RM19-10 NOPR (Published)

Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 124 / Thursday, June 27, 2019 / Proposed Rules
(i) Other FAA AD Provisions

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:

■

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
§ 39.13

[Amended]

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding
the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):

■

Airbus SAS: Docket No. FAA–2019–0486;
Product Identifier 2019–NM–061–AD.
(a) Comments Due Date
We must receive comments by August 12,
2019.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to Airbus SAS Model
A318–112, –121, and –122; A319–111, –112,
–115, –131, –132, and –133; A320–214, –216,
–232, –233, –251N, and –271N; and A321–
211, –212, –213, –231, –232, –251N, –253N,
–271N, and –272N airplanes, certificated in
any category, as identified in European
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2019–
0069, dated March 28, 2019 (‘‘EASA AD
2019–0069’’).
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association (ATA) of
America Code 25, Equipment/furnishings.
(e) Reason
This AD was prompted by reports of
missing or loosened fasteners on connecting
brackets of overhead stowage compartments
(OHSC) and pivoting OHSC (POHSC). We are
issuing this AD to address loosening of the
OHSC or POHSC fasteners. This condition, if
not corrected, could lead to detachment of an
OHSC or POHSC, possibly resulting in injury
to airplane occupants and/or impeding egress
during an emergency evacuation.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the
compliance times specified, unless already
done.
(g) Requirements
Except as specified in paragraph (h) of this
AD: Comply with all required actions and
compliance times specified in, and in
accordance with, EASA AD 2019–0069.

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(h) Exceptions to EASA AD 2019–0069
(1) For purposes of determining
compliance with the requirements of this AD:
Where EASA AD 2019–0069 refers to its
effective date, this AD requires using the
effective date of this AD.
(2) For purposes of determining
compliance with the requirements of this AD:
Paragraph (1) of EASA AD 2019–0069 applies
to all airplanes except for airplanes identified
by paragraph (2) of EASA AD 2019–0069.
(3) The ‘‘Remarks’’ section of EASA AD
2019–0069 does not apply to this AD.

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The following provisions also apply to this
AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs): The Manager, International
Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA,
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this
AD, if requested using the procedures found
in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR
39.19, send your request to your principal
inspector or local Flight Standards District
Office, as appropriate. If sending information
directly to the International Section, send it
to the attention of the person identified in
paragraph (j)(2) of this AD. Information may
be emailed to: [email protected]. Before using any
approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal
inspector, the manager of the local flight
standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
(2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any
requirement in this AD to obtain instructions
from a manufacturer, the instructions must
be accomplished using a method approved
by the Manager, International Section,
Transport Standards Branch, FAA; or EASA;
or Airbus SAS’s EASA Design Organization
Approval (DOA). If approved by the DOA,
the approval must include the DOAauthorized signature.
(3) Required for Compliance (RC): For any
service information referenced in EASA AD
2019–0069 that contains RC procedures and
tests: Except as required by paragraph (i)(2)
of this AD, RC procedures and tests must be
done to comply with this AD; any procedures
or tests that are not identified as RC are
recommended. Those procedures and tests
that are not identified as RC may be deviated
from using accepted methods in accordance
with the operator’s maintenance or
inspection program without obtaining
approval of an AMOC, provided the
procedures and tests identified as RC can be
done and the airplane can be put back in an
airworthy condition. Any substitutions or
changes to procedures or tests identified as
RC require approval of an AMOC.
(j) Related Information
(1) For information about EASA AD 2019–
0069, contact the EASA, Konrad-AdenauerUfer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; telephone
+49 221 89990 6017; email ADs@
easa.europa.eu; Internet
www.easa.europa.eu. You may find this
EASA AD on the EASA website at https://
ad.easa.europa.eu. You may view this EASA
AD at the FAA, Transport Standards Branch,
2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For
information on the availability of this
material at the FAA, call 206–231–3195.
EASA AD 2019–0069 may be found in the
AD docket on the internet at http://
www.regulations.gov by searching for and
locating Docket No. FAA–2019–0486.
(2) For more information about this AD,
contact Sanjay Ralhan, Aerospace Engineer,
International Section, Transport Standards
Branch, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des
Moines, WA 98198; telephone and fax 206–
231–3223.

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Issued in Des Moines, Washington, on June
18, 2019.
Michael Kaszycki,
Acting Director, System Oversight Division,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2019–13420 Filed 6–26–19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
18 CFR Part 40
[Docket No. RM19–10–000]

Transmission Planning Reliability
Standard TPL–001–5
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, Department of Energy.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
AGENCY:

The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (Commission)
proposes to approve Reliability
Standard TPL–001–5 (Transmission
System Planning Performance
Requirements). The North American
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC),
the Commission-certified Electric
Reliability Organization, submitted the
proposed Reliability Standard for
Commission approval to address:
Reliability issues concerning the study
of single points of failure of protection
systems; and Commission directives
regarding planned maintenance outages
and stability analysis for spare
equipment strategy. In addition, the
Commission proposes to direct NERC to
modify the Reliability Standards to
require corrective action plans for
protection system single points of
failure in combination with a threephase fault if planning studies indicate
potential cascading.
DATES: Comments are due August 26,
2019.
SUMMARY:

Comments, identified by
docket number, may be filed in the
following ways:
• Electronic Filing through http://
www.ferc.gov. Documents created
electronically using word processing
software should be filed in native
applications or print-to-PDF format and
not in a scanned format.
• Mail/Hand Delivery: Those unable
to file electronically may mail or handdeliver comments to: Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the
Commission, 888 First Street NE,
Washington, DC 20426.
Instructions: For detailed instructions
on submitting comments and additional
information on the rulemaking process,

ADDRESSES:

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see the Comment Procedures Section of
this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Eugene Blick (Technical Information),
Office of Electric Reliability, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426,
(301) 665–1759, [email protected].
Bob Stroh (Legal Information), Office
of the General Counsel, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street
NE, Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502–
8473, [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
1. Pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of the
Federal Power Act (FPA), the
Commission proposes to approve
Reliability Standard TPL–001–5
(Transmission System Planning
Performance Requirements).1 The North
American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC), the Commissioncertified Electric Reliability
Organization (ERO), submitted proposed
Reliability Standard TPL–001–5 for
Commission approval to address:
reliability issues concerning the study of
single points of failure of protection
systems discussed in Order No. 754; and
directives from Order No. 786 regarding
planned maintenance outages and
stability analysis for spare equipment
strategy.2
2. Proposed Reliability Standard TPL–
001–5 is one of two transmission
planning Reliability Standards
containing requirements for planning
authorities and transmission planners to
develop studies of their portions of the
bulk electric system. Proposed
Reliability Standard TPL–001–5
establishes transmission system
planning performance requirements
within the planning horizon to promote
a bulk electric system that will operate
reliably over a broad spectrum of system
conditions and following a wide range
of probable contingencies. NERC states
that the revisions in the proposed
Reliability Standard are intended to
enhance requirements for the study of
protection system single points of
failure.3
3. Proposed Reliability Standard TPL–
001–5 requires each planning authority
and transmission planner to perform an
annual planning assessment of its
portion of the bulk electric system
considering a number of system
1 16

U.S.C. 824o(d)(2) (2012).
of Transmission Planning
Reliability Standard Order No. 754, 136 FERC ¶
61,186 at P 19 (2011); Transmission Planning
Reliability Standards, Order No. 786, 145 FERC ¶
61,051, at PP 40, 89 (2013).
3 A protection system ‘‘single point of failure’’
refers to a non-redundant component of a
protection system that, if it failed, would affect
normal clearing of faults. NERC Petition at 4.
2 Interpretation

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conditions and contingencies. The
proposed Reliability Standard employs
a risk-based approach to the study of
contingencies and the types of
corrective action that are required if the
entity’s system cannot meet the
specified performance requirements.4
For scenarios considered to be more
commonplace (i.e., planning events), the
planning entity must develop a
corrective action plan if it determines
through studies that its system would
experience performance issues. For the
scenarios considered to be less
commonplace, but which could result in
potentially severe impacts such as
cascading (i.e., extreme events), the
planning entity must conduct a
comprehensive analysis to understand
both the potential impacts on its system
and the types of actions that could
reduce or mitigate those impacts.5
4. Proposed Reliability Standard TPL–
001–5 contains revisions to both the
planning event (Category P5) and
extreme events (Stability 2.a–h)—
identified in Table 1 (Steady State and
Stability Performance Planning Events
and Steady State and Stability
Performance Extreme Events) and the
associated footnote 13—to provide for
more comprehensive study of the
potential impacts of protection system
single points of failure.6 Planning
entities would be required to take
action, consistent with currentlyeffective Reliability Standard TPL–001–
4 requirements, to address system
performance issues identified as a result
of these studies. Additionally, the
proposed Reliability Standard addresses
the two Commission directives in Order
No. 786. Accordingly, pursuant to
section 215(d)(2) of the FPA, the
Commission proposes to approve
proposed Reliability Standard TPL–
001–5 because it is responsive to the
Commission’s directives and improves
4 NERC defines ‘‘Corrective Action Plan’’ as, ‘‘A
list of actions and an associated timetable for
implementation to remedy a specific problem.’’
Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability
Standards (May 13, 2019) (NERC Glossary).
5 NERC defines ‘‘Cascading’’ as, ‘‘The
uncontrolled successive loss of System Elements
triggered by an incident at any location. Cascading
results in widespread electric service interruption
that cannot be restrained from sequentially
spreading beyond an area predetermined by
studies.’’ NERC Glossary.
6 Proposed Reliability Standard TPL–001–5
includes an expanded list of protection system
components for single points of failure studies. The
selected list of components account for: (1) Those
failed non-redundant components of a protection
system that may impact one or more protection
systems; (2) the duration that faults remain
energized until delayed fault clearing; and (3) the
additional system equipment removed from service
following fault clearing depending on the specific
failed non-redundant component of a protection
system. NERC Petition at 16.

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upon the currently-effective Reliability
Standard by enhancing requirements for
the study of protection system single
points of failure.
5. Non-redundant protection systems
can also misoperate when faced with a
three-phase fault. Because three-phase
faults are more serious than singlephase-to-ground faults, the
consequences can be more severe,
including cascading. However, rather
than require a corrective action plan to
address such events, proposed
Reliability Standard TPL–001–5 only
requires an evaluation of possible
actions designed to reduce the
likelihood or mitigate their
consequences and adverse impacts.7
NERC has not adequately justified
categorizing protection system single
points of failure in combination with a
three-phase fault as an ‘‘extreme event’’
that only requires study, but not a
corrective action plan, when there is the
potential for cascading. We are not
persuaded that such events do not
necessitate corrective action plans
because of their alleged rarity,
particularly because their potential
impacts may result in cascading. Thus,
pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the
FPA, we also propose to direct that
NERC develop modifications to the
Reliability Standards to require
corrective action plans for protection
system single points of failure in
combination with three-phase faults if
planning studies indicate potential
cascading.8
I. Background
A. Section 215 and Mandatory
Reliability Standards
6. Section 215 of the FPA requires a
Commission-certified ERO to develop
mandatory and enforceable Reliability
Standards, subject to Commission
review and approval. Reliability
Standards may be enforced by the ERO,
subject to Commission oversight, or by
the Commission independently.9
Pursuant to section 215 of the FPA, the
Commission established a process to

7 NERC, Informational Filing, Docket No. RM10–
06–000, at 10 (filed March 15, 2012) (2012
Informational Filing). A three-phase fault can
originate as a single-line-to-ground (SLG) fault as ‘‘it
is not uncommon for a SLG fault to evolve to a
multi-phase fault.’’ Id.
8 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(5).
9 Id. 824o(e).

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select and certify an ERO,10 and
subsequently certified NERC.11

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B. Order No. 754
7. In Order No. 754, which approved
an interpretation of Reliability Standard
TPL–002–0, Requirement R1.3.10, the
Commission determined that ‘‘there
may be a system protection issue that
merits further exploration by technical
experts’’ and that there is ‘‘an issue
concerning the study of the
non-operation of non-redundant
primary protection systems; e.g., the
study of a single point of failure on
protection systems.’’ 12 To address this
concern, the Commission directed
‘‘Commission staff to meet with NERC
and its appropriate subject matter
experts to explore the reliability
concern, including where it can best be
addressed, and identify any additional
actions necessary to address the
matter.’’ 13 The Commission also
directed NERC ‘‘to make an
informational filing . . . explaining
whether there is a further system
protection issue that needs to be
addressed and, if so, what forum and
process should be used to address that
issue and what priority it should be
accorded relative to other reliability
initiatives planned by NERC.’’ 14
8. In October 2011, Commission staff
hosted a technical conference on single
points of failure, which resulted in four
consensus points and the following
problem statement: ‘‘The group
perceives a reliability concern regarding
the comprehensive assessment of
potential protection system failures by
registered entities. The group agrees on
the need to study if a [reliability] gap
exists regarding the study and
resolution of a single point of failure on
protection systems.’’ 15 One outcome of
the 2011 technical conference, as
described in the 2012 Informational
Filing, was that NERC would issue a
data request to aid in assessing whether
single points of failure in protection
systems pose a reliability concern. To
that end, the NERC Board of Trustees
subsequently approved a request for
10 Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric
Reliability Organization; and Procedures for the
Establishment, Approval, and Enforcement of
Electric Reliability Standards, Order No. 672, 114
FERC ¶ 61,104, order on reh’g, Order No. 672–A,
114 FERC ¶ 61,328 (2006).
11 North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116
FERC ¶ 61,062, order on reh’g and compliance, 117
FERC ¶ 61,126 (2006), aff’d sub nom. Alcoa, Inc. v.
FERC, 564 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
12 Order No. 754, 136 FERC ¶ 61,186 at P 19.
13 Id. P 20.
14 Id.
15 NERC, Order No. 754 Single Point of Failure
Technical Meeting Notes at 8 (October 24–25,
2011).

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data under the NERC Rules of
Procedure.16 Over the next two years,
NERC collected data from transmission
planners. Using the collected data, two
subcommittees of the NERC Planning
Committee, the System Protection and
Control Subcommittee (SPCS) and the
System Analysis and Modeling
Subcommittee (SAMS), conducted an
assessment of protection system single
points of failure. The study examined in
detail the protection systems related to
nearly 4,000 buses. The findings were
presented in a September 2015 report
that concluded that single points of
failure on protection systems posed a
reliability risk that warranted further
action.17 The SPCS/SAMS Report
recommended, after considering a
variety of alternatives, that NERC
modify Reliability Standard TPL–001–4
to best align with the Order No. 754
directives and maximize reliability of
protection system performance. In
particular, the SPCS/SAMS Report
recommended that three-phase faults
involving protection system failures be
assessed as an extreme event in
Reliability Standard TPL–001–4, as
follows:
Additional emphasis in planning studies
should be placed on assessment of
three-phase faults involving protection
system single points of failure. This concern
(the study of protection system single points
of failure) is appropriately addressed as an
extreme event in TPL–001–4 Part 4.5. From
TPL–001–4, Part 4.5: If the analysis
concludes there is Cascading caused by the
occurrence of extreme events, an evaluation
of possible actions designed to reduce the
likelihood or mitigate the consequences and
adverse impacts of the event(s) shall be
conducted.18

C. Order No. 786
9. In Order No. 786, the Commission
approved the currently-effective version
of the transmission system planning
standard, Reliability Standard TPL–
001–4. In that Order, the Commission
also issued several directives to NERC,
including two relating to future
standard modifications that are
addressed in proposed Reliability
Standard TPL–001–5. First, the
Commission expressed concern that the
six-month outage duration threshold in
Reliability Standard TPL–001–4,
Requirement R1 could exclude planned
16 2012 NERC Informational Filing at 7 (stating
that the data request ‘‘is based on an approach that
utilizes . . . a three-phase (3;) fault and assesses
simulated system performance against performance
measures’’).
17 NERC, Order No. 754 Assessment of Protection
System Single Points of Failure Based on the
Section 1600 Data Request at 11 (September 2015)
(SPCS/SAMS Report).
18 Id.

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maintenance outages of significant
facilities from future planning
assessments.19 The Commission
determined that planned maintenance
outages of less than six months in
duration may result in relevant impacts
during one or both of the seasonal offpeak periods, and that prudent
transmission planning should consider
maintenance outages at those load levels
when planned outages are performed to
allow for a single element to be taken
out of service for maintenance without
compromising the ability of the system
to meet demand without loss of load.
The Commission further determined
that a properly planned transmission
system should ensure the known,
planned removal of facilities (i.e.,
generation, transmission or protection
system facilities) for maintenance
purposes without the loss of
nonconsequential load or detrimental
impacts to system reliability such as
cascading, voltage instability or
uncontrolled islanding. The
Commission directed NERC to modify
the Reliability Standards to address this
concern.
10. Second, while stating that NERC
had met the Commission’s Order No.
693 directive to include a spare
equipment strategy for steady state
analysis in Reliability Standard TPL–
001–4, the Commission determined that
a spare equipment strategy for stability
analysis was not addressed in the
standard. The Commission stated that a
similar spare equipment strategy for
stability analysis should exist that
requires studies to be performed for P0,
P1, and P2 categories with the
conditions that the system is expected
to experience during the possible
unavailability of the long lead time
equipment. Rather than direct a change
at that time, however, the Commission
directed NERC to consider the issue
during the next review cycle of
Reliability Standard TPL–001–4.20
D. NERC Petition and Proposed
Reliability Standard TPL–001–5
11. On December 7, 2018, NERC
submitted proposed Reliability Standard
TPL–001–5 for Commission approval.21
NERC maintains that the proposed
Reliability Standard addresses potential
system contingencies including the
protection system single point of failure
issue and Order No. 786 directives.
19 Order

No. 786, 145 FERC ¶ 61,051 at PP 40–45.
PP 88–89.
21 Proposed Reliability Standard TPL–001–5 is
not attached to this notice of proposed rulemaking
(NOPR). The proposed Reliability Standard is
available on the Commission’s eLibrary document
retrieval system in Docket No. RM19–10–000 and
on the NERC website, www.nerc.com.
20 Id.

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With regard to protection system single
points of failure, NERC indicates that
Table 1 of the proposed Reliability
Standard describes system performance
requirements for a range of potential
system contingencies required to be
evaluated by the planner. Table 1
includes three parts: (1) Steady State &
Stability Performance Planning Events,
(2) Steady State & Stability Performance
Extreme Events, and (3) Steady State &
Stability Performance Footnotes. Table 1
describes system performance
requirements for a range of potential
system contingencies required to be
evaluated by the planner. The table
categorizes the events as either
‘‘planning events’’ or ‘‘extreme events.’’
The table lists seven contingency
planning events (P1 through P7) that
require steady-state and stability
analysis as well as five extreme event
contingencies: three for steady-state and
two for stability. NERC asserts that
proposed Reliability Standard TPL–
001–5 also includes certain
modifications to better ensure that
planning entities are performing a more
complete analysis of potential
protection system single points of
failure on their systems and taking
appropriate action to address these
concerns. NERC explains that the
proposed Reliability Standard contains
revisions to both the Table 1 planning
event (Category P5) and extreme events
(Stability 2.a–h) and the associated
footnote 13 to provide for more
comprehensive study of the potential
impacts of protection system single
points of failure.
12. NERC states that if the study of a
protection system single point of failure
for a single-line-to-ground fault (i.e.,
Category P5 event) results in cascading,
a corrective action plan is required.22
NERC considers this a relatively
commonplace scenario, and it explains
that an entity would be required to
develop a corrective action plan if it
determines that its system would be
unable to meet the performance
requirements of Table 1 for the Category
P5 event.
13. In contrast, NERC proposes
revisions to Table 1 to include the study
of a protection system single point of
failure in combination with a threephase fault as an extreme event, which
does not require a corrective action
plan. NERC avers in its petition that the
22 Proposed TPL–001–5 Reliability Standard,
Table 1 (Steady State and Stability Performance
Planning Events), Category P5 requires the study of
a single-line-to-ground faulted element (e.g.,
generator, transmission circuit or transformer) along
with a failure to operate of a non-redundant
component of the protection system (i.e., a single
point of failure) protecting the faulted element.

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three-phase fault scenario is much rarer
(compared to the single-line-to-ground
fault). According to NERC, like the other
extreme events in the proposed
Reliability Standard, this scenario,
while rare, could result in more
significant impacts to an entity’s
system.23 Under this approach, NERC
asserts that, if an entity determines that
its system will experience cascading as
a result of a three-phase fault scenario,
an evaluation of possible actions
designed to reduce the likelihood or
mitigate the consequences of the event
will be conducted but a corrective
action plan is not required.
14. Based on a historical analysis of
NERC data on protection system
misoperations, NERC asserts that the
expected likelihood of a three-phase
fault event occurring and resulting in
the most severe impacts would be small.
NERC states that it reviewed over 12,000
protection system misoperations in its
Misoperation Information Data Analysis
System (MIDAS) database reported
since 2011, of which only 28 involved
three-phase faults. Of those, NERC states
that 10 involved breakers that failed to
operate, and the remaining 18 involved
breakers that were slow to operate.24
NERC explains that a failure to operate
potentially indicates instances of a
protection system single point of failure.
While the potential for severe impacts
from such events remains, NERC states
that none of the 10 failure to trip
scenarios reported since 2011 resulted
in events that reached the threshold for
reporting under Reliability Standard
EOP–004 (Event Reporting).25 With
23 See Mandatory Reliability Standards for the
Bulk-Power System, Order No. 693, 118 FERC
¶ 61,218, at P 1826, order on reh’g, Order No. 693–
A, 120 FERC ¶ 61,053 (2007) (describing extreme
events as ‘‘events resulting in loss of two or more
elements or Cascading’’ that do not require a
corrective action plan rather than assigning a
quantitative probability to the event).
24 NERC Petition at 26, n.55 (‘‘The ERO began to
collect misoperations data in a common format
beginning in 2011. Applicable entities are currently
required to report information on Protection System
misoperations to NERC pursuant to a request for
data or information under Section 1600 of the NERC
Rules of Procedure approved by the NERC Board of
Trustees on August 14, 2014. Previously, the PRC–
004 standard contained requirements for
misoperation reporting.’’); see also North American
Electric Reliability Corp., 151 FERC ¶ 61,129, at P
6 (2015) (‘‘PRC–004–3, and the parallel Section
1600 Data Request provides means to accomplish
this systematic analysis and correction’’).
25 Reliability Standard EOP–004–3 (Event
Reporting), Attachment 1: Reportable Events,
contains a list of various thresholds for reporting
certain events to NERC. Examples of reporting
thresholds include: Loss of firm load for 15 minutes
or more if 300 MW or greater for entities with a
previous year’s demand of at least 3,000 MW, or
200 MW or greater for all other entities, and total
generation loss within one minute 2,000 MW or
greater for entities in the Eastern or Western

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regard to the Order No. 786 directives,
NERC states that proposed Reliability
Standard TPL–001–5 provides for a
more complete consideration of factors
for selecting which known outages will
be included in near-term transmission
planning horizon studies.
II. Discussion
15. Pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of
the FPA, the Commission proposes to
approve proposed Reliability Standard
TPL–001–5 as just, reasonable, not
unduly discriminatory or preferential,
and in the public interest. The proposed
Reliability Standard will improve BulkPower System reliability by requiring
enhanced transmission system planning
with regard to the study of protection
system single points of failure in
combination with a single-line-toground fault, as discussed in Order No.
754. The Commission also proposes to
approve the associated violation risk
factors, violation severity levels and
implementation plan.
16. With respect to the Order No. 786
directives, regarding planned
maintenance outages and stability
analysis for spare equipment strategy,
the Commission proposes to determine
that the revisions satisfy the directives.
First, proposed Reliability Standard
TPL–001–5 provides for a more
complete consideration of factors for
selecting which known outages will be
included in near-term transmission
planning horizon studies. In particular,
the modifications reflected in proposed
Reliability Standard TPL–001–5 address
the Commission’s concern that the
exclusion of known outages of less than
six months in currently-effective
Reliability Standard TPL–001–4 could
result in outages of significant facilities
not being studied. Second, the proposed
Reliability Standard modifies
requirements for stability analysis to
require an entity to assess the impact of
the possible unavailability of long lead
time equipment, consistent with the
entity’s spare equipment strategy.
17. In addition, the Commission,
pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the
FPA, proposes to direct that NERC
develop modifications to the Reliability
Standards because certain protection
system single points of failure may not
be fully addressed even with the
implementation of proposed Reliability
Standard TPL–001–5. As discussed
below, the Commission is concerned
that the proposed Reliability Standard
does not require responsible entities to
develop corrective action plans to
address protection system single points
Interconnection, or 1,000 MW for entities in the
ERCOT or Quebec Interconnection.

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of failure in combination with a threephase fault if planning studies indicate
potential cascading. Accordingly, the
Commission proposes to direct that
NERC develop modifications to the
Reliability Standards to require
corrective action plans for protection
system single points of failure in
combination with three-phase faults if
planning studies indicate potential
cascading.
A. The Record Indicates There Is a
Reliability Gap for a Protection System
Single Point of Failure in Combination
With a Three-Phase Fault
18. While protection system single
points of failure in combination with a
three-phase fault must be studied under
the proposed Reliability Standard to
determine the impact of failure, the
Commission believes that the record
may not support NERC’s contention that
corrective action plans should not be
required even when studies of the event
indicate the potential for cascading.
Specifically, NERC asserts that
protection system single points of
failure in combination with a threephase fault is an extreme event that does
not require a corrective action plan,
even in cases where the study results
indicate potential cascading. NERC
claims that protection system single
points of failure in combination with a
three-phase fault are rare and, ‘‘[l]ike all
of the ‘extreme events’ scenarios in this
[TPL–001 Standard risk-based]
framework, the impacts of a protection
system single point of failure in
combination with a three phase fault
could be severe in some cases, but are
very unlikely.’’ 26 Based on the present
record, it is unclear whether such
contingencies are as rare as NERC
maintains.
19. A 2009 NERC Industry Advisory
reported three system disturbances that
occurred during a five-year period that
were initiated by a protection system
single point of failure in combination
with a single-line-to-ground fault.27
According to the Industry Advisory and
supporting documentation, all three
events evolved into either a multi-phase
fault or a three-phase fault with
cascading.28 Moreover, in the 2012
Informational Filing, NERC reported
that it is not uncommon for a singleline-to-ground fault to evolve into a
multi-phase fault, and NERC stated that
studies solely on single-line-to-ground
26 NERC

Petition at 26.
27 NERC, Industry Advisory: Protection System
Single Point of Failure (March 30, 2009) (2009
NERC Industry Advisory).
28 Id. at 2 (‘‘Three system disturbances were
caused by failure of a single component (lockout or
auxiliary relay) of a protection system.’’).

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faults may understate the reliability risk
of single points of failure of protection
systems.29 As mentioned below, the
NERC standard drafting team pointed to
the likelihood of a single-line-to-ground
fault evolving into a multi-phase fault
when responding to stakeholder
comments that a single-line-to-ground
fault was a rare event.
20. NERC indicates that it reviewed
over 12,000 protection system
misoperations and determined that only
28 involved three-phase faults from
2011 through 2018. However that
averages to approximately one threephase fault event every three months.
NERC, moreover, indicates that ten of
those 28 misoperations involved
breakers that failed to operate that could
reasonably be assumed to be
representative of protection system
single points of failure, which averages
to about one event every 8 months.30
Although we recognize that three-phase
faults constitute a relatively small
subset of all protection system
operations, under the following measure
of one protection system single point of
failure every 8 months, the occurrence
of three-phase faults with misoperations
could reasonably be viewed as regular
occurrences. Thus, based on the
information currently before us, we are
not persuaded by NERC’s analysis that
three-phase faults are rare events that
should be categorized with other
extreme events in proposed Reliability
Standard TPL–001–5 and should be
studied but not have corrective action
plans.
21. The record of development for
proposed Reliability Standard TPL–
001–5 also supports our concerns with
the absence of a corrective action plan
requirement. The development record
evidences a standard drafting team
repeatedly expressing concerns
regarding the reliability risks of threephase faults involving protection system
single points of failure. Indeed, the
standard drafting team evaluated and
initially adopted more robust options to
mitigate protection system single points
of failure in combination with threephase faults if studies indicated
cascading, including requiring a
corrective action plan or some variation
of a corrective action plan.
29 2012 NERC Informational Filing at 3, 10
(‘‘identif[ying] five events between 2004 and 2010
in which a single point of failure on a protection
system caused, in whole or in part, an event on the
Bulk-Power System . . .’’).
30 NERC Petition at 26–27. NERC stated that none
of the ten failure to trip scenarios reached the
threshold for reporting under Reliability Standard
EOP–004. Although NERC did not offer further
explanation, system conditions such as off-peak
load conditions could have contributed to whether
Reliability Standard EOP–004 thresholds were met.

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22. In the first draft of proposed
Reliability Standard TPL–001–5, the
standard drafting team included a draft
requirement (Requirement R4.6) that
would have addressed protection
system single points of failure in
combination with a three-phase fault,
including a specific requirement for the
development of a corrective action
plan.31 After reviewing the unofficial
comments on the proposal, the standard
drafting team provided the following
response:
The [standard drafting team (SDT)]
recognized that the industry comments . . .
were particularly negative. The SDT would
like to address the most common comment
received: Requiring Corrective Action Plans
as part of Requirement R4.6 goes beyond the
scope of the SAR, was not part of the
recommendations from the SPCS/SAMS
report titled ‘‘Order No. 754 Assessment of
Protection System Single Points of Failure
Based on the Section 1600 Data Request’’,
and/or is not justifiable given the low
likelihood of occurrence. . . . While it is
clear that a [single point of failure (SPF)] for
a Protection System component may lead to
significantly longer Delayed Clearing and
notably worse system response than typically
analyzed breaker failure conditions, the
industry has indicated that the probability of
simultaneous SPF occurrence with a bolted
three-phase fault is low. Therefore the SDT
has restored the assessment of SPF for a
Protection System component with a threephase fault to language consistent with TPL–
001–4 Requirement 4.5.32

While the standard drafting team
agreed to remove the corrective action
plan provision in response to the
stakeholder comments, the following
language from the standard drafting
team’s response stressed the reliability
concerns posed by protection system
single points of failure in combination
with a three-phase fault, and suggested
that the related risks are
‘‘underappreciated’’:
The SPF for a Protection System
component is an important topic that, the
SDT believes, may involve risks that are
underappreciated. The SDT considered using
Corrective Action Plan changes in proposed
Requirement 4.6 or a new Table 1 Planning
Events Category P8 to emphasize the
importance of this issue, but given the
industry comments and lack of a FERC
directive did not ‘‘raise the bar’’ at this time.
The SDT would like to document an
important considerations (sic) it considered,
that the fault conditions and system
performance requirement, referred to as
Performance Measure, of the Order 754 data
31 NERC Petition, Ex. G (Summary of
Development and Complete Record of
Development) at page 372–373 of pdf (‘‘If the
analysis concludes there is Cascading caused by the
occurrence of Table 1 extreme events listed in the
stability column for events 2e–2h, a Corrective
Action Plan shall be developed.’’).
32 Id. at page 810 of pdf.

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request were very similar to those of Extreme
Events of TPL–001–4 Table 1, namely threephase fault application and conditions that
can indicate Cascading. The primary
conclusive finding of the SPCS/SAMS report
was: ‘‘analysis of the data demonstrates the
existence of a reliability risk associated with
single points of failure in protection systems
that warrants further action.’’ Further, the
SPCS/SAMS report concluded that:
‘‘additional emphasis in planning studies
should be placed on assessment of threephase faults involving protection system
single points of failure.’’ 33

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The standard drafting team’s above
response acknowledged the importance
of a corrective action plan and noted
conclusive findings of the SPCS/SAMS
report that the reliability risk associated
with protection system single points of
failure warrants further action. The
standard drafting team, nonetheless,
indicated that ‘‘lacking a FERC
directive’’ it would remove the
corrective action plan provision.
23. The standard drafting team then
developed a second draft of proposed
Reliability Standard TPL–001–5. The
second draft did not require a corrective
action plan by name. Rather, the
standard drafting team developed and
submitted for ballot a new provision
requiring that, when system studies
show that a protection system single
points of failure in combination with a
three-phase fault results in system
cascading, the entity must take specific
actions, namely ‘‘listing system
deficiencies, the associated actions
needed to prevent the system from
Cascading and the associated timetable
for implementation.’’ 34 Further, the
proposed provision would require
follow-up in annual planning
assessments for ‘‘continued validity and
implementation status.’’
24. The standard drafting team
developed a technical rationale
document that accompanied the second
draft of the proposed Reliability
Standard.35 In the draft technical
rationale document, the standard
drafting team explained the technical
basis for draft Requirement R4.2.2:
Given the risk to BES reliability, additional
emphasis in planning studies should be
placed on assessment of three-phase faults
involving Protection System SPF. This
concern (the study of Protection System SPF)
is appropriately addressed as an extreme
event in TPL–001–4, Requirement R4, Part
4.2. While less probable than single-phase-toground faults, three-phase faults typically
initiate as single-phase-to-ground and often
evolve into three-phase faults, leading to
Delayed Fault Clearing scenarios more severe
33 Id.
34 Id. at page 824 of pdf (proposed Requirement
4.2.2).
35 Id. at page 942 of pdf.

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than the Table 1 P5 event. Therefore, TPL–
001–4, Requirement R4, Part 4.5, which
specifies that an evaluation of possible
mitigating actions be conducted if analysis
concludes there is cascading caused by the
occurrence of this extreme event, is
inadequate to address the risk of Protection
System component SPF to the reliability of
the BES.36

Again, the standard drafting team
expressed its concerns regarding the
reliability risks associated with a
protection system single point of failure
in combination with a three-phase fault.
The standard drafting team addressed
the stakeholder comments regarding the
perceived low risk of such conditions by
pointing out that ‘‘[w]hile less probable
than single-phase-to-ground faults,
three-phase faults typically initiate as
single-phase-to-ground and often evolve
into three-phase faults, leading to
Delayed Fault Clearing scenarios more
severe than the Table 1 P5 event.’’ 37
Further, the standard drafting team
noted the inadequacy of simply
conducting an ‘‘evaluation’’ as set forth
in the relevant provision of the current
Reliability Standard.38
25. The standard drafting team
developed a third draft of the proposed
Reliability Standard. This third draft
removed the more robust provision
(proposed Requirement R4.2.2) in favor
of the currently proposed language in
Requirement 4.2, which requires that
‘‘[i]f the analysis concludes there is
Cascading caused by the occurrence of
extreme events, an evaluation of
possible actions designed to reduce the
likelihood or mitigate the consequences
of the event(s) shall be conducted.’’
Significantly, however, in the draft
technical rationale document associated
with the second draft of the proposed
Reliability Standard, the standard
drafting team stated that merely
requiring that ‘‘an evaluation of possible
mitigating actions be conducted if
analysis concludes there is cascading
caused by the occurrence of this
extreme event, is inadequate to address
the risk of Protection System component
SPF to the reliability of the BES.’’ 39
26. The standard development history
discussed above therefore supports our
concern that there is a potential
reliability gap with respect to the
proposed Reliability Standard’s
treatment of protection system single
36 Id.

at page 950–951 of pdf (emphasis added).

37 Id.
38 The second draft of Reliability Standard TPL–
001–5, was voted down by stakeholders, with
stakeholders suggesting the removal of Requirement
R4.2.2 again suggesting that three-phase fault
followed by a protection failure is a low probability
event. Id. at page 1327 of pdf.
39 Id. at page 951 of pdf (emphasis added).

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points of failure in combination with a
three-phase fault.40
B. Commission Proposal
27. The Commission, pursuant to
section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, proposes
to direct that NERC develop
modifications to require corrective
action plans for protection system single
points of failure in combination with
three-phase faults if planning studies
indicate potential cascading. While we
do not propose to prescribe how NERC
should respond to the proposed
directive, we discuss below certain
possible alternatives.
28. NERC could address the proposed
directive by modifying the current
Category P5 proposal for single-line-toground faults (that already includes a P5
corrective action plan) to include
language, such as, a footnote stating that
the simulation of Delayed Fault Clearing
must consider that a single-line-toground faulted condition may evolve to
all three-phases before protection
system action operates to clear the fault.
Alternatively, NERC could modify the
Reliability Standard to have a new
Category planning event that would
require a corrective action plan for the
study of a protection system single point
of failure in combination with a threephase fault if the study indicates
cascading.41
29. In addition, we recognize that
during the standard drafting process for
proposed Reliability Standard TPL–
001–5 some stakeholders were
concerned with incurring significant
costs to mitigate protection system
single points of failure in combination
with a three-phase fault, while others
stated that such actions do not usually
incur significant costs.42 While we are
aware of the potential for increased cost
under this proposal, we understand that
there are likely cost-effective actions
that could be taken to mitigate a
protection system single point of failure
in combination with a three-phase fault.
40 The standard development record indicates
several stakeholder comments in support of a
corrective action plan requirement for protection
system single points of failure in combination with
a three-phase fault that was proposed in the third
draft. For example, one commenter suggested ‘‘the
best way to achieve this [corrective action plan]
requirement is through the creation of a P8 [new
category planning event] contingency rather than
extreme events.’’ Another commenter stated it
‘‘does not believe though that the language . . .
goes far enough . . . and believes a corrective
action plan should be required.’’ Id. at pages 2283,
2291, 2415, and 2424 of pdf.
41 See id. at page 1506 and 1746 of pdf.
42 See, e.g., id. at page 1016 (Seattle City Light),
1019 (Arizona Public Service), 1044 (Northeast
Power Coordinating Council), 1048 (Eversource
Energy), 1331 and 1333 (Standard Drafting Team
Response to Commenters) of pdf.

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For example, a corrective action plan to
eliminate a single point of failure of
protection system could add a
redundant lockout relay in the control
circuitry of a protection system, which
would eliminate occurrence of those
events reported in the 2009 NERC
Industry Advisory.43 As another option,
an entity could add control center
monitoring and reporting functions to a
DC battery bank or to a communication
system of a communication-aided
protection scheme so that system
operators are aware of their failure.44 To
better understand the potential for
increased costs and other
implementation issues, the Commission
seeks comment on how many corrective
action plans are expected for protection
system single points of failure in
combination with a three-phase fault if
study results indicate cascading.
30. To ensure no delay and to align
the effective date of the proposed
directive with the current
implementation plan of proposed
Reliability Standard TPL–001–5, the
Commission proposes to direct that

NERC address the directive within one
year of the effective date of a final
rule.45 The Commission seeks
comments on its proposals.
III. Information Collection Statement
31. The FERC–725N information
collection requirements contained in
this notice of proposed rulemaking are
subject to review by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) under
section 3507(d) of the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995.46 OMB’s
regulations require approval of certain
information collection requirements
imposed by agency rules.47 Upon
approval of a collection of information,
OMB will assign an OMB control
number and expiration date.
Respondents subject to the filing
requirements of this rule will not be
penalized for failing to respond to these
collections of information unless the
collections of information display a
valid OMB control number. The
Commission solicits comments on the
Commission’s need for this information,
whether the information will have
practical utility, the accuracy of the

burden estimates, ways to enhance the
quality, utility, and clarity of the
information to be collected or retained,
and any suggested methods for
minimizing respondents’ burden,
including the use of automated
information techniques.
32. The Commission bases its
paperwork burden estimates on the
changes in paperwork burden presented
by proposed Reliability Standard TPL–
001–5. The NERC Compliance Registry,
as of May 10, 2019, identifies
approximately 144 planning
coordinators and transmission planners
in the United States that are subject to
mandatory compliance with this
proposed Regulatory Standard. Of the
144 entities 62 of the entities are
registered as both transmission planners
and planning coordinators. The register
indicates there are seven entities
registered as planning coordinators and
137 entities registered as transmission
planners.
33. Burden Estimate: 48 The estimated
burden and cost for the requirements
contained in this proposed rule follows:

RM19–10–000 NOPR—FERC–725N
[Mandatory reliability standards: Reliability standard TPL–001–5]

Areas of modification

Single Point of Failure (onetime).

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Spare Equipment Strategy
(one-time).

Number of
respondents

Annual
number of
responses 49
per
espondent

Total
number of
responses

Average burden & cost per
response 50

Total annual burden hours &
total annual cost

(1)

(2)

(1) * (2) = (3)

(4)

(3) * (4) = (5)

51 206

(PC/TP)

1

206

206 (PC/TP)

1

206

43 NERC Petition at 20 (‘‘most, if not all,
constituent parts of the control circuitry are
generally unmonitored, may fail, and may remain
undetected until periodic testing is conducted. This
is particularly significant for non-redundant
auxiliary relays or lockout relays within the control
circuitry because they may be used for multiple
functions. . . .’’). In addition, the standard drafting
team stated that ‘‘[i]t is emphasized that Footnote
13 does not prescribe any level of redundancy
. . . . If, after proper consideration and simulation,
required System performance is achieved, then
there may be no impetus to make non-redundant
components of a Protection System redundant. On
the other hand, after proper consideration and
simulation it is demonstrated that required System
performance is not achieved, making nonredundant components of a Protection System
redundant may be but one of many alternatives for
corrective actions to obtain required System
performance.’’ Id., Ex. G at page 162 of pdf.
44 NERC Petition at 18–19 (stating that ‘‘[f]ootnote
13 provides that certain non-redundant components
that are both monitored and reported at a Control
Center would not need to be considered as part of
planning studies. This includes the
communications systems identified in footnote

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16 hrs. (reporting: 12 hrs.;
recordkeeping: 4 hrs.);
$880.
4 hrs. (reporting: 2 hrs.; recordkeeping: 2 hrs.); $220.

13.b. The standard drafting team considered that
the monitoring and reporting of a non-redundant
component to a centralized location (i.e., the
Control Center) would facilitate prompt
identification and correction of abnormal
conditions to minimize the exposure to and
consequence of the failed component . . . Similar
to footnote 13.b, monitoring and reporting the status
of the DC supply to a centralized location [i.e.,
footnote 13.c] can be considered a sufficient
alternative to physical redundancy if the result is
prompt notification and remediation which
minimizes the exposure to and consequence of DC
supply failure’’).
45 NERC Petition, Exhibit B (Implementation
Plan) at 2.
46 44 U.S.C. 3507(d) (2012).
47 5 CFR 1320.11 (2018).
48 ‘‘Burden’’ is the total time, effort, or financial
resources expended by persons to generate,
maintain, retain, or disclose or provide information
to or for a Federal agency. For further explanation
of what is included in the information collection
burden, refer to 5 CFR 1320.3.
49 We consider the filing of an application to be
a ‘‘response.’’

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3,296 hrs; $181,280.

824 hrs; $45,320.

50 Hourly costs are based on the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) figures for May 2017 (Sector 22,
Utilities) for wages (https://www.bls.gov/oes/
current/naics2_22.htm) and benefits for December
2019 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/
ecec.nr0.htm). We estimate that an Office and
Administrative Support (Occupation code: 43–
0000) would perform the functions associated with
recordkeeping requirements, at an average hourly
cost (for wages and benefits) of $41.34. The
functions associated with reporting requirements,
we estimate, would be performed by an Electrical
Engineer (Occupation code: 17–2051) at an average
hourly cost of $68.10 including wages and benefits.
These occupational categories’ wage figures are
averaged and weighted equally as follows: ($41.34
hour + 68.10 hour) ÷ 2 = $54.72/hour. The resulting
wage figure is rounded to $55.00/hour for use in
calculating wage figures in the NOPR in Docket No.
RM19–10–000.
51 Entity count based on May 10, 2019 NERC
Registration: 7 entities register as Planning
Coordinators (PC), 137 entities register as
Transmission Planners (TP), and 62 entities register
as both PCs and TPs.

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RM19–10–000 NOPR—FERC–725N—Continued
[Mandatory reliability standards: Reliability standard TPL–001–5]

Areas of modification

Plan Maintenance Outage
(one-time).

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Total ...............................

Number of
respondents

Annual
number of
responses 49
per
espondent

Total
number of
responses

Average burden & cost per
response 50

Total annual burden hours &
total annual cost

(1)

(2)

(1) * (2) = (3)

(4)

(3) * (4) = (5)

206 (PC/TP)

1

206

16 hrs. (reporting: 12 hrs.;
recordkeeping: 4 hrs.)
$880.

3,296 hrs; $181,280.

........................

........................

618

...............................................

7,416 hrs; $407,880.

This notice of proposed rulemaking
will not significantly change existing
burdens on an ongoing basis. The
Commission estimates a one-time
burden increase for Year 1 only because
Year 1 represents a one-time task not
repeated in subsequent years.
The one-time burden for FERC–725N
information collection can be averaged
over three years:
• 7,416 hours ÷ 3 = 2,472 (rounded)
hours/year over three years.
34. Title: FERC–725N, Mandatory
Reliability Standards: Transmission
Planning (TPL) Reliability Standards.
Action: Proposed revision to FERC–
725N information collection.
OMB Control No.: 1902–0264.
Respondents: Businesses or other forprofit institutions; not-for-profit
institutions.
Frequency of Responses: One Time.
Necessity of the Information: This
notice of proposed rulemaking proposes
to approve the requested modifications
to a Reliability Standard pertaining to
transmission planning. As discussed
above, the Commission proposes to
approve proposed Reliability Standard
TPL–001–5 pursuant to section
215(d)(2) of the FPA because it
improves upon the currently-effective
Reliability Standard TPL–001–4.
Internal Review: The Commission has
reviewed proposed Reliability Standard
TPL–001–5 and made a determination
that its action is necessary to implement
section 215 of the FPA. The
Commission has assured itself, by
means of its internal review, that there
is specific, objective support for the
burden estimates associated with the
information requirements.
35. Interested persons may obtain
information on the reporting
requirements by contacting the
following: Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street NE,
Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: Ellen
Brown, Office of the Executive Director,
email: [email protected], phone:
(202) 502–8663, fax: (202) 273–0873].

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36. For submitting comments
concerning the collection(s) of
information and the associated burden
estimate(s), please send your comments
to the Commission, and to the Office of
Management and Budget, Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, 725
17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503,
[Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, phone:
(202) 395–0710, fax: (202) 395–7285].
For security reasons, comments to OMB
should be submitted by email to: oira_
[email protected]. Comments
submitted to OMB should include
Docket Number RM19–10–000 and
FERC–725N (OMB Control No. 1902–
0264).
IV. Environmental Analysis
37. The Commission is required to
prepare an Environmental Assessment
or an Environmental Impact Statement
for any action that may have a
significant adverse effect on the human
environment.52 The Commission has
categorically excluded certain actions
from this requirement as not having a
significant effect on the human
environment. Included in the exclusion
are rules that are clarifying, corrective,
or procedural or that do not
substantially change the effect of the
regulations being amended.53 The
actions proposed herein fall within this
categorical exclusion in the
Commission’s regulations.
V. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
38. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of
1980 (RFA) 54 generally requires a
description and analysis of proposed
rules that will have significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities.55 The Small
52 Regulations Implementing the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Order No. 486,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 30,783 (1987) (crossreferenced at 41 FERC ¶ 61,284).
53 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii) (2018).
54 5 U.S.C. 601–612 (2012).
55 Id. 601–12.

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Business Administration’s (SBA) Office
of Size Standards develops the
numerical definition of a small
business.56 The SBA revised its size
standard for electric utilities (effective
January 22, 2014) to a standard based on
the number of employees, including
affiliates (from the prior standard based
on megawatt hour sales).57
39. Proposed Reliability Standard
TPL–001–5 is expected to impose an
additional burden on 206 entities 58
(planning coordinators and transmission
planners).
40. Of the 206 affected entities
discussed above, we estimate that
approximately 10 percent of the affected
entities are small entities. We estimate
that each of the 21 small entities to
whom the proposed modifications to
proposed Reliability Standard TPL–
001–5 apply will incur one-time costs of
approximately $1,980 per entity to
implement the proposed Reliability
Standard. We do not consider the
estimated costs for these 21 small
entities to be a significant economic
impact. Accordingly, we propose to
certify that proposed Reliability
Standard TPL–001–5 will not have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
VI. Comment Procedures
41. The Commission invites interested
persons to submit comments on the
matters and issues proposed in this
notice to be adopted, including any
related matters or alternative proposals
that commenters may wish to discuss.
Comments are due August 26, 2019.
Comments must refer to Docket No.
56 13

CFR 121.101 (2018).
121.201.
58 Public utilities may fall under one of several
different categories, each with a size threshold
based on the company’s number of employees,
including affiliates, the parent company, and
subsidiaries. For the analysis in this NOPR, we are
using a 500 employee threshold due to each
affected entity falling within the role of Electric
Bulk Power Transmission and Control (NAISC
Code: 221121).
57 Id.

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Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 124 / Thursday, June 27, 2019 / Proposed Rules
RM19–10–000, and must include the
commenter’s name, the organization
they represent, if applicable, and
address.
42. The Commission encourages
comments to be filed electronically via
the eFiling link on the Commission’s
website at http://www.ferc.gov. The
Commission accepts most standard
word processing formats. Documents
created electronically using word
processing software should be filed in
native applications or print-to-PDF
format and not in a scanned format.
Commenters filing electronically do not
need to make a paper filing.
43. Commenters that are not able to
file comments electronically must send
an original of their comments to:
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
Secretary of the Commission, 888 First
Street NE, Washington, DC 20426.
44. All comments will be placed in
the Commission’s public files and may
be viewed, printed, or downloaded
remotely as described in the Document
Availability section below. Commenters
on this proposal are not required to
serve copies of their comments on other
commenters.

jspears on DSK30JT082PROD with PROPOSALS

VII. Document Availability
45. In addition to publishing the full
text of this document in the Federal
Register, the Commission provides all
interested persons an opportunity to
view and/or print the contents of this
document via the internet through the
Commission’s Home Page (http://
www.ferc.gov) and in the Commission’s
Public Reference Room during normal
business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
Eastern time) at 888 First Street NE,
Room 2A, Washington, DC 20426.
46. From the Commission’s Home
Page on the internet, this information is
available on eLibrary. The full text of
this document is available on eLibrary
in PDF and Microsoft Word format for
viewing, printing, and/or downloading.
To access this document in eLibrary,
type the docket number of this
document, excluding the last three
digits, in the docket number field.User
assistance is available for eLibrary and
the Commission’s website during
normal business hours from the
Commission’s Online Support at (202)
502–6652 (toll free at 1–866–208–3676)
or email at [email protected],
or the Public Reference Room at (202)
502–8371, TTY (202) 502–8659. Email
the Public Reference Room at
[email protected].
By direction of the Commission.

VerDate Sep<11>2014

20:32 Jun 26, 2019

Jkt 247001

Issued: June 20, 2019.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2019–13582 Filed 6–26–19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Bureau of Indian Affairs
25 CFR Part 273
[190D0102DR/DS5A300000/
DR.5A311.IA000119]
RIN 1076–AF24

Education Contracts Under JohnsonO’Malley Act
Bureau of Indian Affairs,
Interior.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
AGENCY:

Under the Johnson O’Malley
(JOM) Act, the Bureau of Indian
Education (BIE) provides assistance,
through contracts, for Indian students
attending public schools and nonsectarian private schools. Congress
recently updated the JOM Act with the
JOM Supplemental Indian Education
Program Modernization Act (JOM
Modernization Act). This proposed rule
would implement the JOM Act, as
amended, to clarify the eligibility
requirements for Indian students to
receive the benefits of a JOM contract,
to clarify the funding formula and
process to ensure full participation of
contracting parties, and to otherwise
reconcile and modernize the rules to
comport with the activities of the
contracting parties under the Act, as
amended.

SUMMARY:

Please submit comments by
August 26, 2019.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
by any of the following methods:
—Federal rulemaking portal: http://
www.regulations.gov. The rule is
listed under the agency name ‘‘Bureau
of Indian Affairs.’’
—Email: [email protected]. Include
the number 1076–AF24 in the subject
line of the message.
—Mail: Elizabeth Appel, Office of
Regulatory Affairs & Collaborative
Action, U.S. Department of the
Interior, 1849 C Street NW, MIB–
4660–MS, Washington, DC 20240.
Include the number 1076–AF24 in the
subject line of the message.
—Hand delivery: Elizabeth Appel,
Office of Regulatory Affairs &
Collaborative Action, U.S. Department
of the Interior, 1849 C Street NW, MS
4660, Washington, DC 20240. Include
DATES:

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30647

the number 1076–AF24 in the subject
line of the message.
Docket: For access to the docket to
read background documents or
comments received, go to http://
www.regulations.gov and search for
Docket Number BIA–2018–0002. We
cannot ensure that comments received
after the close of the comment period
(see DATES) will be included in the
docket for this rulemaking and
considered.
Comments on the information
collections contained in this proposed
regulation (see ‘‘Paperwork Reduction
Act’’ section, below) are separate from
those on the substance of the rule. Send
comments on the information collection
burden to OMB by facsimile to (202)
395–5806 or email to the OMB Desk
Officer for the Department of the
Interior at OIRA_DOCKET@
omb.eop.gov. Please send a copy of your
comments to the person listed in the
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT

section of this notice.
Please see ‘‘V. Tribal Consultation’’ of
this preamble for addresses of Tribal
consultation sessions on this proposed
rule.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Elizabeth Appel, Director, Office of
Regulatory Affairs & Collaborative
Action, (202) 273–4680;
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
II. Overview of Proposed Rule
A. Indian Student Eligibility
1. History of Indian Student Eligibility for
Benefits of JOM Education Contracts
2. March 2018 Proposed Rule: Comments
and Responses
3. Proposed Revisions to Indian Student
Eligibility Requirements
B. Funding Formula
C. Other Reconciliation and Modernization
III. Subpart-by-Subpart Summary of Proposed
Changes
IV. Crosswalk of Proposed Changes
V. Tribal Consultation
VI. Procedural Requirements
A. Regulatory Planning and Review (E.O.
12866 and 13563)
B. Reducing Regulation and Controlling
Regulatory Costs (E.O. 13771)
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
D. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act
E. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
F. Takings (E.O. 12630)
G. Federalism (E.O. 13132)
H. Civil Justice Reform (E.O. 12988)
I. Consultation With Indian Tribes (E.O.
13175)
J. Paperwork Reduction Act
K. National Environmental Policy Act
L. Effects on the Energy Supply (E.O.
13211)
M. Clarity of This Regulation
N. Public Availability of Comments

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