
current practice for on-orbit debris
regarding the ISS is to assess potential
conjunctions inside specific-sized boxes
centered on the ISS. Any object
predicted to pass within this box is
tracked with higher priority. The 18th
SPCS then uses the best available data
set to compute the probability of
collision with the potentiallythreatening catalogued object. If that
probability is greater than 1 × 10¥4, the
ISS performs a collision avoidance
maneuver. If that probability is greater
than 1 × 10¥5, then the ISS would
perform a collision avoidance maneuver
when doing so would not compromise
its mission objectives. Additionally, the
proposed requirements in § 450.169 for
a launch and reentry collision
avoidance probability of collision
criteria of 1 × 10¥6 against inhabitable
136 Operational Interface Procedures. Volume A,
Report Number SSP–50643–A, Section 7.16.2.
Published June 28, 2003, and last modified October
17, 2008.
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objects is consistent with current NASA
practices.
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iii. Separation Distance Calculations by
Sphere or Ellipsoid
Section 417.231 currently requires a
launch operator to ensure a separation
distance of 200 km between its launch
vehicle, any jettisoned components, or
its payload, and an inhabitable
object.137 The regulation does not
specify whether the separation distance
must be spherical or may be ellipsoidal.
Section A417.31(c)(8) of Appendix A
does, however, permit a launch operator
to use spherical or ellipsoidal screening.
In practice, the 18th SPCS provided
ellipsoidal distances in the standardized
collision avoidance request form, and
the FAA has allowed the 18th SPCS
methods as acceptable for launch
screening volumes. The FAA anticipates
that identifying these options in
proposed § 450.169(a) will reduce
confusion and accurately capture the
requirements for ellipsoidal screening.
Additionally, the FAA’s proposal would
clarify that either method of calculation
would be acceptable.
Using ellipsoidal separation
calculation would permit a launch
vehicle to come within a predicted 50
km from an inhabitable object in the
cross-track and radial directions. The intrack distance would be maintained at
200 km. The result is an ellipse around
the inhabitable object that looks
approximately like a pencil with the tip
in the direction of travel. In accordance
with longstanding Federal range
standards, the 50-km separation
distance in the cross-track and radial
directions would provide an equivalent
level of safety compared to a separation
distance based on a sphere because the
uncertainty in orbital location is
significantly less side-to-side than it is
along the velocity vector. Because the
velocity vector is greatest in-track, a
small change in velocity results in a
significant variation in arrival time, and
therefore requires the greatest
compensation (200 km). However
variations in orbital altitude are
possible, but occur at a significantly
reduced rate, allowing the exclusion
distance to be reduced to 50 km
radially. Variations laterally are also
minimal and require the smallest
compensation, allowing the reduction to
50 km in the cross-track directions. The
FAA agrees with the Federal range
conclusions that the ellipsoidal
calculation maintains an equivalent
level of safety as the 200-km spherical
calculation.
137 14
CFR 417.231(b).
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iv. Collision Avoidance for Objects That
Are Not Inhabitable
Sections A417.31(c)(8) and
C417.11(d)(8) require that if a launch
operator requests launch collision
avoidance analysis for unmanned or
unmannable objects, the analysis must
use the spherical screening method with
a separation distance of 25 km
(approximately 15.5 statute miles). The
screening was optional but, if used, the
distance was mandated. The FAA
proposes to alter the collision avoidance
requirements for uninhabitable objects.
Launches from federal ranges require
screening for uninhabitable objects to
meet Air Force or NASA requirements,
therefore there most space launch
operators are already familiar with the
process and requirements. The FAA
proposal creates a common standard for
all commercial space launches.
In proposed § 450.169(a)(2) and (3),
the screening for potential conjunctions
would include avoidance of
uninhabitable objects, active objects,
and trackable debris. The required
minimum separation distance would
remain at 25 km, or a PC of 1 × 10¥5,
for active satellites. For those objects
that are tracked and not active, such as
debris, defunct rocket bodies, and dead
or inactive satellites, for which the FAA
currently has no requirement, the FAA
proposes a required minimum
separation distance of 2.5 km
(approximately 1.6 statute miles),
consistent with 18th SPCS screening
practice. This proposed separation
distance would provide increased safety
for launches and reentries.
The proposed screening would
coincide with the screening for
inhabitable objects and would cover the
same time frames. This is consistent
with current 18th SPCS operational
procedures.
Launch availability during the launch
window is a concern of the FAA
because excessive launch window
closures could limit launch
opportunities, increase the effects of
prolonged airspace closures on aviation,
and increase launch operations costs.
The FAA analyzed previous U.S.
launches—commercial, civil, and
military—to determine the consequence
to the launch window availability of
adding uninhabitable objects as a
mandatory launch collision avoidance
requirement. Of the worldwide launches
between September 2011 and June 2012,
the maximum impact was the closing of
approximately 12% of the launch
window. The average impact was only
2% of each launch window closed due
to launch collision avoidance
accounting for both inhabitable and
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uninhabitable objects. This level of
impact was validated for launch
closures for launches conducted in
2017. The worst-case scenarios for
launch collision avoidance are launches
of low inclination that pass through the
densest part of the low earth orbit (LEO)
population, around 800 km
(approximately 497 statute miles) in
altitude. The FAA believes
implementing collision avoidance for
inhabitable objects, active satellites, and
trackable debris would adequately
prevent collisions without placing
excessive restrictions on launch
opportunities. The FAA seeks comment
on the potential impact of implementing
these requirements.
v. Accounting for A Conjunction Up to
3 Hours After Launch
The current FAA requirement for
screening time is one orbit (at least 100
minutes) plus 10 minutes padding.138
The current Federal screening practice
at the 18th SPCS covers 3 hours. The
FAA proposes to adopt 18th SPCS’s
current practice as the minimum
standard to ensure the necessary level of
safety to inhabitable and active space
objects and to avoid the generation of
space debris. Under proposed
§ 450.169(b), the collision avoidance
analysis for orbital launches would have
to account for a conjunction that could
occur up to 3 hours after launch. This
change would be in line with practices
for Federal launches. In actual practice,
the 18th SPCS performs an analysis
from launch to about 3 hours against all
objects and debris in the catalog.
However, commercial launchers
currently can request screening through
only one orbit after launch.
Pre-launch collision avoidance
analysis ensures there are no immediate
conjunctions during orbital insertion
and shortly thereafter but is dependent
on pre-launch estimated trajectories.
Extending this collision avoidance
analysis to three hours post-launch
provides sufficient time for creation of
the first orbital element set (ELSET), at
which point collision avoidance
analysis begins being calculated using
real positioning information. To create
an ELSET, the Department of Defense
uses multiple tracking information to
establish the first ELSET and reduce the
position error significantly. Once an
ELSET has been created when the
vehicle is on-orbit, an on-orbit collision
avoidance analysis is routinely run out
to 72 hours. Pre-launch collision
avoidance analysis is the only possible
method to prevent a collision until that
first ELSET is created.
138 14
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There is a significant collision
avoidance warning time gap between
the end of 18th SPCS’s 3-hour launch
screening time and when 18th SPCS
determines an ELSET. Pre-launch
collision avoidance analysis beyond 3
hours is currently of limited utility. As
positional errors based on predicted
trajectories grow, data validity becomes
increasingly suspect. Additionally, it is
possible to create large launch window
closures or even close the launch
window entirely. Therefore, without a
significant development in prediction
calculation fidelity and accuracy, the
FAA proposes to extend pre-launch
collision avoidance to 3 hours. The
accuracy of pre-launch collision
avoidance analysis would be dependent
on the accuracy of the trajectories
provided.
This 3-hour extension is important to
protect inhabitable objects on-orbit. The
ISS incurs collision risk from every
launch. There is a warning time gap
between the end of the pre-launch
collision avoidance analysis and the
start of on-orbit collision analysis done
by the 18th SPCS. Until the 18th SPCS
can determine the ELSET, the location
of upper stages, payloads, and any
released debris is unknown. During that
time, whether the ISS is at risk from a
collision would also be unknown.
Extending the pre-launch collision
avoidance requirement from one orbit to
3 hours would codify current practice.
Additionally, although not required
by FAA regulation, operators should
promptly provide the 18th SPCS
positional updates after orbital insertion
until such time as the ELSET is
established and on-orbit collision
avoidance analysis commences.
The FAA proposes to remove the
requirements to expand the collision
avoidance analysis screening time by 10
minutes to ensure that the entire first
orbit of the launch vehicle is screened
in sections A417.31(c)(7)(iv) and
C417.11(d)(7)(iv). The expanded
screening time required by those
appendices would be unnecessary if the
FAA extends the screening to 3 hours as
described in proposed § 450.169(b).
vi. Submitting Collision Avoidance
Inputs to the FAA
Proposed § 450.169(f) would require a
launch operator to submit launch
collision avoidance trajectory data to
both AFSPC and the FAA. The current
regulations only requires an operator to
submit the data to the AFSPC. However,
the AFSPC does not review launch
operator data to ensure it complies with
FAA requirements. The proposal would
ensure the FAA receives and reviews
the same data that is provided to AFSPC
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for launch collision avoidance. As this
data is generally submitted
electronically, sending the data to both
the FAA and AFSPC is not expected to
increase cost or paperwork burden of
the submission. Direct submission to
AFSPC and the FAA will facilitate a
quicker response to the operator than
having the FAA act as a middleman
between the operator and AFSPC, and
enables coordination throughout the
process.
In the past, the FAA has found
discrepancies between operator
trajectory data and operator requests to
AFSPC for specific launch collision
avoidance analysis methods. On
multiple occasions, operators have
misapplied existing launch collision
avoidance regulations. To ensure proper
application of launch collision
avoidance regulations the FAA must be
able to review the launch collision data.
A specific example of a discrepancy
occurred when a launch operator
directed the exclusion of the ISS from
launch collision avoidance analysis in a
request to AFSPC. The launch operator
incorrectly assumed the protections for
the ISS, the ultimate destination for one
of the launched payloads, did not apply.
In actuality, the planned rendezvous
with the station was days into the
mission, and not all objects launched
were planned to rendezvous with the
ISS. Collision avoidance analysis should
have been requested for all launched
objects against the catalog of space
objects, including the ISS. FAA review
of launch collision avoidance trajectory
data would have identified that
oversight.
vii. Appendix A to Part 450—Collision
Analysis Worksheet
The FAA proposes to consolidate the
data input requirements of sections
A417.31 and C417.11 and to clarify the
data and process for collision avoidance
in appendix A to part 450. Existing
sections A417.31 and C417.11 provide
nearly identical requirements for
mission information. However, some
elements are no longer useful or require
an update to meet current practices.
Specifically, proposed appendix A to
part 450, paragraph (a)(1) mission name
and launch location, paragraph (a)(2)
launch or reentry window, paragraph
(a)(3) epoch, time of powered flight, and
point of contact remain the same as
existing requirements. Proposed
paragraph (a)(4) segment number has
been updated to change the requirement
to provide vector at injection to instead
provide orbital parameters. The
substantive requirement to identify how
the operator would receive analysis
results in current sections A417.31(c)(3)
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and C417.11(d)(3) also remains
unchanged in proposed paragraph (b);
however, minor editorial revisions were
made to the examples of the
transmission mediums provided to
reflect modern technology.
The proposed rule provides
clarifications for some data elements.
Specifically, the FAA proposes to
change the requirement to identify
orbital objects to evaluate contained in
section A417.31(c)(9). As written,
section A417.31(c)(9) requires the
operator to identify the orbiting objects
to be included in the analysis. In all
cases the analysis must include all
objects. However, the current practice is
to identify the characteristics of the
orbiting object, i.e., name, length, width,
depth, diameter, and mass. The FAA
proposes to capture current practice in
proposed paragraph (a)(6). Also, the
proposed appendix would replace
‘‘vector at injection’’ in sections
A417.31(c)(5) and C417.11(d)(5), with
orbital parameters at proposed
paragraph (a)(5). The proposed change
would require an operator to identify
the orbital parameters for all objects
achieving orbit including the parameters
for each segment after thrust end instead
of the vector at injection for each
segment. This requirement would allow
accurate COLA calculations that
consider changes in trajectory after
orbital insertion.
The FAA also proposes to clarify the
trajectory file requirements in proposed
paragraph (d) of appendix A to part 450.
Sections A417.31(c)(5)(ii) and
C417.11(d)(5)(ii) require that current
operators provide position and velocity
for each launched object after burnout
or deployment. This requirement
severely lacks in clarity and
completeness. Proposed paragraph (d)
would provide a clearer requirement in
line with current practices. Launch and
reentry operators would be required to
provide trajectory files with position
and velocity for each object through the
entire screening process, not exclusively
after burnout. The current practice at
Federal ranges is to provide data
through the entire screening process,
therefore the FAA proposal is in line
with current practices. Additionally,
radar cross section and covariance
(position and velocity) for probability of
collision analysis would be required by
proposed paragraph (d). These products
are used in the analysis of potential
collisions. Parts 431 and 437 require the
same trajectory files for analysis,
however the current regulations do not
provide guidance on how to provide the
products necessary to complete the
analysis. Proposed § 450.169 and
appendix A to part 450 would provide
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the necessary guidance for all launch
and reentry analysis.
Proposed (e) of appendix A to part
450 would provide the three possible
screening methodologies—spherical,
ellipsoidal, or probability of collision.
These requirements were discussed
previously in this section.
13. Safety at End of Launch
Proposed § 450.171 would include
requirements aimed at preventing the
creation of orbital debris. Proposed
§ 450.171(a) is the same as § 417.129
and substantively the same as
§ 431.43(c)(3), which require certain
measures to be taken by a launch
operator to prevent the creation of
orbital debris. The FAA is not proposing
to update the substantive requirements
for orbital debris mitigation in this
rulemaking because it plans to do so in
a future rulemaking.
Proposed § 450.171(b) would require
an applicant to demonstrate compliance
with the requirements in § 450.171(a) in
its application. This requirement is the
same as § 415.133, which applies to
applications for the launch of an ELV
from a non-Federal launch site.
Proposed § 450.171(b) would broaden
the applicability of the application
requirement to all launches. This is
necessary because the importance of
orbital debris mitigation has no relation
to whether a launch takes place from a
Federal or non-Federal launch site, or
whether the launch vehicle is
expendable or reusable. The expansion
of the applicability of the application
requirement is the only change related
to orbital debris mitigation. As noted
earlier, the substantive safety
requirements remain the same.
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14. Mishaps: Definition, Plan,
Reporting, Response, Investigation,
Test-Induced Damage
As a part of its streamlining efforts,
the FAA proposes four mishap-related
actions, including a revised definition of
anomaly. First, the FAA proposes to
consolidate the many chapter III
mishap-related definitions into a
mishap classification system. Second,
this proposal would consolidate existing
chapter III requirements for mishap,
accident investigation, and emergency
response plans, and clarify and
streamline reporting requirements.
Third, the FAA proposes to redefine the
term ‘‘anomaly’’ and expand its
application to include licensed, and not
just permitted, activities. Fourth, the
FAA proposes to exempt precoordinated test-induced damage to
property involved with the test from
being a mishap.
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The FAA proposes using an
overarching mishap classification
system instead of separate terms for
‘‘mishap,’’ ‘‘launch accident,’’ ‘‘reentry
accident,’’ ‘‘launch incident,’’ ‘‘reentry
incident,’’ ‘‘human space flight
incident,’’ and ‘‘launch site accident.’’
The proposed mishap classification
system would streamline and clarify the
current accident, incident, and mishap
definitions to create four mishap
categories organized by severity, from
most severe (Class 1) to least severe
(Class 4). This proposal would also
eliminate the $25,000 monetary
threshold from current ‘‘mishap’’ and
accident terms. This proposal would
consolidate parts 417 (Accident
investigation plan), 420 (Launch site
accident investigation plan), 431 and
435 (Mishap investigation plan and
emergency response plan), and 437
(Mishap response plan), into a single
section applicable to all types of
licenses, permits, and vehicles.
Additionally, the FAA proposes to
update the definition of the term
‘‘anomaly’’ and relocate it from part 437
to part 401, making it applicable to
licensed and permitted activities.
Finally, the FAA proposes to exclude
pre-coordinated test activities, resulting
in damage to property owned by the
operator and associated with test
activities, from mishap consideration.
This test-induced damage proposal
provides permittees and licensees the
freedom to conduct test activities that
may result in damage to associated
property, and the freedom to test
without the need for a mishap
investigation for foreseeable test
failures.
i. Mishap Definitions
The FAA currently uses a variety of
terms to describe the occurrence of an
unplanned event during commercial
launch, reentry, and site activities. The
term ‘‘mishap’’ is a broad term
encompassing several of these
unplanned events. Mishap, as currently
defined in § 401.5, means a launch or
reentry accident, launch or reentry
incident, launch site accident, failure to
complete a launch or reentry as
planned, or an unplanned event or
series of events resulting in a fatality or
serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR
830.2), or resulting in greater than
$25,000 worth of damage to a payload,
a launch or reentry vehicle, a launch or
reentry support facility, or government
property located on the launch or
reentry site.139 As the definition shows,
the term ‘‘mishap’’ captures 15 specific
139 Section
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kinds of unplanned events,140 including
five types of accidents and incidents.
These are launch accident, reentry
accident, launch incident, reentry
incident, and launch site accident.
These terms are defined separately in
§§ 401.5 and 420.5. Mishap also
includes unplanned events resulting in
failure to complete a mission as
planned, a fatality or serious injury, or
damages greater than $25,000 to certain
property associated with the licensed or
permitted activity.
The terms ‘‘launch accident,’’
‘‘reentry accident,’’ and ‘‘launch site
accident,’’ which are encompassed by
the mishap definition, all include the
occurrence of a fatality or serious injury
to persons not associated with the
activity and damage to property not
associated with the activity exceeding
$25,000. Unlike the term ‘‘launch site
accident,’’ launch and reentry accidents
account for the occurrence of a fatality
or serious injury to a space flight
participant or crew member during
FAA-regulated activities. Other factors
may also satisfy the various accident
definitions. For instance, for launches
involving an ELV, impacts of a launch
vehicle, its payload, or any component
thereof outside designated impact limit
lines constitute an accident. If, however,
the launch involves an RLV, impacts
outside the designated landing site
constitute an accident. In contrast, the
definition for reentry accident makes no
distinction between expendable and
reusable vehicles. For reentry accidents,
if the vehicle, its payload, or any
component thereof lands outside a
designated reentry site, the FAA deems
it an accident.
Similarly, although launch incidents
and reentry incidents are both incidents,
their definitions consist of different
requirements. Launch and reentry
incidents occur due to the malfunction
of a FSS or other safety-critical system,
or a failure of the operator’s safety
organization, design or operations. The
FAA proposes to consolidate these
140 (1) Launch accident; (2) reentry accident; (3)
launch incident; (4) reentry incident; (5) launch site
accident; (6) failure to complete a launch as
planned; (7) failure to complete a reentry as
planned; (8) an unplanned event resulting in a
fatality; (9) an unplanned event resulting in a
serious injury; (10) an unplanned event resulting in
greater than $25,000 worth of damage to a payload;
(11) an unplanned event resulting in greater than
$25,000 worth of damage to a launch vehicle; (12)
an unplanned event resulting in greater than
$25,000 worth of damage to a reentry vehicle; (13)
an unplanned event resulting in greater than
$25,000 worth of damage to a launch support
facility; (14) an unplanned event resulting in greater
than $25,000 worth of damage to government
property located on the launch site; or (15) an
unplanned event resulting in greater than $25,000
worth of damage to a reentry site.
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terms into a single mishap classification
system eliminating the need for
multiple terms.
Current definitions of mishap and
accident also include a $25,000
monetary threshold that is arbitrary and
outdated. Experience has shown that
even minor damage that does not pose
a threat to public safety can easily
exceed the $25,000 monetary threshold,
triggering potentially costly and
burdensome notification, reporting, and
investigation requirements. For
example, a relatively minor unplanned
event following a successful launch
could result in damages to ground
support equipment or launch facilities
exceeding $25,000. The ARC noted the
amount is outdated and does not
necessarily reflect safety implications.
Additionally, the conditions listed
under the current definitions do not
necessarily reflect the severity of
consequences and associated public
safety risks. A better mishap
classification system would provide
consistency of mishap thresholds and
applicability to all types of operations,
mitigating potential confusion. Rather
than adding more definitions, the FAA
would consolidate and replace the
existing accident, incident, and mishap
definitions with a mishap classification
system that would be defined in § 401.5
and would apply to all licensed and
permitted activities.
Under the proposed changes,
‘‘mishap’’ would mean any event, or
series of events associated with a
licensed or permitted activity, that
meets the criteria of a Class 1, 2, 3 or
4 mishap. The FAA would use this
overarching definition to describe any
mishap type occurring during permitted
or licensed activities regardless of
classification or consequence threshold.
The FAA’s proposal was informed by
existing NASA and Air Force mishap
classification system definitions,141 and
NTSB definitions.142
A ‘‘Class 1 mishap’’ would mean any
event resulting in a fatality or serious
injury to any person who is not
associated with the licensed or
permitted activity (e.g., members of the
public) along with any space flight
participant, crew, or government
astronaut. The FAA would be adopting
the definition of fatality or serious
injury from 49 CFR 830.2. To constitute
a Class 1 mishap, the fatality or injury
must result from licensed or permitted
activity, including ground operations at
141 NPR 8621.1C, NASA Procedural Requirements
for Mishap and Close Call Reporting, Investigating,
and Recordkeeping. Air Force Instruction 91–204,
Safety Investigation and Hazard Reporting.
142 As defined in 49 CFR 830.2.
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a launch or reentry site. A Class 1
mishap would be a mishap that has the
highest consequences and greatest
impact on public safety. The proposed
Class 1 mishap definition would
incorporate existing fatality and serious
injury criteria from current ‘‘launch
accident,’’ ‘‘reentry accident’’ and
‘‘launch site accident’’ definitions.
On November 25, 2015, the U.S
Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act was signed into
law (Pub. L. 114–90). This law amends
51 U.S.C. 50901(15) by inserting
‘‘government astronauts’’ after ‘‘crew’’
each place it appears. In accordance
with this amendment, and to ensure
Class 1 mishap criteria applies equally
to all persons on board a launch or
reentry vehicle, the FAA Class 1 mishap
definition includes government
astronauts. The definition would only
cover fatalities or serious injuries to
crew, Government astronauts,
spaceflight participants, or uninvolved
public. The definition of Class 1 mishap
would not cover other persons
associated with the launch or reentry,
similar to the current accident
definitions for which it replaces. The
proposed Class 1 Mishap also
consolidates existing accident
definitions, which would include
potential recovery site accidents that
were previously not defined. The FAA
proposes to define a ‘‘Class 2 mishap’’
as any unplanned event, other than a
Class 1 mishap, resulting in a
malfunction of a safety-critical system, a
failure of the safety organization or
procedures, substantial damage to
property not associated with the
operation, or a high risk of causing a
serious or fatal injury to any space flight
participant, crew, government astronaut,
or member of the public. The Class 2
mishap definition would encompass the
current definitions of a ‘‘launch
incident,’’ ‘‘reentry incident,’’ and
‘‘human space flight incident.’’ The
definition would use a substantial
damage to uninvolved property
requirement instead of the $25,000
damage threshold.
Under this proposal, the FAA would
make a case-by-case determination
whether the damage to public property
is substantial. This evaluation may be
based on, but not limited to, direct
replacement cost, repair cost, and the
property’s intended use and
functionality. For example, structural
damage to public property exceeding 50
percent of its market value may be
deemed as substantial damage. This
approach potentially reduces the burden
on the commercial space industry and
Federal government by providing
flexibility on the determination of
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substantial damage and the scope of the
resulting investigation. This is
consistent with the ARC feedback. Other
criteria—such as events posing a high
risk of causing a serious or fatal injury
to any space flight participant, crew,
government astronaut, or member of the
public—are based on the existing
‘‘human space flight incident’’
definition and expanded to include
government astronauts and members of
the public. With this criterion, the FAA
intends to cover events akin to a near
miss in the aviation industry and is
consistent with the Air Force and NASA
practices. The addition of ‘‘members of
the public’’ is consistent with the FAA’s
public safety mission. The FAA’s goal is
to evaluate the event type by impact to
public safety.
The FAA proposes to define ‘‘Class 3
mishap’’ as any unplanned event, other
than a Class 1 or Class 2 mishap,
resulting in permanent loss of a vehicle
during licensed activity or the impact of
a vehicle, its payload, or any component
thereof outside the planned landing site
or impact area. This change would
differentiate between licensed launches
and reentries and permitted launches
and reentries. The FAA believes this
proposal captures the intent of the
current mishap definition that includes
the failure to complete a launch or
reentry as planned criterion. At the
same time, the separation of licensed
and permitted operations between Class
3 and 4 mishaps is also consistent with
ARC feedback.
The FAA would consider debris
impacts outside of defined limits to
meet the Class 3 mishap definition,
provided the event did not satisfy the
criteria of a Class 1 or 2 mishap. Impacts
of launch vehicle debris outside
designated impact limit lines are
currently considered a launch accident.
The FAA proposes to define a ‘‘Class
4 mishap’’ as an unplanned event, other
than a Class 1, Class 2, or Class 3
mishap, resulting in permanent loss of
a vehicle during permitted activity, a
failure to achieve mission objectives, or
substantial damage associated with
licensed or permitted activity. The FAA
intends proposed ‘‘Class 4 Mishap’’ to
capture other events with the potential
for future public safety implications
without directly affecting public safety
during occurrence. For example, an
operator may have complete loss of a
permitted vehicle in a remote and
unpopulated area. Although the loss
may not have resulted in fatalities,
serious injuries, or public property
damage on this occasion, it is important
to find the root cause of the mishap.
Otherwise, if the operator does not
identify and address the underlying
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cause, it may endanger public safety
during a future launch in different
conditions.
ii. Anomaly Definition
The FAA proposes to change the
definition of ‘‘anomaly’’ and to move
the definition to § 401.5, where it would
apply to all of chapter III. Anomaly
would mean any condition during a
licensed or permitted activity that
deviates from what is standard, normal,
or expected, during the verification or
operation of a system, subsystem,
process, facility, or support equipment.
The inclusion of anomaly in § 401.5
would clearly define the expectation of
post-operation reporting for all licensed
or permitted operations. It would also
capture off-nominal events that do not
fall under the thresholds of Class 1–4
mishaps as part of the required postlaunch report.
The FAA currently defines anomaly
only in part 437. Part 437 defines an
anomaly as a problem that occurs
during verification or operation of a
system, subsystem, process, facility, or
support equipment. Section 437.73
requires strict recording, reporting, and
implementation of corrective actions in
the event of a public safety related
anomaly. Section 417.25(c)(1),
applicable to ELVs, requires operators to
report an anomaly that occurred during
launch countdown and flight in the
post-launch report but does not define
anomaly. Although part 431 does not
have specific anomaly reporting
requirements, in practice, the FAA
requires operators to report anomalies.
To ensure anomaly reporting, the FAA
has begun adding a term and condition
to launch licenses requiring operators to
report anomalies prior to the next
launch. The FAA uses anomaly
reporting to track vehicle-related issues
and to ensure an operator mitigates
those issues prior to future flights.
Given that not all anomalies are
identified during flight, the post-launch
reporting requirement allows the
operator to review countdown and flight
data for off-nominal conditions and
report any anomalous condition to the
FAA as a part of the post-launch report.
Although an anomaly is defined in
§ 437.3, as ‘‘a problem that occurs
during verification or operation of a
system, subsystem, process, facility, or
support equipment,’’ it is not defined in
part 415, 417, 431, or 435, and hence,
it is applicable only to experimental
permits. However, § 417.25—Post
launch report, requires an operator to
‘‘identify any discrepancy or anomaly
that occurred during the launch
countdown or flight.’’ The FAA is
proposing to update the existing
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definition of an anomaly to ‘‘any
condition during a licensed or permitted
activity that deviates from what is
standard, normal, or expected, during
the verification or operation of a system,
subsystem, process, facility, or support
equipment.’’ The proposed definition
seeks only to clarify what a ‘‘problem’’
is by adding ‘‘deviates from what is
standard, normal, or expected.’’
iii. Mishaps—Reporting, Response, and
Investigation Requirements
The FAA proposes to consolidate
current chapter III mishap plan,
reporting, response and investigation
requirements into proposed § 450.173.
The FAA seeks comment on its
proposed approach, as discussed below,
to mishap requirements, including
reporting.
Current title 14 CFR chapter III
requirements for mishap and accident
reporting, response, and investigation
requirements are inconsistent and create
confusion. For that reason, the FAA’s
proposed changes would apply to
mishap requirements for launch and
reentry licenses, experimental permits,
and launch and reentry site licenses.
Proposed § 450.173 would replace
§§ 417.111(h) (Accident Investigation
Plan), 417.415(c) (Post launch and post
flight hazard controls), and 431.45
(Mishap investigation plan and
emergency response plan). The
proposed mishap plan changes to
§§ 420.59(a) (Mishap) and 437.41
(Mishap plan) would require an
operator to meet the requirements of
§ 450.173.
The inconsistencies in the FAA’s
current regulatory scheme, including
signature requirements for mishap
plans, has led to much confusion. For
example, § 417.111(h) requires an
operator to implement a plan containing
the launch operator’s procedures for
reporting and responding to launch
accidents, launch incidents, or other
mishaps. It also requires two signatures,
one from an individual authorized to
sign and certify the application, and
another from the designated safety
official. Similarly, § 420.59 requires that
licensed launch site operators develop
and implement a launch site accident
investigation plan that contains the
licensee’s procedures for reporting,
responding to, and investigating launch
site accidents and for cooperating with
Federal officials in case of a launch
accident. It also requires a signature
from an individual authorized to sign
and certify the application, but not from
the designated safety official like
§ 417.111(h). Current § 431.45 requires
an RLV operator to submit a mishap
investigation plan (MIP) containing the
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applicant’s procedures for reporting and
responding to launch and reentry
accidents, launch and reentry incidents,
or other mishaps that occur during the
conduct of an RLV mission. It also
requires that an RLV operator submit an
emergency response plan (ERP)
containing procedures for informing the
affected public of a planned RLV
mission. The FAA requires that an
individual authorized to sign and certify
the license application, the person
responsible for the conduct of all
licensed RLV mission activities, and the
designated safety official, sign the MIP
and ERP. In contrast, § 437.41 does not
require any signatures. To ensure
consistency between all title 14 CFR
chapter III requirements, the FAA
proposes to consolidate these
requirements.
The ARC noted that reporting
requirements for mishaps not involving
a fatality or serious injury are unclear
and left up to the operator to determine.
The ARC said the FAA should define a
minimum standard for a reportable
mishap, in addition to a minimum set
of investigation and reporting
requirements, including information
that should be provided during initial
notification.
Current notification requirements are
generally consistent for a launch,
reentry, launch site accident, launch or
reentry incident, or mishap involving a
fatality or serious injury. In those
instances, regulations throughout title
14 CFR chapter III require that operators
provide immediate notification to the
FAA’s Washington Operations Center
(WOC).143 This is not the case when a
mishap does not involve a fatality or
serious injury.144 For example, part 417
requires notification within 24 hours to
the Associate Administrator for
Commercial Space Transportation or to
the FAA WOC in the event of a mishap
that does not involve a fatality or
serious injury. In contrast, parts 431 and
437 only require 24-hour notification to
the Associate Administrator for
Commercial Space Transportation, but
not to the FAA WOC for a mishap that
does not involve a fatality or serious
injury. Current part 420 does not require
a launch site operator to provide a 24hour mishap notification. If a mishap
occur during non-business hours, this
raises the possibility that a launch
operator may be unable to report it to
the Associate Administrator for
Commercial Space Transportation,
which would create the potential for a
143 14 CFR 417.111(h)(1)(i), 420.59(b)(1),
431.45(b)(1), and 437.75(a)(1).
144 14 CFR 417.111(h)(1)(ii), 431.45(b)(2), and
437.75(a)(2).
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non-compliance. To address these
issues, the FAA proposes to provide a
single source for all initial mishap
notifications. The single source would
be the FAA’s WOC, a 24-hour, sevenday, operational facility.
Parts 417, 420, 431, and 437 all
require an operator to submit a written
preliminary report within five days 145
of either an accident or incident to the
FAA, Associate Administrator for
Commercial Space Transportation. The
five-day report is a follow-up
requirement designed to supplement
initial mishap notification once more
detailed information is known. Under
the proposed mishap classification
system and mishap plan requirements,
all mishaps would have similar
reporting requirements. The FAA
believes the proposed mishap
classification system would save the
operator time and resources during the
initial mishap response by eliminating
the need to evaluate whether the event
is an accident, incident, or mishap. This
streamlining of reporting requirements
reduces the burden of unclear reporting
requirements noted by the ARC.
Based on past examples, the five-day
report is usually only one to three pages
in length, requiring minimal time to
compose. The FAA will use the
information contained within the fiveday report to ensure the mishap has
been properly classified and the proper
level of investigation and FAA oversight
is being conducted. The FAA believes
the time required to complete the fiveday report is minimal and that by
providing a clear expectation of
required report contents in the event of
all mishap types will eliminate
confusion and ultimately result in timesavings.
Response plan requirements for
containing and minimizing the
consequences of a mishap and for
ensuring the preservation of data and
physical evidence are generally
consistent throughout license types with
some exceptions. For instance, the
regulations require that a launch site
operator’s plan include procedures for
reporting and cooperating with FAA
and NTSB investigations, and for
designating one or more points of
contact. Additionally, licensees must
identify and adopt preventive measures
for avoiding recurrence of the event.
Current investigation requirements
are also generally consistent across
license types. The FAA currently
requires that operators investigate the
cause of a launch, reentry, or launch site
accident, launch or reentry site incident,
145 14 CFR 417.111(h)(1)(iii), 420.49(b)(2),
431.45(b)(3), and 437.75(a)(3).
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or mishap across license types.146 After
the investigation, an operator must
report investigation results to the FAA
and delineate responsibilities for
personnel assigned to conduct the
investigation and for anyone retained by
the operator to participate in an
investigation. Section 420.59(e)(1) also
requires that a launch site operator’s
investigation plan include procedures
for participating in an investigation of a
launch accident for launches launched
from the launch site.
To ensure vehicle recovery can be
conducted safely and effectively and
with minimal risk to the public, part
431 operators must submit an ERP
containing the operator’s procedures for
notifying local officials of unplanned
and offsite landings. In addition, these
operators must provide a plan for
informing the public potentially affected
of the estimated date, time, and landing
location for the reentry activity. This
information must be provided in
layman’s terms. These requirements are
unique to operations conducted under
part 431.
Section 417.415(c)’s post-launch and
post-flight-attempt hazard controls
require that an operator establish
procedural controls for hazards
associated with an unsuccessful flight
where the launch vehicle has a land or
water impact. These procedures ensure
the evacuation and rescue of members
of the public, the dispersion and
movement of toxic plumes, identifying
areas of risk, and communication with
local government authorities.
Additionally, these procedures require
that an operator extinguish fires, secure
impact areas, evacuate members of the
public, prevent unauthorized access,
and preserve evidence. Lastly, the
operator must ensure public safety from
hazardous debris and have plans for the
recovery, salvage, and safe disposal of
debris and hazardous materials.
For all FAA-licensed operations,
proposed § 450.173 would require that
an operator report, respond, and
investigate class 1, 2, 3, and 4 mishaps,
using a plan or other written means.147
An approved mishap plan document
would be eligible for reuse with other
specific or similar vehicles, sites, and
operations. This would ease the burden
on industry. For example, a permittee
applying for a license or a current
licensee applying for a different type of
license, would be able to use the same
written mishap plan document
146 14 CFR 417.111(h)(3), 420.59(d)(3), 431.45(d),
and 437.75(c).
147 For purposes of the preamble discussion
regarding proposed § 450.173, the term ‘‘mishap
plan document’’ is used to encompass a plan or
other written means.
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previously developed because the
requirements would be the same
regardless of license type. This mishap
plan document would include
notification to local officials should a
mishap cause the vehicle to land offsite,
such that a coordinated effort can be
made to protect the public. Provided
emergency response requirements such
as coordinated emergency response
agreements remain current, a permittee
can submit a mishap response plan
developed for permitted operations to
satisfy the mishap plan document
application requirements under a
license. Additionally, the FAA would
not have to evaluate the same company
differently depending on the permit or
license type. This would reduce time
and cost for the industry and the FAA
while maintaining the same level of
public safety.
iv. Discussion of the Mishap Plan—
Reporting, Response, and Investigation
Proposed Requirements
Proposed § 450.173 would eliminate
all mishap plan signature requirements.
The requirement that the person
certifying the accuracy of the
application also sign the mishap plan
document is not necessary because by
signing the application, the operator is
already certifying that the components
thereof, including the mishap plan
document, are accurate. Additional
signatures (e.g., from the safety official
or mission director) are also
unnecessary as the roles and
responsibilities for personnel
implementing the mishap plan
document are contained in the plan
itself. Eliminating the signature
requirements would provide operators
with the flexibility to assign personnel
to implement a mishap plan document
without having to resubmit a signed
document to the FAA.
Proposed § 450.173(a) would require
an operator to report, respond, and
investigate class 1, 2, 3, and 4 mishaps
according to paragraphs (b) through (h)
of § 450.173, using a plan or other
written means. Proposed § 450.173(b)(1)
would require that an operator
document the responsibilities for
personnel assigned to implement the
requirements of proposed § 450.173.
Proposed § 450.173(b)(2) would require
an operator to document reporting
responsibilities for personnel assigned
to conduct investigations and for
anyone retained by the licensee to
conduct or participate in investigations.
Proposed § 450.173(b)(3) would require
an operator to document the allocation
of roles and responsibilities between the
launch operator and any site operator
for reporting, responding to, and
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investigating any mishap during ground
activities at the site. Further, proposed
§ 450.173(c) would require an operator
to report to, and cooperate with, FAA
and NTSB mishap investigations. Also,
it would require that the operator
identify one or more points of contact
for the FAA and NTSB. This proposal
does not substantively change current
requirements to report, cooperate, and
designate points of contact. Any
changes from current regulations would
be made merely for clarification
purposes. In the event of an FAA- or
NTSB-led investigation, the FAA would
not require an operator to perform an
independent internal investigation
because it would be a party to the
investigation. However, the operator
would remain responsible for reporting
investigation results to the FAA, which
would include any governmentgenerated or independent investigation
reports as well as party submissions. In
the event of an operator-led
investigation under FAA oversight, the
operator’s investigation would be the
primary investigation, although the FAA
may grant official observer status to U.S.
Government representatives (e.g.,
NASA, the Air Force). As official
observers, these representatives would
be integrated into the operator’s
investigation to the extent the FAA
finds appropriate. These U.S.
Government entities may decide to
conduct their own investigation
independent of FAA oversight, although
the FAA and NTSB have primary
jurisdiction.
Proposed § 450.173(d) would
establish mishap reporting requirements
applicable to all operations, vehicles, or
mishap types. Proposed § 450.173(d)(1)
would require that an operator
immediately notify the FAA WOC in
case of a mishap involving a fatality or
serious injury. Immediately would
continue to mean notification without
delay. The immediate notification
should not hamper emergency response
activities. Proposed § 450.173(d)(2)
would require that operators report
other mishaps not involving a fatality or
serious injury to the WOC within 24
hours. This would eliminate the current
option to notify the Associate
Administrator for Commercial Space
Transportation instead of the WOC
because the WOC, unlike the
Administrator for Commercial Space
Transportation, is available 24-hours per
day, 7 days per week. Proposed
§ 450.173(d)(3) would require operators
to submit a written preliminary report to
the FAA Office of Commercial Space
Transportation within five days of any
mishap. The report would need to
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include the information listed in
proposed § 450.173(d)(3). This list of
information would include the
operator’s assessment on how the cause
of its mishap could potentially affect
similar vehicles, systems, or operations.
Given some systems and components
are common across operators, this
information could prevent mishaps due
to similar failures of a common system
or component, including ground and
range systems. The reporting
requirements in this paragraph are
similar to existing five-day reporting
requirements. Under current
regulations, a five-day preliminary
written report was only required in the
event of an accident or incident. Based
on lessons learned from past mishaps,
the FAA is streamlining these reporting
requirements to ensure consistency
between mishap classes and that
information required to properly
classify a mishap and the level of
investigation required are reported. For
example, mishaps involving a fatality or
serious injury are typically investigated
at the Federal level, as such, the FAA is
aware of the information that may affect
the safety of the public or public
property. The operator, in accordance
with their mishap plan, may investigate
mishaps not involving a fatality or
serious injury. In such cases, it is
possible that the FAA may not become
aware of information potentially
affecting the public safety or public
property in a timely manner, or other
facts that may require elevating the class
of mishap to a higher level.
Proposed § 450.173(e) sets emergency
response requirements. Proposed
§ 450.173(e)(1) would require that an
operator activate emergency response
services following a mishap. This
requirement is consistent with the postlaunch and post-flight attempt hazard
controls in current § 417.415. Proposed
§ 450.173(e)(2) would require that an
operator maintain existing hazard area
surveillance and clearance as necessary
to protect public safety. These notices
would include NOTAM and NOTMAR.
Proposed § 450.173(e)(3) would require
that an operator contain and minimize
the consequences of a mishap. Proposed
§ 450.173(e)(4) would provide for the
preservation of data and physical
evidence, including debris, which the
FAA considers to be a physical record.
In an effort to contain and minimize the
consequences of the mishap and
maintain site integrity for investigation,
an operator would need to safe and
secure the mishap site in a timely
manner. Proposed § 450.173(e)(4) is
consistent with current requirements.
Proposed § 450.173(e)(5) would require
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15355
an operator to implement agreements
with local government authorities and
emergency response services, as
necessary. Emergency response
procedures should identify who is
responsible for securing the mishap site,
and procedures for access to the mishap
site. For example, the procedures
should identify who is responsible for
educating persons on the treatment of
debris, and the disposal of hazardous
materials. The FAA recommends that
prior to beginning operations, an
operator coordinate with Federal, state,
and local authorities and emergency
first responders to familiarize them with
permitted and licensed operations and
hazards associated with an operator’s
activities, such as launch vehicle
hazards. This pre-coordination is
important to ensure the safety of
emergency personnel responding to the
mishap. Vehicle and operational
hazards may include vehicle
composites, propellants, oxidizers,
pressure vessels, unexploded ordnance,
oxygen systems, and batteries.
If implemented, proposed § 450.173(f)
would require an operator to investigate
the root causes of a mishap and report
the results to the FAA. Proposed
§ 450.173(g) would require that an
operator identify and implement
preventive measures prior to the next
flight, unless otherwise approved by the
Administrator. The FAA is proposing
that preventive measures be
implemented prior to the next flight in
all cases in order to codify current
practice. The FAA would work with
operators on a case-by-case basis to
determine whether its next operation
may proceed if it is unable to implement
preventive measures before the next
flight. The requirement to implement
corrective action prior to next flight is
consistent with existing requirements in
§ 437.73(d) for anomaly recording,
reporting, and implementation of
corrective actions.
Proposed § 450.173(h) would require
that an operator maintain records
associated with a mishap in accordance
with proposed § 450.219(d) (Records).
The operator would make these records
available to Federal officials for
inspection and copying. This
requirement is consistent with existing
record keeping requirements.148
Records would include debris, which
the FAA considers a physical record. In
all mishap cases, disposal of any related
debris would be required to be
coordinated with the FAA. Note that
this proposal would allow for the
sharing of proposed § 450.173
148 Sections 417.15(b), 420.61(b), 431.77(b), and
437.87(b).
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responsibilities between launch and
reentry operators pursuant to an
agreement. For example, the site
operator may report the mishap
occurrence to the FAA as required by
proposed § 450.173(d), while the
emergency response requirements of
proposed § 450.173(e) may be shared by
both the launch or reentry operator and
site operator. An operator would be
required to retain all records until
completion of any Federal investigation
and the FAA advises the operator that
the records need no longer be retained.
Finally, proposed § 450.173(i) would
set application requirements. This
section would require the submission of
the mishap plan document at the time
of license or permit application.
v. Test-Induced Damage
The FAA proposes to introduce a testinduced damage exception to the
mishap definition in proposed § 450.175
(Test-induced Damage). This proposal
would allow an operator to coordinate
testing activities with the FAA before
the activities take place to prevent the
FAA from labeling failures as mishaps.
Any test failure covered by this section
would be considered test-induced
damage and not a mishap, so long as the
failure falls within the pre-coordinated
and FAA-approved testing profile. The
test-induced damage concept is not
currently within the FAA’s commercial
space regulations. This proposal is due
to the FAA’s recognition that current
mishap regulations may deter the kind
of robust testing that may yield future
safety benefits.
The FAA currently deems a failure to
achieve test objectives as a mishap
(failure to complete a launch or reentry
as planned). Similarly, a test failure that
results in over $25,000 in damage to
associated property would also be
considered a mishap.149 In both cases,
the resulting mishap designation would
require a mishap investigation to
identify root causes and preventive
measures, which the operator would
need to implement before the next
operation.
In the recent past, the FAA accepted
the possibility of a test-induced damage
approach by pre-coordinating with a
launch operator prior to conducting an
in-flight abort test of a crew escape
system.150 The FAA found that this
process worked well in pre-defining the
objectives of the test, test limits,
149 ‘‘[R]esulting in greater than $25,000 worth of
damage . . .’’ in accordance with the mishap
definition in § 401.5.
150 Given these events fell within the precoordinated possible scenarios, the FAA did not
consider them unplanned events and therefore, did
not consider the events mishaps.
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expected outcomes, and potential
failure modes. It also allowed the
operator and FAA to reach a common
understanding of what events would be
categorized as a test-induced damage or
mishap. This approach would also be
consistent with ARC feedback that the
existing mishap definition leads to
protracted mishap investigations
because it does not recognize the
difference between operational missions
and higher risk experimental or test
missions. The ARC and FAA believe
this discourages robust testing to push
the limits of a vehicle and undercutting
test programs currently covered under
experimental permits.
As noted earlier, the ARC shared its
concern that current mishap reporting
and investigation requirements
discourage robust testing. The FAA
believes that the proposed test-induced
damages paradigm addresses this
concern by providing an opportunity for
license applicants and existing license
holders to pre-coordinate test activities
and pre-declare damages that the FAA
would not consider a mishap. Under
this paradigm, failure to achieve
identified test objectives and certain
pre-declared damages to property
associated with the licensed activity,
including ground support equipment,
ground support systems, and flight
hardware would not be reportable as an
FAA-mishap provided the requirements
of this section are met. The FAA also
proposes to replace its existing mishap
related definitions in favor of a mishap
classification system to further clarify
the types of events that would be
considered a mishap.
Proposed § 450.175(a) would lay out
the specific conditions for the testinduced damage approach. It would
require an operator to coordinate test
activities with and obtain approval from
the FAA before the planned activity.
The coordination should take place with
sufficient time for the FAA to evaluate
the proposal during the application
process or as a license modification. A
test activity would need to be precoordinated with the FAA to be eligible
for the test-induced damage mishap
exception. The FAA would conduct precoordination activities during preapplication consultation. The testinduced damage exception would be
optional and an operator would not be
required to take this path. However,
absent the test-induced damage
exception, the FAA would categorize an
unplanned event as a mishap in
accordance with the proposed mishap
classification system. Proposed
§ 450.175(a)(2) would preclude certain
kinds of mishaps from the test-induced
damage alternative. Specifically, any
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mishap involving a serious injury or
fatality, damage to property not
associated with the licensed activity, or
hazardous debris leaving the predefined hazard area would be treated as
a mishap and not test-induced damage.
Finally, proposed § 450.175(a)(3) would
require test-induced damage to fall
within the scope of activities
coordinated with the FAA to be eligible
for this alternative. In other words, the
FAA would consider the occurrence of
damages resulting from test activities
that fall outside the scope of approved
activities (e.g., before scheduled test
activities begin or exceeding operation
limits) as a mishap in accordance with
the proposed mishap classification
system. The approved scope of the test
would be outlined in the information
submitted by the permittee or licensee
to meet the application requirements of
proposed § 450.175(b).
Proposed § 450.175(b) would set the
test-induced damage application
requirements. The paragraph would list
the information an applicant would
need to submit under the test-induced
damage alternative to mishap
classification. The FAA does not intend
the test-induced damage exception to
apply to the operation of an entire
vehicle, but rather the testing of specific
components and systems. The applicant
should submit test objectives in a
complete, clear, and concise manner to
help the FAA distinguish between
nominal operations and specific test
objectives. It should also provide test
limits such as the expected
environments, personnel, equipment, or
environmental limits. Also, the
applicant would identify expected
outcomes that the FAA would later
compare to actual outcomes. The FAA
would also request a list of potential
risks, including the applicant’s best
understanding of the uncertainties in
environments, test limits, or system
performance. Applicable procedures or
steps taken to execute the tests and the
expected time and duration of the test
would also be required. Finally, the
FAA may request additional
information such as clarification
information to ensure public safety,
safety of property, and to safeguard the
national security and foreign policy
interests of the United States.
This proposal is similar to NASA’s
test-induced damages process, as
defined in NPR 8621.1C (NASA
Procedural Requirements for Mishap
and Close Call Reporting, Investigating,
and Recordkeeping). NASA developed
the test-induced damages paradigm in
support of the December 2014 launch of
Exploration Flight Test-1 and it has
been in use supporting NASA test
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programs ever since. The test-induced
damages process is a formal process
documenting the risk of damage and
accepting that risk by signature before
the test. Similar to the commercial space
industry, NASA conducts tests to better
understand and mitigate complex
design, manufacturing, or operational
issues with the objective of providing
NASA with confidence that the system
meets its technical and programmatic
requirements and can successfully and
safely perform its mission in the
operational environment. As noted in
NPR 8261.1C, some tests are designed
and intended to result in hardware
damage (e.g., a structural test-to-failure).
Other tests are aggressive in nature, and
test-incurred damage often occurs; the
knowledge gained is used to improve
designs. These statements hold true for
the commercial space transportation
industry as well. The FAA’s proposed
test-induced damages takes a NASAproven process and tailors it to satisfy
the FAA’s public safety mission.
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L. Pre- and Post-Flight Reporting
1. Preflight Reporting
Under proposed § 450.213, the FAA
would continue to require a licensee to
provide the FAA with specified
information prior to each launch or
reentry, consistent with current
requirements. An operator would send
the information as an email attachment
to [email protected], or by some
other method as agreed to by the
Administrator in the license. The FAA
would require five categories of
information: mission-specific, flight
safety analysis products, flight safety
system test data, data required by the
FAA to conduct a collision avoidance
analysis, and a launch or reentry
schedule.
The first category would be missionspecific information in proposed
§ 450.213(b). As currently required in
§§ 417.17(b)(2) and 431.79(a), an
operator would be required to provide
this information to the FAA not less
than 60 days before each mission
conducted under the license. The FAA
may also agree to a different time frame
in accordance with § 404.15. An
operator would not have to provide any
information under this section if the
mission-specific information was
already provided in the application.
This would be the case if an operator’s
license authorizes specific missions, as
opposed to unlimited launches or
reentries within certain parameters.
Specifically, an operator would
continue to have to provide payload
information in accordance with
proposed § 450.43(i), and flight
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information, including the vehicle,
launch site, planned flight path, staging
and impact locations, each payload
delivery point, intended reentry or
landing sites including any contingency
abort locations, and the location of any
disposed launch or reentry vehicle stage
or component that is deorbited. This
section would combine the reporting
requirements of §§ 417.17(b)(2) and
431.79(a), although reporting the
location of any disposed launch or
reentry vehicle stage or component that
is deorbited would be a new
requirement. The FAA would add this
information requirement because
disposals are much more common now
than when parts 417 and 435 were
issued, and notifications to airmen and
mariners would be necessary to protect
the public from vehicle stages or
components reentering as part of a
disposal. In practice, licensees have
arranged for the issuance of NOTAMs
and NTMs for vehicle stages
purposefully deorbited.
The second category is flight safety
analysis products in proposed
§ 450.213(c). An operator would need to
submit to the FAA updated flight safety
analysis products, using previouslyapproved methodologies, for each
mission no less than 30 days before
flight. The FAA may also agree to a
different time frame in accordance with
proposed § 404.15. The flight safety
analysis products are similar to what is
currently required under § 417.17(c)(3).
Part 431 does not require similar flight
safety analysis products to be submitted,
although current practice is to require
similar information in license orders.
An operator would not be required to
submit flight safety analysis products if
the analysis submitted in the license
application already satisfies all the
requirements of the section. This would
be the case if a licensee’s license
authorizes specific missions, as opposed
to unlimited launches within certain
parameters. An operator would also not
be required to submit flight safety
analysis products if the operator
demonstrated during the application
process that the analysis does not need
to be updated to account for missionspecific factors. This would be the case
if an operator operates within certain
operational constraints proven to satisfy
public safety criteria.
Otherwise, an operator would be
required to submit flight safety analysis
products while accounting for vehicle
and mission specific input data and
potential variations in input data that
may affect any analysis product within
the final 30 days before flight. An
operator would also be required to
submit the analysis products using the
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same format and organization used in its
license application. Lastly, an operator
would not be able to change an analysis
product within the final 30 days before
flight, unless the operator has a process,
approved in the license, for making a
change in that period as part of the
operator’s flight safety analysis process.
The third category is flight safety
system test data in proposed
§ 450.213(d). If an operator would be
required to use an FSS to protect public
safety as required by proposed
§ 450.101(c), it would need to submit to
the FAA, or provide access to, any test
reports in accordance with approved
flight safety system test plans no less
than 30 days before flight. The FAA may
also agree to a different time frame in
accordance with proposed § 404.15.
This reporting requirement is discussed
earlier in the section for flight safety
systems.
The fourth category would be data
required by the FAA to conduct a
collision avoidance analysis in
proposed § 450.213(e). Not less than 15
days before the flight of a launch vehicle
or the reentry of a reentry vehicle, an
operator would need to submit the
collision avoidance information in
proposed Appendix A to part 450 to a
Federal entity identified by the FAA,
and the FAA. This reporting
requirement is discussed in the ‘‘Launch
and Reentry Collision Avoidance
Requirements’’ section.
The fifth category, as proposed in
§ 450.213(f), a launch or reentry
schedule that identifies each review,
rehearsal, and safety-critical operation.
The schedule would be required to be
filed and updated in time to allow FAA
personnel to participate in the reviews,
rehearsals, and safety-critical
operations. This is similar to current
§ 417.17(b).
2. Post-Flight Reporting
Under proposed § 450.215, the FAA
would require an operator to provide
specified information no later than 90
days after a launch or reentry. The FAA
may also agree to a different time frame
in accordance with proposed § 404.15.
An operator would send the information
as an email attachment to
[email protected], or other
method as agreed to by the
Administrator in the license.
Specifically, as discussed earlier, an
operator would need to provide any
anomaly that occurred during
countdown or flight that is material to
public health and safety and the safety
of property,151 and any corrective action
151 What is material to public health and safety
and the safety of property is discussed later in this
preamble in reference to proposed § 450.211(a)(2).
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implemented or to be implemented after
the flight due to an anomaly or mishap.
Section 417.25(b) and (c) requires
similar information. Part 431 does not
require post-flight information, although
current practice is to require similar
information in license orders.
In addition, an operator would need
to provide the actual trajectory flown by
the vehicle, and, for an unguided
suborbital launch vehicle, the actual
impact location of all impacting stages
and impacting components. The actual
trajectory flown by the vehicle would be
a new requirement, while the actual
impact locations for an unguided
suborbital launch vehicle is similar to
the requirements in current § 417.25(b)
and (c). The FAA would use the actual
trajectory flown by the vehicle to
compare it to predicted trajectories.
Because the FAA may not need this
information for all launches, this
information would only need to be
reported if requested by the FAA.
Lastly, an operator would need to
report the number of humans on board
the vehicle. This would be required
because the FAA keeps a human space
flight database for use by launch and
reentry operators for the purposes of
informed consent. Under § 460.45(c),
and pursuant to statute, an operator
must inform each space flight
participant of the safety record of all
launch or reentry vehicles that have
carried one or more persons on board,
including both U.S. government and
private sector vehicles, to include the
total number of people who have died
or been seriously injured on these
flights, the total number of launches and
reentries conducted with people on
board, and the number of catastrophic
failures. To facilitate all operators
accurately informing space flight
participants, the FAA maintains the
human space flight database and
populates it using voluntarily provided
information from industry. As more
launches and reentries are expected
with humans on board, the FAA will
require this information to keep the
human spaceflight database up to date,
and expects that this would not
significantly increase the burden to
operators.
Proposed § 450.3(b) would establish that
launch begins under a license with the
start of hazardous activities that pose a
threat to the public, and it would amend
the end of launch language to remove
any reference to ELVs and RLVs.
Finally, the FAA proposes to clarify
that, absent the launch vehicle, the
arrival of a payload at the launch site
would not trigger the beginning of
launch. Also, at a non-U.S. launch site,
launch would begin at ignition or takeoff for a hybrid vehicle.
Title 51 U.S.C. 50902 defines launch
as to place or try to place a launch
vehicle or reentry vehicle and any
payload or human being from Earth in
a suborbital trajectory; in Earth orbit in
outer space; or otherwise in outer space,
including activities involved in the
preparation of a launch vehicle or
payload for launch, when those
activities take place at a launch site in
the United States. The FAA added the
current regulatory definition of launch
in the 1999 final rule.152 The language
in the regulatory definition differs
slightly from the current statutory
language regarding activities in
preparation of the vehicle, and the
regulatory definition does not include
the reference to human beings because
that reference was added to the statute
after 1999.153 The regulatory definition
also includes language that is not set
forth in the statute pertaining to preand post-flight ground operations
including language identifying the
beginning of launch and end of launch.
The FAA and industry have identified
a number of issues associated with the
current definition of launch in § 401.5.
The current definition of launch is
inflexible and has resulted in confusion
regarding launch from non-U.S. sites
and whether the arrival of a payload
constitutes the beginning of launch.
The preamble discussion in the 1999
final rule stated that the intent of the
FAA’s definition of ‘‘launch’’ is to
require a license at the start of those
hazardous preflight activities that put
public safety at risk. The final rule
stated that, in accordance with this
responsibility, the FAA will exercise
regulatory oversight only if an activity is
so hazardous as to pose a threat to third
parties. Specifically, the FAA
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Ground Safety
A. Definition and Scope of Launch
As discussed in more detail in this
section, the FAA proposes to amend the
definitions of ‘‘launch’’ and ‘‘reentry’’ in
part 401 to mirror the statutory
definitions. The FAA would move the
beginning and end of launch to
proposed § 450.3, which defines the
scope of a vehicle operator’s license.
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152 64
FR 19586 (April 21, 1999).
currently defined in 14 CFR 401.5, launch
means to place or try to place a launch vehicle or
reentry vehicle and any payload from Earth in a
suborbital trajectory, in Earth orbit in outer space,
or otherwise in outer space, and includes preparing
a launch vehicle for flight at a launch site in the
United States. The current definition also defines
beginning and end of launch, which, as discussed
later in the preamble, the FAA proposes to amend
and move to proposed part 450 (Scope of a vehicle
operator license).
determined that launch begins when
hazardous activities related to the
assembly and ultimate flight of the
launch vehicle commence.154 The
preamble further elaborated that the
moment at which hazardous activities
begin is when the major components of
a licensee’s launch vehicle enter, for
purposes of preparing for flight, the gate
of a U.S. launch site, regardless of
whether the site is situated on a Federal
launch range and regardless of whether
flight occurs from that site.155 At the
time, the FAA determined that the
arrival of the launch vehicle at a U.S.
launch site would trigger the beginning
of launch for the following reasons: ease
of administration, consistent and broad
interpretation, and change in the level
of risk.156 Additionally, the rule stated
that shortly after vehicle components
arrive, hazardous activities related to
the assembly and ultimate flight of the
launch vehicle begin and therefore the
arrival of the vehicle or its parts is a
logical point at which the FAA should
ensure that a launch operator is
exercising safe practices and is
financially responsible for any damage
it may cause.157 In accordance with the
definition of launch, the FAA has
required a launch license to be in place
before the arrival of major components
of a launch vehicle at a U.S. launch site
that are intended for use on a specific
FAA-licensed launch.
The lack of flexibility in the definition
of beginning of launch has led to
multiple requests from the industry to
waive the requirement for a license to
bring vehicle hardware on site and
begin preflight activity.158 The FAA has
issued numerous waivers because it
determined that the proposed preflight
activities associated with the arrival of
launch vehicles or their major
components were not so hazardous to
the public as to require FAA oversight.
In granting a waiver, the FAA
determines that the waiver is in the
public interest and will not jeopardize
public health and safety, the safety of
property, or any national security or
foreign policy interest of the United
States. In addition, by requesting a
waiver to conduct preflight activities,
the operator agrees that it must forgo the
opportunity to seek indemnification for
153 As
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154 64
FR 19586 (April 21, 1999), at 19591.
FR 19586 (April 21, 1999).
156 64 FR 19586 (April 21, 1999), at 19589.
157 64 FR 19586 (April 21, 1999), at 19591.
158 As stated previously, the FAA is only able to
waive regulatory requirements, not definitions, and
therefore has issued waivers to the requirement to
obtain a license, rather than to the definition of
launch.
155 64
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any loss incurred under the waiver
during the waived preflight activities.
Further, the current definition does
not account for the significant
technological advances the industry has
experienced since adoption of the 1999
rule. For example, in the current
commercial space transportation
environment, launch operations often
include vehicles or vehicle stages that
fly back to a U.S. launch site and remain
at the launch site. In cases where no
license was in place to cover the
presence of flight hardware for possible
reuse, consistent with 1999 rule
preamble language, the FAA has
deemed this to be storage and does not
require a license or waiver.159 As
currently written, however, the
definition could imply that a license is
required for RLV launches during the
period between end-of-launch and
launch vehicle reuse, even when the
vehicle is in a safe and dormant state,
and would not be a threat to public
safety.
Because the current definition states
that launch begins under a license with
the arrival of a launch vehicle or
payload at a U.S. launch site, the term
‘‘or payload’’ has been interpreted to
mean arrival of a payload by itself could
constitute beginning of launch.
However, the 1999 preamble explicitly
states that the FAA does not define
launch to commence with the arrival of
a payload absent the launch vehicle at
a launch site.160 Also, it states that the
FAA does not consider payload
processing absent launch vehicle
integration to constitute part of licensed
activities.161 In addition, the 1999 rule
preamble refers to launch beginning
when the ‘‘major components’’ of a
launch vehicle arrive at the launch site.
However, the regulatory language
remains unclear.
Another point of current uncertainty
is when launch begins from a non-U.S.
site. Title 51 U.S.C. chapter 509 gives
the FAA authority to issue a launch
license to a U.S. citizen conducting a
launch anywhere in the world.
However, the current definition of
launch is silent as to when launch
begins from a non-U.S. site. This has
resulted in operators lacking clarity as
to when launch begins. In recent years,
the FAA has licensed launches from
international waters, Australia, the
Marshall Islands, New Zealand, and
Spain. In licensing these launches, the
159 64 FR 19586 (April 21, 1999), at 19593. ‘‘On
the other hand, the FAA does not intend a launch
license to encompass components stored at a
launch site for a considerable period of time prior
to flight.’’
160 64 FR 19586 (April 21, 1999), at 19589.
161 64 FR 19586 (April 21, 1999), at 19593.
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FAA has consistently interpreted that
launch from outside of U.S. territory to
begin at ignition or at the first
movement that initiates flight,
whichever occurs earlier.
The ARC commented about the
definition of launch for licensed
launches from a U.S. launch site. The
ARC report stated that launch should be
defined on a case-by-case basis for all
operators. The ARC recommended
licensed activities on U.S. launch sites
for all vehicles include preflight ground
operations, flight operations, and launch
operations phases as tailored by each
launch operator. The ARC further
recommends the initiation and scope of
launch activities, including preflight
ground operations and flight operation
phases, be defined by the impact of each
activity on public safety and property.
These activities may include both
hazardous and safety-critical operations,
the latter encompassing non-hazardous
activities that may impact public risk
during other pre-launch and flight
activities. A list of performance-based
criteria for licensed activities would be
tailored for each operator and the FAA
based on their specific concept of
operations. This scope should only
include hazardous operations unique to
activities as defined in the operator’s
license application documents and not
activities already regulated by another
government agency.
In light of the multiple waiver
requests and ARC recommendations, the
FAA proposes to amend the regulatory
definitions of launch and reentry
(discussed later in this section) to match
the statutory definitions. The FAA
would also move the details in the
definitions for beginning and end of
launch (discussed later in this section)
and reentry to the scope of a vehicle
operator license requirements in
proposed § 450.3. In addition, the FAA
would revise ‘‘beginning of launch’’ to
be more performance-based and ‘‘end of
launch’’ to remove references to ELVs
and RLVs. Finally, the FAA proposes to
clarify that launch from a non-U.S. site
would begin at ignition, and that the
arrival of a payload to a launch site does
not constitute beginning of launch. The
FAA believes the proposed revisions
capture the primary intent of the ARC’s
recommendation, which is to limit FAA
oversight to those launch operations
that pose a hazard to public safety and
the safety of property.
The FAA would revise the definitions
of launch and reentry in § 401.5 to
mirror the statutory definitions.
Specifically, the FAA would remove the
beginning and end of launch language
from the definition of ‘‘launch,’’ and
add the term ‘‘human being’’ to align
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with the 2015 update to the Act.
Similarly, the FAA would revise the
definition of ‘‘reenter/reentry’’ in part
401 to mirror the statutory definition,
and would add the term ‘‘human being’’
to align with the 2015 update to the Act.
The FAA would move the beginning
and end of launch and reentry language
to proposed § 450.3. The FAA proposes
this change because such detail in a
definition makes the definition
unwieldy and, unlike regulatory
requirements, definitions cannot be
waived.
The FAA would amend beginning of
launch such that launch begins with the
first hazardous activities related to the
assembly and ultimate flight of the
launch vehicle at a U.S. launch site.
Unless a later point is agreed to by the
Administrator, hazardous preflight
ground operations would be presumed
to begin when the launch vehicle or its
major components arrive at the launch
site. For operations where an applicant
identifies a later time when hazardous
operations begin, the applicant may
propose the event that it believes should
constitute the beginning of launch
during the pre-application process.162
As a result, there would be no need to
request a waiver.
This proposed change would also
clarify that for launch vehicle stages or
when launch begins for an RLV that
returns to a launch site and remains
there in a dormant state, FAA oversight
is not necessary since no hazardous
activity that falls under the FAA’s
oversight responsibilities are being
performed.
This proposal would clarify that,
absent vehicle hardware, the arrival of
payload does not constitute beginning of
launch. Instead, launch would begin
with the arrival of a launch vehicle or
its major components at a U.S. launch
site, or at a later point as agreed to by
the Administrator.
This proposal would also specify that
launch from a non-U.S. site begins at
ignition, or at the first movement that
initiates flight, of the launch vehicle,
whichever comes first. For hybrid
vehicles, flight commences at take-off.
The current ‘‘beginning of launch,’’ as
defined in the definition of ‘‘launch’’
refers only to launches from a U.S.
launch site, and is silent with regard to
launches from sites outside the United
States. Although the FAA issues launch
licenses for launches from non-U.S.
launch sites if the operator is a citizen
162 The FAA’s proposal regarding how an
operator would determine what event constitutes
the beginning of launch, and how to obtain the
Administrator’s approval, is located in the Ground
Safety section under the Identifying First Hazardous
Activity sub-heading of this preamble.
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of the U.S., the FAA considers it outside
its authority to license preflight
activities that take place at a non-U.S.
launch site in light of the statutory
definition of launch that explicitly
refers to ‘‘activities involved in the
preparation of a launch vehicle . . .
when those activities take place at a
launch site in the United States.’’ The
FAA also believes that this
interpretation is necessary because of
issues of sovereignty and liability under
international law. For these non-U.S.
launch sites, the FAA has historically
licensed launches beginning at ignition,
or if there is no ignition, then at the first
movement that initiates flight. In order
to provide clarity for launch operators
launching from non-U.S. sites, the FAA
is proposing to codify this approach in
part 450.
In addition to addressing issues in the
current definition of ‘‘launch’’ regarding
when launch begins, the FAA proposes
to clarify when launch ends. First, the
FAA would move the provisions in the
current definition of launch regarding
end of launch to proposed § 450.3.
Second, the FAA would remove the
distinction between ELVs and RLVs,
which is consistent with one of the
overall goals of this proposed rule.
Overall, the substance of the current
provisions related to end of launch
currently located in § 401.5 would not
change. Specifically, launch ends:
1. For an orbital launch of an ELV,
after the licensee’s last exercise of
control over its vehicle whether on orbit
or a vehicle stage impacting on Earth;
2. For an orbital launch of an RLV,
after deployment of all payloads or if
there is no payload, after the launch
vehicle’s first steady state orbit; and
3. For a suborbital launch of either an
ELV or RLV that includes reentry,
launch ends after reaching apogee; or for
a suborbital launch that does not
include a reentry, launch ends after the
vehicle or vehicle component lands or
impacts on Earth.
In all these cases, activities on the
ground to return either the launch site
or the vehicle or vehicle component to
a safe condition are part of launch and
could possibly extend the end of
launch. In the rare, yet to be seen,
situation of a suborbital launch that
does not require an FAA launch license
but does require a reentry license,
launch ends after the vehicle reaches
apogee. In addition, the FAA would
move the provisions related to reentry
readiness and returning the vehicle to a
safe state on the ground to proposed
§ 450.3. Including these reentry
provisions in the scope of a vehicle
operator license would clarify an
operator’s responsibilities regarding
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post-flight ground operations related to
returning the vehicle to a safe state on
the ground.
Finally, the FAA proposes to modify
the definition for reentry. Title 51 U.S.C.
50902 defines reentry as: to return or
attempt to return, purposefully, a
reentry vehicle and its payload or
human beings, if any, from Earth orbit
or from outer space to Earth. In 2000,
the FAA codified the current regulatory
definition of reentry in the final rule,
Commercial Space Transportation
Reusable Launch Vehicle and Reentry
Licensing Regulations. Section 401.5
defines ‘‘reenter; reentry’’ as: To return
or attempt to return, purposefully, a
reentry vehicle and its payload, if any,
from Earth orbit or from outer space to
Earth. The term ‘‘reenter; reentry’’
includes activities conducted in Earth
orbit or outer space to determine reentry
readiness, and that are critical to
ensuring public health and safety and
the safety of property during reentry
flight. The term ‘‘reenter; reentry’’ also
includes activities conducted on the
ground after vehicle landing on Earth to
ensure the reentry vehicle does not pose
a threat to public health and safety or
the safety of property. As noted earlier,
the FAA proposes to revise the
definition to mirror the statute and
move the provisions related to reentry
readiness and returning the vehicle to a
safe state on the ground to proposed
§ 450.3.
B. Ground Safety Requirements
This proposal would revise current
ground safety requirements to make
them more flexible, scalable, and
adaptable to varying types of launch and
reentry operations. The proposal seeks
to ensure that the FAA’s oversight of
ground operations at U.S. launch sites
would only cover activities that are
hazardous to the public and critical
assets. Specifically, as proposed in
§ 450.179, an operator would be
required to protect the public from
adverse effects of hazardous operations
and systems associated with preparing a
launch vehicle for flight, returning a
launch or reentry vehicle to a safe
condition after landing, or after an
aborted launch attempt, and returning a
site to a safe condition. An operator
would be required to conduct a ground
hazard analysis (proposed § 450.185)
and comply with certain prescribed
hazard controls during those preflight
activities that constitute launch. In
addition, an operator would be required
to comply with other ground safety and
related application requirements in
proposed part 450.
The FAA proposed the part 417
ground safety regulations in the 2000
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NPRM 163 and codified it in the 2006
final rule. The 2006 final rule adopted
ground safety standards governing the
preparation of a launch vehicle for
flight. The final rule specified that in
order for a launch operator to meet part
417 ground safety requirements, an
operator must conduct a ground hazard
analysis to meet the requirements of
subpart E, part 417, as well as a toxic
release hazard analysis to meet the
requirements of § 417.227. For launches
conducted from a Federal launch range,
a launch operator could rely on an
LSSA as an alternative means of
demonstrating compliance with the
FAA’s part 417 ground safety rules.
Because most licensed ground
operations were covered by the LSSA
approach, the FAA did not begin to
exercise the ground safety requirements
in part 417 until 2016.
Beginning in 2016, the FAA received
several applications for launch licenses
from non-Federal launch sites.164
Applicants were required to
demonstrate compliance with the
ground safety regulations in part 417.
During the FAA’s evaluation, the agency
found that many of its ground safety
requirements were overly burdensome,
highly prescriptive, and did not include
criteria for determining public safety.
Furthermore, the FAA discovered the
requirements were out-of-date with
commercial space transportation
practices and operations, and in some
cases duplicated other state and Federal
regulations.
Part 431 does not include explicit
ground safety requirements. However,
the scope of a launch license under part
431 includes preparing a launch vehicle
for flight at a launch site in the United
States. In conducting its safety review
under § 431.31, the FAA must
determine whether an applicant is
capable of launching an RLV and
payload, if any, from a designated
launch site without jeopardizing public
health and safety and the safety of
property. The FAA evaluates on an
individual basis all public safety aspects
of a proposed RLV mission to ensure
they are sufficient to support safe
conduct of the mission, including
ground safety. In licenses issued under
part 431, the FAA has required
operators to address reasonably
163 Licensing and Safety requirements for Launch,
NPRM. 65 FR 63922 (October 25, 2000).
164 The FAA’s first license application involving
a launch from a non-Federal launch range was from
SpaceX for operations at pad 39A in Cape
Canaveral, Florida. The FAA completed its
evaluation and issued SpaceX the license on
February 2017. Astra Space originally applied for a
launch license from a non-Federal launch range in
June 2017, and the FAA issued its license March
2018.
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foreseeable hazards to ensure the safety
of pre- and post-flight ground
operations. The lack of clarity in part
431 is problematic, and would be fixed
by the ground safety requirements in
this proposal.
The ARC recommended that the FAA
create ground safety regulations that are
flexible and streamlined, continue to
protect the public, and are not
duplicative of other state or Federal
authorities. The ARC provided four
primary recommendations for ground
safety. First, the ARC recommended the
FAA allow operators to determine what
activities and operations would be
covered under FAA regulations by
performing an analysis to define
hazards. Second, the ARC
recommended the FAA scale the scope
of what is considered licensed activities
based on each operator’s unique
operations. Third, the ARC
recommended the FAA focus its
regulatory authority solely on those
things that affect public safety. Finally,
the ARC recommended the FAA only
regulate those things that are not already
overseen by other governmental
authorities.
The FAA agrees with the ARC’s
recommendations that ground safety
regulations should be flexible,
performance-based, and utilize a ground
hazard analysis that determines the best
methods for protecting the public. The
proposed ground safety regulations
would rely on a system safety approach
to allow flexibility by stripping away
specific design requirements,
establishing more performance-based
requirements, and giving the operator
flexibility in satisfying these
requirements. Specifically, an operator
would conduct a ground hazard analysis
(proposed § 450.185), and comply with
prescribed hazard controls. In addition
to any mitigations identified in the
ground hazard analysis, the proposed
regulations would require several
prescribed hazard controls, including an
accounting of how the operator would
protect members of the public who enter
areas under their control, provisions on
how the operator would mitigate
hazards created by a countdown abort,
an explanation of the operator’s plans
for controlling fires, and generic
emergency procedures an operator
would implement. As will be discussed
later, operators using toxic materials
would have to perform a toxic release
hazard analysis (proposed § 450.187),
show how it would contain the effects
of a toxic release, or how the public
would be protected from those risks
from toxic releases. Operators would
also be required to develop an explosive
siting plan (proposed § 450.183) and to
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coordinate with licensed launch and
reentry site operators (proposed
§ 450.181).
1. Ground Safety: Identifying First
Hazardous Activity
In proposed § 450.3, an operator
would have the flexibility to determine
for its particular operation when the
first preflight activity that poses a
hazard to the public begins in
coordination with the FAA. An operator
could identify the arrival of the vehicle
or its major components at the launch
site as the beginning of hazardous
operations, which is consistent with
current practice. This option would
provide a clear demarcation of when
launch begins that is easily understood
by both an operator and the FAA. The
license would cover all ground
operations that may present a hazard to
the public from the time flight hardware
first arrives at the launch or reentry site
to the end of launch or reentry.
Alternatively, an operator could
identify some other action, after the
arrival of the vehicle or its major
components at the launch site, as the
beginning of hazardous activities. As
discussed earlier in the scope of a
vehicle operator license discussion, this
option would be available for those
operations where the arrival of the
launch vehicle does not constitute the
beginning of hazardous activities. It
would also provide flexibility to
operators because the start of hazardous
launch operations is unique to each
operator’s circumstances. These
hazardous launch operations would
include the pressurizing or loading of
propellants into the vehicle or launch
system,165 operations involving a fueled
launch vehicle,166 or the transfer of
energy necessary to initiate flight.167
While this option offers greater
flexibility, it would require that an
applicant talk with the FAA during preapplication consultation to identify
which activity would be the beginning
of hazardous launch operations. This is
necessary for the FAA to scope its
requirements accordingly, and so that
165 This would include the loading of propellants
or pressurants, where there are potential hazards
such as overpressure, explosion, debris,
deflagration, fire, and toxic material release. The
operations that are typically performed include wet
dress rehearsals, cold flow, returning the vehicle to
a safe state following a scrub, and tests that might
be performed while the vehicle is being fueled.
166 This would include static fire or tests with a
fully-fueled integrated vehicle.
167 This would include activities that involve
placing the launch vehicle into a state that would
enable it to achieve suborbital or orbital flight. Even
if traditional propellants are not used, the energy
needed to escape Earth’s gravity is significant and
the initiation of the action to launch a vehicle could
potentially have significant impact to public safety.
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the applicant knows what to include in
its application. Early interactions with
the FAA would allow a potential
applicant to work with the FAA to
determine which preflight operations
constitute launch and therefore must
occur under a license. An applicant that
elects to identify an activity after the
arrival of a launch vehicle or associated
major components at a launch site as the
beginning of launch should be prepared
to discuss its operations with the FAA
so that the FAA can determine that
operations occurring prior to that point
would not pose a threat to public safety.
Note that under this proposal,
indemnification and reciprocal waiver
of claims coverage would start when
launch begins as it does under current
regulations. In other words, financial
responsibility requirements would
apply from the first hazardous operation
until launch ends.
2. Ground Safety: Ground Hazard
Analysis
Proposed § 450.185 (Ground Hazard
Analysis) would require an operator to
complete a ground hazard analysis
which would include a thorough
assessment of the launch vehicle, the
launch vehicle integrated systems,
ground support equipment, and other
launch site hardware. The analysis
would include an identification of
hazards, a risk assessment, an
identification and description of
mitigations and controls, and provisions
for hazard control verification and
validation. Although the analysis might
incorporate employee safety and
mission assurance, this proposal would
only require an applicant to identify the
hazards that affect the public, and how
an operator would mitigate those
hazards.
Proposed § 450.185(a) would require
an operator to identify hazards. A
hazard is a real or potential condition
that could lead to an unplanned event
or series of events resulting in death,
serious injury, or damage to or loss of
equipment or property. The FAA
proposes separating ground hazards into
two primary categories: System and
operational hazards. System hazards
would include, but would not be
limited to, vehicle over-pressurization,
sudden energy release including
ordnance actuation, ionizing and nonionizing radiation, fire or deflagration,
radioactive materials, toxic release,
cryogens, electrical discharge, and
structural failure. Operational hazards
would be hazards introduced to the
launch site through procedures and
processes that occur during vehicle
processing. Operational hazards would
include propellant handling and
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loading, transporting vehicles or
components, vehicle system activation,
and related tests.
Once an operator has identified
hazards, proposed § 450.185(b) would
require an operator to conduct a risk
assessment. In other words, an operator
would have to evaluate each hazard to
determine the likelihood and the
severity of that hazard. This assessment
should identify the likelihood of each
hazard causing a casualty. This
assessment should also account for the
likelihood of each hazard causing major
damage to public property or critical
assets. Public property, in this case,
means any property not associated with
the operation. Critical assets means an
asset that is essential to the national
interests of the United States, and
includes property, facilities, or
infrastructure necessary to maintain
national defense, or assured access to
space for national priority missions.
Proposed § 450.185(c) would require
an operator to identify mitigations or
controls used to eliminate or mitigate
the severity or likelihood of identified
hazards. An operator would be required
to demonstrate, as part of its ground
hazard analysis, that the mitigations or
controls reduce the likelihood of each
hazard that may cause (1) death or
serious injury to the public to an
extremely remote likelihood, and (2)
major damage to public property or
critical assets to a remote likelihood.
These qualitative thresholds are the
same as those in § 437.55(a)(3) and
proposed § 450.109(a)(3). A hazard
control is a preventative or mitigation
measure that reduces the likelihood of
the hazard or ameliorates its severity.
Proposed § 450.185(d) would require
an operator to identify and describe the
risk elimination and mitigation
measures required to satisfy the risk
criteria in proposed § 450.185(c). Under
current industry standards, these
measures include one or more of the
following: Design for minimum risk,
incorporate safety devices, provide
warning devices, or implement
procedures and training, as previously
discussed in reference to the analogous
flight hazard analysis requirement in
§ 450.109(a)(4).168
Finally, proposed § 450.185(e) would
require an operator to demonstrate
through verification and validation that
the risk elimination measures meet the
remote and extremely remote standards
discussed earlier. Verification is an
evaluation to determine that safety
measures derived from the ground
hazard analysis are effective and have
been properly implemented.
168 MIL–STD–882E,
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Verification provides measurable
evidence that a safety measure reduces
risk to acceptable levels. Validation is
an evaluation to determine that each
safety measure derived from the ground
hazard analysis is correct, complete,
consistent, unambiguous, verifiable, and
technically feasible. Validation ensures
that the right safety measure is
implemented, and that the safety
measure is well understood.
While this proposal would require an
operator to complete a full ground
hazard analysis as described previously,
an operator would not need to submit
this analysis in its entirety as part of its
vehicle operator license application.
Rather in proposed § 450.185(f), the
FAA would require an applicant to
provide a description of the ground
safety hazard analysis methodology, a
list of the systems and operations
involving the vehicle or payload that
may cause a hazard to the public, and
the results of the ground hazard analysis
that affect the public. Although the
results of the ground hazard analysis
would be unique to each applicant’s
operations, the ground hazard analysis
application deliverables should have
common elements. Specifically, the
ground hazard analysis should contain
the hazards that have a high likelihood
or high severity of affecting the public.
The analysis should include controls for
the hazards that mitigate the risk to the
public and all of the other requirements
shown in § 450.185. Common hazards
that affect public safety, which the FAA
would expect to be addressed in a
ground hazard analysis, include
propellant loading, ordinance
installation or actuation, proximity to
pressurized systems during operations,
certain lifting operations (such as solid
rocket motors and payload integration),
operations which could result in toxic
release, and RF testing. Fundamentally,
if the operator identifies a hazard that
affects the public, it must be properly
documented and mitigated to reduce the
risk to the public. It should be noted
that any part of the ground hazard
analysis could be reviewed during
inspection.
3. Ground Safety: Ground Safety
Prescribed Hazard Controls
In addition to those mitigations an
operator would implement as a result of
its ground hazard analysis, proposed
§ 450.189 (Ground Safety Prescribed
Hazard Controls) would require an
operator to implement certain
prescribed hazard controls during the
ground operations period of launch or
reentry. These prescribed hazard
controls would require that an operator
document how it would protect
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members of the public who enter areas
under the operator’s control, mitigate
hazards created by a countdown abort.
They would also require the operator’s
plans for controlling fires and
emergency procedures.
Specifically, proposed § 450.189(b)
would require an operator to document
a process for protecting members of the
public who enter any area under the
operator’s control. Although the public
would be protected from many hazards
because they are excluded from safety
clear zones and prevented from entering
the site during certain hazardous
operations, an operator should account
for the protection of the public when
they are allowed to be on the site. The
proposed rule would require an operator
to develop procedures to identify and
track members of the public while on
site, and methods to protect the public
from hazards in accordance with the
ground hazard analysis and the toxic
hazard analysis. For example, the
operator could have plans in place to
control who enters its site, whether or
not members of the public on site will
be escorted, how the public will be
made aware of and protected from
hazards, and if members of the public
will be required to wear personal
protective equipment.
This rule would also require an
operator to establish, maintain, and
perform procedures for controlling
certain hazards in the event of a
countdown abort or recycle operation.
Current § 417.415(b) requires an
operator to meet specific requirements
for safing their vehicle, maintaining
control of their FSS, and controlling
access to the site until it is returned to
a safe state. This rule would require a
more performance-based approach to
ensuring the safety of the vehicle and
the site following a countdown abort or
recycle operation in order to
accommodate many different types of
flight safety systems and operations.
Proposed § 450.189(c) would require
that an operator, following a countdown
abort or recycle operation, establish,
maintain, and perform procedures for
controlling hazards related to the
vehicle and returning the vehicle,
stages, or other flight hardware and site
facilities to a safe condition. In all of
these instances, this proposal would
require an operator to have provisions
in place to keep the public safe while
returning the launch vehicle or launch
site back to a safe condition. If a launch
vehicle does not lift-off after a command
to initiate flight, an operator would be
required to ensure that the vehicle and
any payload are in a safe configuration,
prohibit the public from entering into
any identified hazard areas until the site
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is returned to a safe condition, and
maintain and verify that any FSS
remains operation until certain that the
launch vehicle does not represent a risk
of inadvertent flight. These more
specific requirements would be levied
on an operator in the event of a failure
to lift-off after a command to initiate
because a launch vehicle can be in a
particularly hazardous state.
This proposed requirement is similar
to § 417.415(b), which requires a launch
operator to establish procedures for
controlling hazards associated with a
failed flight attempt where an engine
start command was sent, but the launch
vehicle did not lift-off. These
procedures must include maintaining
and verifying that each flight
termination system remains operational,
assuring that the vehicle is in a safe
configuration, and prohibiting launch
complex entry until the launch pad area
safing procedures are complete.
Proposed § 450.189(d) would require
an operator to have in place reasonable
precautions for reporting and
controlling any fire that occurs during
launch and reentry activities in order to
prevent the occurrence of secondary
hazards such as a brush fire caused by
a static fire test or some related ground
launch activity. These secondary
hazards, if not controlled, could reach
pressure vessels or other related
equipment causing more damage. An
operator may choose to meet industry
standards or fire codes as a means of
satisfying this requirement.
Proposed § 450.189(e) would require
an operator to establish general
emergency procedures that address how
emergencies would be handled at the
site. An emergency has the potential to
directly affect the public or create
secondary hazards that may affect the
public; therefore, implementation of
these procedures are critical for safety of
the public. An emergency would
include any event that would require an
evacuation, or a response from
emergency officials such as the fire
department or emergency medical
technicians. Additionally, the
establishment of general emergency
procedures would allow the operator to
have roles, responsibilities, and plans in
place in advance of an emergency to
reduce the effects of any emergency on
the public. Section 417.111(c)(15)
currently requires an operator to have
generic emergency procedures in place
for any emergency that may create a
hazard to the public, and this rule
would replace those prescriptive
requirements with performance-based
requirements.
Proposed § 450.189(f) would require
an applicant to submit its process for
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protecting members of the public who
enter any area under the operator’s
control. This process would be
submitted as part of an applicant’s
vehicle operator license application.
4. Ground Safety: Coordination With a
Licensed Launch or Reentry Site
Operator
Under proposed § 450.181(a), for a
launch or reentry conducted from or to
a Federal launch or reentry site or a site
licensed under part 420 or 433, an
operator must coordinate with the site
operator because the two entities each
have public safety responsibilities
during ground operations. Specifically,
an operator must coordinate with the
site operator to ensure public access is
controlled where and when necessary to
protect public safety, to ensure launch
or reentry operations are coordinated
with other launch and reentry operators
and other affected parties to prevent
unsafe interference, to ensure that any
ground hazard area does not
unnecessarily interfere 169 with
continued operation of the launch or
reentry site, and to ensure prompt and
effective response in the event of a
mishap that could impact public safety.
This is similar to § 417.9(b)(2), which
requires a launch operator to coordinate
with a launch site operator and provide
any information on its activities and
potential hazards necessary for the
launch site operator to determine how
to protect any other launch operator,
person, or property at the launch site.
Part 431 requires an agreement between
a launch or reentry operator and any site
operator in § 431.75. In addition, in the
mission readiness review requirements
in § 431.37(a), an operator must involve
launch site and reentry site personnel
and verify their readiness to provide
safety-related launch property and
launch services.
For a launch or reentry conducted
from or to a site licensed under part 420
or 433, § 450.181(b) would require an
operator to also coordinate with the site
operator to establish roles and
responsibilities for reporting,
responding to, and investigating any
mishap during ground activities at the
169 The FAA has proposed minimum
requirements for ground hazard areas based on
safety thresholds, either toxic hazard areas or other
hazard areas derived from the ground hazard
analysis, but has always allowed operators to
propose to clear areas larger than necessary to
ensure greater safety. In consultation with NASA
and the Department of Defense, the FAA discovered
that FAA approved ground hazard areas were
having adverse impacts on neighboring space
operations in easily avoidable ways. As such, the
FAA has proposed ground hazard areas be
coordinated with the affected launch or reentry site
operators prior to licensing.
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site. The same mishap plan
requirements in proposed § 450.173
would apply to a site operator leaving
open the assignment of roles and
responsibilities between a site and
launch or reentry operator for reporting,
responding to, and investigating
mishaps during ground operations.
Proposed § 450.181(b) is designed to
ensure those roles and responsibilities
are established.
As part of its application, an applicant
would be required to describe how it is
coordinating with a Federal or licensed
launch or reentry site operator in
compliance with this section. As
discussed earlier, in reference to
proposed § 450.147, a vehicle operator
would be required to submit as part of
its vehicle operator license application
references to any agreements with other
entities utilized to meet any
requirements of this section. In this
context, agreements may include
security, access control services, any
lease agreements for launch sites,
services used for hazard controls or
analysis, or any agreement with local
emergency or government services.
5. Ground Safety: Explosive Site Plan
Proposed § 450.183 (Explosive Site
Plan) would require an applicant to
include an explosive site plan as part of
its vehicle operator license application,
if it proposes to conduct a launch or
reentry from or to a site exclusive to its
own use. The explosive site plan would
have to demonstrate compliance with
the explosive siting requirements of
§§ 420.63, 420.65, 420.66, 420.67,
420.69, and 420.70. Currently for
exclusive use sites, § 417.9(c) requires a
launch operator to satisfy the
requirements of the public safety
requirements of part 420. With proposed
§ 450.183, the FAA is clarifying that the
only requirements from part 420 that
need be conducted by an exclusive use
operator is the explosive safety
requirements.
6. Ground Safety: Toxic Hazards During
Ground Operations
Proposed § 450.187 contains
requirements for toxic hazard mitigation
for ground operations. This is discussed
later in the ‘‘Additional Technical
Justification and Rationale’’ section, in
the subsection on toxic hazards for
flight, due to the commonality of toxic
requirements for ground operations and
flight.
Process Improvements
A. Safety Element Approval
This proposal would modify part 414
to enable applicants to request a safety
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element approval in conjunction with a
license application as provided in
proposed part 450. Proposed § 450.39
(Use of Safety Element Approval) would
allow an applicant to use any vehicle,
safety system, process, service, or
personnel for which the FAA has issued
a safety element approval under part
414 without the FAA’s reevaluation of
that safety element during a license
application evaluation to the extent its
use is within its approved envelope.
Finally, this proposal would change the
part 414 term from ‘‘safety approval’’ to
‘‘safety element approval’’ to distinguish
it from ‘‘safety approval’’ as used in
parts 415, 431, and 435, and proposed
part 450, because these terms, as
discussed later in this section, have
entirely different meanings.
i. Part 414 and 415 Safety Approval
Clarification
As defined in current § 414.3, a safety
approval is an FAA document
containing an FAA determination that
one or more safety elements, when used
or employed within a defined envelope,
parameter, or situation, will not
jeopardize public health and safety or
safety of property. As listed in the Act,
safety elements include: (1) Launch
vehicle, reentry vehicle, safety system,
process, service, or any identified
component thereof; or (2) qualified and
trained personnel, performing a process
or function related to licensed launch
activities or vehicles. In contrast, parts
415, 431, and 435 reference ‘‘safety
approval’’ to mean an FAA
determination that an applicant is
capable of launching a launch vehicle
and its payload without jeopardizing
public health and safety, and safety of
property. Other chapter III parts,
including parts 431 and 435, reference
‘‘safety approval’’ as described in part
415.
The use of identical terms in parts
414, 415, 431, and 435 to reference
different meanings has caused
confusion. Therefore, the FAA proposes
to distinguish these terms by changing
the part 414 term to ‘‘safety element
approval.’’ This proposed term more
accurately reflects the substance of a
part 414 safety approval of a particular
element that may be used to support the
application review for one or more
launch or reentry licenses. Other than
the addition of ‘‘element’’ to the current
term, the part 414 definition and related
references in parts 413 and 437 would
remain the same. The FAA would make
conforming changes throughout parts
413, 414, and 437, where a part 414
safety approval is referenced, to change
those references to ‘‘safety element
approval.’’ The term ‘‘safety approval’’
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would maintain the same meaning as
that in current 415, 431 and 435 where
it appears in the proposed rule.
ii. Part 414 Safety Element Approval 170
Application Submitted in Conjunction
With a License Application
Part 414 enables a launch and reentry
operator to use an approved safety
element within a specified scope
without a re-examination of the
element’s fitness and suitability for a
particular launch or reentry proposal. A
safety element approval may be issued
independent of a license, and it does not
confer any authority to conduct
activities for which a license is required
under chapter III. A safety element
approval does not relieve its holder of
the duty to comply with all applicable
requirements of law or regulation that
may apply to the holder’s activities.
The ARC recommended that an
applicant for a launch or reentry license
be able to identify one or more safety
elements included in the applicant’s
license application and to request
review of those safety elements for a
safety element approval concurrent with
the license application review.171
The FAA agrees with the ARC’s
recommendation. The FAA notes that
its practice has always been to accept
references to information provided in a
previous license application so long as
the applicant can demonstrate the
relevance of that information to the
current application. The FAA also relies
on previous evaluations where it
analyzed compliance with a particular
requirement if the same operator
submits a more recent application using
the same analysis. The proposed
changes would codify this approach for
safety element approval applications in
proposed § 450.39 172 and the relevant
sections in part 414.
This proposal would allow an
applicant to request a safety element
approval as part of its vehicle operator
license application. Specifically, this
rule would provide a process in
proposed § 414.13 to apply for a safety
170 For readability and ease of understanding, this
section refers to a current part 414 safety approval
as a safety element approval, regardless of whether
the discussion is referencing the current regulations
or the proposed regulations. For direct quotations,
the FAA retains the previous term ‘‘safety
approval.’’
171 ARC Report, p. 24–25.
172 Proposed § 450.39 is similar to § 437.21(c) for
experimental permits, which states that if an
applicant proposes to use any reusable suborbital
rocket, safety system, process, service, or personnel
for which the FAA has issued a safety approval
under part 414, the FAA will not reevaluate that
safety element to the extent its use is within its
approved envelope. Parts 415 and 431 do not have
similar sections because they were developed
before part 414 was issued.
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element approval concurrently with a
license application. These safety
element approval applications
submitted in conjunction with a license
would largely use information
contained in a license application to
satisfy part 414 requirements. This
would alleviate the need to provide
separate applications for a vehicle
operator license and a safety element
approval. The FAA envisions safety
element approvals in conjunction with
a license application to cover the same
safety elements as delineated in § 414.3.
Using similar processes as for part
414, the FAA would determine whether
a safety element is eligible for a safety
element approval. The FAA would base
its determination on criteria in proposed
part 450. The applicant would be
required to specify the sections of the
license application that support its
application for a safety element
approval. The technical criteria for
reviewing a safety approval submitted
as part of a vehicle operator license
application would be limited to the
requirements of proposed part 450. This
limitation would simplify the safety
element approval process by eliminating
the need to provide a Statement of
Conformance letter, as required under
current § 414.1(c)(3) for a safety element
approval separate from a vehicle
operator license application. To avoid
this limitation to proposed part 450
criteria, an applicant could apply for a
safety element approval separate from a
vehicle operator license. However, there
is no difference between a safety
element approval issued through a
separate application or a vehicle
operator license application.
Finally, the FAA proposes to remove
the requirement stating that, for each
grant of a safety element approval, the
FAA will publish in the Federal
Register a notice of the criteria that were
used to evaluate the safety element
approval application, and a description
of the criteria. The FAA provided the
rationale for this notification in the
preamble to a proposed rule.173 The
FAA explained that the purpose of this
notification requirement was to make
clear the criteria and standards the FAA
used to assess a safety element.
However, the FAA has found that this
requirement is unnecessary, and has
potentially discouraged applications for
safety element approvals due to
concerns that proprietary data may be
disclosed. Going forward, a safety
element approval application submitted
concurrently with a vehicle operator
license application would be evaluated
173 Safety Approvals, NPRM, 70 FR 32191, 32198
(June 1, 2005).
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based only on criteria in proposed part
450. For other safety element approvals,
experience has shown that there is no
need to publish the criteria because the
FAA’s determinations were not based
on any uniquely-derived standard. In
fact, all eight safety element approvals
granted by the FAA have been evaluated
against regulations in 14 CFR chapter
III. Therefore, the FAA proposes to
revise the requirement in current
§ 414.35 (re-designated as § 414.39) such
that safety element approval evaluation
criteria, whether related to an
application submitted concurrently with
a license application or separately,
would not require publication.
Given the FAA’s proposal to not
require publication of evaluation
criteria, the confidentiality provision
under current § 414.13(d) 174 is no
longer necessary. That provision notifies
applicants that if proposed criteria is
secret, proprietary, or confidential, it
may not be used as a basis to issue a
safety approval.
B. Incremental Review of a License
Application
In response to the ARC
recommendations, the FAA proposes to
amend part 413 and to include language
in proposed part 450 to allow an
applicant the option for an incremental
review of the safety approval portion of
its application.
Under 51 U.S.C. 50905(a)(1), the FAA
is required by statute to issue or deny
a launch or reentry license not later than
180 days after accepting an application.
Under the same statute, the FAA must
inform the applicant of any pending
issue and action required to resolve the
issue not later than 120 days after
accepting an application. To ensure that
the FAA has sufficient time to complete
a thorough review to evaluate whether
the applicant complies with the FAA’s
commercial space transportation
regulations in the prescribed time frame,
§ 413.11 states the FAA screens the
application to determine if it contains
sufficient information for it to begin its
review. It also states that if the
application is so incomplete or
indefinite that the FAA cannot start to
evaluate it, the FAA will notify the
applicant accordingly. In accordance
with internal policy, the FAA aims to
make this complete enough
determination within two calendar
weeks after receiving the application.
When the FAA accepts an application,
the 180-day review period begins on the
date that the FAA received the
174 Current § 414.13 would be renumbered in this
proposal as § 414.17 to maintain sequential section
numbering.
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application. If the FAA accepts an
application as complete enough to
review, the FAA works with applicants
to identify additional information and
documentation needed to demonstrate
regulatory compliance, and advises
applicants when those materials are
needed. If the additional materials are
not provided within an appropriate time
frame, the FAA tolls the review period,
stopping the counting of time towards
the 180-day deadline. Once the FAA has
completed its review, it issues a license,
or informs the applicant, in writing, that
the license application is being denied
and states the reasons for denial.
Industry representatives have
expressed frustration both with a lack of
clarity as to what is ‘‘complete enough’’
for the FAA to accept an application
and begin review and with the 180-day
review period. The FAA seeks comment
on how the FAA can improve the clarity
of ‘‘complete enough’’ to address past
frustrations. For an applicant that is in
the early stages of development, there
are challenges with compiling all of the
documentation in parallel with their
vehicle development. First-time
applicants regularly underestimate the
amount of time needed for licensing.
For nearly all applicants, much of the
vehicle and mission information is only
refined and finalized within the 180-day
review period, which may subject the
application to tolling and business risk
to the applicant’s timeline for launch
operations. The timing of the issuance
of an FAA authorization has never
caused a delay to a launch or reentry
operation, but the FAA is cognizant that
there could be impacts on an operator
even absent an operation delay.
In part to address these issues, and
bearing in mind that a written
application is the means by which the
FAA determines whether a launch or
reentry operator can conduct a launch
or reentry safely, the FAA invited the
ARC to describe how the FAA might
modify its application process to
improve efficiency for both the FAA and
applicants. The ARC suggested in part
that the FAA allow for an incremental
or modular application and review
process. Specifically, the ARC
recommended that the application
review process should be modified to
allow for incremental approvals of
subsections to guide a focused review
and avoid tolling. The recommendation
suggested further that, rather than 180
days for review of an entire application,
the FAA should assign a brief period for
each subsection or module.
The current application process is
already modular to an extent. The FAA
has issued payload determinations
outside of a license, primarily for
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payload developers seeking early
assurances that their payload would be
permitted to be launched. The FAA has
even conducted preliminary policy
reviews to provide similar assurances to
future applicants on a less formal basis.
Despite these allowances, the vast
majority of FAA commercial space
licensing evaluation time is spent on
evaluating the safety implications of a
license application. Because this
proposed rule seeks to convert the
prescriptive safety requirements to
performance-based criteria, the FAA
believes that it may be possible to
develop a flexible safety review process
that can afford applicants early
determinations, providing an applicant
more flexibility and control over the
timing of the licensing process.
The ARC also recommended that the
FAA reduce its application review time.
The ARC focused on differentiating
between experienced and inexperienced
operators in order to decrease FAA
review time of license applications.
While the FAA agrees that experienced
operators may require shorter
application review times, it should be
noted that this would likely be due to
familiarity with the application process,
more streamlined application materials
that lend themselves to a more efficient
review, and established processes that
have been through FAA review
previously (such as ground safety
analyses). While the proposed
incremental review process would
empower operators to better define
when certain portions of an application
are reviewed and would allow an
operator that has satisfied certain
requirements early to receive credit for
those portions of its application in
advance, other proposals in this
rulemaking, such as safety element
approvals concurrent with a license
application, flexible time frames, and
reduced application burdens, would
probably serve to reduce review times
more effectively than an incremental
application process. Nevertheless, the
modular nature of payload
determinations, policy approvals,
environmental evaluations, and
financial responsibility requirements,
and the more granular incremental
review of compliance with the safety
approval requirements would allow an
applicant to seek partial approval of an
application as soon as a portion is ready
to be evaluated. These approvals would
allow an operator to better manage its
timeline and any potential timeline risk.
The flexible nature of this proposal
would allow the FAA to further engage
with industry and establish new best
practices and greater efficiencies for
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both government evaluators and our
commercial partners. The option of
using an incremental approach would
provide more flexibility to operators
who are able to provide portions of their
application in advance.
In proposed § 450.33 (Incremental
Review and Determinations), the FAA
would revise the launch and reentry
regulations to allow for an incremental
review application submission option
for vehicle operator license applicants.
Because the current regulations already
allow an operator to submit the payload,
policy, environmental, and financial
responsibility portions of its application
independently, the FAA proposes that
the incremental review process apply
specifically to the safety approval
portion of a license application. Given
the large variety of applicant
experience, proposed operations, and
company timelines, the FAA recognizes
a need for flexibility. Accordingly, the
FAA is proposing amendments to part
413 and regulatory language in
proposed part 450 to allow for
incremental application submission and
determinations. This incremental
review application process would not
replace the traditional review of a full,
complete application submitted at
once—the incremental review would be
an optional path to obtaining an FAA
license determination that allows an
applicant to choose an application
submission process that suits their
business model and program needs.
The FAA is proposing in § 450.33(a)
that, prior to any submission, an
applicant would be required to identify
to the FAA that it plans to avail itself
of the incremental review and
determination application process.
During pre-application consultation, the
FAA would work with an applicant
towards an incremental review process
that is aligned to both the development
process for an applicant and the
necessities of the FAA’s evaluation
framework. The FAA proposes to
coordinate with applicants during preapplication consultation to determine
the following: (1) Appropriate portions
of an operator’s application that could
be submitted and reviewed
independently; (2) the application and
review schedule with dates of key
milestones; (3) the applicant’s planned
approach to demonstrate compliance
with each applicable regulation, to
include any foreseeable requests for
waiver; and (4) the scope of the
proposed action being applied for, the
identification of any novel safety
approaches or other potentially
complicating factors, and how those
will be addressed during the licensing
process.
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The details of an applicant’s
incremental application process would
have to be approved by the FAA in
accordance with proposed § 450.33(b)
prior to application submission and the
FAA could issue determinations
towards a safety approval resulting from
those reviews, in accordance with
proposed § 450.33(c). An applicant
would be able to propose sections of the
safety approval portion of its
application that the FAA could review
independently. This process would
allow an applicant to submit completed
sections, for example the System Safety
Program, to the FAA early, rather than
wait until the entire application was
complete enough. The FAA would also
be able, where appropriate, to review
and make determinations on these
increments prior to a full licensing
determination. It would also allow an
applicant to identify more challenging
or lengthy portions of an application
that could be submitted earlier to avoid
delays and tolling closer to a launch
date. The FAA believes this process
would improve predictability for
applicants seeking assurances against
business risks. As the FAA gains more
experience with the incremental
application process, the FAA may issue
guidance for the process or an example
of a process that has been found to
satisfy the intent of the regulation.
The FAA considered the ARC’s
recommendations for predetermined
modules, but identified several concerns
in attempting to model the practice of
such a process. The ARC provided a
flow diagram that partitioned the
evaluation process into nine conceptual
30-day modules, with the proposal that
those modules could be reviewed in
serial or in parallel. As noted earlier, the
FAA is statutorily limited to a 180-day
review process, so any review of
modules in serial could not exceed 180
days. The ARC recommended that if the
modules are submitted in parallel for
concurrent review, extra time should be
provided for FAA review up to 90 days
to allow for dependent analyses. The
ARC recommendation asserted the
importance that the modules are
independent in terms of content, when
possible, but correctly acknowledged
that some modules will necessarily
depend on others.175 The FAA seeks to
provide as much flexibility as
practicable in the proposed process to
enable innovative business practices
and schedules that contemplate frequent
launches and reentries, but many
aspects of the safety evaluation are
interdependent, and the FAA requires
certain material from one aspect of a
175 ARC
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safety evaluation to inform and remain
consistent with other aspects.
Furthermore, operators generally
develop and define standards,
methodologies, processes, preliminary
designs, and plans for an aspect of their
evaluation long before they are able to
submit advanced analysis products or
testing results. The FAA seeks comment
on how a formal incremental review
process would account for the statutory
180-day review period, when
application increments or modules are
likely to be submitted and reviewed at
very different time periods.
To enable incremental application
submission and review, the FAA is
proposing to amend § 413.1 to broaden
the term application to encompass
either a full application submitted for
review or an application portion
submitted under the incremental review
process. In making this amendment, the
FAA would be able to accommodate
applications submitted under either
process. The FAA proposes to retain the
pre-application consultation
requirement of § 413.5, which is
streamlined by the proposed removal of
§ 415.105 and its duplicative
requirement for a more prescriptive preapplication consultation process. Under
this proposal, an operator would be
required to identify whether it wants to
enter into the incremental application
process during pre-application
consultation. Should an operator elect
to submit its application incrementally,
it would work with the FAA to detail
what is needed for each application
portion to begin review. In proposing an
approach to incremental review, the
FAA expects that an applicant would
consider the following:
1. Application increments submitted
at different times should be not be
dependent on other increments to the
extent practicable.
2. Application increments should be
submitted in a workable chronological
order. In other words, an applicant
should not submit an application
increment before a separate application
increment on which it is dependent. For
example, the FAA would not expect to
agree to review a risk analysis before
reviewing a debris analysis or
probability of failure analysis because
the risk analysis is directly dependent
on the other two analyses.
3. An applicant should be able to
clearly identify all the regulations and
associated application materials that
would be required for each application
increment, and should be able to
demonstrate to the FAA that all the
applicable regulations are covered by
the separately submitted portions.
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4. Examples of application increments
that may be suitable for incremental
review include: System Safety Program,
Preliminary Safety Assessment for
Flight, Flight Safety Analysis Methods,
and FSS Design.
The FAA seeks comment on the
incremental approach generally. The
FAA further seeks comment on any
other useful guidelines that an applicant
should consider when crafting an
incremental approach. Finally, the FAA
also seeks comment on any other safety
approval sections of a license
application that would be appropriate
for incremental review.
Finally, the FAA would amend
§ 413.15 to provide that the time frame
for any incremental review and
determinations would be established
with an applicant on a case-by-case
basis during pre-application
consultation. The FAA would continue
to work with applicants during the preapplication phase to assist applicants in
navigating the FAA’s regulations and
identifying potential challenges.
C. Time Frames
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Chapter III regulations include a
number of prescriptive time frame
requirements that the FAA proposes to
make more flexible. In 2016, the FAA
conducted a review of the time frames
in chapter III and found that many
could be made more flexible without
any discernable impact on safety.
During meetings with the Commercial
Spaceflight Federation (CSF) 176 in 2017
and 2018, some members of industry
expressed concern about the FAA’s
restrictive time frame requirements. The
ARC also stated that the current
regulatory time frames and requirements
for submission of changes is onerous
and untenable for high flight rates.177
In consideration of the industry’s
comments and the FAA’s review of
chapter III time frames, the FAA
proposes in § 450.15 to increase
flexibility by allowing an operator the
option to propose alternative time
frames that better suit its operations.
The FAA would revise the time frame
requirements in parts 404, 413, 414,
415, 417, 420, 431, 437, and 440 that are
overly burdensome and may result in
waiver requests. Further, the FAA
would, after reviewing the operator’s
request for an alternative time frame,
176 The Commercial Spaceflight Federation (CSF)
states that its mission is ‘‘to promote the
development of commercial human spaceflight,
pursue ever-higher levels of safety, and share best
practices and expertise throughout the industry.’’
Its member businesses and organizations include
commercial spaceflight developers, operators,
spaceports, suppliers and service providers.
177 ARC Report, p. 48.
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provide the FAA’s expected review
period to make its determination on the
proposed alternative time frame. The
proposed revisions to parts 415, 417,
and 431 would be included in new
proposed part 450. For ease of reference,
the FAA would list all revised chapter
III time frames in proposed appendix A
to part 404.
Proposed § 450.15(b) would inform
the operator to submit its request for an
alternative time frame in writing. The
‘‘in writing’’ provision could be in the
form of a formal letter or email sent
electronically to the email address
[email protected], with the
subject line ‘‘Alternative Time Frame
Request.’’ If an operator would like to
send the request in hardcopy, it would
mail the request to the Federal Aviation
Administration, Associate
Administrator for Commercial Space
Transportation, Room 331, 800
Independence Avenue SW, Washington,
DC 20591; Attention: Alternative Time
Frame Request. The FAA anticipates
that an operator would submit these
requests during the pre-application
consultation or during the application
process, and not after a license has been
issued. At a minimum, the operator
would be required to submit its request
before the time frame specified in the
regulations. Note, the FAA would need
time to process the request. For
example, if a requirement states that an
operator must submit a document 30
days before launch, the operator may
not submit a request for an alternative
time frame 30 days before launch or
later. Also, under the proposal, the
requested alternate time frame must be
specific. For example, an operator could
request to submit a document 15 days
before launch, but not ‘‘as soon as
possible.’’ The FAA would provide the
operator its decision in writing.
Proposed § 404.15(c) would provide
the conditions under which the
Administrator would agree to an
alternative time frame. That is, the FAA
would review and agree to an
alternative time frame if the proposed
alternative time frame would allow time
for the FAA to conduct its review and
make the requisite findings. For
example, the default time frame in
proposed § 450.213(b) for a licensee to
submit to the FAA certain payload
information would be not less than 60
days before each mission conducted
under a license. The FAA uses the
information to verify that each payload
fits within any approved class of
payload under the license, and to
address any issues that may arise. The
FAA may only need a shorter time
frame for this effort if the approved
payload classes are well defined and
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unlikely to generate payload-specific
issues. As another example, the default
time frame in proposed § 450.213(d) for
a licensee to submit to the FAA certain
flight safety system test data would be
no later than 30 days before flight. The
FAA may agree to a shorter time frame
for an experienced operator that uses a
proven flight safety system.
D. Continuing Accuracy of License
Application and Modification of License
The FAA proposes to consolidate
continuing accuracy requirements
currently in §§ 417.11 and 431.73 in
proposed § 450.211. The proposed rule
would preserve the standards in
§§ 417.11 and 431.73. In addition, it
would allow an applicant to request
approval of an alternate method for
requesting license modifications during
the application process. This option
currently only exists in § 437.85 for
experimental permits.
Under the current regulations, an
operator must ensure that any
representation contained in a license
application is accurate for the entire
term of a license. After the FAA issues
a launch license, an operator must apply
to the FAA for a license modification if
any representation that is material to
public health and safety or safety of
property is no longer accurate
(commonly referred to as ‘‘material
change’’). An application to modify a
license must be prepared and submitted
in accordance with part 413. The
licensee must indicate what parts of its
license application or license terms and
conditions would be affected by a
proposed modification.
Although license applications are
often updated during the application
process, the application, as fixed at the
time of license issuance, becomes part
of the licensing record. After issuing the
license, the FAA deems any material
change to a representation in the
application to be a modification to the
license. However, changes may occur
after a license is issued, particularly
among operators that are developing
new systems or incorporating
innovative technology. The FAA does
not wish for the material change
requirement to deter those changes
intended to improve operations.
Although the FAA and operators may
not always agree on what constitutes a
material change, the FAA works with
the operator to resolve any issues and
reduce uncertainties.
Regarding compliance with an issued
license, the ARC recommended that
information needed prior to each
launch, as long as it is within the
approved flight envelope, should be
minimized and a centralized, automated
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system for submitting preflight
information should be established.
Continuing accuracy reviews should be
limited to an assessment of the risks
created by the change. The ARC further
recommended that if the regulations
continued to use the term ‘‘material
change,’’ then that term should be
defined in the regulations, guidance, or
pre-application agreement.
The FAA agrees with the ARC’s
recommendations. While there already
exist avenues by which a licensee can
minimize the need for license
modifications,178 this rule would adopt
an approach from § 437.85 where the
FAA may identify the types of changes
that a permittee may make to a reusable
suborbital rocket design without
invalidating the permit. In proposed
§ 450.211, the FAA may approve an
alternate method for requesting license
modifications if requested during the
application process. The FAA envisions
that this approach would permit an
applicant during the application process
to propose a method that is responsive
to its anticipated types of changes after
a license is issued.
Regarding the recommendation for the
development of a centralized automated
system for submitting preflight
information, while the FAA has been
flexible in accepting application
material and license updates submitted
in electronic format, it recognizes that
an improved system is desirable. The
FAA is exploring mechanisms to
facilitate these submissions.
Finally, the FAA agrees with the ARC
recommendation that it should develop
guidance on what constitutes a
‘‘material change’’ and has identified
the following areas that often constitute
a material change:
1. Safety-critical system or component
changes (e.g., flight safety system) that
may affect public safety, including—
a. Substitution of an existing safetycritical component with a component
with a new part number or
manufacturer (reflecting changed
dimensions, changed functional or
performance specifications, or changed
manufacturing process).
b. Modifications to a safety critical
component deemed necessary by an
178 A license applicant may circumvent or lessen
the need for frequent license modification due to
material change by providing in its application a
range of payloads, flight trajectories, hazard areas,
and orbital destinations, so as to encompass more
flexibility in actual licensed operations. A license
applicant may also create acceptable processes for
making changes to safety critical systems and their
components, mission rules, hazard areas, and safety
organization, that limit the need for license
modifications. Part of these processes would
include a mechanism for informing FAA of the
change.
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anomaly investigation, and requiring reverification by test or inspection.
c. Rework or repair of a safety-critical
component after inspections or tests
revealed fabrication or assembly
imperfections.
d. Reuse, after an earlier launch or
reentry, of safety-critical systems or
components, requiring refurbishment,
re-qualification testing, and reacceptance testing.
2. Hazard analysis changes that may
affect public safety such as the validity
of the hazard analysis, mitigation
measure, or verification of a safety
critical system or component.
3. Flight safety rule changes that may
affect public safety such as flight
commit criteria associated with public
safety.
4. Hazard area changes that may affect
public safety, including the dimensions
of the area.
5. Maximum Probable Loss (MPL)
related changes that affect the validity of
the assumptions used to establish the
MPL (e.g., change in the number of
personnel within a hazard area, change
in trajectory resulting in more overflight
of people or property, increase in
vehicle size with more propellant,
hazardous materials, or potential
debris).
6. Environmental Assessment related
changes that affect the validity of an
environmental assessment (e.g., changes
to mitigation measures outlined in a
record of decision or environmental
impact statement).
7. Safety organization changes that
may affect public safety such as changes
to the roles and responsibilities of the
safety organization or personnel,
including changes in contractual safety
services.179
8. Critical documents or processes
that may affect public safety.
The FAA believes that this list
provides guidance to help operators
better understand what constitutes a
material change. As the industry
continues to develop and the FAA
identifies material changes, it will
consider providing more detailed
guidance.
179 As discussed earlier in the preamble, the
proposed rule would eliminate the current
requirement to name a specific individual as the
safety official. Instead, the NPRM would allow for
one person or several persons to perform the safety
official functions, and, the operator would be
required to designate a position, not a specific
individual, to accomplish the safety official
functions. Therefore, under this proposal, if the
operator changes the specific individual performing
the safety official functions, that would not
constitute a material change.
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Other Changes
A. Pre-Application Consultation
As discussed earlier, the ARC
recommended that the FAA require the
pre-application process only for new
operators or new vehicle programs. For
all other operations, the ARC
recommended that pre-application
occur at the operator’s discretion.180
The FAA does not agree that preapplication should be discretionary for
anyone. In light of the various
flexibilities proposed in this rule, preapplication consultation would remain
critical to assist operators with the
licensing process, especially those that
choose to avail themselves of the
flexibilities provided in this proposal.
These flexibilities include incremental
review, timelines, and the performancebased nature of many of the regulatory
requirements. Pre-application
consultation eases the burden on both
the applicant and the FAA during the
application process by identifying and
resolving issues that allow applicants to
submit application materials the agency
can accept as complete enough for
review. That being said, pre-application
consultation with an experienced
operator conducting an operation
substantively similar to one previously
licensed would likely be an abbreviated
process.
In response to the ARCs request for
defined review times, the FAA
considered an approach to preapplication consultation that would
culminate in a mutually agreeable
‘‘compliance plan.’’ Under this
approach, a compliance plan would be
developed collaboratively between the
applicant and the FAA. Key milestones
that could be established by the
compliance plan would include, but
would not be limited to, the planned
dates of the formal application
submittal, the FAA’s licensing
determination, and the submission of
any required information that is
unavailable at the time of formal
application submittal. The FAA chose
not to propose this requirement because
it could be overly burdensome, possibly
delay an application submittal, and the
compliance plan could require frequent
updates. However, the FAA would be
open to commenters’ views on how to
best develop a voluntary pre-application
product, such as a compliance plan.
B. Policy Review and Approval
The FAA currently reviews a launch
and reentry license application to
determine whether it presents any
issues affecting national security
180 ARC
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interests, foreign policy interests, or
international obligations of the United
States. As part of its review and in
accordance with section 50918 of the
Act, the FAA consults with the
Department of State, Department of
Defense, and other executive agencies,
as appropriate. The Department of
Defense assesses the effect of the launch
on U.S. national security, and the
Department of State assesses its effect
on foreign policy interests and
international obligations of the United
States. For good practice, the FAA also
consults with NASA, the Department of
Commerce’s National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
and the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), for counsel on those
U.S. interests related to the primary
responsibilities of each agency. As such,
the FAA coordinates with the FCC and
NOAA over matters related to frequency
licensing and Earth imaging,
respectively, and with NASA for matters
particularly related to its assets in space.
Section 415.25 currently contains
application requirements for a policy
review of the launch of a vehicle other
than an RLV, § 431.25 for the launch
and reentry of an RLV, and § 435.23 for
the launch of a reentry vehicle other
than an RLV.181 To date, these
informational requirements have served
their purpose well. However, the FAA
believes that the current informational
requirements should be modified to
relieve the applicant of unnecessary
burden and to improve the utility of the
information requested for a policy
review. Currently, §§ 415.25(b) and
431.25(b) both require an applicant to
identify structural, pneumatic,
propellant, propulsion, electrical and
avionics systems. Section 431.25(b) also
requires an applicant to identify thermal
and guidance systems used in the
launch vehicle, and all propellants.
Although identifying the
aforementioned systems is important for
a safety review, the FAA believes that
this information is not critical for a
policy review, which addresses whether
the launch or reentry presents issues
affecting national security interests,
foreign policy interests, or international
obligations of the United States.
The FAA proposes to consolidate the
policy review requirements contained in
181 These sections require an applicant to provide
basic information about the launch or reentry
vehicle, its ownership, launch site, flight azimuths,
trajectories, associated ground tracks and
instantaneous impact points, sequence of planned
events or maneuvers during flight, range of nominal
impact areas for all spent motors and other
discarded mission hardware, and for each orbital
mission, the range of intermediate and final orbits
of each vehicle upper stage, and their estimated
orbital lifetimes.
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§§ 415.25 and 431.25 under proposed
§ 450.41 (Policy Review and Approval).
In doing so, the FAA would retain the
substance of the current requirements
while further tailoring the informational
requirements toward a policy review.
Also, the FAA would replace the launch
or reentry vehicle description
requirements with vehicle description
requirements that are more appropriate
for a policy review. Finally, the FAA
would require the applicant to provide
flight azimuths, trajectories, and
associated ground tracks and
instantaneous impact points, and
contingency abort 182 profiles, if any, for
the duration of the licensed activity.
Specifically, proposed § 450.41(e)(2)
would replace the current requirement
to identify structural, pneumatic,
propulsion, electrical, thermal, guidance
and avionics systems with a
requirement to describe the launch or
reentry vehicle and any stages,
including their dimensions, type and
amounts of all propellants, and
maximum thrust. As previously
mentioned, currently required
information is not critical for a policy
review because policy determinations
do not require the same level of
technical detail as a safety review and
do not need to delve into vehicle design
specifics. Instead, the information
required by proposed § 450.41(e)(2)
would provide the FAA and its
interagency partners with the scope of
the proposed activity that is more
pertinent to a policy review. Moreover,
the FAA anticipates that the proposed
changes would be significantly less
burdensome for an applicant, as the
information is readily available and
requires minimal effort to provide. In
contrast, the currently required
information, while also readily
available, might be extensive and
require more effort to compile.
Additionally, it is unclear that the
requirements to supply flight azimuths,
trajectories, and associated ground
tracks and instantaneous impact points,
currently found in §§ 415.25(d)(2) and
431.25(d)(2), apply for the duration of
the licensed activity (i.e., from lift-off to
the end of licensed activities). For
example, applicants previously have
interpreted the requirement to supply
flight azimuths and trajectories to end at
orbital insertion because that is when
ground tracks and instantaneous impact
points vanish. However, during
interagency coordination for policy
182 The FAA proposes to revise the definition in
§ 401.5 of ‘‘contingency abort’’ to mean a flight
abort with a landing at a planned location that has
been designated in advance of vehicle flight. The
proposed definition is discussed later in this
preamble.
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reviews of orbital missions, NASA and
the Department of Defense have
repeatedly, and specifically, requested
information from the FAA concerning
the trajectories of upper stages after
orbital insertion in order to determine
the potential for the proposed mission
to jeopardize the safety of government
property in outer space or national
security.
Therefore, in addition to
consolidating §§ 415.25(d)(2) and
431.25(d)(2) into proposed
§ 450.41(e)(4)(ii), the FAA would add
language to clarify that the requirement
to supply flight azimuths, trajectories,
and associated ground tracks and
instantaneous impact points applies for
the duration of the licensed activity (i.e.,
lift off to the end of launch). This
clarification would eliminate the need
for the FAA to request additional
information from an applicant to satisfy
inquiries from NASA and the
Department of Defense during policy
reviews and prevent any unnecessary
delays to the policy review process.
C. Payload Review and Determination
The FAA proposes to consolidate the
payload review requirements. The
agency would also remove the
requirement to identify the method of
securing the payload on an RLV, add
application requirements to assist the
interagency review, such as the
identification of approximate transit
time to final orbit and any encryption,
clarify the FAA’s relationship with
other federal agencies for payload
reviews, and modify the 60-day
notification requirement currently
found in §§ 415.55 and 431.53.
While speaking of payload reviews, it
is important to keep in mind the
definitions of launch vehicle and
payload as defined in FAA regulations.
The FAA is not proposing to amend
these definitions. A launch vehicle is a
vehicle built to operate in, or place a
payload in, outer space or a suborbital
rocket. A payload is an object that a
person undertakes to place in outer
space by means of a launch vehicle,
including components of the vehicle
specifically designed or adapted for that
object. Thus, a payload can become a
reentry vehicle. For example, the
Dragon is a payload when it is launched
on the Falcon 9 and a reentry vehicle
when it reenters from Earth orbit. The
FAA believes that any component
attached to, or part of, a launch or
reentry vehicle that has an intended use
in space other than transporting itself or
a payload, is in fact a payload. For
example, the FAA has treated canisters
of cremains attached to a stage left in
orbit as payloads.
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Pursuant to § 415.51, unless the
payload is exempt from review under
§ 415.53, the FAA reviews a payload
proposed for launch to determine
whether an applicant, payload owner, or
operator has obtained all the required
licenses, authorization, and permits.
The FAA further determines whether a
payload’s launch would jeopardize
public health and safety, safety of
property, U.S. national security or
foreign policy interests, or international
obligations of the United States.
Similarly, both § 431.51 for launch and
reentry of an RLV and § 435.41 for
reentry of a reentry vehicle other than
an RLV, require the FAA to review a
payload to examine the policy and
safety issues related to the proposed
reentry of a payload.
Current §§ 415.59 and 431.57 also
require the applicant to submit basic
payload information to allow the FAA
to conduct a payload review. While the
information requirements for payload
review in §§ 415.59 and 431.57 are
similar, they are not identical. Both
sections require that an applicant
provide the payload’s physical
dimensions and weight; owner and
operator; orbital parameters for parking,
transfer, and final orbits; and hazardous
materials, as defined in § 401.5, and
radioactive materials, and the amounts
of each. However, § 415.59 requires an
applicant to provide the name and class
of the payload, the intended payload
operations during the life of the
payload, and the delivery point in flight
at which the payload will no longer be
under the licensee’s control. Whereas,
§ 431.57 requires an applicant to
provide either the payload name or
payload class and function; the physical
characteristics of the payload in
addition to the payload’s dimensions
and weight; the explosive potential of
payload materials, alone and in
combination with other materials found
on the payload or RLV during reentry;
and the method of securing the payload
on the reusable launch vehicle. It also
replaces delivery point with designated
reentry site(s); and requires the
identification of intended payload
operations during the life of the
payload. With respect to hazardous
materials, § 431.57 also requires the
applicant to identify the container of the
hazardous materials, in addition to the
type and amount, because how the
hazardous materials are contained is
important for reentry.
The FAA believes that the current
payload review informational
requirements necessitate modification to
improve the utility and efficiency of
payload review. During interagency
review, other agencies have requested
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information from the FAA for the
amount of time a payload will take to
reach its final orbital destination. This
information allows the agencies to
assess the payload’s potential to impact
their operations. However, current
regulations do not contain an
informational requirement that the
applicant provide this information. As a
result, the FAA often must make
additional requests to the applicant in
order to provide the requesting agencies
with the information.
In the past, most non-government
payloads were telecommunications or
remote sensing satellites for which there
were well-established regulatory
regimes. Operators are now proposing
payloads with new intended uses such
as servicing other satellites and
mapping frequency use. The capabilities
of payloads continue to grow; for
example, cubesats are appearing in great
numbers with unique capabilities. As a
result, it is possible that these new uses
may pose threats to national security,
such as the resolution of on-board
cameras that might be used to survey
national security space assets.
Consequently, payload reviews
increasingly need to address the threat
that these new uses and capabilities
might pose to U.S. national security,
either unintentional or malicious.
Additionally, § 415.53 provides that
the FAA does not review payloads
regulated by the FCC or the Department
of Commerce. Section 431.51 provides
that the FAA does not review payloads
subject to regulation by other federal
agencies. However, neither of these
regulations reflect current practice. In
practice, the FAA includes payload
information in its interagency reviews
for all payloads, with the exception of
certain U.S. Government payloads for
which information is unavailable due to
national security concerns, because
§ 415.51 provides that the safety
requirements apply to all payloads,
regardless of whether the payload is
otherwise exempt. Even though the FAA
conducts a review of all payloads, the
FAA does not impinge on the authority
of the FCC or the Department of
Commerce, nor question the decision of
the FCC or NOAA to approve
communications or remote sensing
satellites. It does not question the
decision of another federal agency
concerning its payloads. More
accurately, while the FAA may conduct
a review of all payloads, the FAA does
not make a payload determination on
what it considers an ‘‘exempt’’ payload.
Changes in the types of payloads that
are being launched or proposed have
also complicated the scope of FAA
payload reviews and demonstrated that
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the language exempting certain
payloads from review is overly
restrictive. The FAA has made payload
determinations for payloads that will
undoubtedly require FCC or NOAA
licensing, but the proposed payload
missions were beyond the scope of
communications or remote sensing.
These payloads were examined in the
interagency process and neither the FCC
nor NOAA took exception to the FAA’s
approach.
Section 50918 of Title 51 of the U.S.
Code mandates that the Secretary of
Transportation consult with the
Secretary of Defense on matters affecting
national security, the Secretary of State
on matters affecting foreign policy, and
the heads of other agencies when
appropriate. Section 50919(b) states that
chapter 509 of Title 51 does not affect
the authority of the FCC or Department
of Commerce. The language of FAA
regulations exempting from review
those payloads subject to the
jurisdiction of the FCC, NOAA, and
other agencies, is more restrictive
regarding the FAA’s authority than what
is required in the statutory mandate of
51 U.S.C. 50918 and 50919. The genesis
of this more-limited role by the FAA
came from the Report of House of
Representatives, May 31, 1984, that
accompanied H.R. 3942. Specifically,
the report stated: ‘‘[t]he Committee
intends that the Secretary not review or
otherwise evaluate the merits of
communications satellites licensed and
approved by the FCC, other than to
assure the proper integration of such
payload with the launch vehicle and its
launch into orbit.’’ At that time, almost
all non-government payloads were
communications or remote sensing
satellites, regulated by the FCC and
NOAA, respectively.
When DOT published the initial
licensing regulations in 1988, the
preamble noted that the payloads
subject to existing payload regulation
included only telecommunications
satellites licensed by the FCC and
remote sensing satellites licensed by
NOAA. It went on to state that payloads
that were not subject to review by DOT
included all domestic payloads not
presently regulated by the FCC or
NOAA and all foreign payloads. Almost
any domestic payload, even if it is not
a telecommunications satellite,
however, requires FCC licensing
because it will invariably have a U.S.owned or -operated transmitter for
telemetry purposes. Therefore, it
appears that the intention of the rule
was only to exclude from FAA
regulation telecommunications satellites
licensed by the FCC and likewise,
remote sensing satellites licensed by
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NOAA, and not any satellite with a
transmitter licensed by the FCC or with
some incidental remote sensing
capability.
In recent years, there have been
proposals for commercial payloads
where the primary purpose might be
scientific or exploratory or even artistic.
Despite their primary purpose, these
payloads almost always require an FCC
license because they have transmitters
for telemetry. Similarly, some payloads
also require approval by NOAA even
though remote sensing may be ancillary
to the main purpose. Without an
interagency review, the FAA has no
direct means of knowing whether a
payload is exempt from review and, as
a result, has initiated interagency
reviews. These reviews also serve the
purpose of alerting the other agencies to
launches of payloads that might
jeopardize U.S. national security or
foreign policy interests, or international
obligations of the United States, even if
they are exempt from an FAA payload
review. Although the FAA has not to
date been faced with the Department of
Defense or the Department of State
raising concerns through the
interagency review regarding national
security or foreign policy for an
‘‘exempt’’ payload, the FAA believes
that it would be its responsibility to
convey those concerns to the
appropriate agencies for resolution.
The ARC asserts that the payload
reviews being conducted are more
detailed than necessary to assure the
protection of ‘‘public health and safety.’’
The ARC recommended that payloads
that stay within the vehicle, have nonhazardous materials, or those that have
previously been approved for flight,
should not require reviews. It
recommended that safety goals can be
met by only requiring reviews for
hazardous payloads that could impact
‘‘public health and safety.’’ The ARC
also stated that it would be more cost
effective to regulate only hazardous
payloads ejected from the launch
vehicle in reportable quantities using
the existing standards in 49 CFR
172.101. It believes such an approach
would reduce unnecessary paperwork
and subsequent FAA review for ‘‘benign
payloads,’’ and the reduction of burden
on the FAA to review ‘‘non-safety
related payloads’’ would support
industry’s increased flight tempo and
reduce FAA review times.
The FAA does not agree with the ARC
recommendation that payloads that stay
within the vehicle, payloads that are
non-hazardous materials, or those that
have previously been approved for flight
should not require reviews. The fact that
a payload remains on or within the
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launch or reentry vehicle does not
change the function of the payload. The
payload’s intended use in space or
changes in the orbit of the vehicle to
accommodate the payload operation
might present issues because it could
affect NASA or Department of Defense
assets either due to its orbit or function.
For example, the Department of Defense
has concerns regarding payloads that
may pass close enough to its assets to
photograph them. The FAA recognizes
that some payloads, such as canisters of
cremains, attached to an upper stage,
might have little or no safety or policy
implications. However, a review is still
necessary to make that determination.
Obviously, the absence of hazardous
materials also removes some safety
concerns; however, as previously
discussed, hazardous materials are not
the only concern addressed in the
payload review.
While payloads that stay within a
vehicle, do not contain hazardous
materials, or have previously been
approved may require less scrutiny, a
payload review is still required because
the FAA is statutorily mandated under
51 U.S.C. 50904(c) to determine whether
a license applicant or payload owner or
operator has obtained all required
licenses, authorization, and permits. If
no license or authorization or permit is
required by another federal agency, the
FAA must determine whether a launch
would jeopardize public health and
safety, safety of property, U.S. national
security or foreign policy interests, or
international obligations of the United
States. Similarly, while potentially it
might be more cost effective to regulate
only hazardous payloads ejected from a
launch vehicle in reportable quantities
using existing standards in 49 CFR
172.101, the FAA must still comply
with the statutory requirements
imposed on it by 51 U.S.C. 50904(c).
Both the FAA’s current and proposed
regulations reflect this statutory
requirement.
As for payloads that have previously
been approved for launch, the FAA
already authorizes classes of payloads
under §§ 431.53 and 415.55, but it still
requires identification of the specific
payload at least 60 days prior to the
launch in order to confirm that the
payload fits within the authorized class
and to coordinate with other federal
agencies. The FAA currently does not
make a new payload determination if a
payload fits within a class of payloads
authorized under a particular license,
but the review is still necessary to
confirm there are no issues that affect
public health and safety, the safety of
property, or national security. The more
defined the payload class, the less the
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likelihood of any issues once the
specific payload is identified. For series
of virtually identical payloads, the FAA
has authorized the entire series. A
payload or launch operator can work
with the FAA to facilitate and expedite
payload approvals by defining payload
classes to accommodate possible
payloads. Also, payload classes
authorized for one operator will usually
be authorized for another operator. The
FAA acknowledges that the current 60day notification requirement might be
unnecessary for certain well-defined
payload classes and proposes to modify
this requirement to permit a shorter
notification on a case-by-case basis. The
FAA anticipates that the notification
requirement would be specified either
in the separate payload determination or
in a vehicle operator license.
The ARC recommended that payloads
that contain hazardous materials in
Federally-reportable quantities be
reviewed in 15 days. The FAA does not
agree with the ARC’s recommendation
because there are other considerations
regarding intended operations in space
that might affect national security or the
safety of property. For example, a
payload may have the capability of
observing or interfering with U.S.
national security assets or violate a
provision of a treaty.
The FAA proposes to consolidate the
requirements for a payload review
currently contained in subparts D of
parts 415, 431, and 435 in proposed
§ 450.43 (Payload Review and
Determination). The proposed
consolidation would retain most of the
current payload review requirements.
The limited changes the FAA proposes
to the payload requirements are
discussed in this section.
The FAA proposes to modify the
relationship with other agencies by
removing the misleading statement that
the FAA does not review payloads that
are subject to regulation by the FCC or
the Department of Commerce.
Specifically, the FAA proposes to
modify the regulation to reflect that
while it does not review those aspects
of payloads that are subject to regulation
by the FCC or the Department of
Commerce, it still reviews the payloads
to determine their effect on the safety of
launch. The FAA also consults with
other agencies to determine whether
their launch would jeopardize public
health and safety, safety of property,
U.S. national security or foreign policy
interests, or international obligations of
the United States. Proposed § 450.43(b)
would provide that the FAA would not
make a payload determination over
those aspects of payloads that are
subject to regulation by the FCC or the
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Department of Commerce. The FAA
does not intend to interfere with any
requirement that these agencies might
impose or with approvals or denials.
This clarification is merely a recognition
of current practice regarding payloads
that do not easily fit into the existing
regulatory rubric.
The FAA also proposes not to retain
the specific reference to NOAA in
§ 415.53(a). Although commercial
remote sensing is currently licensed by
NOAA’s Office of Commercial Remote
Sensing Regulatory Affairs (CRSRA), the
Secretary of Commerce recently
proposed merging CRSRA with NOAA’s
Office of Space Commerce and moving
them directly under the Office of the
Secretary of Commerce. As a result,
proposed § 450.43(b) would revise the
description of which payloads are
exempt, to clarify that a payload
planning to conduct remote sensing
operations would be exempt if licensed
by any office within the Department of
Commerce.
In consolidating the informational
requirements in parts 415, 431, and 435,
the FAA proposes to eliminate
information requirements concerning
the method of securing a payload that
was a requirement under § 431.57(g) for
RLVs because that information is not
relevant to a payload review. The FAA
considered replacing that informational
requirement with a more general one to
provide the potential of the payload to
affect the dynamics of the vehicle.
However, the FAA determined such
information was more pertinent to the
vehicle operator and should instead be
included in systems safety analysis for
the launch or reentry, if appropriate.
Proposed § 450.43(i)(1) also would
require an applicant to provide an
expanded description for the payload
that would include its composition and
any hosted payloads in addition to the
current requirements of physical
dimensions and weight. The FAA
proposes to ask for any foreign
ownership of the payload or payload
operator. In addition, the FAA would
add the approximate transit times to
final orbit for the payload. The FAA
proposes to elaborate what it means by
intended payload operations during the
life of the payload by adding its
anticipated life span and any planned
disposal. Further, it proposes a
requirement to describe any encryption
associated with data storage on the
payload and transmissions to or from
the payload. Encryption helps ensure
against cyber intrusion, loss of
spacecraft control, and potential debriscausing events. The FAA is proposing
these additions to the information
requirements for launches to assist other
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federal agencies because NASA and the
Department of Defense frequently have
requested this information in response
to the FAA’s interagency review in
order to determine whether the
proposed payload would jeopardize the
safety of government property in outer
space, or U.S. national security.
The FAA also proposes to add a
general requirement that it may request
any other information necessary to make
a determination based on public health
and safety, safety of property, U.S.
national security or foreign policy
interests, or international obligations of
the United States. The FAA believes
that it would rarely invoke this
provision but believes that it is crucial
to address unique payloads.
The FAA anticipates that for payload
classes—as distinguished from specific
payloads—the applicant might only be
able to provide a range of expected
transit times and would find this
acceptable. Similarly, for classes of
payloads the FAA would find it
appropriate to provide ranges for
information related to size of the
payload and quantities of hazardous
materials. It also proposes to add the
explosive potential of payload materials,
alone and in combination with other
materials on the payload for launches,
as it already does for reentries because
the information is equally relevant to
the safety of a launch as for a reentry.
The FAA anticipates that these
additional data requirements would
impose minimal burden, if any, on the
applicant. For example, the payload
operator should already have detailed
plans for moving its payload to its final
destination, and the explosive
equivalent for most materials is easily
calculated using readily-available
information. As another example, in
requesting information about what
encryption, if any, is used, the FAA is
not asking for a detailed account of
encryption methodology. Many
operators are already using 256-bit
Advanced Encryption Standard
encryption (AES–256) to protect
commercial telemetry, tracking, and
control data links and mission data
transmission or storage. In this case, an
operator would only need to state that
it uses AES–256. These additional data
requirements help inform the overall
evaluation of a payload.
By specifying in its regulations what
is required to expedite the FAA’s
payload review process without the
need to make supplemental requests to
an applicant to address interagency
concerns, and the applicant would
avoid having to respond to such
requests. The FAA seeks comment on
this proposed approach.
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D. Safety Review and Approval
As part of its current licensing process
under parts 415 and 431, the FAA
conducts a safety review to determine
whether a proposed launch or reentry
will jeopardize public health and safety
and safety of property. The FAA would
not change the philosophy or purpose of
a safety review in this rulemaking. As
with the current regulations, an
applicant would have to satisfy the
safety requirements in order to obtain a
license to conduct a launch or reentry.
Only a vehicle operator license
applicant would be eligible to apply for
a safety approval, and may apply for a
safety approval separately and
incrementally. As with current
regulations, the FAA would advise an
applicant, in writing, of any issues
raised during a safety review that would
impede issuance of a license, and the
applicant may respond in writing, or
amend its license application in
accordance with § 413.17. This proposal
would also not change the process by
which the FAA denies a license, and the
recourse afforded an applicant if a
license is denied.
For launches and reentries from, or to,
a Federal launch range or any launch or
reentry site where a Federal launch
range provides safety-related launch or
reentry services or property by contract,
the FAA would accept the service or
property as meeting the relevant
requirements of proposed part 450, as
long as the FAA determines that the
Federal launch range’s safety
requirements for the launch or reentry
services or property provided satisfy
those requirements. Note that a Federal
launch range could, at the direction of
the operator, provide FSA products
such a debris risk analyses or flight
safety limits analyses, directly to the
FAA on behalf of an operator.
While the FAA is not proposing to
change the philosophy and purpose of
a safety review and approval, the FAA
is proposing changes to the
requirements to obtain a safety
approval. The FAA proposes to locate
the application requirements for a safety
approval in proposed § 450.45 (Safety
Review and Approval), in paragraph (e),
and throughout proposed subpart C.
The application requirements in
proposed § 450.45(e) are general and not
specific to any safety requirement, and
would include information not covered
explicitly in proposed subpart C.
Proposed § 450.45(e)(1) would address
basic requirements for an application,
such as the inclusion of a glossary of
terms and a listing of referenced
material. This proposed requirement is
similar to current § 415.107, although
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the proposed regulation would not
include the requirement for an
application to be logically organized,
with a clear and consistent page
numbering system, and topics crossreferenced. The FAA expects an
applicant to ensure its application meets
these basic organizational standards
without explicitly requiring them.
In proposed § 450.45(e)(2), the FAA
would require an applicant to submit
information about its launch or reentry
site. This proposed requirement is
similar to current § 415.109(a), with the
addition of references to a reentry site.
In proposed § 450.45(e)(3), the FAA
would require an applicant to submit
information about its launch or reentry
vehicle, including safety critical
systems. This proposed requirement is
similar to current § 415.109(b), but
would include reentry vehicles in
addition to launch vehicles.
In proposed § 450.45(e)(4), the FAA
would require an applicant to submit a
generic launch or reentry processing
schedule that identifies any readiness
activities, such as reviews and
rehearsals, each safety-critical preflight
operation, and day of flight activities.
Although the proposed regulations do
not necessarily require reviews or
rehearsals, should the applicant propose
them to meet readiness requirements,
they should be included in the
schedule. This proposed requirement is
similar to current § 415.119, but with
the addition of reentry vehicles.
Proposed § 450.45(e)(5) would apply
to any proposed launch or reentry with
a human being on board the vehicle,
and would require an applicant to
demonstrate compliance with certain
safety requirements in part 460. This
proposed requirement is similar to
current § 415.8, except that it would
include reentry vehicles.
Proposed § 450.45(e)(6) would
address the potential launch or reentry
of radionuclides, similar to current
§ 415.115(b) but with the addition of
reentries. Because such proposals are
rare, it is the current practice of the FAA
to address the public safety issues on a
case-by-case basis. This proposed rule
would not change this approach.
Lastly, in proposed § 450.45(e)(7), the
FAA would reserve the right to request
additional information if necessary.
This request would include information
incorporated by reference in the license
application, such as a previous
application submittal. The FAA could
also request additional products that
would allow the FAA to conduct an
independent safety analysis. The FAA
periodically conducts independent
system safety and flight safety analyses
in order to gain a deeper understanding
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of the safety issues associated with a
launch or reentry proposal. This
independent analysis is particularly
important for novel systems or
operations. The FAA proposes to
continue this practice with this
rulemaking.
Proposed subpart C would contain the
remainder of the application
requirements for a safety approval. With
some exceptions, discussed later, each
safety requirement in proposed subpart
C has application requirements
articulated at the end of each section.
Under current regulations for ELVs,
application requirements are contained
in part 415, while safety requirements
are contained in part 417. Under current
regulations for RLVs contained in part
431, application requirements and
safety requirements are not
distinguished so clearly. The proposed
approach is designed to clearly separate
safety requirements from application
requirements.
However, the following proposed
sections do not include application
requirements, either because they
introduce other sections or because the
FAA would not require a demonstration
of compliance to obtain a license:
1. § 450.101: This section would
address the core public safety criteria
for launching a launch vehicle or
reentering a reentry vehicle. An
applicant would demonstrate that it can
meet these criteria in other parts of
proposed subpart C.
2. § 450.113 (Flight Safety Analysis
Requirements—Scope and
Applicability): This section would
address the scope and applicability of
the FSA requirements contained in
§§ 450.113 through 450.141.
3. § 450.157: This section would
include requirements for
communication procedures, but an
applicant would not have to
demonstrate compliance with this
section in order to obtain a license.
4. § 450.159: This section would
include requirements for preflight
procedures. Similar to proposed
§ 450.157, an applicant would not have
to demonstrate compliance with this
section in order to obtain a license.
5. § 450.169: This section would
include requirements for launch and
reentry collision avoidance analysis. An
applicant would not have to
demonstrate compliance with this
section in order to obtain a license, but
it would have to provide certain
information to the FAA prior to a
launch or reentry.
6. § 450.179 (Ground Safety—
General): This section would address
the scope and applicability of the
ground safety requirements contained in
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§§ 450.181 (Coordination with a Site
Operator) through 450.189.
E. Environmental Review
The FAA proposes to consolidate
environmental review requirements for
launch and reentry operators in a single
section, as proposed § 450.47
(Environmental Review). Currently,
these requirements are set forth in
§§ 415.201, 415.203, 431.91, 431.93, and
435.61. In addition, the FAA proposes
to revise current §§ 420.15, 433.7, 433.9,
and 437.21 to conform to the changes in
proposed § 450.47. Apart from
consolidation, these proposed revisions
would not alter the current
environmental review process.
The FAA is responsible for complying
with the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) and other applicable
environmental laws, regulations, and
Executive Orders prior to issuing a
launch or reentry license. To comply
with NEPA, the FAA must first
determine whether the licensing action
requires a Categorical Exclusion
(CATEX), an Environmental Assessment
(EA), or an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS). A CATEX is
appropriate when actions, individually
or cumulatively, do not have a
significant effect on the human
environment. An EA broadly documents
evidence and analysis necessary to
determine whether a proposed action
may significantly affect the human
environment requiring the preparation
of an EIS or results in a finding of no
significant impact (FONSI). If the action
may significantly affect the human
environment, NEPA requires
preparation of an EIS. An EIS is a
thorough analysis of a proposed action’s
impacts on the environment, including
a public involvement process.
Under current FAA practice, the
issuance of a new launch or reentry
license does not fall within the scope of
a CATEX. However, an applicant may
provide data and analysis to assist the
FAA in determining whether a CATEX
could apply (including whether an
extraordinary circumstance exists) to a
license modification. Examples include
modifications that are administrative in
nature or involve minor facility siting,
construction, or maintenance actions. If
a CATEX does not apply to the
proposed action, but it is not anticipated
to have significant environmental
effects, then NEPA requires the
preparation of an EA instead. The FAA
may prepare an EA using applicantprovided information. In the alternative,
an applicant may prepare an EA with
FAA oversight. When NEPA requires an
EIS for commercial space actions, the
FAA uses third-party contracting to
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prepare the document. That is, the FAA
selects a contractor to prepare the EIS,
and the license applicant pays the
contractor. Finally, if an EA or EIS was
previously developed, the FAA may
require a written re-evaluation of the
environmental document to ensure the
document’s continued adequacy,
accuracy and validity.183
This proposed rule would not alter
the current environmental review
requirements. However, the
consolidation of the launch and reentry
regulations would require a
consolidation of the environmental
review requirements.
and, that an applicant must submit a
license application to transfer a license
according to the provisions of part 413
and the requirements of proposed part
450. Also, like the current requirements,
the proposal would require an applicant
to satisfy all of the approvals and
determinations required under part 450
before the FAA would transfer a license
to an applicant, and the FAA would
retain the ability to incorporate by
reference any findings made part of the
record to support the initial licensing
determination and to modify a license to
reflect any changes necessary because of
a license transfer.
F. Additional License Terms and
Conditions, Transfer of a Vehicle
Operator License, Rights Not Conferred
by a Vehicle Operator License
As discussed earlier in this preamble,
the FAA proposes to consolidate, under
proposed part 450, the differing types of
launch and reentry licenses, currently in
parts 415, 431, and 435, into a single
vehicle operator license. As part of this
consolidation, the FAA would combine
specified sections of parts 415, 431, and
435 into proposed sections of part 450,
such that the consolidated requirements
would apply to a single vehicle operator
license. Except for these changes, the
current requirements would remain the
same. The specific proposed changes are
identified below.
3. Rights Not Conferred by a Vehicle
Operator License
The FAA proposes to consolidate in
proposed § 450.13 (Rights Not Conferred
by a Vehicle Operator License) the
requirements in current §§ 415.15,
431.15, and 435.15 regarding the rights
that are not conferred by issuance of a
license. Although the location of the
requirements would change, the
requirements themselves would not
substantively change.
The proposed requirements would
continue to state that issuance of a
vehicle operator license does not relieve
a licensee of its obligation to comply
with all applicable requirements of law
or regulation that may apply to its
activities. In addition, the proposal
would state the issuance of a license
does not confer any proprietary,
property or exclusive right in the use of
any Federal launch range or related
facilities, airspace, or outer space.
its application, an operator would need
to demonstrate that each unique safety
policy, requirement, or practice
imposed by the FAA protects public
health and safety, safety of property,
and the national security and foreign
policy interests of the United States.
Proposed § 450.177 is largely the same
as § 417.127 with two differences.
Section 417.127 requires an applicant to
file a request for license modification for
any change to a unique safety policy,
requirement, or practice. The FAA
would not incorporate this requirement
in proposed part 450 because it is
duplicative given the general license
modification requirement in proposed
§ 450.177. Also, § 417.127 applies only
when necessary to protect the public,
whereas proposed § 450.177(b) would
also apply to national security and
foreign policy interests of the United
States. This is necessary to cover the full
scope of FAA’s licensing authority.
The purpose for this proposed section
is the same as for current § 417.127. As
the space transportation industry
continues to grow, advances in
technology and implementation of
innovations by launch and reentry
operators will likely introduce new and
unforeseen safety challenges. These
unique challenges will require FAA
officials and operators to collaborate on
a case-by-case basis to identify and
mitigate those unique hazards to public
health and safety, safety of property,
and the national security and foreign
policy interests of the United States not
specifically addressed by proposed part
450.
G. Unique Safety Policies,
Requirements, and Practices
Proposed § 450.177 (Unique Policies,
Requirements and Practices) would
require an operator to review
operations, system designs, analysis,
and testing, and to identify any unique
launch or reentry hazards not otherwise
addressed by proposed part 450,
consistent with current regulations and
practice. An operator would be required
to implement any unique safety policy,
requirement, or practice needed to
protect the public from the unique
hazard. In its application, an operator
would have to identify any unique
safety policy, requirement, or practice,
and demonstrate that each it protects
public health and safety and the safety
of property.
Proposed § 450.177 would also
provide that the FAA may identify and
impose a unique policy, requirement, or
practice, as needed, to protect the public
health and safety, safety of property,
and the national security and foreign
policy interests of the United States. In
H. Compliance Monitoring
The FAA proposes to combine the
compliance monitoring requirements of
parts 417 and 431 into § 450.209
(Compliance Monitoring). In combining
the requirements, the FAA would adopt
§ 417.23. The FAA currently conducts
safety inspections to ensure a licensee
complies with applicable regulations,
the terms and conditions of its license,
and representations the licensee made
in its application.
Compliance monitoring requirements
are codified in §§ 417.23, 431.83, and
435.51. Section 417.23 requires that a
launch operator cooperate with and
allow Federal officers or employees
access to observe any of its activities
associated with the conduct of a
licensed launch, and provide the FAA
with a console for monitoring the
countdown’s progress, and the
communication on all channels of the
countdown communication network.
The requirements of §§ 417.23(a) and
431.83 are nearly identical in that both
require a licensee to cooperate with and
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1. Additional Terms and Conditions
The FAA proposes to consolidate the
current additional terms and conditions
requirements in §§ 415.11, 431.11, and
435.11 into proposed § 450.9
(Additional License Terms and
Conditions) without substantive change.
Therefore, the proposed requirement
would state that the FAA may amend a
vehicle operator license at any time by
modifying or adding terms and
conditions to the license to ensure
compliance with the Act and
regulations.
2. Transfer of a Vehicle Operator
License
The FAA proposes to consolidate the
requirements to transfer a license in
current §§ 415.13, 431.13, and 435.13
into proposed § 450.11 (Transfer of a
Vehicle Operator License). Although the
location of the requirements would
change, the requirements themselves
would not substantively change.
The proposed requirements would
continue to provide that only the FAA
may transfer a vehicle operator license;
183 FAA Order 1050.1F, Environmental Impacts:
Policies and Procedures, provides a more detailed
description of the FAA’s policies and procedures
for NEPA and CEQ compliance.
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to allow Federal officers or employees
access to observe any of its activities
associated with the conduct of a
licensed RLV mission. However, unlike
§ 417.23, § 431.83 does not require a
licensee to provide a console to the FAA
for monitoring all the channels on the
countdown communication network.
Monitoring the communications
channels—including countdown,
anomaly, range coordination,
surveillance, and weather—is a vital
part of compliance monitoring and
safety inspection operations, regardless
of operation type. Under part 417, a
licensee cooperates with the FAA and
provides its inspectors with access and
consoles to observe the activities
associated with the licensed launch. As
a result, the FAA is able to monitor all
communication channels, and has
access to the safety official and the
mission director through the
communications panel and through a
phone line. FAA inspectors regularly
monitor an operator’s communications
channels. In doing so, an inspector can
become aware of issues that arise during
a countdown. These issues may include
vehicle health, ground operations, FSS
health, range readiness, clearance of
surveillance and hazard areas, weather,
and countdown procedures.
Additionally, listening to the
communications channels also gives an
inspector a sense of an operator’s safety
culture, rigor, and readiness. In
addition, inspectors can communicate
face-to-face with the safety official and
the mission director, if necessary,
because they are typically collocated.
Although there is a requirement in
part 431, and incorporated by reference
in part 435, that an operator cooperate
with safety inspectors, there is no
specific requirement for the licensee to
provide access to all communication
channels. The FAA has had to discuss
with the operator what channels will be
available for monitoring during these
operations. Some operators have
contended that their employees will not
be as forthcoming with information if
they know FAA inspectors are listening.
However, being able to hear how the
operator communicates during critical
operations is necessary for inspectors to
determine compliance and to address
problems before they occur. Since
inspectors cannot physically listen to all
channels concurrently, an inspector will
listen to one or more channels that can
provide situational awareness and
information used to determine
compliance. The necessary discussions
require additional time and may cause
a delay, consume man-hours, and is a
cost to both the government and the
operator during the license application
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phase, or potentially during a launch
countdown.
Regarding the contention that
personnel are less likely to discuss
problems if inspectors are monitoring
their conversation, the FAA strives to be
as unobtrusive as possible so as not to
affect operations. Additionally, the
purpose of compliance monitoring is
not to punish operators. Rather, channel
monitoring and on-site inspection
allows inspectors to identify potential
licensing issues and alert the operator,
so it can take action to maintain or
return to compliance. This approach
ensures safety while minimizing
impacts to the operator. There have
been many instances where inspectors
noticed incorrect test setups for FSS
checks, for example, or other issues
during compliance monitoring that
would affect public safety, and informed
the operator so they could be corrected
before safety was impacted.
Compliance monitoring is important
for ensuring public safety and requires
that FAA safety inspectors be exposed
to actual operations in order to be
trained, qualified, and capable of
performing their safety-critical role.
Because safety inspectors are trained to
detect non-compliances, they need to
have access to, and the discretion to see
and hear, as much of the operation as
they deem necessary. Observing
activities for training and familiarization
purposes benefits both the inspectors
and the operator because the more
familiar an inspector is with an
operation, the better he or she can
perform the inspection. Knowledgeable
inspectors cause less operational
impacts because they ask fewer
questions and are less likely to
incorrectly identify a non-compliance.
The FAA proposes to combine the
compliance monitoring requirements of
§§ 417.23 and 431.83 in proposed
§ 450.209. The proposed regulation
would primarily adopt those
requirements in § 417.23, but ‘‘launch
operator’’ would be replaced by
‘‘licensee’’, and ‘‘licensed launch’’
would be replaced by ‘‘licensed launch
or reentry.’’ Additionally, the FAA
proposes to allow an operator the option
to provide the FAA with means other
than a console for monitoring the
communication and countdown
channels. For example, a smaller
company may operate without consoles,
in which case the operator may provide
the FAA with radio monitoring and a
location in close proximity to the
necessary data to monitor launch. As a
result, the compliance monitoring
requirements of proposed § 450.209
would apply to all launch and reentry
operations, thereby capturing licensed
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launch operations under current part
417 and licensed RLV operations under
current part 431. Proposed § 450.209
also codifies current FAA practice for
conducting compliance monitoring of
part 435 operations.
Proposed § 450.209(b) would require
the licensee to provide the FAA with a
console or other means for monitoring
the countdown and communication
network. This proposed requirement
would alleviate the issues that result
from extended negotiations. The option
for ‘‘other means’’ would provide the
operator with some flexibility, as the
FAA recognizes that operations may
occur with temporary infrastructure and
a console may be an unrealistic request.
In this case, the operator would be
expected to provide the FAA with an
alternative method to monitor
communications that is approved by the
FAA prior to operations.
I. Registration of Space Objects
The FAA proposes to consolidate the
requirements for the registration of
space objects in proposed § 450.217
(Registration of Space Objects). These
requirements currently reside in
§§ 417.19 and 431.85 and are largely
identical. This proposal would not
change the substantive requirements of
either section, except to add a
registration requirement for objects
owned by a foreign entity.
The 1975 Convention on Registration
of Objects Launched into Outer Space
(Registration Convention), to which the
United States is a signatory, requires
details about the orbit of each space
object. To that end, current regulations
require an applicant to provide
information on space objects that the
FAA forwards to the Department of
State. The Department of State then
registers the objects with the United
Nations as required by the Registration
Convention. Since enacting these
current regulations, the Department of
State has requested that the FAA also
provide this information for objects
possibly owned by foreign entities.
Current registration of space objects
requirements is codified in § 417.19,
applicable to ELVs, and § 431.85,
applicable to RLVs. The two provisions
are substantively identical in all
respects but one. That is, they both
require the registration of any object
placed in space by a licensed mission,
unless the object is owned and
registered by the U.S. Government or
owned by a foreign entity. Similarly,
both sections require the licensee to
submit information about the space
object’s international designator, the
date and location of the mission, the
general function of the space object, and
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the final orbital parameters. The sole
substantive distinction is that § 431.85
also requires an operator to notify the
FAA when it removes a space object.
Proposed § 450.217 would deviate
from current §§ 417.19 and 431.85 by
requiring the registration of foreignowned space objects. The FAA would
not require the licensee to determine the
owner’s nationality. The Department of
State would use this information to
ensure that other nations meet their
obligations by registering their foreign
objects. Proper registration of all objects
owned by foreign entities would allow
for the protection of the United States
from liability associated with these
objects.
Otherwise, the FAA would retain the
same informational requirements. It
would continue to require a licensee to
submit information about the space
object’s international designator, the
date and location of the mission, the
general function of the space object, and
the final orbital parameters.
Additionally, proposed § 450.217 would
retain current § 431.85’s requirement
that an operator notify the FAA when it
removes a space object.
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J. Public Safety Responsibility,
Compliance With License, Records,
Financial Responsibility, and Human
Spaceflight Requirements
The FAA is not proposing any
substantive changes to the requirements
specified below. However, the agency is
proposing to consolidate these
requirements into the new, proposed
part 450; clarify that the consolidated
requirements apply to any licensed
launch or reentry; and make other
minor, clarifying edits. The following is
a summary of the proposed changes:
1. Public Safety Responsibility and
Compliance With License
The FAA would consolidate the
public safety responsibility
requirements in current §§ 417.7 and
431.71(a) into proposed § 450.201
(Public Safety Responsibility). Also, the
FAA would move the compliance
requirement in current § 431.71(b) to its
own section, proposed § 450.203,
Compliance with License. Although the
location of these requirements would
change, the requirements themselves
would not change.
Therefore, proposed § 450.201 would
provide that a licensee is responsible for
ensuring public safety and safety of
property during the conduct of a
licensed launch or reentry. Proposed
§ 450.203 (Compliance with License)
would require that a licensee conduct a
licensed launch or reentry in
accordance with representations made
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in its license application, the
requirements of proposed part 450,
subparts C and D, and the terms and
conditions contained in the license.
The proposed requirement for a
licensee to conduct a licensed launch or
reentry in accordance with
representations made in its license
application is the same, in substance, to
§§ 417.11(a) and 431.71(b). Section
417.11(a) states that a launch operator
must conduct a licensed launch and
carry out launch safety procedures in
accordance with its application. Section
431.71(b) states that a licensee must
conduct a licensed RLV mission and
perform RLV safety procedures in
accordance with representations made
in its license application. The fact that
representations made in a license
application become binding on a
licensee is discussed earlier in this
preamble.
The proposed requirement for a
licensee to conduct a licensed launch or
reentry in accordance with the
requirements of proposed part 450,
subparts C and D, is the same, in
substance, to § 417.1(b)(2)’s treatment of
part 417 requirements. Section
417.1(b)(2) states that the safety
requirements of part 417, subparts B
through E, apply to all licensed
launches of expendable launch vehicles.
Part 431 does not have a similar
requirement because application
requirements and safety requirements
are interlinked, leaving uncertain the
actual safety requirements under a
license. Note that in subpart C, the
application requirement paragraphs do
not apply once a license is issued,
unless a licensee applies for a
modification.
The proposed requirement for a
licensee to conduct a licensed launch or
reentry in accordance with the terms
and conditions contained in the license
is the same, in substance, to §§ 415.9(b)
and 431.71(b). Section 415.9(b) states
that a launch license authorizes a
licensee to conduct a launch or
launches subject to the licensee’s
compliance with terms and conditions
contained in license orders
accompanying the license. Section
431.71(b) states that a licensee’s failure
to comply with any license condition is
sufficient basis for the revocation of a
license or other appropriate
enforcement action. The FAA includes
terms and conditions in a license to
address license-specific requirements.
Under the proposal, a licensee’s failure
to act in accordance with these items
would be sufficient basis to revoke a
license, or some other appropriate
enforcement action.
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2. Financial Responsibility
The FAA would consolidate the
current financial responsibility
requirements in §§ 417.21 and 431.81
into proposed § 450.205 (Financial
Responsibility Requirements). Although
the location of the requirements would
change, the requirements themselves
would not change.
As such, the proposed regulation
would require a licensee to comply with
financial responsible requirements as
required by part 440, and as specified in
a license or license order.
3. Human Spaceflight
The FAA would consolidate the
human spaceflight requirements in
current §§ 415.8, 431.8, and 435.8 into
proposed § 450.207 (Human Spaceflight
Requirements). The proposal would
require a licensee conducting a launch
or reentry with a human being on board
the vehicle to comply with human
spaceflight requirements as required by
part 460 of this chapter and as specified
in a license or license order. Although
the location of the requirements would
change, the requirements themselves
would not change.
4. Records
The FAA would consolidate the
current record requirements in
§§ 417.15(a) and (b) and 431.77(a) and
(b) into proposed § 450.219(a) and (b).
However, the FAA would replace the
terms ‘‘launch accident’’ and ‘‘launch
incident’’ in § 417.15(b) and the terms
‘‘launch accident,’’ ‘‘reentry accident,’’
‘‘launch incident,’’ and ‘‘reentry
incident’’ in § 431.77(b) with ‘‘class 1 or
class 2 mishap.’’ As discussed in more
detail earlier in this preamble, the FAA
proposes to replace current part 401
definitions involving ‘‘accident,’’
‘‘incident,’’ and ‘‘mishap’’ with
specified mishap classes.
The proposed regulation would
require an operator to maintain, for 3
years, all records, data, and other
material necessary to verify that a
launch or reentry is conducted in
accordance with representations
contained in the operator’s application,
the requirements of subparts C and D,
and the terms and conditions contained
in the license. To satisfy this
requirement, the FAA expects an
operator to keep a record of the actual
conditions at the time of flight and any
deviations outside of the flight commit
criteria as specified in the current
§ 417.113(c). Similar to current
requirements, in the event of a class 1
or class 2 mishap, an operator would be
required to preserve all records related
to the event until the completion of any
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Federal investigation (which could be
greater than 3 years) and the FAA has
notified the operator that the records
need no longer be retained. The operator
would need to make all records required
to be maintained under the regulations
available to Federal officials for
inspection and copying.
K. Applicability
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1. General
Proposed § 450.1 (Applicability)
would state that part 450 prescribes
requirements for obtaining and
maintaining a license to launch, reenter,
or both launch and reenter, a launch or
reentry vehicle. As discussed
previously, proposed part 450 would
consolidate licensing requirements
currently covered in parts 415, 417, 431,
and 435.
2. Grandfathering
Under proposed § 450.1(b), proposed
part 450 would not apply to any launch
or reentry that an operator elects to
conduct pursuant to a license issued by
the FAA or an application accepted by
the FAA prior to the effective date of
proposed part 450, with two exceptions.
The proposed requirements for collision
avoidance analysis (COLA) and asset
protection would apply to all operators
subject to the FAA’s authority under 51
U.S.C. chapter 509 who are conducting
launches after the effective date of the
new regulations. The FAA would
determine the applicability of proposed
part 450 to an application for a license
modification submitted after the
effective date of the part on a case-bycase basis.
The proposed regulations are more
performance based, and many of the
current requirements would serve as a
means of compliance to meet the
proposed regulations. As a result,
activities authorized under the existing
regulations would be authorized under
the proposed regulations. The FAA
proposes to allow an operator to operate
under the current regulations
(specifically, parts 401, 415, 417, 431,
and 435) when conducting a launch
after the effective date of new part 450
provided it holds a license or has had
a license application accepted prior to
the effective date of this regulation.
Pursuant to Space Policy Directive-3 184
(SPD–3), proposed § 450.169 and
proposed appendix A to part 450 would
align the COLA criteria with current
common practice and provide better
protection for inhabitable and active
orbiting objects. Additionally, § 450.101
184 Space Policy Directive-3, National Space
Traffic Management Policy, 83 FR 28969 (June 21,
2018).
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would require that the probability of
loss of functionality for each critical
asset must not exceed 1 × 10¥3 to
protect national assets. For that reason,
the FAA is proposing that all operators
would be required to comply with these
two provisions on this rule’s effective
date.
Because many of the current
regulations would serve as a means of
compliance for the proposed
regulations, the FAA would review
license modifications that applied the
current regulations as means of
demonstrating compliance with the
proposed regulations. Additionally, an
operator could use a means of
compliance other than the current
regulations to demonstrate compliance
in a license modification request. The
FAA would determine the applicability
of proposed part 450 to an application
for a license modification submitted
after the effective date of the part on a
case-by-case basis. The FAA does not
anticipate that a vehicle operator would
have any greater difficulty meeting the
requirements under the proposed
regulations than under the existing
regulations. In fact, the FAA believes
that the proposed regulations are more
flexible because most allow for many
different means of compliance.
An applicant for a renewal would be
required to meet all the requirements of
proposed part 450. The FAA anticipates
that this would not be burdensome for
operators seeking license renewals
because there would be few, if any,
additional application requirements that
could not be fulfilled by reference to
previously submitted information.
L. Equivalent Level of Safety
In addition to developing
performance-based requirements, this
proposal would preserve the equivalentlevel-of-safety flexibility by relocating
the provision to proposed § 450.37.
Unlike using a means of compliance,
which requires demonstration of
compliance with a performance-based
regulation, the ELOS provision would
continue to allow an applicant to
propose an alternative method to meet
the safety intent of a current regulatory
requirement. For example,
§ 450.117(d)(3) would require
representative normal flight trajectory
analysis outputs for each one second of
flight. An applicant may wish to request
an ELOS determination to the onesecond interval, and the FAA would
likely accept it if an alternative interval
provides smooth and continuous
individual PC contours.
To demonstrate equivalent level of
safety, an operator would provide a
clear and convincing demonstration,
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through technical rationale, that the
proposed alternative approach provided
a level of safety equivalent to the
requirement it would replace. An ELOS
determination means an approximately
equal level of safety as determined by
qualitative or quantitative means. Under
§ 450.37(b), an operator would not be
able to use an ELOS determination to
replace the public risk criteria set forth
in § 450.101.
In 2018, the FAA issued a final rule
that expanded the option to satisfy
commercial space transportation
requirements by demonstrating an
equivalent level of safety in order to
provide more choice to operators and
reduce the number of waivers that must
be prepared by industry and processed
by the government.185 To utilize the
option, operators are required to
demonstrate that they are achieving a
level of safety equivalent to any safety
parameters specified in the regulations.
The FAA evaluates every request for an
alternative means of regulatory
compliance under the ELOS provisions
to ensure that the safety of the public,
property, or any national security or
foreign policy interest of the United
States is maintained to be consistent
with the requirements in 14 CFR
chapter III. The FAA would preserve the
process established in the 2018
rulemaking, and would include its
ELOS determination as part of any
license issued applying this provision.
The FAA requests comment on the
potential use of ‘‘safety cases’’ when
demonstrating an equivalent level of
safety under proposed § 450.37. A safety
case is a structured argument, supported
by a body of evidence that provides a
compelling, comprehensive, and valid
case that a system is safe, for a given
application in a given environment.186
The ARC report (at p. 25) suggested that
FAA review time could be minimize if
applicant submittals were ‘‘structured as
a reasonable safety case that the
proposed actions are safe under all
plausible scenarios.’’ In fact, the ARC
suggested ‘‘safety cases’’ could be useful
options several times. With respect to
the proposed regulation, a safety case
would potentially show that certain
requirements identified by the
applicant, excluding the requirements of
§ 450.101, need not be complied with
per se in order to demonstrate that an
alternative approach provides an
equivalent level of safety to the
185 Updates to Rulemaking and Waiver
Procedures and Expansion of the Equivalent Level
of Safety Option, Final Rule, 83 FR 28528 (June 20,
2018).
186 This Safety Case definition is from the U.K.
Ministry of Defence (MOD) Standard 00–56, ‘‘Safety
Management Requirements for Defence Systems.’’
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requirements identified by the
applicant.
A–P–T Research, Inc., under contract
to the FAA, recommended the use of a
safety case approach as an alternate path
to securing a license.187 The FAA
considered proposing a safety case
approach to demonstrating an
equivalent level of safety under
proposed § 450.37 that would include a
formal proposal process that must use a
means of compliance accepted by the
Administrator, unless the Administrator
determines otherwise based on
predicted public risks and
consequences, or demonstrated
reliability. The formal proposal process
would: (1) Facilitate an FAA audit of all
risk management methods proposed for
use, including a demonstration of how
the proposed methods can demonstrate
compliance with § 450.101; (2)
implement all the recommended
improvements from the audit or justify
all deviations from the recommended
improvements; (3) document the risk
management methods used and the
verification evidence to demonstrate
compliance with § 450.101; (4) facilitate
an audit by an FAA-approved third
party of the risk management methods
used and the verification evidence to
demonstrate compliance with § 450.101;
and (5) submit the results of the third
party audit for FAA review and
approval. An applicant that sought to
use this safety case approach would
need to submit: (1) A description of
their plan to facilitate an FAA audit of
all risk management methods proposed
for use, including a demonstration of
how the proposed methods can
demonstrate compliance with § 450.101;
(2) a description of the improvements
implemented based on the FAA audit
and detailed justifications for any
deviations from the FAA recommended
improvements; (3) a description of the
risk management methods used and the
verification evidence to demonstrate
compliance with § 450.101; (4) an
agreement to facilitate an audit by an
FAA-approved third party of the risk
management methods used and the
verification evidence to demonstrate
compliance with § 450.101; and (5) a
description of the results of the third
party audit. The safety case approach
recommended by APT included the use
of a third party to review. The FAA sees
potential complications, including
liability considerations, when involving
a third party in the licensing process.
The FAA seeks comments on the
potential usefulness and challenges
187 A–P–T Research, Inc. ‘‘A New Path to Launch
Licenses,’’ Doc. No. CDSP–FL004–18–00402
(October 16, 2018).
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associated with a safety case approach,
whether or not a third party would be
involved.
Additional Technical Justification and
Rationale
The sections below provide detailed
discussions of flight safety analyses and
software safety. Additionally, this
section discusses the numerous
conforming changes the FAA proposes
to the existing regulations in order to
implement the proposed regulations.
A. Flight Safety Analyses
As discussed earlier, for purposes of
this proposed rule, an FSA consists of
a set of quantitative analyses used to
determine flight commit criteria, flight
abort rules, flight hazard areas, and
other mitigation measures, and to verify
compliance with the public safety
criteria in proposed § 450.101. The FAA
proposes 15 sections for flight safety
analysis, as discussed below.
1. Scope and Applicability
Proposed § 450.113 establishes the
portions of flight for which an operator
would be required to perform and
document an FSA, and would describe
the analyses required for each type of
operation. The portion of flight
governed by the public safety criteria is
central to the scope of the FSA.
The current scope of FSA regulations
is laid out in §§ 417.201 and 417.107(b)
for ELVs. Specifically, § 417.107(b)(1)
currently requires that FSAs quantify
the collective risks from lift-off through
orbital insertion for orbital launches and
from lift-off to final impact for
suborbital launches. Unfortunately,
§ 417.107(b)(2) does not clearly specify
the portion of flight for which an FSA
must quantify the individual risks. In
practice, the FAA has reconciled this
vagueness by requiring the same scope
for both collective and individual risks:
From lift-off through orbital insertion
for orbital launches and from lift-off to
final impact for suborbital launches.
It is also unclear in current
regulations what portions of flight the
FSA needs to cover for RLVs. Section
431.35(b)(1) simply states that the
collective public risk limit applies to
each proposed reentry, but does not
speak specifically to beginning and end
of the period of flight that an FSA must
analyze. Reentry means to return or
attempt to return, purposefully, a
reentry vehicle from earth orbit or from
outer space to Earth.188 Reentry
includes activities conducted in Earth
orbit or outer space to determine reentry
readiness and that are critical to
188 14
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ensuring public health and safety and
the safety of property during reentry
flight. The definition also includes
activities conducted on the ground after
vehicle landing on Earth to ensure the
vehicle does not pose a threat to public
health and safety or the safety of
property. In practice, the FAA has
required public risk assessments to
begin at the final health check prior to
initiation of de-orbit burn and ending
when flight stops, such as splashdown
for a capsule.
Further, for both ELVs and RLVs, the
current regulations do not expressly
address the potential public safety
hazards caused by the disposal of a
launch vehicle stage or component from
orbit. That is, §§ 417.107(b) and
431.35(b)(1), in addressing the public
risk criteria, do not specifically address
the disposal of launch vehicle stages or
components. As discussed earlier, such
vehicle disposals have become more
common in recent years, reflecting the
elevated priority put on orbital debris
mitigation. The FAA explained in the
2016 final rule 189 that when the FAA
requires that the quantitative risk
analysis account for the planned impact
of a first stage (or any stage) jettisoned
prior to orbital insertion, it includes
accounting for stage impacts regardless
of whether the actual impact occurs
before or after orbital insertion.
For reentry, proposed §§ 450.101(b)
and 450.113(a)(4) would clarify and
reduce the period FSAs must analyze
when quantifying the public risks posed
by reentry operations. The proposal
would clarify that post-flight operations
are not included in the safety analyses
necessary to quantify the public risks
posed by reentry operations. In § 401.5,
the FAA proposes to include a
definition for deorbit that clarifies that
deorbit begins with the final command
to commit the vehicle to a perigee below
70 nautical miles, approximately 130
km, and ends when all vehicle
components come to rest on the Earth.
Proposed § 450.113 replaces § 417.201
to clarify the scope and applicability of
FSAs. In proposed § 450.113(a)(1), an
operator would be required to perform
and document an FSA for orbital
launch, from lift-off through orbital
insertion,190 including any component
or stage landings. In proposed
§ 450.113(a)(2), an operator would be
189 Changing the Collective Risk Limits for
Launches and Reentries and Clarifying the Risk
Limit Used to Establish Hazard Areas for Ships and
Aircraft, Final Rule. 81 FR 47017 (July 20, 2016).
190 The FAA proposes orbital insertion to mean
the point at which a vehicle achieves a minimum
70-nautical mile perigee based on a computation
that accounts for drag. This adopts the definition of
orbital insertion in RCC 321–17 Standard.
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required to perform and document an
FSA for suborbital launch, from lift-off
through final impact. In proposed
§ 450.113(a)(3), the FAA clarifies the
scope of disposal FSA that would be
necessary to demonstrate compliance
with the disposal safety criteria in
proposed § 450.101(d). Specifically, for
disposal, an FSA would span from the
beginning of the deorbit burn through
final impact.
Proposed § 450.113(a)(4) would
require an operator to perform and
document an FSA for reentry, from the
beginning of the deorbit burn through
landing. The proposal is consistent with
current practice, but would clarify that
post-landing activities are not included
in the FSA.
Proposed § 450.113(a)(5) would
explicitly address hybrid vehicles,
which include air-launch rockets
released from carrier aircraft such as the
Pegasus rocket carried by a modified L–
1011 airliner. The proposal would
clarify that FSAs generally apply to
hybrid vehicles, for all phases of flight
unless the Administrator determines
otherwise based on demonstrated
reliability. Thus, the proposal would
enable an operator of a hybrid vehicle
with a high level of demonstrated
reliability for the entire flight or for a
phase of flight, to be exempt from
performing some FSAs without seeking
a waiver for the flight or phase of flight.
Demonstrated reliability refers to
statistically valid probability of failure
estimates based on the outcomes of all
previous flights of the vehicle or stage.
For example, if an applicant seeks to
operate a hybrid vehicle that features an
air-launch rocket released from a carrier
aircraft with minimal modification from
the original design certified as a
commercial transport aircraft, the FAA
would find certain FSAs not applicable
if empirical data sufficiently showed
that the demonstrated reliability and
estimated public risks of the system are
equivalent to general aviation aircraft
during a given phase of flight.
Specifically, the FAA foresees that such
an applicant could be exempt from
some of the normal flight trajectory
analysis requirements during the
captive carry phases of flight if the
applicant could demonstrate
compliance with the public safety
criteria in proposed § 450.101 without
the benefit of some of the normal flight
trajectory analysis outputs.
Proposed § 450.113(b) would identify
the specific FSA actions applicable to
all launch and reentry vehicles (in
paragraph (b)(1)), a launch or reentry
vehicle that relies on an FSS to comply
with proposed § 450.101 (in paragraph
(b)(2)), and launch of an unguided
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suborbital launch vehicle (in paragraph
(b)(3)).
2. Flight Safety Analysis Methods
Proposed § 450.115 (Flight Safety
Analysis Methods) would set the
methodology requirements for FSAs.
This section would replace the
prescriptive requirements currently in
§ 417.203 and appendices A, B, C and I
to part 417. Currently, § 417.203(a)
requires that FSAs meet the
requirements for methods of analysis
contained in appendices A (section
A417) and B (section B417) to part 417
for a launch vehicle flown with an FSS,
and appendices B and C (section C417)
for an unguided suborbital launch
vehicle that uses a wind-weighting
safety system. Specifically, section A417
provides prescriptive requirements on
the FSA methodologies and products for
a launch vehicle flown with an FSS.
Section B417 provides prescriptive
requirements on the FSA for hazard area
analyses for ship and aircraft protection.
Section C417 provides prescriptive
requirements on the FSA methodologies
and products for a launch vehicle flown
with a wind weighting safety system.
Section 417.203(b) specifically lists
the broad categories of approved
methods of analysis while § 417.203(c)
addresses requirements for alternate
analysis methods. Section 417.203(c)
currently requires that an alternate FSA
method be based on accurate data and
scientific principles, and is statistically
valid. In practice, the FAA has
evaluated the validity of an applicant’s
proposed methods by comparing the
results to valid benchmarks such as data
from mishaps, test, or validated highfidelity methods. Section 417.203(e)
requires that a launch operator
demonstrate to the FAA compliance
with the requirements of part 417,
subpart C. In its application, a launch
operator must include the analysis
products required by parts 415, subpart
F, 417, subpart A, and appendices A, B,
C, and I, depending on whether the
launch vehicle uses an FSS or a windweighting safety system.
Pursuant to § 431.35(c), the FSA for
an RLV is required to account for any
reasonably foreseeable hazardous event
and safety-critical system failures
during launch flight or reentry that
could result in a casualty to the public.
However, part 431 does not include
requirements for the methods used to
provide an FSA, thus providing no
standards for evaluating an FSA’s
validity or level of fidelity. The part 431
license applications approved by the
FAA included FSA methodologies and
products comparable to those in 417
license applications.
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Proposed § 450.115(a) sets the scope
for FSA methods. This section would
not materially change the scope of the
FSA methods under current parts 417
and 431, which account for the risk to
the public from hazards associated with
normal and malfunctioning vehicle
flight in accordance to § 417.205(a).
However, proposed § 450.115(a) would
add language currently not expressly
provided in § 417.205(a) that would
require an operator’s FSA method to
account for all reasonably foreseeable
events and failure of safety-critical
systems. This language is consistent
with the current requirement in
§ 431.35(c) to account for any
reasonably foreseeable hazardous event,
and safety-critical system failures
during launch flight or reentry that
could result in a casualty to the public.
Proposed § 450.115(b) would establish
the level of fidelity for FSAs.
Specifically, it would require a level of
fidelity sufficient to demonstrate that
any risk to the public would satisfy the
public risk criteria of proposed
§ 450.101, including the use of
mitigations, accounting for all known
sources of uncertainty, using a means of
compliance accepted by the
Administrator. It would also require that
the analysis identify the dominant
source of each type of public risk with
a criterion in proposed § 450.101(a) or
(b) in terms of phase of flight, source of
hazard (such as toxic exposure, inert, or
explosive debris), and vehicle response
mode. Thus, this proposed rule would
provide performance targets instead of
the current part 417 approach that
mandates a single level of fidelity
equivalent to methods that comply with
the extensive requirements given in the
appendices of part 417.
The requirements in proposed
§ 450.115(b) would account for all
known sources of uncertainty and
identify the dominant sources of risk.
The proposal would be consistent with
the best practices of other regulatory
agencies that use quantitative risk
analyses as part of a risk management
approach to ensure public safety. The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
which has a long history of
performance-based regulations with
quantitative risk analyses to ensure
public safety, has a long-standing policy
to ensure that the quantitative
techniques used for regulatory decisionmaking take into account the potential
uncertainties that exist so that an
estimate can be made on the confidence
level to be ascribed to the quantitative
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results.191 The NRC has also found that,
through use of quantitative techniques,
important uncertainties have been, and
continue to be, brought into better focus
and may even be reduced as compared
to those that would remain with sole
reliance on deterministic decisionmaking. The NRC found that direct lack
of severe accident experience makes it
necessary that proper attention be given
not only to the range of uncertainty
surrounding probabilistic estimates, but
also to the phenomenology that most
influences the uncertainties. In other
words, the NRC found the need to
identify the dominant sources of public
risks and their uncertainties when using
quantitative risk analyses to ensure
public safety.192
The FAA would require that operators
use a means of compliance accepted by
the Administrator for FSA methods. The
FAA plans to publish a draft version of
that AC concurrently with this NPRM.
An important aspect of that AC is the
use of approaches generally consistent
with the consensus U.S. Government
standards on launch and reentry risk
assessments (e.g., RCC 321). The RCC
321 Standard (paragraph 2.4) recognizes
that there is significant uncertainty in
the computed risks of rocket launches
and notes that confidence bounds of 90
percent describing the uncertainty in
the computed risk can span multiple
orders of magnitude. Thus, the
consensus U.S. Government standards
on launch and reentry risk assessments
contains a policy statement that
uncertainty cannot be ignored. The RCC
321 Supplement further concurred with
several statements originally made by
the NRC, including the following three:
(1) The use of mean estimates does not,
however, resolve the need to quantify
(to the extent reasonable) and
understand those important
uncertainties involved in risk
predictions; (2) sensitivity studies
should be performed to determine those
uncertainties most important to the
probabilistic estimates; and (3) the
results of sensitivity studies should be
displayed showing, for example, the
range of variation together with the
underlying science or engineering
assumptions that dominate this
variation. Even so, the RCC went on to
conclude that a formal uncertainty
191 Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Nuclear
Regulatory Safety Policy Goals. 51 FR 28044
(August 21, 1986).
192 The Department of the Interior (DOI), Bureau
of Reclamation, uses risk criteria for achieving
public protection in dam safety decision-making in
a manner consistent with this proposed rule.
Specifically, the DOI uses mean values calculated
from Monte Carlo or similar analyses that include
explicit treatment of input uncertainty.
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analysis may not be necessary under
conditions where the best mean
estimate of the public risk is low
relative to the collective risk criterion.
For this rulemaking, the FAA
considered adopting an approach to the
treatment of uncertainty following RCC
321 Standard and Supplement. The
FAA requests comment on whether this
treatment of uncertainty is reasonable.
Specifically, the FAA solicits input on
the process whereby the uncertainty
does not have to be considered if the
computed risk is less than one-third of
the primary aggregated collective risk
criterion.193 Current Air Force practice
is to include implementation of
measures to improve risk analyses to
reduce the level of uncertainty when the
predicted risks exceed 3 × 10¥5 EC.
Examples of that could include refined
input data or a higher-fidelity method
for the risk computations.
Similarly, if the estimated risk level
exceeds 3 × 10¥5 EC, the RCC 321
Standard states that the range should
compute the uncertainty to ensure that
a launch is not allowed that would
violate the criterion based on best
estimates that account for uncertainty.
There are published examples of
uncertainty analyses for launch risks
that explicitly account for uncertainties
associated with the input data (e.g., the
probability of failure associated with a
given break-up state vector), and biases
and uncertainties in key sub-models
(e.g., the sub-model used to compute the
PC given an impact with a given piece
of debris on a specific structure type).
However, the end effect of the RCC 321
Standard approach to uncertainty
treatment is that a range or range user
could continue operating under current
practice, using their current tools
without formal uncertainty
quantification for missions with a
collective risk no greater than 3 × 10¥5
EC. Under the RCC approach, only
missions that pose collective risks above
3 × 10¥5 EC based on point estimates
would be required to perform formal
uncertainty quantification. The FAA
requests comment on whether the
current approaches to uncertainty
treatment employed by the RCC or the
Air Force are viable in the FAA’s
regulatory framework. The FAA further
requests comments on any currently
193 The choice of one-third was consistent with
the recommendation in AFSPCMAN 91–710 Vol.1,
1 July 2004. Attachment 5 states that if risk to all
individuals from a single hazard exceeds an EC of
30 × 10¥6, a range user may have to take additional
measures to protect personnel and resources.
Examples include to fix, correct, or improve
existing non-compliances, improve risk analyses to
reduce the level of uncertainty, require a day-oflaunch risk analysis, or establish disaster aversion
criteria.
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available approaches to address
uncertainties in public risk assessments,
including the approach identified in the
draft means of compliance on
uncertainty and level of fidelity in FSA
methods.
Proposed § 450.115(b) would require
that an operator account for all known
sources of uncertainty in various FSAs.
The FAA intends to ensure that FSA
methods account for known sources of
aleatory (random) uncertainties that are
the result of inherently random
processes. An example of aleatory
uncertainty is the influence of
prevailing weather conditions on the
results of collective and individual risk
analyses for launch or reentry. The true
EC is often highly influenced by the
prevailing weather conditions during
the proposed operation. The uncertainty
in the true EC due to weather conditions
is substantial for a typical baseline risk
analysis that accounts for the
foreseeable weather conditions in a
given month based upon historical data
and assumes that an operation is equally
feasible under any of those likely
weather conditions given all the safety
and mission assurance constraints. For
example, most vehicles would not
attempt to fly through certain wind
conditions due to the potential for the
vehicle to break up or veer off-course,
leading to a violation of safety or
mission assurance constraints. The
uncertainty in the true EC for a day-oflaunch risk analysis is much smaller,
but the uncertainty in any forecast or
measured weather input data will still
produce some uncertainty in the EC due
to measurement errors and variability in
the weather measurements and
forecasts. There are several other
potentially important sources of aleatory
uncertainty in an EC analysis, and there
are various valid approaches to account
for these aleatory uncertainties. This
proposed rule would require that
aleatory uncertainties are accounted for,
including known sources of randomness
in critical input data. These would
include normal and malfunction
trajectories, weather conditions,
population and sheltering
characteristics (e.g., between day and
night), velocities induced during breakup, aerodynamic properties of the
vehicle and debris, any yield from an
explosive impact, and the amount of
debris that burns up due to aero-thermal
heating during re-entry.
Proposed § 450.115(c) would establish
application requirements for methods of
analysis. Specifically, the proposed rule
would require that an applicant submit
a description of the FSA methodology
for each launch or reentry approved by
the FAA, including identification of the
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scientific principles and statistical
methods used, and all assumptions and
their justifications. However, if the FAA
determines that the range’s FSA
methods meets FAA safety
requirements, then the operator would
not be required to provide the FAA with
a description of the FSA methodology.
Also, an applicant would be required to
include the rationale for the level of
fidelity, the evidence for validation and
verification required by proposed
§ 450.101(g), the extent that the
benchmark conditions are comparable
to the foreseeable conditions of the
intended operations, and the extent the
analyses accounted for risk mitigations.
The FAA intends for assumptions to be
justified using logic, historical flight
experience data, relevant test data, and
the results from physics-based
simulations.
3. Trajectory Analysis for Normal Flight
The FAA proposes a single regulation
governing an FSA for normal
trajectories, applicable to all launch and
reentry vehicles, in proposed § 450.117
(Trajectory Analysis for Normal Flight).
The provision would distinguish
between variability in the intended
trajectory and uncertainties due to
random sources of dispersion such as
winds and vehicle performance. It
would also clarify application
requirements.
All the FSAs depend on some form of
analysis of the trajectory under normal
conditions, otherwise known as a
normal trajectory. That is, one must first
understand a vehicle’s trajectory when
it performs as intended and under
normal conditions before one can
determine the effects of malfunctions
along its flight path.
Current regulations for normal
trajectory analyses are found in
§§ 417.207 and 431.35(d) and appendix
A to part 417. Section 417.207 sets the
current trajectory analysis requirements
for ELVs. Section 417.207(a)(1) requires
an analysis that establishes the limits of
a launch vehicle’s normal flight, as
defined by the normal trajectory and
potential three-sigma trajectory
dispersions about the normal trajectory
for any time after lift-off. Although this
requirement is generally clear, the
uncertainties the analysis must consider
could be clearer. For example, the
current requirement does not
distinguish between inherently random
uncertainties that could cause the actual
trajectory to differ from the nominal
trajectory, and variability in the known
conditions immediately prior to the
initiation of the operation (e.g., weather
conditions at the time of the launch or
the time into a launch window that the
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launch occurs for a rendezvous
mission).
In terms of current RLV regulations in
part 431, they describe flight trajectory
analyses requirements in a single
paragraph in § 431.35(d)(8). Specifically,
the FAA requires that applicants
provide flight trajectory analyses
covering launch or ascent of the vehicle
through orbital insertion and reentry or
descent of the vehicle through landing,
including its three-sigma dispersion.
This regulation is silent as to the
specific uncertainties for which the
analysis must account. In practice, part
431 license applicants have provided
normal trajectory data consistent with
the part 417 regulations.
Proposed § 450.117 would retain the
substantive normal trajectory analysis
requirements currently in § 417.207 and
the definitions of key terms such as
‘‘normal flight’’ and ‘‘normal trajectory.’’
Proposed § 450.117(a)(1) would require
a trajectory analysis that establishes the
limits of a vehicles normal flight. The
proposal would retain the requirement
in § 417.207(a)(1) to establish a nominal
trajectory where the vehicle performs as
designed without any deviation due to
winds, propulsion performance, or mass
properties but would add clarity about
the sources of uncertainty that a
trajectory analysis must account for by
distinguishing between variability and
random uncertainty.
Specifically, the proposal would
expressly require a trajectory analysis to
establish two separate sets of trajectories
to characterize distinct sources of
uncertainty, including variability and
random uncertainty. One set of normal
trajectories in § 450.117(a)(1)(ii) would
characterize the uncertainty during
normal flight due to random deviations
from ideal conditions, such as wind
conditions, vehicle mass, and
performance characteristics. Another set
of normal trajectories in
§ 450.117(a)(1)(i) would characterize
how the intended trajectory could vary
due to conditions known prior to
initiation of flight. An example of
variability is how the intended
trajectory would change due to different
times for lift-off within a launch
window that lasts several minutes for a
mission with an orbital rendezvous as
the primary objective. Another example
of variability is how the intended
trajectory would change due to wind
conditions. In such cases, the nominal
trajectory represents the most likely liftoff time. An FSA must distinguish
between variability and random
uncertainty in the normal trajectory in
order to demonstrate that the criteria in
proposed § 450.101 would be satisfied at
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any time the operator intends to initiate
launch or re-entry flight.
Section 450.117(a)(2) would require a
fuel exhaustion trajectory that produces
instantaneous impact points with the
greatest range for any given time after
liftoff for any stage that has the potential
to impact the Earth and does not burn
to propellant depletion before a
programmed thrust termination. This is
the same as current § 417.207(a)(2). The
FAA is unaware of any challenges with
the current regulation regarding a fuel
exhaustion trajectory.
For vehicles with an FSS, proposed
§ 450.117(a)(3) would establish a new
requirement for trajectory data or
parameters that describe the limits of a
useful mission. The FAA proposes in
§ 401.5 to define the ‘‘limits of a useful
mission’’ as the trajectory data or other
parameters that describes the limits of a
mission that can attain the primary
objective, including but not limited to
flight azimuth limits. Thus, the proposal
would require an operator to establish
the limits of a useful mission based on
the values of trajectory parameters
necessary to attain the primary mission
objective, including flight azimuth
limits. Note that the azimuth limit data
is currently required by the Air Force in
Air Force Space Command Manual
(AFSPCMAN) 91–710 Vol. 2. The limits
of a useful mission are essential input
data for the flight safety limits analysis,
and for an evaluation of whether a
vehicle should be allowed to pass
through a gate, as discussed later in this
preamble.
Proposed § 450.117(b) would require a
final trajectory analysis to use a sixdegree of freedom trajectory model, and
proposed § 450.117(c) would require a
trajectory analysis to account for all
wind effects, including profiles of winds
that are no less severe than the worst
wind conditions under which flight
might be attempted, and for uncertainty
in the wind conditions. These are
similar to § 417.207(b) and (c),
respectively.
Proposed § 450.117(d) would provide
application requirements for trajectory
analyses that address the proposed
methodology, input data, and output
data. In paragraph (d)(1), an applicant
would be required to describe the
methodology used to characterize
normal flight and the limits of a useful
mission, including the scientific
principles and statistical methods used,
all assumptions and their justifications,
the rationale for the level of fidelity of
the methods, and the evidence for
validation and verification that would
be required by proposed § 450.101(g). In
paragraph (d)(2), the FAA proposes to
require that the applicant describe the
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input data used in normal trajectory
analyses and provides a list of the
minimum input data an applicant must
describe. In paragraph (d)(3), the FAA
proposes to require that an applicant
describe a representative normal
trajectory analysis outputs (e.g.,
position, velocity, and vacuum
instantaneous impact point) for each
second of flight for (1) the nominal
trajectory, (2) a fuel exhaustion
trajectory under otherwise nominal
conditions, (3) a set of trajectories that
characterize variability in the intended
trajectory based on conditions known
prior to initiation of flight, (4) a set of
trajectories that characterize how the
actual trajectory could differ from the
intended trajectory due to random
uncertainties, and (5) a set of trajectories
that characterize the limits of a useful
mission as described in proposed
§ 450.117(a). The proposed application
requirements provide regulatory clarity
regarding the normal trajectory
characterization necessary to ensure
compliance with proposed § 450.101.
Note that in this proposed section,
and other proposed flight safety analysis
application requirements, the FAA
requires representative data. This allows
the FAA to evaluate an applicant’s
methodologies. Representative data
should be the best, meaning the most
realistic, data available given the
intended flight parameters.
The applicant would also be required
to submit additional products that allow
the FAA to conduct an independent
analysis, if requested by the
Administrator. This same application
requirement would also be in proposed
§§ 450.119 through 450.141. At times,
the FAA conducts independent flight
safety analyses which usually require
additional information than is normally
required of an applicant. Instead of
attempting to list out what is needed for
every independent analysis, which is
usually case-specific, the FAA proposes
to simply state that more information
may be necessary. The FAA’s conduct of
an independent analysis is usually
reserved for new vehicle concepts, new
analysis methods, or proposals that
involve unique public safety issues.
4. Trajectory Analysis for Malfunction
Flight
Proposed § 450.119 (Trajectory
Analysis for Malfunction Flight) would
consolidate trajectory analysis
requirements for all launch and reentry
vehicles. In consolidating, the FAA
would also update its requirements to
reflect advancements in trajectory
analysis capabilities and clarify
application requirements. A
malfunction trajectory analysis is
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necessary to determine how far a
vehicle can deviate from its normal
flight path in case of a malfunction. This
analysis helps determine impact points
in case of a malfunction and is therefore
a vital input for the analyses needed to
demonstrate compliance with risk
criteria. The FAA’s current regulations
covering trajectory analyses in case of
malfunction are in § 417.209
(Malfunction turn analysis), appendix A
to part 417, and § 431.35(d)(8).
Current § 417.209 sets forth the
trajectory analysis requirements in case
of a malfunction applicable to ELVs.
Section 417.209(a)(1) requires a
trajectory analysis to establish the
launch vehicle’s turning capability in
the event of a malfunction during flight
using a set of turn curves. Appendix A
to part 417 (section A417.9) also
provides more detailed and prescriptive
requirements for analyzing ‘‘turn
curves.’’ Turn curve data offered a
reasonable way to simulate failures that
produce trajectory departures,
particularly in response to thrust offsets
when computational limitations made it
impractical to perform six degrees of
freedom (6–DOF) simulations of
malfunction trajectories.
In the past, turn curves produced a
reasonable way to model the classic
cornus spiral behavior associated with a
constant thrust offset or nozzle burnthrough. Thus, § 417.209(b) requires a
set of turn curves to establish the launch
vehicle velocity vector turn angle from
the nominal launch vehicle velocity
vector, and to establish the vehicle
velocity turn magnitude from the
nominal velocity magnitude. There are
two fundamental types of malfunction
turn curves: (1) One that shows how the
magnitude velocity changes during the
turn; and (2) the other for the direction
of the velocity. Given advancements in
computational capabilities, the use of
turn curves as mandated by the current
regulations constitutes an outdated and
unnecessarily simplified analysis
technique. For instance, through current
computational capabilities, particularly
the prevalence of 6–DOF trajectory
models, it is generally more efficient
and more accurate for an applicant to
provide sets of Monte Carlo trajectories
that characterize a given type of
malfunction, even for the thrust vector
offsets and nozzle burn-through, than to
provide turn curve data.
The current RLV regulations in part
431 do not explicitly address
malfunction trajectory analyses. Section
431.35(d)(8) describes flight trajectory
analysis requirements in a single
paragraph. It requires that applicants
provide flight trajectory analyses
covering launch or ascent of the vehicle
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through orbital insertion and reentry or
descent of the vehicle through landing,
including its three-sigma dispersion. In
practice, part 431 license applicants
have provided malfunction trajectory
analyses consistent with the part 417
regulations. However, the lack of clarity
regarding the malfunction trajectory
analysis requirements and ensuing
discussions between the FAA and
operators has resulted in inefficiencies
and delays in the licensing process.
Proposed § 450.119 would consolidate
all trajectory analysis requirements for a
malfunctioning flight which would be
applicable to any launch or reentry
vehicle. Based on the noted
advancements in computational
capabilities that have rendered the
current use of turn curves outdated and
over simplistic, the FAA proposes to
remove the § 417.209(b) requirements
related to turn curves in favor of more
modern Monte Carlo methods. Proposed
§ 450.119(b) would provide
performance-based requirements
regarding what a malfunction trajectory
analysis must account for, including
applicable times in flight and valid
trajectory time intervals. Specifically,
the proposal would require the analysis
to account for (1) all trajectory times
during the thrusting phases or when the
lift vector is controlled during flight, (2)
the duration starting when a
malfunction begins to cause each flight
deviation throughout the thrusting
phases of flight, and (3) trajectory time
intervals between malfunction turn start
times that are sufficient to establish
flight safety limits, if any, and
individual risk contours that are smooth
and continuous. The proposal would
retain in § 450.119(b)(4) the
performance-based requirement
currently in § 417.209(a)(3) to establish
the relative probability of occurrence of
each malfunction turn of which the
vehicle is capable. In proposed
§ 450.119(b)(5), the analysis would also
have to account for the probability
distribution of position and velocity of
the vehicle when each malfunction will
terminate due to vehicle breakup, along
with the cause of termination and the
state of the vehicle.194 Finally, in
proposed § 450.119(b)(6), the analysis
would establish the vehicle’s flight
behavior from the time when a
malfunction begins to cause a flight
deviation until ground impact or
predicted structural failure, with
trajectory time intervals that are
194 The proposed § 450.119(b)(5) requirement
would be equivalent to the § 417.209(a)(4) through
(9) requirements. Under § 417.209, the FAA
prescribed the use of ‘‘turn curves’’ that were a
particular way to compute the position and velocity
at the end of a malfunction trajectory.
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sufficient to establish individual risk
contours that are smooth and
continuous.
Finally, proposed § 450.119(c) would
provide application requirements for
malfunction trajectory analyses that
address the proposed methodology,
input data, and output data. An
applicant would be required to describe
the methodology used to characterize
malfunction flight including the same
elements required for the normal
trajectory analyses. The FAA proposes
to require that an applicant describe the
input data used in malfunction
trajectory analyses and provides a list of
the minimum data an applicant must
describe. The FAA also proposes to
require that an applicant describe
representative malfunction trajectory
analysis outputs (e.g., position, velocity,
and vacuum instantaneous impact
point) for each second of flight and for
the probability of each trajectory that
characterizes a type of malfunction
flight. Finally, the FAA may also request
additional products to conduct an
independent analysis. These proposed
application requirements are consistent
or less burdensome than current
requirements.
5. Debris Analysis
Proposed § 450.121 (Debris Analysis)
would set the requirements for debris
analysis by revising current
requirements in § 417.211 (Debris
analysis), accounting for part 431
practices not fully expressed in the
regulatory language, consolidating
requirements from § 417.107 (Flight
Safety), and removing overly
prescriptive and burdensome
requirements from Appendix A to part
417.
Under § 417.211(a), a debris analysis
must identify the inert, explosive, and
other hazardous vehicle debris that
results from normal and malfunctioning
flight. Section 417.211(b) specifies that
a debris analysis must account for
various causes of a launch vehicle
breakup. This analysis includes debris
from any flight termination system
activation, launch vehicle explosion,
aerodynamic loads, inertial loads,
atmospheric reentry heating, and impact
of an intact vehicle. Section 417.211(c)
asks for a list of debris fragments for
each cause of breakup and any planned
jettison of debris, launch vehicle
components, or payload. Also,
§ 417.107(c) contains debris threshold
requirements for debris analysis and
appendix A to part 417 (section
A417.11) provides detailed direction on
the debris analysis constraints, debris
models, and other debris analysis
products.
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Although part 431 does not expressly
ask for a debris analysis, the FAA has
deemed § 431.35(b) to require one,
applying the same standards as those in
part 417. However, this lack of
regulatory specificity in part 431 has led
to longer pre-application consultation
periods as the FAA and operators
worked to ascertain the applicable
requirements.
Proposed § 450.121 would provide
performance-based regulations
regarding the level of fidelity required
for key elements of a valid debris
analysis. Proposed § 450.121(a) would
include a debris analysis that
characterizes the debris generated for
each foreseeable vehicle response mode
as a function of vehicle flight time,
accounting for the effects of fuel burn
and any configuration changes.
The FAA proposes to add the
references to fuel burn and
configuration changes that are absent
from current part 417 because an
operator’s debris list will change over
time with variations to the amount of
available propellant and with the
jettisoning of hardware.
Proposed § 450.121(b) would require
that the debris analysis account for each
foreseeable cause of vehicle breakup,
including any breakup caused by an
FSS activation or by impact of an intact
vehicle. This proposal would include
debris from a vehicle’s jettisoned
components and payloads because such
debris could cause a casualty due to
impact with an aircraft or waterborne
vessel or could pose a toxic or fire
hazard. This proposal is consistent with
the ARC recommendation to develop a
process for a debris catalogue.
Foreseeable causes of vehicle breakup
would include engine or motor
explosion, or exceeding structural limits
due to aerodynamic loads, inertial
loads, or aerothermal heating.
Proposed § 450.121(c) is substantively
the same as § 417.107(c). The section
contains the debris thresholds
requirements. It would adopt the
references to inert, explosive, and other
hazardous vehicle debris currently in
§ 417.211(a). The inert debris
requirement would include all debris
that could impact a human being with
a mean expected kinetic energy at
impact greater than or equal to 11 ft-lbs,
or mean impact kinetic energy per unit
area of 34 ft-lb/in2. The required
thresholds are well-established
standards used by Federal launch
ranges. In general, the 11 ft-lb
requirement is the primary threshold for
debris, whereas the 34 ft-lb/in2 is for
penetrating injuries. This paragraph also
would clarify the need to consider the
effects of all inert debris on aircraft or
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waterborne vessels, or those that pose a
toxic or fire hazard. The debris analysis
would also be required to identify any
explosive debris.
Proposed § 450.121(d) would provide
the debris analysis application
requirements. This paragraph would
inherit, in a less detailed and
prescriptive manner, the requirements
in appendix A to part 417, section
A417.11. It would expressly identify the
information and data needed by the
FAA to evaluate compliance with the
regulatory requirements. Proposed
§ 450.121(d) would describe the level of
fidelity required for the products of a
debris analysis including (1) a
description of the debris analysis
methodology, including input data,
assumptions, and justifications for the
assumptions; (2) a description of all
vehicle breakup modes and the
development of debris lists; and (3) all
debris fragment lists necessary to
quantitatively describe the physical,
aerodynamic, and harmful
characteristics of each debris fragment
or fragment class. Finally, as discussed
earlier, the applicant would be required
to provide additional products as
requested by the FAA to conduct an
independent analysis to ensure that
public safety criteria are satisfied.
6. Flight Safety Limits Analysis
Proposed § 450.123 would set the
requirements to identify uncontrolled
areas and establish flight safety limits
that define when an operator must
initiate flight abort to (1) ensure
compliance with the public safety
criteria of proposed § 450.101 and (2)
prevent debris capable of causing a
casualty from impacting in uncontrolled
areas if the vehicle is outside the limits
of a useful mission.
Current § 417.213(a) requires that a
flight safety limits analysis identify the
location of populated or other protected
areas and establish flight safety limits to
define when an FSS must terminate a
launch vehicle’s flight to prevent
hazardous impacts from reaching any
protected area and ensure that the
public risk criteria of § 417.107(b) are
satisfied. Section 417.3 currently
defines a flight safety limit as criteria to
ensure a set of impact limit lines
established for the flight of a launch
vehicle flown with an FSS bound the
area where debris with a ballistic
coefficient of 3 psf or more is allowed
to impact when an FSS functions. Thus,
§ 417.213(a) and the definition of flight
safety limit require that any populated
area be protected by flight safety limits
from where the FSS must be activated.
This requirement is not consistent with
operations on Federal launch ranges
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that allow potential debris impact in
populated areas inside the impact limit
lines, as long as the individual and
collective public risks remain within
acceptable limits.
The requirements in § 417.213(b) are
specific about potential contributors to
the vehicle and debris dispersions for
which the flight safety limits analysis
must account including time delays, all
wind effects, velocity imparted to
vehicle fragments by breakup, all lift
and drag forces on the malfunctioning
vehicle and falling debris, all launch
vehicle guidance and performance
errors, all launch vehicle malfunction
turn capabilities, and any uncertainty
due to map errors and launch vehicle
tracking errors.
Section 417.213(d) requires that the
analysis establish designated impact
limit lines to bound the area where
debris with a ballistic coefficient of 3
psf is allowed to impact, assuming the
FSS functions properly. In contrast, part
431 does not contain any express
requirements for a flight safety limits
analysis to set flight safety limits. That
being said, part 431 license applicants
have performed a flight safety limits
analysis mirroring part 417
requirements in cases where an FSS was
employed to satisfy the public risk
criteria in § 431.35(b).
The FAA proposes to move the
definition of ‘‘flight safety limit’’ from
current § 417.3 to § 401.5 and update the
definition to mean criteria to ensure that
public safety is protected from the flight
of a vehicle when an FSS functions
properly. Thus, the proposal would
remove any ballistic coefficient
threshold from the definition of a flight
safety limit. As previously discussed,
the Air Force has permanently waived
its previous requirement that embedded
a specific ballistic coefficient threshold
into the flight safety limits, and the FAA
has also waived the corresponding
requirement in § 417.213(d).195 When
the FAA adopted the 3 psf ballistics
coefficient standard (in 2006), the FAA
recognized that ballistic coefficient is
not well correlated with the probability
of a casualty producing impact.196
Simply put, ballistic coefficient is an
imperfect surrogate that was adopted
based on past practice when computers
were less capable than today.
In § 401.5, the proposal would also
replace the term ‘‘protected area’’ with
‘‘uncontrolled area,’’ defined as an area
of land not controlled by a launch or
reentry operator, a launch or reentry site
operator, an adjacent site operator, or
195 81
FR 1470 (January 12, 2016).
and Safety Requirements for
Launch, NPRM. 67 FR 49464 (October 28, 2002).
196 Licensing
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other entity by agreement. This change
reflects the fact that all members of the
public, even those in areas of land
controlled by a launch operator, are
protected to the extent that collective
and individual public risk limits apply
everywhere. Specifically, proposed
§ 450.123(a) would require protection of
uncontrolled areas by flight safety limits
and ensure compliance with the public
safety criteria of proposed § 450.101,
while controlled areas would be
required to meet only the collective and
individual risk requirements (also in
accordance with proposed § 450.101).
The FAA intends to assess the need
for flight safety limits to protect
environmentally-sensitive areas in the
environmental review process of
proposed § 450.47. The FAA anticipates
that not all environmentally-sensitive
areas will need this protection. For
example, current practice for launches
from the Western Range protects a
National Marine Sanctuary in the
Pacific Ocean against planned impacts
of jettisoned items, but not against
debris from a flight abort.
Proposed § 450.123(a) would require
an FSA to identify the location of
uncontrolled areas and establish flight
safety limits that would define when an
operator must initiate flight abort to
prevent debris capable of causing a
casualty from impacting in uncontrolled
areas if the vehicle is outside the limits
of a useful mission, and to ensure
compliance with the public safety
criteria of proposed § 450.101. Given
flight safety limits are only required to
protect people in uncontrolled areas and
not people in controlled areas, the
proposal would reconcile the current
inconsistency between the part 417
requirements versus the current practice
at some Federal launch ranges that
allows the public’s exposure to debris
hazards as long as the collective and
individual risk criteria are met.
Proposed § 450.123(b) would require a
flight safety limits analysis to identify
flight safety limits for use in
establishing flight abort rules. The flight
safety limits would be required to
account for temporal and geometric
extents on the Earth’s surface of any
vehicle hazards resulting from any
planned or unplanned event for all
times during flight, and account for
potential contributions to the debris
impact dispersions. This is the same as
§ 417.213(b). Proposed § 450.123(b)(3)
would add a requirement to design
flight safety limits to avoid flight abort
under conditions that result in
increased collective risk to people in
uncontrolled areas, compared to
continued flight. The proposed
requirement is equivalent to the U.S.
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Government consensus standard that a
conditional risk management process
should be implemented to ensure that
mission rules do not induce
unacceptable consequences when they
are implemented.197 In the flight safety
context, a flight abort is a good example
of a safety intervention intended to
mitigate public risks, but that typically
induces a conditional risk (e.g., a
consequence associated with the debris
event triggered by the flight abort). A
flight safety limits analysis would
ideally minimize all foreseeable
consequences, not just those to people
on the ground or to the extent necessary
to meet the public safety criteria. For
example, placing flight safety limits in
areas where flight abort might place
debris on a busy shipping lane or air
corridor is not an ideal solution when
other locations for the limits could meet
the public safety criteria and
consequence criteria, and still provide
space for the vehicle to fly a useful
mission. Also, as a malfunctioning
vehicle’s debris footprint migrates
towards a populated area, the
consequence to people on the ground
from a flight abort will increase from a
low number and possibly reach the
proposed consequence limit. The ideal
location for a flight safety limit on such
trajectory is not at the last location
where an abort would still result in
meeting the consequence criteria, which
would presumably result in a
consequence close to the limit, but at a
location that minimizes the
consequence. This proposed approach
could result in flight safety limits that
provide debris containment, or nearly
so, while also allowing normal flight
and flight within the limits of a useful
mission without triggering an abort. In
summary, the design of the flight safety
limits and the associated flight safety
rules would be required to avoid an
increase in risk induced by a flight
abort, compared to inaction or action at
a different time. This is relevant to areas
where debris containment is not
possible, as discussed in greater length
in the next section on proposed
§ 450.125.
Proposed § 450.123(c) would require
the flight safety analysis to include a
gate analysis for an orbital launch, or
any launch or reentry where one or
more trajectories that represents a useful
mission intersects a flight safety limit
that provides containment of debris
capable of causing a casualty. This is
also discussed in more detail in the next
section on gate analysis.
Proposed § 450.123(d) would provide
flexibility to allow the computation of
197 RCC
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flight safety limits in real-time in lieu of
computing flight safety limits preflight.
This alternative would reduce the
number of assumptions used in the
flight safety limits analysis and allow
for a computation that uses the best
available data on the vehicle state. The
proposal would allow the computation
of flight safety limits in real-time to be
performed on the ground or onboard the
vehicle.
The FAA proposes to remove the
requirement for a straight-up time
analysis currently in § 417.215. A
straight-up time analysis establishes
when to terminate the flight of a vehicle
that fails to pitch over, and thus flies
straight up, to achieve debris
containment. The straight-up time is not
the only method of limiting the risks
and consequences to the launch area in
the case of a vehicle that flies a straightup trajectory. Although the express
provision is being removed in the
proposed rule, the new performancebased analysis permitted under
§ 450.213 would allow the straight-up
time approach to control the hazards
from a straight-up flight, but its use
would not be required.
Proposed § 450.123(e) lays out the
application requirements for flight
safety limits analyses. The FAA would
require an applicant to submit: (1) A
description of how each flight safety
limit will be computed; (2)
representative flight safety limits and
associated parameters; (3) an indication
of which flight abort rule from proposed
§ 450.165(c) is used in conjunction with
each example flight safety limit; (4) a
graphic depiction or series of depictions
of representative flight safety limits, the
launch or landing point, all
uncontrolled area boundaries, and
vacuum instantaneous impact point
traces for the nominal trajectory, extents
of normal flight, and limits of a useful
mission trajectories; (5) if the
requirement for flight abort is computed
in real-time in lieu of precomputing
flight safety limits, a description of how
the real-time flight abort requirement is
computed including references to public
safety criteria of § 450.101; and (6)
additional products requested by the
FAA for an independent analysis when
necessary to demonstrate compliance
with risk criteria. The proposed
application requirements are consistent
with current practice under parts 417
and 431.
7. Gate Analysis
The FAA proposes § 450.125 to make
regulations governing gate analyses
more performance-based, flexible, and
clear. This change would include
revising the definition of ‘‘gate’’ and, as
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discussed earlier, adding a definition of
the ‘‘limits of a useful mission.’’ The
proposal would also add an option to
relax flight safety criteria without using
a gate.
Current § 417.3 defines a ‘‘gate’’ as the
portion of a flight safety limit boundary
through which the tracking icon of a
launch vehicle flown with an FSS may
pass without flight termination. As
discussed earlier, a gate is an opening in
a flight safety limit through which a
vehicle may fly, provided the vehicle
meets certain pre-defined conditions
such that the vehicle performance
indicates an ability to continue safe
flight. If the vehicle fails to meet the
required conditions to pass a gate, then
flight abort would occur at the flight
safety limit. In other words, the gate
would be closed.
The FAA has requirements for an
overflight gate analysis in § 417.217 and
appendix A, section A417.17, and for a
hold-and-resume gate analysis in
§ 417.218. An overflight gate analysis
determines whether a vehicle can
overfly populated areas. This analysis
requires a launch operator determine
why it is safe to allow flight through a
flight safety limit—the limit that
protects populated or protected areas—
without terminating a flight. This
analysis accounts for the fact that it is
potentially more dangerous to
populated or protected areas to destroy
a malfunctioning vehicle during certain
portions of a launch than not to destroy
it. In some circumstances, a destroyed
vehicle may disperse debris over a
wider area affecting more people than if
the vehicle were to impact intact.
The primary purpose of flight safety
limits and gates is to establish safe
locations and conditions to abort the
flight prior to the vehicle entering a
region or condition where it may
endanger populated or other protected
areas if flight were to continue. From an
operator’s perspective, a gate should
allow the vehicle to fly through a flight
safety limit when the trajectory
corresponds to a useful mission.198
Otherwise, a flight abort would be
required for every flight that intersects
with a flight safety limit even if the
mission can still have a successful
outcome. The optimal use of flight
safety limits and gates would be to
prevent vehicles that cannot achieve a
useful mission from continuing flight,
198 As discussed earlier in this preamble, the FAA
proposes in § 401.5 to define the ‘‘limits of a useful
mission’’ as the trajectory data or other parameters
that describes the limits of a mission that can attain
the primary objective, including but not limited to
flight azimuth limits.
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even when the flight is along a trajectory
that crosses a gate.
The current gate regulations imply
that gates are the only option when
debris containment is not possible along
a trajectory that represents a useful
mission, whether it is normal or outside
of the normal trajectory envelope. This
requirement does not reflect current
practice at the Federal launch ranges.
Federal launch ranges sometimes relax
flight safety limits to allow continued
flight for these trajectories without the
use of a gate, as long as the operations
satisfies the collective risk criterion.
Also, some Federal launch ranges do not
currently require explicit identification
of the conditional risk posed by a
vehicle that flies on a trajectory within
the normal trajectory envelope or the
limits of a useful mission. The preflight
risk due to such a trajectory is often
small because the vehicle is not likely
to deviate far from nominal. However, a
gate or relaxed flight safety limit to
allow flight on such a trajectory implies
that the risk must be acceptable given
that the vehicle does fly on such a
trajectory. Such a failure to identify the
conditional risk associated with such a
trajectory as part of the gate analysis is
inconsistent with the U.S. Government
consensus standard (RCC 321–17
paragraph 2.3.6) that a conditional risk
management process should be
implemented to ensure that mission
rules do not induce unacceptable levels
of risk when they are implemented.
Although part 431 has no
requirements related to gate analysis,
the one orbital RLV operation licensed
to date employed an FSS and performed
a gate analysis.
The FAA’s proposed § 450.125 would
establish a single set of performancebased gate analysis requirements
applicable to all launch and reentry
vehicles. The gate analysis requirements
in §§ 417.217 and 417.218 would be
combined. Proposed § 450.125 would
remove prescriptive requirements on the
types of gates, standardize the
requirements for establishing a gate, and
open the possibility of relaxing flight
safety limits. The FAA believes an
operator should have the freedom to
select risk mitigation methods that will
present the best safety posture rather
than prescribing certain strategies that
may not be the best for all scenarios and
vehicles. The FAA also proposes to
revise the existing definition of ‘‘gate’’
in § 401.5 to replace the term ‘‘flight
termination’’ with ‘‘flight abort’’ and to
add language to reflect that the flight
must remain within specified
parameters to avoid flight abort.
Proposed § 450.125(a) would require a
gate analysis for an orbital launch, or
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any launch or reentry where one or
more trajectories that represents a useful
mission intersects a flight safety limit
that provides containment of debris
capable of causing a casualty.
Proposed § 450.125(b) would set the
gate analysis requirements. The FAA
would require an analysis to establish a
relaxation of flight safety limits to allow
continued flight or a gate where a
decision will be made to abort the
launch or reentry, or allow continued
flight. If a gate is established, the
analysis should establish a measure of
performance at the gate that would
enable the flight abort crew or
autonomous FSS to determine whether
the vehicle is able to complete a useful
mission, and abort the flight if it is not.
Further, the analysis should establish
accompanying flight abort rules. Finally,
for an orbital launch, the analysis
should establish a gate at the last
opportunity to determine whether the
vehicle’s flight is in compliance with
the flight abort rules and can make a
useful mission, and abort the flight if
not. This last requirement would
achieve the goal of assuring that only
missions that can be useful are allowed
to proceed to orbit, thereby limiting the
potential for space debris. In addition,
when the vehicle performance does not
demonstrate an ability to reach a
minimum safe orbit (without an
imminent random reentry), meaning it
cannot pass the useful mission
requirement, the regulation would
require that flight abort occur.
In proposed § 450.125(c), the FAA
would require the extents of any gate or
relaxation of the flight safety limits to be
based on normal trajectories, trajectories
that may achieve a useful mission,
collective risk, and consequence
criteria. In proposed § 450.125(c)(1), the
FAA proposes to require a gate or
relaxation of flight safety limits
anywhere a flight safety limit intersects
with a normal trajectory if that trajectory
would meet the individual and
collective risk criteria of proposed
§ 450.101(a)(1) and (2) or (b)(1) and (2)
when treated like a nominal trajectory
with normal trajectory dispersions.199
Requiring all normal trajectories to be
treated like a nominal trajectory with
dispersions as input to a conditional
risk analysis (given a sample normal
trajectory) for the gate analysis would
resolve the issue of an incomplete
characterization of the conditional risk
of a vehicle that flies through what was
199 The FAA would retain the definitions of
‘‘normal flight’’ and ‘‘normal trajectory’’ currently
found in § 417.3.
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a flight safety limit while within the
normal trajectory envelope.
Another requirement of the proposed
gate analysis would be that the
predicted average consequence from
flight abort resulting from any
reasonably foreseeable vehicle response
mode, in any one-second period of
flight, using any modified flight safety
limits must not exceed 1 × 10¥2 CEC.
The goal of this requirement is to ensure
that flight safety limits do not create an
unacceptable consequence when used,
since debris containment is no longer
provided. A gate that does not have
flight safety limits after the gate would
not need to meet this consequence
criterion since it would be placed at the
same location as flight safety limits that
do provide debris containment. Under
the proposal, any intersections of flight
safety limits with normal trajectories
would result in flight safety limits that
are relaxed enough to allow passage, or
an open gate in the flight safety limit as
long as there is enough data available to
confirm that the vehicle is healthy (i.e.,
appears capable of reaching a minimum
safe perigee). Flight on normal
trajectories must still meet the public
safety criteria in proposed § 450.101, so
this practice would ensure acceptable
risks and use the best available data to
confirm that a vehicle is unlikely to fail
before being allowed to fly through a
gate, if one is present. Whether flight
safety limits would be relaxed enough to
let a vehicle fly through that area, or be
gated, is optional. A gate is preferred if
it would reduce risk, given that there is
sufficient information available to make
a decision on whether the vehicle is
sufficiently healthy to pass. This
practice would align with the Federal
launch range’s current practice and
meet the intent of the current
requirement in § 417.107(a)(2).
In proposed § 450.125(c)(2),
trajectories that are outside of normal
flight but within the limits of a useful
mission would be evaluated as potential
normal trajectories. Proposed
§ 450.125(c)(2) would allow flight safety
limits to be gated or relaxed where they
intersect with any trajectory within the
limits of a useful mission, if the
trajectory would meet the individual
and collective risk criteria of proposed
§ 450.101(a)(1) and (2) or (b)(1) and (2),
assuming that the trajectory flown
would be treated like a nominal
trajectory with normal trajectory
dispersions. The predicted average
consequence from flight abort resulting
from a failure in any one-second period
of flight, using any modified flight
safety limits, would be required to not
exceed 1 × 10¥2 CEC. The philosophy
behind proposed § 450.125(c)(2) is to
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allow a non-normal flight to continue as
long as the mission does not pose an
unacceptable conditional risk given the
present trajectory. A good example of
missions that fall into this category are
missions that lift-off on an incorrect
flight azimuth, usually due to a software
input error, such as the Ariane 5 failure
on January 25, 2018, during its 97th
mission (VA241). Apart from the
programming error, these vehicles may
be healthy and are not expected to fail
more frequently than a flight without
the programming error, so these flights
should be allowed to continue if they
meet the individual and collective risk
criteria on the present azimuth (unless
the risk from planned debris impacts
was unacceptable on the present flight
azimuth). If they do not, such flights
would be required to implement an
abort. This proposal is consistent with
the ARC’s recommendation to expand
part 431 to include flight abort rules that
apply when the vehicle is performing
outside of its profile and is unable to
reach a useful orbit or survive, and
needs to be terminated prior to
overflight of a populated area.
Proposed § 450.125(d) would
establish the application requirements
for gate analyses. Specifically, the
proposal would require an applicant to
submit a description of the methodology
used to establish each gate or relaxation
of a flight safety limit; a description of
the measure of performance used to
determine whether a vehicle will be
allowed to cross a gate without flight
abort, the acceptable ranges of the
measure of performance, and how these
ranges were determined; a graphic
depiction showing representative flight
safety limits, any protected uncontrolled
area overflight regions, and
instantaneous impact point traces for
the nominal trajectory, extents of
normal flight, and limits of a useful
mission trajectories; and any additional
products requested by the FAA to
conduct an independent analysis when
necessary to ensure that public risk
criteria are not exceeded. The proposed
application requirements are consistent
with current practice under parts 417
and 431.
8. Data Loss Flight Time and Planned
Safe Flight State Analyses
The FAA proposes to consolidate and
update data loss flight times and
planned safe flight states requirements
in proposed § 450.127 (Data Loss Flight
Time and Planned Safe Flight State
Analyses).
Data loss flight time analyses are used
to establish when an operator must
abort a flight following the loss of
vehicle tracking information. In § 417.3,
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the FAA currently defines ‘‘data loss
flight time’’ as the shortest elapsed
thrusting time during which a launch
vehicle flown with an FSS can move
from its normal trajectory to a condition
where it is possible for the launch
vehicle to endanger the public. This
definition is unclear as to what
constitutes a condition where it is
possible for the launch vehicle to
endanger the public. Given the overall
approach to impact limit lines in
§ 417.213(d) and the treatment of data
loss flight times in appendix A to part
417, section A417.19, the FAA has
interpreted the definition to mean any
impact on a protected area with debris
greater than 3 psf ballistic coefficient.
With this proposal, the FAA would
move the definition of ‘‘data loss flight
time’’ from current § 417.3 to § 401.5
and update the definition to mean the
shortest elapsed thrusting or gliding
time during which a vehicle flown with
an FSS can move from its trajectory to
a condition where it is possible for the
vehicle to violate a flight safety limit.
An important change in the definition
would be the replacement of ‘‘move
from its normal trajectory’’ with ‘‘move
from its trajectory.’’ Computing data loss
flight times initialized using normal
trajectories or nominal trajectories
would both be acceptable means of
compliance with the proposed
regulation, since using the former
should be more conservative. This
resolves the issue of varying practices at
different ranges and provides additional
flexibility.
In § 417.219(a), the FAA requires a
launch operator to establish data loss
flight times and a planned safe flight
state. In § 417.219(b), the FAA requires
that thrust be considered as a means of
moving a vehicle towards a protected
area, but some vehicles can also glide a
significant distance using lift. Further,
§ 417.219(b) requires the data loss flight
time to be relative to reaching protected
areas, not flight safety limits. The
requirements in § 417.219(c) also
include a method of establishing the
planned safe flight state that includes
the subjective phrase ‘‘the absence of a
flight safety system would not
significantly increase the accumulated
risk from debris impacts.’’ Data loss
times are currently computed in
different ways at Federal launch ranges,
with some initializing the computation
from the nominal trajectory and some
from trajectories within the normal
trajectory envelope, sometimes referred
to as ‘‘dispersed’’ trajectories.
Part 431 has no requirements related
to analysis to establish data loss flight
times or planned safe flight state.
However, the one orbital RLV operation
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licensed to date employed an FSS and
established data loss flight times.
The FAA’s proposed § 450.127(a)
would require an FSA to establish data
loss flight times and a planned safe
flight state for each flight to establish
each flight abort rule that applies when
vehicle tracking data is not available for
use by the flight abort crew or
autonomous FSS. Substantively, this
proposal is consistent with the current
rule in § 417.219(a). However, the FAA’s
proposal would update language to
account for autonomous FSS and the
use of the term flight abort in place of
flight termination.
Proposed § 450.127(b)(1) would retain
the data loss flight time analysis
requirements consistent with § 417.219,
but with the addition of gliding flight as
a means of moving a vehicle towards
flight safety limits (in lieu of protected
areas in accordance with § 417.219). The
proposal would replace the subjective
method of establishing the safe flight
state with a more straightforward
method of analyzing when the vehicle’s
state vector reaches a state where the
vehicle is no longer required to have a
flight safety system. This is to avoid
aborting a flight due to loss of track data
during a phase of flight in which track
data is not required to ensure safe flight.
Thus, the proposal would encourage
operators to avoid a flight abort, which
often correlates with creating debris,
due to loss of track data when in an area
where flight abort is not required to
meet the regulations.
Proposed § 450.127(b)(2) would
require data loss flight times to account
for forces that may stop the vehicle
before reaching a flight safety limit,
such as aerodynamic forces that exceed
the structural limits of the vehicle.
When more conservative methods are
used, such as assuming an
instantaneous turn towards the nearest
flight safety limit, data loss flight times
can be underestimated in that a vehicle
could not physically perform the turn
without breaking up. Data loss flight
times that are unrealistically low create
the risk of an unnecessary abort (and
thus, an unnecessary debris event) if
track is lost, since track may return and
allow flight to continue if the data loss
flight times are greater.
Proposed § 450.127(b)(3) would allow
the computation of data loss flight times
in real-time in lieu of only computations
made preflight. This proposal would
allow for a computation using the lastknown state vector of the vehicle before
track was lost. Proposed § 450.127(b)(3)
would allow the computation of data
loss flight times to be performed on the
ground or onboard the vehicle,
depending on whether a traditional
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command destruct or autonomous flight
safety system is used.
In proposed § 450.127(c), the
requirements regarding the planned safe
flight state would be consistent with
those currently in § 417.219(c), only
generalized to apply to reentry as well
as launch. Proposed § 450.127(c)(1)
would update the § 417.219(c)(1)
requirement using new terminology
without any change to the meaning.
Proposed § 450.127(d) lays out the
application requirements for data loss
flight time and planned safe flight state
analyses. Specifically, the proposal
would require an applicant to submit a
description of the methodology used to
determine data loss flight times; tabular
data describing the data loss flight times
from a representative mission; the safe
flight state and methodology used to
determine it; and any additional
products requested by the FAA to
conduct an independent analysis.
9. Time Delay Analysis
For ELVs, § 417.221(a) requires a time
delay analysis that establishes the mean
elapsed time between the violation of a
flight termination rule and the time
when the flight safety system is capable
of terminating flight for use in
establishing flight safety limits. Section
417.221(b) requires the analysis to
determine a time delay distribution that
accounts for the variance of all time
delays for each potential failure
scenario, a flight safety official’s
decision and reaction time, and flight
termination hardware and software
delays which includes all delays
inherent in tracking systems, data
processing systems, display systems,
command control systems, and flight
termination systems.
The FAA has also required time delay
analyses for RLVs under the current
regulatory scheme. Specifically,
§ 431.39(a) requires an RLV license
applicant to submit contingency abort
plans, if any, that ensure safe conduct
of mission operations during nominal
and non-nominal vehicle flight. In
practice, a time delay analysis has been
necessary to ensure safe conduct of an
RLV that uses flight abort.
The FAA proposes to streamline the
regulations governing the analysis of
time delay in proposed § 450.129 (Time
Delay Analysis). Proposed § 450.129(a)
would use language identical to
§ 417.221(a), except that the term
‘‘terminating’’ would be replaced with
the term ‘‘aborting.’’ The proposal
would replace the list of time delay
contributions prescribed in § 417.221(b)
with a performance-based requirement
in proposed § 450.129(a), that the time
delay analysis would be required to
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determine a time delay distribution that
accounts for all foreseeable sources of
delay.
Proposed § 450.129(b) would list
application requirements. Specifically,
the proposal would require an applicant
to submit a description of the
methodology used in the time delay
analysis, a tabular listing of each time
delay source and the total delay, with
uncertainty, and any additional
products the FAA would request to
conduct an independent analysis.
10. Probability of Failure
Proposed § 450.131 (Probability of
Failure Analysis) would cover
probability of failure (POF) analysis
requirements for all launch and reentry
vehicles. The proposal would also make
application requirements clearer and
implement performance-based
requirements to address allocation to
flight times and vehicle response
modes. The proposed POF performance
requirements would allow an operator
to employ alternative, potentially
innovative methodologies so long as the
results satisfy proposed requirements
such as valid input data.
Current regulations covering POF
analysis requirements for ELVs are
found in § 417.224. Part 431 does not
have requirements for a POF analysis.
Even so, a POF analysis is necessary to
demonstrate compliance with the public
risk criteria set for RLV operations in
§ 431.35(b).
Section 417.224(a) requires that POF
analyses use accurate data, scientific
principles, and a method that is
statistically or probabilistically valid.
For vehicles with fewer than two flights,
the POF must account for the outcome
of all previous launches of vehicles
developed and launched in similar
circumstances. If a vehicle has more
than two flights, the POF analysis must
account for the outcomes of all previous
flights of the vehicle in a statistically
valid manner. Section 417.224(a) does
not address the use of data on partial
failures and anomalies, which is a
shortcoming the FAA seeks to correct.
Section 417.224(b) defines failure to
mean when a launch vehicle does not
complete any phase of normal flight, or
when any anomalous condition exhibits
the potential for a stage or its debris to
impact the Earth or reenter the
atmosphere during the mission, or any
future mission, of similar launch vehicle
capability. The paragraph makes clear a
launch incident or accident also
constitutes a failure. Finally, Section
417.224(c) explains that previous flights
begin when the launch vehicle normally
or inadvertently lifts off from a launch
platform and that liftoff occurs with any
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motion of the launch vehicle with
respect to the launch platform.
Although the § 417.224 definitions
have generally served the FAA and the
industry well, § 417.224 lacks
requirements to address allocation to
flight times and vehicle response modes
(VRMs), even though these allocations
are necessary to determine the public
risks posed by various VRMs at various
times in flight. Given POF is a primary
factor in any risk computation, it is
impossible for an applicant to
demonstrate compliance with the
quantitative public risk criteria without
an analysis to determine the probability
of any reasonably foreseeable outcome,
such as an on-trajectory loss of thrust or
a malfunction turn ending in
aerodynamic break-up.
The FAA would retain the substantive
§ 417.224 POF analysis requirements in
proposed § 450.131, including the
definitions of key terms such as
‘‘failure’’ and ‘‘previous flight’’.
However, the proposal would apply to
all launch and reentry vehicles. In
addition, it would clarify the data a POF
analysis must use to establish a valid
allocation to flight times and vehicle
response modes.
Proposed § 450.131(a) would retain
the same substantive requirements
regarding the an operator’s estimation of
the POF for vehicles with fewer than
two flights. However, for vehicles with
two or more previous flights, the
proposal would change the § 417.224(a)
provision by requiring that the
outcomes of all previous flights of the
vehicle or vehicle stage account for data
on partial failures and anomalies
including Class 3 and Class 4 mishaps.
Thus, the proposal would require an
analysis to account for partial failures
and anomalies. These changes should
improve the credibility of POF analyses
by giving due credit to stages that
succeed even though a subsequent stage
fails. For example, consider a vehicle
launched two times, with a failure
during the second stage on the first
launch and no failures during the
second launch. For the third launch, the
proposal would allow a probability of
failure analysis to account for the fact
that the first stage flew twice without a
failure, while the second stage flew
twice with one failure.
Proposed § 450.131(b) would retain
essentially the same definition of
‘‘failure’’ used in § 417.224(b), with
changes using the proposed mishap
terminology (Class 1 or Class 2) and to
cover other vehicles beyond ELVs.
Proposed § 450.131(c) would retain
essentially the same definition of
‘‘previous flight’’ for FSA purposes,
with changes intended to encompass all
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launch and reentry vehicles, including
cases where an operator uses a carrier
aircraft. Thus, ‘‘previous flight’’ for the
purposes of an FSA would cover the
flight of a launch vehicle beginning
when the vehicle normally or
inadvertently lifts off from a launch
platform. Liftoff would still occur with
any motion of the launch vehicle with
respect to the launch platform. The FAA
would clarify that this would include a
carrier aircraft as a launch platform, and
would include any intentional or
unintentional separation from the
launch platform. In terms of a reentry
vehicle, the flight of a reentry vehicle or
deorbiting upper stage would begin
when a vehicle attempts to initiate a
deorbit.
Proposed § 450.131(d), titled
‘‘Allocation,’’ would establish
performance requirements to address
POF allocation to flight times and
VRMs. The proposal would require that
a vehicle POF be distributed across
flight times and vehicle response modes
consistent with the data available from
all previous flights of vehicles
developed and launched or reentered in
similar circumstances; and data from
previous flights of vehicles, stages, or
components developed and launched or
reentered by the subject vehicle
developer or operator. Such data may
include previous experience involving
similar vehicle, stage, or component
design characteristics; development and
integration processes, including the
extent of integrated system testing; and
level of experience of the vehicle
operation and development team
members. These requirements were not
in § 417.224 or part 431. In this context,
phases of flight would be defined by
planned events affecting the vehicle
configuration and its failure rate, such
as ignition, first stage flight, stage
separation, second stage ignition,
second stage flight, payload fairing
separation, etc. This proposal would
require what is already necessary and
thus done in current practice.
In proposed § 450.131(e), the FAA
would require that a POF allocation
account for significant differences in the
observed failure rate and the conditional
failure rate. The conditional failure rate
represents the failure rate conditional
on the vehicle or subsystem having
survived, without a failure as defined
earlier, to a given time in flight. The
observed failure rate is the product of
the conditional failure rate and the
reliability function, which is commonly
defined as the probability that the
vehicle or subsystem has not failed prior
to a given time in flight. For high
reliability systems where the reliability
function is close to one (by definition),
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the observed failure rate can be
approximated as the conditional failure
rate. If the overall vehicle or stage POF
is below 10 percent (over the entire
period of time corresponding to a phase
of flight), then this simplified approach
produces a relative error less than
approximately 0.5 percent, which is
generally not considered a significant
difference. For lower reliability systems,
this approximation does produce a
significant difference between the
observed failure rate and the conditional
failure rate. Here again, the proposal
would clarify what is already necessary
and thus done in current practice.
Proposed § 450.131(e) would also
require that a POF analysis use a
constant conditional failure rate for each
phase of flight, unless there is clear and
convincing evidence of a different
conditional failure rate for a particular
vehicle, stage, or phase of flight. Thus,
the proposal would require a POF
analysis to assume that the conditional
failure rate can be represented as a
piece-wise constant function of time for
each phase of flight, absent clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary.
The points that define transitions to a
potentially different conditional failure
rate must include staging events or other
vehicle configuration changes, such as
ignition of other engines or rocket
motors. In some cases, the FAA
anticipates that there will be sufficient
evidence to justify a different failure
rate, for example during a start-up or
shut-down/burnout transient for a
rocket motor compared to steady state
operation of a stage, engine, or motor.
Proposed § 450.131(f) would lay out
the FAA’s application requirements for
POF analyses that address the proposed
methodology, assumptions and
justification, input data, and output
data. An applicant would also be
required to provide a complete set of
tabular data and graphs of the predicted
failure rate and cumulative failure
probability for each foreseeable VRM.
The proposed requirements are
consistent with current practice to the
extent that any valid FSA must include
the probability of failure assigned to
each VRM as a function of time into
flight.
11. Flight Hazard Areas
The FAA proposes to streamline its
regulations on flight hazard area in
proposed § 450.133, applicable to all
launch and reentry vehicles. The FAA
would codify its working definition of
‘‘flight hazard area’’ to mean any region
of land, sea, or air that must be
surveyed, publicized, controlled, or
evacuated in order to protect the public
health and safety and safety of property.
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An FSA would include a flight hazard
area analysis to identify regions of land,
sea, or air where an operation poses a
potential hazard to the public. The
proposal would reduce the size of the
regions of land, sea, and air requiring
hazard warnings from normal flight
events and would reduce the size of
regions requiring surveillance prior to
initiating a commercial space
transportation operation. These changes
would be consistent with practices at
Federal launch ranges.
The current FAA regulations most
pertinent to flight hazard area analysis
are found in §§ 417.107(b) (Flight safety)
and 417.223 (Flight hazard analysis) for
ELVs, and §§ 431.35(b) (Acceptable
reusable launch vehicle mission risk)
and 431.43(b) (Reusable launch vehicle
mission operational requirements and
restrictions) for RLVs. Both the ELV and
RLV regulations require flight hazard
areas to protect against hazards posed
by vehicle malfunctions (e.g., an inflight break-up) and normal flight events
that create hazards (e.g., any planned
jettison of debris, launch vehicle
components, or vehicle stages).
The FAA currently sets requirements
to warn of, or limit the operations of,
ELVs and RLVs in regions where
planned debris impacts are likely, for
example, due to jettisoned stages. In
§ 417.223(b), the FAA currently requires
flight hazard area analyses to establish
ship and aircraft hazard area warnings
to mariners and airman in regions that
encompass the three-sigma impact
dispersion area for each planned debris
impact. Similar language appears in
§ 431.43(b), which states that a nominal
landing location is suitable if the area of
the predicted three-sigma dispersion of
the vehicle impacts can be wholly
contained within the designated
location. In the 2000 final rule, the FAA
explained that it intended the threesigma to refer a location where the
vehicle or stage landing would be
contained 997 times out of 1000
attempts, or 99.7 percent probability of
containment.200 Hence, these
regulations used the term ‘‘three-sigma’’
to refer to a univariate Gaussian
distribution,201 despite the fact that
impact dispersions are bivariate, and
not necessarily Gaussian. Notably,
neither § 417.223 nor § 431.43 stipulate
whether these warning areas must
account for all debris or only debris
capable of causing a casualty. There is
evidence that the separation of large
200 65
FR 56618 (September 9, 2000), at 56629.
distribution (also known as normal
distribution) is a bell-shaped curve, and it is
assumed that during any measurement values will
follow a normal distribution with an equal number
of measurements above and below the mean value.
201 Gaussian
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stages can liberate small fragments with
a negligible probability of creating a
casualty, depending on the nature of the
exposed population. For example,
people in aircraft are often more
vulnerable than people on the ground
because a fragment that impacts an
aircraft has a much higher kinetic
energy due to the velocity of the aircraft.
Both the ELV and RLV regulations
require public risk controls, such as
evacuation or surveillance, to ensure
that no individual member of the public
is exposed to greater one-in-a-million (1
× 10¥6) PC, irrespective of their location
on land, sea, or air, to satisfy risk
criterion in §§ 417.107(b) and 431.35(b).
The part 417 regulations address the
identification and surveillance of flight
hazard areas explicitly in several
sections, including §§ 417.111(b)(5),
417.121(f), and 417.223 as discussed
below. Part 431 regulations do not
expressly address flight hazard areas.
However, the preamble to the 2000 final
rule stated that the individual risk limit
of 1 × 10¥6 PC would dictate whether
or not an area must be evacuated for
launch or reentry activity along that
trajectory to occur safely, and clarified
that limit applied for any person not
involved in the licensed activity. Hence,
the current RLV regulations clearly
intended the evacuation, and
surveillance by inference, of any area
where a person not involved in the
licensed activity would otherwise
experience more than 1 × 10¥6 PC.
Only § 417.223 and associated
appendices provide specific direction
on conducting flight hazard area
analyses. In § 417.223(a), the FAA
requires launch operators to perform a
flight hazard area analysis that identifies
any regions of land, sea, or air that must
be surveyed, publicized, controlled, or
evacuated in order to control the risk to
the public from debris impact hazards.
In addition, the current regulation notes
that the risk management requirements
of § 417.205(a) apply to the flight hazard
area analyses. Lastly, § 417. 223(a)
paragraph lists factors that the analysis
must account for.
Regarding aircraft hazard areas, the
preamble to part 431 stated that the
FAA also reserves discretion to impose
measures deemed necessary by that
office to protect public safety.202 This
deference to regional offices for aircraft
protection resulted in a lack of clarity
and potential unevenness to the aircraft
protection requirements potentially
imposed on RLV operators.
Proposed § 450.133 would establish
general requirements for the flight
hazard area analysis as well as
202 65
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requirements specific to waterborne
vessel hazard areas, land hazard areas,
airspace hazard volumes, and the
license application. The proposal would
make uniform to launch and reentry the
requirement in current § 417.223(a) that
operators must identify any regions of
land, sea, or air that must be surveyed,
publicized, controlled, or evacuated to
the extent necessary to ensure
acceptable individual and collective
risks. However, as discussed later in this
section, the proposed regulations would
allow operators to reduce, or otherwise
optimize, the size of the warning regions
for hazards resulting from normal flight
events.
The proposal would add a definition
of ‘‘flight hazard area’’ to § 405.1 to
mean any region of land, sea, or air that
must be surveyed, publicized,
controlled, or evacuated in order to
protect the public health and safety, and
safety of property. This definition is
consistent with the current requirement
in § 417.223(a). Note that the proposed
definition would allow for the fact that
it may be appropriate to issue a public
warning for a flight hazard area, but
unnecessary to survey or evacuate the
area to ensure the public risks are
within the criteria given in proposed
§ 450.101, as explained in the
discussion of hazard area surveillance
and publication.
Proposed § 450.133(a) would also
revise the technical factors for which
the hazard area analysis must account to
remove language limiting those factors
to launch activity alone, thus making
consistent the regulations for all types of
commercial space transportation
operations. The proposal would merge
current § 417.223(a)(2), (3), and (4) with
slight changes into § 450.133(a)(1) to
require an operator to account for the
‘‘regions of land, sea, and air potentially
exposed to debris impact resulting from
normal flight events and from debris
hazards resulting from any potential
malfunction.’’ Proposed § 450.133(a)(5)
would also clarify that the analysis must
account for all foreseeable sources of
debris dispersion during freefall,
including wind effects, guidance and
control, velocity imparted by break-up
or jettison, lift, and drag forces with
winds that are no less severe than the
worst wind conditions under which
flight might be attempted, and
uncertainty in the wind conditions. In
§ 417.223(a)(4), the current regulation
implies that the analysis only needed to
account for some exposed populations
in the vicinity of the launch site. The
proposed § 450.133(a) would further
clarify that all sources of debris
dispersion must be accounted for by
removing any ambiguity associated with
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what constitutes ‘‘in the vicinity of the
launch site;’’ by eliminating that phrase,
and thus ensuring equal protection for
all public exposures. Finally, the
proposal would clarify that valid flight
hazard area analyses would be required
to treat all planned debris hazards,
planned impacts, and planned landings
as a virtual certainty, consistent with
current practice and the regulations in
sections A417.23 and B417.13. Again,
part 431 does not address flight hazard
areas, but current practice for RLVs is
generally consistent with the ELV
regulations.
Proposed § 450.133(b)(1), (c)(1), and
(d)(1) would align FAA regulations with
practices at the Federal launch ranges
by allowing operators to reduce or
otherwise optimize the size of the
regions for warnings of potential
hazardous debris resulting from normal
flight events. Specifically, in
§ 417.223(b), the FAA currently requires
hazard area analyses to establish ship
and aircraft hazard area warnings in
regions that encompass the three-sigma
impact dispersion area for each planned
debris impact. Similar language appears
in § 431.43(b), and the FAA previously
took the position that ‘‘three-sigma’’ in
this context referred to 99.7 percent
probability of containment (as explained
earlier). However, the current
regulations do not specify if the
confidence of containment applies to all
planned debris or only debris capable of
causing a casualty. In any case, current
practice includes the establishment of
flight hazard areas sufficient for 97
percent probability of containment of
debris capable of causing a casualty.
Thus, the proposed requirements in
§ 450.133 (b)(1), (c)(1), and (d)(1) would
be revised to include language reflecting
that the provision applies to debris
capable of causing a casualty to any
person located on land, sea, or air.
Finally, proposed § 450.133(e) would
list flight hazard area application
requirements. An applicant would need
to submit a description of the
methodology to be used in the flight
hazard area analysis, including all
assumptions and justifications for the
assumptions, vulnerability models,
analysis methods, and input data. This
information would include the worst
wind conditions under which flight
might be attempted accounting for
uncertainty in the wind conditions, the
classes of waterborne vessels and
vulnerability criteria employed, and the
classes of aircraft and vulnerability
criteria employed. Section 450.133(e)(2)
would require an applicant to submit
representative hazard area analysis
outputs to include tabular data and
graphs of the results of the flight hazard
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area analysis. Note that the proposal
would require hazard area results to
identify the regions of land, sea, and air
considered hazardous, regardless of
location or ownership.203 The proposed
requirement to show contours of
probability of impact (PI) and PC that are
an order of magnitude lower than those
used to define the flight hazard areas is
necessary to demonstrate sufficient
computational resolution and analysis
fidelity for the results that are critical to
public safety. Furthermore, the FAA Air
Traffic Organization currently requires
identification of regions of air where the
PI exceeds 1 × 10¥7 for all debris
capable of causing a casualty to persons
on an aircraft, in order to facilitate safe
and efficient integration of launch and
reentry operations into the NAS.
Proposed § 450.133(e)(3) would
specifically provide that applicants
must provide additional products if
requested by the FAA to conduct an
independent analysis.
12. Debris Risk Analysis
The FAA proposes to streamline,
clarify, and make consistent its
regulations on debris risk analysis used
to evaluate compliance with the public
safety criteria in proposed § 450.101.
The proposal would require launch and
reentry operators to conduct a debris
risk analysis that demonstrates
compliance with proposed § 450.101
either prior to the day of the operation,
accounting for all foreseeable conditions
within the flight commit criteria, or
during the countdown using the best
available input data.
A debris risk analysis determines the
expected average number of casualties
to the public, individually and
collectively, due to inert and explosive
debris hazards. This analysis includes
an evaluation of risk to populations on
land, including areas following passage
through any gate in a flight safety limit
boundary. The current FAA regulations
require a debris risk analysis, but only
part 417 provides any specificity about
what constitutes a valid analysis
including prescriptive requirements in
section A417.25 of appendix A. Part 431
provides no requirements to clarify
what constitutes a valid debris risk
analysis. In practice though, RLV
license applicants often abided by
debris risk performance requirements
set in part 417, such as the need to use
trajectory time intervals sufficient to
203 However, as provided in proposed
§ 450.161(c), an operator would only be required to
publicize warnings for flight hazard areas that
exclude any regions of land, sea, or air under the
control of the vehicle or site operator or other entity
by agreement.
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produce smooth and continuous
individual risk contours.
Section A417.1 states that the
appendix applies to the methods for
performing analysis required by
§§ 417.107 and 417.225, and provides
(1) an acceptable means of compliance,
and (2) a standard and a measure of
fidelity against which the FAA will
measure any proposed alternative
analysis approach. However, in some
cases the 417 appendices are overly
prescriptive and unduly burdensome.
For example, section A417.25(c)
requires an operator to file with the
FAA a debris risk analysis report that
includes all populated areas included in
the debris risk analysis, which typically
translates into many thousands of
population centers for an orbital launch,
as well as the values of probability of
impact and expected casualty for each
populated area. In other cases, the part
417 appendices mistakenly neglected to
direct an applicant to account for
important phenomena, such as the
influence of uncertainties in
atmospheric conditions on the
propagation of debris from each
predicted breakup location to impact.
The FAA proposes to streamline,
clarify, and make consistent its
regulations regarding debris risk
analyses to determine if public risks
posed by a proposed launch or reentry
can comply with the public safety
criteria in proposed § 450.101. The
proposal would provide performancebased regulations regarding the level of
fidelity required for key elements of a
valid debris risk analysis, including
analyses for the propagation of debris,
public exposure and critical assets
model, and casualty areas. The
proposed debris risk analysis
requirements in § 450.135 would
supplement the more generic
requirements for flight safety methods
proposed in § 450.115. The proposal
would also align FAA regulations with
practices at the Federal launch ranges.
Proposed § 450.135(a) provides
applicants an option to perform a debris
risk analysis that demonstrates
compliance with public safety criteria in
§ 450.101, either prior to the day of the
operation, by accounting for all
foreseeable conditions within the flight
commit criteria, or during the
countdown using the best available
input data. Thus, the proposal provides
flexibility that was lacking in both parts
417 and 431.
Proposed § 450.135(b) would include
performance-based requirements to
clarify the phenomena the propagationof-debris portion of the analysis must
consider. The propagation of debris is a
physics-based analysis that predicts
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where debris impacts are likely to occur
in the case of a debris event while the
vehicle is in flight, such as jettison of a
vehicle stage or an explosion. As
mentioned previously, section A417
provides some requirements regarding
the sources of debris impact dispersions
that must be accounted for, but in some
cases that was either overly prescriptive
or incomplete. A debris risk analysis
must compute statistically-valid debris
impact probability distributions using
the input data produced by FSAs
required in proposed §§ 450.117
through 450.133. The propagation of
debris from each predicted breakup
location to impact would be required to
account for all foreseeable forces that
can influence any debris impact
location, and all foreseeable sources of
impact dispersion. At a minimum, the
foreseeable sources of impact dispersion
must include the uncertainties in
atmospheric conditions, debris
aerodynamic parameters, pre-breakup
position and velocity, and breakupimparted velocities.204
Proposed § 450.135(c) would provide
performance-based regulations that
specify features of a valid exposure
model. An exposure model provides
critical input data on the geographical
location of people and critical assets at
various times when the launch or
reentry operation could occur. A debris
risk analysis must use an exposure
model that accounts for the distribution
of people and critical assets. The
exposure input data would be required
to include the entire region where there
is a significant probability of impact of
hazardous debris, to characterize the
distribution and vulnerability of people
and critical assets both geographically
and temporally, and to account for the
distribution of people in various
structure and vehicle types with a
resolution consistent with the
characteristic size of the impact
probability distributions for relevant
fragment groups. It would be required to
have sufficient temporal and spatial
resolution that a uniform distribution of
people within each defined region can
be treated as a single average set of
characteristics without degrading the
accuracy of any debris analysis output,
and to use accurate source data from
demographic sources, physical surveys,
or other methods. As well, the exposure
204 The level of fidelity of the analysis would be
subject to the requirements in proposed § 450.101(g)
which, as proposed, requires an operator’s flight
safety analysis method to use accurate data and
scientific principles and be statistically valid. The
method must produce results consistent with or
more conservative than the results available from
previous mishaps, tests, or other valid benchmarks,
such as higher-fidelity methods.
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input data would be required to be
regularly updated to account for recent
land-use changes, population growth,
migration, and construction. Finally, it
would be required to account for
uncertainty in the source data and
modeling approach.
In § 450.135(d), the proposal would
provide performance-based regulations
that set forth the features of a valid
casualty area and consequence analysis.
The proposal would include a definition
of casualty area in § 401.5. ‘‘Casualty
area’’ would mean the area surrounding
each potential debris or vehicle impact
point where serious injuries, or worse,
can occur. A debris risk analysis would
be required to model the casualty area
and compute the predicted
consequences of each reasonably
foreseeable vehicle response mode in
terms of conditional expected
casualties. The casualty area and
consequence analysis would be required
to account for all relevant debris
fragment characteristics and the
characteristics of a representative
person exposed to any potential debris
hazard; any direct impacts of debris
fragments, intact impact, or indirect
impact effects; and vulnerability of
people and critical assets to debris
impacts. The vulnerability of people
and critical assets to debris impacts
would be required to account for the
effects of buildings, ground vehicles,
waterborne vessel, and aircraft upon the
vulnerability of any occupants; for all
hazard sources, such as the potential for
any toxic or explosive energy releases;
and for indirect or secondary effects
such as bounce, splatter, skip, slide or
ricochet, including accounting for
terrain. It would also be required to
account for the effect of wind on debris
impact vector and toxic releases, and for
impact speed and angle (also accounting
for motion of vehicles). Finally, it would
be required to account for uncertainty in
fragment impact parameters, and
uncertainty in modeling methodology.
These broad performance-based items
would replace the unduly narrow and
prescriptive requirements in appendix
A which would give operators more
flexibility in demonstrating that public
risk criteria have been met.
In order to provide adequate
protection from public safety risks such
as the risk of casualties, it is important
that analyses used to protect public
safety account for all known influences
on the vulnerability of people and
critical assets. At the same time, the
proposal recognizes in § 450.101(g) that
a valid method must produce results
consistent with or more conservative
than the results available from previous
mishaps, tests, or other valid
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benchmarks. Hence, the proposal would
not require a vulnerability model to
account explicitly for each known
influence on the empirical results per
se, but the proposal would require that
a valid vulnerability model produce
results that are either consistent with
the standard in proposed § 450.101(g).
Proposed § 450.135(e) would list
application requirements, which are
designed to be more balanced and less
prescriptive and ambiguous than
current requirements in appendix A to
part 417, section A417. The proposal
would require an application to describe
the methods used to compute debris
impact distributions, population
exposure data, atmospheric data, as well
as how the operator proposes to account
for the conditions immediately prior to
enabling the launch or reentry flight, per
§ 450.135(e)(1) through (5).
Proposed § 450.135(e)(6) and (7)
would require an applicant to submit
sample debris risk analysis outputs,
including the effective unsheltered
casualty area for all fragment classes,
assuming a representative impact
vector; and the effective casualty area
for all fragments classes for a
representative type of building, ground
vehicle, waterborne vessel, and aircraft,
assuming a representative impact
vector. This is not a new requirement
because the effective casualty area was
always necessary for computing the EC.
The proposal would define effective
casualty area in § 401.5 as the aggregate
casualty area of each piece of debris
created by a vehicle failure at a
particular point on its trajectory. The
effective casualty area for each piece of
debris is a modeling construct in which
the area within which 100 percent of the
population are assumed to be a casualty,
and outside of which 100 percent of the
population are assumed not to be a
casualty.
In proposed § 450.135(e)(8), an
applicant would be required to submit
sample collective and individual
outputs under representative conditions
and the worst foreseeable conditions,
including the total collective casualty
expectation for the proposed operation;
a list of the collective risk contribution
for at least the top ten population
centers and all centers with collective
risk exceeding 1 percent of the
collective risk criterion in proposed
§ 450.101; a list of the maximum
individual PC for the top ten population
centers and all centers that exceed 10
percent of the individual risk criterion
in proposed § 450.101. The applicant
would also be required to submit a list
of the probability of loss of functionality
of any critical asset that exceeds 1
percent of the critical asset criterion in
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proposed § 450.101. Proposed
§ 450.135(e)(9) would require an
operator to submit a list of the
conditional collective casualty
expectation for each vehicle response
mode for each one-second interval of
flight under representative conditions
and the worst foreseeable conditions.
Finally, in all FSAs, the applicant must
also submit additional products that
allow an independent analysis, if
requested by the FAA, in order to assure
that the public risk criteria are satisfied.
13. Far-field Overpressure Blast Effects
The FAA proposes to consolidate its
regulations on far-field overpressure
blast effects analyses in proposed
§ 450.137 (Far-Field Overpressure Blast
Effect Analysis), used to demonstrate
compliance with the public safety
criteria in proposed § 450.101. This
analysis looks at the potential public
hazard from broken windows as a result
of impacting explosive debris, including
impact of an intact launch vehicle.
The near-field effects of explosions
are covered under debris risk analysis,
where meteorological conditions do not
significantly influence the attenuation
of overpressure. However, the FAA
would require a far-field blast effect
analysis for peak incident overpressures
below 1 pound per square inch (psi,) the
point where meteorological conditions
can significantly influence the
attenuation of explosive overpressures.
A launch and reentry operator would be
required to conduct a far-field
overpressure blast effects analysis (also
known as distance focusing
overpressure, or DFO) that demonstrates
compliance with public safety criteria in
proposed § 450.101. An operator would
need to complete the analysis either
prior to the day of the operation
accounting for all foreseeable conditions
within the flight commit criteria or
during the countdown using the best
available input data. An applicant
would be required to describe the
critical input data, such as the
meteorological measurements, and
develop flight commit criteria to include
any hazard controls derived from this
FSA in accordance with proposed
§ 450.165(b)(6).
Impacting explosive materials, both
liquid and solid, have the potential to
explode. Given the appropriate
combination of atmospheric pressure
and temperature gradients, the impact
explosion can produce distant focus
overpressure at significant distance from
the original blast point. Overpressures
from as low as 0.1 psi may cause
windows to break. However, other forms
of overpressure, such as multiple
pulses, may also prove hazardous
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depending on the size and thickness of
windows and the number of
windowpanes. Moreover, levels of
overpressure will change depending on
distance, atmospherics, and a vehicle’s
explosive yield.
Multiple historical events involving
large explosions, including rocket
failures, have shown that under
unfavorable atmospheric conditions, a
shock wave may focus to produce
significant peak overpressures at
communities beyond the boundaries of
the launch site, potentially causing
window breakage and injuries. In light
of the historical evidence of blast
damage due to overpressure focusing,
and building on the legacy of U.S.
agency efforts to protect against the
potential public risks associated with
rocket explosions, the FAA adopted
regulations to protect the public from
the DFO phenomena in § 417.229 (Farfield overpressure blast effect analysis)
and appendix A to part 417 (section
A417.29.) In § 417.229, the FAA
requires an FSA to establish flight
commit criteria that protect the public
from any hazard associated with DFO
effects and demonstrate compliance
with the public risk criterion. Section
417.229(b) currently lists appropriate
constraints on the analysis and section
A417.29 provides an acceptable means
of compliance. Section A417.29
includes hazard controls based on ANSI
S2.20–183 Standard,205 as well as a
standard and a measure of fidelity used
to assess any proposed alternative
analytic approach. Section A417.29 also
lists the products of a valid DFO
analysis.
However, current regulations lack
clarity on when a day-of-launch DFO
analysis is necessary. Specifically,
section A417.29(c) requires that an
operator conduct a risk analysis that
accounts for ‘‘current meteorological
conditions,’’ unless the operator
complies with the prescriptive
requirements in § 417.229(b) that
include the extremely conservative
method prescribed by the ANSI S2.20–
183 Standard. These requirements have
led to situations where an operator was
technically required to perform a day-oflaunch risk analysis to protect against
the DFO hazard, when in fact the public
risks due to the DFO phenomena were
insignificant based on every weather
condition measured over a period of
many years.
Part 431 does not explicitly address
the potential public hazard posed by
205 ANSI S2.20–1983, Estimating Air Blast
Characteristics for Single Point Explosions in Air,
with a Guide to Evaluation of Atmospheric
Propagation and Effects, Acoustical Society of
America, New York (1983).
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DFO. However, since 2016,
§ 431.35(b)(1)(i) has required an
applicant to demonstrate that the total
collective risk does not exceed 1 × 10¥4
EC, where the total risk consists of risk
posed by impacting inert and explosive
debris, toxic release, and far-field blast
overpressure. Because the RLVs
licensed to date under part 431 have
relatively low potential explosive yields
(compared to large ELVs), some part 431
license applicants were able to perform
hazard analyses based on the extremely
conservative method prescribed by the
ANSI S2.20–183 Standard to
demonstrate that the public risks due to
the DFO phenomena were insignificant.
The FAA proposes to streamline and
clarify its regulations on DFO analyses.
Whereas part 417 regulations and
relevant appendices contain
prescriptive methodology requirements
in Appendix A, the proposal would
distill these sections into performance
requirements applicable to both launch
and reentry flight operations.
Proposed § 450.137(a) would provide
applicants an option to perform a DFO
risk analysis that demonstrates
compliance with public safety criteria in
proposed § 450.101, either prior to the
day of the operation, by accounting for
all foreseeable conditions within the
flight commit criteria, or during the
countdown using the best available
input data. If an operator could satisfy
§ 450.137(a)(1), then it would not be
required to satisfy § 450.137(a)(2). There
are at least two different screening
analyses that would demonstrate
compliance with § 450.137(a)(1).
Method one would be a very simple
deterministic window breakage
screening analysis. Method two would
be a simplified risk-based screening
analysis. If either screening analysis
indicates no potential hazards or
insignificant risks, with or without
mitigations, then an operator would not
be required to comply with
§ 450.137(a)(2). Conversely, an operator
would be required to satisfy proposed
§ 450.137(a)(2) if it could not
demonstrate compliance with
§ 450.137(a)(1). Thus, the proposal
would provide clarity regarding how to
determine if a day-of-operations risk
analysis is necessary, and flexibility to
establish flight commit criteria to limit
the contribution of DFO public risks
based on analysis done prior to the day
of the operation. This clarity and
flexibility were lacking in both parts 417
and 431.
Proposed § 450.137(b) would set
required performance outcomes and the
specific factors that a DFO FSA must
consider. Substantively, § 450.137(b)
would contain the same requirements as
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those currently in § 417.229(b). Note
that the level of fidelity of the DFO
analysis would be subject to the
requirements in proposed § 450.101(g),
so that the analysis methods used must
produce results consistent with, or more
conservative than, the results available
from valid benchmarks.
Proposed § 450.137(c) would clarify
the materials an operator must submit
with its license application, which are
generally consistent with those
currently required to comply with part
417. This paragraph would clarify the
level of fidelity required for the
products of a DFO analysis by
specifying the key input data and
critical model elements that an
application would be required to
describe. The proposal would require an
application to include: (1) A description
of the population centers, terrain,
building types, and window
characteristics used as input to the farfield overpressure analysis; (2) a
description of the methods used to
compute the foreseeable explosive yield
probability pairs, and the complete set
of yield-probability pairs, used as input
to the far-field overpressure analysis; (3)
a description of the methods used to
compute peak incident overpressures as
a function of distance from the
explosion and prevailing meteorological
conditions, including sample
calculations for a representative range of
the foreseeable meteorological
conditions, yields, and population
center locations; (4) a description of the
methods used to compute the
probability of window breakage,
including tabular data and graphs for
the probability of breakage as a function
of the peak incident overpressure for a
representative range of window types,
building types, and yields accounted
for; (5) a description of the methods
used to compute the PC for a
representative individual, including
tabular data and graphs for the PC, as a
function of location relative to the
window and the peak incident
overpressure for a representative range
of window types, building types, and
yields accounted for; (6) tabular data
and graphs showing the hypothetical
location of any member of the public
that could be exposed to a PC of 1 ×
10¥5 or greater for neighboring
operations personnel, and 1 × 10¥6 or
greater for other members of the public,
given foreseeable meteorological
conditions, yields, and population
exposures; (7) the maximum expected
casualties that could result from farfield overpressure hazards greater given
foreseeable meteorological conditions,
yields, and population exposures; and
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(8) a description of the meteorological
measurements used as input to any realtime far-field overpressure analysis. It
would also require the submission of
any additional products that allow an
independent analysis, as requested by
the Administrator.
14. Toxic Hazards for Flight
The FAA proposes to replace current
§ 417.227 and appendix I to part 417
with the following two performancebased regulations: § 450.139 for toxic
hazard analyses for flight operations and
§ 450.187 for toxic hazards mitigation
for ground operations.
Currently, the requirements for a toxic
release hazard analysis are specified in
§ 417.227. Section 417.277 requires that
an FSA establish flight commit criteria
that protect the public from any hazard
associated with toxic release and
demonstrate compliance with the public
risk criteria of § 417.107(b). This
analysis must account for any toxic
release that will occur during the
proposed flight of a launch vehicle or
that would occur in the event of a flight
mishap, and for all members of the
public that may be exposed to toxic
release. Additionally, § 417.405 sets
forth the requirements for a ground
safety analysis, and, although toxic
release is not explicitly enumerated, a
launch operator must identify each
potential hazard including the sudden
release of a hazardous material.
Appendix I to part 417 provides
methodologies for performing toxic
release hazard analysis for the flight of
a launch vehicle and for launch
processing at a launch site in the U.S.
as required by § 417.407(f).
Similarly, § 431.35 requires that for a
reusable launch vehicle mission, an
applicant must demonstrate that the
proposed mission does not exceed the
acceptable risk defined in
§ 417.107(b)(1) that includes the risk
associated with toxic release. Further,
§ 431.35(c) requires that an applicant
employ a system safety process to
identify the hazards and assess the risks
to public health and safety of property
associated with the mission. Although
parts 431 and 435 have the same risk
criteria for toxic release as are contained
in part 417, unlike part 417, they have
no explicit requirements for establishing
toxic thresholds. Instead, toxic hazards
are addressed as part of the systems
safety process. The lack of definitive
requirements in parts 431 and 435 has
created a lack of clarity as to the
requirements for toxic release hazard
analysis during the system safety
process.
The current toxic hazard requirements
have a number of shortcomings. The
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requirements of § 417.227 are not
sufficiently definitive for an operator to
establish the toxic concentration and
exposure duration threshold for a toxic
propellant, to evaluate toxic hazards for
flight or for ground operations, to
determine a toxic hazard area in the
event of a release during flight or from
a ground operations mishap, or to
require toxic containment or evacuation
of the public from a toxic hazard area.
Conversely, the existing appendix I to
part 417 is overly prescriptive in
defining permissible values for
assumptions and data inputs to analyses
but, as discussed later, lacks important
items. In many instances, appendix I
requires specific methods, formulas,
acceptable sources, specific conditions,
and assumptions. However, often these
are not the only ways in which the
requirements or required
demonstrations can be made.
There are numerous examples of the
prescriptive nature of appendix I to part
417. For example, section I417.3(c)(1)
identifies only three agencies of the U.S.
Government, namely, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the
Federal Emergency Management
Agency, and the Department of
Transportation, that the launch operator
is permitted to use as sources of toxicant
levels of concern (LOC). There are no
common standards in toxicological
dose-response data. The data bases of
concentration thresholds are different
from agency to agency. Specific toxic
chemicals that are released may not be
included in some or many lists, and
some databases account for exposure
durations where others do not.
Additionally, some databases account
for differences in the age and
vulnerability of populations exposed,
while others do not. Furthermore, some
databases account for differences in the
severity of physiological responses to
exposure, when others do not.
Therefore, excluding available doseresponse databases limits the capability
of the operator to select the most
appropriate LOC. Other U.S
Government agencies that have
established airborne toxic concentration
thresholds of exposure, including the
National Research Council (NRC), the
U.S. Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH), the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), the American Conference of
Government Industrial Hygienists
(ACGIH), the U.S. Department of
Defense, the National Institutes of
Health (NIH), the U.S. National Institute
of Medicine, and the U.S. National
Library of Medicine.
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Other prescriptive examples in
Appendix I include section I417.3(c)(3)
which requires the launch operator to
use only one formulation to determine
the toxic concentration threshold for
mixtures of two or more toxicants, and
section I417.5(c)(2), which prescribes a
set of single-valued worst-case
conditions that a launch operator must
apply in an analysis of toxic hazard
conditions for uncommon or unique
propellants. Other sections of the
appendix mandate specific
assumptions.206
In addition to being overly
prescriptive, Appendix I also contains
inaccuracies and out of date
information. For example, section
I417.7(b) (Process hazards analysis)
provides that an analysis that complies
with 29 CFR 1910.119(e) satisfies
section I417.7(b)(1) and (2). However,
the specific requirements of 29 CFR
1910.119(e) are not completely
congruent with the specific
requirements of section I417.7(b)(1) and
(2). In particular, the following
requirements of section I417.7(b)(2) do
not have counterparts in § 1910.119(e):
location of the source of the release;
each opportunity for equipment
malfunction or human error that can
cause an accidental release; and each
safeguard used or needed to control
each hazard or prevent equipment
malfunctions or human error. Thus, if
an operator chooses to satisfy
§ 1910.119(e), important parts of section
I417.7(b)(2) may not be addressed, such
as the location of the source of the
release which is needed to determine
the toxic hazard area necessary to
achieve toxic containment.
The tables in appendix I are also
problematic and in many cases omit
important information. For example,
Table I417–1, Commonly Used NonToxic Propellants, contains only three
propellants, designated as commonly
used non-toxic propellants. However,
this list leaves other non-toxic liquid
propellants such as liquid methane or
liquefied natural gas without an explicit
exemption from performing a toxic
release hazard analysis.
The FAA proposes to consolidate the
requirements for toxic release analysis
for the launch of an ELV currently
contained in parts 415 and 417, the
206 For example, section I417.7(e)(2), the worstcase release scenario for toxic liquids, requires an
assumption that liquid spreads to one centimeter
deep, and that the volatilization rate must account
for the highest daily maximum temperature
occurring the past 3 years precluding more severe
or more realistic worst-case conditions, such as
assuming the liquid spreads to a lesser depth,
exposing a greater surface area for evaporation. This
may not be conservative enough to provide
acceptable public safety in some cases.
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launch and reentry of an RLV in part
431, and the launch of a reentry vehicle
other than a reusable launch vehicle in
part 435. Specifically, the FAA proposes
to replace current § 417.227 and
appendix I to part 417, with two
performance-based regulations—
proposed §§ 450.139 and 450.187. The
proposed requirements would apply to
all launches and reentries, and would
provide more definitive application
requirements for the toxic release
hazard analysis.
Both proposed §§ 450.139 and
450.187 would apply to launch and
reentry vehicles, including all
components and payloads that have
toxic propellants or other toxic
chemicals, making it explicitly clear
that reentry operations require a toxic
hazard release analysis where the
requirement was not previously explicit
in parts 431 and 435. The FAA decided
to split the toxic release analysis
regulations into two sections, one for
flight and the other for ground
operations, because ground operations
and flight operations have different
criteria available to establish an
acceptable level of public safety.
Specifically, the FAA proposes to apply
a quantitative public risk acceptability
criteria for flight consistent with the risk
criteria in § 450.101 and to apply a
qualitative hazard acceptability criterion
for ground hazards that is consistent
with the standard in § 450.109(a)(3).207
Proposed § 450.139(b)(1) would
require an operator to conduct a toxic
release hazard analysis. Additionally,
under paragraph (b)(2) an operator
would be required to manage the risk of
casualties that could arise from
exposure to toxic release either through
containing hazards in accordance with
proposed § 450.139(d) or performing a
toxic risk assessment under proposed
paragraph (e) that protects the public in
compliance with proposed § 450.101,
including toxic release. Furthermore,
under proposed § 450.139(b)(3) an
operator would be required to establish
flight commit criteria based on the
results of its toxic release hazard
analysis, containment analysis, or toxic
risk assessment for any necessary
evacuation of the public from any toxic
hazard area.
Section 450.139(c) would contain the
requirements for a toxic release hazard
analysis, which are currently lacking in
207 Section 450.109(a)(3) would require that the
risk associated with each hazard meets the
following criteria: (i) The likelihood of any
hazardous condition that may cause death or
serious injury to the public must be extremely
remote and (ii) the likelihood of any hazardous
condition that may cause major damage to public
property or critical assets must be remote.
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§ 417.227. Specifically, under proposed
§ 450.139(c) the toxic release hazard
analysis would require an operator to
account for any toxic releases that could
occur during nominal or non-nominal
launch or reentry for flight operation.
Furthermore, an operator’s toxic release
hazard analysis would be required to
include a worst-case release scenario
analysis or a maximum-credible release
scenario analysis for each process that
involves a toxic propellant or other
chemical; determine if toxic release can
occur based on an evaluation of the
chemical compositions and quantities of
propellants, other chemicals, vehicle
materials, and projected combustion
products, and the possible toxic release
scenarios; account for both normal
combustion products and any unreacted
propellants and phase change or
molecular derivatives of released
chemicals; and account for any
operational constraints and emergency
procedures that provide protection from
toxic release. While the proposed
§ 450.139(c) would contain more
definitive requirements than current
regulations, it would also provide the
operator more flexibility in the analysis
because unlike the current regulations it
would not require an operator to make
specific assumptions when performing a
worst-case release scenario analysis to
determine worst-case released quantities
of toxic propellants, toxic liquids, or
toxic gases from ground operations.
Proposed § 450.139(b)(2) would
require an operator to manage the risk
of casualties arising from toxic release
either by containing the hazards in
accordance with paragraph (d) or by
performing a toxic risk assessment in
accordance with paragraph (e) that
protects the public in compliance with
the risk criteria of § 450.101. If an
operator chose toxic containment to
comply with proposed § 450.139(b)(2),
the operator would be required to
manage the risk of casualties by either
(1) evacuating, or being prepared to
evacuate, the public from a toxic hazard
area, where an average member of the
public would be exposed to greater than
one percent conditional individual PC in
the case of worst-case release or
maximum credible release scenario, or
(2) by employing meteorological
constraints to limit a launch operation
to times when the prevailing winds
would transport a toxic release away
from populated areas otherwise at risk.
The conditional individual PC would be
computed assuming that (1) a maximum
credible release event occurs, and (2)
average members of the public are
present along the boundary of the toxic
hazard area.
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If an operator chose to comply with
proposed § 450.139(b)(2) by conducting
a toxic risk assessment that protects the
public in compliance with proposed
§ 450.101, in accordance with
§ 450.139(e), the toxic risk assessment
would require the operator to account
for airborne concentration and duration
thresholds of toxic propellants or other
chemicals. For any toxic propellant,
other chemicals, or combustion product,
an operator would be required to use
airborne toxic concentration and
duration thresholds identified in a
means of compliance accepted by the
Administrator. Currently, the thresholds
set by the Acute Exposure Guideline
Level 2 (AEGL–2), the Emergency
Response Planning Guidelines Level 2
(ERPG–2), or the Short-term Public
Emergency Guidance Level (SPEGL) 208
would be accepted means of compliance
for proposed § 450.139(e)(1) (and
§ 450.187(d)(1)). These are thresholds
designed to anticipate casualty-causing
health effects from exposure to certain
airborne chemical concentrations. The
FAA anticipates, as discussed earlier,
that additional agencies’ threshold
values could satisfy the requirements
and would identify any additional
accepted thresholds. By requiring an
operator to use airborne toxic
concentration thresholds identified in a
means of compliance accepted by the
Administrator under proposed § 450.35,
the FAA anticipates that operators
would be provided with some flexibility
to utilize toxic concentration thresholds
identified by agencies other than the
three currently identified in appendix I
to part 417 thereby enhancing the
capability of the operator to select the
most appropriate LOC for its operation.
An operator also would be required
under § 450.139(e)(2) to account for
physical phenomena (such as
meteorological conditions and
characterization of the terrain) expected
to influence any toxic concentration and
duration in the area surrounding the
potential release site instead of
prescribing a set of single-valued wind
speed and atmospheric stability classes
and dictating how an operator must
derive the variance of the mean wind
directions. Hence, under proposed
§ 450.139(e)(2) the toxic assessment
would likely be more appropriate for the
actual situation. Proposed
§ 450.139(e)(3) would require an
operator to determine a toxic hazard
area for the launch or reentry,
surrounding the potential release site for
208 AEGLs are used by EPA, the American
Industrial Hygiene Association’s ERPGs are used by
NOAA, and the National Research Council’s SPEGL
is used by the DOD.
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each toxic propellant or other chemical
based on the amount and toxicity of the
propellant or other chemical, the
exposure duration, and the
meteorological conditions involved.
Finally, under proposed § 450.139(e)(4)
and (5) the toxic assessment would be
required to account for all members of
the public that may be exposed to the
toxic release, including all members of
the public on land and on any
waterborne vessels, populated offshore
structures, and aircraft that are not
operated in direct support of the launch
or reentry, and for any risk mitigation
measures applied in the risk assessment.
In many respects, proposed
§§ 450.139 and 450.187 are nearly
identical, and the rationale behind the
revisions proposed in § 450.139 would
be the same for proposed § 450.187. As
discussed previously, proposed
§ 450.187 would apply to any launch or
reentry vehicle, including all vehicle
components and payloads, that uses
toxic propellants or other toxic
chemicals. Like § 450.139, § 450.187(b)
would require a toxic hazard analysis.
Under the proposed rule an operator
would be required to manage risk from
a toxic release hazard or demonstrate
compliance with proposed
§ 450.109(a)(3) 209 with a toxic risk
assessment. The requirements for a toxic
risk assessment under proposed
§ 450.187(e) are substantially similar to
those of proposed § 450.139, except that
ground operations use a qualitative
acceptability criteria and flight
operations can use quantitative risk
criteria. FAA has not proposed
quantitative criteria for ground
operations because there are no
commonly accepted criteria.
The proposed application
requirements under § 450.139(f) toxic
hazards for flight and under § 450.187(e)
for ground operations would be similar.
The FAA believes that the proposed
approach will provide applicants with a
clear understanding of what the FAA
requires in order to avoid repeated
requests for clarifications and additional
information. Both would require the
applicant to submit: (1) The identity of
the toxic propellant, chemical, or toxic
combustion products or derivatives in
the possible toxic release; (2) its selected
airborne toxic concentration and
duration thresholds; (3) meteorological
conditions for the atmospheric
209 As discussed earlier, § 450.109(a)(3) would
require that the risk associated with each hazard
meets the following criteria: (i) The likelihood of
any hazardous condition that may cause death or
serious injury to the public must be extremely
remote and (ii) the likelihood of any hazardous
condition that may cause major damage to public
property or critical assets must be remote.
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transport, and buoyant cloud rise of any
toxic release from its source to
downwind receptor locations; (4)
characterization of the terrain; (5) the
identity of the toxic dispersion model
used, and any other input data; (6)
representative results of toxic dispersion
modeling to predict concentrations and
durations at selected downwind
receptor locations; (7) a description of
the failure modes and associated
relative probabilities for potential toxic
release scenarios used in the risk
evaluation; (8) the methodology and
representative results of the worst-case
or maximum-credible quantity of any
toxic release; (9) a demonstration that
the public will not be exposed to
airborne concentrations above the toxic
concentration and duration thresholds;
(10) the population density in receptor
locations that are identified by toxic
dispersion modeling as toxic hazard
areas; and (11) a description of any risk
mitigations applied in the toxic risk
assessment; and (12) the identity of the
population database used. Like other
risk analyses, the FAA may request
additional products that allow the FAA
to conduct an independent analysis.
15. Wind Weighting for the Flight of an
Unguided Suborbital Launch Vehicle
The FAA proposes to consolidate
three current part 417 provisions
expressly regulating unguided
suborbital launch vehicle operations
into § 450.141. The proposed rule would
retain the performance requirements
and remove the prescriptive provisions
in §§ 417.125 and 417.233. The FAA
also proposes to incorporate the
overarching safety performance
requirements in appendix C to part 417
related to wind weighting analysis
products. This proposal applies
specifically to the flight of unguided
suborbital launch vehicles using wind
weighting to meet the public safety
criteria of proposed § 450.101.
An unguided suborbital launch
vehicle is a suborbital rocket that does
not contain active guidance or a
directional control system. Unlike the
launch of a guided launch vehicle, an
unguided suborbital launch vehicle may
safely fly by adjusting the launcher
azimuth and elevation (aiming the
rocket) shortly before launch to correct
for the effects of wind conditions at the
time of flight. This process limits impact
locations to those that minimize public
exposure. The FAA refers to this safety
process as ‘‘wind weighting,’’ which
involves unique organizational and
operational safety requirements.
Section 417.125 provides the broad
requirements for launching an unguided
suborbital launch vehicle. Specifically,
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it lays out provisions for a flight safety
system, a wind weighting safety system,
public risk criteria, stability, tracking,
and post launch review. Section
417.125(b) requires an applicant to use
an FSS if the vehicle can reach a
populated area and the applicant does
not use an effective wind weighting
system. Section 417.125(c) sets
requirements for a wind weighting
system if that system is used in place of
an FSS. It provides that the vehicle must
not contain a guidance or directional
control system. It also requires the
launcher azimuth and elevation setting
to be wind weighted to correct for the
effects of wind conditions at the time of
flight in compliance with § 417.233’s
FSA requirements, and requires specific
nominal launcher elevation angle for
proven (85°, and 86° with wind
correction) and unproven (80°, and 84°
with wind correction) unguided
suborbital launch vehicles. These
prescriptive launch elevation angles are
used so that the vehicle does not fly
uprange. In other words, the rocket
should not be angled so vertically that
winds could force the rocket uprange
instead of the intended downrange
direction. Section 417.125(d) expressly
requires unguided suborbital launch
vehicles to fly in accordance with the
public risk criteria required for all
launch vehicles under part 417.
In addition, the current rule has
stability, tracking, and post-launch
review requirements that are specific to
unguided suborbital launch vehicles.
Section § 417.125(e) requires specific
stability requirements measured in
calibers to ensure that the unguided
suborbital launch vehicle is stable
throughout flight. The tracking
requirements in § 417.125(f) require that
a launch operator track impact locations
after launch to verify that the preflight
wind weighting analysis was accurate.
Section 417.125(g) is related to postlaunch review and states that the launch
operator must provide these impact
locations, a comparison of actual to
predicted nominal performance, and
investigation results of any launch
anomaly.
Current § 417.233 describes the FSA
requirements particular to unguided
suborbital launch vehicles with wind
weighting systems. The analyses must
establish flight commit criteria, wind
constraints under which launch may
occur, and launcher azimuth and
elevation settings that correct for wind
effects on the launch vehicle. This last
requirement is known as the wind
weighting analysis.
Appendix C to part 417 contains flight
safety methodologies and products for
an unguided suborbital launch vehicle
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flown with a wind weighting safety
system. These includes methodologies
and products for a trajectory analysis, a
wind weighting analysis, a debris
analysis, a risk analysis, and a collision
avoidance analysis. Section C417.3
requires the launch operator perform a
six-degrees-of-freedom trajectory
simulation in order to determine a
nominal trajectory, impact point, and
potential three-sigma dispersions about
the nominal impact point. Section
C417.5 is related to wind weighting and
describes the methodology an applicant
must use to measure winds and
incorporate them into the trajectory
simulation in order to determine launch
elevation angle and azimuth settings.
The debris (section C417.7) and risk
(section C417.9) analyses describe
methodologies and analysis products
applicable to all launch vehicles for
calculating EC. The parts of appendix C
that are covered elsewhere in the
proposed rule because they are
applicable to all vehicles have not been
transferred to proposed § 450.141. This
includes the debris, risk, and collision
avoidance analyses.
Proposed § 450.141 would consolidate
the requirements of §§ 417.125 and
417.233 and appendix C, but would not
carry over the detailed methodological
and prescriptive requirements. Proposed
§ 450.141(a) would explain that the
section applies to the flight of an
unguided suborbital launch vehicle
using a wind weighting safety system to
meet the public safety criteria of
proposed § 450.101. The FAA proposes
to define a wind weighting safety
system as equipment, procedures,
analysis, and personnel functions used
to determine the launcher elevation and
azimuth setting that correct for wind
effects that an unguided suborbital
launch vehicle will experience during
flight. The FAA proposes the wind
weighting safety system be a means to
satisfy the safety requirements in
proposed § 450.101.
Proposed § 450.141(b) would set the
requirements for the wind weighting
safety system. It would require that the
launcher azimuth and elevation angle
settings (1) be wind weighted to correct
for the effects of wind conditions at the
time of flight to provide a safe impact
location, and (2) ensure the rocket will
not fly in an unintended direction given
wind uncertainties. This section would
replace current § 417.125(b), which
requires a flight safety system unless the
vehicle uses wind weighting or does not
have sufficient energy to reach a
populated area. Rather than the blanket
FSS requirement in current § 417.125(b),
the consequence analysis in proposed
§ 450.135(d) would determine the need
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for an FSS. This section also eliminates
the requirement in § 417.125(c)(3)
regarding specific nominal launcher
elevation angle for proven (85° and 86°
with wind correction) and unproven
(80° and 84° with wind correction)
vehicles to prevent the vehicle from
flying uprange. Rather than requiring
specific launcher elevation angles to
prevent a vehicle from flying uprange,
the FAA would require an operator to
determine what angles would ensure the
rocket not fly in unintended direction
given wind uncertainties. This
flexibility would allow a licensee to
determine the best angle to both
maximize mission objectives given the
particularities of their operation while
simultaneously ensuring safety.
Proposed § 450.141(c) would contain
FSA performance requirements that
apply only to the launch of an unguided
suborbital launch vehicle flown with a
wind weighting safety system. It is
necessary to establish the flight commit
criteria and other flight safety rules to
control risk to the public and satisfies
the public safety criteria in proposed
§ 450.101. Proposed § 450.141(c) would
require an operator to establish any
wind constraints under which launch
could occur, and conduct a wind
weighting analysis that establishes the
launcher azimuth and elevation settings.
Proposed § 450.141(c) is, in essence, the
same as § 417.233.
Proposed § 450.141(d) would require
an unguided suborbital launch vehicle
to remain stable in all configurations
throughout each stage of powered flight.
This performance outcome would
eliminate the need for the specific
prescriptive stability requirements of
current § 417.125(e), which requires a
suborbital launch vehicle be stable in
flexible body to 1.5 calibers and rigid
body to 2.0 calibers throughout each
stage of powered flight.
Finally, proposed § 450.141(e) would
establish the agency’s application
requirements specific to unguided
suborbital launch vehicles. The FAA
would require a description of wind
weighting analysis methods, description
of wind weighting system and
equipment, and a sample wind
weighting analysis, all derived from part
417, appendix C, section C417.5(d). The
remainder of appendix C was not
included in the proposal because these
are all prescriptive methodologies, or
are requirements applying to all launch
vehicles covered in other sections of the
proposal. For instance, the Trajectory
Analysis of section C417.3 would be
covered by proposed §§ 450.117 and
450.119. Except for section C417.5(d) as
described earlier, section C417.5 was
not included in the proposal since this
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is a prescriptive methodology. The
methodologies for debris analysis from
section C417.7 are not in the proposal
and the debris analysis proposal would
now be in proposed § 450.121.
Similarly, section C417.9 would be
covered by proposed § 450.135 without
the prescribed methodologies. Lastly,
the collision avoidance section of the
appendix, section C417.11 would be
covered by proposed § 450.169.
B. Software
As discussed earlier, the FAA
proposes software safety requirements
in § 450.111. The risk mitigation
measures that result from this rule are
meant to be minimums, and software
development processes tend to benefit
from consistency across projects, so an
applicant may apply the requirements
from its most critical software to all of
its software, but the FAA does not
require that an applicant do so.
Software can contribute to accidents
or losses in several ways. Software may
contain errors that, in certain system
conditions, cause unintended behaviors
or prevent intended behaviors. Software
may also perform actions that while
correct and intended in isolation, cause
hazards when interacting with other
components or the system as a whole.
Software may provide accurate
information to an operator in a manner
that confuses the operator, leading to a
software-human interaction error.
Software safety therefore typically
requires separate analyses of the
software, software and computing
system interaction, and the integration
of software, hardware, and humans into
the entire system.
Software becomes safety-critical when
the applicant uses its outputs in safety
decisions. The development, validation,
and evaluation of safety-critical software
requires a level of rigor commensurate
with the severity of the potential
hazards and the software’s degree of
control over those hazards. Reliance on
software differs among operators. For
example, some launch systems employ
Autonomous Flight Safety Systems
(AFSS) that rely on rigorouslydeveloped and thoroughly-tested
software to make safety decisions to
protect the public without human
intervention. Other systems require
human intervention to make safety
decisions, such as when a pilot or
ground transmitter operator must make
decisions for launch systems.
Current FAA licensing regulations
segregate software safety requirements
by type of vehicle (ELV, RLV, or reentry
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vehicle) in three separate sections.210
Current software safety regulations in
parts 415, 417, and 431 are flexible.
With this flexibility comes uncertainty.
For example, § 415.123(b) requires that
a launch operator provide all plans for
software development, the results of
software hazard analyses, and plans and
results of software validation and
verification, but does not give guidance
on the minimum-acceptable levels of
rigor for those products or guidance on
their contents. The FAA and the
operator must determine the appropriate
level of rigor, scope, and content of each
plan and result for each operation. This
process can be labor-intensive, requiring
multiple meetings over a period of
weeks or months.
Also, § 417.123(c), applicable to ELVs,
requires that a launch operator conduct
computing system and software hazard
analyses for the integrated system. This
requirement does not specify the
requisite forms of the analyses, the
scope and contents of the analyses, or
the application data required to
demonstrate compliance with the
requirement. The FAA and the
applicant must negotiate the specifics
for each of those items for every
application. Similarly, § 417.123(d)
requires that a launch operator develop
and implement computing system and
software validation and verification
plans, but is silent regarding the
contents of the plans. This again
requires that the FAA and the applicant
discuss, often at length, the software test
plans for every operation.
Unlike §§ 415.123 and 417.123,
§ 431.35 does not contain any explicit
references to software safety. However,
in practice, the FAA has set software
safety requirements under the current
system safety process requirements in
§ 431.35(c). Pursuant to § 431.35(c), the
FAA has required applicants satisfy
§ 417.123 or demonstrate an equivalent
level of safety, in order to meet § 431.35
for software safety. This lack of detail
forces the FAA and applicant to work
collaboratively to develop the system
safety process criteria on a case-by-case
basis.
Operators have offered consistent
feedback on the FAA’s software safety
requirements. Applicants frequently
asked whether §§ 417.123(b) and
431.35(c)’s verification and validation
plan requirement included a
requirement for independent
verification and validation. Independent
verification and validation is a common
210 Part 415 covers launch license application
procedures for ELVs; part 417 addresses launch
safety requirements for ELVs, and part 431 sets
launch license and safety requirements for RLVs.
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and effective method of mitigating
software hazards for high-criticality
software, one for which there is no
known substitute. Thus, although not
explicitly stated in the regulations, the
FAA has required independent
verification and validation as part of the
verification and validation requirements
in §§ 417.123(b) and 431.35(c). The FAA
considers software testers independent
when the test organization is
independent of the development
organization up to the senior-executive
level. Generally, an in-house software
testing team can be sufficiently
independent to perform a credible
independent verification and validation
function when rigorously insulated from
software development authorities and
incentives. Still more independence
may be required for highly safetycritical autonomous software, such as an
independent contractor, depending on
the risks and the other mitigation
measures implemented by the applicant.
The FAA has required at least
independence up to the seniormanagement level and expected an
applicant to show evidence of this
independence in its application.
Applicants have also often asked
whether the FAA requires submissions
of software code. The FAA has not
historically required executable code
submissions and does not plan to do so
in this proposal. Instead, the FAA’s
requirements focus on the software
development and testing processes,
combined with analysis of the
software’s use in the context of the
system as a whole. Firstly, the FAA
seeks to understand the software
development processes used for the
design, production, verification, and
qualification of software to determine
the code quality. Proposed § 450.111(a),
(b), and (c) would provide these general
software process requirements that are
independent of the degree of control
exercised by a given software
component. Secondly, the FAA must
understand the impacts of the software
on the system as a whole. It is important
to understand design risks, which are
those risks inherent to the software
design and architecture; and also
process risks, which arise from the
software development processes and
standards of the applicant. The FAA
uses these two components, process and
implementation, to evaluate software
components and processes for the
appropriate level of rigor.
The FAA must also understand the
relationship between software actions
and system risks to set the appropriate
level of rigor. Establishing the required
level of rigor and understanding its
implementation form the basis of
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software safety determinations.
Configuration management, including
version control, then ensures the
operator uses the intended processes
and functionality for the correct
software in the system’s operation.
Applicants have often sought help in
determining whether software is safetycritical in accordance with §§ 417.123(b)
and 415.123(a). For instance, operators
sometimes use software to generate
information used in safety-critical
decisions, such as initiating a deorbit
burn. The FAA has consistently found
software that generates information used
in safety-critical decisions to be safetycritical software, albeit with a low
degree of control over the system.
Applicants have also asked whether
the FAA requires redundant processing
such as running a second instance of a
software component on a second
independent computer, and if so, the
required level of risk. The FAA has
made such determinations based on the
hazards involved and on the software’s
degree of control over those hazards.
The FAA has chosen not to prescribe a
requirement for redundant processing
because such a requirement is best
derived from the applicant’s individual
approach to hazard mitigation at the
system level. Redundant copies of
identical software contain identical
software faults, so redundant processing
is best described as a mitigation for
hardware failures. The proposal would
allow for software without redundant
processing whenever processing
redundancy is not necessary to achieve
acceptable risk. For example, the FAA
may not require redundant processing
in fail-safe systems, low-criticality
systems, or where hardware ensures
software processing integrity by using
hardware features such as watchdog
timers or error-correcting memory.
In light of the range of design
strategies between commercial space
operators, the FAA realized that a onesize-fits-all approach to software safety
would not be practical. Instead, in
proposed § 450.111(d) through (g) the
FAA would establish requirements for
each safety category of software. The
safety categories, commonly known in
the software safety industry as ‘‘levels of
rigor’’ or ‘‘software criticality indexes,’’
would range from autonomous software
with catastrophic hazards to software
with no safety impact.
Applicants may rely upon Federal
launch range standards to show
compliance with the proposed rule,
provided the standards meet the
regulations. The FAA maintains
awareness of the Federal launch range
safety standards through the CSWG. The
FAA currently incorporates the known
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and coordinated standards maintained
by the Federal launch ranges into FAA
licensing in order to avoid duplication
of effort. The Federal launch ranges
have an extensive launch safety history,
and their standards meet or exceed the
level of safety required by the FAA. The
FAA intends to retain the ability to
apply Federal launch range safety
standards toward license evaluation and
issuance.
In developing this proposed rule, the
FAA has tried to remain consistent with
prevalent industry standards related to
the ‘‘level of rigor’’ approach to software
safety. Specifically, the FAA has used
the level of rigor approaches applied by
the Department of Defense and NASA to
inform the FAA’s proposed level of rigor
approach to software safety regulation.
The FAA proposes to use the
Department of Defense’s MIL–STD–
882E concept of ‘‘level of rigor’’ to
categorize software according to the
amount of risk it presents to the
operation and use its ‘‘level of rigor
tasks’’ to derive appropriate regulatory
requirements for each level of rigor.
MIL–STD–882E uses a software hazard
severity category with a software control
category to assign level of rigor tasks to
software. This method has proven
successful in achieving an acceptable
level of safety for space operations.
The FAA also used RCC 319, Flight
Termination Systems Commonality
Standard, to develop the requirements
for autonomous software in proposed
§ 450.111(d). RCC 319–14 provides
detailed software requirements for
autonomous flight safety systems, which
have been extensively reviewed by the
space community. RCC 319–14 creates
software categories that combine hazard
severity and degree of control in a single
step, and provides deep detail on the
appropriate risk reduction tasks for each
category. AFSPCMAN 91–712 (draft) is
the source of RCC 319–14’s software
categories and risk reduction tasks.
The FAA also reviewed NASA’s
Software Safety Standard (NASA–STD–
8719.13C), which provides standards
applicable to defining the requirements
for implementing a systematic approach
to software safety. Like RCC 319–14,
NASA–STD–8719.13C combines
software hazard’s severity with the
software’s degree of control to assign
analysis and testing tasks. However,
NASA expands its software control
category definitions to include software
autonomy, software complexity, timecriticality, and degree of hazard control.
The FAA also considered NASA’s
Software Assurance Standard (NASA–
STD–8739.8), which provides criticality,
risk, resource investment, and financial
impact categorizations and correlates
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these to levels of software assurance
effort. These two NASA documents
provided the FAA with a wealth of
potential software safety requirements
and methods to determine the
requirements that would be most
appropriate for a variety of space
systems. These documents also
provided a checklist of key aspects of
software projects that enable software
safety. The FAA has drawn from these
documents the minimum set of
requirements that would enable space
operators to protect the public, and the
minimum set of data that would enable
the FAA to verify that space operators
will protect the public in the course of
their innovations.
Finally, the FAA reviewed the Air
Force Space Command’s draft 91–712,
Launch Safety Software and Computing
System Requirements. The Air Force
has successfully used 91–712 for
military space projects and it is the
source of many RCC 319–14
requirements. 91–712, and the standards
discussed earlier, all prescribe
increasing the effort devoted to software
safety in proportion to the severity of
the hazards that software can create and
in proportion to the degree of control
that software exercises over those
hazards.
The proposed software safety
regulations would categorize software
and computing functions into the
following degrees of control as defined
in proposed § 450.111(d) through (g):
Autonomous software, semiautonomous software, redundant faulttolerant software, influential software,
and no safety impact.
This proposal for software safety
would address the causes of software
faults and software failures. Software
faults are design flaws in software that
cause unintended behaviors or prevent
intended behaviors. Software faults
include errors in syntax, definitions,
steps, or processes that can cause a
program to produce an unintended or
unanticipated result. The presence of
software faults might not always result
in an observable software failure that is
evident to the user because it may
appear to be behaving properly. A
software failure, in contrast, is an
unintended or undesirable event caused
by, or unintentionally allowed by, one
or more software faults. A software fault
is a defect or vulnerability in software
while a software failure results from the
execution of faulty software.211
211 An example of a software failure is the ‘‘blue
screen of death,’’ which causes a computer to end
all processing. An example of software fault is a
fault in requirements for measurement units and a
fault in test procedures. The Mars Climate Orbiter
was lost as a result of these two faults when one
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This proposal would address faults in
software requirements by analytical
means in proposed § 450.111.
Specifically, the proposal would require
an applicant to describe the functions
and features, including interfaces, of the
software. The FAA has interpreted the
need to describe software to include
providing the software requirements for
each safety-critical software component
even though not explicitly required by
§ 431.35 or § 417.123. The proposal
therefore codifies current practice.
Software requirements are an
excellent, even indispensable, means of
understanding any software
component’s safety implications.
Software requirements, both
documented and implied, are the basis
of the software design and constitute a
key part of § 417.123(a) through (e)
requirement for software designs. The
FAA proposes to clarify the necessity
and scope of software requirements that
would be required to be included in an
application in proposed § 450.111(h).
Software requirements would need to be
documented and analyzed whenever
safety-critical software is present.212
Software requirements are frequently
inherited from system requirements,
and both must be internally and
mutually consistent and valid for the
resulting software to work safely. A
system-level hazard analysis finds out
what hazards software presents to the
system. The software analyses can use
the system-level analyses as initial
assessments of software’s criticality
when starting software safety analyses.
If software requirements are flawed, the
software written to those software
requirements will be flawed as well.
This causal path, where software faults
originate in software requirements, is
the reason for the proposal’s focus on
identification, documentation,
validation, and verification of software
requirements.
This proposal addresses faults in
implementation by requiring specific
types of software verification and
validation testing in proposed
§ 450.111(d)(4), (e)(4), (f)(3), and (g)(2).
This proposal would clarify the required
types of software verification and
validation testing that are required
under current §§ 417.123(d) and
415.123(b)(8).213 Verification and
validation are standard aspects of a
function was written in English units while the rest
were written in metric.
212 Implied or undocumented software
requirements are common sources of software
faults.
213 Examples of testing include unit testing to
verify some of the smallest units of code, such as
functions, and acceptance testing to validate highlevel software requirements.
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software development cycle and are
used together to determine that software
meets its intended purpose. In this
context, verification refers to ensuring
software meets the software
requirements and design specifications.
Validation ensures that the software
achieves its intended purpose.214 While
testing does not ensure the absence of
software faults, it helps detect and
therefore reduce their presence.
The proposal would address faults in
configuration with explicit requirements
to establish and verify software
configuration management processes.
Configuration management is the set of
processes that ensure that the flight
components, including software
components, are the correct components
with the appropriate development and
test heritage. Faults in configuration
management can lead to unsuitable or
incompatible components in a system,
resulting in an increased potential for
unintended and unsafe system actions.
Proposed § 450.111(a) would require
operators to document a process that
identifies the risks to the public health
and safety and the safety of property
arising from computing systems and
software. This is consistent with the
§ 417.123(a) requirement for a
description of the computing system
and software system safety process. It
adds no more requirements than part
415 because § 415.123(b)(6) requires an
applicant to describe the computing
system and software system safety
process as required by § 417.123(a).
Unlike § 431.35(c), proposed
§ 450.111(a) specifically mentions
computing systems and software as
items to be included in the system
safety process.
Proposed § 450.111(b) would require
an operator to identify all safety-critical
functions associated with its computing
systems and software. The 10 listed
functions are a minimum set of items to
include whenever they are present in a
system, because they represent the most
common safety-critical roles in which
software can be employed. For example,
software used to control or monitor
safety-critical systems is capable of
hazardous actions by definition.
Similarly, software that accesses safetycritical data is safety-critical because it
may alter safety-critical data or prevent
other components from accessing safetycritical data at required times. The
software safety process must then
demonstrate that the software that
accesses safety-critical data cannot
214 Verification takes place while the software is
under development while validation is performed
after completing software development and
implementation.
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cause a hazard by doing so. These
requirements are the same as in the
current § 417.123(b), with the addition
of one new criterion for software that
displays safety-critical information.
Proposed § 450.111 would retain the
requirement of § 417.123(b) for the
identification of safety-critical
functions. The proposal would add
detail and clarity to this requirement,
specifying that the identified functions
must be accompanied by assessments of
the criticality of each software function.
This is normally done by assessing the
consequences of a functional failure or
error and assessing the degree of control
that the software can exercise to
implement the function. The proposal
would retain the examples of software
that may have safety-critical functions,
with the expectation that the full list of
safety-critical functions is not limited to
the examples. It differs from
§ 415.123(b), which describes the
documents and materials that the
applicant must provide, whereas
proposed § 450.111(b) would list the
safety-critical computing system and
software functions that must be
identified and would not list the
application requirements in the same
section. The proposal would depart
from § 431.35(d)(3) by specifically
requiring the applicant to identify all
safety-critical functions associated with
its computing systems and software
instead of implicitly requiring the
identification of safety-critical software
as part of the process of identifying
safety-critical systems.
Proposed § 450.111(c) would require
the identification of safety-critical
software functions by consequence and
degree of control. It would elaborate on
the requirements of §§ 415.123(a) and
417.123(a), which require the
identification and assessment of the
software risks to public safety by
specifying that the assessments must
include the public safety consequences
of each safety-critical software function
and the degree of control that software
exercises over the performance of that
function. Proposed § 450.111(c) would
provide the classification for the
applicants to use while the application
requirements are contained in proposed
§ 450.111(h). Requiring software degree
of control would allow the FAA to
request less information for software
components with reduced or no
influence on public safety. The proposal
would differ from § 431.35 by explicitly
requiring identification of software
hazards by function and specifying the
documentation requirements related to
computing systems and software in
proposed § 450.111(h). Even though this
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language is different from § 431.35, this
is not a new requirement.
The requirements in the proposal vary
based on the software degree of control
and degree of hazard presented. The
first and highest degree of control is
autonomous software. Autonomous
software would mean software that
exercises autonomous control over
safety-critical systems, subsystems, or
components such that a control entity
cannot detect or intervene to prevent a
hazard that may impact public health
and safety or the safety of property. It is
any software that can act without an
opportunity for meaningful human
intervention. The FAA would impose
the most stringent requirements for
autonomous software with potential
catastrophic public safety consequences.
Proposed § 450.111(d) would set forth
five criteria specific to autonomous
software.
Under proposed § 450.111(d)(1), the
software component would be required
to undergo full path coverage testing
and any inaccessible code must be
documented and addressed. Full path
coverage testing is a systematic
technique for ensuring that all routes
through the code have been tested. Path
coverage testing includes decision,
statement, and entry and exit coverage.
Proposed § 450.111(d)(1) would retain
and clarify the current requirements in
§ 431.35(d). Full path coverage testing
and documentation of inaccessible code
would be required for autonomous
components because the presence of
inaccessible code segments presents a
potential for the execution of untested
instructions, which is obviously
deleterious for an autonomous system
that, by definition, depends on the
correctness of its instructions for safe
operation.
Under proposed § 450.111(d)(2), the
software component’s functions would
be required to be tested on flight-like
hardware. Testing would be required
also to include nominal operation and
fault responses for all functions. The
proposal would retain and clarify the
current requirements in §§ 431.35(d)
and 415.123(b)(8). Testing software
components on flight-like hardware,
including nominal operation and fault
responses, is an industry standard for
ensuring that the software interfaces
with the hardware as designed. All
autonomous safety-critical components
require this testing.
Under proposed § 450.111(d)(3), an
operator would be required to conduct
hazard analyses of computing systems
and software for the integrated system
and for each autonomous, safety-critical
software component. A software hazard
analysis identifies those hazards
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associated with safety-critical computer
system functions, assesses their risk,
identifies methods for mitigating them,
and specifies evidence of the
implementation of those mitigation
measures. This requirement is currently
in §§ 415.123(b)(7), 417.123(c), and
431.35(d)(4). All software components,
regardless of degree of control, require
this analysis for the integrated system.
This analysis is also required for each
autonomous, safety-critical software
component. Hazard analyses provide
the essential foundation for risk
assessment and management of any
system. This analysis is necessary
throughout the lifecycle of the system,
from development to disposal. As a
system is modified during design,
operation, and maintenance, changes to
any part of the system can lead to
unexpected consequences that may
incur new hazards to public safety. It is
important to consider risks that result
from software and computing errors as
a class or subsystem, as well as those
resulting from the operation and
interaction of software with all other
components of the system.
Proposed § 450.111(d)(4) would
require an operator to validate and
verify any computing systems and
software. Current §§ 415.123(b)(8) and
417.123(d) already require verification
and validation although this proposed
rule would add the requirement that
testing be conducted by testers who are
independent from the software
developers. Independence is essential
because it enables testing of cases and
conditions that the software developers
may not have considered or may have
inadvertently omitted.
Under proposed § 450.111(d)(5), an
operator would be required to develop
and implement software development
plans as currently required in
§§ 415.123(b)(9) and 417.123(e)(1)
through (5). A software development
plan is a means to consolidate and
standardize the management of a
software development process. These
plans would include descriptions of
coding standards used, configuration
control, programmable logic controllers,
and policies on use of commercial-offthe-shelf software and software reuse. It
would be updated as necessary
throughout the lifecycle of the project,
and may be comprised of one or several
documents.
The configuration control of a
software development project is
particularly important to ensure and
facilitate an efficient and accurate
development process. Therefore, the
proposal would retain the existing, if
implicit, requirements of § 417.123(e)(2)
to limit faults in configuration by
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requiring robust configuration
management. Proper configuration
management ensures consistency and
accuracy throughout a system’s design,
development, operation, and
maintenance. In software engineering
terms, it is a fundamental aspect of a
disciplined approach to the software
lifecycle that provides a continuously
current baseline for the system. The
FAA would set configuration
management requirements for all safetycritical documentation and code,
including but not limited to software
requirements, hazard analysis, test
plans, test results, change requests, and
development plans. Tools, processes,
and procedures for configuration
management are employed throughout
the software industry.
Proposed § 450.111(e) would apply to
semi-autonomous software, with a
definition nearly identical to that stated
in MIL–STD–882E. The FAA regards
semi-autonomous software as software
that exercises control over safety-critical
hardware systems, subsystems, or
components, allowing time for safe
detection and intervention by a control
entity. The software safety requirements
for semi-autonomous software are a
subset of those required for autonomous
software as described in proposed
§ 450.111(d).
Under proposed § 450.111(e)(1), the
software component’s safety-critical
functions, as categorized by the process
in proposed § 450.111(a), (b), and (c),
would be required to be subjected to full
path coverage testing and any
inaccessible code must be documented
and addressed. Proposed § 450.111(e)(1)
would retain and clarify current
§ 431.35(d) as described in proposed
§ 450.111(d)(1). The rationale for
proposed § 450.111(e)(1) and (d)(1) are
identical.
Under proposed § 450.111(e)(2), the
semi-autonomous software component’s
safety-critical functions would be
required to be tested on flight-like
hardware, including testing of nominal
operation and fault responses for all
safety-critical functions. Proposed
§ 450.111(e)(2) would also retain and
clarify the current requirements in
§ 431.35(d) as described in proposed
§ 450.111(d)(2).
Under proposed § 450.111(e)(3), an
operator would be required to conduct
computing system and software hazard
analyses for the integrated system. The
proposal would retain the requirement
of conducting computing system and
software hazard analyses that exists in
current §§ 415.123(b)(7), 417.123(c), and
431.35(d)(4). All software components,
regardless of level of control, would
require this analysis for the integrated
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system. The rationale for proposed
§ 450.111(e)(3) and (d)(3) are identical.
Under proposed § 450.111(e)(4), an
operator would need to verify and
validate any computing systems and
software related to semi-autonomous
software as described earlier, with the
associated rationale, for autonomous
software relative to proposed
§ 450.111(d)(4). This verification and
validation would be required to include
testing by a test team independent of the
software development division or
organization. This would retain the
requirement for verification and
validation of computing systems and
software, including testing by an
independent test team, as currently
required in §§ 415.123(b)(8) and
417.123(d).
Under proposed § 450.111(e)(5), an
operator would be required to develop
and implement software development
plans as currently required in
§§ 415.123(b)(9) and 417.123(e)(1)
through (5). The rationale for proposed
§ 450.111(e)(5) and (d)(5) are identical.
Proposed § 450.111(f) would apply to
redundant fault-tolerant software, which
is defined as software that exercises
control over safety-critical hardware
systems, subsystems, or components, for
which a non-software component must
also fail in order to impact public health
and safety or the safety of property.215
There are redundant sources of safetysignificant information, and mitigating
functionality can respond within any
time-critical period. The proposal
would include four criteria for
redundant fault-tolerant software.
Proposed § 450.111(f)(1) is consistent
with the second criteria for autonomous
and semi-autonomous software in
proposed § 450.111(d)(2) and (e)(2), in
that the software component’s safetycritical functions would be required to
be tested on flight-like hardware,
including testing of nominal operation
and fault responses for all safety-critical
functions. The proposal would retain
and clarify the current requirements in
§ 431.35(d).
Proposed § 450.111(f)(2) would repeat
the third criteria for autonomous and
semi-autonomous software as described
in proposed § 450.111(d)(3) and (e)(3). It
would require that an operator conduct
computing system and software hazard
analyses for the integrated system. The
proposal would retain the requirement
of conducting computing system and
software hazard analyses that exists in
215 MIL–STD–882E elaborates that the definition
of redundant fault-tolerant assumes that there is
adequate fault detection, annunciation, tolerance,
and system recovery to prevent the hazard
occurrence if software fails, malfunctions, or
degrades.
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the current §§ 415.123(b)(7), 417.123(c),
and 431.35(d)(4). All software
components, regardless of level of
control, would require this analysis for
the integrated system. The rationale for
this part is the same as that for proposed
§ 450.111(d)(3).
Under proposed § 450.111(f)(3), an
operator would be required to verify and
validate any computing systems and
software related to redundant faulttolerant software as described earlier,
with associated rationale, for
autonomous software related to
proposed § 450.111(d)(4) and semiautonomous software in proposed
§ 450.111(e)(4). This verification and
validation would be required to include
testing by a test team independent of the
software development division or
organization. This would retain the
requirement for verification and
validation of computing systems and
software, including testing by an
independent test team, as currently
required under §§ 415.123(b)(8) and
417.123(d).
Under proposed § 450.111(f)(4), an
operator would be required to develop
and implement software development
plans as currently required under
§§ 415.123(b)(9) and 417.123(e)(1)
through (5). The same rationale applies
here as for proposed § 450.111(d)(5) and
(e)(5).
Proposed § 450.111(g) would apply to
software that provides information to a
person who uses the information to take
actions or make decisions that can
impact public health and safety or the
safety of property, but does not require
operator action to avoid a mishap.
Influential software provides
information that is used in safetycritical decisions, but cannot cause a
hazard on its own. The proposal would
include three criteria for influential
software.
Proposed § 450.111(g)(1) would
require an operator to conduct
computing system and software hazard
analyses for the integrated system. The
proposed rule would retain the
requirement of conducting computing
system and software hazard analyses
that exists in the current
§§ 415.123(b)(7), 417.123(c), and
431.35(d)(4). All software components,
regardless of level of control, would
require this analysis for the integrated
system. The rationale for this proposed
section is the same as that for proposed
§ 450.111(d)(3).
Proposed § 450.111(g)(2) would
require an operator to verify and
validate any computing systems and
software related to influential software.
This verification and validation would
be required to include testing by a test
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team independent of the software
development division or organization.
This would retain the requirement for
verification and validation of computing
systems and software, including testing
by an independent test team, as
currently required under
§§ 415.123(b)(8) and 417.123(d). The
rationale for this proposed section is the
same as that for proposed
§ 450.111(d)(4).
Proposed § 450.111(g)(3) would
require an operator to develop and
implement software development plans
as required in existing §§ 415.123(b)(9)
and 417.123(e)(1) through (5). The same
rationale applies here as for proposed
§ 450.111(d)(5), (e)(5), and (f)(4).
Proposed § 450.111(h) would retain
the application requirements of
§§ 415.123 and 417.123, but would vary
in the required amount of detail
according to the level of control of the
software. The amount of application
materials would depend on the software
component’s risk to safety. The proposal
would differ from § 431.35 by expressly
requiring documentation related to
computing systems and software. This
requirement was implicit in § 431.35
and the FAA has requested these
documents in practice. The FAA would
require descriptions of software
components with no safety impact but
would not impose process requirements.
This information would be required to
supplement the vehicle description
requirements contained elsewhere in
this proposal. It would also lead to a
shared understanding of the systems
and components that do not have
known safety significance allowing the
FAA only cursorily to review those
systems during the license application
evaluation without undue concern over
undocumented systems, functions, or
features.
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C. Changes to Parts 401, 413, 414, 420,
437, 440
1. Part 401—Definitions
The FAA proposes to modify
definitions in parts 401, 414, 417, 420,
437, and 440. This would include
adding new definitions to or modifying
current definitions in § 401.5
(Definitions) to align with the new
proposed regulations. The FAA also
proposes to clarify and move some of
the definitions that are currently in part
417 to proposed part 450. Also, the
proposal would not retain some of the
definitions currently in part 417.
Finally, the FAA proposes to remove
various current definitions from
§§ 401.5 and 420.5.
The FAA proposes to add new
definitions to § 401.5. These definitions
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would be necessary additions to
accompany the proposed part 450
requirements, especially in the area of
flight safety analysis. Proposed
§§ 450.113 through 450.139 would
require the addition of ‘‘Casualty Area,’’
‘‘Critical Asset,’’ ‘‘Deorbit,’’ ‘‘DoseResponse Relationship,’’ ‘‘Disposal,’’
‘‘Effective Casualty Area,’’ ‘‘Expected
Casualty,’’ ‘‘Flight Abort,’’ ‘‘Flight Abort
Rules,’’ ‘‘Flight Hazard Area,’’ ‘‘Liftoff,’’
‘‘Limits of a Useful Mission,’’ ‘‘Orbital
Insertion,’’ and ‘‘Probability of
Casualty.’’ Most important within that
group are ‘‘Critical Asset,’’ which is
driven by proposed protection criteria
for assets that are essential to the
national interests of the United States,
and ‘‘Disposal,’’ which is driven by
proposed upper stage disposal risk
criteria. The other terms and associated
definitions that would be added to
support proposed §§ 450.113 through
450.139 are referenced in the proposed
FSA requirements.
The proposed system safety
regulations would require the addition
of the following terms and associated
definitions: ‘‘Hazard Control’’ and
‘‘Launch or Reentry System.’’ Proposed
§ 450.101(a)(1) and (b)(1) would require
a definition for ‘‘Neighboring
Operations Personnel’’; proposed
§ 450.107(b) would require a clear
definition of ‘‘Physical Containment’’;
proposed § 450.111 would require a
definition for ‘‘Control Entity’’ and
‘‘Software Function’’; proposed
§§ 450.139 and 450.187 would require a
definition for ‘‘Toxic Hazard Area.’’
Proposed § 450.101(c) would require the
addition of ‘‘Vehicle Response Mode.’’
The collision avoidance requirements in
proposed § 450.169 would require the
addition of ‘‘Reentry Window’’ and
‘‘Window Closure’’ to § 401.5, while the
unguided suborbital requirements in
proposed § 450.141 would require the
addition of ‘‘Unguided Suborbital
Launch Vehicle’’ and ‘‘Wind Weighting
Safety System.’’
These new definitions are discussed
in detail in corresponding sections of
this preamble, including the proposed
meaning and usage.
Current § 401.5 definitions that would
be modified by this rule are as follows:
‘‘Contingency Abort,’’ which would be
simplified; ‘‘Flight Safety System,’’
which would be simplified to
incorporate the new term ‘‘Flight
Abort;’’ and ‘‘Instantaneous Impact
Point,’’ which would remove drag
effects and clarify that this term means
a predicted impact point. ‘‘Mishap’’
would be defined as having four classes
or categories, from most to least severe,
based on lessons learned as discussed
earlier in this preamble. The current
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definition of ‘‘Public Safety’’ would be
removed from § 401.5 and the definition
of ‘‘Public’’ would be removed from
§ 420.5, and a new definition for
‘‘Public’’ would be added to § 401.5.
‘‘Launch’’ and ‘‘Reenter; Reentry’’
would be modified to remove language
that further scopes what aspects of
space transportation are licensed, as
discussed earlier. Scoping language
would be transferred to proposed
§ 450.3. ‘‘Safety Critical’’ would be
modified to remove the last sentence
because it is unnecessary. The
definition for ‘‘State and United States’’
would fix a minor printing error.
Section 417.3 contains the definitions
for part 417, only some of which would
be preserved and added to § 401.5 by
this proposed rulemaking. These are
‘‘Command Control System,’’
‘‘Countdown,’’ ‘‘Crossrange,’’ ‘‘Data Loss
Flight Time,’’ ‘‘Downrange,’’ ‘‘Explosive
Debris,’’ ‘‘Flight Abort Crew,’’ ‘‘Flight
Safety Limit,’’ ‘‘Gate,’’ ‘‘Launch
Window,’’ ‘‘Normal Flight,’’ ‘‘Normal
Trajectory,’’ ‘‘Operating Environment,’’
‘‘Operation Hazard,’’ ‘‘Service Life,’’
‘‘System Hazard,’’ ‘‘Sub-Vehicle Point,’’
‘‘Tracking Icon,’’ and ‘‘Uprange.’’ A
number of changes have been made as
follows:
• ‘‘Command Control System’’ would
be modified to take out unnecessary
detail.
• ‘‘Countdown,’’ ‘‘Downrange,’’
‘‘Explosive Debris,’’ and ‘‘Normal
Flight’’ would be modified to add
reentry.
• ‘‘Crossrange,’’ ‘‘Launch Window,’’
‘‘Normal Trajectory,’’ ‘‘Service Life,’’
and ‘‘System Hazard’’ would be
unchanged.
• The term ‘‘Flight Abort Crew’’
would be changed from ‘‘Flight Safety
Crew,’’ and would be simplified.
• ‘‘Operating Environment’’ would be
changed to add reentry, and would use
the term ‘‘lifecycle’’ within the
definition instead of the limiting
reference to acceptance testing, launch
countdown, and flight.
• ‘‘Operation Hazard’’ would be
modified to clarify that a system hazard
is not an operation hazard.
• The term ‘‘Protected Area’’ would
be removed, and the term ‘‘Uncontrolled
Area’’ would be added to § 401.5 but
with the inclusion of a launch or reentry
site operator, an adjacent site operator,
or other entity by agreement who can
control an area of land.
• The term ‘‘Service life’’ would be
changed to replace reference to a flight
termination system component with any
safety-critical system component.
• The last sentence in ‘‘Sub-Vehicle
Point’’ and ‘‘Uprange’’ would be
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removed because these sentences are
unnecessary.
• ‘‘Tracking Icon’’ would be modified
to include autonomous flight safety
systems.
• ‘‘Data Loss Flight Time,’’ ‘‘Flight
Safety Limit,’’ and ‘‘Gate’’ would be
changed as discussed earlier in this
preamble.
In part 414, ‘‘Safety Approval’’ would
be changed to ‘‘Safety Element
Approval,’’ so that a part 414 approval
is not confused with a proposed part
450 safety approval. Its meaning,
however, would remain the same as
discussed earlier in this preamble.
The definition of ‘‘Maximum Probable
Loss (MPL)’’ in § 440.3 would be
modified to include Neighboring
Operations Personnel.
The definition of ‘‘Anomaly’’ would
be removed from part 437 and added to
§ 401.5 with a revised meaning.
Definitions that would not be retained
from part 417 are ‘‘Command Destruct
Systems,’’ ‘‘Conjunction on Launch,’’
‘‘Destruct,’’ ‘‘Drag Impact Point,’’
‘‘Dwell Time,’’ ‘‘Fail-Over,’’ ‘‘Family
Performance Data,’’ ‘‘Flight Safety
System,’’ ‘‘Flight Termination System,’’
‘‘Inadvertent Separation Destruct
System,’’ ‘‘In-Family,’’ ‘‘Launch
Azimuth,’’ ‘‘Launch Crew,’’ ‘‘Launch
Wait,’’ ‘‘Meets Intent Certification,’’
‘‘Non-Operating Environment,’’
‘‘Operating Life,’’ ‘‘Out-of-Family,’’
‘‘Passive Component,’’ ‘‘Performance
Specifications,’’ ‘‘Safe-Critical Computer
System Function,’’ ‘‘Storage Life,’’ and
‘‘Waiver.’’ These would no longer be a
part of commercial space regulations
because they have been replaced with
different terms (i.e., ‘‘Conjunction on
Launch’’ and ‘‘Launch Wait’’), are
already defined in § 401.5 (i.e., ‘‘Flight
Safety System’’), or are simply not used
(all others).
This proposed rule would also
remove from § 401.5, ‘‘Human Space
Flight Incident,’’ ‘‘Launch Accident,’’
‘‘Launch Incident,’’ ‘‘Reentry Accident,’’
and ‘‘Reentry Incident.’’ In addition, it
would remove ‘‘Launch Site Accident’’
from § 420.5. These definitions would
be removed because of the proposed
changes in definitions related to
mishaps. The proposed rule would also
remove from § 401.5 ‘‘Emergency
Abort,’’ because it is no longer in use,
and ‘‘Vehicle Safety Operations
Personnel,’’ because those personnel are
referred to as ‘‘Safety Critical
Personnel’’ in proposed part 450.
The FAA also proposes to remove the
definition of ‘‘Instantaneous Impact
Point’’ from § 420.5. This definition
would be removed because a new
definition with a modified meaning
would be added to § 401.5.
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iv. Electronic Submission
email as a link to a secure server, and
remove the requirement that an
application be in a format that cannot be
altered.
In 2015, the FAA published the
‘‘Electronic Applications for Licenses,
Permits, and Safety Approvals’’ rule.216
In that rule, the FAA made the
application process more flexible and
efficient by providing an applicant with
the option to submit applications to the
FAA electronically, either via email or
on an electronic storage device, rather
than submitting a paper application.
Specifically, § 413.7(a)(3) requires that
an application made via email be
submitted as an email attachment to
[email protected] in a format
that cannot be altered. The FAA’s intent
was to allow applicants to transact with
the agency electronically, in accordance
with the Government Paperwork
Elimination Act. However, since the
rule published, the FAA has found that
many of the files containing the
necessary application materials are too
large to be transmitted successfully by
email. When this occurs, applicants
have transmitted an email message with
a File Transfer Program (FTP) link or a
link to a digital repository where the
materials can be downloaded by the
FAA. The FAA has found this to be an
acceptable means of submitting an
application. Because the FAA proposes
to amend application procedures in this
rulemaking, the FAA also proposes to
align the regulations with the current
acceptable practice of allowing this form
of electronic application submission.
Accordingly, the FAA proposes to
amend § 413.7(a)(3) to allow an
applicant the option to submit its
application by email as a link to a
secure server.
Additionally, the 2015 rulemaking
identified that in requiring a file format
that could not be altered, the FAA
would accept a PDF document or a readonly Word file. Because both of these
file types can actually be modified, the
FAA has found it is impossible to
comply with the requirement in
§ 413.7(a)(3)(ii). However, the need for
document and version control of
applications still exists for accurate
record keeping and to ensure that the
application materials the FAA evaluates
and enforces represent the final and
accurate submission from the applicant
and have not been altered in any way.
As nearly every form of electronic file
submitted could be altered in some way
or another, the FAA proposes to replace
the current § 413.7(a)(3)(ii) with a new
This rule proposes to amend
§ 413.7(a)(3) to allow an applicant the
option to submit its application by
216 Electronic Applications for Licenses, Permits,
and Safety Approvals, Direct Final Rule. 80 FR
30147 (May 27, 2015).
2. Part 413—Application Procedures
i. § 413.1 Clarification of the Term
‘‘Application’’
The FAA proposes to modify § 413.1
to clarify the term ‘‘application.’’
Specifically, the FAA would add to
§ 413.1 that the term application means
either an application in its entirety, or
a portion of an application for
incremental review and determination
in accordance with § 450.33. This
change is necessary to enable
incremental review as discussed earlier.
ii. § 413.21 Denial of a License or
Permit Application
The FAA proposes to correct the
section heading of § 413.21 to reflect the
content of the section, and also correct
paragraph (c) of this section to reference
both license and permit applications.
Section 413.21 applies to a license or
permit application. However, the
section heading and paragraph (c) of
this section only reference ‘‘license.’’ To
correct this oversight, the FAA proposes
to revise the section heading to read,
‘‘Denial of a license or permit
application.’’ In addition, the FAA
proposes to remove the reference to
‘‘license’’ from paragraph (c) so that it
would apply to both license and permit
applications.
iii. ‘‘Complete Enough’’ and
‘‘Sufficiently Complete’’
The FAA proposes to change the term
‘‘sufficiently complete’’ in part 414 to
‘‘complete enough,’’ as used in § 413.11,
because the two terms mean the same
thing. That is, they both describe the
point at which the FAA has determined
it has sufficient information to accept an
application and begin its evaluation to
make findings regarding issuing a
license or permit.
Section 413.11 uses ‘‘complete
enough’’ to describe when the FAA will
accept an application and begin its
review for a launch license or permit.
The original intent was to use the same
term in other chapter III sections.
However, the term ‘‘sufficiently
complete’’ in §§ 414.15(a), 415.107(a),
and 417.203(c) was never changed to
‘‘complete enough.’’
Therefore, the agency proposes to
change the term ‘‘sufficiently complete’’
to ‘‘complete enough’’ for consistency
and clarity. The proposed change would
be made in part 414 and in proposed
part 450, since parts 415 and 417 would
be consolidated under this new part.
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requirement that an applicant’s email
submission would be required to
identify each document appended to the
email, including any that are included
as an attachment or that are stored on
a secure server. The FAA further
proposes to include a new
§ 413.7(a)(3)(iii) which would require all
electronic files be date stamped and
include version control documentation.
The replacement of § 413.7(a)(3)(ii) and
the addition of § 413.7(a)(3)(iii) would
further the FAA’s intent to prevent any
unrecognized alteration.
The proposed amendments to
§ 414.13(a)(3) would mirror the
proposed text of § 413.7(a)(3). The FAA
also proposes to remove § 414.11(a)(3)
because those requirements would be
addressed in the proposed text of
§ 414.13(a)(3). These changes would
remove unactionable application
requirements and replace them with
regulations that align with current
practice and practicable compliance.
The FAA also proposes to change the
heading of part 413 from ‘‘License
Application Procedures’’ to
‘‘Application Procedures.’’ The
proposed heading change reflects the
multiple application procedures under
part 413, which includes launch and
reentry licenses, launch and reentry site
licenses, and experimental permits. The
FAA proposes this title change to
improve the regulatory clarity for future
experimental permit applicants.
3. Part 414—Safety Element Approvals
As discussed earlier, the FAA
proposes to change the part 414 term
from ‘‘safety approval’’ to ‘‘safety
element approval’’ to distinguish it from
‘‘safety approval’’ as used in parts 415,
431, and 435, and proposed part 450.
Also, the FAA proposes to modify part
414 to enable applicants to request a
safety element approval in conjunction
with a license application as provided
in proposed part 450.217
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4. Part 420—License To Operate a
Launch Site
As discussed earlier, the proposal
would modify the environmental
requirements in § 420.15 to match the
environmental requirements in
proposed § 450.47. Also, the proposal
would remove the definitions of
‘‘instantaneous impact point,’’ ‘‘launch
site accident,’’ and ‘‘public’’ from
§ 420.5, and allow alternate time frames
in § 420.57. In addition, it would change
the heading of § 420.59 from ‘‘Launch
Site Accident Investigation Plan’’ to
217 Discussion on safety element approval
changes to part 414 can be found in the Process
Improvements section A portion of this preamble.
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‘‘Mishap Plan,’’ and modify the section
as discussed earlier. Further, it would
make a minor edit in § 420.51.
5. Part 433—License To Operate a
Reentry Site
As discussed earlier, the proposal
would modify the environmental
requirements in §§ 433.7 and 433.9 to
align them with the environmental
requirements in proposed § 450.47.
6. Part 437—Experimental Permits
As discussed earlier, the FAA
proposes to modify part 437
(Experimental Permits) in six ways.
First, the proposal would remove the
definition of ‘‘anomaly’’ from § 437.3
and include a modified version in
§ 401.5. Second, the proposal would
modify the environmental requirements
in § 437.21(b)(1) to match the
environmental requirements proposed
in § 450.47. Third, it would change the
name of ‘‘safety approval’’ to ‘‘safety
element approval’’ in § 437.21. Fourth,
it would modify the mishap plan
requirements in §§ 437.41 and 437.75.
Fifth, it would change the requirements
for collision avoidance to match
proposed § 450.169. Sixth, it would
allow for alternate time frames in
§ 437.89.
7. Part 440—Financial Responsibility
As discussed earlier, the FAA
proposes to modify § 440.15 to allow for
alternate time frames, and modify the
definition of ‘‘maximum probable loss’’
in § 440.3 to align it with the new,
proposed definition of ‘‘neighboring
operations personnel.’’
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
A. Regulatory Evaluation
Changes to Federal regulations must
undergo several economic analyses.
First, Executive Order 12866 and
Executive Order 13563 direct that each
federal agency shall propose or adopt a
regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that the benefits of the
intended regulation justify its costs.
Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act
of 1980 (Pub. L. 96–354) requires
agencies to analyze the economic
impact of regulatory changes on small
entities. Third, the Trade Agreements
Act (Pub. L. 96–39 as amended)
prohibits agencies from setting
standards that create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the
United States. In developing U.S.
standards, the Trade Agreements Act
requires agencies to consider
international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis of
U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L.
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104–4) requires agencies to prepare a
written assessment of the costs, benefits,
and other effects of proposed or final
rules that include a Federal mandate
likely to result in the expenditure by
State, local, or tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of
$100 million or more annually (adjusted
for inflation with base year of 1995).
The FAA has provided a more detailed
Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis
of the benefits and costs of this
proposed rule in the docket of this
rulemaking. This portion of the
preamble summarizes this analysis.
In conducting these analyses, the FAA
has determined that this proposed rule:
(1) Has benefits that justify its costs, (2)
is not an economically ‘‘significant
regulatory action’’ as defined in section
3(f) of Executive Order 12866, (3) is
‘‘significant’’ as defined in DOT’s
Regulatory Policies and Procedures, (4)
will have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small
entities, (5) will not create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the
United States, and (6) will not impose
an unfunded mandate on state, local, or
tribal governments, or on the private
sector by exceeding the threshold
identified earlier. These analyses are
summarized below.
Baseline Problem and Statement of
Need
The FAA is proposing this
deregulatory action to comply with
President Donald J. Trump’s Space
Policy Directive-2 (SPD–2)
‘‘Streamlining Regulations on
Commercial Use of Space.’’ The
directive instructed the Secretary of
Transportation to publish for notice and
comment, proposed rules rescinding or
revising the launch and reentry
licensing regulations. Section 2 of SPD–
2 charged the Department of
Transportation with revising regulations
to require a single license for all types
of commercial space flight operations
and replace prescriptive requirements
with performance-based criteria. The
subject proposed rule would implement
this section of SPD–2.
The FAA’s existing regulations have
been criticized as overly-prescriptive,
lacking sufficient clarity, outdated, and
inconsistent with the requirements of
other Government agencies. The
regulations for ELV launches in parts
415 and 417 have proven to be too
prescriptive and one-size-fits-all. The
requirements of these parts were written
in a very detailed fashion, which has
caused some sections to become
outdated or obsolete. In contrast, the
regulations for RLV launches have
proven to be too general, lacking
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regulatory clarity. For example, part 431
does not contain specificity regarding
the qualification of flight safety systems,
acceptable methods for flight safety
analysis, and ground safety
requirements.
The purpose of the proposed rule is
to streamline and simplify the licensing
of launch and reentry operations by
relying on performance-based
regulations rather than prescriptive
regulations. This action would
consolidate and revise multiple
commercial space launch and reentry
regulations addressing licensing into a
single regulatory part that states safety
objectives to be achieved for the launch
of suborbital and orbital expendable and
reusable launch vehicles, and the
reentry of reentry vehicles. This action
would also enable flexible timeframes,
remove unnecessarily burdensome
ground safety regulations, redefine
when launch begins to allow specified
pre-flight operations prior to license
approval, and allow applicants to seek
a license to launch from multiple sites.
This proposal is necessary to reduce the
need to file and process waivers,
improve clarity of the regulations, and
relieve administrative and cost burdens
on industry and the FAA. The intended
effect of this action is to make
commercial space transportation
regulations more efficient and effective,
while maintaining public safety.
Since the last comprehensive update
to the regulations in 2006, the
differences between ELVs and RLVs
have blurred. Vehicles that utilize
traditional flight safety systems now are
partially reusable. For example, the
Falcon 9 first stage, launched by Space
Exploration Technologies Corp.
(SpaceX), routinely returns to the
launch site or lands on a barge and other
operators are developing launch
vehicles with similar capabilities.
Although the reuse of safety critical
systems or components can have public
safety implications, labeling a launch
vehicle as expendable or reusable has
not shown to impact the primary
approach necessary to protect public
safety, certainly not to the extent
suggested in the differences between
part 431 and parts 415 and 417.
This deregulatory action would
consolidate and revise multiple
commercial space regulatory parts to
apply a single set of licensing and safety
regulations across several types of
operations and vehicles. It would also
218 See the Preliminary Regulatory Impact
Analysis of this proposed rule in the docket for
more information. The FAA Office of Commercial
Space Transportation derived the launches affected
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Over a 5-year period of analysis, this
proposed rule would result in net
present value cost savings to industry of
about $19 million using a 7% discount
rate or about $21 million using a 3%
discount rate, with annualized net cost
savings to industry of about $4.6 million
using either discount rate. This
proposed rule would also result in net
present value savings for FAA of about
$0.8 million using a 7% discount rate or
about $1 million using a 3% discount
rate, with annualized net cost savings to
FAA of about $0.2 million using either
discount rate.
The largest quantified cost savings for
industry would result from eliminating
or relaxing requirements for a flight
safety system on some launches (about
$11 million in present value savings
over 5 years at a discount rate of 7% or
about $12 million at a discount rate of
3%) and from reducing the number of
personnel that would have to be
evacuated from neighboring launch sites
(about $8 million in present value
savings over 5 years at a discount rate
of 7% or about $9 million at a discount
rate of 3%). These cost savings are
described in more detail below.
The FAA proposes to move from
prescriptive flight safety system
requirements to performance-based
requirements. As a result, the proposed
rule would not require all launch
vehicles to have a full flight safety
system. Launch vehicles that have a
very low probability of multiple
casualties even if vehicle control fails
would not be required to have a flight
safety system. In addition, vehicles that
have moderately low probability of
casualty even if vehicle control fails
would not be required to have robust
flight safety systems.219 These
performance-based requirements would
reduce costs for some vehicle operators,
especially for small vehicles or those
operating in remote locations.
The proposed rule would provide a
new definition of neighboring
operations personnel and establish new
criteria for neighboring launch site
personnel for the purposes of risk and
financial responsibility. The change
would allow affected operators to
potentially reduce the number of
personnel that have to evacuate and
enable more concurrent operations by
accepting a small safety risk tradeoff.
The FAA has monetized the value of
this small increased safety risk as
summarized in the following tables. The
FAA estimates the present value of
these small increased safety risks to be
about $1.4 million discounted at 7% or
about $1.5 discounted at 3% over the
five years.
The FAA estimates some small costs
to industry that would assist both
industry and the FAA in the
implementation of this proposed rule,
such as providing information to the
FAA that other agencies frequently
request or performing one-time updates
of flight safety limit analyses and
ground hazard analyses that would be
used to determine performance-based
means of compliance that provide future
savings. In addition, there may be
additional costs for the modification of
existing licenses to benefit from the cost
saving provisions of this proposed rule.
The FAA would also incur small costs
for payload review, ground hazard
analysis, and the review of
modifications to existing licenses.
The following table summarizes total
quantified savings, costs, and net
impacts.
by this proposed rule for a 5-year period of analysis
due to the rapidly changing environment of
commercial space transportation.
219 See discussion in the preamble regarding
being compliant with the flight safety systems of
part 417.
replace many prescriptive regulations
with performance-based regulations,
giving industry greater flexibility to
develop a means of compliance that
maximizes their business objectives.
This proposed rule would result in net
cost savings for industry and enable
future innovation in U.S. commercial
space transportation.
Affected Operators and Launches
At the time of writing based on FAA
license data, the FAA estimates this
proposed rule would affect 12 operators
that have an active license or permit to
conduct launch or reentry operations. In
addition, the FAA estimates this
proposed rule would affect
approximately 276 launches over the
next 5 years based on actual launch and
reentry numbers and forecasted
numbers.218 The FAA anticipates that
the proposed rule would reduce the
costs of current and future launch
operations by removing current
prescriptive requirements that are often
burdensome to meet or require a waiver.
The FAA expects these changes would
lead to more efficient launch operations
and have a positive effect on expanding
the number of future launch and reentry
operations.
Summary of Impacts
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SUMMARY OF TOTAL 5-YEAR QUANTIFIED SAVINGS, COSTS AND NET IMPACTS
[Presented in thousands of dollars]
Industry
present value
(7%)
Impact
Industry
present value
(3%)
FAA present
value
(7%)
FAA present
value
(3%)
Cost Savings ....................................................................................................
Costs ................................................................................................................
$19,386.1
¥542.6
$21,844.5
¥569.5
$1,045.7
¥222.3
$1,208.9
¥237.0
Net Cost Savings ......................................................................................
18,843.5
21,275.0
823.4
971.8
Annualized Net Cost Savings ............................................................
4,595.7
4,645.5
200.8
212.2
Increased Safety Risks ....................................................................................
¥1,370.2
¥1,540.6
........................
........................
Net Cost Savings less Increased Safety Risks ........................................
17,473.3
19,734.4
823.4
971.8
Annualized Net Cost Savings less Increased Safety Risks ..............
4,261.6
4,309.1
200.8
212.2
Table notes: The sum of individual items may not equal totals due to rounding. Negative signs are used to indicate costs and increased safety
risks in this table. Present value estimates provided at 7% and 3% per OMB guidance.
The following table summarizes
quantified impacts by provision
category.
SUMMARY OF 5-YEAR QUANTIFIED SAVINGS, COSTS AND NET IMPACTS BY PROVISIONS
[Presented in thousands of dollars]
Industry
present value
(7%)
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Provision category/impact
Industry
present value
(3%)
FAA
present value
(7%)
FAA
present value
(3%)
Waiver Avoidance:
—Definition of Launch ..............................................................................
—Waterborne Vessel Hazard Areas ........................................................
—Waiver for 48 Hour Readiness .............................................................
System Safety Program—Safety Official .........................................................
Duration of a Vehicle License .........................................................................
Readiness—Elimination of pre-launch meeting 15 days prior ........................
Flight Safety System—Not required for all launches ......................................
Flight Safety Analysis no longer required for hybrids .....................................
Neighboring Operations * .................................................................................
Ground Hazard Analysis ..................................................................................
$32.8
65.6
41.0
39.1
50.6
709.9
10,612.6
22.1
7,698.9
113.3
$36.7
73.3
45.8
43.7
56.5
799.0
11,981.3
25.0
8,656.7
126.6
$10.3
20.5
12,8
45.7
104.3
127.7
572.5
2.8
........................
149.2
$11.5
22.9
14.3
51.0
116.5
143.6
679.2
3.2
........................
166.6
Total Cost Savings ...................................................................................
19,386.1
21,844.5
1,045.7
1,208.9
Payload Review and Determination ................................................................
Flight Safety Limit Analysis .............................................................................
Ground Hazard Analysis ..................................................................................
Modification Costs for Existing Licenses .........................................................
¥45.6
¥157.7
¥24.0
¥315.4
¥51.2
¥163.8
¥26.8
¥327.6
¥46.4
........................
¥27.2
¥148.7
¥52.2
........................
¥30.4
¥154.5
Total Costs ...............................................................................................
¥542.6
¥569.5
¥222.3
¥237.0
Net Cost Savings ..............................................................................
18,843.5
21,275.0
823.4
971.8
Annualized Net cost Savings .....................................................
4,595.7
4,645.5
200.8
212.2
Increased Safety Risks: Neighboring Operations * ..........................................
¥1,370.2
¥1,540.6
........................
........................
Net Cost Savings less Increased Safety Risks ........................................
17,473.3
19,734.4
823.4
971.8
Annualized Net Cost savings Less Increased Safety Risks .............
4,261.6
4,309.1
200.8
212.2
* Changes to Neighboring Operations requirements result in net savings less increased safety risks.
Table notes: The sum of individual items may not equal totals due to rounding. Negative signs are used to indicate costs and increased safety
risks in this table. Present value estimates provided at 3% and 7% per OMB guidance.
The FAA also expects industry will
gain additional unquantified savings
and benefits from the proposed rule,
since it provides flexibility and
scalability through performance-based
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requirements that would reduce the
future cost of innovation and improve
the efficiency and productivity of U.S.
commercial space transportation.
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The following table summarizes some
of the proposed changes that would
result unquantified savings.
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UNQUANTIFIED SAVINGS
Change
Savings
Time Frames ...................
The proposal would revise time frames in parts 404, 413, 414, 415, 417, 420, 431, 437, and 440 that may be burdensome for some operators. This would increase flexibility by allowing an operator the option to propose alternative time frames that better suit their operations. Eligible time frames include preflight and post-flight reporting
among others listed in proposed Appendix A to Part 404—Alternative Time Frames.
The proposal would remove the requirement in part 414 to publish in the Federal Register the criteria upon which
safety element approvals were based. The purpose of this notification requirement was to make clear the criteria
and standards the FAA used to assess a safety element, particularly when no clear regulatory requirement existed
and there could be other potential users of the safety approval. However, the FAA has found that this requirement
is unnecessary, and has potentially discouraged applications for safety element approvals due to concerns that
propriety data may be disclosed. FAA anticipates that removing this requirement will lead to increased use of safety element approvals, reducing industry burden and potentially improving safety.
The proposal would provide the following mishap-related enhancements, which FAA expects to better tailor mishap
responses.
• Replace current part 400 mishap related definitions with a consolidated mishap classification system (streamlines
and reduces confusion).
• Consolidate existing part 400 mishap/accident investigation and emergency response plan requirements into a
single part (streamlines and reduces confusion).
• Exempt pre-coordinated test-induced property damage from being a mishap (removes need to consider test-induced property damages from mishap requirements and likely results in fewer investigations of minor mishaps).
• This proposal also eliminates the small $25,000 monetary threshold from the current mishap and accident investigation requirements potentially reducing the number of mishaps being investigated that do not pose a threat to
public safety. A minor damage that does not pose a threat to public safety can easily exceed the $25,000 monetary threshold, triggering potentially costly and burdensome notification, reporting, and investigation requirements.
The proposal would replace part 417 toxic release hazard analysis requirements with performance-based regulations
that would provide flexibility for operators to comply with the required risk criteria in varied and innovative ways relative to their operations.
The proposal would remove appendix G to part 417, Natural and Triggered Lightning Flight Commit Criteria, and replace it with the performance-based requirements. The current requirements are outdated, inflexible, overly conservative, and not explicitly applicable to RLVs and RVs. The proposed revision would provide an operator with
more flexibility, and allow it to take into account the vehicle’s mission profile when determining how to mitigate the
direct and indirect effects of a lightning discharge.
Safety Element Approval
Mishaps ...........................
Toxics ..............................
Lightning protection requirement.
The FAA intends to update its
analysis with additional information
and data identified during the comment
period to better assess the impacts of
this deregulatory action. Estimates may
change for the final rule as a result.
The FAA invites comments on the
benefits, savings, or costs of this
proposed rule. Send comments by any
of the methods identified under
Addresses in this proposed rule.
Specifically, the FAA requests
information and data that can be used
to quantify the additional savings of this
proposed rule. Please provide references
and sources for information and data.
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B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980
(Pub. L. 96–354) (RFA) establishes ‘‘as a
principle of regulatory issuance that
agencies shall endeavor, consistent with
the objectives of the rule and of
applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and
informational requirements to the scale
of the businesses, organizations, and
governmental jurisdictions subject to
regulation. To achieve this principle,
agencies are required to solicit and
consider flexible regulatory proposals
and to explain the rationale for their
actions to assure that such proposals are
given serious consideration.’’ The RFA
covers a wide-range of small entities,
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including small businesses, not-forprofit organizations, and small
governmental jurisdictions.
Agencies must perform a review to
determine whether a rule will have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. If
the agency determines that it will, the
agency must prepare a regulatory
flexibility analysis as described in the
RFA.
Under Section 603(b) of the RFA, the
initial regulatory flexibility analysis for
a proposed rule must:
• Describe reasons the agency is
considering the action;
• State the legal basis and objectives;
• Describe the recordkeeping and
other compliance requirements;
• State all federal rules that may
duplicate, overlap, or conflict;
• Describe an estimated number of
small entities impacted; and
• Describe alternatives considered.
1. Description of Reasons the Agency Is
Considering the Action
The Chair of the National Space
Council, the Vice President, directed the
Secretaries of Transportation and
Commerce, and the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, to
conduct a review of the U.S. regulatory
framework for commercial space
activities and report back within 45
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days with a plan to remove barriers to
commercial space enterprises.
The Council approved four
recommendations, including the
Department of Transportation’s
recommendation that the launch and
reentry regulations should be reformed
into a consolidated, performance-based
licensing regime.
Codifying the recommendations of the
Council, SPD–2 was issued on May 24,
2018. SPD–2 instructed the Secretary of
Transportation to publish for notice and
comment proposed rules rescinding or
revising the launch and reentry
licensing regulations, no later than
February 1, 2019. SPD–2 charged the
Department with revising the
regulations such that they would require
a single license for all types of
commercial space flight operations and
replace prescriptive requirements with
performance-based criteria. The current
action is complying with this
recommendation.
Current regulations setting forth
procedures and requirements for
commercial space transportation
licensing were based largely on the
distinction between expendable or
reusable launch vehicles. Specifically,
14 CFR parts 415 and 417 address the
launch of expendable launch vehicles,
part 431 addresses the launch and
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reentry of reusable launch vehicles, and
part 435 addresses the reentry of reentry
vehicles.
The regulations in parts 415 and 417
are based on the Federal launch range
standards developed in the 1990s. Parts
431 and 435 are primarily processbased, relying on a license applicant to
derive safety requirements through a
‘‘system safety’’ process. While these
regulations satisfied the need of the
commercial launch industry at the time
they were issued, the industry has
changed and continues to evolve, thus
rendering the current regulatory
structure cumbersome and outdated.
2. Statement of the Legal Basis and
Objectives
The Commercial Space Launch Act of
1984, as amended and re-codified at 51
U.S.C. 50901–50923 (the Act),
authorizes the Department of
Transportation, and the FAA through
delegation, to oversee, license, and
regulate commercial launch and reentry
activities, and the operation of launch
and reentry sites as carried out by U.S.
citizens or within the United States.
Section 50905 directs the FAA to
exercise this responsibility consistent
with public health and safety, safety of
property, and the national security and
foreign policy interests of the United
States. The FAA is authorized to
regulate only to the extent necessary to
protect the public health and safety,
safety of property, and national security
and foreign policy interests of the
United States. In addition, section
50903 requires that the FAA encourage,
facilitate, and promote commercial
space launches and reentries by the
private sector.
If adopted as proposed, this
rulemaking would streamline and
increase flexibility in the FAA’s
commercial space regulations. This
action would consolidate and revise
multiple regulatory parts to apply a
single set of licensing and safety
regulations across several types of
operations and vehicles. It would also
replace many prescriptive regulations
with performance-based rules, giving
industry greater flexibility to develop
means of compliance that maximize
their business objectives while
maintaining an equivalent level of safety
to the agency’s current regulations.
Because this rulemaking would amend
the FAA’s launch and reentry
requirements, it falls under the
authority delegated by the Act.
3. Description of the Recordkeeping and
Other Compliance Requirements
The FAA is not proposing any
substantive changes to the requirements
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specified below. However, the agency is
proposing to consolidate these
requirements into a new, proposed part
450 (Launch and Reentry License
Requirements); clarify that the
consolidated requirements apply to any
licensed launch or reentry; and make
other minor, clarifying edits. The
following is a summary of the proposed
changes:
i. Public Safety Responsibility and
Compliance With License
The FAA would consolidate the
public safety responsibility
requirements in current §§ 417.7 and
431.71(a) into proposed § 450.201,
Public Safety Responsibility. Also, the
FAA would move the compliance
requirement in current § 431.71(b) to its
own section, proposed § 450.203
(Compliance with License). Although
the location of these requirements
would change, the requirements
themselves would not change.
Therefore, proposed § 450.201 would
provide that a licensee is responsible for
ensuring public safety and safety of
property during the conduct of a
licensed launch or reentry. And
proposed § 450.203 would require that a
licensee conduct a licensed launch or
reentry in accordance with
representations made in its license
application, the requirements of part
450, subparts C and D, and the terms
and conditions contained in the license.
A licensee’s failure to act in accordance
with these items would be sufficient
basis to revoke a license, or some other
appropriate enforcement action.
ii. Records.
The FAA would consolidate the
current record requirements in
§§ 417.15(a) and (b) and 431.77(a) and
(b) into proposed § 450.219(a) and (b).
However, the FAA would replace the
term ‘‘launch accident’’ in paragraph (b)
with ‘‘class 1 or class 2 mishap.’’ As
discussed in more detail in the Part
401—Definitions section of this
preamble, the FAA is proposing to
replace current part 401 definitions
involving ‘‘accident,’’ ‘‘incident,’’ and
‘‘mishap’’ with specified mishap
classes.
As such, the proposed regulation
would require a licensee to maintain, for
3 years, all records, data, and other
material necessary to verify that a
launch or reentry is conducted in
accordance with representations
contained in the licensee’s application.
The exception would be for a class 1 or
class 2 mishap, where a licensee would
be required to preserve all records
related to the event. These records
would be required to be retained until
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the completion of any Federal
investigation and the FAA has notified
the licensee that the records need not be
retained. The licensee would be
required to make all records required to
be maintained under the regulations
available to Federal officials for
inspection and copying.
4. All Federal Rules That May
Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict
No other federal rules duplicate,
overlap, or conflict with FAA’s launch
and reentry licensing requirements.
5. Description and an Estimated Number
of Small Entities Impacted
The FAA has identified two potential
small entities that this proposed rule
would impact, Vector Launch, Inc. and
Generation Orbit. Both operators
employ fewer than 1,500 people and
both were in pre-application
consultation to launch under parts 415
and 417 at the time of this writing.220
These two companies are the only small
entities identified in this analysis that
may be directly affected by this
proposed rule.
6. Alternatives Considered
The FAA considered three
alternatives to the proposed rule.
i. No Change to Current Regulations
This alternative was not chosen
because the current regulations are
outdated, prescriptive, and do not
adequately reflect industry current
practices or technology development.
The inefficiency of the licensing process
due to current regulations risks stifling
innovation and growth of the industry,
especially for small operators.
ii. Propose a More Process-Based
Regulatory Approach
With this alternative, the FAA would
propose less detailed regulations that
would rely primarily on the outcome of
an operator’s system safety process to
protect public safety. This alternative
was not chosen because it would lack
regulatory clarity without adding any
additional flexibility for a launch or
reentry operator which may be more
burdensome to small operators
compared to large operators.
iii. Propose a Defined Modular
Application Process
With this alternative, the FAA would
propose similar safety requirements but
would add a more defined incremental
220 The FAA uses the current Small Business
Administration size standard of 1,500 employees
for passenger and freight air transportation. This
information is found in https://www.sba.gov/sites/
default/files/files/Size_Standards_Table_2017.pdf.
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or modular application process. The
current proposal enables an incremental
application process, but does not define
one with explicit modules and time
frames. This alternative was not chosen
because the FAA has no experience
with an incremental or modular
application process with which to base
a proposal. In addition, a more defined
incremental or modular application
process may be less flexible and scalable
and therefore more burdensome to small
operators.
The FAA expects this proposed rule
would provide regulatory relief to small
entities from current prescriptive
requirements and result in net savings.
As discussed previously in this
section, the FAA identified two possible
small entities that would be affected by
this proposed rule but they are in the
pre-application stage for potential ELV
and RLV launches and we have little
information on how they may comply
with existing or proposed requirements.
As these entities have not begun
operations, we do not have estimates of
the costs savings or costs that would
reliably apply. However, the following
are some estimates of per entity cost
savings and costs based on data
representing existing ELV and RLV
operators. We note that some of the
estimated savings and costs of this
proposed rule may not apply to these
entities.
Cost Savings
i. Readiness—Elimination of Pre-Launch
Meeting 15 Days Prior (§ 450.155)
ELV operators might save $4,600 per
avoided launch readiness meeting,
however this assumes the average
number of people at each meeting
would be 25 and this might not apply
to a small business.
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ii. Flight Safety System—Not Required
for All Launches (§ 450.145)
For launches where an FSS would not
be required under the proposal, RLV
operators might save $195,000 per
launch vehicle for a vehicle using an
existing design. An ELV operator might
save $680,000 per launch. Both ELV and
RLV operators might save an estimated
$1.3 million for new vehicle designs by
not having to incur all the research,
design, testing, materials and
installation costs for an FSS.
iii. Ground Hazard Analysis (§ 450.185)
An ELV operator might save $28,000
per application by not having to do a
ground hazard analysis under this
proposal.
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Costs
i. Payload Review and Determination
(§ 450.43)
The proposed rule could cause small
operators to incur about $204 more per
launch than due to additional payload
review and determination costs.
ii. Ground Hazard Analysis (§ 450.185)
RLV applicants might incur about
$3,000 more per application due to
having to perform ground hazard
analyses under the proposal.
The FAA invites comments on this
initial regulatory flexibility analysis for
the proposed rule. Send comments by
any of the methods identified under
Addresses in this proposed rule.
Specifically, the FAA requests
information and data that can be used
to quantify savings and costs to small
operators directly affected by this
proposed rule. Please provide references
and sources for information and data.
C. International Trade Impact
Assessment
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979
(Pub. L. 96–39), as amended by the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub.
L. 103–465), prohibits federal agencies
from establishing standards or engaging
in related activities that create
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States.
Pursuant to these Acts, the
establishment of standards is not
considered an unnecessary obstacle to
the foreign commerce of the United
States, so long as the standard has a
legitimate domestic objective, such as
the protection of safety, and does not
operate in a manner that excludes
imports that meet this objective. The
statute also requires consideration of
international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for
U.S. standards. The FAA has assessed
the potential effect of this proposed rule
and determined that it will not create
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States.
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4)
requires each federal agency to prepare
a written statement assessing the effects
of any Federal mandate in a proposed or
final agency rule that may result in an
expenditure of $100 million or more (in
1995 dollars) in any one year by State,
local, and tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector; such
a mandate is deemed to be a ‘‘significant
regulatory action.’’ The threshold after
adjustment for inflation is $150 million
using the most current annual (2017)
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15409
Implicit Price Deflator for Gross
Domestic Product from the U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis. This proposed
rule does not contain such a mandate;
therefore, the requirements of Title II of
the Act do not apply.
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires that the
FAA consider the impact of paperwork
and other information collection
burdens imposed on the public.
According to the 1995 amendments to
the Paperwork Reduction Act (5 CFR
1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an agency may not
collect or sponsor the collection of
information, nor may it impose an
information collection requirement
unless it displays a currently valid
Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) control number.
This action contains the following
proposed consolidation of two existing
information collection requirements,
previously approved under OMB
Control Numbers 2120–0608 and 2120–
0643, under a new OMB control
number. As required by the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
3507(d)), the FAA will submit the
proposed information collection
requirements to OMB for its review. In
addition, the FAA has published a
separate notice of the proposed
requirements for public comment, and
has included the notice in the docket for
this rulemaking. The notice includes
instructions on how to submit
comments specifically to the proposed
information collection requirements.
Additional details on assumptions and
calculations used in this section are
presented in the Preliminary Regulatory
Impact Analysis available in the docket
of this rulemaking. The following
estimates are included in the total
savings and costs summarized in the
Regulatory Evaluation section and
considered in the Regulatory Flexibility
Determination section of this proposed
rule.
Summary: The FAA proposes to
consolidate under a new part 450, the
requirements currently contained in
parts 415 and 417 for the launch of an
ELV, in part 431 for the launch and
reentry of an RLV, and in part 435 for
the reentry of a reentry vehicle other
than an RLV. The result of this effort
would be streamlined regulations
designed to be more flexible and
scalable, with reduced timelines and
minimal duplicative jurisdiction. The
net result would be reduced paperwork
for operators, although for some
provisions paperwork would increase.
Use: The information would be used
by FAA to evaluate the launch and
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reentry operators’ applications and to
ensure safety.
Paperwork Impact to Industry
Respondents (including number of):
The information collection would
potentially affect 12 operators based on
available data at the time of writing.
Annual Burden Estimate: Most
changes in part 450 would result in a
reduction in the paperwork burden. The
paperwork associated with industry
requesting waivers to certain provisions
would be alleviated. Paperwork
associated with industry requesting
license modifications would also be
reduced because an operator would not
have to modify a license if the specific
safety official were to change. In
addition, with the extension of RLV
licenses to up to five years, it is likely
that fewer licenses would be issued,
resulting in less paperwork. Due to the
change in launch scope, the
documentation accompanying a ground
hazard analysis for ELV operators would
be reduced.
Industry Cost Savings
The following table indicates the
frequency of responses, the estimated
time per response, the burdened wage
rate, annual hours, and the cost for each
cost saving provision. Response
frequency is provided for the estimated
number of waivers avoided (§ 450.3),
estimated reduction in annual number
of licenses modified (§ 450.103),
estimated reduction in annual license
renewals, and the estimated annual
number of launches for which there
would be a reduction in ground hazard
analysis paperwork (§ 450.185). An
estimated time for each response is also
indicated below, as are burdened hourly
wage rates for the specific personnel
associated with each provision and
annual hours and total cost savings.
INDUSTRY PAPERWORK COST SAVINGS
Estimated
time per
response
(hours)
Response
frequency
Description
Industry
wage rate
Annual
hours
Cost
savings
Waiver Avoidance (§ 450.3) .................................................
System Safety Program—Safety Official (§ 450.103) ..........
Duration of a Vehicle License (§ 450.7) ..............................
Ground Safety (§ 450.185) ...................................................
17
5.6
1.2
1
20
24
126.5
340
$100.03
71.01
81.28
81.28
340
134.4
151.8
340
$34,010
9,544
12,338
27,634
Total Annual Savings ....................................................
........................
........................
........................
966
83,526
Cost savings includes paperwork
related to waivers avoided due to the
definition of launch, waterborne vessel
protection, and removal of 48-hour
readiness requirement.
Industry Paperwork Burden
Other changes would result in an
increase in paperwork burden. The
Payload Review and Determination
section (§ 450.43) would add
requirements for applicants to provide
explosive potential of payload materials,
alone and in combination with other
materials on the payload for launches,
as well as the appropriate transit time to
final orbit for payloads with significant
transit time after release from vehicle.
The FAA is adding requirements for
ground hazard analysis (§ 450.185) for
RLV launches. The proposed rule would
require RLVs to submit information to
the FAA.
The table below indicates the
frequency of responses, estimated time
per response, burdened hourly wage
rate, annual hours, and the cost for each
provision that would add burden.
Response frequency is provided for the
estimated number of explosive potential
and transit time calculations, and the
estimated number of annual RLV
applications which would require
ground hazard analysis. An estimated
time per response is also indicated
below, as are burdened hourly wage
rates for the specific personnel
associated with each provision and
annual hours and total cost savings.
INDUSTRY PAPERWORK BURDEN
Industry
wage rate
Annual
hours
Cost
Explosive Potential (§ 450.43) .............................................
Transit time (§ 450.43) .........................................................
Ground Safety (§ 450.185) ...................................................
50
50
2
2
0.5
36
$81.28
81.28
81.28
100
25
72
$8,128
2,032
5,852
Total Cost Burden .........................................................
........................
........................
........................
197
16,012
The following table summarizes the
industry total annual paperwork
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Estimated
time per
response
(hours)
Response
frequency
Description
savings, total annual burden and the net
annual savings.
INDUSTRY NET PAPERWORK SAVINGS
Annual
hours
Description
Total Annual Savings ...............................................................................................................................................
Total Annual Burden ................................................................................................................................................
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Cost
savings
966
197
$83,526
16,012
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INDUSTRY NET PAPERWORK SAVINGS—Continued
Annual
hours
Description
Net Annual Savings ..........................................................................................................................................
Paperwork Burden to the Federal
Government
The following tables summarizes FAA
paperwork savings and burden. Similar
to industry burden savings, the FAA
would receive burden relief from
waivers avoided due to the definition of
launch, waterborne vessel protection,
and removal of the 48-hour readiness
Cost
savings
769
67,514
requirement. See the Regulatory Impact
Analysis available in the docket for
more details on these estimates and
calculations.
FAA PAPERWORK COST SAVINGS
Estimated
time per
response
(hours)
Description
FAA
wage rate
Annual
hours
Cost
savings
Waiver Avoidance (§ 450.3) .............................................................................
System Safety Program—Safety Official (§ 450.103) ......................................
Duration of a Vehicle License (§ 450.7) ..........................................................
Ground Safety (§ 450.185) ..............................................................................
7.5
24
253.5
439
$83.26
82.88
83.61
82.88
127.5
134.4
304.2
439
$10,616
11,139
25,434
36,384
Total Annual Savings ...............................................................................
........................
........................
1,005
83,573
FAA PAPERWORK BURDEN
Estimated
time per
response
(hours)
Description
FAA
wage rate
Annual
hours
Cost
savings
Explosive Potential (§ 450.43) .........................................................................
Transit time (§ 450.43) .....................................................................................
Ground Safety (§ 450.185) ..............................................................................
2.0
0.5
40
$82.88
82.88
82.88
100
25
80
$8,288
2,072
6,630
Total Annual Burden .................................................................................
........................
........................
205
16,990
FAA NET PAPERWORK SAVINGS
Annual
hours
Description
Total Annual Savings ...............................................................................................................................................
Total Annual Burden ................................................................................................................................................
1,005
205
$83,573
16,990
Net Annual Savings ..........................................................................................................................................
800
66,583
Voluntary One-Time Modification of
Existing Licenses
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Cost
savings
There are currently 24 active licenses
held by 12 operators. Once the rule is
in effect, existing licenses would be
grandfathered under the current
provisions, unless the licenses are
modified. Operators may choose to
modify their licenses to benefit from the
cost saving provisions of the proposed
rule—some operators may choose also
to wait until they apply for a new
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license. The FAA assumes
modifications of licenses would occur
within the first year after the rule is
effective. The FAA assumes it would
take about one month for an industry
aerospace engineer to develop
documentation and analysis to apply for
a modification of an existing license and
about two weeks for an FAA employee
to review an application for a
modification of an existing license.
The following estimates assume all
licenses would be modified. This
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overestimates paperwork costs, since
some operators may not find it
advantageous to modify their existing
licenses. The FAA requests comment on
these assumptions and the following
estimates to apply for applications to
modify existing licenses. Specifically,
the FAA requests information if licenses
holders would modify existing licenses
for changes from this proposed rule or
wait to apply for new licenses. The FAA
may revise these assumptions and
estimates for the final rule.
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INDUSTRY BURDEN COSTS FOR APPLICATIONS TO MODIFY EXISTING LICENSES
Year
Wage rate
Time
(one month of
work hours) *
Cost per
license
Number of
licenses
Total burden
hours
Total costs
1 ...............................................................
$81.28
173
$14,061
24
4,152
$337,457
* One month of work hours based on the following calculations: 52 work weeks/year × 40 work hours/week = 2,080 work hours/year; and,
2,080 work hours/year ÷ 12 months = 173 work hours/month (rounded).
FAA BURDEN COSTS TO REVIEW APPLICATIONS TO MODIFY EXISTING LICENSES
Year
Wage rate
Hours
(two weeks of
work hours)
Cost per
license
Number of
licenses
Total burden
hours
Total costs
1 ...............................................................
$82.88
80
$6,630
24
1,920
$159,130
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The agency is soliciting comments
to—
(1) Evaluate whether the proposed
information requirement is necessary for
the proper performance of the functions
of the agency, including whether the
information will have practical utility;
(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden;
(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
(4) Minimize the burden of collecting
information on those who are to
respond, including by using appropriate
automated, electronic, mechanical, or
other technological collection
techniques or other forms of information
technology.
Individuals and organizations may
send comments on the information
collection requirement to the address
listed in the ADDRESSES section at the
beginning of this preamble by June 14,
2019. Comments also should be
submitted to the Office of Management
and Budget, Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, Attention: Desk
Officer for FAA, New Executive
Building, Room 10202, 725 17th Street
NW, Washington, DC 20053.
F. International Compatibility
In keeping with U.S. obligations
under the Convention on International
Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to
conform to International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) Standards and
Recommended Practices to the
maximum extent practicable. The FAA
has determined that there are no ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices
that correspond to these proposed
regulations.
G. Environmental Analysis
FAA Order 1050.1F identifies FAA
actions that are categorically excluded
from preparation of an environmental
assessment or environmental impact
statement under the National
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Environmental Policy Act in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances.
The FAA has determined this
rulemaking action qualifies for the
categorical exclusion identified in
paragraph 5–6.6 and involves no
extraordinary circumstances.
V. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
The FAA has analyzed this proposed
rule under the principles and criteria of
Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The
agency has determined that this action
would not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, or the relationship
between the Federal Government and
the States, or on the distribution of
power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government, and,
therefore, would not have Federalism
implications.
B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations
That Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use
The FAA analyzed this proposed rule
under Executive Order 13211, Actions
Concerning Regulations that
Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The
agency has determined that it would not
be a ‘‘significant energy action’’ under
the executive order and would not be
likely to have a significant adverse effect
on the supply, distribution, or use of
energy.
C. Executive Order 13609, International
Cooperation
Executive Order 13609, Promoting
International Regulatory Cooperation,
promotes international regulatory
cooperation to meet shared challenges
involving health, safety, labor, security,
environmental, and other issues and to
reduce, eliminate, or prevent
unnecessary differences in regulatory
requirements. The FAA has analyzed
this action under the policies and
PO 00000
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Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
agency responsibilities of Executive
Order 13609, and has determined that
this action would have no effect on
international regulatory cooperation.
D. Executive Order 13771, Reducing
Regulation and Controlling Regulatory
Costs
This proposed rule is expected to be
a deregulatory action under Executive
Order 13771 and would result in net
cost savings for industry that would
likely reduce the future cost of
innovation in U.S. commercial space
transportation. The Preliminary
Regulatory Impact Analysis for the
proposed rule provides additional
information.
VI. Additional Information
A. Comments Invited
The FAA invites interested persons to
participate in this rulemaking by
submitting written comments, data, or
views. Also, the agency invites
comments regarding potential overlap
with the regulatory requirements of
other agencies not addressed in this
proposed rule. In addition, the FAA
invites comments relating to the
economic, environmental, energy, or
federalism impacts that might result
from adopting the proposals in this
document. The most helpful comments
reference a specific portion of the
proposal, explain the reason for any
recommended change, and include
supporting data. To ensure the docket
does not contain duplicate comments,
commenters should send only one copy
of written comments, or if comments are
filed electronically, commenters should
submit only one time.
The FAA will file in the docket all
comments it receives, as well as a report
summarizing each substantive public
contact with FAA personnel concerning
this proposed rulemaking. Before acting
on this proposal, the FAA will consider
all comments it receives on or before the
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closing date for comments. The FAA
will consider comments filed after the
comment period has closed if it is
possible to do so without incurring
expense or delay. The agency may
change this proposal in light of the
comments it receives.
Proprietary or Confidential Business
Information: Commenters should not
file proprietary or confidential business
information in the docket. Such
information must be sent or delivered
directly to the person identified in the
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT
section of this document, and marked as
proprietary or confidential. If submitting
information on a disk or CD ROM, mark
the outside of the disk or CD ROM, and
identify electronically within the disk or
CD ROM the specific information that is
proprietary or confidential.
Under 14 CFR 11.35(b), if the FAA is
aware of proprietary information filed
with a comment, the agency does not
place it in the docket. It is held in a
separate file to which the public does
not have access, and the FAA places a
note in the docket that it has received
it. If the FAA receives a request to
examine or copy this information, it
treats it as any other request under the
Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C.
552). The FAA processes such a request
under Department of Transportation
procedures found in 49 CFR part 7.
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B. Availability of Rulemaking
Documents
An electronic copy of rulemaking
documents may be obtained from the
internet by—Searching the Federal
eRulemaking Portal (http://
www.regulations.gov);
Visiting the FAA’s Regulations and
Policies web page at http://
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies or
Accessing the Government Printing
Office’s web page at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/.
Copies may also be obtained by
sending a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of
Rulemaking, ARM–1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or
by calling (202) 267–9680. Commenters
must identify the docket or notice
number of this rulemaking.
All documents the FAA considered in
developing this proposed rule,
including economic analyses and
technical reports, may be accessed from
the internet through the Federal
eRulemaking Portal referenced in item
(1) above.
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List of Subjects
14 CFR Part 404
Administrative practice and
procedure, Space transportation and
exploration.
14 CFR Part 413
Confidential business information,
Space transportation and exploration.
14 CFR Part 414
Airspace, Aviation safety, Space
transportation and exploration.
14 CFR Part 420
Environmental protection, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements, Space
transportation and exploration.
14 CFR Part 437
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements, Space
transportation and exploration.
14 CFR Part 440
Indemnity payments, Insurance,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Space transportation and
exploration.
14 CFR Part 450
Aircraft, Aviation safety,
Environmental protection,
Investigations, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Space
transportation and exploration.
The Proposed Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the
Federal Aviation Administration
proposes to amend chapter III of title 14,
Code of Federal Regulations as follows:
PART 401—ORGANIZATION AND
DEFINITIONS
1. The authority citation for part 401
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50101–50923.
2. In § 401.5:
a. Add, in alphabetical order, the
definitions of ‘‘Anomaly,’’ ‘‘Casualty
area,’’ and ‘‘Command control system’’;
■ b. Revise the definition of
‘‘Contingency abort’’;
■ c. Add, in alphabetical order, the
definitions of ‘‘Control entity,’’
‘‘Countdown,’’ ‘‘Critical asset,’’
‘‘Crossrange,’’ ‘‘Data loss flight time,’’
‘‘Deorbit,’’ ‘‘Disposal,’’ ‘‘Dose-response
relationship,’’ ‘‘Downrange,’’ and
‘‘Effective casualty area’’;
■ d. Remove the definition of
‘‘Emergency abort’’;
■
■
Frm 00119
Fmt 4701
e. Add, in alphabetical order, the
definition of ‘‘Expected casualty,’’
‘‘Explosive debris,’’ ‘‘Flight abort,’’
‘‘Flight abort crew,’’ ‘‘Flight abort
rules,’’ ‘‘Flight hazard area,’’ and ‘‘Flight
safety limit’’;
■ f. Revise the definition of ‘‘Flight
safety system’’;
■ g. Add, in alphabetical order, the
definitions of ‘‘Gate’’ and ‘‘Hazard
control’’;
■ h. Remove the definition of ‘‘Human
space flight incident’’;
■ i. Revise the definitions of
‘‘Instantaneous impact point’’ and
‘‘Launch’’;
■ j. Remove the definitions of ‘‘Launch
accident’’ and ‘‘Launch incident’’;
■ k. Add, in alphabetical order, the
definitions of ‘‘Launch or reentry
system,’’ ‘‘Launch window,’’ ‘‘Liftoff,’’
and ‘‘Limits of a useful mission’’;
■ l. Revise the definition of ‘‘Mishap’’;
■ m. Add, in alphabetical order, the
definitions of ‘‘Mishap, Class 1,’’
‘‘Mishap, Class 2,’’ ‘‘Mishap, Class 3’’,
‘‘Mishap, Class 4,’’ ‘‘Neighboring
operations personnel,’’ ‘‘Normal flight,’’
‘‘Normal trajectory,’’ ‘‘Operating
environment,’’ and ‘‘Operation hazard’’;
■ n. Revise the definition of ‘‘Operator’’;
■ o. Add, in alphabetical order, the
definitions of ‘‘Orbital insertion,’’
‘‘Physical containment,’’ ‘‘Probability of
casualty,’’ and ‘‘Public’’;
■ p. Remove the definition of ‘‘Public
safety’’;
■ q. Revise the definition of ‘‘Reenter;
reentry’’;
■ r. Remove the definitions of ‘‘Reentry
accident’’ and ‘‘Reentry incident’’;
■ s. Add, in alphabetical order, the
definition of ‘‘Reentry window’’;
■ t. Revise the definition of ‘‘Safety
critical’’;
■ u. Add, in alphabetical order, the
definitions of ‘‘Service life’’ and
‘‘Software function’’;
■ v. Revise the definition of ‘‘State and
United States’’;
■ w. Add, in alphabetical order, the
definitions of ‘‘Sub-vehicle point,’’
‘‘System hazard,’’ ‘‘Toxic hazard area,’’
‘‘Tracking icon,’’ ‘‘Uncontrolled area,’’
‘‘Unguided suborbital launch vehicle,’’
‘‘Uprange,’’ and ‘‘Vehicle response
modes’’;
■ x. Remove the definition of ‘‘Vehicle
safety operations personnel’’; and
■ y. Add, in alphabetical order, the
definitions of ‘‘Wind weighting safety
system’’ and ‘‘Window closure’’.
The additions and revisions read as
follows:
■
14 CFR Part 401
Organization and functions
(Government agencies), Space
transportation and exploration.
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15413
Sfmt 4702
§ 401.5
Definitions.
*
*
*
*
*
Anomaly means any condition during
licensed or permitted activity that
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deviates from what is standard, normal,
or expected, during the verification or
operation of a system, subsystem,
process, facility, or support equipment.
*
*
*
*
*
Casualty area means the area
surrounding each potential debris or
vehicle impact point where serious
injuries, or worse, can occur.
Command control system means the
portion of a flight safety system that
includes all components needed to send
a flight abort control signal to the onboard portion of a flight safety system.
Contingency abort means a flight
abort with a landing at a planned
location that has been designated in
advance of vehicle flight.
Control entity means a person or
device that can control another device
or process.
Countdown means the timed
sequence of events that must take place
to initiate flight of a launch vehicle or
reentry of a reentry vehicle.
*
*
*
*
*
Critical asset means an asset that is
essential to the national interests of the
United States. Critical assets include
property, facilities, or infrastructure
necessary to maintain national defense,
or assured access to space for national
priority missions.
Crossrange means the distance
measured along a line whose direction
is either 90 degrees clockwise (right
crossrange) or counter-clockwise (left
crossrange) to the projection of a
vehicle’s planned nominal velocity
vector azimuth onto a horizontal plane
tangent to the ellipsoidal Earth model at
the vehicle’s sub-vehicle point. The
terms right crossrange and left
crossrange may also be used to indicate
direction.
Data loss flight time means the
shortest elapsed thrusting or gliding
time during which a vehicle flown with
a flight safety system can move from its
trajectory to a condition where it is
possible for the vehicle to violate a
flight safety limit.
Deorbit means the flight of a vehicle
that begins with the final command to
commit to a perigee below 70 nautical
miles (approximately 130 kilometers),
and ends when all vehicle components
come to rest on the Earth.
Disposal means the return or attempt
to return, purposefully, a launch vehicle
stage or component, not including a
reentry vehicle, from Earth orbit to
Earth, in a controlled manner.
Dose-response relationship means a
quantitative methodology used to assign
a probability of casualty within a
population group given exposure to a
toxic chemical of known or predicted
concentration and duration.
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Downrange means the distance
measured along a line whose direction
is parallel to the projection of a vehicle’s
planned nominal velocity vector
azimuth into a horizontal plane tangent
to the ellipsoidal Earth model at the
vehicle sub-vehicle point. The term
downrange may also be used to indicate
direction.
Effective casualty area means the
aggregate casualty area of each piece of
debris created by a vehicle failure at a
particular point on its trajectory. The
effective casualty area for each piece of
debris is a modeling construct in which
the area within which 100 percent of the
population are assumed to be a casualty,
and outside of which 100 percent of the
population are assumed not to be a
casualty.
*
*
*
*
*
Expected casualty means the mean
number of casualties predicted to occur
per flight operation if the operation
were repeated many times.
*
*
*
*
*
Explosive debris means solid
propellant fragments or other pieces of
a vehicle or payload that result from
breakup of the vehicle during flight and
that explode upon impact with the
Earth’s surface and cause overpressure.
*
*
*
*
*
Flight abort means the process to limit
or restrict the hazards to public health
and safety, and the safety of property,
presented by a launch vehicle or reentry
vehicle, including any payload, while in
flight by initiating and accomplishing a
controlled ending to vehicle flight.
Flight abort crew means the personnel
who make a flight abort decision.
Flight abort rules means the
conditions under which a flight safety
system must abort the flight to ensure
compliance with public safety criteria.
*
*
*
*
*
Flight hazard area means any region
of land, sea, or air that must be
surveyed, publicized, controlled, or
evacuated in order to protect public
health and safety and the safety of
property.
Flight safety limit means criteria to
ensure that public safety is protected
from the flight of a vehicle when a flight
safety system functions properly.
Flight safety system means a system
used to implement flight abort. A
human can be a part of a flight safety
system.
Gate means the portion of a flight
safety limit boundary through which the
tracking icon of a vehicle flown with a
flight safety system may pass without
flight abort, provided the flight remains
within specified parameters.
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Sfmt 4702
Hazard control means a preventative
measure or mitigation put in place for
systems or operations to reduce the
severity of a hazard or the likelihood of
the hazard occurring.
*
*
*
*
*
Instantaneous impact point means a
predicted impact point, following thrust
termination of a vehicle.
Launch means to place or try to place
a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle and
any payload or human being from Earth
in a suborbital trajectory, in Earth orbit
in outer space, or otherwise in outer
space, including activities involved in
the preparation of a launch vehicle or
payload for launch, when those
activities take place at a launch site in
the United States.
*
*
*
*
*
Launch or reentry system means the
integrated set of subsystems, personnel,
products, and processes that, when
combined together, safely carries out a
launch or reentry.
*
*
*
*
*
Launch window means a period of
time during which the flight of a launch
vehicle may be initiated.
Liftoff means any motion of the
launch vehicle with intention to initiate
flight.
Limits of a useful mission means the
trajectory data or other parameters that
describe the limits of a mission that can
attain the primary objective, including
flight azimuth limits.
Mishap means any event, or series of
events associated with a licensed or
permitted activity, that meets the
criteria of a Class 1, 2, 3 or 4 mishap.
Mishap, Class 1 means any event
resulting in one or more of the
following:
(1) A fatality or serious injury (as
defined in 49 CFR 830.2) as a result of
licensed or permitted activity to any
person who is not associated with the
licensed or permitted activity, including
ground activities at a launch or reentry
site; or
(2) A fatality or serious injury to any
space flight participant, crew, or
government astronaut.
Mishap, Class 2 means any event,
other than a Class 1 mishap, resulting in
one or more of the following:
(1) A malfunction of a flight safety
system or safety-critical system; or
(2) A failure of the licensee’s or
permittee’s safety organization, safety
operations, safety procedures; or
(3) High risk, as determined by the
FAA, of causing a serious or fatal injury
to any space flight participant, crew,
government astronaut, or member of the
public; or
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(4) Substantial damage, as determined
by the FAA, to property not associated
with licensed or permitted activity.
Mishap, Class 3 means any unplanned
event, other than a Class 1 or Class 2
mishap, resulting in one or more of the
following:
(1) Permanent loss of a launch or
reentry vehicle during licensed activity;
or
(2) The impact of a licensed or
permitted launch or reentry vehicle, its
payload, or any component thereof
outside the planned landing site or
designated hazard area.
Mishap, Class 4 means an unplanned
event, other than a Class 1, Class 2, or
Class 3 mishap, resulting in one or more
of the following:
(1) Permanent loss of a vehicle during
permitted activity;
(2) Failure to achieve mission
objectives; or
(3) Substantial damage, as determined
by the FAA, to property associated with
licensed or permitted activity.
Neighboring operations personnel
means, as determined by the Federal or
licensed launch or reentry site operator,
those members of the public located
within a launch or reentry site, or an
adjacent launch or reentry site, who are
not associated with a specific hazardous
licensed or permitted operation
currently being conducted but are
required to perform safety, security, or
critical tasks at the site and are notified
of the operation.
*
*
*
*
*
Normal flight means the flight of a
properly performing vehicle whose realtime vacuum instantaneous impact
point does not deviate from the nominal
vacuum instantaneous impact point by
more than the sum of the wind effects
and the three-sigma guidance and
performance deviations in the uprange,
downrange, left-crossrange, or rightcrossrange directions.
Normal trajectory means a trajectory
that describes normal flight.
Operating environment means an
environment that a launch or reentry
vehicle component will experience
during its lifecycle. Operating
environments include shock, vibration,
thermal cycle, acceleration, humidity,
and thermal vacuum.
Operation hazard means a hazard
created by an operating environment or
by an unsafe act.
*
*
*
*
*
Operator means a holder of a license
or permit under 51 U.S.C. Subtitle V,
chapter 509.
Orbital insertion means the point at
which a vehicle achieves a minimum
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70-nautical mile perigee based on a
computation that accounts for drag.
*
*
*
*
*
Physical containment means a launch
vehicle does not have sufficient energy
for any hazards associated with its flight
to reach the public or critical assets.
*
*
*
*
*
Probability of casualty means the
likelihood that a person will suffer a
serious injury or worse, including a fatal
injury, due to all hazards from an
operation at a specific location.
Public means, for a particular licensed
or permitted launch or reentry, people
and property that are not involved in
supporting the launch or reentry and
includes those people and property that
may be located within the launch or
reentry site, such as visitors, individuals
providing goods or services not related
to launch or reentry processing or flight,
and any other operator and its
personnel.
Reenter; reentry means to return or
attempt to return, purposefully, a
reentry vehicle and its payload or
human being, if any, from Earth orbit or
from outer space to Earth.
*
*
*
*
*
Reentry window means a period of
time during which the reentry of a
reentry vehicle may be initiated.
*
*
*
*
*
Safety critical means essential to safe
performance or operation. A safetycritical system, subsystem, component,
condition, event, operation, process, or
item, is one whose proper recognition,
control, performance, or tolerance, is
essential to ensuring public safety.
Service life means, for a safety-critical
system component, the sum total of the
component’s storage life and operating
life.
*
*
*
*
*
Software function means a collection
of computer code that implements a
requirement or performs an action. This
includes firmware and operating
systems.
*
*
*
*
*
State and United States means, when
used in a geographical sense, the several
States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
American Samoa, the United States
Virgin Islands, Guam, and any other
commonwealth, territory, or possession
of the United States.
Sub-vehicle point means the location
on an ellipsoidal Earth model where the
normal to the ellipsoid passes through
the vehicle’s center of gravity.
System hazard means a hazard
associated with a system and generally
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exists even when no operation is
occurring.
*
*
*
*
*
Toxic hazard area means a region on
the Earth’s surface where toxic
concentrations and durations may be
greater than approved toxic thresholds
for acute casualty, in the event of a
release during launch or reentry.
Tracking icon means the
representation of a vehicle’s
instantaneous impact point, debris
footprint, or other vehicle performance
metric used during real-time tracking of
the vehicle’s flight.
Uncontrolled area is an area of land
not controlled by a launch or reentry
operator, a launch or reentry site
operator, an adjacent site operator, or
other entity by agreement.
Unguided suborbital launch vehicle
means a suborbital rocket that does not
contain active guidance or a directional
control system.
*
*
*
*
*
Uprange means the distance
measured along a line that is 180
degrees to the downrange direction.
*
*
*
*
*
Vehicle response modes means
mutually exclusive scenarios that
characterize foreseeable combinations of
vehicle trajectory and debris generation.
*
*
*
*
*
Wind weighting safety system means
equipment, procedures, analysis and
personnel functions used to determine
the launcher elevation and azimuth
settings that correct for wind effects that
an unguided suborbital launch vehicle
will experience during flight.
Window closure means a period of
time when launch or reentry is not
permitted in order to avoid a collision
with an object in orbit. A window
closure may occur within a launch or
reentry window, may delay the start of
a window, or terminate a window early.
PART 404—REGULATIONS AND
LICENSING REQUIREMENTS
3. The authority citation for part 404
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923.
■
4. Revise § 404.5 to read as follows:
§ 404.5
Filing a petition for waiver.
(a) A petition for waiver must be
submitted at least 60 days before the
proposed effective date of the waiver,
unless the Administrator agrees to a
different time frame in accordance with
§ 404.15.
(b) The petition for waiver must
include:
(1) The specific section or sections of
this chapter from which the petitioner
seeks relief;
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(2) The extent of the relief sought and
the reason the relief is being sought;
(3) The reason why granting the
request for relief is in the public interest
and will not jeopardize the public
health and safety, safety of property,
and national security and foreign policy
interests of the United States; and
(4) Any additional facts, views, and
data available to the petitioner to
support the waiver request.
■ 5. Add § 404.15 to read as follows:
§ 404.15
Alternative time frames.
(a) General. Unless otherwise
approved by the Administrator, an
applicant, a licensee, a permittee, or a
safety element approval holder must
meet the time frames set forth in this
chapter.
(b) Request to change a time frame. A
person may file a written request to the
FAA to propose an alternative time
frame to any of the time frames included
in the sections listed in appendix A to
this part. The request must be—
(1) Submitted no later than the
specific time frame included in the
regulation; and
(2) Emailed to ASTApplications@
faa.gov; or
(3) Mailed to the Federal Aviation
Administration, Associate
Administrator for Commercial Space
Transportation, Room 331, 800
Independence Avenue SW, Washington,
DC 20591. Attention: Alternative Time
Frame Request.
(c) Administrator review. The
Administrator will review and make a
decision or grant a request for an
alternative time-frame as follows:
(1) The FAA will conduct its review
on a case-by-case basis, taking into
account the complexity of the request
and whether it allows sufficient time for
the FAA to conduct its review and make
the requisite public health and safety,
safety of property, and national security
and foreign policy findings; and
(2) The FAA will provide its decision
in writing.
■ 6. Add appendix A to part 404 the
read as follows:
Appendix A to Part 404—Alternative
Time Frames
A404.1
GENERAL
Alternative time frames. This appendix
lists the sections and corresponding
paragraphs in this chapter that provide the
eligible time frames for an applicant,
licensee, permittee or a safety element
approval holder, as applicable, to request an
alternative time frame.
TABLE A404.1—ELIGIBLE TIME FRAMES
49 CFR
Paragraphs
§ 404.5—Filing a petition for waiver ...................................................................................................................................................
§ 413.23—License or permit renewal .................................................................................................................................................
§ 414.31—Safety element approval renewal .....................................................................................................................................
§ 420.57—Notifications .......................................................................................................................................................................
§ 437.89—Preflight reporting ..............................................................................................................................................................
§ 440.15—Demonstration of compliance ...........................................................................................................................................
(a)
(a)
(a)
(d)
(a), (b)
(a)(1), (a)(2),
(a)(3), (a)(4)
(f)(1)
(b), (c), (d), (e)
(a)
§ 450.169— Launch and Reentry Collision Avoidance Analysis Requirements ...............................................................................
§ 450.213—Preflight reporting ............................................................................................................................................................
§ 450.215—Post-flight reporting .........................................................................................................................................................
■
PART 413—APPLICATION
PROCEDURES
9. Revise § 413.1 to read as follows:
§ 413.1
7. The authority citation for part 413
continues to read as follows:
■
Scope of this part.
(a) This part explains how to apply for
a license or experimental permit. These
procedures apply to all applications for
obtaining a license or permit,
transferring a license, and renewing a
Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923.
8. Revise the heading for part 413 to
read as set forth above.
■
license or permit. In this part, the term
application means either an application
in its entirety, or a portion of an
application for incremental review and
determination in accordance with
§ 450.33 of this chapter.
(b) Use the following table to locate
specific requirements:
TABLE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (b)
Subject
Part
License to Operate a Launch Site .......................................................................................................................................................
License to Operate a Reentry Site ......................................................................................................................................................
Experimental Permits ...........................................................................................................................................................................
Launch And Reentry License Requirements .......................................................................................................................................
10. Amend § 413.7 by revising the
section heading and paragraph (a)(3) to
read as follows:
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■
§ 413.7
Application submission.
(a) * * *
(3) For an application submitted by
email, an applicant must send the
application as an email attachment, or
as a link to a secure server, to
[email protected]. The
application and the email to which the
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application is attached or linked must
also satisfy the following criteria:
(i) The email to which the application
is attached or linked must be sent from
an email address controlled by the
person who signed the application or by
an authorized representative of the
applicant;
(ii) The email must identify each
document that is included as an
attachment or that is stored on a secure
server; and
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420
433
437
450
(iii) The electronic files must be datestamped and have version control
documentation.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 11. Amend § 413.11 by revising
paragraph (a) to read as follows:
§ 413.11
Acceptance of an application.
*
*
*
*
*
(a) The FAA accepts the application
and will initiate review; or
*
*
*
*
*
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■
12. Revise § 413.15 to read as follows:
§ 413.15
Review period.
(a) Review period duration. Unless
otherwise specified in this chapter, the
FAA reviews and makes a license or
permit determination on an application
within 180 days of receiving an
accepted license application or within
120 days of receiving an accepted
permit application. The FAA will
establish the time frame for any
incremental review and determination
with an applicant on a case-by-case
basis during pre-application
consultation.
(b) Review period tolled. If an
accepted application does not provide
sufficient information to continue or
complete the reviews or evaluations
required by this chapter for a license,
permit, or incremental determination, or
an issue exists that would affect a
determination, the FAA notifies the
applicant, in writing, and informs the
applicant of any information required to
complete the application. If the FAA
cannot review an accepted application
because of lack of information or for any
other reason, the FAA will toll the
review period until the FAA receives
the information it needs or the applicant
resolves the issue.
(c) Notice. Unless applying under
incremental review and determination
in accordance with § 450.33 of this
chapter, if the FAA does not make a
decision within 120 days of receiving an
accepted license application or within
90 days of receiving an accepted permit
application, the FAA informs the
applicant, in writing, of any outstanding
information needed to complete the
review, or of any issues that would
affect the decision.
■ 13. Amend § 413.21 by revising the
section heading and paragraphs (b) and
(c) to read as follows:
§ 413.21 Denial of a license or permit
application.
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*
*
*
*
*
(b) If the FAA has denied an
application in its entirety, the applicant
may either—
(1) Attempt to correct any deficiencies
identified and ask the FAA to
reconsider the revised application. The
FAA has 60 days or the number of days
remaining in the review period,
whichever is greater, within which to
reconsider the decision; or
(2) Request a hearing in accordance
with part 406 of this chapter, for the
purpose of showing why the application
should not be denied.
(c) An applicant whose application is
denied after reconsideration under
paragraph (b)(1) of this section may
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request a hearing in accordance with
paragraph (b)(2) of this section.
■ 14. Revise part 414 to read as follows:
PART 414—SAFETY ELEMENT
APPROVALS
Sec.
Subpart A—General
414.1 Scope.
414.3 Definitions.
414.5 Applicability.
414.7 Eligibility.
Subpart B—Application Procedures
414.9 Pre-application consultation.
414.11 Application.
414.13 Application separate from a vehicle
operator license application.
414.15 Application concurrent with vehicle
operator license application.
414.17 Confidentiality.
414.19 Processing the initial application.
414.21 Maintaining the continued
accuracy of the initial application.
Subpart C—Safety Element Approval
Review and Issuance
414.23 Technical criteria for reviewing a
safety element approval application.
414.25 Terms and conditions for issuing a
safety element approval; duration of a
safety element approval.
414.27 Maintaining the continued accuracy
of the safety element approval
application.
414.29 Safety element approval records.
414.31 Safety element approval renewal.
414.33 Safety element approval transfer.
414.35 Monitoring compliance with the
terms and conditions of a safety element
approval.
414.37 Modification, suspension, or
revocation of a safety element approval.
414.39 [Reserved]
Subpart D—Appeal Procedures
414.41 Hearings in safety element approval
actions.
414.43 Submissions; oral presentations in
safety element approval actions.
414.45 Administrative law judge’s
recommended decision in safety element
approval actions.
Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923.
Subpart A—General
§ 414.1
Scope.
This part establishes procedures for
obtaining a safety element approval and
renewing and transferring an existing
safety element approval. Safety element
approvals issued under this part may be
used to support the application review
for one or more vehicle operator license
requests under other parts of this
chapter.
§ 414.3
Definitions.
For purposes of this part the following
definitions apply:
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Safety element approval. A safety
element approval is an FAA document
containing the FAA determination that
one or more of the safety elements listed
in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this
definition, when used or employed
within a defined envelope, parameter,
or situation, will not jeopardize public
health and safety or safety of property.
A safety element approval may be
issued independent of a license, and it
does not confer any authority to conduct
activities for which a license is required
under this chapter. A safety element
approval does not relieve its holder of
the duty to comply with all applicable
requirements of law or regulation that
may apply to the holder’s activities.
(1) Launch vehicle, reentry vehicle,
safety system, process, service, or any
identified component thereof; or
(2) Qualified and trained personnel,
performing a process or function related
to licensed activities or vehicles.
Safety element. A safety element is
any one of the items or persons
(personnel) listed in paragraphs (1) and
(2) of the definition of ‘‘safety approval’’
in this section.
§ 414.5
Applicability.
This part applies to an applicant that
wants to obtain a safety element
approval for any of the safety elements
defined under this part and to persons
granted a safety element approval under
this part. Any person eligible under this
part may apply to become the holder of
a safety element approval.
§ 414.7
Eligibility.
(a) There is no citizenship
requirement to obtain a safety element
approval.
(b) You may be eligible for a safety
element approval if you are—
(1) A designer, manufacturer, or
operator of a launch or reentry vehicle
or component thereof;
(2) The designer or developer of a
safety system or process; or
(3) Personnel who perform safety
critical functions in conducting a
licensed launch or reentry.
(c) A safety element approval
applicant must have sufficient
knowledge and expertise to show that
the design and operation of the safety
element for which safety element
approval is sought qualify for a safety
element approval.
(d) Only the safety elements defined
under this part are eligible for a safety
element approval. The applicant must
consult with the FAA before submitting
an application. Unless the applicant or
the FAA requests another form of
consultation, consultation is oral
discussion with the FAA about the
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application process and the potential
issues relevant to the FAA’s safety
element approval decision.
Subpart B—Application Procedures
§ 414.9
Pre-application consultation.
The applicant must consult with the
FAA before submitting an application.
Unless the applicant or the FAA
requests another form of consultation,
consultation is oral discussion with the
FAA about the application process and
the potential issues relevant to the
FAA’s safety approval decision.
§ 414.11
Application.
An applicant may submit an
application for a safety element
approval in one of two ways:
(a) Separate from a vehicle operator
license application in accordance with
§ 414.13; or
(b) Concurrent with a vehicle operator
license application in accordance with
§ 414.15.
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§ 414.13 Application separate from a
vehicle operator license application.
(a) An applicant must make an
application in writing and in English.
The applicant must file the application
with the Federal Aviation
Administration either by paper, by use
of physical electronic storage, or by
email in the following manner:
(1) For an application submitted on
paper, an applicant must send two
copies of the application to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Associate
Administrator for Commercial Space
Transportation, Room 331, 800
Independence Avenue SW, Washington,
DC 20591. Attention: Application
Review.
(2) For an application submitted by
use of physical electronic storage, the
applicant must either mail the
application to the address specified in
paragraph (a)(1) of this section or handdeliver the application to an authorized
FAA representative. The application
and the physical electronic storage
containing the application must also
satisfy all of the following criteria:
(i) The application must include a
cover letter that is printed on paper and
signed by the person who signed the
application or by an authorized
representative of the applicant;
(ii) The cover letter must identify each
document that is included on the
physical electronic storage; and
(iii) The physical electronic storage
must be in a format such that its
contents cannot be altered.
(3) For an application submitted by
email, an applicant must send the
application as an email attachment, or
as a link to a secure server, to
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[email protected]. The
application and the email to which the
application is attached must also satisfy
the following criteria:
(i) The email to which the application
is attached must be sent from an email
address controlled by the person who
signed the application or by an
authorized representative of the
applicant; and
(ii) The email must identify each
document that is included as an
attachment or that is stored on a secure
server; and
(iii) The electronic files must be datestamped and have version control
documentation.
(b) The application must identify the
following basic information:
(1) Name and address of the
applicant.
(2) Name, address, and telephone
number of any person to whom
inquiries and correspondence should be
directed.
(3) Safety element as defined under
this part for which the applicant seeks
a safety element approval.
(c) The application must contain the
following technical information:
(1) A Statement of Conformance letter,
describing the specific criteria the
applicant used to show the adequacy of
the safety element for which a safety
element approval is sought, and
showing how the safety element
complies with the specific criteria.
(2) The specific operating limits for
which the safety element approval is
sought.
(3) The following as applicable:
(i) Information and analyses required
under this chapter that may be
applicable to demonstrating safe
performance of the safety element for
which the safety element approval is
sought.
(ii) Engineering design and analyses
that show the adequacy of the proposed
safety element for its intended use, such
that the use in a licensed launch or
reentry will not jeopardize public health
or safety or the safety of property.
(iii) Relevant manufacturing
processes.
(iv) Test and evaluation procedures.
(v) Test results.
(vi) Maintenance procedures.
(vii) Personnel qualifications and
training procedures.
(d) The application must be legibly
signed, dated, and certified as true,
complete, and accurate by one of the
following:
(1) For a corporation, an officer or
other individual authorized to act for
the corporation in licensing or safety
element approval matters.
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(2) For a partnership or a sole
proprietorship, a general partner or
proprietor, respectively.
(3) For a joint venture, association, or
other entity, an officer or other
individual duly authorized to act for the
joint venture, association, or other entity
in licensing matters.
(e) Failure to comply with any of the
requirements set forth in this section is
sufficient basis for denial of a safety
element approval application.
§ 414.15 Application concurrent with
vehicle operator license application.
(a) An applicant for a vehicle operator
license may also identify one or more
sections of its application for which it
seeks to obtain a safety element
approval concurrently with a license.
An applicant applying for a safety
element approval concurrently with a
license must—
(1) Meet the applicable requirements
of part 450 of this chapter;
(2) Provide the information required
in § 414.13(b)(3) and (c)(2) and (3); and
(3) Specify the sections of the license
application that support its application
for a safety element approval.
(b) The scope of the safety element
approval will be limited to what the
application supports. The technical
criteria for reviewing a safety element
submitted as part of a vehicle operator
license application are limited to the
applicable requirements of part 450 of
this chapter.
§ 414.17
Confidentiality.
(a) To ensure confidentiality of data or
information in the application, the
applicant must—
(1) Send a written request with the
application that trade secrets or
proprietary commercial or financial data
be treated as confidential, and include
in the request the specific time frame
confidential treatment is required.
(2) Mark data or information that
require confidentiality with an
identifying legend, such as ‘‘Proprietary
Information,’’ ‘‘Proprietary Commercial
Information,’’ ‘‘Trade Secret,’’ or
‘‘Confidential Treatment Requested.’’
Where this marking proves
impracticable, attach a cover sheet that
contains the identifying legend to the
data or information for which
confidential treatment is sought.
(b) If the applicant requests
confidential treatment for previously
submitted data or information, the FAA
will honor that request to the extent
practicable in case of any prior
distribution of the data or information.
(c) Data or information for which
confidential treatment is requested or
data or information that qualifies for
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exemption under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4) will
not be disclosed to the public unless the
Associate Administrator determines that
withholding the data or information is
contrary to the public or national
interest.
§ 414.19
Processing the initial application.
(a) The FAA will initially screen an
application to determine if the
application is complete enough for the
FAA to start its review.
(b) After completing the initial
screening, the FAA will inform the
applicant in writing of one of the
following:
(1) The FAA accepts the application
and will begin the reviews or
evaluations required for a safety element
approval determination under this part.
(2) The FAA rejects the application
because it is incomplete or indefinite
making initiation of the reviews or
evaluations required for a safety element
approval determination under this part
inappropriate.
(c) The written notice will state the
reason(s) for rejection and corrective
actions necessary for the application to
be accepted. The FAA may return a
rejected application to the applicant or
may hold it until the applicant provides
more information.
(d) The applicant may withdraw,
amend, or supplement an application
any time before the FAA makes a final
determination on the safety element
approval application by making a
written request to the Associate
Administrator. If the applicant amends
or supplements the initial application,
the revised application must meet all
the applicable requirements under this
part.
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§ 414.21 Maintaining the continued
accuracy of the initial application.
The applicant is responsible for the
continuing accuracy and completeness
of information provided to the FAA as
part of the safety element approval
application. If at any time after
submitting the application,
circumstances occur that cause the
information to no longer be accurate and
complete in any material respect, the
applicant must submit a written
statement to the Associate
Administrator explaining the
circumstances and providing the new or
corrected information. The revised
application must meet all requirements
under § 414.13 or § 414.15.
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Subpart C—Safety Element Approval
Review and Issuance
§ 414.23 Technical criteria for reviewing a
safety element approval application.
The FAA will determine whether a
safety element is eligible for and may be
issued a safety approval. We will base
our determination on performancebased criteria, against which we may
assess the effect on public health and
safety and on safety of property, in the
following hierarchy:
(a) FAA or other appropriate Federal
regulations.
(b) Government-developed or adopted
standards.
(c) Industry consensus performancebased criteria or standard.
(d) Applicant-developed criteria.
Applicant-developed criteria are
performance standards customized by
the manufacturer that intends to
produce the system, system component,
or part. The applicant-developed criteria
must define—
(1) Design and minimum
performance;
(2) Quality assurance system
requirements;
(3) Production acceptance test
specifications; and
(4) Continued operational safety
monitoring system characteristics.
§ 414.25 Terms and conditions for issuing
a safety element approval; duration of a
safety approval.
(a) The FAA will issue a safety
element approval to an applicant that
meets all the requirements under this
part.
(b) The scope of the safety element
approval will be limited by the scope of
the safety demonstration contained in
the application on which the FAA based
the decision to grant the safety element
approval.
(c) The FAA will determine specific
terms and conditions of a safety element
approval individually, limiting the
safety element approval to the scope for
which it was approved. The terms and
conditions will include reporting
requirements tailored to the individual
safety element approval.
(d) A safety element approval is valid
for five years and may be renewed.
§ 414.27 Maintaining the continued
accuracy of the safety element approval
application.
(a) The holder of a safety element
approval must ensure the continued
accuracy and completeness of
representations contained in the safety
element approval application, on which
the approval was issued, for the entire
term of the safety element approval.
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15419
(b) If any representation contained in
the application that is material to public
health and safety or safety of property
ceases to be accurate and complete, the
safety element approval holder must
prepare and submit a revised
application according to § 414.13 or
§ 414.15. The safety element approval
holder must point out any part of the
safety element approval or the
associated application that would be
changed or affected by a proposed
modification. The FAA will review and
make a determination on the revised
application under the terms of this part.
§ 414.29
Safety element approval records.
The holder of a safety element
approval must maintain all records
necessary to verify that the holder’s
activities are consistent with the
representations contained in the
application for which the approval was
issued for the duration of the safety
element approval plus one year.
§ 414.31
Safety element approval renewal.
(a) Eligibility. A holder of a safety
element approval may apply to renew it
by sending the FAA a written
application at least 90 days before the
expiration date of the approval, unless
the Administrator agrees to a different
time frame in accordance with § 404.15
of this chapter.
(b) Application. (1) A safety element
approval renewal application must meet
all the requirements under § 414.13 or
§ 414.15.
(2) The application may incorporate
by reference information provided as
part of the application for the expiring
safety element approval or any
modification to that approval.
(3) Any proposed changes in the
conduct of a safety element for which
the FAA has issued a safety element
approval must be described and must
include any added information
necessary to support the fitness of the
proposed changes to meet the criteria
upon which the FAA evaluated the
safety element approval application.
(c) Review of application. The FAA
conducts the reviews required under
this part to determine whether the safety
element approval may be renewed. We
may incorporate by reference any
findings that are part of the record for
the expiring safety element approval.
(d) Grant of safety element approval
renewal. If the FAA makes a favorable
safety element approval determination,
the FAA issues an order that amends the
expiration date of the safety element
approval or issues a new safety element
approval. The FAA may impose added
or revised terms and conditions
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necessary to protect public health and
safety and the safety of property.
(e) Written notice. The FAA will
provide written notice to the applicant
of our determination on the safety
element approval renewal request.
(f) Denial of a safety element approval
renewal. If the FAA denies the renewal
application, the applicant may correct
any deficiency the FAA identified and
request a reconsideration of the revised
application. The applicant also has the
right to appeal a denial as set forth in
subpart D of this part.
§ 414.33
Safety element approval transfer.
(a) Only the FAA may approve a
transfer of a safety element approval.
(b) Either the holder of a safety
element approval or the prospective
transferee may request a safety element
approval transfer.
(c) Both the holder and prospective
transferee must agree to the transfer.
(d) The person requesting the transfer
must submit a safety element approval
application according to § 414.13 or
§ 414.15, must meet the applicable
requirements of this part, and may
incorporate by reference relevant
portions of the initial application.
(e) The FAA will approve a transfer of
a safety element approval only after all
the approvals and determinations
required under this chapter for a safety
element approval have been met. In
conducting reviews and issuing
approvals and determinations, the FAA
may incorporate by reference any
findings made part of the record to
support the initial safety element
approval determination. The FAA may
modify the terms and conditions of a
safety element approval to reflect any
changes necessary because of a safety
element approval transfer.
(f) The FAA will provide written
notice to the person requesting the
safety element approval transfer of our
determination.
amozie on DSK9F9SC42PROD with PROPOSALS2
§ 414.35 Monitoring compliance with the
terms and conditions of a safety element
approval.
Each holder of a safety element
approval must allow access by, and
cooperate with, Federal officers or
employees or other individuals
authorized by the Associate
Administrator to inspect manufacturing,
production, testing, or assembly
performed by a holder of a safety
element approval or its contractor. The
FAA may also inspect a safety element
approval process or service, including
training programs and personnel
qualifications.
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§ 414.37 Modification, suspension, or
revocation of a safety element approval.
(a) The safety element approval
holder. The safety element approval
holder may submit an application to the
FAA to modify the terms and conditions
of the holder’s safety element approval.
The application must meet all the
applicable requirements under this part.
The FAA will review and make a
determination on the application using
the same procedures under this part
applicable to an initial safety element
approval application. If the FAA denies
the request to modify a safety element
approval, the holder may correct any
deficiency the FAA identified and
request reconsideration. The holder also
has the right to appeal a denial as set
forth in subpart D of this part.
(b) The FAA. If the FAA finds it is in
the interest of public health and safety,
safety of property, or if the safety
element approval holder fails to comply
with any applicable requirements of this
part, any terms and conditions of the
safety approval, or any other applicable
requirement, the FAA may—
(1) Modify the terms and conditions
of the safety element approval; or
(2) Suspend or revoke the safety
element approval.
(c) Effective date. Unless otherwise
stated by the FAA, any modification,
suspension, or revocation of a safety
element approval under paragraph (b) of
this section—
(1) Takes effect immediately; and
(2) Continues in effect during any
reconsideration or appeal of such action
under this part.
(d) Notification and Right to Appeal.
If the FAA determines it is necessary to
modify, suspend, or revoke a safety
element approval, we will notify the
safety element approval holder in
writing. If the holder disagrees with the
FAA’s determination, the holder may
correct any deficiency the FAA
identified and request a reconsideration
of the determination. The applicant also
has the right to appeal the
determination as set forth in subpart D
of this part.
§ 414.39
[Reserved]
Subpart D—Appeal Procedures
§ 414.41 Hearings in safety element
approval actions.
(a) The FAA will give the safety
element approval applicant or holder, as
appropriate, written notice stating the
reason for issuing a denial or for
modifying, suspending, or revoking a
safety element approval under this part.
(b) A safety element approval
applicant or holder is entitled to a
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determination on the record after an
opportunity for a hearing.
§ 414.43 Submissions; oral presentations
in safety element approval actions.
(a) Determinations in safety element
approval actions under this part will be
made on the basis of written
submissions unless the administrative
law judge, on petition or on his or her
own initiative, determines that an oral
presentation is required.
(b) Submissions must include a
detailed exposition of the evidence or
arguments supporting the petition.
(c) Petitions must be filed as soon as
practicable, but in no event more than
30 days after issuance of decision or
finding under § 414.37.
§ 414.45 Administrative law judge’s
recommended decision in safety element
approval actions.
(a) The Associate Administrator, who
will make the final decision on the
matter at issue, will review the
recommended decision of the
administrative law judge. The Associate
Administrator will make such final
decision within 30 days of issuance of
the recommended decision.
(b) The authority and responsibility to
review and decide rests solely with the
Associate Administrator and may not be
delegated.
PART 415 [REMOVE AND RESERVE]
■
15. Remove and reserve part 415.
PART 417 [REMOVE AND RESERVE]
■
16. Remove and reserve part 417.
PART 420—LICENSE TO OPERATE A
LAUNCH SITE
17. The authority citation for part 420
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923.
§ 420.5
[Amended]
18. Amend § 420.5 by removing the
definitions for ‘‘Instantaneous impact
point,’’ ‘‘Launch site accident,’’ and
‘‘Public.’’
■ 19. Amend § 420.15 by revising
paragraph (b) to read as follows:
■
§ 420.15
Information requirements.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) Environmental. The FAA is
responsible for complying with the
procedures and policies of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and
other applicable environmental laws,
regulations, and Executive Orders prior
to issuing a launch site license. An
applicant must provide the FAA with
information needed to comply with
such requirements. The FAA will
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consider and document the potential
environmental effects associated with
issuing a launch site license.
(1) Environmental Impact Statement
or Environmental Assessment. An
applicant must—
(i) Prepare an Environmental
Assessment with FAA oversight;
(ii) Assume financial responsibility
for preparation of an Environmental
Impact Statement by an FAA-selected
and -managed consultant contractor; or
(iii) Submit a written re-evaluation of
a previously submitted Environmental
Assessment or Environmental Impact
Statement when requested by the FAA.
(2) Categorical exclusion. An
applicant may request a categorical
exclusion determination from the FAA
by submitting the request and
supporting rationale.
(3) Environmental information. An
application must include an approved
FAA Environmental Assessment,
Environmental Impact Statement,
categorical exclusion determination, or
written re-evaluation covering all
planned licensed activities in
compliance with NEPA and the Council
on Environmental Quality Regulations
for Implementing the Procedural
Provisions of NEPA.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 20. Revise § 420.51 to read as follows:
§ 420.51
Responsibilities—general.
A licensee must operate its launch
site in accordance with the
representations in its application.
■ 21. Amend § 420.57 by revising
paragraph (d) to read as follows:
§ 420.57
Notifications.
*
*
*
*
*
(d) At least 2 days prior to flight of a
launch vehicle, unless the
Administrator agrees to a different time
frame in accordance with § 404.15 of
this chapter, the licensee must notify
local officials and all owners of land
adjacent to the launch site of the flight
schedule.
■ 22. Revise § 420.59 to read as follows:
amozie on DSK9F9SC42PROD with PROPOSALS2
§ 420.59
Mishap plan.
(a) A licensee must submit a mishap
response plan that meets the
requirements of § 450.173 of this
chapter.
(b) A launch site operator’s mishap
plan must also contain—
(1) Procedures for participating in an
investigation of a launch mishap for
launches launched from the launch site;
and
(2) Require the licensee to cooperate
with FAA or National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) investigations of a
mishap for launches launched from the
launch site.
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(c) Emergency response and
investigation procedures developed in
accordance with 29 CFR 1910.119 and
40 CFR part 68 will satisfy the
requirements of § 450.173(d) and (e) to
the extent that they include the
elements required by § 450.173(d) and
(e).
PART 435 [REMOVED AND
RESERVED]
■
23. Remove and reserve part 431.
PART 433—LICENSE TO OPERATE A
REENTRY SITE
24. The authority citation for part 433
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923.
■
25. Revise § 433.7 to read as follows:
§ 433.7
Environmental.
(a) General. The FAA is responsible
for complying with the procedures and
policies of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) and other applicable
environmental laws, regulations, and
Executive Orders prior to issuing a
reentry site license. An applicant must
provide the FAA with information
needed to comply with such
requirements. The FAA will consider
and document the potential
environmental effects associated with
issuing a license for a reentry site.
(b) Environmental Impact Statement
or Environmental Assessment. An
applicant must—
(1) Prepare an Environmental
Assessment with FAA oversight;
(2) Assume financial responsibility for
preparation of an Environmental Impact
Statement by an FAA-selected and
-managed consultant contractor; or
(3) Submit a written re-evaluation of
a previously submitted Environmental
Assessment or Environmental Impact
Statement when requested by the FAA.
(c) Categorical exclusion. An
applicant may request a categorical
exclusion determination from the FAA
by submitting the request and
supporting rationale.
(d) Environmental information. An
application must include an approved
FAA Environmental Assessment,
Environmental Impact Statement,
categorical exclusion determination, or
written re-evaluation covering all
planned licensed activities in
compliance with NEPA and the Council
on Environmental Quality Regulations
for Implementing the Procedural
Provisions of NEPA.
§ 433.9
■
[Removed and Reserved]
26. Remove and reserve § 433.9.
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27. Remove and reserve part 435.
PART 437—EXPERIMENTAL PERMITS
28. The authority citation for part 437
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923.
PART 431 [REMOVE AND RESERVE]
■
15421
§ 437.3
[Amended]
29. Amend § 437.3 by removing the
definition for ‘‘Anomaly.’’
■ 30. Amend § 437.21 by revising
paragraphs (b) and (c) to read as follows:
■
§ 437.21
General.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) Other regulations—(1)
Environmental—(i) General. The FAA is
responsible for complying with the
procedures and policies of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and
other applicable environmental laws,
regulations, and Executive Orders to
consider and document the potential
environmental effects associated with
proposed reusable suborbital rocket
launches or reentries. An applicant
must provide the FAA with information
needed to comply with such
requirements. The FAA will consider
and document the potential
environmental effects associated with
proposed reusable suborbital rocket
launches or reentries.
(ii) Environmental Impact Statement
or Environmental Assessment. An
applicant must—
(A) Prepare an Environmental
Assessment with FAA oversight;
(B) Assume financial responsibility
for preparation of an Environmental
Impact Statement by an FAA-selected
and -managed consultant contractor; or
(C) Submit a written re-evaluation of
a previously submitted Environmental
Assessment or Environmental Impact
Statement when requested by the FAA.
(iii) Categorical exclusion. An
applicant may request a categorical
exclusion determination from the FAA
by submitting the request and
supporting rationale.
(iv) Information requirements. An
application must include an approved
FAA Environmental Assessment,
Environmental Impact Statement,
categorical exclusion determination, or
written re-evaluation covering all
planned licensed activities in
compliance with NEPA and the Council
on Environmental Quality Regulations
for Implementing the Procedural
Provisions of NEPA.
(2) Financial responsibility. An
applicant must provide the information
required by part 3 of appendix A of part
440 of this chapter for the FAA to
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conduct a maximum probable loss
analysis.
(3) Human space flight. An applicant
proposing launch or reentry with flight
crew or a space flight participant on
board a reusable suborbital rocket must
demonstrate compliance with §§ 460.5,
460.7, 460.11, 460.13, 460.15, 460.17,
460.51 and 460.53 of this subchapter.
(c) Use of a safety element approval.
If an applicant proposes to use any
reusable suborbital rocket, safety
system, process, service, or personnel
for which the FAA has issued a safety
element approval under part 414 of this
chapter, the FAA will not reevaluate
that safety element to the extent its use
is within its approved envelope. As part
of the application process, the FAA will
evaluate the integration of that safety
element into vehicle systems or
operations.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 31. Revise § 437.41 to read as follows:
§ 437.41
Mishap plan.
An applicant must submit a mishap
plan that meets the requirements of
§ 450.173 of this chapter.
■ 32. Revise § 437.65 to read as follows:
§ 437.65
Collision avoidance analysis.
For a permitted flight with a planned
maximum altitude greater than 150
kilometers, a permittee must obtain a
collision avoidance analysis in
accordance with § 450.169 of this
chapter.
§ 437.75
[Removed and Reserved]
33. Remove and reserve § 437.75.
34. Amend § 437.89 by:
a. Revising paragraph (a) introductory
text;
■ b. In paragraphs (a)(1) through (3),
removing the comma at the end of the
paragraphs and adding a semicolon in
its place; and
■ c. Revise paragraph (b).
The revisions read as follows:
■
■
■
amozie on DSK9F9SC42PROD with PROPOSALS2
§ 437.89
Pre-flight reporting.
(a) Not later than 30 days before each
flight or series of flights conducted
under an experimental permit, unless
the Administrator agrees to a different
time frame in accordance with § 404.15
of this chapter, a permittee must
provide the FAA with the following
information:
*
*
*
*
*
(b) Not later than 15 days before each
permitted flight planned to reach greater
than 150 km altitude, unless the
Administrator agrees to a different time
frame in accordance with § 404.15, a of
this chapter permittee must provide the
FAA its planned trajectory for a
collision avoidance analysis.
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PART 440—FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY
35. The authority citation for part 440
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923.
36. Amend § 440.3 by revising the
definition for ‘‘Maximum probable loss’’
to read as follows:
■
§ 440.3
Definitions.
*
*
*
*
*
Maximum probable loss (MPL) means
the greatest dollar amount of loss for
bodily injury or property damage that is
reasonably expected to result from a
licensed or permitted activity:
(1) Losses to third parties, excluding
Government personnel and other launch
or reentry participants’ employees
involved in licensed or permitted
activities and neighboring operations
personnel, that are reasonably expected
to result from a licensed or permitted
activity are those that have a probability
of occurrence of no less than one in ten
million.
(2) Losses to Government property
and Government personnel involved in
licensed or permitted activities and
neighboring operations personnel that
are reasonably expected to result from
licensed or permitted activities are those
that have a probability of occurrence of
no less than one in one hundred
thousand.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 37. Amend § 440.15 by revising
paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) to read as
follows:
§ 440.15
Demonstration of compliance.
(a) * * *
(1) All reciprocal waiver of claims
agreements required under § 440.17(c)
must be submitted at least 30 days
before the start of any licensed or
permitted activity involving a customer,
crew member, or space flight
participant; unless the Administrator
agrees to a different time frame in
accordance with § 404.15 of this
chapter;
(2) Evidence of insurance must be
submitted at least 30 days before
commencement of any licensed launch
or permitted activity, and for licensed
reentry no less than 30 days, before
commencement of launch activities
involving the reentry licensee, unless
the Administrator agrees to a different
time frame in accordance with § 404.15
of this chapter;
(3) Evidence of financial
responsibility in a form other than
insurance, as provided under § 440.9(f)
must be submitted at least 60 days
before commencement of a licensed or
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permitted activity, unless the
Administrator agrees to a different time
frame in accordance with § 404.15 of
this chapter; and
(4) Evidence of renewal of insurance
or other form of financial responsibility
must be submitted at least 30 days in
advance of its expiration date, unless
the Administrator agrees to a different
time frame in accordance with § 404.15
of this chapter.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 38. Add part 450 to read as follows:
PART 450—LAUNCH AND REENTRY
LICENSE REQUIREMENTS
Sec.
Subpart A—General Information
450.1 Applicability.
450.3 Scope of a vehicle operator license.
450.5 Issuance of a vehicle operator license.
450.7 Duration of a vehicle operator license.
450.9 Additional license terms and
conditions.
450.11 Transfer of a vehicle operator
license.
450.13 Rights not conferred by a vehicle
operator license.
Subpart B—Requirements to Obtain a
Vehicle Operator License
450.31 General.
450.33 Incremental review and
determinations.
450.35 Accepted means of compliance.
450.37 Equivalent level of safety.
450.39 Use of safety element approval.
450.41 Policy review and approval.
450.43 Payload review and determination.
450.45 Safety review and approval.
450.47 Environmental review.
Subpart C—Safety Requirements
Public Safety Criteria
450.101 Public safety criteria.
System Safety Program
450.103 System safety program.
Preliminary Safety Assessment for Flight
and Hazard Control Strategies
450.105 Preliminary safety assessment for
flight.
450.107 Hazard control strategies.
Flight Hazard Analyses for Hardware and
Software
450.109 Flight hazard analysis.
450.111 Computing systems and software.
Flight Safety Analyses
450.113 Flight safety analysis
requirements—scope and applicability.
450.115 Flight safety analysis methods.
450.117 Trajectory analysis for normal
flight.
450.119 Trajectory analysis for malfunction
flight.
450.121 Debris analysis.
450.123 Flight safety limits analysis.
450.125 Gate analysis.
450.127 Data loss Flight time and planned
safe flight state analyses.
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450.129 Time delay analysis.
450.131 Probability of failure analysis.
450.133 Flight hazard area analysis.
450.135 Debris risk analysis.
450.137 Far-field overpressure blast effects
analysis.
450.139 Toxic hazards for flight.
450.141 Wind weighting for the flight of an
unguided suborbital launch vehicle.
Prescribed Hazard Controls
450.143 Safety-critical system design, test,
and documentation.
450.145 Flight safety system.
450.147 Agreements.
450.149 Safety-critical personnel
qualifications.
450.151 Work shift and rest requirements.
450.153 Radio frequency management.
450.155 Readiness.
450.157 Communications.
450.159 Preflight procedures.
450.161 Surveillance and publication of
hazard areas.
450.163 Lightning hazard mitigation.
450.165 Flight safety rules.
450.167 Tracking.
450.169 Launch and reentry collision
avoidance analysis requirements.
450.171 Safety at end of launch.
450.173 Mishap plan—reporting, response,
and investigation requirements.
450.175 Test-induced damage.
450.177 Unique Policies, requirements, and
practices.
Ground Safety
450.179 Ground safety—general.
450.181 Coordination with a site operator.
450.183 Explosive site plan.
450.185 Ground hazard analysis.
450.187 Toxic hazards mitigation for
ground operations.
450.189 Ground safety prescribed hazard
controls.
Subpart D—Terms and Conditions of a
Vehicle Operator License.
450.201 Public safety responsibility.
450.203 Compliance with license.
450.205 Financial responsibility
requirements.
450.207 Human Spaceflight Requirements.
450.209 Compliance monitoring.
450.211 Continuing accuracy of license
application; application for modification
of license.
450.213 Preflight reporting.
450.215 Post-flight reporting.
450.217 Registration of space objects.
450.219 Records.
Appendix A to Part 450—Collision Analysis
Worksheet
Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923.
amozie on DSK9F9SC42PROD with PROPOSALS2
Subpart A—General Information
§ 450.1
Applicability.
(a) General. This part prescribes
requirements for obtaining and
maintaining a license to launch, reenter,
or both launch and reenter, a launch or
reentry vehicle.
(b) Grandfathering. Except for
§§ 450.169 and 450.101(a)(4) and (b)(4),
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this part does not apply to any launch
or reentry that an operator elects to
conduct pursuant to a license issued by
the FAA or an application accepted by
the FAA no later than [EFFECTIVE
DATE OF FINAL RULE]. The
Administrator will determine the
applicability of this part to an
application for a license modification
submitted after [EFFECTIVE DATE OF
FINAL RULE] on a case-by-case basis.
§ 450.3 Scope of a vehicle operator
license.
(a) A vehicle operator license
authorizes a licensee to conduct one or
more launches or reentries using the
same vehicle or family of vehicles. A
vehicle operator license identifies the
scope of authorization as defined in
paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section or
as agreed to by the Administrator.
(b) A vehicle operator license
authorizes launch, which includes the
flight of a launch vehicle and pre- and
post-flight ground operations as follows:
(1) Launch begins when hazardous
preflight ground operations commence
at a U.S. launch site that pose a threat
to the public. Unless a later point is
agreed to by the Administrator,
hazardous preflight ground operations
commence when a launch vehicle or its
major components arrive at a U.S.
launch site.
(2) At a non-U.S. launch site, launch
begins at ignition or at the first
movement that initiates flight,
whichever occurs earlier.
(3) Launch ends when any of the
following events occur:
(i) For an orbital launch of a vehicle
without a reentry of the vehicle, launch
ends after the licensee’s last exercise of
control over its vehicle on orbit, after
vehicle stage impact on Earth, after
activities necessary to return the vehicle
or stage to a safe condition on the
ground after landing, or after activities
necessary to return the site to a safe
condition, whichever occurs later;
(ii) For an orbital launch of a vehicle
with a reentry of the vehicle, launch
ends after deployment of all payloads,
upon completion of the vehicle’s first
steady-state orbit if there is no payload,
or after activities necessary to return the
site to a safe condition, whichever
occurs later;
(iii) For a suborbital launch that
includes a reentry, launch ends after
reaching apogee; or
(iv) For a suborbital launch that does
not include a reentry, launch ends after
the vehicle or vehicle component
impact on Earth, after activities
necessary to return the vehicle or
vehicle component to a safe condition
on the ground after landing, or after
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15423
activities necessary to return the site to
a safe condition, whichever occurs later.
(c) A vehicle operator’s license
authorizes reentry, which includes
activities conducted in Earth orbit or
outer space to determine reentry
readiness and that are critical to
ensuring public health and safety and
the safety of property during reentry
flight. Reentry also includes activities
necessary to return the reentry vehicle
to a safe condition on the ground after
landing.
§ 450.5 Issuance of a vehicle operator
license.
(a) The FAA issues a vehicle operator
license to an applicant who has
obtained all approvals and
determinations required under this part
for a license.
(b) A vehicle operator license
authorizes a licensee to conduct
launches or reentries, in accordance
with the representations contained in
the licensee’s application, with subparts
C and D of this part, and subject to the
licensee’s compliance with terms and
conditions contained in license orders
accompanying the license, including
financial responsibility requirements.
§ 450.7 Duration of a vehicle operator
license.
A vehicle operator license is valid for
the period of time determined by the
Administrator as necessary to conduct
the licensed activity but may not exceed
5 years from the issuance date.
§ 450.9 Additional license terms and
conditions.
The FAA may modify a vehicle
operator license at any time by
modifying or adding license terms and
conditions to ensure compliance with
the Act (as defined in § 401.5 of this
chapter) and its implementing
regulations in this chapter.
§ 450.11
license.
Transfer of a vehicle operator
(a) Only the FAA may transfer a
vehicle operator license.
(b) An applicant for transfer of a
vehicle operator license must submit a
license application in accordance with
part 413 of this chapter and must meet
the requirements of part 450 of this
chapter. The FAA will transfer a license
to an applicant that has obtained all of
the approvals and determinations
required under this part for a license. In
conducting its reviews and issuing
approvals and determinations, the FAA
may incorporate by reference any
findings made part of the record to
support the initial licensing
determination. The FAA may modify a
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license to reflect any changes necessary
as a result of a license transfer.
§ 450.13 Rights not conferred by a vehicle
operator license.
Issuance of a vehicle operator license
does not relieve a licensee of its
obligation to comply with all applicable
requirements of law or regulation that
may apply to its activities, nor does
issuance confer any proprietary,
property or exclusive right in the use of
any Federal launch range or related
facilities, airspace, or outer space.
Subpart B—Requirements to Obtain a
Vehicle Operator License
§ 450.31
General.
(a) To obtain a vehicle operator
license, an applicant must—
(1) Submit a license application in
accordance with the procedures in part
413 of this chapter;
(2) Obtain a policy approval from the
Administrator in accordance with
§ 450.41;
(3) Obtain a favorable payload
determination from the Administrator in
accordance with § 450.43;
(4) Obtain a safety approval from the
Administrator in accordance with
§ 450.45;
(5) Satisfy the environmental review
requirements of § 450.47; and
(6) Provide the information required
by appendix A of part 440 of this
chapter for the Administrator to conduct
a maximum probable loss analysis for
the applicable licensed operation.
(b) An applicant may apply for the
approvals and determinations in
paragraphs (a)(2) through (6) of this
section separately or all together in one
complete application, using the
application procedures contained in
part 413 of this chapter.
(c) An applicant may also apply for a
safety approval in an incremental
manner, in accordance with § 450.33.
(d) An applicant may reference
materials previously provided as part of
a license application in order to meet
the application requirements of this
part.
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§ 450.33 Incremental review and
determinations.
An applicant may submit its
application for a safety review
incrementally using an approach
approved by the Administrator.
(a) An applicant must identify to the
Administrator, prior to submitting an
application, whether it will submit an
incremental application for any
approval or determination.
(b) An applicant using an incremental
approach must have the approach
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approved by the Administrator prior to
submitting an application.
(c) The Administrator may make
incremental determinations as part of
this review process.
§ 450.35
Accepted means of compliance.
(a) An applicant must demonstrate
compliance with applicable sections of
this part using a means of compliance
accepted by the Administrator. These
applicable sections specify that only an
accepted means of compliance can be
used to demonstrate compliance.
(b) The FAA will provide public
notice of each means of compliance that
the Administrator has accepted.
(c) An applicant requesting
acceptance of an alternative means of
compliance must submit the alternative
means of compliance to the FAA in a
form and manner acceptable to the
Administrator.
§ 450.37
Equivalent level of safety.
(a) An applicant must demonstrate
compliance with each requirement of
this part, unless the applicant clearly
and convincingly demonstrates that an
alternative approach provides an
equivalent level of safety to the
requirement of this part.
(b) Paragraph (a) of this section does
not apply to the requirements of
§ 450.101.
§ 450.39
Use of safety element approval.
If an applicant proposes to use any
vehicle, safety system, process, service,
or personnel for which the FAA has
issued a safety element approval under
part 414 of this chapter, the FAA will
not reevaluate that safety element
during a license application evaluation
to the extent its use is within its
approved envelope.
§ 450.41
Policy review and approval.
(a) General. The FAA issues a policy
approval to an applicant unless the FAA
determines that a proposed launch or
reentry would jeopardize U.S. national
security or foreign policy interests, or
international obligations of the United
States.
(b) Interagency consultation. (1) The
FAA consults with the Department of
Defense to determine whether a license
application presents any issues affecting
U.S. national security.
(2) The FAA consults with the
Department of State to determine
whether a license application presents
any issues affecting U.S. foreign policy
interests or international obligations.
(3) The FAA consults with other
Federal agencies, including the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration,
authorized to address issues identified
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under paragraph (a) of this section,
associated with an applicant’s proposal.
(c) Issues during policy review. The
FAA will advise an applicant, in
writing, of any issue raised during a
policy review that would impede
issuance of a policy approval. The
applicant may respond, in writing, or
amend its license application as
required by § 413.17 of this chapter.
(d) Denial of policy approval. The
FAA notifies an applicant, in writing, if
it has denied policy approval for a
license application. The notice states
the reasons for the FAA’s determination.
The applicant may respond in writing to
the reasons for the determination and
request reconsideration in accordance
with § 413.21 of this chapter.
(e) Application requirements for
policy review. In its license application,
an applicant must—
(1) Identify the model, type, and
configuration of any vehicle proposed
for launch or reentry by the applicant;
(2) Describe the vehicle by
characteristics that include individual
stages, their dimensions, type and
amounts of all propellants, and
maximum thrust;
(3) Identify foreign ownership of the
applicant as follows:
(i) For a sole proprietorship or
partnership, identify all foreign
ownership;
(ii) For a corporation, identify any
foreign ownership interests of 10
percent or more; and
(iii) For a joint venture, association, or
other entity, identify any participating
foreign entities; and
(4) Identify proposed vehicle flight
profile, including:
(i) Launch or reentry site, including
any contingency abort locations;
(ii) Flight azimuths, trajectories, and
associated ground tracks and
instantaneous impact points for the
duration of the licensed activity,
including any contingency abort
profiles;
(iii) Sequence of planned events or
maneuvers during flight;
(iv) Normal impact or landing areas
for all mission hardware; and
(v) For each orbital mission, the range
of intermediate and final orbits of each
vehicle upper stage and their estimated
orbital lifetimes.
§ 450.43 Payload review and
determination.
(a) General. The FAA issues a
favorable payload determination for a
launch or reentry to a license applicant
or payload owner or operator if—
(1) The applicant, payload owner, or
payload operator has obtained all
required licenses, authorizations, and
permits; and
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(2) Its launch or reentry would not
jeopardize public health and safety,
safety of property, U.S. national security
or foreign policy interests, or
international obligations of the United
States.
(b) Relationship to other executive
agencies. The FAA does not make a
determination under paragraph (a)(2) of
this section for—
(1) Those aspects of payloads that are
subject to regulation by the Federal
Communications Commission or the
Department of Commerce; or
(2) Payloads owned or operated by the
U.S. Government.
(c) Classes of payloads. The FAA may
review and issue findings regarding a
proposed class of payload, including
communications, remote sensing, or
navigation. However, prior to a launch
or reentry, each payload is subject to
verification by the FAA that its launch
or reentry would not jeopardize public
health and safety, safety of property,
U.S. national security or foreign policy
interests, or international obligations of
the United States.
(d) Payload owner or payload
operator may apply. In addition to a
launch or reentry operator, a payload
owner or payload operator may request
a payload review and determination.
(e) Interagency consultation. The FAA
consults with other agencies as follows:
(1) The Department of Defense to
determine whether launch or reentry of
a proposed payload or payload class
would present any issues affecting U.S.
national security;
(2) The Department of State to
determine whether launch or reentry of
a proposed payload or payload class
would present any issues affecting U.S.
foreign policy interests or international
obligations; or
(3) Other Federal agencies, including
the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, authorized to address
issues of public health and safety, safety
of property, U.S. national security or
foreign policy interests, or international
obligations of the United States,
associated with the launch or reentry of
a proposed payload or payload class.
(f) Issues during payload review. The
FAA will advise a person requesting a
payload determination, in writing, of
any issue raised during a payload
review that would impede issuance of a
license to launch or reenter that payload
or payload class. The person requesting
payload review may respond, in writing,
or amend its application as required by
§ 413.17 of this chapter.
(g) Denial of a payload determination.
The FAA notifies an applicant, in
writing, if it has denied a favorable
payload determination. The notice
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states the reasons for the FAA’s
determination. The applicant may
respond in writing to the reasons for the
determination and request
reconsideration in accordance with
§ 413.21 of this chapter.
(h) Incorporation of payload
determination in license application. A
favorable payload determination issued
for a payload or class of payload may be
included by a license applicant as part
of its application. However, any change
in information provided under
paragraph (i) of this section must be
reported in accordance with § 413.17 of
this chapter. The FAA determines
whether a favorable payload
determination remains valid in light of
reported changes and may conduct an
additional payload review.
(i) Application requirements. A
person requesting review of a particular
payload or payload class must identify
the following:
(1) For launch of a payload:
(i) Payload name or class, and
function;
(ii) Description, including physical
dimensions, weight, composition, and
any hosted payloads;
(iii) Payload owner and payload
operator, if different from the person
requesting payload review and
determination,
(iv) Any foreign ownership of the
payload or payload operator, as
specified in § 450.41(e)(3);
(v) Hazardous materials as defined in
§ 401.5 of this chapter, radioactive
materials, and the amounts of each;
(vi) Explosive potential of payload
materials, alone and in combination
with other materials found on the
payload;
(vii) For orbital launches, parameters
for parking, transfer and final orbits, and
approximate transit times to final orbit;
(viii) Delivery point in flight at which
the payload will no longer be under the
licensee’s control;
(ix) Intended operations during the
lifetime of the payload, including
anticipated life span and any planned
disposal;
(x) Any encryption associated with
data storage on the payload and
transmissions to or from the payload;
and
(xi) Any other information necessary
to make a determination based on
public health and safety, safety of
property, U.S. national security or
foreign policy interests, or international
obligations of the United States; or
(2) For reentry of a payload:
(i) Payload name or class and
function;
(ii) Physical characteristics,
dimensions, and weight of the payload;
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(iii) Payload owner and payload
operator, if different from the person
requesting the payload review and
determination;
(iv) Type, amount, and container of
hazardous materials and radioactive
materials in the payload;
(v) Explosive potential of payload
materials, alone and in combination
with other materials found on the
payload or reentry vehicle during
reentry; and
(vi) Designated reentry site.
§ 450.45
Safety review and approval.
(a) General. The FAA issues a safety
approval to an applicant if it determines
that an applicant can conduct launch or
reentry without jeopardizing public
health and safety and safety of property.
A license applicant must satisfy the
application requirements in this section
and subpart C of this part.
(b) Services or property provided by a
Federal launch range. The FAA will
accept any safety-related launch or
reentry service or property provided by
a Federal launch range or other Federal
entity by contract, as long as the FAA
determines that the launch or reentry
services or property provided satisfy
this part.
(c) Issues during safety review. The
FAA will advise an applicant, in
writing, of any issues raised during a
safety review that would impede
issuance of a safety approval. The
applicant may respond, in writing, or
amend its license application as
required by § 413.17 of this chapter.
(d) Denial of a safety approval. The
FAA notifies an applicant, in writing, if
it has denied a safety approval for a
license application. The notice states
the reasons for the FAA’s determination.
The applicant may respond in writing to
the reasons for the determination and
request reconsideration in accordance
with § 413.21 of this chapter.
(e) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit the application
requirements information in subpart C
of this part, as well as the following:
(1) General. An application must—
(i) Contain a glossary of unique terms
and acronyms used in alphabetical
order;
(ii) Contain a listing of all referenced
material;
(iii) Use equations and mathematical
relationships derived from or referenced
to a recognized standard or text, and
define all algebraic parameters;
(iv) Include the units of all numerical
values provided; and
(v) Include a legend or key that
identifies all symbols used for any
schematic diagrams.
(2) Site description. An applicant
must identify the proposed launch or
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reentry site, including contingency abort
locations, and submit the following:
(i) Boundaries of the site;
(ii) Launch or landing point locations,
including latitude and longitude;
(iii) Identity of any site operator; and
(iv) Identity of any facilities at the site
that will be used for pre- or post-flight
ground operations.
(3) Vehicle description. An applicant
must submit the following:
(i) A written description of the vehicle
or family of vehicles, including
structural, thermal, pneumatic,
propulsion, electrical, and avionics and
guidance systems used in each vehicle,
and all propellants. The description
must include a table specifying the type
and quantities of all hazardous materials
on each vehicle and must include
propellants, explosives, and toxic
materials; and
(ii) A drawing of each vehicle that
identifies:
(A) Each stage, including strap-on
motors;
(B) Physical dimensions and weight;
(C) Location of all safety-critical
systems;
(D) Location of all major vehicle
control systems, propulsion systems,
pressure vessels, and any other
hardware that contains potential
hazardous energy or hazardous material;
and
(E) For an unguided suborbital launch
vehicle, the location of the rocket’s
center of pressure in relation to its
center of gravity for the entire flight
profile.
(4) Mission schedule. An applicant
must submit a generic launch or reentry
processing schedule that identifies any
readiness activities, such as reviews and
rehearsals, and each safety-critical
preflight operation to be conducted. The
mission schedule must also identify day
of flight activities.
(5) Human space flight. For a
proposed launch or reentry with a
human being on board a vehicle, an
applicant must demonstrate compliance
with §§ 460.5, 460.7, 460.11, 460.13,
460.15, 460.17, 460.51, and 460.53 of
this chapter.
(6) Radionuclides. The FAA will
evaluate the launch or reentry of any
radionuclide on a case-by-case basis,
and issue an approval if the FAA finds
that the launch or reentry is consistent
with public health and safety, safety of
property, and national security and
foreign policy interests of the United
States. For any radionuclide on a launch
or reentry vehicle, an applicant must—
(i) Identify the type and quantity;
(ii) Include a reference list of all
documentation addressing the safety of
its intended use; and
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(iii) Describe all approvals by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission for
preflight ground operations.
(7) Additional material. The FAA may
also request—
(i) Any information incorporated by
reference in the license application; and
(ii) Additional products that allow the
FAA to conduct an independent safety
analysis.
§ 450.47
Environmental review.
(a) General. The FAA is responsible
for complying with the procedures and
policies of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) and other applicable
environmental laws, regulations, and
Executive Orders prior to issuing a
launch or reentry license. An applicant
must provide the FAA with information
needed to comply with such
requirements. The FAA will consider
and document the potential
environmental effects associated with
issuing a launch or reentry license
consistent with paragraph (b) of this
section.
(b) Environmental Impact Statement
or Environmental Assessment. An
applicant must—
(1) Prepare an Environmental
Assessment with FAA oversight;
(2) Assume financial responsibility for
preparation of an Environmental Impact
Statement by an FAA-selected and
-managed consultant contractor; or
(3) Submit a written re-evaluation of
a previously submitted Environmental
Assessment or Environmental Impact
Statement when requested by the FAA.
(c) Categorical exclusion. An
applicant may request a categorical
exclusion determination from the FAA
by submitting the request and
supporting rationale.
(d) Application requirements. An
application must include an approved
FAA Environmental Assessment,
Environmental Impact Statement,
categorical exclusion determination, or
written re-evaluation, which should
address compliance with any other
applicable environmental laws,
regulations, and Executive Orders
covering all planned licensed activities
in compliance with NEPA and the
Council on Environmental Quality
Regulations for Implementing the
Procedural Provisions of NEPA.
Subpart C—Safety Requirements
Public Safety Criteria
§ 450.101
Public safety criteria.
(a) Launch risk criteria. An operator
may initiate the flight of a launch
vehicle only if all risks to the public
satisfy the criteria in paragraphs (a)(1)
through (4) of this section. The
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following criteria apply to each launch
from liftoff through orbital insertion for
an orbital launch, and through final
impact or landing for a suborbital
launch:
(1) Collective risk. The collective risk,
measured as expected number of
casualties (EC), consists of risk posed by
impacting inert and explosive debris,
toxic release, and far field blast
overpressure. The FAA will determine
whether to approve public risk due to
any other hazard associated with the
proposed flight of a launch vehicle on
a case-by-case basis.
(i) The risk to all members of the
public, excluding persons in aircraft and
neighboring operations personnel, must
not exceed an expected number of 1 ×
10¥4 casualties.
(ii) The risk to all neighboring
operations personnel must not exceed
an expected number of 2 × 10¥4
casualties.
(2) Individual risk. The individual
risk, measured as probability of casualty
(PC), consists of risk posed by impacting
inert and explosive debris, toxic release,
and far field blast overpressure. The
FAA will determine whether to approve
public risk due to any other hazard
associated with the proposed flight of a
launch vehicle on a case-by-case basis.
(i) The risk to any individual member
of the public, excluding neighboring
operations personnel, must not exceed a
probability of casualty of 1 × 10¥6 per
launch.
(ii) The risk to any individual
neighboring operations personnel must
not exceed a probability of casualty of
1 × 10¥5 per launch.
(3) Aircraft risk. A launch operator
must establish any aircraft hazard areas
necessary to ensure the probability of
impact with debris capable of causing a
casualty for aircraft does not exceed 1 ×
10¥6.
(4) Risk to critical assets. The
probability of loss of functionality for
each critical asset must not exceed 1 ×
10¥3, or a more stringent probability if
the FAA determines, in consultation
with relevant Federal agencies, it is
necessary to protect the national
security interests of the United States.
(b) Reentry risk criteria. An operator
may initiate the deorbit of a vehicle only
if all risks to the public satisfy the
criteria in paragraphs (b)(1) through (4)
of this section. The following criteria
apply to each reentry, from the final
health check prior to the deorbit burn
through final impact or landing:
(1) Collective risk. The collective risk,
measured as expected number of
casualties (EC), consists of risk posed by
impacting inert and explosive debris,
toxic release, and far field blast
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overpressure. The FAA will determine
whether to approve public risk due to
any other hazard associated with the
proposed deorbit of a reentry vehicle on
a case-by-case basis.
(i) The risk to all members of the
public, excluding persons in aircraft and
neighboring operations personnel, must
not exceed an expected number of 1 ×
10¥4 casualties.
(ii) The risk to all neighboring
operations personnel must not exceed
an expected number of 2 × 10¥4
casualties.
(2) Individual risk. The individual
risk, measured as probability of casualty
(PC), consists of risk posed by impacting
inert and explosive debris, toxic release,
and far field blast overpressure. The
FAA will determine whether to approve
public risk due to any other hazard
associated with the proposed flight of a
launch vehicle on a case-by-case basis.
(i) The risk to any individual member
of the public, excluding neighboring
operations personnel, must not exceed a
probability of casualty of 1 × 10¥6 per
reentry.
(ii) The risk to any individual
neighboring operations personnel must
not exceed a probability of casualty of
1 × 10¥5 per reentry.
(3) Aircraft risk. A reentry operator
must establish any aircraft hazard areas
necessary to ensure the probability of
impact with debris capable of causing a
casualty for aircraft does not exceed 1 ×
10¥6.
(4) Risk to critical assets. The
probability of loss of functionality for
each critical asset must not exceed 1 ×
10¥3, or a more stringent probability if
the FAA determines, in consultation
with relevant Federal agencies, it is
necessary to protect the national
security interests of the United States.
(c) Flight abort. An operator must use
flight abort with a flight safety system
that meets the requirements of § 450.145
as a hazard control strategy if the
consequence of any reasonably
foreseeable vehicle response mode, in
any one-second period of flight, is
greater than 1 × 10¥3 conditional
expected casualties for uncontrolled
areas. This requirement applies to all
phases of flight, unless otherwise agreed
to by the Administrator based on the
demonstrated reliability of the launch or
reentry vehicle during that phase of
flight.
(d) Disposal safety criteria. A launch
operator must ensure that any disposal
meets the criteria of paragraphs (b)(1),
(2), and (3) of this section, or targets a
broad ocean area.
(e) Protection of people and property
on-orbit. (1) A launch or reentry
operator must prevent the collision
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between a launch or reentry vehicle
stage or component and people or
property on-orbit, in accordance with
the requirements in § 450.169(a).
(2) For any launch vehicle stage or
component that reaches Earth orbit, a
launch operator must prevent the
creation of debris through the
conversion of energy sources into
energy that fragments the stage or
component, in accordance with the
requirements in § 450.171.
(f) Notification of planned impacts.
For any launch, reentry, or disposal, an
operator must notify the public of any
region of land, sea, or air that contain,
with 97 percent probability of
containment, all debris resulting from
normal flight events capable of causing
a casualty.
(g) Validity of the analysis. For any
analysis used to demonstrate
compliance with this section, an
operator must use accurate data and
scientific principles and be statistically
valid. The method must produce results
consistent with or more conservative
than the results available from previous
mishaps, tests, or other valid
benchmarks, such as higher-fidelity
methods.
System Safety Program
§ 450.103
System safety program.
An operator must implement and
document a system safety program
throughout the operational lifecycle of a
launch or reentry system that includes
the following:
(a) Safety organization. An operator
must maintain and document a safety
organization that has clearly defined
lines of communication and approval
authority for all public safety decisions.
At a minimum, the safety organization
must have the following positions:
(1) Mission director. For each launch
or reentry, an operator must designate a
position responsible for the safe conduct
of all licensed activities and authorized
to provide final approval to proceed
with licensed activities. This position is
referred to as the mission director in
this part.
(2) Safety official. For each launch or
reentry, an operator must designate a
position with direct access to the
mission director that is—
(i) Responsible for communicating
potential safety and noncompliance
issues to the mission director; and
(ii) Authorized to examine all aspects
of the operator’s ground and flight safety
operations, and to independently
monitor compliance with the operator’s
safety policies, safety procedures, and
licensing requirements.
(3) Addressing safety concerns. The
mission director must ensure that all of
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the safety official’s concerns are
addressed.
(b) Procedures. An operator must
establish procedures to evaluate the
operational lifecycle of the launch or
reentry system:
(1) An operator must conduct a
preliminary safety assessment as
required by § 450.105, and the system
safety program must include:
(i) Methods to review and assess the
validity of the preliminary safety
assessment throughout the operational
lifecycle of the launch or reentry
system;
(ii) Methods for updating the
preliminary safety assessment; and
(iii) Methods for communicating and
implementing the updates throughout
the organization.
(2) For operators that must conduct a
flight hazard analysis as required by
§ 450.109, the system safety program
must include:
(i) Methods to review and assess the
validity of the flight hazard analysis
throughout the operational lifecycle of
the launch or reentry system;
(ii) Methods for updating the flight
hazard analysis;
(iii) Methods for communicating and
implementing the updates throughout
the organization; and
(iv) A process for tracking hazards,
risks, mitigation and hazard control
measures, and verification activities.
(c) Configuration management and
control. An operator must—
(1) Employ a process that tracks
configurations of all safety-critical
systems and documentation related to
the operation;
(2) Ensure the use of correct and
appropriate versions of systems and
documentation tracked in paragraph
(c)(1) of this section; and
(3) Maintain records of launch or
reentry system configurations and
document versions used for each
licensed activity, as required by
§ 450.219.
(d) Post-flight data review. An
operator must employ a process for
evaluating post-flight data to—
(1) Ensure consistency between the
assumptions used for the preliminary
safety assessment, any hazard or flight
safety analysis, and associated
mitigation and hazard control measures;
(2) Resolve any identified
inconsistencies prior to the next flight of
the vehicle;
(3) Identify any anomaly that may
impact any flight hazard analysis, flight
safety analysis, or safety critical system,
or is otherwise material to public health
and safety and the safety of property;
and
(4) Address any anomaly identified in
paragraph (d)(3) of this section prior to
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the next flight, including updates to any
flight hazard analysis, flight safety
analysis, or safety critical system.
(e) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit in its application
the following:
(1) A description of the applicant’s
safety organization as required by
paragraph (a) of this section, identifying
the applicant’s lines of communication
and approval authority, both internally
and externally, for all public safety
decisions and the provision of public
safety services; and
(2) A summary of the processes and
products identified in the system safety
program requirements in paragraphs (b),
(c), and (d) of this section.
Preliminary Safety Assessment for
Flight and Hazard Control Strategies
§ 450.105
for flight.
Preliminary safety assessment
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(a) Preliminary safety assessment. An
operator must conduct and document a
preliminary safety assessment for the
flight of a launch or reentry vehicle that
identifies—
(1) Vehicle response modes;
(2) Public safety hazards associated
with vehicle response modes, including
impacting inert and explosive debris,
toxic release, and far field blast
overpressure;
(3) Geographical areas where vehicle
response modes could jeopardize public
safety;
(4) Any population exposed to public
safety hazards in or near the identified
geographical areas;
(5) The CEC, unless otherwise agreed
to by the Administrator based on the
demonstrated reliability of the launch or
reentry vehicle during any phase of
flight;
(6) A preliminary hazard list which
documents all hardware, operational,
and design causes of vehicle response
modes that, excluding mitigation, have
the capability to create a hazard to the
public;
(7) Safety-critical systems; and
(8) A timeline of all safety-critical
events.
(b) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit the result of the
preliminary safety assessment,
including all of the items identified in
paragraph (a) of this section.
§ 450.107
Hazard control strategies.
(a) General. For each phase of a
launch or reentry vehicle’s flight—
(1) If the public safety hazards
identified in the preliminary safety
assessment can be mitigated adequately
to meet the requirements of § 450.101
using physical containment, wind
weighting, or flight abort, in accordance
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with paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of this
section, an operator does not need to
conduct a flight hazard analysis for that
phase of flight.
(2) If the public safety hazards
identified in the preliminary safety
assessment cannot be mitigated
adequately to meet the public risk
criteria of § 450.101 using physical
containment, wind weighting, or flight
abort, in accordance with paragraphs
(b), (c), and (d) of this section, an
operator must conduct a flight hazard
analysis in accordance with § 450.109 to
derive hazard controls for that phase of
flight.
(b) Physical containment. To use
physical containment as a hazard
control strategy, an operator must—
(1) Ensure that the launch vehicle
does not have sufficient energy for any
hazards associated with its flight to
reach outside the flight hazard area
developed in accordance with
§ 450.133; and
(2) Apply other mitigation measures
to ensure no public exposure to hazards
as agreed to by the Administrator on a
case-by-case basis.
(c) Wind weighting. To use wind
weighting as a hazard control strategy—
(1) The launch vehicle must be a
suborbital rocket that does not contain
any guidance or directional control
system; and
(2) An operator must conduct the
launch using a wind weighting safety
system in accordance with § 450.141.
(d) Flight abort. To use flight abort as
a hazard control strategy an operator
must employ a flight safety system, or
other safeguards agreed to by the
Administrator, that meets the
requirements of § 450.145.
(e) Application requirement. An
applicant must—
(1) Describe its hazard control strategy
for each phase of flight; and
(2) If using physical containment as a
hazard control strategy—
(i) Demonstrate that the launch
vehicle does not have sufficient energy
for any hazards associated with its flight
to reach outside the flight hazard area
developed in accordance with
§ 450.133; and
(ii) Describe the methods used to
ensure that flight hazard areas are
cleared of the public and critical assets.
Flight Hazard Analyses for Hardware
and Software
§ 450.109
Flight hazard analysis.
Unless an operator uses physical
containment, wind weighting, or flight
abort as a hazard control strategy, an
operator must perform and document a
flight hazard analysis, and continue to
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maintain it throughout the lifecycle of
the launch or reentry system. Hazards
associated with computing systems and
software are further addressed in
§ 450.111.
(a) Flight hazard analysis. A flight
hazard analysis must identify, describe,
and analyze all reasonably foreseeable
hazards to public safety and safety of
property resulting from the flight of a
launch or reentry vehicle. Each flight
hazard analysis must—
(1) Identify all reasonably foreseeable
hazards, and the corresponding vehicle
response mode for each hazard,
associated with the launch or reentry
system relevant to public safety and
safety of property, including those
resulting from:
(i) Vehicle operation, including
staging and release;
(ii) System, subsystem, and
component failures or faults;
(iii) Software operations;
(iv) Environmental conditions;
(v) Human factors;
(vi) Design inadequacies;
(vii) Procedure deficiencies;
(viii) Functional and physical
interfaces between subsystems,
including any vehicle payload;
(ix) Reuse of components or systems;
and
(x) Interactions of any of the items in
paragraphs (a)(1)(i) through (ix) of this
section.
(2) Assess each hazard’s likelihood
and severity.
(3) Ensure that the risk associated
with each hazard meets the following
criteria:
(i) The likelihood of any hazardous
condition that may cause death or
serious injury to the public must be
extremely remote; and
(ii) The likelihood of any hazardous
condition that may cause major damage
to public property or critical assets must
be remote.
(4) Identify and describe the risk
elimination and mitigation measures
required to satisfy paragraph (a)(3) of
this section.
(5) Demonstrate that the risk
elimination and mitigation measures
achieve the risk levels of paragraph
(a)(3) of this section through validation
and verification. Verification includes:
(i) Analysis;
(ii) Test;
(iii) Demonstration; or
(iv) Inspection.
(b) Identification of new hazards. An
operator must establish and document
the criteria and techniques for
identifying new hazards throughout the
lifecycle of the launch or reentry
system.
(c) Completeness for each flight. For
every launch or reentry, the flight
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hazard analysis must be complete and
all hazards must be mitigated to an
acceptable level in accordance with
paragraph (a)(3) of this section.
(d) Updates throughout the lifecycle.
An operator must continually update
the flight hazard analysis throughout the
operational lifecycle of the launch or
reentry system.
(e) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit in its application
the following:
(1) Flight hazard analysis products of
paragraphs (a)(1) through (5) of this
section, including data that verifies the
risk elimination and mitigation
measures resulting from the applicant’s
flight hazard analyses required by
paragraph (a)(5) of this section; and
(2) The criteria and techniques for
identifying new hazards throughout the
lifecycle of the launch or reentry system
as required by paragraph (b) of this
section.
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§ 450.111 Computing systems and
software.
(a) General. An operator must
implement and document a process that
identifies the hazards and assesses the
risks to public health and safety and the
safety of property arising from
computing systems and software.
(b) Safety-critical functions. An
operator must identify all safety-critical
functions associated with its computing
systems and software. Safety-critical
computing system and software
functions include the following:
(1) Software used to control or
monitor safety-critical systems;
(2) Software that transmits safetycritical data, including time-critical data
and data about hazardous conditions;
(3) Software that computes safetycritical data;
(4) Software that accesses or manages
safety-critical data;
(5) Software that displays safetycritical data;
(6) Software used for fault detection
in safety-critical computer hardware or
software;
(7) Software that responds to the
detection of a safety-critical fault;
(8) Software used in a flight safety
system;
(9) Processor-interrupt software
associated with safety-critical computer
system functions; and
(10) Software used for wind
weighting.
(c) Consequence and the degree of
control. Safety-critical functions must
be identified by consequence and the
degree of control exercised by the
software component as defined by
paragraphs (d) through (h) of this
section.
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(d) Autonomous software. This
section applies to software that
exercises autonomous control over
safety-critical hardware systems,
subsystems, or components, such that a
control entity cannot detect and
intervene to prevent a hazard that may
impact public health and safety or the
safety of property. Autonomous
software must meet the following
criteria:
(1) The software component must be
subjected to full path coverage testing.
Any inaccessible code must be
documented and addressed;
(2) The software component’s
functions must be tested on flight-like
hardware. Testing must include
nominal operation and fault responses
for all functions;
(3) An operator must conduct
computing system and software hazard
analyses for the integrated system and
for each autonomous, safety-critical
software component;
(4) An operator must verify and
validate any computing systems and
software. Verification and validation
must include testing by a test team
independent of the software
development division or organization;
and
(5) An operator must develop and
implement software development plans,
including descriptions of the following:
(i) Coding standards used;
(ii) Configuration control;
(iii) Programmable logic controllers;
(iv) Policy on use of any commercialoff-the-shelf software; and
(v) Policy on software reuse.
(e) Semi-autonomous software. This
section applies to software that
exercises control over safety-critical
hardware systems, subsystems, or
components, allowing time for
predetermined safe detection and
intervention by a control entity to detect
and intervene to prevent a hazard that
may impact public health and safety or
the safety of property. Semi-autonomous
software must meet the following
criteria:
(1) The software component’s safetycritical functions must be subjected to
full path coverage testing. Any
inaccessible code in a safety-critical
function must be documented and
addressed;
(2) The software component’s safetycritical functions must be tested on
flight-like hardware. Testing must
include nominal operation and fault
responses for all safety-critical
functions;
(3) An operator must conduct
computing system and software hazard
analyses for the integrated system;
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15429
(4) An operator must verify and
validate any computing systems and
software. Verification and validation
must include testing by a test team
independent of the software
development division or organization;
and
(5) An operator must develop and
implement software development plans,
including descriptions of the following:
(i) Coding standards used;
(ii) Configuration control;
(iii) Programmable logic controllers;
(iv) Policy on use of any commercialoff-the-shelf software; and
(v) Policy on software reuse.
(f) Redundant fault-tolerant software.
This section applies to software that
exercises control over safety-critical
hardware systems, subsystems, or
components, for which a non-software
component must also fail in order to
impact public health and safety or the
safety of property. Redundant faulttolerant software must meet the
following criteria:
(1) The software component’s safetycritical functions must be tested on
flight-like hardware. Testing must
include nominal operation and fault
responses for all safety-critical
functions;
(2) An operator must conduct
computing system and software hazard
analyses for the integrated system;
(3) An operator must verify and
validate any computing systems and
software. Verification and validation
must include testing by a test team
independent of the software
development division or organization;
and
(4) An operator must develop and
implement software development plans,
including descriptions of the following:
(i) Coding standards used;
(ii) Configuration control;
(iii) Programmable logic controllers;
(iv) Policy on use of any commercialoff-the-shelf software; and
(v) Policy on software reuse.
(g) Influential software. This section
applies to software that provides
information to a person who uses the
information to take actions or make
decisions that can impact public health
and safety or the safety of property, but
does not require operator action to avoid
a mishap. Influential software must
meet the following criteria:
(1) An operator must conduct
computing system and software hazard
analyses for the integrated system;
(2) An operator must verify and
validate any computing systems and
software. Verification and validation
must include testing by a test team
independent of the software
development division or organization;
and
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(3) An operator must develop and
implement software development plans,
including descriptions of the following:
(i) Coding standards used;
(ii) Configuration control;
(iii) Programmable logic controllers;
(iv) Policy on use of any commercialoff-the-shelf software; and
(v) Policy on software reuse.
(h) Application requirements. An
applicant must document and include
in its application the following:
(1) For autonomous software:
(i) Test plans and results as required
by paragraphs (d)(1) and (2) of this
section;
(ii) All software requirements, and
design and architecture documentation;
(iii) The outputs of the hazard
analyses as required by paragraph (d)(3)
of this section; and
(iv) Computing system and software
validation and verification plans as
required by paragraph (d)(4) of this
section.
(2) For semi-autonomous software:
(i) Test plans and results as required
by paragraphs (e)(1) and (2) of this
section;
(ii) All software requirements, and
design and architecture documentation;
(iii) The outputs of the hazard
analyses as required by paragraph (e)(3)
of this section; and
(iv) Computing system and software
validation and verification plans as
required by paragraph (e)(4) of this
section.
(3) For redundant fault-tolerant
software:
(i) Test plans and results as required
by paragraph (f)(1) of this section; and
(ii) All software requirements and
design documents.
(4) For influential software:
(i) The software component’s
development and testing; and
(ii) The software component’s
functionality.
(5) For software that the applicant has
determined to have no safety impact,
the software component’s functionality
must be described in detail.
Flight Safety Analyses
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§ 450.113 Flight safety analysis
requirements—scope and applicability.
(a) Scope. An operator must perform
and document a flight safety analysis—
(1) For orbital launch, from liftoff
through orbital insertion, and any
component or stage landings;
(2) For suborbital launch, from liftoff
through final impact;
(3) For disposal, from the beginning of
the deorbit burn through final impact;
(4) For reentry, from the beginning of
the deorbit burn through landing; and
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(5) For hybrid vehicles, for all phases
of flight, unless the Administrator
determines otherwise based on
demonstrated reliability.
(b) Applicability. (1) Sections 450.115
through 450.121 and 450.131 through
450.139 apply to all launch and reentry
vehicles;
(2) Sections 450.123 through 450.129
apply to a launch or reentry vehicle that
relies on flight abort to comply with
§ 450.101; and
(3) Section 450.141 applies to the
launch of an unguided suborbital
launch vehicle.
§ 450.115
Flight safety analysis methods.
(a) Scope of the analysis. An
operator’s flight safety analysis method
must account for all reasonably
foreseeable events and failures of safetycritical systems during nominal and
non-nominal launch or reentry that
could jeopardize public health and
safety, and the safety of property.
(b) Level of fidelity of the analysis. An
operator’s flight safety analysis method
must have a level of fidelity sufficient
to—
(1) Demonstrate that any risk to the
public satisfies the public safety criteria
of § 450.101, including the use of
mitigations, accounting for all known
sources of uncertainty, using a means of
compliance accepted by the
Administrator; and
(2) Identify the dominant source of
each type of public risk with a criterion
in § 450.101(a) or (b) in terms of phase
of flight, source of hazard (such as toxic
exposure, inert, or explosive debris),
and vehicle response mode.
(c) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit a description of
the flight safety analysis methodology,
including identification of:
(1) The scientific principles and
statistical methods used;
(2) All assumptions and their
justifications;
(3) The rationale for the level of
fidelity;
(4) The evidence for validation and
verification required by § 450.101(g);
(5) The extent that the benchmark
conditions are comparable to the
foreseeable conditions of the intended
operations; and
(6) The extent that risk mitigations
were accounted for in the analyses.
§ 450.117
flight.
Trajectory analysis for normal
(a) General. A flight safety analysis
must include a trajectory analysis that
establishes—
(1) For any phase of flight within the
scope as provided by § 450.113(a), the
limits of a launch or reentry vehicle’s
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normal flight as defined by the nominal
trajectory, and the following sets of
trajectories sufficient to characterize
variability and uncertainty during
normal flight:
(i) A set of trajectories to characterize
variability. This set must describe how
the intended trajectory could vary due
to conditions known prior to initiation
of flight; and
(ii) A set of trajectories to characterize
uncertainty. This set must describe how
the actual trajectory could differ from
the intended trajectory due to random
uncertainties.
(2) A fuel exhaustion trajectory that
produces instantaneous impact points
with the greatest range for any given
time after liftoff for any stage that has
the potential to impact the Earth and
does not burn to propellant depletion
before a programmed thrust termination.
(3) For vehicles with a flight safety
system, trajectory data or parameters
that describe the limits of a useful
mission.
(b) Trajectory model. A final trajectory
analysis must use a six-degree of
freedom trajectory model to satisfy the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this
section.
(c) Wind effects. A trajectory analysis
must account for all wind effects,
including profiles of winds that are no
less severe than the worst wind
conditions under which flight might be
attempted, and for uncertainty in the
wind conditions.
(d) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit the following:
(1) A description of the methodology
used to characterize the vehicle’s flight
behavior throughout normal flight and
limits of a useful mission, including:
(i) The scientific principles and
statistical methods used;
(ii) All assumptions and their
justifications;
(iii) The rationale for the level of
fidelity, and
(iv) The evidence for validation and
verification required by § 450.101(g).
(2) A description of the input data
used to characterize the vehicle’s flight
behavior throughout normal flight and
limits of a useful mission, including:
(i) The worst wind conditions under
which flight might be attempted, and a
description of how the operator will
evaluate the wind conditions and
uncertainty in the wind conditions prior
to initiating the operation;
(ii) A description of the wind input
data, including uncertainties;
(iii) A description of the parameters
with a significant influence on the
vehicle’s behavior throughout normal
flight, including a quantitative
description of the nominal value for
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each significant parameter throughout
normal flight;
(iv) A description of the random
uncertainties with a significant
influence on the vehicle’s behavior
throughout normal flight, including a
quantitative description of the statistical
distribution for each significant
parameter; and
(v) The primary mission objectives
and the conditions that describe the
limits of a useful mission.
(3) Representative normal flight
trajectory analysis outputs, including
the position, velocity, and vacuum
instantaneous impact point, for each
second of flight for—
(i) The nominal trajectory;
(ii) A fuel exhaustion trajectory under
otherwise nominal conditions;
(iii) A set of trajectories that
characterize variability in the intended
trajectory based on conditions known
prior to initiation of flight;
(iv) A set of trajectories that
characterize how the actual trajectory
could differ from the intended trajectory
due to random uncertainties, and
(v) A set of trajectories that
characterize the limits of a useful
mission as described in paragraph (a)(3)
of this section.
(4) Additional products that allow an
independent analysis, as requested by
the Administrator.
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§ 450.119 Trajectory analysis for
malfunction flight.
(a) General. A flight safety analysis
must include a trajectory analysis that
establishes—
(1) The vehicle’s capability to depart
from normal flight; and
(2) The vehicle’s deviation capability
in the event of a malfunction during
flight.
(b) Characterizing foreseeable
trajectories. A malfunction trajectory
analysis must account for each cause of
a malfunction flight, including software
and hardware failures. For each cause of
a malfunction trajectory, the analysis
must characterize the foreseeable
trajectories resulting from a
malfunction. The analysis must account
for—
(1) All trajectory times during the
thrusting phases, or when the lift vector
is controlled, during flight;
(2) The duration, starting when a
malfunction begins to cause each flight
deviation throughout the thrusting
phases of flight;
(3) Trajectory time intervals between
malfunction turn start times that are
sufficient to establish flight safety
limits, if any, and individual risk
contours that are smooth and
continuous;
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(4) The relative probability of
occurrence of each malfunction turn of
which the vehicle is capable;
(5) The probability distribution of
position and velocity of the vehicle
when each malfunction will terminate
due to vehicle breakup, along with the
cause of termination and the state of the
vehicle; and
(6) The vehicle’s flight behavior from
the time when a malfunction begins to
cause a flight deviation until ground
impact or predicted structural failure,
with trajectory time intervals that are
sufficient to establish individual risk
contours that are smooth and
continuous.
(c) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit—
(1) A description of the methodology
used to characterize the vehicle’s flight
behavior throughout malfunction flight,
including:
(i) The scientific principles and
statistical methods used;
(ii) All assumptions and their
justifications;
(iii) The rationale for the level of
fidelity; and
(iv) The evidence for validation and
verification required by § 450.101(g).
(2) A description of the input data
used to characterize the vehicle’s
malfunction flight behavior, including:
(i) A list of each cause of malfunction
flight considered;
(ii) A list of each type of malfunction
flight for which malfunction flight
behavior was characterized;
(iii) A description of the parameters
with a significant influence on the
vehicle’s behavior throughout
malfunction flight for each type of
malfunction flight characterized,
including a quantitative description of
the nominal value for each significant
parameter throughout normal flight; and
(iv) A description of the random
uncertainties with a significant
influence on the vehicle’s behavior
throughout malfunction flight for each
type of malfunction flight characterized,
including a quantitative description of
the statistical distribution for each
significant parameter.
(3) Representative malfunction flight
trajectory analysis outputs, including
the position, velocity, and vacuum
instantaneous impact point for each
second of flight for—
(i) Each set of trajectories that
characterizes a type of malfunction
flight; and
(ii) The probability of each trajectory
that characterizes a type of malfunction
flight.
(4) Additional products that allow an
independent analysis, as requested by
the Administrator.
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§ 450.121
15431
Debris analysis.
(a) General. A flight safety analysis
must include a debris analysis that
characterizes the debris generated for
each foreseeable vehicle response mode
as a function of vehicle flight time,
accounting for the effects of fuel burn
and any configuration changes.
(b) Vehicle impact or breakup. A
debris analysis must account for each
foreseeable cause of vehicle breakup,
including any breakup caused by flight
safety system activation, and for impact
of an intact vehicle.
(c) Debris thresholds. A debris
analysis must account for all inert,
explosive, and other hazardous vehicle,
vehicle component, and payload debris
foreseeable from normal and
malfunctioning vehicle flight. At a
minimum, the debris analysis must
identify—
(1) All inert debris that can cause a
casualty or loss of functionality of a
critical asset, including all debris that
could—
(i) Impact a human being with a mean
expected kinetic energy at impact
greater than or equal to 11 ft-lbs;
(ii) Impact a human being with a
mean impact kinetic energy per unit
area at impact greater than or equal to
34 ft-lb/in2;
(iii) Cause a casualty due to impact
with an aircraft;
(iv) Cause a casualty due to impact
with a waterborne vessel; or
(v) Pose a toxic or fire hazard.
(2) Any explosive debris that could
cause a casualty or loss of functionality
of a critical asset.
(d) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit:
(1) A description of the debris
analysis methodology, including input
data, assumptions, and justifications for
the assumptions;
(2) A description of all vehicle
breakup modes and the development of
debris lists;
(3) All debris fragment lists necessary
to quantitatively describe the physical,
aerodynamic, and harmful
characteristics of each debris fragment
or fragment class; and
(4) Additional products that allow an
independent analysis, as requested by
the Administrator.
§ 450.123
Flight safety limits analysis.
(a) General. A flight safety analysis
must identify the location of
uncontrolled areas and establish flight
safety limits that define when an
operator must initiate flight abort to—
(1) Ensure compliance with the public
safety criteria of § 450.101; and
(2) Prevent debris capable of causing
a casualty from impacting in
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uncontrolled areas if the vehicle is
outside the limits of a useful mission.
(b) Flight safety limits. The analysis
must identify flight safety limits for use
in establishing flight abort rules. The
flight safety limits must—
(1) Account for temporal and
geometric extents on the Earth’s surface
of any vehicle hazards resulting from
any planned or unplanned event for all
times during flight;
(2) Account for potential
contributions to the debris impact
dispersions; and
(3) Be designed to avoid flight abort
that results in increased collective risk
to people in uncontrolled areas,
compared to continued flight.
(c) Gates. For an orbital launch, or any
launch or reentry where one or more
trajectories that represents a useful
mission intersects a flight safety limit
that provides containment of debris
capable of causing a casualty, the flight
safety analysis must include a gate
analysis as required by § 450.125.
(d) Real-time flight safety limits. As an
alternative to flight safety limits
analysis, flight abort time can be
computed and applied in real-time
during vehicle flight as necessary to
meet the criteria in § 450.101.
(e) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit:
(1) A description of how each flight
safety limit will be computed including
references to public safety criteria of
§ 450.101;
(2) Representative flight safety limits
and associated parameters;
(3) An indication of which flight abort
rule from § 450.165(c) is used in
conjunction with each example flight
safety limit;
(4) A graphic depiction or series of
depictions of representative flight safety
limits, the launch or landing point, all
uncontrolled area boundaries, and
vacuum instantaneous impact point
traces for the nominal trajectory, extents
of normal flight, and limits of a useful
mission trajectories;
(5) If the requirement for flight abort
is computed in real-time in lieu of
precomputing flight safety limits, a
description of how the real-time flight
abort requirement is computed
including references to public safety
criteria of § 450.101; and
(6) Additional products that allow an
independent analysis, as requested by
the Administrator.
§ 450.125
Gate analysis.
(a) Applicability. The flight safety
analysis must include a gate analysis for
an orbital launch or any launch or
reentry where one or more trajectories
that represent a useful mission intersect
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a flight safety limit that provides
containment of debris capable of
causing a casualty.
(b) Analysis requirements. The
analysis must establish—
(1) A relaxation of the flight safety
limits that allows continued flight or a
gate where a decision will be made to
abort the launch or reentry, or allow
continued flight;
(2) If a gate is established, a measure
of performance at the gate that enables
the flight abort crew or autonomous
flight safety system to determine
whether the vehicle is able to complete
a useful mission, and abort the flight if
it is not;
(3) Accompanying flight abort rules;
and
(4) For an orbital launch, a gate at the
last opportunity to determine whether
the vehicle’s flight is in compliance
with the flight abort rules and can make
a useful mission, and abort the flight if
it is not.
(c) Gate extents. The extents of any
gate or relaxation of the flight safety
limits must be based on normal
trajectories, trajectories that may
achieve a useful mission, collective risk,
and consequence criteria as follows:
(1) Flight safety limits must be gated
or relaxed where they intersect with a
normal trajectory if that trajectory
would meet the individual and
collective risk criteria of § 450.101(a)(1)
and (2) or (b)(1) and (2) when treated
like a nominal trajectory with normal
trajectory dispersions. The predicted
average consequence from flight abort
resulting from any reasonable vehicle
response mode, in any one-second
period of flight, using the modified
flight safety limits, must not exceed 1 ×
10¥2 conditional expected casualties;
(2) Flight safety limits may be gated
or relaxed where they intersect with a
trajectory within the limits of a useful
mission if that trajectory would meet the
individual and collective risk criteria of
§ 450.101(a)(1) and (2) or (b)(1) and (2)
when treated like a nominal trajectory
with normal trajectory dispersions. The
predicted average consequence from
flight abort resulting from any
reasonable vehicle response mode, in
any one-second period of flight, using
the modified flight safety limits, must
not exceed 1 × 10¥2 conditional
expected casualties; and
(3) For an orbital launch, in areas
where no useful mission trajectories
intersect with flight safety limits, the
final gate may extend no further than
necessary to allow vehicles on a useful
mission to continue flight.
(d) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit:
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(1) A description of the methodology
used to establish each gate or relaxation
of a flight safety limit;
(2) A description of the measure of
performance used to determine whether
a vehicle will be allowed to cross a gate
without flight abort, the acceptable
ranges of the measure of performance,
and how these ranges were determined;
(3) A graphic depiction or depictions
showing representative flight safety
limits, any uncontrolled area overflight
regions, and instantaneous impact point
traces for the nominal trajectory, extents
of normal flight, and limits of a useful
mission trajectories; and
(4) Additional products that allow an
independent analysis, as requested by
the Administrator.
§ 450.127 Data loss flight time and planned
safe flight state analyses.
(a) General. For each flight, a flight
safety analysis must establish data loss
flight times and a planned safe flight
state to establish each flight abort rule
that applies when vehicle tracking data
is not available for use by the flight
abort crew or autonomous flight safety
system.
(b) Data loss flight times. (1) A flight
safety analysis must establish a data loss
flight time for each trajectory time
interval along the nominal trajectory
from initiation of the flight of a launch
or reentry vehicle through that point
during nominal flight when the
minimum elapsed thrusting or gliding
time is no greater than the time it would
take for a normal vehicle to reach the
final gate crossing, or the planned safe
flight state established under paragraph
(c) of this section, whichever occurs
earlier.
(2) Data loss flight times must account
for forces that may stop the vehicle
before reaching a flight safety limit.
(3) Data loss flight times may be
computed and applied in real-time
during vehicle flight in which case the
state vector just prior to loss of data
should be used as the nominal state
vector.
(c) Planned safe flight state. For a
vehicle that performs normally during
all portions of flight, the planned safe
flight state is the point during the
nominal flight of a vehicle where—
(1) The vehicle cannot reach a flight
safety limit for the remainder of the
flight;
(2) The vehicle achieves orbital
insertion; or
(3) The vehicle’s state vector reaches
a state where the vehicle is no longer
required to have a flight safety system.
(d) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit:
(1) A description of the methodology
used to determine data loss flight times;
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(2) Tabular data describing the data
loss flight times from a representative
mission;
(3) The safe flight state for a
representative mission and methodology
used to determine it; and
(4) Additional products that allow an
independent analysis, as requested by
the Administrator.
§ 450.129
Time delay analysis.
(a) General. A flight safety analysis
must include a time delay analysis that
establishes the mean elapsed time
between the violation of a flight abort
rule and the time when the flight safety
system is capable of aborting flight for
use in establishing flight safety limits.
The time delay analysis must determine
a time delay distribution that accounts
for all foreseeable sources of delay.
(b) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit:
(1) A description of the methodology
used in the time delay analysis;
(2) A tabular listing of each time delay
source and the total delay, with
uncertainty; and
(3) Additional products that allow an
independent analysis, as requested by
the Administrator.
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§ 450.131
Probability of failure analysis.
(a) General. For each hazard and
phase of flight, a flight safety analysis
for a launch or reentry must account for
vehicle failure probability. The
probability of failure must be consistent
for all hazards and phases of flight.
(1) For a vehicle or vehicle stage with
fewer than two flights, the failure
probability estimate must account for
the outcome of all previous flights of
vehicles developed and launched or
reentered in similar circumstances.
(2) For a vehicle or vehicle stage with
two or more flights, vehicle failure
probability estimates must account for
the outcomes of all previous flights of
the vehicle or vehicle stage in a
statistically valid manner. The outcomes
of all previous flights of the vehicle or
vehicle stage must account for data on
partial failures and anomalies, including
Class 3 and Class 4 mishaps, as defined
in § 401.5 of this chapter.
(b) Failure. For flight safety analysis
purposes, a failure occurs when a
vehicle does not complete any phase of
normal flight or when any anomalous
condition exhibits the potential for a
stage or its debris to impact the Earth or
reenter the atmosphere outside the
normal trajectory envelope during the
mission or any future mission of similar
vehicle capability. Also, a Class 1 or
Class 2 mishap, as defined in § 401.5 of
this chapter, constitutes a failure.
(c) Previous flight. For flight safety
analysis purposes—
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(1) The flight of a launch vehicle
begins at a time in which a launch
vehicle normally or inadvertently lifts
off from a launch platform; and
(2) The flight of a reentry vehicle or
deorbiting upper stage begins at a time
in which a vehicle attempts to initiate
a deorbit.
(d) Allocation. The vehicle failure
probability estimate must be distributed
across flight time and vehicle response
mode. The distribution must be
consistent with—
(1) The data available from all
previous flights of vehicles developed
and launched or reentered in similar
circumstances; and
(2) Data from previous flights of
vehicles, stages, or components
developed and launched or reentered by
the subject vehicle developer or
operator. Such data may include
previous experience involving similar—
(i) Vehicle, stage, or component
design characteristics;
(ii) Development and integration
processes, including the extent of
integrated system testing; and
(iii) Level of experience of the vehicle
operation and development team
members.
(e) Observed vs. conditional failure
rate. Probability of failure allocation
must account for significant differences
in the observed failure rate and the
conditional failure rate. A probability of
failure analysis must use a constant
conditional failure rate for each phase of
flight, unless there is clear and
convincing evidence of a different
conditional failure rate for a particular
vehicle, stage, or phase of flight.
(f) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit:
(1) A description of the probability of
failure analysis, including all
assumptions and justifications for the
assumptions, analysis methods, input
data, and results;
(2) A representative set of tabular data
and graphs of the predicted failure rate
and cumulative failure probability for
each foreseeable vehicle response mode;
and
(3) Additional products that allow an
independent analysis, as requested by
the Administrator.
§ 450.133
Flight hazard area analysis.
(a) General. A flight safety analysis
must include a flight hazard area
analysis that identifies any region of
land, sea, or air that must be surveyed,
publicized, controlled, or evacuated in
order to control the risk to the public.
A flight hazard area analysis must
account for all reasonably foreseeable
vehicle response modes during nominal
and non-nominal flight that could result
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in a casualty. The analysis must account
for, at a minimum—
(1) The regions of land, sea, and air
potentially exposed to debris impact
resulting from normal flight events and
from debris hazards resulting from any
potential malfunction;
(2) Any hazard controls implemented
to control risk to any hazard;
(3) The limits of a launch or reentry
vehicle’s normal flight, including winds
that are no less severe than the worst
wind conditions under which flight
might be attempted and uncertainty in
the wind conditions;
(4) The debris identified for each
foreseeable cause of breakup, and any
planned jettison of debris, launch or
reentry vehicle components, or payload;
(5) All foreseeable sources of debris
dispersion during freefall, including
wind effects, guidance and control,
velocity imparted by break-up or
jettison, lift, and drag forces; and
(6) A probability of one for any
planned debris hazards or planned
impacts.
(b) Waterborne vessel hazard areas.
The flight hazard area analysis for
waterborne vessels must determine the
areas and durations for regions of
water—
(1) That are necessary to contain, with
97 percent probability of containment,
all debris resulting from normal flight
events capable of causing a casualty to
persons on waterborne vessels;
(2) That are necessary to contain
either where the probability of debris
capable of causing a casualty impacting
on or near a vessel would exceed 1 ×
10¥5, accounting for all relevant
hazards, or where the individual
probability of casualty for any person on
board a vessel would exceed the
criterion in § 450.101(a)(2) or (b)(2); and
(3) Where reduced vessel traffic is
necessary to meet collective risk
criterion in § 450.101(a)(1) or (b)(1).
(c) Land hazard areas. The flight
hazard area analysis for land must
determine the durations and areas
regions of land—
(1) That are necessary to contain, with
97 percent probability of containment,
all debris resulting from normal flight
events capable of causing a casualty to
any person on land;
(2) Where the individual probability
of casualty for any person on land
would exceed the criterion in
§ 450.101(a)(2) or (b)(2); and
(3) Where reduced population is
necessary to meet the collective risk
criterion in § 450.101(a)(1) or (b)(1).
(d) Airspace hazard volumes. The
flight hazard area analysis for airspace
must determine the durations and
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volumes for regions of air to be
submitted to the FAA for approval—
(1) That are necessary to contain, with
97 percent probability of containment,
all debris resulting from normal flight
events capable of causing a casualty to
persons on an aircraft; and
(2) Where the probability of impact on
an aircraft would exceed the criterion in
§ 450.101(a)(3) or (b)(3).
(e) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit:
(1) A description of the methodology
to be used in the flight hazard area
analysis including all assumptions and
justifications for the assumptions,
vulnerability models, analysis methods,
input data, including:
(i) Input wind data and justification
that those represent the worst wind
conditions under which flight might be
attempted accounting for uncertainty in
the wind conditions;
(ii) Classes of waterborne vessel and
vulnerability criteria employed; and
(iii) Classes of aircraft and
vulnerability criteria employed.
(2) Tabular data and graphs of the
results of the flight hazard area analysis,
including:
(i) Geographical coordinates of all
hazard areas that are representative of
those to be published prior to any
proposed operation;
(ii) Representative 97 percent
probability of containment contours for
all debris resulting from normal flight
events capable of causing a casualty,
regardless of location, including regions
of land, sea, or air;
(iii) Representative individual
probability of casualty contours
regardless of location;
(iv) If applicable, representative 1 ×
10¥5 and 1 × 10¥6 probability of impact
contours for all debris capable of
causing a casualty to persons on an
waterborne vessel regardless of location;
and
(v) Representative 1 × 10¥6 and 1 ×
10¥7 probability of impact contours for
all debris capable of causing a casualty
to persons on an aircraft regardless of
location.
(3) Additional products that allow an
independent analysis, as requested by
the Administrator.
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§ 450.135
Debris risk analysis.
(a) General. A debris risk analysis
must demonstrate compliance with
public safety criteria in § 450.101,
either—
(1) Prior to the day of the operation,
accounting for all foreseeable conditions
within the flight commit criteria; or
(2) During the countdown using the
best available input data.
(b) Propagation of debris. A debris
risk analysis must compute statistically
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valid debris impact probability
distributions using the input data
produced by flight safety analyses
required in §§ 450.117 through 450.133.
The propagation of debris from each
predicted breakup location to impact
must account for—
(1) All foreseeable forces that can
influence any debris impact location;
and
(2) All foreseeable sources of impact
dispersion, including, at a minimum:
(i) The uncertainties in atmospheric
conditions;
(ii) Debris aerodynamic parameters;
(iii) Pre-breakup position and
velocity; and
(iv) Breakup-imparted velocities.
(c) Exposure model. A debris risk
analysis must account for the
distribution of people and critical
assets. The exposure input data must—
(1) Include the entire region where
there is a significant probability of
impact of hazardous debris;
(2) Characterize the distribution and
vulnerability of people and critical
assets both geographically and
temporally;
(3) Account for the distribution of
people in various structures and vehicle
types with a resolution consistent with
the characteristic size of the impact
probability distributions for relevant
fragment groups;
(4) Have sufficient temporal and
spatial resolution that a uniform
distribution of people within each
defined region can be treated as a single
average set of characteristics without
degrading the accuracy of any debris
analysis output;
(5) Use accurate source data from
demographic sources, physical surveys,
or other methods;
(6) Be regularly updated to account
for recent land-use changes, population
growth, migration, and construction;
and
(7) Account for uncertainty in the
source data and modeling approach.
(d) Casualty area and consequence
analysis. A debris risk analysis must
model the casualty area, and compute
the predicted consequences of each
reasonably foreseeable vehicle response
mode in any one-second period of flight
in terms of conditional expected
casualties. The casualty area and
consequence analysis must account
for—
(1) All relevant debris fragment
characteristics and the characteristics of
a representative person exposed to any
potential debris hazard.
(2) Any direct impacts of debris
fragments, intact impact, or indirect
impact effects.
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(3) The vulnerability of people and
critical assets to debris impacts,
including:
(i) Effects of buildings, ground
vehicles, waterborne vessel, and aircraft
upon the vulnerability of any occupants;
(ii) All hazard sources, such as the
potential for any toxic or explosive
energy releases;
(iii) Indirect or secondary effects such
as bounce, splatter, skip, slide or
ricochet, including accounting for
terrain;
(iv) Effect of wind on debris impact
vector and toxic releases;
(v) Impact speed and angle,
accounting for motion of impacted
vehicles;
(vi) Uncertainty in fragment impact
parameters; and
(vii) Uncertainty in modeling
methodology.
(e) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit:
(1) A description of the methods used
to compute the parameters required to
demonstrate compliance with the public
safety criteria in § 450.101, including a
description of how the operator will
account for the conditions immediately
prior to enabling the flight of a launch
vehicle or the reentry of a reentry
vehicle, such as the final trajectory,
atmospheric conditions, and the
exposure of people and critical assets;
(2) A description of the methods used
to compute debris impact distributions;
(3) A description of the methods used
to develop the population exposure
input data;
(4) A description of the exposure
input data, including, for each
population center, a geographic
definition and the distribution of
population among shelter types as a
function of time of day, week, month, or
year;
(5) A description of the atmospheric
data used as input to the debris risk
analysis;
(6) The effective unsheltered casualty
area for all fragment classes assuming a
representative impact vector;
(7) The effective casualty area for all
fragment classes for a representative
type of building, ground vehicle,
waterborne vessel, and aircraft,
assuming a representative impact
vector;
(8) Collective and individual debris
risk analysis outputs under
representative conditions and the worst
foreseeable conditions, including:
(i) Total collective casualty
expectation for the proposed operation;
(ii) A list of the collective risk
contribution for at least the top ten
population centers and all centers with
collective risk exceeding 1 percent of
the collective risk criterion in § 450.101;
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(iii) A list of the maximum individual
probability of casualty for the top ten
population centers and all centers that
exceed 10 percent of the individual risk
criterion in § 450.101; and
(iv) A list of the probability of loss of
functionality of any critical asset that
exceeds 1 percent of the critical asset
criterion in § 450.101;
(9) A list of the conditional collective
casualty expectation for each vehicle
response mode for each one-second
interval of flight under representative
conditions and the worst foreseeable
conditions; and
(10) Additional products that allow an
independent analysis, as requested by
the Administrator.
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§ 450.137 Far-field overpressure blast
effects analysis.
(a) General. The far-field overpressure
blast effect analysis must demonstrate
compliance with public safety criteria in
§ 450.101, either—
(1) Prior to the day of the operation,
accounting for all foreseeable conditions
within the flight commit criteria; or
(2) During the countdown using the
best available input data.
(b) Analysis constraints. The analysis
must account for—
(1) The potential for distant focus
overpressure or overpressure
enhancement given current
meteorological conditions and terrain
characteristics;
(2) The potential for broken windows
due to peak incident overpressures
below 1.0 psi and related casualties;
(3) The explosive capability of the
vehicle at impact and at altitude and
potential explosions resulting from
debris impacts, including the potential
for mixing of liquid propellants;
(4) Characteristics of the vehicle flight
and the surroundings that would affect
the population’s susceptibility to injury,
including shelter types and time of day
of the proposed operation;
(5) Characteristics of the potentially
affected windows, including their size,
location, orientation, glazing material,
and condition; and
(6) The hazard characteristics of the
potential glass shards, including falling
from upper building stories or being
propelled into or out of a shelter toward
potentially occupied spaces.
(c) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit a description of
the far-field overpressure analysis,
including all assumptions and
justifications for the assumptions,
analysis methods, input data, and
results. At a minimum, the application
must include:
(1) A description of the population
centers, terrain, building types, and
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window characteristics used as input to
the far-field overpressure analysis;
(2) A description of the methods used
to compute the foreseeable explosive
yield probability pairs, and the
complete set of yield-probability pairs,
used as input to the far-field
overpressure analysis;
(3) A description of the methods used
to compute peak incident overpressures
as a function of distance from the
explosion and prevailing meteorological
conditions, including sample
calculations for a representative range of
the foreseeable meteorological
conditions, yields, and population
center locations;
(4) A description of the methods used
to compute the probability of window
breakage, including tabular data and
graphs for the probability of breakage as
a function of the peak incident
overpressure for a representative range
of window types, building types, and
yields accounted for;
(5) A description of the methods used
to compute the probability of casualty
for a representative individual,
including tabular data and graphs for
the probability of casualty, as a function
of location relative to the window and
the peak incident overpressure for a
representative range of window types,
building types, and yields accounted
for;
(6) Tabular data and graphs showing
the hypothetical location of any member
of the public that could be exposed to
a probability of casualty of 1 × 10¥5 or
greater for neighboring operations
personnel, and 1 × 10¥6 or greater for
other members of the public, given
foreseeable meteorological conditions,
yields, and population exposures;
(7) The maximum expected casualties
that could result from far-field
overpressure hazards greater given
foreseeable meteorological conditions,
yields, and population exposures;
(8) A description of the
meteorological measurements used as
input to any real-time far-field
overpressure analysis; and
(9) Additional products that allow an
independent analysis, as requested by
the Administrator.
§ 450.139
Toxic hazards for flight.
(a) Applicability. This section applies
to any launch or reentry vehicle,
including all vehicle components and
payloads, that use toxic propellants or
other toxic chemicals.
(b) General. An operator must—
(1) Conduct a toxic release hazard
analysis in accordance with paragraph
(c) of this section;
(2) Manage the risk of casualties that
could arise from the exposure to toxic
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release through one of the following
means:
(i) Contain hazards caused by toxic
release in accordance with paragraph (d)
of this section; or
(ii) Perform a toxic risk assessment, in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this
section, that protects the public in
compliance with the risk criteria of
§ 450.101, including toxic release
hazards.
(3) Establish flight commit criteria
based on the results of its toxic release
hazard analysis, containment analysis,
or toxic risk assessment for any
necessary evacuation of the public from
any toxic hazard area.
(c) Toxic release hazard analysis. A
toxic release hazard analysis must—
(1) Account for any toxic release that
could occur during nominal or nonnominal flight;
(2) Include a worst-case release
scenario analysis or a maximumcredible release scenario analysis;
(3) Determine if toxic release can
occur based on an evaluation of the
chemical compositions and quantities of
propellants, other chemicals, vehicle
materials, and projected combustion
products, and the possible toxic release
scenarios;
(4) Account for both normal
combustion products and any unreacted
propellants and phase change or
chemical derivatives of released
substances; and
(5) Account for any operational
constraints and emergency procedures
that provide protection from toxic
release.
(d) Toxic containment. An operator
using toxic containment must manage
the risk of any casualty from the
exposure to toxic release either by—
(1) Evacuating, or being prepared to
evacuate, the public from a toxic hazard
area, where an average member of the
public would be exposed to greater than
one percent conditional individual
probability of casualty in the event of a
worst-case release or maximum credible
release scenario; or
(2) Employing meteorological
constraints to limit a launch operation
to times during which prevailing winds
and other conditions ensure that an
average member of the public would not
be exposed to greater than one percent
conditional individual probability of
casualty in the event of a worst-case
release or maximum credible release
scenario.
(e) Toxic risk assessment. An operator
using toxic risk assessment must
establish flight commit criteria that
demonstrate compliance with the public
risk criterion of § 450.101. A toxic risk
assessment must—
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(1) Account for airborne concentration
and duration thresholds of toxic
propellants or other chemicals. For any
toxic propellant, other chemicals, or
combustion product, an operator must
use airborne toxic concentration and
duration thresholds identified in a
means of compliance accepted by the
Administrator;
(2) Account for physical phenomena
expected to influence any toxic
concentration and duration in the area
surrounding the potential release site;
(3) Determine a toxic hazard area for
the launch or reentry, surrounding the
potential release site for each toxic
propellant or other chemical based on
the amount and toxicity of the
propellant or other chemical, the
exposure duration, and the
meteorological conditions involved;
(4) Account for all members of the
public that may be exposed to the toxic
release, including all members of the
public on land and on any waterborne
vessels, populated offshore structures,
and aircraft that are not operated in
direct support of the launch or reentry;
and
(5) Account for any risk mitigation
measures applied in the risk assessment.
(f) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit:
(1) The identity of toxic propellant,
chemical, or combustion products or
derivatives in the possible toxic release;
(2) The applicant’s selected airborne
toxic concentration and duration
thresholds;
(3) The meteorological conditions for
the atmospheric transport and buoyant
cloud rise of any toxic release from its
source to downwind receptor locations;
(4) Characterization of the terrain, as
input for modeling the atmospheric
transport of a toxic release from its
source to downwind receptor locations;
(5) The identity of the toxic
dispersion model used, and any other
input data;
(6) Representative results of an
applicant’s toxic dispersion modeling to
predict concentrations and durations at
selected downwind receptor locations,
to determine the toxic hazard area for a
released quantity of the toxic substance;
(7) For toxic release hazard analysis in
accordance with paragraph (c) of this
section:
(i) A description of the failure modes
and associated relative probabilities for
potential toxic release scenarios used in
the risk evaluation; and
(ii) The methodology and
representative results of an applicant’s
determination of the worst-case or
maximum-credible quantity of any toxic
release that might occur during the
flight of a vehicle;
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(8) For toxic risk assessment in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this
section:
(i) A demonstration that the public
will not be exposed to airborne
concentrations above the toxic
concentration and duration thresholds,
based upon representative results of the
toxic release hazard analysis;
(ii) The population density in receptor
locations that are identified by toxic
dispersion modeling as toxic hazard
areas;
(iii) A description of any risk
mitigations applied in the toxic risk
assessment; and
(iv) The identity of the population
database used; and
(9) Additional products that allow an
independent analysis, as requested by
the Administrator.
§ 450.141 Wind weighting for the flight of
an unguided suborbital launch vehicle.
(a) Applicability. This section applies
to the flight of an unguided suborbital
launch vehicle using wind weighting to
meet the public safety criteria of
§ 450.101.
(b) Wind weighting safety system. The
flight of an unguided suborbital launch
vehicle that uses a wind weighting
safety system must meet the following:
(1) The launcher azimuth and
elevation settings must be wind
weighted to correct for the effects of
wind conditions at the time of flight to
provide a safe impact location; and
(2) An operator must use launcher
azimuth and elevation angle settings
that ensures the rocket will not fly in an
unintended direction given wind
uncertainties.
(c) Analysis. An operator must—
(1) Establish flight commit criteria
and other flight safety rules that control
the risk to the public from potential
adverse effects resulting from normal
and malfunctioning flight;
(2) Establish any wind constraints
under which flight may occur; and
(3) Conduct a wind weighting analysis
that establishes the launcher azimuth
and elevation settings that correct for
the windcocking and wind-drift effects
on the unguided suborbital launch
vehicle.
(d) Stability. An unguided suborbital
launch vehicle, in all configurations,
must be stable throughout each stage of
powered flight.
(e) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit:
(1) A description of its wind
weighting analysis methods, including
its method and schedule of determining
wind speed and wind direction for each
altitude layer;
(2) A description of its wind
weighting safety system and identify all
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equipment used to perform the wind
weighting analysis;
(3) A representative wind weighting
analysis using actual or statistical winds
for the launch area and provide samples
of the output; and
(4) Additional products that allow an
independent analysis, as requested by
the Administrator.
Prescribed Hazard Controls
§ 450.143 Safety-critical system design,
test, and documentation.
(a) Applicability. This section applies
to all safety-critical systems. Flight
safety systems that are required to meet
the requirements of § 450.101(c) must
meet additional requirements in
§ 450.145.
(b) Fault-tolerant design. An operator
must design safety-critical systems to be
fault-tolerant such that there is no single
credible fault that can lead to increased
risk to public safety beyond nominal
safety-critical system operation.
(c) Qualification testing of design. An
operator must functionally demonstrate
the design of the vehicle’s safety-critical
systems at conditions beyond its
predicted operating environment. The
operator must select environmental test
levels that ensure the design is
sufficiently stressed to demonstrate that
system performance is not degraded due
to design tolerances, manufacturing
variances, or uncertainties in the
environment.
(d) Acceptance of hardware. An
operator must—
(1) Functionally demonstrate any
safety-critical system while exposed to
its predicted operating environment
with margin to demonstrate that it is
free of defects, free of integration and
workmanship errors, and ready for
operational use; or
(2) Combine in-process controls and a
quality assurance process to ensure
functional capability of any safetycritical system during its service life.
(e) Lifecycle of safety-critical systems.
(1) The predicted operating
environment must be based on
conditions predicted to be encountered
in all phases of flight, recovery, and
transportation.
(2) An operator must monitor the
flight environments experienced by
safety-critical system components to the
extent necessary to—
(i) Validate the predicted operating
environment; and
(ii) Assess the actual component life
remaining or adjust any inspection
period.
(f) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit to the FAA the
following as part of its application:
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(1) A list and description of each
safety-critical system;
(2) Drawings and schematics for each
safety-critical system;
(3) A summary of the analysis to
determine the predicted operating
environment and duration to be applied
to qualification and acceptance testing
covering the service life of any safetycritical system;
(4) A description of any
instrumentation or inspection processes
to monitor aging of any safety-critical
system; and
(5) The criteria and procedures for
disposal or refurbishment for service life
extension of safety-critical system
components.
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§ 450.145
Flight safety system.
(a) General. For each phase of flight
for which an operator must implement
flight abort to meet the requirement of
§ 450.101(c), the operator must use a
flight safety system, or other safeguards
agreed to by the Administrator, on the
launch or reentry vehicle, vehicle
component, or payload with the
following reliability:
(1) If the consequence any vehicle
response mode is 1 × 10¥2 conditional
expected casualties or greater for
uncontrolled areas, an operator must
employ a flight safety system with
design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent
confidence and commensurate design,
analysis, and testing; or
(2) If the consequence of any vehicle
response mode is between 1 × 10¥2 and
1 × 10¥3 conditional expected casualties
for uncontrolled areas, an operator must
employ a flight safety system with a
design reliability of 0.975 at 95 percent
confidence and commensurate design,
analysis, and testing.
(b) Accepted means of compliance. To
comply with paragraph (a) of this
section, an applicant must use a means
of compliance accepted by the
Administrator.
(c) Monitoring. An operator must
monitor the flight environments
experienced by any flight safety system
component.
(d) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit the information
identified in paragraphs (d)(1) through
(5) of this section, for any flight safety
system including any flight safety
system located on board a launch or
reentry vehicle; any ground based
command control system; any support
system, including telemetry subsystems
and tracking subsystems, necessary to
support a flight abort decision; and the
functions of any personnel who operate
the flight safety system hardware or
software:
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(1) Flight safety system description.
An applicant must describe the flight
safety system and its operation in detail,
including all components, component
functions, and possible operational
scenarios.
(2) Flight safety system diagram. An
applicant must submit a diagram that
identifies all flight safety system
subsystems and shows the
interconnection of all the elements of
the flight safety system. The diagram
must include any subsystems used to
implement flight abort both on and off
the vehicle, including any subsystems
used to make the decision to abort
flight.
(3) Flight safety system analyses. An
applicant must submit any analyses and
detailed analysis reports of all flight
safety system subsystems necessary to
demonstrate the reliability and
confidence levels required by paragraph
(a) of this section.
(4) Tracking validation procedures.
An applicant must document and
submit the procedures for validating the
accuracy of any vehicle tracking data
utilized by the flight safety system to
make the decision to abort flight.
(5) Flight safety system test plans. An
applicant must submit acceptance,
qualification, and preflight test plans of
any flight safety system, subsystems,
and components. The test plans must
include test procedures and test
environments.
§ 450.147
Agreements.
(a) General. An operator must
establish a written agreement with any
entity that provides a service or
property that meets a requirement in
this part, including:
(1) Launch and reentry site use
agreements. A Federal launch range
operator, a licensed launch or reentry
site operator, or any other person that
provides services or access to or use of
property required to support the safe
launch or reentry under this part;
(2) Agreements for notices to
mariners. Unless otherwise addressed in
agreements with the site operator, for
overflight of navigable water, the U.S.
Coast Guard or other applicable
maritime authority to establish
procedures for the issuance of a Notice
to Mariners prior to a launch or reentry
and other measures necessary to protect
public health and safety;
(3) Agreements for notices to airmen.
Unless otherwise addressed in
agreements with the site operator, the
FAA Air Traffic Organization or other
applicable air navigation authority to
establish procedures for the issuance of
a Notice to Airmen prior to a launch or
reentry, for closing of air routes during
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15437
the respective launch and reentry
windows, and for other measures
necessary to protect public health and
safety; and
(4) Mishap response. Emergency
response providers, including local
government authorities, to satisfy the
requirements of § 450.173.
(b) Roles and responsibilities. The
agreements required in this section must
clearly delineate the roles and
responsibilities of each party to support
the safe launch or reentry under this
part.
(c) Effective date. The agreements
required in this section must be in effect
before a license can be issued, unless
otherwise agreed to by the
Administrator.
(d) Application requirement. The
applicant must describe each agreement
in this section. The applicant must
provide a copy of any agreement, or
portion thereof, to the FAA upon
request.
§ 450.149 Safety-critical personnel
qualifications.
(a) Qualification requirements. An
operator must ensure safety-critical
personnel are trained, qualified, and
capable of performing their safetycritical tasks, and that their training is
current.
(b) Application requirements. An
applicant must—
(1) Identify safety-critical tasks that
require qualified personnel;
(2) Provide internal training and
currency requirements, completion
standards, or any other means of
demonstrating compliance with the
requirements of this section; and
(3) Describe the process for tracking
training currency.
§ 450.151 Work shift and rest
requirements.
(a) General. For any launch or reentry,
an operator must document and
implement rest requirements that ensure
safety-critical personnel are physically
and mentally capable of performing all
assigned tasks.
(b) Specific items to address. An
operator’s rest requirements must
address the following:
(1) Duration of each work shift and
the process for extending this shift,
including the maximum allowable
length of any extension;
(2) Number of consecutive work shift
days allowed before rest is required;
(3) Minimum rest period required—
(i) Between each work shift, including
the period of rest required immediately
before the flight countdown work shift;
and
(ii) After the maximum number of
work shift days allowed; and
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(4) Approval process for any deviation
from the rest requirements.
(c) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit rest rules that
demonstrate compliance with the
requirements of this section.
§ 450.153
Radio frequency management.
(a) Frequency management. For any
radio frequency used, an operator
must—
(1) Identify each frequency, all
allowable frequency tolerances, and
each frequency’s intended use,
operating power, and source;
(2) Provide for the monitoring of
frequency usage and enforcement of
frequency allocations; and
(3) Coordinate use of radio
frequencies with any site operator and
any local and Federal authorities.
(b) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit procedures or
other means to demonstrate compliance
with the radio frequency requirements
of this section.
§ 450.155
Readiness.
(a) Flight readiness. An operator must
document and implement procedures to
assess readiness to proceed with the
flight of a launch or reentry vehicle.
These procedures must address, at
minimum, the following:
(1) Readiness of vehicle and launch,
reentry, or landing site, including any
contingency abort location;
(2) Readiness of safety-critical
personnel, systems, software,
procedures, equipment, property, and
services; and
(3) Readiness to implement the
mishap plan required by § 450.173.
(b) Application requirements. An
applicant must—
(1) Demonstrate compliance with the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this
section through procedures that may
include a readiness meeting close in
time to flight; and
(2) Describe the criteria for
establishing readiness to proceed with
the flight of a launch or reentry vehicle.
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§ 450.157
Communications.
(a) Communication procedures. An
operator must implement
communication procedures during the
countdown and flight of a launch or
reentry vehicle that—
(1) Define the authority of personnel,
by individual or position title, to issue
‘‘hold/resume,’’ ‘‘go/no go,’’ and abort
commands;
(2) Assign communication networks
so that personnel identified in
paragraph (a)(1) of this section have
direct access to real-time safety-critical
information required to issue ‘‘hold/
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resume,’’ ‘‘go/no go,’’ and any abort
commands;
(3) Ensure personnel, identified in
paragraph (a)(1) of this section, monitor
each common intercom channel during
countdown and flight; and
(4) Implement a protocol for using
defined radio telephone
communications terminology.
(b) Currency. An operator must ensure
the currency of the communication
procedures, and that all personnel are
working with the approved version of
the communication procedures.
(c) Communication records. An
operator must record all safety-critical
communications network channels that
are used for voice, video, or data
transmissions that support safety critical
systems during each countdown.
§ 450.159
Preflight procedures.
(a) Preflight procedures. An operator
must implement preflight procedures
that—
(1) Verify that each flight commit
criterion is satisfied before flight is
initiated; and
(2) Ensure the operator can return the
vehicle to a safe state after a countdown
abort or delay.
(b) Currency. An operator must ensure
the currency of the preflight procedures,
and that all personnel are working with
the approved version of the preflight
procedures.
§ 450.161 Surveillance and publication of
hazard areas.
(a) General. The operator must
publicize, survey, and evacuate each
flight hazard area prior to initiating
flight of a launch vehicle or the reentry
of a reentry vehicle to the extent
necessary to ensure compliance with
§ 450.101.
(b) Verification. The launch or reentry
operator must perform surveillance
sufficient to verify or update the
assumptions, input data, and results of
the flight safety analyses.
(c) Publication. An operator must
publicize warnings for each flight
hazard area, except for regions of land,
sea, or air under the control of the
vehicle operator, site operator, or other
entity by agreement. If the operator
relies on another entity to publicize
these warnings, it must verify that the
warnings have been issued.
(d) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit:
(1) A description of how it will
provide for day-of-flight surveillance of
flight hazard areas, if necessary, to
ensure that the presence of any member
of the public in or near a flight hazard
area is consistent with flight commit
criteria developed for each launch or
reentry as required by § 450.165(b); and
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(2) A description of how it will
establish flight commit criteria based on
the results of its toxic release hazard
analysis, containment analysis, or toxic
risk assessment for any necessary
evacuation of the public from any toxic
hazard area.
§ 450.163
Lightning hazard mitigation.
(a) Lighting hazard mitigation. An
operator must—
(1) Establish flight commit criteria
that mitigate the potential for a launch
or reentry vehicle intercepting or
initiating a lightning strike, or
encountering a nearby discharge, using
a means of compliance accepted by the
Administrator;
(2) Use a vehicle designed to continue
safe flight in the event of a direct
lightning strike or nearby discharge; or
(3) Ensure compliance with § 450.101,
given any direct lightning strike or an
encounter with a nearby discharge.
(b) Application requirements. (1) An
applicant electing to comply with
paragraph (a)(1) of this section must
submit flight commit criteria that
mitigate the potential for a launch or
reentry vehicle intercepting or initiating
a direct lightning strike, or encountering
a nearby lightning discharge.
(2) An applicant electing to comply
with paragraph (a)(2) of this section
must submit documentation providing
evidence that the vehicle is designed to
protect safety-critical systems against
the effects of a direct lightning strike or
nearby discharge.
(3) An applicant electing to comply
with paragraph (a)(3) of this section
must submit documentation providing
evidence that the safety criteria in
§ 450.101 will be met given any direct
lightning strike or an encounter with a
nearby discharge.
§ 450.165
Flight safety rules.
(a) General. For each launch or
reentry, an operator must establish and
observe flight safety rules that govern
the conduct of the launch or reentry.
(b) Flight commit criteria. The flight
safety rules must include flight commit
criteria that identify each condition
necessary prior to flight of a launch
vehicle or the reentry of a reentry
vehicle to satisfy the requirements of
§ 450.101, and must include:
(1) Surveillance of any region of land,
sea, or air in accordance with § 450.161;
(2) Monitoring of any meteorological
condition necessary to—
(i) Be consistent with any safety
analysis required by this part; and
(ii) If necessary in accordance with
§ 450.163, mitigate the potential for a
launch or reentry vehicle intercepting a
lightning strike, or encountering a
nearby discharge;
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(3) Implementation of any launch or
reentry window closure in the launch or
reentry window for the purpose of
collision avoidance in accordance with
§ 450.169;
(4) Confirmation that any safetycritical system is ready for flight;
(5) For any reentry vehicle, except a
suborbital vehicle, monitoring by the
operator or an on board system that the
status of safety-critical systems are
healthy before enabling reentry flight, to
assure the vehicle can reenter safely to
Earth; and
(6) Any other hazard controls derived
from any safety analysis required by this
part.
(c) Flight abort rules. (1) For a vehicle
that uses a flight safety system, the flight
safety rules must identify the conditions
under which the flight safety system,
including the functions of any flight
abort crew, must abort the flight to:
(i) Ensure compliance with § 450.101;
and
(ii) Prevent debris capable of causing
a casualty from impacting in
uncontrolled areas if the vehicle is
outside the limits of a useful mission.
(2) Vehicle data required to evaluate
flight abort rules must be available to
the flight safety system across the range
of normal and malfunctioning flight.
(3) The flight abort rules must include
the following:
(i) The flight safety system must abort
flight when valid, real-time data
indicate the vehicle has violated any
flight safety limit;
(ii) The flight safety system must abort
flight when the vehicle state approaches
conditions that are anticipated to
compromise the capability of the flight
safety system and further flight has the
potential to violate a flight safety limit;
(iii) The flight safety system must
incorporate data loss flight times to
abort flight at the first possible violation
of a flight safety limit, or earlier, if valid
tracking data is insufficient for
evaluating a minimum set of flight abort
rules required to maintain compliance
with § 450.101; and
(iv) Flight may continue past any gate
established under § 450.125 only if the
parameters used to establish the ability
of the vehicle to complete a useful
mission are within limits.
(d) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit:
(1) For flight commit criteria, a list of
all flight commit criteria; and
(2) For flight abort rules:
(i) A description of each rule, and the
parameters that will be used to evaluate
each rule;
(ii) A list that identifies the rules
necessary for compliance with each
requirement in § 450.101; and
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(iii) A description of the vehicle data
that will be available to evaluate flight
abort rules across the range of normal
and malfunctioning flight.
§ 450.167
Tracking.
(a) Vehicle tracking. During the flight
of a launch or reentry vehicle, an
operator must measure and record in
real time the position and velocity of the
vehicle. The system used to track the
vehicle must provide data to determine
the actual impact locations of all stages
and components, and to obtain vehicle
performance data for comparison with
the preflight performance predictions.
(b) Application requirements. An
applicant must identify and describe
each method or system used to meet the
tracking requirements of paragraph (a)
of this section.
§ 450.169 Launch and reentry collision
avoidance analysis requirements.
(a) Criteria. For an orbital or
suborbital launch or reentry, an operator
must establish window closures needed
to ensure that the launch or reentry
vehicle, any jettisoned components, or
payloads meet the following
requirements with respect to orbiting
objects, not including any object being
launched or reentered.
(1) For inhabitable objects, one of
three criteria in paragraphs (a)(1)(i)
through (iii) of this section must be met:
(i) The probability of collision
between the launching or reentering
objects and any inhabitable object must
not exceed 1 × 10¥6;
(ii) The launching or reentering
objects must maintain an ellipsoidal
separation distance of 200 km in-track
and 50 km cross-track and radially from
the inhabitable object; or
(iii) The launching or reentering
objects must maintain a spherical
separation distance of 200 km from the
inhabitable object.
(2) For objects that are neither orbital
debris nor inhabitable, one of the two
criteria in paragraphs (a)(2)(i) and (ii) of
this section must be met:
(i) The probability of collision
between the launching or reentering
objects and any object must not exceed
1 × 10¥5; or
(ii) The launching or reentering
objects must maintain a spherical
separation distance of 25 km from the
object.
(3) For all other known orbital debris
identified by the FAA or other Federal
Government entity as 10 cm squared or
larger, the launching or reentering
objects must maintain a spherical
separation distance of 2.5 km from the
object.
(b) Screening time. A launch or
reentry operator must ensure the
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15439
requirements of paragraph (a) of this
section are follows:
(1) Through the entire flight of a
suborbital launch vehicle;
(2) For an orbital launch, during
ascent from a minimum of 150 km to
initial orbital insertion and for a
minimum of 3 hours from liftoff;
(3) For reentry, during descent from
initial reentry burn to 150 km altitude;
and
(4) For disposal, during descent from
initial disposal burn to 150 km altitude.
(c) Rendezvous. Planned rendezvous
operations that occur within the
screening time frame are not considered
a violation of collision avoidance if the
involved operators have pre-coordinated
the rendezvous or close approach.
(d) Analysis not required. A launch
collision avoidance analysis is not
required if the maximum altitude
attainable by a launch operator’s
suborbital launch vehicle and any
released debris is less than 150 km. The
maximum altitude attainable means an
optimized trajectory, assuming
maximum performance within 99.7%
confidence bounds, extended through
fuel exhaustion of each stage, to achieve
a maximum altitude.
(e) Analysis. Collision avoidance
analysis must be obtained for each
launch or reentry from a Federal entity
identified by the FAA.
(1) An operator must use the results
of the collision avoidance analysis to
establish flight commit criteria for
collision avoidance; and
(2) Account for uncertainties
associated with launch or reentry
vehicle performance and timing, and
ensure that each window closure
incorporates all additional time periods
associated with such uncertainties.
(f) Timing and information required.
An operator must prepare a collision
avoidance analysis worksheet for each
launch or reentry using a standardized
format that contains the input data
required by appendix A to this part, as
follows:
(1) An operator must file the input
data with a Federal entity identified by
the FAA and the FAA at least 15 days
before the first attempt at the flight of a
launch vehicle or the reentry of a
reentry vehicle, unless the
Administrator agrees to a different time
frame in accordance with § 404.15 of
this chapter;
(2) An operator must obtain a
collision avoidance analysis performed
by a Federal entity identified by the
FAA 6 hours before the beginning of a
launch or reentry window; and
(3) If an operator needs an updated
collision avoidance analysis due to a
launch or reentry delay, the operator
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must file the request with the Federal
entity and the FAA at least 12 hours
prior to the beginning of the new launch
or reentry window.
§ 450.171
Safety at end of launch.
(a) Debris mitigation. An operator
must ensure for any proposed launch
that for all vehicle stages or components
that reach Earth orbit—
(1) There is no unplanned physical
contact between the vehicle or any of its
components and the payload after
payload separation;
(2) Debris generation does not result
from the conversion of energy sources
into energy that fragments the vehicle or
its components. Energy sources include
chemical, pressure, and kinetic energy;
and
(3) For all vehicle stages or
components that are left in orbit, stored
energy is removed by depleting residual
fuel and leaving all fuel line valves
open, venting any pressurized system,
leaving all batteries in a permanent
discharge state, and removing any
remaining source of stored energy.
(b) Application requirements. An
applicant must demonstrate compliance
with the requirements in paragraph (a)
of this section.
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§ 450.173 Mishap plan—reporting,
response, and investigation requirements.
(a) General. An operator must report,
respond, and investigate class 1, 2, 3,
and 4 mishaps, as defined in § 401.5 of
this chapter, in accordance with
paragraphs (b) through (h) of this
section using a plan or other written
means.
(b) Responsibilities. An operator must
document—
(1) Responsibilities for personnel
assigned to implement the requirements
of this section;
(2) Reporting responsibilities for
personnel assigned to conduct
investigations and for anyone retained
by the licensee to conduct or participate
in investigations; and
(3) Allocation of roles and
responsibilities between the launch
operator and any site operator for
reporting, responding to, and
investigating any mishap during ground
activities at the site.
(c) Cooperation with FAA and NTSB.
An operator must report to, and
cooperate with, the FAA and NTSB
investigations and designate one or
more points of contact for the FAA and
NTSB.
(d) Mishap reporting requirements.
An operator must—
(1) Immediately notify the FAA
Washington Operations Center in case
of a mishap that involves a fatality or
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serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR
830.2);
(2) Notify within 24 hours the FAA
Washington Operations Center in the
case of a mishap that does not involve
a fatality or serious injury (as defined in
49 CFR 830.2); and
(3) Submit a written preliminary
report to the FAA Office of Commercial
Space Transportation within five days
of any mishap. The preliminary report
must include the following information,
as applicable:
(i) Date and time of the mishap;
(ii) Description of the mishap and
sequence of events leading to the
mishap, to the extent known;
(iii) Intended and actual location of
the launch or reentry or other landing
on Earth;
(iv) Vehicle or debris impact points,
including those outside a planned
landing or impact area;
(v) Identification of the vehicle;
(vi) Identification of any payload;
(vii) Number and general description
of any fatalities or injuries;
(viii) Description and estimated costs
of any property damage;
(ix) Identification of hazardous
materials, as defined in § 401.5 of this
chapter, involved in the event, whether
on the vehicle, any payload, or on the
ground;
(x) Action taken by any person to
contain the consequences of the event;
(xi) Weather conditions at the time of
the event; and
(xii) Potential consequences for other
similar vehicles, systems, or operations.
(e) Emergency response requirements.
An operator must—
(1) Activate emergency response
services to protect the public following
a mishap as necessary including, but not
limited to:
(i) Evacuating and rescuing members
of the public, taking into account debris
dispersion and toxic plumes; and
(ii) Extinguishing fires;
(2) Maintain existing hazard area
surveillance and clearance as necessary
to protect public safety;
(3) Contain and minimize the
consequences of a mishap, including:
(i) Securing impact areas to ensure
that no members of the public enter;
(ii) Safely disposing of hazardous
materials; and
(iii) Controlling hazards at the site or
impact areas;
(4) Preserve data and physical
evidence; and
(5) Implement agreements with
government authorities and emergency
response services, as necessary, to
satisfy the requirements of this section.
(f) Mishap investigation requirements.
In the event of a mishap, an operator
must—
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(1) Investigate the root causes of the
mishap; and
(2) Report investigation results to the
FAA.
(g) Preventative measures. An
operator must identify and implement
preventive measures for avoiding
recurrence of the mishap prior to the
next flight, unless otherwise approved
by the Administrator.
(h) Mishap records. An operator must
maintain records associated with the
mishap in accordance with § 450.219(b).
(i) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit the plan or other
written means required by this section.
§ 450.175
Test-induced damage.
(a) Coordination of anticipated testinduced damage. Test-induced damage
is not a mishap if all of the following are
true:
(1) An operator coordinates potential
test-induced damage with the FAA
before the planned activity, and with
sufficient time for the FAA to evaluate
the operator’s proposal during the
application process or as a license
modification; and
(2) The test-induced damage did not
result in any of the following:
(i) Serious injury or fatality (as
defined in 49 CFR 830.2);
(ii) Damage to property not associated
with the licensed activity; and
(iii) Hazardous debris leaving the predefined hazard area; or
(3) The test-induced damage falls
within the scope of activities
coordinated with the FAA in paragraph
(a)(1) of this section.
(b) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit the following
information:
(1) Test objectives;
(2) Test limits;
(3) Expected outcomes;
(4) Potential risks, including the
applicant’s best understanding of the
uncertainties in environments, test
limits, or system performance;
(5) Applicable procedures;
(6) Expected time and duration of the
test; and
(7) Additional information as required
by the FAA to ensure protection of
public health and safety, safety of
property, and the national security and
foreign policy interests of the United
States.
§ 450.177 Unique policies, requirements,
and practices.
(a) Operator identified unique
hazards. An operator must review
operations, system designs, analysis,
and testing, and identify any unique
hazards not otherwise addressed by this
part. An operator must implement any
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unique safety policy, requirement, or
practice needed to protect the public
from the unique hazard.
(b) FAA unique policy, requirement,
or practice. The FAA may identify and
impose a unique policy, requirement, or
practice as needed to protect the public
health and safety, safety of property,
and the national security and foreign
policy interests of the United States.
(c) Application requirements. (1) An
operator must identify any unique safety
policy, requirement, or practice
necessary in accordance with paragraph
(a) of this section, and demonstrate that
each unique safety policy, requirement,
or practice protects public health and
safety and the safety of property.
(2) An operator must demonstrate that
each unique safety policy, requirement,
or practice imposed by the FAA in
accordance with paragraph (b) of this
section, protects public health and
safety, safety of property, and the
national security and foreign policy
interests of the United States.
Ground Safety
§ 450.179
Ground safety—general.
At a U.S. launch or reentry site, an
operator must protect the public from
adverse effects of hazardous operations
and systems associated with—
(a) Preparing a launch vehicle for
flight;
(b) Returning a launch or reentry
vehicle to a safe condition after landing,
or after an aborted launch attempt; and
(c) Returning a site to a safe condition.
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§ 450.181
operator.
Coordination with a site
(a) General. For a launch or reentry
conducted from or to a Federal launch
or reentry site or a site licensed under
part 420 or 433 of this chapter, an
operator must coordinate with the site
operator to ensure—
(1) Public access is controlled where
and when necessary to protect public
safety;
(2) Launch or reentry operations are
coordinated with other launch and
reentry operators and other affected
parties to prevent unsafe interference;
(3) Any ground hazard area that
affects the operations of a launch or
reentry site is coordinated with the
Federal or licensed launch or reentry
site operator; and
(4) Prompt and effective response in
the event of a mishap that could impact
public safety.
(b) Licensed site operator. For a
launch or reentry conducted from or to
a site licensed under part 420 or 433 of
this chapter, an operator must also
coordinate with the site operator to
establish roles and responsibilities for
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reporting, responding to, and
investigating any mishap during ground
activities at the site.
(c) Application requirements. An
applicant must describe how it is
coordinating with a Federal or licensed
launch or reentry site operator in
compliance with this section.
§ 450.183
Explosive site plan.
(a) Exclusive use sites. For a launch or
reentry conducted from or to a site
exclusive to its own use, an operator
must comply with the explosive siting
requirements of §§ 420.63, 420.65,
420.66, 420.67, 420.69, and 420.70 of
this chapter.
(b) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit an explosive site
plan in accordance with paragraph (a) of
this section.
§ 450.185
Ground hazard analysis.
An operator must perform and
document a ground hazard analysis, and
continue to maintain it throughout the
lifecycle of the launch or reentry
system. The analysis must—
(a) Hazard identification. Identify
system and operation hazards posed by
the vehicle and ground hardware,
including site and ground support
equipment. Hazards identified must
include the following:
(1) System hazards, including:
(i) Vehicle over-pressurization;
(ii) Sudden energy release, including
ordnance actuation;
(iii) Ionizing and non-ionizing
radiation;
(iv) Fire or deflagration;
(v) Radioactive materials;
(vi) Toxic release;
(vii) Cryogens;
(viii) Electrical discharge; and
(ix) Structural failure; and
(2) Operation hazards, including:
(i) Propellant handling and loading;
(ii) Transporting of vehicle or vehicle
components;
(iii) Vehicle testing; and
(iv) Vehicle or system activation.
(b) Hazard assessment. Assess each
hazard’s likelihood and severity.
(c) Risk criteria. Ensure that the risk
associated with each hazard meets the
following criteria:
(1) The likelihood of any hazardous
condition that may cause death or
serious injury to the public must be
extremely remote; and
(2) The likelihood of any hazardous
condition that may cause major damage
to public property or critical assets must
be remote.
(d) Risk elimination and mitigation.
Identify and describe the risk
elimination and mitigation measures
required to satisfy paragraph (c) of this
section.
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(e) Validation and verification.
Demonstrate that the risk elimination
and mitigation measures achieve the
risk levels of paragraph (c) of this
section through validation and
verification. Verification includes:
(1) Analysis;
(2) Test;
(3) Demonstration; or
(4) Inspection.
(f) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit—
(1) A description of the methodology
used to perform the ground hazard
analysis;
(2) A list of all systems and operations
that may cause a hazard involving the
vehicle or any payload; and
(3) The ground hazard analysis
products of paragraphs (a) through (e) of
this section, including data that verifies
the risk elimination and mitigation
measures.
§ 450.187 Toxic hazards mitigation for
ground operations.
(a) Applicability. This section applies
to any launch or reentry vehicle,
including all vehicle components and
payloads, that use toxic propellants or
other toxic chemicals.
(b) Toxic release hazard analysis. An
operator must conduct a toxic release
hazard analysis that—
(1) Accounts for any toxic release that
could occur during nominal or nonnominal launch or reentry ground
operations;
(2) Includes a worst-case release
scenario analysis or a maximumcredible release scenario analysis for
each process that involves a toxic
propellant or other chemical;
(3) Determines if toxic release can
occur based on an evaluation of the
chemical compositions and quantities of
propellants, other chemicals, vehicle
materials, and projected combustion
products, and the possible toxic release
scenarios;
(4) Accounts for both normal
combustion products and any unreacted
propellants and phase change or
chemical derivatives of released
substances; and
(5) Accounts for any operational
constraints and emergency procedures
that provide protection from toxic
release.
(c) Toxic containment. An operator
using toxic containment must manage
the risk of casualty from the exposure to
toxic release either by—
(1) Evacuating, or being prepared to
evacuate, the public from a toxic hazard
area, where an average member of the
public would be exposed to greater than
one percent conditional individual
probability of casualty in the event of a
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worst-case release or maximum credible
release scenario; or
(2) Employing meteorological
constraints to limit a ground operation
to times during which prevailing winds
and other conditions ensure that an
average member of the public would not
be exposed to greater than one percent
conditional individual probability of
casualty in the event of a worst-case
release or maximum credible release
scenario.
(d) Toxic risk assessment. An operator
using toxic risk assessment must
manage the risk from any toxic release
hazard and demonstrate compliance
with the criteria in § 450.109(a)(3). A
toxic risk assessment must—
(1) Account for airborne concentration
and duration thresholds of toxic
propellants or other chemicals. For any
toxic propellant, other chemicals, or
combustion product, an operator must
use airborne toxic concentration and
duration thresholds identified in a
means of compliance accepted by the
Administrator;
(2) Account for physical phenomena
expected to influence any toxic
concentration and duration in the area
surrounding the potential release site;
(3) Determine a toxic hazard area for
each process, surrounding the potential
release site for each toxic propellant or
other chemical based on the amount and
toxicity of the propellant or other
chemical, the exposure duration, and
the meteorological conditions involved;
(4) Account for all members of the
public that may be exposed to the toxic
release; and
(5) Account for any risk mitigation
measures applied in the risk assessment.
(e) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit:
(1) The identity of the toxic
propellant, chemical, or toxic
combustion products in the possible
toxic release;
(2) The applicant’s selected airborne
toxic concentration and duration
thresholds;
(3) The meteorological conditions for
the atmospheric transport and buoyant
cloud rise of any toxic release from its
source to downwind receptor locations;
(4) Characterization of the terrain, as
input for modeling the atmospheric
transport of a toxic release from its
source to downwind receptor locations;
(5) The identity of the toxic
dispersion model used, and any other
input data;
(6) Representative results of an
applicant’s toxic dispersion modeling to
predict concentrations and durations at
selected downwind receptor locations,
to determine the toxic hazard area for a
released quantity of the toxic substance;
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(7) For toxic release hazard analysis in
accordance with paragraph (b) of this
section:
(i) A description of the failure modes
and associated relative probabilities for
potential toxic release scenarios used in
the risk evaluation; and
(ii) The methodology and results of an
applicant’s determination of the worstcase or maximum-credible quantity of
any toxic release that might occur
during ground operations;
(8) For toxic risk assessment in
accordance with paragraph (d) of this
section:
(i) A demonstration that the public
will not be exposed to airborne
concentrations above the toxic
concentration and duration thresholds,
based upon the representative results of
the toxic release hazard analysis;
(ii) The population density in receptor
locations that are identified by toxic
dispersion modeling as toxic hazard
areas;
(iii) A description of any risk
mitigation measures applied in the toxic
risk assessment; and
(iv) The identity of the population
database used; and
(9) Additional products that allow an
independent analysis, as requested by
the Administrator.
§ 450.189
controls.
Ground safety prescribed hazard
(a) General. In addition to the hazard
controls derived form an operator’s
ground hazard analysis and toxic hazard
analysis, an operator must comply with
paragraphs (b) through (e) of this
section.
(b) Protection of public on the site. An
operator must document a process for
protecting members of the public who
enter any area under the control of a
launch or reentry operator, including:
(1) Procedures for identifying and
tracking the public while on the site;
and
(2) Methods the operator uses to
protect the public from hazards in
accordance with the ground hazard
analysis and toxic hazard analysis.
(c) Countdown abort. Following a
countdown abort or recycle operation,
an operator must establish, maintain,
and perform procedures for controlling
hazards related to the vehicle and
returning the vehicle, stages, or other
flight hardware and site facilities to a
safe condition. When a launch vehicle
does not liftoff after a command to
initiate flight was sent, an operator
must—
(1) Ensure that the vehicle and any
payload are in a safe configuration;
(2) Prohibit entry of the public into
any identified hazard areas until the site
is returned to a safe condition; and
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(3) Maintain and verify that any flight
safety system remains operational until
verification that the launch vehicle does
not represent a risk of inadvertent flight.
(d) Fire suppression. An operator
must have reasonable precautions in
place to report and control any fire
caused by licensed activities.
(e) Emergency procedures. An
operator must have general emergency
procedures that apply to any
emergencies not covered by the mishap
plan of § 450.173 that may create a
hazard to the public.
(f) Application requirements. An
applicant must submit the process for
protecting members of the public who
enter any area under the control of a
launch or reentry operator in
accordance with paragraph (b) of this
section.
Subpart D—Terms and Conditions of a
Vehicle Operator License
§ 450.201
Public safety responsibility.
A licensee is responsible for ensuring
public safety and safety of property
during the conduct of a licensed launch
or reentry.
§ 450.203
Compliance with license.
A licensee must conduct a licensed
launch or reentry in accordance with
representations made in its license
application, the requirements of subpart
C of this part and this subpart, and the
terms and conditions contained in the
license. A licensee’s failure to act in
accordance with the representations
made in the license application, the
requirements of subpart C of this part
and this subpart, and the terms and
conditions contained in the license, is
sufficient basis for the revocation of a
license or other appropriate
enforcement action.
§ 450.205 Financial responsibility
requirements.
A licensee must comply with
financial responsibility requirements as
required by part 440 of this chapter and
as specified in a license or license order.
§ 450.207 Human spaceflight
requirements.
A licensee conducting a launch or
reentry with a human being on board
the vehicle must comply with human
spaceflight requirements as required by
part 460 of this chapter and as specified
in a license or license order.
§ 450.209
Compliance monitoring.
(a) A licensee must allow access by,
and cooperate with, Federal officers or
employees or other individuals
authorized by the FAA to observe any
of its activities, or of its contractors or
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subcontractors, associated with the
conduct of a licensed launch or reentry.
(b) For each licensed launch or
reentry, a licensee must provide the
FAA with a console or other means for
monitoring the progress of the
countdown and communication on all
channels of the countdown
communications network. A licensee
must also provide the FAA with the
capability to communicate with the
mission director designated by
§ 450.103(a)(1).
(c) If the FAA finds a licensee has not
complied with any of the requirements
in subpart C of this part or this subpart,
the FAA may require the licensee to
revise its procedures to achieve
compliance.
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§ 450.211 Continuing accuracy of license
application; application for modification of
license.
(a) A licensee is responsible for the
continuing accuracy of representations
contained in its application for the
entire term of the license. After a license
has been issued, a licensee must apply
to the FAA for modification of the
license if—
(1) The licensee proposes to conduct
a launch or reentry in a manner not
authorized by the license; or
(2) Any representation contained in
the license application that is material
to public health and safety or the safety
of property is no longer accurate and
complete or does not reflect the
licensee’s procedures governing the
actual conduct of a launch or reentry. A
change is material to public health and
safety or the safety of property if it alters
or affects the—
(i) Class of payload;
(ii) Type of launch or reentry vehicle;
(iii) Type or quantity of hazardous
material;
(iv) Flight trajectory;
(v) Launch site or reentry site or other
landing site; or
(vi) Any system, policy, procedure,
requirement, criteria, or standard that is
safety critical.
(b) An application to modify a license
must be prepared and submitted in
accordance with part 413 of this
chapter. If requested during the
application process, the FAA may
approve an alternate method for
requesting license modifications. The
licensee must indicate any part of its
license or license application that
would be changed or affected by a
proposed modification.
(c) Upon approval of a modification,
the FAA issues either a written approval
to the licensee or a license order
amending the license if a stated term or
condition of the license is changed,
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added, or deleted. An approval has the
full force and effect of a license order
and is part of the licensing record.
§ 450.213
Preflight reporting.
(a) Preflight reporting methods. An
operator must send the information in
this section as an email attachment to
[email protected], or other
method as agreed to by the
Administrator in the license.
(b) Mission information. A licensee
must submit to the FAA the following
mission-specific information not less
than 60 days before each mission
conducted under the license, unless the
Administrator agrees to a different time
frame in accordance with § 404.15 of
this chapter in the license, except when
the information was provided in the
license application:
(1) Payload information in accordance
with § 450.43(i); and
(2) Flight information, including the
vehicle, launch site, planned flight path,
staging and impact locations, each
payload delivery point, intended reentry
or landing sites including any
contingency abort location, and the
location of any disposed launch or
reentry vehicle stage or component that
is deorbited.
(c) Flight safety analysis products. An
operator must submit to the FAA
updated flight safety analysis products,
using previously-approved
methodologies, for each mission no less
than 30 days before flight, unless the
Administrator agrees to a different time
frame in accordance with § 404.15 of
this chapter in the license.
(1) An operator is not required to
submit the flight safety analysis
products if—
(i) The analysis submitted in the
license application satisfies all the
requirements of this section; or
(ii) The operator demonstrated during
the application process that the analysis
does not need to be updated to account
for mission-specific factors.
(2) If the operator is required to
submit the flight safety analysis
products, the operator—
(i) Must account for vehicle and
mission specific input data;
(ii) Must account for potential
variations in input data that may affect
any analysis product within the final 30
days before flight;
(iii) Must submit the analysis
products using the same format and
organization used in its license
application; and
(iv) May not change an analysis
product within the final 30 days before
flight unless the operator has a process,
approved in the license, for making a
change in that period as part of the
operator’s flight safety analysis process.
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(d) Flight safety system test data. Any
licensee that is required to use a flight
safety system to protect public safety as
required by § 450.101(c) must submit to
the FAA, or provide the FAA access to,
any test reports, in accordance with
approved flight safety system test plans,
no less than 30 days before flight, unless
the Administrator agrees to a different
time frame in accordance with § 404.15
of this chapter in the license. These
reports must include:
(1) A summary of the system,
subsystem, and component-level test
results, including all test failures and
corrective actions implemented;
(2) A summary of test results
demonstrating sufficient margin to
predicted operating environments;
(3) A comparison matrix of the actual
qualification and acceptance test levels
used for each component in each test
compared against the predicted flight
levels for each environment, including
any test tolerances allowed for each test;
and
(4) A clear identification of any
components qualified by similarity
analysis or a combination of analysis
and test.
(e) Collision avoidance analysis. In
accordance with § 450.169(f), at least 15
days before the first attempt at the flight
of a launch vehicle or the reentry of a
reentry vehicle, or at least 12 hours
prior to the beginning of a new launch
or reentry window due to a launch or
reentry delay, unless the Administrator
agrees to a different time frame in
accordance with § 404.15 of this
chapter, a licensee must submit to a
Federal entity identified by the FAA
and the FAA the collision avoidance
information in appendix A to this part.
(f) Launch or reentry schedule. A
licensee must file a launch or reentry
schedule that identifies each review,
rehearsal, and safety-critical operation.
The schedule must be filed and updated
in time to allow FAA personnel to
participate in the reviews, rehearsals,
and safety-critical operations.
§ 450.215
Post-flight reporting.
(a) An operator must submit to the
FAA the information in paragraph (b) of
this section no later than 90 days after
a launch or reentry, unless the
Administrator agrees to a different time
frame in accordance with § 404.15 of
this chapter.
(b) An operator must send the
following information as an email
attachment to [email protected],
or other method as agreed to by the
Administrator in the license:
(1) Any anomaly that occurred during
countdown or flight that is material to
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public health and safety and the safety
of property;
(2) Any corrective action
implemented or to be implemented after
the flight due to an anomaly or mishap;
(3) The number of humans on board
the vehicle;
(4) The actual trajectory flown by the
vehicle, if requested by the FAA; and
(5) For an unguided suborbital launch
vehicle, the actual impact location of all
impacting stages and impacting
components, if requested by the FAA.
§ 450.217
Registration of space objects.
(a) To assist the U.S. Government in
implementing Article IV of the 1975
Convention on Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space, each
licensee must submit to the FAA the
information required by paragraph (b) of
this section for all objects placed in
space by a licensed launch, including a
launch vehicle and any components,
except any object owned and registered
by the U.S. Government.
(b) For each object that must be
registered in accordance with this
section, not later than 30 days following
the conduct of a licensed launch, an
operator must file the following
information:
(1) The international designator of the
space object;
(2) Date and location of launch;
(3) General function of the space
object;
(4) Final orbital parameters,
including:
(i) Nodal period;
(ii) Inclination;
(iii) Apogee; and
(iv) Perigee; and
(5) Ownership, and country of
ownership, of the space object.
(c) A licensee must notify the FAA
when it removes an object that it has
previously placed in space.
§ 450.219
Records.
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(a) Except as specified in paragraph
(b) of this section, a licensee must
maintain for 3 years all records, data,
and other material necessary to verify
that a launch or reentry is conducted in
accordance with representations
contained in the licensee’s application,
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the requirements of subpart C of this
part and this subpart, and the terms and
conditions contained in the license.
(b) In the event of a class 1 or class
2 mishap, as defined in § 401.5 of this
chapter, a licensee must preserve all
records related to the event. Records
must be retained until completion of
any Federal investigation and the FAA
advises the licensee that the records
need not be retained. The licensee must
make all records required to be
maintained under the regulations
available to Federal officials for
inspection and copying.
Appendix A to Part 450—Collision
Analysis Worksheet
(a) Launch or reentry information. An
operator must file the following information:
(1) Mission name and launch location. A
mnemonic given to the launch vehicle/
payload combination identifying the launch
mission from all others. Launch site location
in latitude and longitude;
(2) Launch or reentry window. The launch
or reentry window opening and closing times
in Greenwich Mean Time (referred to as
ZULU time) and the Julian dates for each
scheduled launch or reentry attempts
including primary and secondary launch or
reentry dates;
(3) Epoch. The epoch time, in Greenwich
Mean Time (GMT), of the expected launch
vehicle liftoff time;
(4) Segment number. A segment is defined
as a launch vehicle stage or payload after the
thrusting portion of its flight has ended. This
includes the jettison or deployment of any
stage or payload. For each segment, an
operator must determine the orbital
parameters;
(5) Orbital parameters. An operator must
identify the orbital parameters for all objects
achieving orbit including the parameters for
each segment after thrust end (such as SECO–
1 and SECO–2);
(6) Orbiting objects to evaluate. An
operator must identify all orbiting object
descriptions including object name, length,
width, depth, diameter, and mass;
(7) Time of powered flight and sequence of
events. The elapsed time in hours, minutes,
and seconds, from liftoff to passivation or
disposal. The input data must include the
time of powered flight for each stage or
jettisoned component measured from liftoff;
and
(8) Point of contact. The person or office
within an operator’s organization that
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collects, analyzes, and distributes collision
avoidance analysis results.
(b) Collision avoidance analysis results
transmission medium. An operator must
identify the transmission medium, such as
voice or email, for receiving results.
(c) Deliverable schedule/need dates. An
operator must identify the times before flight,
referred to as ‘‘L-times,’’ for which the
operator requests a collision avoidance
analysis. The final collision avoidance
analysis must be used to establish flight
commit criteria for a launch.
(d) Trajectory files. Individual position and
velocity trajectory files, including:
(1) The position coordinates in the EarthFixed Greenwich (EFG) coordinates
coordinate system measured in kilometers
and the EFG velocity components measured
in kilometers per second, of each launch
vehicle stage or payload starting below 150
km through screening time frame;
(2) Radar cross section values for each
individual file;
(3) Covariance, if probability of impact
analysis option is desired; and
(4) Separate trajectory files identified by
valid window time frames, if launch or
reentry trajectory changes during launch or
reentry window.
(e) Screening. An operator must select
spherical, ellipsoidal, or collision probability
screening as defined in this paragraph (e) for
determining any conjunction:
(1) Spherical screening. Spherical
screening centers a sphere on each orbiting
object’s center-of-mass to determine any
conjunction;
(2) Ellipsoidal screening. Ellipsoidal
screening utilizes an impact exclusion
ellipsoid of revolution centered on the
orbiting object’s center-of-mass to determine
any conjunction. An operator must provide
input in the UVW coordinate system in
kilometers. The operator must provide deltaU measured in the radial-track direction,
delta-V measured in the in-track direction,
and delta-W measured in the cross-track
direction; or
(3) Probability of Collision. Collision
probability is calculated using position and
velocity information with covariance in both
position and velocity.
Issued under authority provided by 49
U.S.C. 106(f) and 51 U.S.C. chapter 509 in
Washington, DC, on March 22, 2019.
Wayne R. Monteith,
Associate Administrator, Office of
Commercial Space Transportation.
[FR Doc. 2019–05972 Filed 4–12–19; 8:45 am]
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15APP2
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