HM-224I Interim Final Rule

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Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 44 / Wednesday, March 6, 2019 / Rules and Regulations

303(r), 332, and §§ 1.1 and 1.425 of the
Commission’s rules, 47 CFR 1.1, 1.425,
the windows for challengers and
respondents to collect information in
connection with the MF–II challenge
process are extended, to the extent
described herein.
15. It is further ordered that, pursuant
to § 1.427(b) of the Commission’s rules,
47 CFR 1.427(b), this Order shall be
effective upon its publication in the
Federal Register.
16. It is further ordered that the
Commission’s Consumer and
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference
Information Center, shall send a copy of
this Order, including the Final
Regulatory Flexibility Certification, to
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the
SBA.
Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2019–03635 Filed 3–5–19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration
49 CFR Parts 172 and 173
[Docket No. PHMSA–2016–0014 (HM–224I)]
RIN 2137–AF20

Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Safety
Provisions for Lithium Batteries
Transported by Aircraft (FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018)
Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA), DOT.
ACTION: Interim final rule (IFR).
AGENCY:

PHMSA issues this interim
final rule (IFR) to revise the Hazardous
Materials Regulations for lithium cells
and batteries transported by aircraft.
This IFR prohibits the transport of
lithium ion cells and batteries as cargo
on passenger aircraft; requires lithium
ion cells and batteries to be shipped at
not more than a 30 percent state of
charge aboard cargo-only aircraft when
not packed with or contained in
equipment; and limits the use of
alternative provisions for small lithium
cell or battery shipments to one package
per consignment. This IFR does not
restrict passengers or crew members
from bringing personal items or
electronic devices containing lithium
cells or batteries aboard aircraft, or
restrict cargo-only aircraft from
transporting lithium ion cells or

SUMMARY:

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batteries at a state of charge exceeding
30 percent when packed with or
contained in equipment or devices.
DATES:
Effective date: This interim final rule
is effective on March 6, 2019.
Comment date: Comments must be
received by May 6, 2019.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
identified by Docket Number [PHMSA–
2016–0014 (HM–224I)] by any of the
following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
online instructions for submitting
comments.
• Fax: 1–202–493–2251.
• Mail: Docket Operations, U.S.
Department of Transportation, West
Building, Ground Floor, Room W12–
140, Routing Symbol M–30, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC
20590.
• Hand Delivery: To Docket
Operations, Room W12–140 on the
ground floor of the West Building, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC
20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal
Holidays.
Instructions: All submissions must
include the agency name and docket
number for this rulemaking at the
beginning of the comment. Note that all
comments received will be posted
without change to the docket
management system, including any
personal information provided.
Docket: For access to the dockets to
read background documents or
comments received, go to http://
www.regulations.gov or DOT’s Docket
Operations Office (see ADDRESSES).
Privacy Act: In accordance with 5
U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits comments
from the public to better inform its
rulemaking process. DOT posts these
comments, without edit, including any
personal information the commenter
provides, to www.regulations.gov, as
described in the system of records
notice (DOT/ALL–14 FDMS), which can
be reviewed at www.dot.gov/privacy.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Shelby Geller, (202) 366–8553,
Standards and Rulemaking Division,
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590–
0001.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
II. Current Lithium Battery Transportation
Requirements
III. Need for the Rule

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A. FAA Technical Center Testing
B. ICAO Activities
C. Risk Potential
D. Alternative Transport Conditions
IV. Good Cause for Immediate Adoption
V. Summary of Changes
A. Passenger Aircraft Prohibition
B. State of Charge Requirement
C. Consignment and Overpack Restriction
D. Limited Exceptions to Restrictions on
Air Transportation of Medical Device
Cells or Batteries
VI. Regulatory Analysis and Notices
A. Statutory/Legal Authority for This
Rulemaking
B. Executive Order 12866 and DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures
C. Executive Order 13771
D. Executive Order 13132
E. Executive Order 13175
F. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive
Order 13272, and DOT Regulatory
Policies and Procedures
G. Paperwork Reduction Act
H. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
I. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
J. Environmental Assessment
K. Privacy Act
L. Executive Order 13609 and International
Trade Analysis
List of Subjects

I. Executive Summary
The safe transport of lithium batteries
by air has been an ongoing concern due
to the unique challenges they pose to
safety in the air transportation
environment. Unlike other hazardous
materials, lithium batteries contain both
a chemical and an electrical hazard.
This combination of hazards, when
involved in a fire encompassing
significant quantities of lithium
batteries, may exceed the fire
suppression capability of the aircraft
and lead to a catastrophic loss of the
aircraft.
The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHMSA) issues
this interim final rule (IFR) to amend
the Hazardous Materials Regulations
(HMR; 49 CFR parts 171–180) to (1)
prohibit the transport of lithium ion
cells and batteries as cargo on passenger
aircraft; (2) require all lithium ion cells
and batteries to be shipped at not more
than a 30 percent state of charge on
cargo-only aircraft; and (3) limit the use
of alternative provisions for small
lithium cell or battery to one package
per consignment. These amendments
will predominately affect air carriers
(both passenger and cargo-only) and
shippers offering lithium ion cells and
batteries for transport as cargo by
aircraft. The amendments will not
restrict passengers or crew members
from bringing personal items or
electronic devices containing lithium
cells or batteries aboard aircraft, or
restrict the air transport of lithium ion
cells or batteries when packed with or

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Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 44 / Wednesday, March 6, 2019 / Rules and Regulations
contained in equipment. To
accommodate persons in areas
potentially not serviced daily by cargo
aircraft, PHMSA, through the
requirement in the FAA Reauthorization
Act of 2018, is providing a limited
exception, with the approval of the
Associate Administrator, for not more
than two replacement lithium cells or
batteries specifically used for medical
devices to be transported by passenger
aircraft. Furthermore, these batteries
may be excepted from the state of charge
requirements, when meeting certain
provisions. See ‘‘Section V.D. Limited
Exceptions to Restrictions on Air
Transportation of Medical Device Cells
or Batteries’’ for further discussion.
This IFR is necessary to address an
immediate safety hazard, meet a
statutory deadline, and harmonize the
HMR with emergency amendments to
the 2015–2016 edition of the
International Civil Aviation
Organization’s Technical Instructions
for the Safe Transport of Dangerous
Goods by Air (ICAO Technical
Instructions). The serious public safety
hazards associated with lithium battery
transportation and the statutory
deadline in the FAA Reauthorization
Act of 2018 necessitate the immediate
adoption of these standards in

accordance with sections 553(b)(3)(B)
and 553(d)(3) of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). While PHMSA
values public participation in the
rulemaking process, the current risk of
a lithium battery incident and statutory
deadline imposed by Congress makes it
impractical and contrary to public
interest to delay the effect of this
rulemaking until after a notice and
comment period. However, with the
publication of this IFR, PHMSA
encourages persons to participate in this
rulemaking by submitting comments
containing relevant information, data, or
views. PHMSA will consider all
comments received on or before the IFR
closing comment date, consider latefiled comments to the extent
practicable, and make any necessary
amendments as appropriate.
In developing this IFR, PHMSA
considered the findings of lithium
battery research conducted by the
Federal Aviation Administration’s
William J. Hughes Technical Center
(FAA Technical Center), the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB),
and several other well-respected
academic sources on lithium batteries
and their hazards. The FAA Technical
Center’s research found that lithium
batteries subject to certain conditions

8007

could result in adverse events, such as
smoke and fire, that could impair the
safe operation of the aircraft.
Specifically, they found that in a
lithium battery fire, flammable gases
could collect, ignite, and ultimately
exceed the capabilities of an aircraft’s
fire suppression system. The ICAO also
recognized these dangers and enacted
international regulations, which went
into effect on April 1, 2016. The
potential for a catastrophic loss of an
aircraft, the need for harmonization of
the HMR with emergency amendments
to the ICAO Technical Instructions, and
the statutory deadline in the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018 provide
compelling justification to immediately
adopt these changes into the HMR
without prior notice and comment.
A Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) is
included in the docket for this
rulemaking and supports the
amendments made in this IFR. PHMSA
examined the benefits and costs of these
rulemaking provisions using the postICAO baseline 1 as shown in the
analysis below. Table 1 shows the costs
by affected section and rulemaking
provision over a 10-year period,
discounted at a 7 percent rate:

TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF BENEFITS AND COSTS FOR LITHIUM BATTERY PROVISIONS—POST ICAO
10-Year quantified
cost
(7%)

Provision

Benefits

Unquantified costs

State of Charge ...........

• Limits the volume of flammable gases emitted by lithium ion cells propagated in a
thermal runaway.
• Results in a less energetic thermal runaway event if one should occur.
• Reduces the likelihood of thermal propagation from cell to cell.
• Harmonization facilitates international trade
by minimizing the burden of complying with
multiple or inconsistent safety requirements
(although currently domestic shippers and
carriers have the option to voluntarily comply with ICAO requirements). Consistency
between regulations reduces compliance
costs and helps to avoid costly frustrations
of international shipments.

• Potential changes in manufacturing procedures to ensure compliance with state of
charge provision.
• Reevaluation of management practices and
potentially instituting changes to avoid or
lessen supply chain impacts such as reduced shelf life of batteries and battery
quality issues.
• Additional time for end users needed to
charge the batteries from 30 percent state
of charge or less instead of the typical levels of 40 percent or 50 percent at which
manufacturers currently set the state of
charge.

1 The post-ICAO baseline is the international
operating environment present after April 1, 2016;
this would (1) restrict lithium ion batteries to a 30
percent state of charge for international air

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shipments, (2) restrict the number of Section II
packages to one per consignment on international
air shipments, and (3) prohibit the shipping of
lithium ion batteries as cargo on international

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$2,304,551
These estimates include only the cost
for entities to apply
for permission to
ship batteries at
higher charge levels.

passenger flights. This environment also includes a
level of voluntary domestic compliance with the
above provisions in the United States.

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Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 44 / Wednesday, March 6, 2019 / Rules and Regulations
TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF BENEFITS AND COSTS FOR LITHIUM BATTERY PROVISIONS—POST ICAO—Continued
Provision

Benefits

Unquantified costs

10-Year quantified
cost
(7%)

Consignment Limit .......

• Reduces the risk of fire from shipping large
quantities of excepted batteries that were
previously being consolidated in overpacks,
pallets, in single-unit load devices and single aircraft cargo compartments..
• Reduces the propensity for large numbers
of batteries or packages shipped in accordance with regulatory exceptions..
• Harmonization facilitates international trade
by minimizing the burden of complying with
multiple or inconsistent safety requirements
(although currently domestic shippers and
carriers have the option to voluntarily comply with ICAO requirements). Consistency
between regulations reduces compliance
costs and helps to avoid costly frustrations
of international shipments..
• Safety benefits expected to be low or none
given evidence of pre-IFR compliance..
• Eliminates the risk of an incident induced
by lithium ion batteries shipped as cargo in
a passenger aircraft..
• Eliminates the risk of a fire exacerbated by
the presence of lithium ion batteries involving the cargo hold of a passenger aircraft..
• Harmonization facilitates international trade
by minimizing the burden of complying with
multiple or inconsistent safety requirements
(although currently domestic shippers and
carriers have the option to voluntarily comply with ICAO requirements). Consistency
between regulations reduces compliance
costs and helps to avoid costly frustrations
of international shipments.

• Costs due to modal shift that might occur
from air transport to ground or marine
transport due to higher shipping costs by
air. The end receivers may be inconvenienced by longer shipping times that imply
less prompt access to goods purchased..

$44,328,936
Costs include additional hazard communication and employee training.

• Potential additional costs to air carriers
transporting cargo shipments of lithium ion
batteries on cargo planes instead of passenger aircraft. They vary for each air carrier based on the size of the airline and the
areas they service, the availability of cargoonly aircraft fleet, the capacity usage and
cargo volume availability of cargo aircraft
fleet, and the volume of lithium ion batteries they were transporting by passenger
airplanes..
• Cost due to modal shift that might occur as
higher costs to ship by air may induce
shippers to send by ground and marine
transportation. The end receivers may be
inconvenienced by longer shipping times
that imply less prompt access to goods
purchased. This can have potential impacts
on rural and remote communities not serviced daily by cargo aircraft or only serviced
by passenger aircraft. For customers needing lithium batteries used in devices, other
than medical devices, the delays in the delivery of the required batteries could result
in a range of consequences depending on
their intended need..

Impact expected low
given evidence of
pre-IFR compliance.

.........................................................................

.........................................................................

10-Year: $46,633,487
Annualized:
$6,639,559

Lithium Battery Prohibition as Cargo on
Passenger Aircraft.

Total .....................

Based on the analysis described in the
RIA, at the mean, PHMSA estimates the
present value costs about $46.6 million
over 10 years and about $6.6 million
annualized (at a 7 percent discount
rate).
While PHMSA examined the benefits
and the costs of the provisions of this
rulemaking using the post-ICAO
baseline as the basis for the analysis, we
acknowledge that using the pre-ICAO
baseline 2 would produce different cost
2 The pre-ICAO baseline is the international
operating environment present before April 1, 2016
with: (1) No limitations of state of charge, (2) No
limitation on the number of Section II packages
offered in a single consignment, and (3) No

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and benefit figures. That said, given the
significant data uncertainties regarding
pre-ICAO baseline and operational
practices, PHMSA was unable to
completely quantify the pre-ICAO
baseline. PHMSA has provided a
discussion of these qualitative benefits
and costs. For more detail on cost and
benefits of the pre-ICAO baseline, see
‘‘Section 11 Alternative Baseline
Analysis’’ of the RIA included in the
docket for this rulemaking. PHMSA
requests public comment on the RIA as
it applies to the benefits and costs under
both baselines.
prohibition of shipping Lithium ion batteries as
cargo on passenger carrying aircraft.

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II. Current Lithium Battery
Transportation Requirements
Lithium cells and batteries fall into
one of two basic categories: lithium
metal, including lithium alloy (also
known as primary lithium batteries),
and lithium ion, including lithium ion
polymer (also known as secondary
lithium batteries). As the name
indicates, lithium metal cells and
batteries contain a small amount of
metallic lithium or a lithium alloy.
Lithium metal batteries are mostly nonrechargeable and are often used in
medical devices, computer memory, and
as replaceable batteries (AA and AAA
size) suitable for electronic devices. The
lithium content in these cells and

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Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 44 / Wednesday, March 6, 2019 / Rules and Regulations
batteries ranges from a fraction of a gram
to a few grams and typical geometries
include coin cells, cylindrical, and
rectangular. Conversely, lithium ion
cells and batteries contain a lithium
compound (e.g., lithium cobalt dioxide,
lithium iron phosphate). Lithium ion
batteries are generally rechargeable and
are most often found in portable
computers, mobile phones, and power
tools. Common configurations are
cylindrical and rectangular. For the
purposes of the HMR, the size of lithium
ion cells and batteries is measured in
Watt-hours (Wh).
Lithium cells and batteries are
capable of efficiently storing large
amounts of energy and have a higher
specific energy (capacity) and energy
density relative to other battery
chemistries, such as alkaline, nickel
metal hydride (NiMH), and nickel
cadmium (NiCd). However, when
subjected to mechanical abuse, internal
or external short circuit, overcharge, or
excessive heat, a lithium cell or battery
is susceptible to thermal runaway,
which is a chain reaction leading to selfheating and release of stored energy.3 4
A lithium ion cell sufficiently heated
can induce a thermal runaway event.
Cells in thermal runaway can release
excessive heat (up to 1400 °F (760 °C)),
as well as flammable and toxic gases,
and the heat from a single cell in
thermal runaway can spread to adjacent
cells in a battery or package.5 6 This
cascading effect, or spreading, (hereafter
referred to as propagation) increases the
potential ignition of adjacent
combustible materials. In addition, the
pressure inside a cell can increase,
causing the cell to rupture and resulting
in a projectile hazard and the release of
flammable gases. Vented gases from
only a small number of cells, if ignited,
can result in a pressure pulse that can
compromise the fire suppression
capability of an aircraft cargo
3 Bandhauer, Todd M., Garimella, Srinivas, and
Fuller, Thomas F., A Critical Review of Thermal
Issues in Lithium-ion Batteries, The Journal of the
Electrochemical Society, Vol. 158 R–21–R25,
January 2011.
4 Mikolajczak, Celina, P.E., Kahn, Michael, Ph.D.,
White, Kevin, Ph.D., and Long, Richard T., P.E., Fire
Protection Research Foundation Report: LithiumIon Batteries Hazard and Use Assessment,
Exponents Failure Analysis Associates, Inc., July
2011.
5 Webster, H., Fire Protection for the Shipment of
Lithium Batteries in Aircraft Cargo Compartments,
FAA Technical Center, DOT/FAA/AR–10/31,
November 2010. http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/1031.pdf
6 Panagiotou, Joseph, Materials Laboratory Study
Report, National Transportation Safety Board,
Office of Research and Engineering, Materials
Laboratory Division, Report No. 12–019, March
2012.

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compartment.7 Based on FAA Technical
Center data, the volume of flammable
cell gas ignited to produce a 1.2 psi
pressure rise corresponded to only 6.4
cells at 100 percent state of charge or 20
cells at 50 percent state of charge. Cargo
compartments are only designed to
withstand an approximate 1-psi
pressure differential.
Triggering events to a thermal event
include external short circuits,
mechanical damage, exposure to heat,
and manufacturing defects that result in
an internal short circuit. While the
likelihood of a thermal event occurring
on an aircraft is low, the consequences
of an event are high. The inability of the
aircraft fire suppression systems to
address lithium cell or battery fires
poses an unacceptable safety risk, even
if the likelihood of an event is low.
The HMR include separate entries for
lithium metal batteries (UN3090),
lithium metal batteries packed with
equipment (UN3091), lithium metal
batteries contained in equipment
(UN3091), lithium ion batteries
(UN3480), lithium ion batteries packed
with equipment (UN3481), and lithium
ion batteries contained in equipment
(UN3481). Both the HMR and the 2015–
2016 ICAO Technical Instructions
already prohibit the transport of lithium
metal batteries (UN3090) as cargo on
passenger aircraft.8 9
The requirements for the transport of
lithium batteries are based on risk and
are designed to work together to create
layers of safety, accounting for battery
chemistry (lithium metal and lithium
ion), battery size, and package quantity.
Lithium batteries are subject to design
type testing, various hazard
communication, and packaging
requirements. Design testing serves to
ensure that batteries are able to
withstand certain transport and abuse
conditions without hazardous
consequences.10 However, the tests are
not meant to ensure that lithium
batteries are safe in all conditions, such
as extreme heat or damage. Lithium
cells and batteries may still be subject
to mishandling in transport that can
7 Webster, Harry, Summer, Steven M., Maloney,
Thomas, Dadia, Dhaval, Rehn, Steven J., Karp,
Matthew, ‘‘Summary of FAA Studies Related to the
Hazards Produced by Lithium Cells in Thermal
Runaway in Aircraft Cargo Compartments, FAA
Report DOT/FAA/TC–16/37, June 2016, available at
https://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/TC-16-37.pdf.
8 Hazardous Materials: Prohibition on the
Transportation of Primary Lithium Batteries and
Cells Aboard Passenger Aircraft; Interim Final Rule;
[69 FR 75208] December 15, 2004.
9 Dangerous Goods Panel Working Group on
Lithium Batteries; April 7–11, 2014; DGP–WG/LB/
2–WP/8.
10 The tests and procedures are described in the
United Nations Manual of Tests and Criteria, Part
III, Subsection 38.3.

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8009

result in severe mechanical damage or
short circuits.11 This hazard drives the
need for protection against damage and
short circuits, as well as the use of
strong outer packaging. Hazard
communication (i.e., package marks,
labels, and shipping documents) serves
to alert transport workers throughout
the supply chain of the presence of
lithium cells or batteries, the need to
handle them properly, and the measures
to take in the event of an emergency.
Hazmat employees must be trained in
accordance with the HMR, ensuring that
personnel responsible for preparing for
transport and transporting do so in
compliance with the HMR and maintain
safety throughout the supply chain.
In § 173.185, PHMSA sets forth
general requirements for lithium cells
and batteries, such as United Nations
(UN) design testing requirements,
packaging requirements, and provisions
for small cells and batteries.12 Unless
otherwise specified in § 173.185, the
hazard communication and training
requirements are located in part 172 of
the HMR.
Section 173.185(c) of the HMR
describes provisions for the carriage of
up to 8 small lithium cells or 2 small
lithium batteries per package with
alternative hazard communication that
replaces the Class 9 label with a lithium
battery mark that communicates the
presence of lithium batteries and
indicates (1) that the package is to be
handled with care, (2) that a flammable
hazard exists if the package is damaged,
and (3) that special procedures must be
followed in such event that the package
is damaged (i.e., inspection and
repacking (if necessary), as well as a
telephone number for additional
information). Further, when used, an air
waybill must indicate compliance with
the provisions of § 173.185(c) or the
applicable ICAO packing instruction.13
Consignments of lithium batteries that
comply with these provisions are
provided alternatives from the standard
hazard communication and relief from
the acceptance checks that air carriers
use to recognize and accept or reject
hazardous materials as appropriate.
11 A lithium battery incident at LAX in 1999 was
the result of severe mishandling of lithium metal
batteries. Hazardous Materials Factual Report,
DCA–99–MZ–005. Retrieved from http://
dms.ntsb.gov/public/13000-13499/13470/
559466.pdf.
12 Small cells and batteries for the purposes of
this rulemaking are a lithium metal cell containing
not more than 1 gram of lithium metal, a lithium
metal battery containing not more than 2 grams of
lithium metal, a lithium ion cell not more than 20
Wh, and a lithium ion battery not more than 100
Wh (See § 173.185(c) and Section II of Packing
Instructions 965 and 968 in the ICAO Technical
Instructions).
13 See 49 CFR 173.185(c)(4).

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Currently, § 173.185(c) does not place a
limit on the number of packages
containing such lithium batteries
permitted in overpacks,14 pallets, single
unit load devices, or single aircraft cargo
compartments. This condition allows
large numbers of packages of small cells
and batteries to be placed near each
other without standard declaration to
the air carrier or pilot in command.
III. Need for the Rule
Lithium batteries are increasingly
prevalent in today’s consumer market
due to their ability to store substantially
more energy than other batteries of the
same size and weight. This trend toward
lithium ion battery technology has
continued over the last decade as
illustrated by an increase in lithium ion
cell production from approximately 3
billion cells in 2007 to over 7 billion
lithium ion cells produced in 2017.
PHMSA identified a total of 39
incidents in air cargo transportation
between 2010 and 2016 with 13 of these
incidents involving lithium batteries
and smoke, fire, extreme heat, or
explosion that would have been affected
by this rulemaking. Many of these
incidents were identified at an air cargo
sort facility either before or after a flight.
In at least one instance, packages of
lithium ion cells were found smoldering
in an aircraft unit load device during
unloading. This indicates that the initial
thermal runaway likely occurred while
the shipment was on the aircraft.
PHMSA also notes three aircraft
accidents in 2007, 2010, and 2011
where lithium ion batteries transported
as cargo were suspected as either the
cause or a factor that increased the
severity of the fire. Collectively these
accidents resulted in the complete loss
of all three aircraft and four lives. These
accidents highlight the potential for
lithium batteries to contribute to an
incident resulting in loss of life and/or
loss of aircraft.
Testing conducted by the FAA
Technical Center to assess the
flammability characteristics of lithium
ion rechargeable cells and the potential
hazard associated with shipping them
on transport aircraft confirmed that fires
involving lithium batteries sometimes
include a mechanical energy release that
14 See 49 CFR 171.8. An overpack means an
enclosure that is used by a single consignor to
provide protection or convenience in handling of a
package or to consolidate two or more packages.
Overpack does not include a transport vehicle,
freight container, or aircraft unit load device.
Examples of overpacks are one or more packages:
(1) Placed or stacked onto a load board such as
a pallet and secured by strapping, shrink wrapping,
stretch wrapping, or other suitable means; or
(2) Placed in a protective outer packaging such as
a box or crate.

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can create projectile hazards; thermal
runaway from a single cell that can
spread to adjacent cells and packages;
and the venting of flammable gases that
can occur even when the fire is
suppressed. Cell failure resulting in a
mechanical energy release was observed
during testing and was more energetic at
100 percent state of charge relative to
cells tested a lower state of charge.
However, a state of charge at less than
100 percent still has the potential to
result in a mechanical energy release.
For example, the FAA testing conducted
in 2010 using lithium ion 18650 LiCoO2
cells at a 50 percent state of charge
resulted in all 100 cells experiencing
thermal runaway.15 Testing conducted
by the NTSB confirmed the potential for
fire and projectile hazards and further
concluded that aircraft unit load device
design can impact the time it takes to
detect a fire originating from inside a
cargo container.16 Additionally, the
FAA testing determined that Halon
1301, the fire-suppressant agent used in
Class C cargo compartments, could
suppress the electrolyte and burning
packaging fires, but it had no effect on
stopping the propagation of thermal
runaway from cell to cell. See 14 CFR
25.857 for aircraft cargo compartment
classification, including Class C. Halon
1301 was also shown to be ineffective in
suppressing an explosion of the
flammable gases vented from lithium
ion cells during thermal runaway.
A. FAA Technical Center Testing
The FAA Technical Center issued a
series of test reports in 2004, 2006,
2010, and 2014 that characterized the
hazards posed by lithium cells and
batteries transported as cargo on aircraft
and the effectiveness of aircraft fire
suppression agents, packagings, and
packaging configurations. Specifically,
the FAA Technical Center tested the
ability of various fire extinguishing
agents and fire resistant packagings to
control fires involving lithium batteries.
This testing revealed that: (1) The
ignition of the unburned flammable
gases associated with a lithium cell or
battery fire could lead to a catastrophic
loss of the aircraft; (2) the current design
of the Halon 1301 fire suppression
system 17 in a Class C cargo
compartment in passenger aircraft is
incapable of preventing such an
explosion; and (3) the ignition of a
15 Webster,

H. See footnote 5.
Joseph. See footnote 6.
17 Halon systems work by flooding the cargo
compartment with Halon gas. The concentration of
Halon in the local atmosphere interferes with the
burning reaction and suppresses the flame. Halon
is stored in pressurized containers and distributed
via a series of pipes and fire suppression nozzles.
16 Panagiotou,

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mixture of flammable gases could
produce an over pressure, which would
dislodge pressure relief panels, allow
leakage of Halon from the associated
cargo compartment, and compromise
the ability of fire suppression systems to
function as intended. As a result, the
smoke and fire can spread to adjacent
compartments and potentially
compromise the entire aircraft.
Moreover, the FAA testing concluded
neither oxygen starvation through
depressurization in the case of cargo
aircraft nor common shipping
containers (e.g., unit load devices) is
effective in containing or suppressing a
lithium cell or battery fire.
When controlling lithium battery
fires, aircraft fire extinguishing agents
must both extinguish the electrolyte fire
and cool remaining cells to stop the
propagation of thermal runaway.
Gaseous agents (such as Halon) are
somewhat effective against lithium ion
battery fires; however, while Halon is
effective in extinguishing the electrolyte
fire and nearby combustible materials
such as packaging, it has no effect in
stopping the propagation of thermal
runaway from cell to cell. Conventional
fiberboard packagings initially protect
cells and batteries but eventually ignite
and add to the fire load. Special
packagings originally designed for
chemical oxygen generators are effective
in containing a fire from burning
lithium ion cells but allow smoke and
fumes to escape the package. Currently
available fire containment covers (FCC)
and fire resistant containers (FRC) that
suppress fires by means of oxygen
starvation are not effective in
controlling lithium ion cell or battery
fires. The fire load for each test
consisted of 5,000 lithium ion 18650
LiCoO2 cells, with the balance of the
interior volume containing the standard
fire test load of cardboard boxes filled
with shredded paper. The state of
charge was measured to be around 40
percent. The FCCs tested were unable to
contain a fire involving lithium ion
batteries and flames escaped from under
the cover, while tests on the FRCs
resulted in explosions that were caused
by the ignition of accumulated
flammable gases vented from burning
cells and/or batteries.18
The 2004 tests concluded that the
presence of a consignment of lithium
metal batteries can significantly increase
the severity of an in-flight cargo
compartment fire and that Halon 1301 is
ineffective in such occurrences.19
18 Webster

et al. See footnote 7.
Harry, Flammability Assessment of
Bulk-Packed, Nonrechargeable Lithium Batteries in
19 Webster,

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Furthermore, the report stated that the
ignition of a lithium metal battery
releases burning electrolytes and a
molten lithium spray capable of
perforating the aircraft cargo
compartment liners, while also
generating a pressure pulse that can
dislodge the cargo compartment
pressure relief panels. The dislodged
pressure relief panels allow the Halon
1301 fire suppressant to leak out,
reducing its effectiveness and
permitting the fire to spread beyond the
cargo compartment. These test results
identified that the Halon fire
suppression system required on
passenger aircraft could not effectively
suppress a fire involving lithium metal
batteries, but they were inconclusive
with respect to lithium ion batteries.
Based on the 2004 FAA Technical
Center test results, PHMSA published
an IFR in December 2004 [69 FR 75208]
prohibiting the transport of lithium
metal batteries as cargo on passenger
aircraft and indicated plans for the
continued assessment of the hazards
associated with lithium ion batteries in
transportation. ICAO later aligned with
the HMR.
The 2006 tests concluded that the
Halon fire suppression system is
effective in suppressing a fire arising
from lithium ion batteries. Cells
continued to vent due to the air
temperature but did not ignite in the
presence of Halon.20
The 2010 tests investigated the ability
of various packages and shipping
configurations to contain the effects of
lithium battery fires and prevent the
propagation of thermal runaway.21 The
baseline for these tests was a common
shipping configuration for lithium ion
cells consisting of a fiberboard box
containing 100 cells with fiberboard
separators. A single cell was removed
from the package and replaced with a
cartridge heater to initiate thermal
runaway. The cartridge heater was
activated at time zero, and its
temperature reached 1000 °F (538 °C) at
the 9-minute mark and peaked at
1250 °F (677 °C) at approximately 19
minutes, at which point the power to
the cartridge heater was shut off. The
Transport Category Aircraft, DOT/FAA/AR–04/26,
June 2004.
20 Webster, H., Flammability Assessment of BulkPacked, Rechargeable Lithium-Ion Cells in
Transport Category Aircraft, FAA Report DOT/
FAA/AR–06/38, September 2006.
21 Webster, H. See footnote 5.

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fiberboard box began to smoke 8
minutes into the test and then caught
fire at the 11-minute mark. As cells
went into thermal runaway, strong torch
flames erupted from the box as
electrolytes were vented and ignited by
the burning fiberboard. The fire
continued to burn vigorously for 45
minutes until all of the cells were
consumed. Data was collected until all
thermocouples returned to near ambient
temperature. In a subsequent test, the
fiberboard separators were replaced
with a fiberglass material used as a
flame barrier in aircraft thermal acoustic
insulation that was cut to the same
dimensions as the fiberboard separators.
The fiberglass separators were not
successful in controlling the
propagation of thermal runaway. In
additional tests, the fiberboard dividers
were replaced with those coated with
intumescent paint or aluminum foil.
This modification only delayed adjacent
batteries from being driven into thermal
runaway and did not prevent its
propagation. Finally, the FAA Technical
Center evaluated the ability of an
overpack originally designed for the
transport of chemical oxygen generators
to protect against a lithium ion battery
fire initiated from a single cell. This
package consists of a fiberboard
container with a foil and/or ceramic
insulator that meets the requirements of
HMR provisions found in appendix D to
part 178—Thermal Resistance Test and
appendix E to part 178—Flame
Penetration Resistance Test. A
fiberboard package with 100 cells and
fiberboard separators was placed into
the overpack. Thermal runaway was
initiated and allowed to propagate until
all cells were consumed. The overpack
successfully contained the fire but
allowed smoke and fumes to escape due
to increased pressure. The chemical
oxygen generator overpack standard did
not account for the accumulation of
vented flammable gases and was
therefore not effective in containing
lithium ion battery fires.
In 2013, the FAA Technical Center
conducted a series of tests to examine
the effectiveness of fire extinguishing
agents for suppressing lithium metal
and lithium ion battery fires and
preventing thermal runaway
propagation (DOT/FAA/TC–13/53).
These tests used five 2600mAh lithium
ion 18650 LiCoO2cells charged to 50
percent capacity. Aqueous agents were
the most effective at preventing thermal

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8011

runaway propagation.22 The FAA
Technical Center further tested the
effectiveness of passive protection of
lithium battery shipments and
published a report in February 2016. For
these tests, a packet of water placed
above the cells in a package containing
16 lithium ion 18650 LiCoO2 cells (at 50
percent state of charge) was the most
effective method of stopping thermal
runaway propagation, aside from a
lowered state of charge.23 Early tests
with small numbers of cells predicted
that the Halon 1301 extinguishing agent
would suppress the open flames but not
prevent the propagation of thermal
runaway from cell to cell. Further tests
confirmed that, in some instances, the
Halon fire suppression system was
unable to mitigate a fire involving
lithium ion batteries effectively. These
tests were conducted with fiberboard
boxes containing 100 lithium ion 18650
LiCoO2 cells. A single cell was removed
and replaced with a cartridge heater to
simulate a cell in thermal runaway. The
test chamber was flooded with a 6
percent Halon 1301 concentration at the
first indication of open flames. The
agent extinguished the open flame and
prevented open flames for the duration
of the test. Thermal runaway continued
to propagate throughout the box until all
cells were consumed. Tests on FCCs and
FRCs that suppress fires by means of
oxygen starvation showed that these fire
suppression methods are not effective in
controlling lithium ion cell or battery
fires. The fire load for these tests
consisted of 5,000 lithium ion 18650
LiCoO2 cells, with the balance of the
interior volume containing the standard
fire test load of cardboard boxes filled
with shredded paper. The state of
charge was measured to be around 40
percent. Since Halon has no cooling
effect, the temperatures found in a
suppressed cargo fire were high enough
that cells continued to vent, creating an
ignition source for the accumulated gas.
The buildup and subsequent ignition of
these gases ruptured the container. The
container and its contents were
destroyed by the ensuing fire.24
22 Maloney, T., Extinguishment of Lithium-Ion
and Lithium-Metal Battery Fires, DOT/FAA/TC–13/
53, January 2014.
23 Maloney, T., and Dadia, D., Passive Protection
of Lithium Battery Shipments, DOT/FAA/TC–15/38,
February 2016.
24 Webster et al. See footnote 7.

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In July 2015, in response to the FAA
Technical Center testing, two major
aircraft manufacturers issued notices to
aircraft operators warning of these
hazards and supporting a prohibition on
the carriage of high-density packages of
lithium ion batteries on passenger
aircraft until safer methods of transport
were implemented.25 26 27 Additionally,
the aircraft manufacturers
recommended that operators who
choose to carry lithium batteries as
cargo on cargo aircraft conduct a safety
risk assessment that considers specific
criteria listed in the July 2015 notices.
While the likelihood of a cargo fire
involving lithium batteries is low, the
potential for catastrophic consequences
including loss of life and loss of aircraft
results in an unacceptable safety risk
under the existing regulations.
B. ICAO Activities
The ICAO Technical Instructions set
minimum standards for the
international air transport of hazardous
materials—including lithium batteries.
PHMSA periodically amends the HMR
to adopt revisions to the ICAO
Technical Instructions. The
harmonization between the HMR and
the ICAO Technical Instructions creates
consistency in hazardous materials
transportation standards both
internationally and domestically. The
amendments in this IFR will aid in
maintaining this alignment by adopting
requirements consistent with the 2015–
2016 ICAO Technical Instructions.
Based largely on the FAA Technical
Center testing, which identified hazard
factors leading to the potential
compromise of the cargo compartment
fire protection capabilities due to a loss
of Halon containment and significant
damage to the aircraft, ICAO conducted
several Multidisciplinary Lithium
Battery Transport Coordination
Meetings consisting of a group of
experts from hazardous materials, air
operations, airworthiness, battery
manufacturing, and package
manufacturing disciplines. This
25 Boeing Multi Operator Message MOM–MOM–
15–0469–01B, Information—Transporting Lithium
Batteries, July 17, 2015. See http://
www2.anac.gov.br/transparencia/audiencia/2015/
aud19/anexoVI.pdf.
26 Airbus In-Service Information Transport of
Dangerous Goods, Lithium Batteries, reference:
00.00.00182, July 24, 2015. See http://
www2.anac.gov.br/transparencia/audiencia/2015/
aud19/anexoV.pdf.
27 A single quantifiable measurement for high
density is not possible because of the variable
effects battery chemistry, cargo compartment
characteristics, and loading configurations. As such,
high-density quantities of lithium batteries could be
any number of batteries or cells having the potential
to overwhelm cargo compartment fire protection
features.

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multidisciplinary group met three times
between 2014 and 2015 and developed
a series of recommendations and highlevel performance standards intended to
mitigate the hazard of transporting
lithium ion batteries by air to an
acceptable level.28 Several of these
recommendations were directed to the
attention of the ICAO Dangerous Goods
Panel (DGP), including the development
of performance standards to be met at
the cell, battery, or package level; the
implementation of interim measures,
such as reducing the state of charge for
lithium ion batteries; and the
recommendation to no longer use the
current provisions for small batteries for
large consignments.
The FAA Technical Center’s research
was presented to the DGP over the last
five years and specifically at each of the
previous three meetings (ICAO DGP:
Working Group 14, Working Group
2015, and DGP/25). The research was
subsequently given to the ICAO Flight
Operations Panel (FLTOPSP) and the
ICAO Airworthiness Panel (AIRP),
which are staffed with global experts in
each discipline as well as
representatives from appropriate NonGovernment Organizations (NGO). The
DGP determined that the
implementation of a 30 percent state of
charge provision and the reduction in
the number of small cells and batteries
permitted in a consignment and
overpack were required to reduce the
risk being introduced into the aviation
system. In addition, the DGP
determined that offering small cell and
battery consignments separately to the
air carrier will allow for better
awareness of each shipment, enabling
operators to have a more informed
approach to safety risk management and
ultimately a more robust safety
management system. As a result,
operators can apply more targeted
controls to mitigate risks introduced
into their system by shipments of
lithium batteries. Mitigation strategies
will be based on the characteristics of
the operator’s system and may include,
but are not limited to, limiting
quantities and using certain protective
equipment when transporting these
consignments. The major airframe
manufacturers recommended that
operators perform a safety risk
assessment to establish whether they
can manage the risks associated with the
transport of lithium batteries. We expect
that operators would incorporate
28 A report of each ICAO Multidisciplinary
Lithium Battery Transport Coordination Meeting is
available through the following URL: http://
www.icao.int/safety/DangerousGoods/Pages/
Multidisciplinary.aspx.

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information on lithium battery
shipments to develop risk mitigation
strategies as part of their safety
management activities. Mitigations will
vary but could include evaluating the
specific fire protection features of the
aircraft; how and where shipments are
loaded including proximity of lithium
batteries to each other and other
hazardous materials, such as flammable
liquids; and additional acceptance and
handling procedures. This IFR will
apply these important safety provisions
to the small cell and battery
consignments consistent with
international requirements.
The FLTOPSP stressed the need for
air carriers to conduct appropriate safety
risk management activities to ensure
that lithium cells and batteries can be
carried safely.29 The AIRP determined
that the continued transportation of
lithium ion batteries on passenger
aircraft presents ‘‘an unacceptable risk
to aircraft’’ under current conditions,
and that ‘‘lithium batteries and cells
should not be transported in aircraft
engaged in commercial air transport
operations as cargo unless acceptable
means to mitigate the risk can be
established.’’ The panel further
emphasized the following:
A growing body of test data has identified
that existing cargo compartment fire
protection systems certified to EASA CS
25.857 and U.S. CFR part 25.857 (CS/CFR
part 25) regulations are unable to suppress or
extinguish a fire involving significant
quantities of lithium batteries, resulting in
reduced time available for safe flight and
landing of an aircraft to a diversion
aerodrome.30

ICAO recognized the safety hazard
associated with the offering and
acceptance of lithium batteries as cargo
and addressed it by taking action to
implement addenda to the current ICAO
Technical Instructions based on input
and expertise from the AIRP, FLTOPSP,
DGP, Air Navigation Commission, and
the FAA Technical Center research.
Based on this information, the ICAO
Council authorized the issuance of an
addendum—an ICAO tool used for a
high consequence event resulting in, or
creating a direct risk of, loss of life or
serious injury to a person or damage to
the aircraft—to address the immediate
safety risk. The FAA subsequently
issued Safety Alert for Operators
(SAFO) 16001: Risks of Fire or
Explosion when Transporting Lithium
Ion Batteries or Lithium Metal Batteries
as Cargo on Passenger and Cargo
29 Flight Operations Panel (FLTOPSP); Second
Meeting; October 12–16, 2015; FLTOPSP/2–WP/31.
30 Airworthiness Panel (AIRP); Third Meeting;
December 7–11, 2015; AIRP/3–WP/21.

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Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 44 / Wednesday, March 6, 2019 / Rules and Regulations
Aircraft on January 19, 2016, advising
operators of the safety hazard associated
with lithium batteries in cargo. SAFO
16001 specifically recommends
performing a safety risk assessment and
implementing risk mitigation
strategies.31
Public Meeting
In consideration of the
recommendations put forward by the
multidisciplinary group, and in
preparation for the ICAO DGP/25
meeting, DOT (with representatives
from PHMSA, FAA, and OST) hosted a
public meeting on September 18, 2015,
to obtain feedback on how to better
enhance the safe transport of lithium
batteries by air.32 DOT specifically
requested public input on mitigation
strategies, information, and data. The
meeting included a discussion on
pertinent safety recommendations from
the multidisciplinary group and
possible amendments to the ICAO
Technical Instructions. DOT noted both
in the meeting notice and during the
public meeting that we may consider
adopting new standards or revised ICAO
Technical Instructions in a future
rulemaking action. Additionally, on
October 8, 2015, FAA hosted a public
meeting to discuss the agenda for ICAO
DGP/25, including those proposals
related to lithium batteries.
ICAO agreed to a series of measures
to address the previously and newly
identified hazards, such as prohibiting
the transport of lithium ion batteries as
cargo on passenger aircraft and
requiring all lithium ion cells and
batteries transported on cargo-only
aircraft to be shipped at a reduced state
of charge of not more than 30 percent
until such time that detailed
performance standards could be
developed and implemented. An
approval provision would allow
competent authorities to authorize
transport of lithium ion batteries on
cargo-only aircraft at a higher state of
charge provided an equivalent level of
safety can be established. ICAO also
agreed to greatly reduce the application
of long-standing provisions for the
transport of small batteries (commonly
referred to in the ICAO Technical
Instructions as Section II batteries). Per
this amendment, the Section II
provisions apply only to a single small
31 The FAA Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO)
16001 is available through the following URL:
http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/
airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/all_safos/
media/2016/safo16001.pdf.
32 The public meeting notice and the comments
received are available on the public docket DOT–
OST–2015–0169 available through
www.regulations.gov.

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package offered and accepted for
transport, thus eliminating the ability to
ship multiple packages in a single
consignment without standard hazard
communication. ICAO agreed that these
provisions should be incorporated in
the current 2015–2016 edition of the
ICAO Technical Instructions by way of
addenda as they address immediate
hazards to air transport safety.
Specifically, ICAO agreed to the
following measures effective April 1,
2016: 33 34
1. Prohibit the transport of lithium ion
batteries (not packed with or contained
in equipment) as cargo on passenger
aircraft;
2. Require all lithium ion batteries
(not packed with or contained in
equipment) to be shipped at not more
than a 30 percent state of charge on
cargo-only aircraft;
3. Restrict the use of Section II 35 (both
lithium ion and lithium metal) cell and
battery shipments to one package per
consignment or overpack.
ICAO agreed that prohibiting the
transport of lithium ion batteries as
cargo on passenger aircraft addresses a
pressing safety issue and further
determined that a reduced state of
charge, combined with restricting
Section II batteries to one package per
consignment or overpack, is
significantly safer than the current
transport requirements. ICAO also
agreed to include in the 2017–2018
ICAO Technical Instructions a provision
highlighting the need for air carriers
who wish to transport hazardous
materials to include a safety risk
assessment process for the transport of
hazardous materials before choosing to
do so. The provision will further state
that safety risk assessments should
include appropriate information to
result in the implementation of safety
measures that ensure the safe transport
of hazardous materials, including
lithium cells and batteries, as cargo.
C. Risk Potential
The respective FAA Technical Center
and NTSB testing demonstrate that
current packages, hazmat handling
33 Addendum 3 to the 2015–2016 edition of the
ICAO Technical Instructions, issued January 15,
2016. http://www.icao.int/safety/DangerousGoods/
AddendumCorrigendum%20to%20the%20
Technical%20Instructions/Doc%209284-20152016.ADD-3.pdf.
34 Addendum 4 to the 2015–2016 edition of the
ICAO Technical Instructions, issued February 23,
2016. http://www.icao.int/safety/DangerousGoods/
AddendumCorrigendum%20to%20the%20
Technical%20Instructions/Doc%209284-20152016.ADD-4.en.pdf.
35 The term ‘‘Section II’’ is not used in the HMR
but identical provisions for small cells and batteries
are included. (See 49 CFR 173.185(c)).

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requirements, shipping configurations,
and cargo compartment fire protection
systems do not provide adequate
protection and may be unable to
effectively mitigate a fire involving
lithium ion batteries. The results further
demonstrate that a relatively small fire
of only 450 °F (232 °C) is sufficient to
heat lithium ion cells to thermal
runaway and that the heat from a single
cell in thermal runaway, which can
reach 1100 °F (593 °C), is capable of
igniting adjacent packaging materials.
Furthermore, while the Halon 1301
fire suppression system in Class C cargo
compartments has been shown to
effectively suppress the open fire
associated with the burning electrolyte
and greatly reduce the potential ignition
of adjacent flammable materials, it is not
effective in cooling any cells already
engaged in thermal runaway. Thermal
runaway will continue to propagate
until all the cells in the consignment
have been consumed. Aircraft cargo
containers delay the detection of smoke
and fire originating from container
contents, thereby decreasing the time
interval between when smoke and fire
become detectable and taking
immediate action to suppress a fire and
protect the aircraft.36 Flammable gases
produced during a thermal runaway
event may continue to develop and
collect in a confined space, and the
ignition of these gases is sufficient to
rupture packages and dislodge pressure
relief panels that could result in loss of
Halon containment, significant damage
to the aircraft, and danger to both the
traveling public and flight crews.
This information was presented to the
Multidisciplinary Meeting on Lithium
Batteries that recommended mitigating
measures be taken to reduce the risk of
a fire involving significant quantities of
lithium cells and batteries (UN3090 and
UN3480) that may exceed the fire
suppression capability of the aircraft
and could lead to a catastrophic loss of
the aircraft. Various other groups
including the International
Coordination Council for Aerospace
Industry Association (ICCAIA), major
airframe manufacturers, the
International Federation of Airline
Pilots Association (IFALPA), AIRP, and
FLTOPSP endorsed the
recommendations from the
Multidisciplinary Meeting on Lithium
Batteries and separately provided
additional recommendations. The ICAO
Council approved the adoption of
additional requirements to mitigate risks
posed by lithium batteries as cargo on
cargo-only aircraft. This decision was
based upon the input and expertise from
36 Panagiotou,

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the AIRP, FLTOPSP, DGP, Air
Navigation Commission, and the FAA
Technical Center research. The
prohibition of the transport of lithium
ion batteries (UN3480) as cargo on
passenger aircraft was made in response
to tests that demonstrate that fire
involving lithium ion batteries may
exceed the capability of aircraft cargo
fire protection systems. The additional
requirements to mitigate risks posed by
lithium batteries, which will continue to
be permitted for transport on cargo
aircraft, include transporting all lithium
ion batteries at a state of charge not
exceeding 30 percent of their rated
capacity and limiting the number of
packages of small lithium ion or lithium
metal batteries. While the likelihood of
a fire involving a shipment of lithium
batteries in air transport is low, the
consequences of such an incident would
be catastrophic. With the potential for
an uncontrolled fire involving a
relatively small quantity of lithium
batteries to lead to a catastrophic failure
of the airframe, the inability of the
package or the aircraft fire suppression
system to control such a fire presents an
unacceptable safety risk. PHMSA
acknowledges that there are
advancements in packaging design and
packaging configurations, including fill
materials and fire suppression agents,
which are promising and may
eventually provide safe and reliable
ways to continue to transport lithium
batteries on board passenger aircraft.
However, PHMSA identified a total of
39 incidents in air cargo transportation
between 2010 and 2016, with 13 of
these incidents involving lithium
batteries and smoke, fire, extreme heat,
or explosion, that would have been
affected by this IFR. These types of
incidents are indicative of the types of
events that are possible if lithium ion
batteries continue to be transported on
passenger aircraft. Below are summaries
of three U.S. and international events
that highlight the potential for lithium
batteries to contribute to an incident
resulting is loss of life and/or loss of
aircraft.
• February 7, 2006: Incident at the
Philadelphia International Airport in
which a fire suspected to have been
caused by lithium ion batteries
destroyed a cargo aircraft and much of
its cargo.
• September 3, 2010: Dubai, United
Arab Emirates, a 747–400 cargo aircraft
(U.S. flag) crashed while attempting to
land at the Dubai International Airport
after a fire was discovered. Both pilots
were killed, and the aircraft and its
cargo, which included a significant
quantity of lithium ion batteries, were
destroyed.

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• July 28, 2011: The Republic of
Korea, a 747–400 cargo aircraft crashed
into international waters. The two pilots
aboard the flight were killed. The Korea
Aviation and Railway Accident
Investigation Board determined that the
cause of this accident was a fire that
developed on or near two pallets
containing hazardous materials
packages, including hybrid-electric
vehicle lithium ion batteries and
flammable liquids.
Please see the Appendix A of the RIA
for this rulemaking, a copy of which has
been placed in the docket, for more
detail on PHMSA Incident Reports
involving lithium batteries.
Although the aforementioned
measures provide significant
improvements to safety, they do not
eliminate all risks and should be
coupled with other mitigation strategies
as part of a layered approach to safety.
In this IFR, PHMSA is adopting the
changes approved by ICAO that were
informed by aviation safety experts and
are already implemented in
international air transportation.
As discussed in ‘‘Section IV. Good
Cause for Immediate Adoption,’’
PHMSA has determined that proceeding
with notice and comment to adopt
additional safety measures for transport
of lithium ion batteries is impracticable.
D. Alternative Transport Conditions
PHMSA considered an alternative in
which the IFR would prescribe specific
conditions authorizing the transport of
lithium ion batteries at a charge greater
than 30 percent on cargo-only aircraft or
as cargo on passenger aircraft. The
conditions would need to mitigate the
safety risks posed by the batteries,
which include fire, thermal runaway,
and explosion from ignition of vented
gases. The conditions considered
included limits on the size and number
of cells, a reduced state of charge, the
number of packages, the packaging,
additional fire suppression systems, and
manufacturing controls on the cells
themselves. PHMSA was unable to
identify a general set of conditions in
which it would be safe to transport any
quantity or type of lithium ion cells as
cargo on a passenger aircraft or at a
charge greater than 30 percent on cargoonly aircraft.
However, PHMSA is authorizing, with
the approval of the Associate
Administrator, up to two lithium
batteries used for medical devices to be
transported on passenger aircraft, and as
applicable, at a state of charge higher
than 30 percent, when the intended
destination of the batteries is not
serviced daily by cargo aircraft. See
‘‘Section V.D. Limited Exceptions to

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Restrictions on Air Transportation of
Medical Device Cells or Batteries’’ for
further discussion. This provision
addresses the legislation titled ‘‘FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018’’ signed on
October 5, 2018, by the President, which
instructs the Secretary to issue limited
exceptions for lithium ion and metal
cells or batteries used for a medical
device to be transported on passenger
aircraft. See Public Law 302–89.
Additionally, the provision addresses
comments submitted to Docket No.
DOT–OST–2015–0169 announcing a
public meeting to seek input on issues
concerning lithium batteries that were
to be discussed by the ICAO DGP, in
which the Medical Device Battery
Transport Council (MDBTC) noted
concerns relevant to shipping medical
devices and batteries by air (e.g.,
delivery to remote locations and
increased supply chain constraints). The
MDBTC noted that prohibiting the
transport of lithium ion batteries on
passenger aircraft and the 30 percent
state of charge restriction would
negatively impact the transport of
replacement lithium ion batteries for
medical devices. The provision also
addresses comments to the docket that
identified a need to ship lithium ion
cells and batteries to remote areas.
As previously discussed in
‘‘Subsection A. FAA Technical Center
Testing’’ of this section, the
ineffectiveness of fire suppression
systems (Halon or oxygen starvation) to
control propagation of thermal runaway
from cell to cell or to control the
production of large quantities of
flammable gases drives the need for
additional safety controls. The ICAO
Council adopted a prohibition on the
transport of lithium ion batteries as
cargo on passenger aircraft due to the
inability of aircraft fire suppression
systems to mitigate a fire involving
lithium ion batteries. Determination of
the aircraft fire suppression system
vulnerability was based on assessments
and positions presented by a wide range
of global experts in the field of aircraft
design, certification, and operations.
The additional requirements to mitigate
risks posed by lithium batteries, which
will continue to be permitted for
transport on cargo aircraft, include
transporting all lithium ion batteries at
a state of charge not exceeding 30
percent of their rated capacity and
limiting the number of packages of
small lithium ion or lithium metal
batteries.
Therefore, in this IFR, PHMSA is
implementing the revisions approved by
ICAO and informed aviation safety
experts to address the risks created by
the air transport of lithium batteries,

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along with an exception for the limited
transport of lithium cells or batteries
specifically used for a medical device
where the intended destination is not
serviced daily by cargo aircraft, with the
approval of the Associate Administrator.
IV. Good Cause for Immediate
Adoption
The Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., generally
requires public notice before
promulgating regulations. See 5 U.S.C.
553(b). The APA provides an exception,
however, when there is good cause to
conclude that notice and public
comment is impracticable, unnecessary,
or contrary to the public interest. See 5
U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B).
PHMSA finds that compliance with
the notice-and-comment process for this
rulemaking would be impracticable.
Accordingly, PHMSA finds that there is
good cause for this IFR to be exempt
from the notice-and-comment process.
Interested parties will still have an
opportunity to submit comments in
response to this IFR before a permanent
final rule is issued.37 PHMSA’s finding
of good cause is based on the
impracticability of providing the public
with notice-and-comment while
attempting to comply with the 90-day
statutory rulemaking mandate in the
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018,
Public Law 115–254 (October 5, 2018,
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018).38
Section 333 of the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018 requires the
Secretary of Transportation to conform
U.S. regulations on the air
transportation of lithium cells and
batteries to the 2015–2016 edition of the
ICAO Technical Instructions, including
the amendments that were made
effective on April 1, 2016. The act was
signed into law on October 5, 2018, and
requires DOT to take this action within
90 days, which is January 3, 2019. This
IFR adopts the 2015–2016 edition of the
ICAO Technical Instructions and
subsequent revised standards effective
April 1, 2016, into the domestic HMR,
37 DOT has sought public input on multiple
occasions prior to this rulemaking. DOT held a
public meeting on September 18, 2015, to discuss
the ICAO Technical Instructions lithium battery
amendments and to obtain input on mitigation
strategies, information, and data on how to better
ensure the safe transportation of lithium batteries
by air. See Notice of Lithium Battery Safety Public
Meeting and Request for Information, 80 FR 52368
(August 28, 2015). Additionally, FAA hosted a
public meeting on October 8, 2015, to discuss the
agenda for ICAO’s lithium battery proposed
amendments.
38 PHMSA’s compliance with the statutory
deadline was negatively impacted by a lapse in
funding from December 22, 2018 through January
25, 2019, that affected PHMSA, FAA, and other
government agencies.

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as required. The IFR is necessary to
allow PHMSA to come close to
complying with the 90-day timeframe
required by the FAA Reauthorization
Act of 2018. The statutory mandated
deadline does not provide PHMSA with
sufficient time to prepare and publish a
proposed regulation in the Federal
Register, provide an opportunity to
comment, and issue a final rule.
The purpose of Section 333 is to
address the potential safety risk in
transporting lithium batteries by air.
Indeed, the caption of the provision is
‘‘Safe Air Transportation of Lithium
Cells and Batteries.’’ Congress’s choice
to single out Section 333 for rapid
implementation suggests that it
perceived this safety risk to warrant
accelerated intervention. The need to
follow Congress’s directive to address,
within 90 days, a status quo that
Congress itself regarded as demanding
urgent remediation would make the
notice-and-comment process ordinarily
applicable under the APA ‘‘contrary to
the public interest’’ in this instance.
Congress’s desire to eliminate, as
speedily as possible, potential air
transportation risks associated with
lithium batteries among air operators
which have not already voluntarily
adopted ICAO’s 2015–2016 lithium
battery standards is supported by FAA
Technical Center testing showing the
potential for an uncontrolled fire
involving a relatively small quantity of
lithium batteries and the potential
buildup of flammable gases in a
suppressed lithium ion battery fire that
could lead to a catastrophic failure of
the airframe, as well as the large body
of research conducted by DOT, NTSB,
and other respected sources that
demonstrates the potential safety risks
of lithium batteries transported by air
under the current regulations and the
connection of the revised regulations to
those hazards.
PHMSA finds that the use of notice
and comment procedures before issuing
this rulemaking is impracticable. This
IFR is the only rulemaking option that
will allow PHMSA to come close to
meeting the statutory deadline in the
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 while
addressing the potential safety risk in
transporting lithium batteries by air.
Additionally, while the APA generally
requires that publication of a
substantive rulemaking be made at least
30 days before its effective date, the
APA provides for dispensation of the
30-day effectiveness delay upon good
cause similar to the notice and comment
requirements. 5 U.S.C. 553(d). For the
reasons discussed above, PHMSA finds
good cause to dispense with the 30-day
delay in effectiveness upon publication.

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8015

Accordingly, this IFR is effective upon
publication in the Federal Register.
V. Summary of Changes
To ensure the safe transport of lithium
batteries by air and protect the traveling
public, flight crews, and for
harmonization with international
regulations from ICAO, PHMSA amends
the HMR to prohibit the transport of
lithium ion cells and batteries (UN3480)
as cargo on passenger aircraft; require
all lithium ion cells and batteries
(UN3480) to be shipped at not more
than a 30 percent state of charge on
cargo-only aircraft; and restrict small
lithium cell or battery shipments to one
package per consignment or overpack.
Also, PHMSA is providing a limited
exception, with the approval of the
Associate Administrator, to the
restrictions on the air transport of
replacement medical device cells and
batteries if the intended destination for
the cells or batteries is not serviced
daily by cargo aircraft. PHMSA would
authorize the transport on passenger
aircraft of not more than two lithium
cells or batteries specifically used for a
medical device and would waive the 30
percent state of charge limit for lithium
ion cells and batteries, with an approval
of the Associate Administrator. PHMSA
further defines medical device for the
purposes of the HMR as an instrument,
apparatus, implement, machine,
contrivance, implant, or in vitro reagent,
including any component, part, or
accessory thereof, which is intended for
use in the diagnosis of disease or other
conditions, or in the cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease, of a
person. See ‘‘Subsection D. Limited
Exceptions to Restrictions on Air
Transportation of Medical Device Cells
or Batteries’’ of this section for further
discussion.
A. Passenger Aircraft Prohibition
PHMSA is prohibiting the transport of
lithium ion batteries (UN3480) as cargo
on passenger aircraft because of their
unique challenges associated with
thermal runaway: Pressure pulses,
venting of flammable gas, and resistance
to extinguishment. The FAA Technical
Center investigated the ability of various
fire suppression measures—fire
suppression agents, depressurization,
FCC, and FRC—to control lithium ion
battery fires. The results concluded that
gaseous fire suppression agents were
effective in extinguishing the electrolyte
fire but had no effect in stopping the
propagation of thermal runaway from
cell to cell. Therefore, a lithium ion
battery fire can still compromise the
aircraft critical systems even in the
presence of Halon, which is the current

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means of suppression in passenger
aircraft cargo compartments. A lithium
ion battery fire was marginally
controlled through oxygen starvation,
which is the primary means of
controlling fires in Class E cargo
compartments.39 The FCCs were unable
to contain flames and flammable gases
from escaping, and tests involving FRCs
resulted in explosions. The FRCs
permitted flammable gases generated
from cells in thermal runaway to
accumulate in a confined area within
the FRC before being ignited by burning
packages, or a spark from a burning cell,
and exploding. An analysis of the
batteries consumed in the FRC fire test
indicated that only a small fraction of
the 5,000 cells went into thermal
runaway, vented, and caused the
explosion.
As discussed in this IFR, the FAA
Technical Center tested the ability of
several common shipping containers to
contain the effects of a thermal runaway
originating from a single lithium cell.
Currently authorized packages, package
configurations, shipping containers, and
consignment limits could neither
contain a lithium battery fire nor
prevent the propagation of fire from one
package to another. FCCs and FRCs
were unable to contain a fire involving
lithium batteries. Overpack containers
designed to transport chemical oxygen
generators successfully contained the
fire from lithium ion batteries but
permitted smoke and vapors to escape.
Neither were fire suppression systems,
including the Halon that is currently
used in cargo compartments, entirely
effective against lithium battery fires. Of
the package configurations that were
tested, the only effective methods to
stop propagation of thermal runaway
were reducing the state of charge to 30
percent and adding a pack of water
above the cells.40 The inability of the
package or the aircraft fire suppression
system to control a fire involving
lithium ion batteries presents an
immediate safety hazard of which the
actions in this IFR will address, while
also harmonizing to the ICAO Technical
Instructions.
This IFR is consistent with the July
2015 aircraft manufacturer notices to air
carriers warning of these hazards and
supporting a prohibition on the carriage
39 Class E cargo compartments are common on the
upper deck cargo compartments of freighter aircraft.
Class E compartments have fire detection systems,
the means to shut off ventilation flow, and the
means to exclude hazardous quantities of smoke,
flames, and noxious gases from the flight crew
compartment. Class C cargo compartments also
include an approved built-in fire extinguishing or
suppression system controllable from the cockpit.
See 14 CFR 25.857.
40 Maloney, T., and Dadia, D. See footnote 23.

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of high-density packages of lithium ion
batteries on passenger aircraft. Several
large passenger air carriers responded to
the notices by voluntarily instituting
bans on the transport of lithium ion
batteries.
Removal of Authorization for Lithium
Ion Aircraft Batteries
As a consequence of the prohibition
on the transport of lithium ion batteries
(UN3480) as cargo on passenger aircraft,
PHMSA is removing the authorization
in § 172.102(c)(2) special provision A51
that permits the transport of lithium ion
aircraft batteries on passenger aircraft.
Special provision A51 was added to the
HMR in the HM–215L final rule. 78 FR
987 (Jan. 7, 2013). This amendment,
which became effective on January 1,
2013, harmonized the HMR with an
authorization added to the 2013–2014
ICAO Technical Instructions that
allowed a package containing a single
lithium ion aircraft battery with a net
mass not exceeding 35 kg on passenger
aircraft. In 2013, shortly after the
authorization in special provision A51
became effective, there were two
incidents involving lithium ion batteries
installed in Boeing Model 787–8
aircraft. The first incident on January 7,
2013, involved a Japan Airlines Boeing
787–8 that was parked at the gate at
Logan International Airport in Boston,
MA. Maintenance personnel observed
smoke coming from the lid of the
auxiliary power unit battery case, as
well as a fire with two distinct flames
at the electrical connector on the front
of the case. No passengers or
crewmembers were aboard the airplane
at the time and none of the maintenance
or cleaning personnel aboard the
airplane was injured.41 A second
incident on January 16, 2013, on an All
Nippon Airways flight required the
flight to make an emergency landing.
Four passengers out of the 173
occupants on board the aircraft suffered
minor injuries during the evacuation. It
appears that in both cases the heat from
a single overheated cell propagated to
adjacent cells resulting in a thermal
runaway.42 In response to these
incidents, ICAO issued an addendum in
February 2013 to disallow lithium ion
batteries from being transported under
special provision A51. Lithium ion
batteries with a net weight of up to 35
41 Aircraft Incident Report; Auxiliary Power Unit
Battery Fire; National Transportation Safety Board
NTSB/AIR–14/01; Adopted November 21, 2014.
42 Aircraft Serious Incident Investigation Report,
Japan Transport Safety Board; AI25014–4;
September 25, 2014.

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kg may continue to be transported on
cargo-only aircraft.43
B. State of Charge Requirement
PHMSA is requiring all lithium ion
cells and batteries transported as
UN3480 (not packed with or contained
in equipment) on cargo-only aircraft be
shipped at a state of charge of not more
than 30 percent of their rated capacity.
This requirement was determined based
on FAA Technical Center test results
demonstrating that the propagation of
thermal runaway could be greatly
reduced or eliminated at this level. The
hazardous effects of thermal runaway
were markedly less when the cells were
at 30 percent state of charge or less
relative to higher states of charge. The
FAA tested lithium ion 18650 LiCoO2
cells at five charge states: 100% (two
tests), 50%, 40%, 30%, and 20%.
The results can be summed up as
follows:
• The 100% cell exploded in both
tests, and rapid cooling was observed.
Peak temperature: 1030 °F.
• The 50% test consumed all cells.
Peak temperature: 1044 °F.
• At 40%, two cells were consumed,
and the peak temperature 760 °F
decreased after thermal runaway in Cell
2.
• At 30%, venting occurred in Cell 1
with no thermal runaway. Peak
temperature: 560 °F.
• At 20%, venting occurred in Cell 1
with no thermal runaway. Peak
temperature: 502 °F.
These results apply to lithium ion
cells of this size and chemistry and
thermal runaway effects may be
different for different cell sizes and
chemistries. However other studies
involving different lithium ion cell
chemistries show a similar trend of
reduced hazardous effects at a reduced
state of charge. The ICAO agreed that a
30 percent state of charge limit was
appropriate based on the testing
information available.
In implementing the ICAO Technical
Instructions, PHMSA has fully
transmitted the provisions into the
HMR. Consistent with the ICAO
Technical Instructions, PHMSA
authorizes the transport of lithium ion
cells or batteries on cargo-only aircraft
at a higher state of charge subject to the
approval of the Associate Administrator
for Hazardous Materials Safety. Also,
consistent with ICAO, PHMSA did not
provide an authorization for
transporting lithium ion batteries as
43 Addendum 1 to the 2013–2014 edition of the
ICAO Technical Instructions, issued February 12,
2013. http://www.icao.int/safety/DangerousGoods/
Documents/Doc%209284-2013-2014Edition_
Addendum-1.en.pdf.

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Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 44 / Wednesday, March 6, 2019 / Rules and Regulations
cargo on passenger aircraft.
Accordingly, if there is a need to
transport lithium ion batteries on a
passenger aircraft, an applicant must
apply for a special permit in accordance
with the provisions of part 107, subpart
B.
An approval is written consent,
including a competent authority
approval, from the Associate
Administrator or other designated
Department official, to perform a
function that requires prior consent
under the HMR. Approvals are an
extension of the regulations and
facilitate the continued safe transport of
hazardous materials by providing
specific regulatory relief on a case-bycase basis. Approvals are valid for both
domestic and international
transportation and are recognized as
approval by a competent authority for
the purposes of the ICAO Technical
Instructions and other international
hazardous materials regulations. When
shipping internationally, approval is
required from the country of origin and
the country of the air carrier. Only a
single approval is required for
shipments originating in the United
States transported by a domestic air
carrier. PHMSA’s approval application
procedures are set forth in 49 CFR part
107, subpart H. PHMSA specifies an
expiration date in each approval, which
is typically 2 years from the date of
issuance. It is important to note that
PHMSA only grants approvals for
activities allowed (if approved) under
specific conditions identified in the
HMR. Applications for approvals and
supporting documentation may be
submitted by mail, by facsimile,
electronically via email, or through
PHMSA’s online system. Unless
emergency processing is requested and
granted, applications are usually
processed in the order in which they are
filed.
Lithium ion batteries contain both a
chemical and an electrical hazard. It is
the combination of these two hazards
that creates a unique challenge to safety
in the air transportation environment.
As referenced in this section, numerous
private and public sector studies have
clearly demonstrated and validated
through physical testing that reducing a
cell or battery’s state of charge
measurably reduces this risk. A number
of factors can lead to an incident in
transport, including but not limited to
thermal, mechanical, or electrical abuse;
substandard cell design; and internal

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cell faults associated with cell
manufacturing defects. Existing
transport requirements reduce the
likelihood of thermal runaway from
damage and external short circuits.
Internal short circuits can form during
charge and discharge cycles, physical
damage to the cell or battery or
manufacturing defects. Thermal
runaway events originating from
internal cell faults appear to be rare, but
do nevertheless occur. Regardless of the
cause, the hazardous effects of a thermal
runaway event are the same. Cell
chemistry, state of charge, and heat
transfer environment are some of the
significant factors that influence the
effects of failure.44 Multiple
independent studies have shown that,
independent of the initiating factor,
reducing the state of charge measurably
reduces both the likelihood and
consequence of an incident involving
lithium ion batteries. Most significantly,
lowering the state of charge reduces or
eliminates the ability of a cell to
experience thermal runaway and the
potential for propagation. Reducing the
state of charge for lithium ion cells and
batteries offered for transport translates
to a safer transport environment.
Specifically, reducing the state of
charge of a lithium ion cell or battery:
• Decreases the likelihood of thermal
runaway; 45
• Decreases or eliminates the
potential for thermal runaway to spread
to adjacent cells or batteries; 46
• Increases the cell’s ability to
tolerate a short circuit and significantly
reduces the maximum temperature
achieved at the point of shorting; 47
• Reduces the quantities of gases
released if thermal runaway
occurs; 48 49 50 51
44 Mikolajczak

et al. See footnote 4.
Dan, and Roth, E. Peter, A General
Discussion of Li Ion Battery Safety, The
Electrochemical Society Interface, Vol. 21, No.2,
Summer 2012.
46 Doughty, Dan, and Roth, E. Peter. See footnote
45.
47 Doughty, Dan, and Roth, E. Peter. See footnote
45.
48 Doughty, Dan, and Roth, E. Peter. See footnote
45.
49 Somandepalli, V., Marr, Kevin C., and Horn,
Quinn C., Quantification of Combustion Hazards of
Thermal Runaway Failures in Lithium-Ion Batteries,
SAE International. J. Alt. Power, Vol. 3, No. 1, May
2014.
50 Golubkov, Andrey W., Scheikl, Sebastian,
Planteu, Rene´, Voitic, Gernot, Wiltsche, Helmar,
Stangl, Christoph, Fauler, Gisela, Thaler,
Alexander, and Hacker, Viktor, Thermal runaway of
45 Doughty,

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8017

• Reduces the magnitude of the
heating rate if thermal runaway
occurs.52 53 54 55 56
Comprehensive laboratory testing
from various sources, including the
FAA, has shown that lithium ion
batteries are thermally more stable and
the hazardous effects of thermal
runaway are less when the battery is at
a reduced state of charge. Both Roth et
al.57 and Doughty and Roth 58 found that
a higher state of charge in commerciallyavailable lithium ion 18650 LiCoO2
cells resulted in lower onset
temperature of self-generated heating
and that the magnitude of a cell’s
response to internal short circuit is
influenced by state of charge. Other
studies, such as that done by
Somandepalli et al.59 have observed that
the volume of gas vented from cells in
thermal runway is less at lower states of
charge. More importantly, a sufficiently
reduced state of charge for the most
commonly carried cells eliminates
propagation of thermal runaway and the
potential for a chain reaction in the
event of a single cell failure.
In an aviation environment, the safety
benefits associated with a reduced state
of charge are more pronounced than for
other modes due to the potential
consequences of an in-flight event. As
evidenced by testing conducted by the
FAA Technical Center and supported by
analyses performed by a major aircraft
manufacturer, an incident involving
even a relatively small number of
lithium ion cells is sufficient to
overwhelm existing aircraft safety
systems and compromise the integrity of
the aircraft. Taking this into account,
manufacturers often preemptively ship
lithium ion batteries at a reduced state
of charge as a business practice.
commercial 18650 Li-ion batteries with LFP and
NCA cathodes—impact of state of charge and
overcharge, Royal Society of Chemistry Advances,
Issue 70, June 2015.
51 Roth, E. P., Crafts, CC, Doughty, D. H., and
McBreen J., Advanced Technology Development
Program for Lithium-Ion Batteries: Thermal Abuse
Performance of 18650 Li-Ion Cells, Sandia Report:
SAND2004–0584, March 2004.
52 Doughty, Dan, and Roth, E. Peter. See footnote
45.
53 Somandepalli et al. See footnote 49.
54 Bandhauer et al. See footnote 3.
55 Roth et al. See footnote 51.
56 Golubkov et al. See footnote 52.
57 Roth et al. See footnote 51.
58 Doughty, Dan, and Roth, E. Peter. See footnote
45.
59 Somandepalli et al. See footnote 49.

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Existing aircraft protection systems
simply cannot mitigate the
accumulation and potential for ignition
of flammable gases, which can
completely overwhelm current aircraft
safety systems and lead to loss of the
aircraft’s flight capabilities. Requiring
cells and batteries to be transported at
a sufficiently reduced state of charge
would immediately and measurably
reduce both the likelihood and
consequences of an incident involving
lithium ion cells or batteries in an
aviation environment. As demonstrated
by multiple studies and physical testing,
the exothermic reaction experienced by
a cell is highly dependent on the state
of charge.60 61 For the most commonly
carried cell, the lithium ion 18650
LiCoO2 cell, research and testing is
particularly significant. The FAA
Technical Center testing has specifically
demonstrated that for these cells, a state
of charge of 30 percent not only reduces
the intensity of thermal runaway but
also completely eliminates propagation
of thermal runaway.62 While no one
safety measure known today is
singularly effective in eliminating all
hazards inherent in the transport of
lithium ion batteries, this particular
measure dramatically reduces the
possibility of an unmanageable event
that could lead to loss of the aircraft and
the lives of those aboard. Further
research and additional work is
necessary to more comprehensively
assess the most effective mechanisms to
mitigate those hazards. While this work
continues, it is in the best interest of the
public that carriage of lithium ion cells
or batteries as cargo on passenger
aircraft be prohibited and that state of
charge be reduced on lithium ion cells
and batteries being carried as cargo on
cargo-only aircraft.
C. Consignment and Overpack
Restriction
PHMSA is restricting the use of
alternative provisions for small lithium
cells and batteries to one package per
overpack or consignment to prevent the
consolidation of large numbers of
lithium cell and battery shipments in a
single overpack or consignment under
provisions designed for small quantities
of batteries. Shippers can still offer
lithium cells or batteries in an overpack
or a consolidated consignment, but
60 Mikolajczak,

C.J., and A. Wagner-Jaureff, US
FAA-Style Flammability Assessment of Lithium Ion
Cells and Battery Packs in Aircraft Cargo Holds,
Exponent Failure Analysis Report, April 15, 2005
Retrieved from: http://www.prba.org/wp-content/
uploads/Exponent_PRBA_burn_box_report_
final1.pdf.
61 Webster, H. See footnote 20.
62 Maloney, T., and Dadia, D. See footnote 23.

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these must be identified to the air
operator as hazardous materials. The
identification of these consignments as
hazardous materials will allow
operators to consider safety risk
assessments and implement mitigation
strategies appropriate to the operator’s
specific capabilities, thus reducing the
hazards posed by such consignments.
The hazardous materials regulatory
system has for decades proven its
effectiveness in mitigating risks
associated with hazardous materials
transportation. Shippers and operators
understand this system and have
included steps in their processes to
ensure compliance. Current provisions
for small batteries were developed based
on the reduced risk posed by a limited
number of small batteries in a single
package. These provisions were
developed before current research and
testing that demonstrate the significant
fire hazard posed by consolidations of
such packages in an aviation
environment. ICAO considered reducing
or eliminating the provisions for Section
II of the ICAO Technical Instructions
because such consignments do not
require shipping papers or notification
to the pilot in command. Shipping
papers provide air carriers with
information (i.e., quantity, type of
package, package weight) that is
essential to accurately identify packages
of lithium batteries and to conduct
effective safety assessments. ICAO
ultimately agreed to limit provisions for
Section II batteries by restricting to one
the number of packages that can be
offered as a single shipment or placed
into a single overpack and noted that
this action would ensure such
consignments were subject to standard
hazard communication, thereby
improving awareness to the operator.
ICAO considered recent actions by
government regulators and the industry,
and various recommendations from the
Third International Multidisciplinary
Lithium Battery Transport Coordination
Meeting:
• A safety alert for operators issued
by the FAA in 2010 (SAFO 10017)
recommending that operators load bulk
consignments of Section II batteries in
Class C cargo compartments or locations
where alternate fire suppression was
available; 63
• A multi-operator message issued by
the Boeing Company in 2015 (MOM–
MOM–15–0469–01B) advising operators
who transport lithium batteries to
conduct a safety risk assessment that
63 The FAA Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO)
10017 is available through the following URL:
http://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/media/
safo10017.pdf.

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takes into account, among other factors,
the types and quantities of lithium
batteries carried, the quantity per flight,
their location within the cargo
compartment, and their proximity to
other dangerous goods;
• An in-service information article
issued by Airbus Industries in 2015 (ISI
00.00.00182) advising operators who
transport lithium batteries to conduct a
safety assessment that considers, among
other factors, information on the types
of lithium batteries being shipped, as
well as the quantity and density of the
consignment. Airbus further
recommended that all consignments of
lithium batteries be identified and
notified, and that policy to notify the
flight crew of all lithium battery
consignments is established; and
• Interim recommendations from the
Third International Multidisciplinary
Lithium Battery Transport Coordination
Meeting (see paragraph 5.1.3 and
appendix A to the report available at
http://www.icao.int/safety/
DangerousGoods/Pages/
Multidisciplinary.aspx), including
safety risk assessments by operators
who wished to transport lithium
batteries that would require
consideration of information on the
types and quantities of lithium batteries
and cells being transported.
Alignment of the HMR with the
revised Section II provisions in the
ICAO Technical Instructions for small
batteries directly addresses NTSB
Recommendation A–07–109 that the
Department ‘‘eliminate regulatory
exemptions for the packaging, marking,
and labeling of cargo consignments of
small secondary lithium batteries (no
more than 8 grams equivalent lithium
content) until the analysis of the failures
and the implementation of risk-based
requirements asked for in Safety
Recommendation A–07–108 are
completed.’’ This recommendation was
closed by NTSB when the DOT took an
‘‘Acceptable Alternative Action’’ by
harmonizing the HMR with the 2013–
2014 ICAO Technical Instructions,
which included amended provisions for
Section II batteries. The relevant
amendments to the 2013–2014 ICAO
Technical Instructions were adopted by
ICAO on the basis that those
amendments were considered to ensure
that:
[T]raining would now be required for many
more shippers preparing lithium battery
shipments; operators would now be required
to perform acceptance checks on all large
shipments of lithium batteries prior to
loading and stowage aboard an aircraft; pilots
would be notified of the presence, location
and quantity of lithium batteries aboard the
aircraft . . . and regulators would be

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provided a framework in which better
training, oversight and enforcement could be
applied.

However, implementation of the
revised ICAO provisions in practice
revealed a deficiency in that large
numbers of Section II packages
continued to enter the air transport
stream in bulk (overpacked and/or
palletized) configurations. Adopting the
amendments in this IFR will bring the
HMR into alignment with the ICAO
Technical Instructions and address this
deficiency.
D. Limited Exceptions to Restrictions on
Air Transportation of Medical Device
Cells or Batteries
To execute the mandate in Section
333 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of
2018, PHMSA is authorizing, with the
approval of the Associate Administrator,
the transport of not more than two
lithium cells or batteries used for a
medical device to be transported on
passenger aircraft and an exception from
the 30 percent state of charge limit
under specified conditions. This
provision applies when the intended
destination of the batteries is not
serviced daily by cargo aircraft and the
batteries are required for medically
necessary care. The medical device cells
or batteries must be (1) individually
packed in an inner packaging that
completely encloses the cell or battery,
(2) placed in a rigid outer packaging,
and (3) protected to prevent short
circuiting.64 PHMSA is also adopting
the definition of medical device as used
in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018
as follows: ‘‘A medical device means an
instrument, apparatus, implement,
machine, contrivance, implant, or in
vitro reagent, including any component,
part, or accessory thereof, which is
intended for use in the diagnosis of
disease or other conditions, or in the
cure, mitigation, treatment, or
prevention of disease, of a person.’’
Several aspects necessary to
implement the FAA Reauthorization Act
of 2018 requirements, are not defined in
the congressional mandate. In this IFR,
PHMSA defines requirements based on
previous interpretations, current
regulatory requirements, and ease of
implementation. PHMSA requests
comments on these criteria, including
64 PHMSA notes methods to prevent short
circuiting include, but are not limited to: Packaging
each battery in fully enclosed inner packages made
of non-conductive material, packaging batteries in
a manner to prevent contact with other batteries,
devices or conductive materials, and ensuring
exposed terminals or connectors are protected with
non-conductive caps, non-conductive tape, or by
other appropriate means. See PHMSA Letter of
Interpretation, Reference Number 16–0174; May 18,
2018.

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potential impacts these criteria may
have on stakeholders.
• The limitation to ‘‘not more than
two replacement lithium cells or
batteries’’ applies to the number of cells
or batteries per package, as approved by
the Associate Administrator.
• A destination is no longer
considered to be ‘‘serviced daily by a
cargo aircraft’’ when it is
impracticable 65 to reach the intended
destination by cargo aircraft and
subsequent motor vehicle
transportation. The person applying for
the approval of the Associate
Administrator must demonstrate that
this provision applies. PHMSA has not
provided a specific distance of when a
location is no longer considered
serviced daily by a cargo aircraft to
allow for flexibility in evaluating each
scenario on a case-by-case basis;
however, PHMSA seeks comment on
whether a distance should be
considered.
• Batteries ‘‘required for medically
necessary care’’ are batteries that are
needed for a medical device that is used
by the recipient for medical care.
PHMSA’s standard operating
procedures [for approvals and special
permits] will be updated when
reviewing applications for consignments
of lithium cells or batteries for medical
devices, as prescribed in Section 333
paragraph (b)(1) of the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018.
Specifically, PHMSA will either grant or
deny an application for air
transportation of lithium ion cells or
batteries specifically used for medical
devices, no later than 45 days after
receipt of the application. A draft will
be submitted to the FAA no later than
30 days after the date of application,
and the FAA will conduct an on-site
inspection no later than 20 days after
receiving the draft from PHMSA.
Section 333 paragraph (b)(1) applies to
only lithium ion cells and batteries, but
since paragraph (b)(2) applies to both
lithium ion and metal batteries for
medical devices, PHMSA understands
the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018
language in section 333 paragraph (b)(1)
to also apply to lithium metal batteries
for medical devices. PHMSA seeks
comments on the application
requirements or evaluation process,
including any potential impacts on
applicants or airlines, such as package
design, distance between the intended
destination and an airport not serviced
daily by a cargo aircraft, communication
65 PHMSA has previously used the term
‘‘impracticable’’ in the HMR. See §§ 173.150(f) and
175.310(a).

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8019

requirements, and the FAA on-site
inspection.
This limited exception also addresses
comments submitted to Docket No.
DOT–OST–2015–0169, which identified
a need to transport lithium ion batteries
to remote areas that are accessible by
passenger aircraft only.
VI. Regulatory Analysis and Notices
A. Statutory/Legal Authority for This
Rulemaking
This IFR is published under the
authority of the Federal Hazardous
Materials Transportation Law, 49 U.S.C.
5101 et seq. Section 5103(b) authorizes
the Secretary of Transportation to
prescribe regulations for the safe
transportation, including security, of
hazardous material in intrastate,
interstate, and foreign commerce. This
IFR revises regulations for the safe
transport of lithium cells and batteries
by air and the protection of aircraft
operators and the flying public.
B. Executive Order 12866 and DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures
Executive Order 12866 (‘‘Regulatory
Planning and Review’’) requires
agencies to regulate in the ‘‘most costeffective manner,’’ to make a ‘‘reasoned
determination that the benefits of the
intended regulation justify its costs,’’
and to develop regulations that ‘‘impose
the least burden on society.’’
This IFR is considered a significant
regulatory action under E.O. 12866 and
the Regulatory Policies and Procedures
of the Department of Transportation. 44
FR 11034. However, this IFR is not an
economically significant regulatory
action as defined by section 3(f)(1)
under E.O. 12866, because it does not
have an annual effect on the economy
of $100 million or more or adversely
affect in a material way the economy, a
sector of the economy, productivity,
competition, jobs, the environment,
public health or safety, or State, local,
or tribal governments or communities. A
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) is
available for review in the public docket
for this rulemaking and summarized
below. Please see the RIA for more
details on the benefits and costs of the
IFR.
As previously discussed, the safe
transport of lithium batteries by air has
been an ongoing concern for PHMSA,
FAA, and DOT. Lithium batteries pose
unique challenges to safety in a
transportation environment because,
unlike other hazardous materials, they
contain both a chemical and an
electrical hazard. This combination of
hazards, when involved in a fire
encompassing significant quantities of

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lithium batteries, may exceed the fire
suppression capability of the aircraft
and lead to a catastrophic loss of the
aircraft.
In response to both the hazards posed
by the transport of lithium ion batteries
by air, as evidenced by the FAA
Technical Center testing results (see
‘‘Section III.A. FAA Technical Center
Testing’’), and the recent developments
in the international community,
PHMSA is amending the HMR
applicable to lithium cells and batteries
not contained in or packed with
equipment to:

(1) Prohibit the transport of lithium
ion cells and batteries (not packed with
or contained in equipment) as cargo on
passenger aircraft;
(2) Require all lithium ion cells and
batteries (not packed with or contained
in equipment) to be shipped at not more
than a 30 percent state of charge on
cargo-only aircraft; and
(3) Restrict small lithium cell and
battery shipments to one package per
consignment or overpack.
Some costs and benefits are related to
the total number of companies or
employees affected. The IFR potentially

impacts approximately 99 domestic
passenger airlines, 468 shipping firms,
and over 27,000 employees on average.
PHMSA examined the benefits and the
costs of the provisions of this
rulemaking using the post-ICAO
baseline 66 as the basis for the analysis
as shown below. Table 2 summarizes
the benefits and costs by rulemaking
provision over a 10-year period and
annualized, discounted at a 7 percent
rate.

TABLE 2—SUMMARY OF BENEFITS AND COSTS FOR LITHIUM BATTERY PROVISIONS—POST ICAO
10-Year
quantified cost
(7%)

Provision

Benefits

Unquantified costs

State of Charge ...........

• Limits the volume of flammable gases emitted by lithium ion cells propagated in a
thermal runaway.
• Results in a less energetic thermal runaway event if one should occur.
• Reduces the likelihood of thermal propagation from cell to cell.
• Harmonization facilitates international trade
by minimizing the burden of complying with
multiple or inconsistent safety requirements
(although currently domestic shippers and
carriers have the option to voluntarily comply with ICAO requirements). Consistency
between regulations reduces compliance
costs and helps to avoid costly frustrations
of international shipments.
• Reduces the risk of fire from shipping large
quantities of excepted batteries that were
previously being consolidated in overpacks,
pallets, in single-unit load devices and single aircraft cargo compartments.
• Reduces the propensity for large numbers
of batteries or packages shipped in accordance with regulatory exceptions.
• Harmonization facilitates international trade
by minimizing the burden of complying with
multiple or inconsistent safety requirements
(although currently domestic shippers and
carriers have the option to voluntarily comply with ICAO requirements). Consistency
between regulations reduces compliance
costs and helps to avoid costly frustrations
of international shipments.

• Potential changes in manufacturing procedures to ensure compliance with state of
charge provision.
• Reevaluation of management practices and
potentially instituting changes to avoid or
lessen supply chain impacts such as reduced shelf life of batteries and battery
quality issues.
• Additional time for end users needed to
charge the batteries from 30 percent state
of charge or less instead of the typical levels of 40 or 50 percent at which manufacturers currently set the state of charge.

$2,304,551. These estimates include only
the cost for entities
to apply for permission to ship batteries at higher
charge levels.

• Costs due to modal shift that might occur
from air transport to ground or marine
transport due to higher shipping costs by
air. The end receivers may be inconvenienced by longer shipping times that imply
less prompt access to goods purchased.

$44,328,936. Costs include additional hazard communication
and employee training.

Consignment Limit .......

66 The post-ICAO baseline is the international
operating environment present after April 1, 2016;
this would (1) restrict lithium ion batteries to a 30
percent state of charge for international air

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shipments, (2) restrict the number of Section II
packages to one per consignment on international
air shipments, and (3) prohibit the shipping of
lithium ion batteries as cargo on international

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passenger flights. This environment also includes a
level of voluntary domestic compliance with the
above provisions in the United States.

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8021

TABLE 2—SUMMARY OF BENEFITS AND COSTS FOR LITHIUM BATTERY PROVISIONS—POST ICAO—Continued
10-Year
quantified cost
(7%)

Provision

Benefits

Unquantified costs

Lithium Battery Prohibition as Cargo on
Passenger Aircraft.

• Safety benefits expected to be low or none
given evidence of pre-IFR compliance.
• Eliminates the risk of an incident induced
by lithium ion batteries shipped as cargo in
a passenger aircraft.
• Eliminates the risk of a fire exacerbated by
the presence of lithium ion batteries involving the cargo hold of a passenger aircraft.
• Harmonization facilitates international trade
by minimizing the burden of complying with
multiple or inconsistent safety requirements
(although currently domestic shippers and
carriers have the option to voluntarily comply with ICAO requirements). Consistency
between regulations reduces compliance
costs and helps to avoid costly frustrations
of international shipments.

• Potential additional costs to air carriers
transporting cargo shipments of the lithium
ion batteries on cargo planes instead of
passenger airplanes. They vary for each air
carrier function of the size of the airline and
the areas they service, the availability of
cargo-only aircraft fleet, the capacity usage
and cargo volume availability of their cargo
aircraft fleet, the volume of lithium ion batteries they were transporting by passenger
airplanes.
• Cost due to modal shift that might occur as
higher costs to ship by air may induce
shippers to send by ground and marine
transportation. The end receivers may be
inconvenienced by longer shipping times
that imply less prompt access to goods
purchased. This can have potential impacts
on rural and remote communities not serviced daily by cargo aircraft or only serviced
by passenger aircraft. For customers needing lithium batteries used in devices other
than medical devices, the delays in the delivery of the required batteries could result
in a range of consequences depending on
their intended need.

Impact expected low
given evidence of
pre-IFR compliance.

Total .....................

.........................................................................

.........................................................................

10-Year: $46,633,487.
Annualized:
$6,639,559.

Based on the analysis described in
this RIA, at the mean, PHMSA estimates
the present value costs about $46.6
million over 10 years and about $6.6
million annualized (at a 7 percent
discount rate).
While PHMSA examined the benefits
and the costs of the provisions of this
rulemaking using the post-ICAO
baseline, we acknowledge that using the
pre-ICAO baseline 67 would produce
different cost and benefit figures. That
said, given the significant data
uncertainties regarding pre-ICAO
baseline and operational practices,
PHMSA was unable to completely
quantify the pre-ICAO baseline. For
more detail on cost and benefits of the
pre-ICAO baseline see the ‘‘Section 11
Alternative Baseline Analysis’’ of the
RIA included in the docket for this
rulemaking.
PHMSA reviewed incidents involving
lithium batteries shipped by air to
determine how many reported incidents
would be affected by the scope of this
IFR. The following summary provides a
67 The pre-ICAO baseline is the international
operating environment present before April 1, 2016
with: (1) No limitations of state of charge, (2) No
limitation on the number of Section II packages
offered in a single consignment, and (3) No
prohibition of shipping Lithium ion batteries as
cargo on passenger carrying aircraft.

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breakdown of U.S. passenger and cargoonly aircraft incidents involving lithium
batteries from 2010 to 2016 in which a
Hazardous Materials Incident Report,
DOT Form 5800.1, was submitted.
We filtered incidents for those
involving lithium batteries and fire,
extreme heat, or explosion. In addition,
we filtered passenger aircraft incidents
for those occurring in cargo as opposed
to passenger baggage. We also filtered
both passenger and cargo-only aircraft
incidents for those involving lithium
ion batteries as opposed to lithium
metal batteries given applicability of the
three provisions and the extent that
information was available in the
incident report. We further filtered
incidents for undeclared shipments or
those without labels and markings
where possible.
U.S. Passenger Aircraft Lithium
Battery Incidents: PHMSA identified a
total of 21 lithium battery incidents in
passenger air transportation relevant to
the scope of this rulemaking. PHMSA
started with a set of 36 lithium battery
incidents in passenger air transportation
and filtered out 15 of the incidents
involving lithium ion batteries and fire,
extreme heat, or explosion. PHMSA
determined that the incidents resulting
in fire involved lithium ion batteries
transported in passenger baggage or

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were packed in equipment. While these
incidents indicate the potential harm
from the presence of a lithium ion
battery fire, the scope of this rulemaking
does not affect lithium ion batteries
carried in airline passenger baggage or
packed in equipment. There were no
fatalities or hospitalizations associated
with these incidents.
U.S. Cargo Aircraft Lithium Battery
Incidents: PHMSA identified a total of
139 incidents in air cargo
transportation. Thirteen of these
incidents involved lithium batteries and
fire, extreme heat or explosion that
would be affected by the IFR. PHMSA
cannot be certain of how many of the 13
lithium battery incidents in cargo
transportation relate to the consignment
limit provision. However, based on
review of the narratives of the incidents,
PHMSA believes that at least five of the
incidents are related to the consignment
limit provision.
Summary of Benefits
PHMSA expects the IFR will improve
safety for flight crews, air cargo
operators, and the public as a result of
the state of charge requirement and the
consignment and overpack restriction
by reducing the possibility of fire on
cargo-only aircraft. Additionally, the
IFR will harmonize the prohibition of

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lithium ion batteries as cargo on
passenger aircraft and eliminate the
possibility of a package of lithium ion
batteries causing or contributing to a fire
in the cargo hold of a passenger aircraft.
Passenger Aircraft Prohibition
The provision prohibiting lithium ion
batteries as cargo on passenger aircraft
will provide safety benefits to air
operators and the public by virtually
eliminating the possibility of (1) an
incident induced by lithium ion
batteries shipped as cargo in a passenger
aircraft and (2) a fire exacerbated by the
presence of lithium ion batteries in the
cargo compartment of a passenger
aircraft. In addition, this rulemaking
will harmonize U.S. regulations with
the ICAO Technical Instructions.
State of Charge Requirement
The provision limiting the state of
charge will provide safety benefits to air
cargo operators and the public by
reducing the available energy and
limiting the propagation of heat and fire
in the event of thermal runaway in
lithium ion cells and batteries. The FAA
Technical Center report, Hazards
Produced by Lithium Batteries in
Thermal Runaway in Aircraft Cargo
Compartments, found that the volume
of gases emitted by lithium ion cells in
thermal runaway is dependent on the
state of charge of the cell and higher
states of charge yield greater volumes of
flammable gases. Further, reducing the
state of charge of lithium ion 18650
LiCoO2 cells to not more than 30
percent resulted in a less energetic
thermal runaway event and greatly
reduced the likelihood of thermal
propagation from cell to cell.68 As such,
the state of charge requirement in this
rulemaking will serve to mitigate the
likelihood of thermal propagation for
lithium ion cells stored in cargo holds
of cargo-only aircraft, particularly for
lithium ion 18650 LiCoO2 cells, by
preventing the propagation of thermal
runaway.
Consignment and Overpack Restriction
The provision restricting the number
of packages per consignment or
overpack when transported in
accordance with limited hazard
communication will provide safety
benefits to air cargo operators and the
public by addressing the fire hazard
associated with shipping large
quantities of small lithium cells and
batteries that were previously being
consolidated in overpacks, pallets, in
single unit load devices. The existing
regulations permit large quantities of
68 Webster

et al. See footnote 7.

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closely packed lithium ion batteries to
be transported by aircraft without
requiring the shipper to disclose
information to the air operator or the
pilot in command. The potential for a
small number of lithium batteries in
thermal runaway to vent flammable gas
and propagate thermal runaway
between cells in the same package and
between adjacent packages and material
caused the ICAO to review the
effectiveness of the existing safety
standards. ICAO adopted a consignment
restriction to preclude abuse of the relief
provided for small quantities of small
lithium cells and batteries.
Based on the estimated mean 10-year
undiscounted cost of $65.84 million and
the estimated economic consequences of
$34.9 million for a cargo-only flight
incident, the rulemaking would need to
prevent 1.9 incidents over the next 10
years for the benefits to exceed the
quantified costs, or approximately one
every 5 years. The rulemaking would
need to prevent a larger number of
incidents to exceed the rulemaking’s
cost when non-quantified costs are
considered. There have been two
fatalities in the U.S. safety record,69
which covers the period related to
accidents involving lithium ion batteries
shipped by air.
C. Executive Order
This rulemaking is considered an
Executive Order 13771 regulatory
action. Details on the estimated costs of
this rulemaking can be found in the
rulemaking’s economic analysis.
D. Executive Order 13132
This IFR has been analyzed in
accordance with the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Order
13132 (‘‘Federalism’’) and the
President’s memorandum
(‘‘Preemption’’) published in the
Federal Register on May 22, 2009 [74
FR 24693]. This IFR will preempt State,
local, and Indian tribe requirements but
does not propose any regulation that has
substantial direct effects on the States,
the relationship between the national
government and the States, or the
distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government. Therefore, the
consultation and funding requirements
of Executive Order 13132 do not apply.
If adopted, this IFR will preempt any
State, local, or tribal requirements
concerning these subjects unless the
69 For the purposes of this analysis, the scope of
the U.S. safety record includes incidents reported
to PHMSA over a 10-year period using a DOT Form
5800.1. Furthermore, PHMSA is unable to conduct
a root cause analysis on many lithium battery
incidents due to the destruction of evidence in fire.

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non-Federal requirements are
‘‘substantively the same’’ as the Federal
requirements. In addition, this IFR does
not have sufficient federalism impacts
to warrant the preparation of a
federalism assessment.
E. Executive Order 13175
This IFR has been analyzed in
accordance with the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Order
13175 (‘‘Consultation and Coordination
with Indian Tribal Governments’’).
Because this rulemaking does not
significantly or uniquely affect the
communities of Tribal governments and
does not impose substantial direct
compliance costs, the funding and
consultation requirements of Executive
Order 13175 do not apply.
F. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive
Order 13272, and DOT Regulatory
Policies and Procedures
Section 603 of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (RFA) requires an agency
to prepare an initial regulatory
flexibility analysis describing impacts
on small entities whenever an agency is
required by 5 U.S.C. 553 to publish a
general notice of proposed rulemaking
for any proposed rulemaking. Similarly,
section 604 of the RFA requires an
agency to prepare a final regulatory
flexibility analysis when an agency
issues a final rule under 5 U.S.C. 553
after being required to publish a general
notice of proposed rulemaking. Because
of the contributing factors and the need
to address the identified safety risk,
PHMSA has found that there is good
cause to forgo notice and comment
pursuant to the exceptions in 5 U.S.C.
553(b)(B)(3). Accordingly, PHMSA has
not analyzed the effects of this action
under 5 U.S.C. 603 and 604.
G. Paperwork Reduction Act
PHMSA currently has approved
information collections under Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) Control
Numbers 2137–0034, ‘‘Hazardous
Materials Shipping Papers and
Emergency Response Information’’ and
2137–0557, ‘‘Approvals for Hazardous
Materials.’’ A review of the baseline and
change of paperwork and recordkeeping
burden related to this IFR would bring
small lithium batteries into fully
regulated status, thus requiring shipping
papers. PHMSA estimates that there will
be an additional 28,242 shipments
annually that will require a shipping
paper. PHMSA estimates that each
shipping paper takes one minute and
thirty seconds to complete (28,242
shipments × 1 minute 30 seconds),
which results in approximately 741
burden hours. PHMSA does not

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estimate any increase in out-of-pocket
costs. These shipments will also require
a notification to the pilot in command
(NOPIC) taking 1 minute per shipment
(28,242 shipments × 1 minute), which
results in an increase of approximately
471 burden hours. PHMSA does not
estimate any increase in out-of-pocket
costs. In total for this information
collection, PHMSA estimates an
approximate increase of 56,484 annual
number of responses (28,242 shipping
paper responses + 28,242 NOPIC
responses) and approximate increase of
1,212 burden hours (741 shipping paper
burden hours + 471 NOPIC burden
hours).
PHMSA also estimates that an
additional 468 approval requests will
result from the new requirements in this
IFR. PHMSA estimates that it takes 40
hours to complete the paperwork
portion of an approval request, resulting
in 18,720 additional burden hours (468
approval requests × 40 hours per
request). PHMSA does not estimate any
increase in out-of-pocket costs.
A summary of the information
collection changes can be found below:
OMB Control Number 2137–0034
Annual Increase in Number of
Respondents: 0.
Annual Increase in Annual Number of
Responses: 56,484.
Annual Increase in Annual Burden
Hours: 1,212.
Annual Increase in Annual Burden
Costs: $0.
OMB Control Number: 2137–0557
Annual Increase in Number of
Respondents: 468.
Annual Increase in Annual Number of
Responses: 468.
Annual Increase in Annual Burden
Hours: 18,720.
Annual Increase in Annual Burden
Costs: $0.
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1995, Public Law 104–13, no person
is required to respond to an information
collection unless it has been approved
by OMB and displays a valid OMB
control number. Section 1320.8(d) of
title 5 of the CFR requires that PHMSA
provide interested members of the
public and affected agencies an
opportunity to comment on information
and recordkeeping requests. Please
direct your requests for a copy of the
information collection to Steven
Andrews or Shelby Geller, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Pipeline
& Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA), East
Building, Office of Hazardous Materials
Standards, 1200 New Jersey Avenue

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Southeast, Washington DC 20590,
Telephone (202) 366–8553.
H. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
A regulation identifier number (RIN)
is assigned to each regulatory action
listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal
Regulations. The Regulatory Information
Service Center publishes the Unified
Agenda in April and October of each
year. The RIN contained in the heading
of this document can be used to crossreference this action with the Unified
Agenda.
I. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
This IFR does not impose unfunded
mandates under the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995. It does
not result in costs of $141.3 million or
more to either State, local, or Tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or to the
private sector, and it is the least
burdensome alternative that achieves
the objective of the rulemaking.
J. Environmental Assessment
The National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321–4375
(NEPA) requires Federal agencies to
consider the environmental impacts of
proposed actions in their decisionmaking process. Where an agency does
not anticipate significant environmental
impacts, the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) regulations implementing
NEPA require Federal agencies to
conduct an environmental assessment to
consider (1) the need for the action, (2)
alternatives considered, (3) the human
and environmental impacts of the action
and alternatives, and (4) a list of the
agencies and persons consulted. See 40
CFR 1508.9(b). This IFR would amend
the Hazardous Materials Regulations
(HMR; 49 CFR parts 171–180), with the
following provisions to (1) prohibit the
transport of lithium ion cells and
batteries as cargo on passenger aircraft;
(2) require all lithium ion cells and
batteries to be shipped at not more than
a 30 percent state of charge on cargoonly aircraft; and (3) restrict small
lithium cell and battery shipments to
one package per consignment or
overpack.
1. Need for the Action
Lithium batteries pose unique
challenges to safety when transported
by air because, unlike other hazardous
materials, they contain both a chemical
and an electrical hazard. This
combination of hazards, when involved
in a fire encompassing significant
quantities of lithium batteries, may
exceed the fire suppression capability of
an aircraft and lead to a catastrophic
lithium battery event. Lithium batteries

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8023

can overheat and ignite under certain
conditions and, once ignited, can be
especially difficult to extinguish. The
presence of lithium batteries can also
increase the severity of a fire originating
from another source. In general, lithium
batteries have a higher energy density
(i.e., high energy to size ratio) than other
types of batteries and are susceptible to
thermal runaway, which is a chain
reaction leading to self-heating and
uncontrolled release of the battery’s
stored energy. In addition, most lithium
ion batteries manufactured today
contain a flammable electrolyte.
Laboratory testing conducted at the
FAA Technical Center has demonstrated
that lithium batteries pose a greater risk
in air transportation than other types of
batteries (e.g., alkaline, nickel-metal
hydride, and nickel cadmium). This
testing has also demonstrated that even
a few lithium batteries can present a
serious hazard. The current fire
suppression systems installed on
aircraft provide, at best, limited
effectiveness in mitigating fires
involving a consignment of lithium
batteries, which confirms that lithium
batteries pose unique transportation
hazards of which the current
requirements are not effective in
mitigating.
Additionally, during the ICAO
Dangerous Goods Panel Meeting (DGP–
25; October 19–30, 2015), the DGP
proposed two amendments to the ICAO
Technical Instructions. These proposed
amendments were based on
recommendations developed at the
Second and Third International
Multidisciplinary Lithium Battery
Transport Coordination Meetings,
which took place in September 2014
and July 2015, respectively. By way of
DGP–25, the DGP recommended that the
ICAO Technical Instructions be
amended to (1) require all lithium ion
cells and batteries on cargo-only aircraft
to be shipped at not more than a 30
percent state of charge and (2) restrict
the number of packages that may be
offered under current ICAO Technical
Instructions provisions for small
batteries (‘‘Section II’’ batteries) to not
more than one package per
consignment. The ICAO Council
approved and published these
amendments for incorporation into the
2015–2016 ICAO Technical Instructions
in January 2016, with an effective date
of April 1, 2016.
On February 22, 2016, in addition to
the two safety enhancements discussed
above, ICAO adopted an additional
safety measure that prohibits, on an
interim basis, all consignments of
lithium ion batteries as cargo on
passenger aircraft. This prohibition will

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continue to be in force as separate work
continues through ICAO on a new
lithium battery packaging performance
standard. This additional safety measure
is also effective April 1, 2016.
Lastly, this rulemaking meets the
congressional requirements in Section
333 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of
2018. The FAA Reauthorization Act of
2018 mandates that within 90 days of
enactment, the Secretary shall issue
regulations that adopt the requirements
in the 2015–2016 ICAO Technical
Instructions related to the air
transportation of lithium cells and
batteries, as well as the revised
standards adopted by ICAO, which were
effective on April 1, 2016, and any other
provisions adopted by ICAO prior to the
effective date of the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018. The FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018 also directs
the issuance of a limited exception to
the restrictions on medical device
lithium cells and batteries transported
via aircraft, including an expedited
review of applications for approvals and
special permits related to the air
transportation of lithium cells and
batteries required for medically
necessary care.
2. Alternatives Considered
In this rulemaking, PHMSA
considered the following three
alternatives:
Selected Alternative:
The Selected Alternative is the
scenario, in which PHMSA adopts into
the HMR the amendments presented in
this rulemaking, including to:
• Prohibit the transport of lithium ion
cells and batteries as cargo on passenger
aircraft;
• Require all lithium ion cells and
batteries to be shipped at not more than
a 30 percent state of charge on cargoonly aircraft; and
• Restrict small lithium cell and
battery shipments to one package per
consignment or overpack.
PHMSA’s selected alternative is the
‘‘full harmonization’’ approach since it
aligns with ICAO actions and
amendments to the ICAO Technical
Instructions described in this
rulemaking. Full harmonization under
this rulemaking includes all three
amendments above. In addition, this
alternative meets the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018 mandate to
harmonize with the 2015–2016 ICAO
Technical Instructions for air
transportation of lithium cells and
batteries and adopt any further revisions
adopted prior to the effective date of the
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 within
90 days of enactment (See Section 333).
This alternative also meets the FAA

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Reauthorization Act of 2018 mandate to
issue a limited exception for lithium
cells and batteries transported via
aircraft for medically necessary care.
Alternative 1: No Action Alternative:
The No Action Alternative is the
scenario in which PHMSA does not
adopt any of the provisions that
comprise the IFR. This alternative
represents a baseline scenario in that it
portrays the way the world would look
absent of PHMSA action. The current
regulatory standards would remain in
effect. This alternative does not meet the
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018
congressional mandate to harmonize
with the 2015–2016 ICAO Technical
Instructions for air transportation of
lithium cells and batteries, harmonize
with any further revisions including
those effective on April 1, 2016, and to
add a limited exception and expedited
review of special permit and approval
applications for air transportation of
lithium cells and batteries for medical
device.
Alternative 2: Partial Harmonization
Alternative:
Under the Partial Harmonization
Alternative, PHMSA would:
• Partially adopt the planned
regulation. In particular, this alternative
would involve adoption of the
prohibition provision described in this
rulemaking as well as the 30 percent
state of charge provision (see ‘‘Section
V. Summary of Changes’’ for further
detail on these provisions). While there
may be some combination of factors that
effectively mitigate the hazards posed
by the transportation of lithium ion
batteries on passenger aircraft, the
variable effects of battery chemistry,
cargo compartment characteristics
including fire suppression capabilities,
and loading configuration clearly
demonstrates that there is no single
factor that would preclude the
possibility of a thermal runaway event
for all types of lithium ion batteries.
Therefore, since the information to date
does not provide for a level of surety
that the risk can be fully mitigated, a
prohibition on the transport of lithium
ion batteries as cargo on passenger
aircraft is most suitable option. With
respect to the prohibition provision,
PHMSA expects that the prohibition on
transporting lithium ion batteries on
domestic passenger aircraft would result
in minimal cost impacts on shippers of
lithium ion batteries and air carriers.
This is because most U.S. passenger air
carriers have already voluntarily
stopped carrying this cargo on their
passenger aircraft.
• Adopt the 30 percent state of charge
requirement. PHMSA maintains that the
technical basis for this provision is

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widely agreed-upon; numerous
laboratory tests support that thermal
runaway is related to the battery’s state
of charge.
• Not adopt the provision to restrict
excepted battery shipments to one
package per consignment or overpack.
• As this alternative only partially
addresses the transportation of lithium
cells and batteries adopted by ICAO
prior to the effective date of the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018, this
alternative would not meet
congressional mandate in its entirety.
3. Environmental Impacts
Preferred Alternative:
In selecting the provisions as
described in this IFR, PHMSA
concluded that human safety and
environmental risks would be reduced
and an increase in protections to human
health and environmental resources. As
discussed in detail in ‘‘Section III. Need
for the Rule,’’ FAA research has shown
that air transportation of lithium ion
batteries poses a human safety risk. This
IFR includes the specific measures to
reduce environmental and human safety
risks to air cargo operators and the
public. Specifically, the consignment
and overpack restriction will lower the
risk of inadvertent bulk loading batteries
in a cargo compartment of a cargo-only
aircraft without full hazard
communication, and the state of charge
provision will decrease both the
likelihood and consequence of an
incident involving lithium ion batteries.
Additionally, the prohibition of lithium
ion batteries as cargo on passenger
aircraft will generate human safety
benefits to air operators and public by
eliminating the possibility of (1) an
incident induced by lithium ion
batteries and (2) a fire exacerbated by
the presence of lithium ion batteries
involving the cargo hold of a passenger
aircraft.
Potential environmental impacts of
each amendment in the IFR are
discussed below:
(1) Prohibit the transport of lithium
ion cells and batteries as cargo on
passenger aircraft.
Prohibiting lithium ion batteries as
cargo on passenger aircraft will generate
human safety benefits to air operators
and the public by virtually eliminating
the possibility of (1) an incident
induced by lithium ion batteries
shipped as cargo in a passenger aircraft
and (2) a fire exacerbated by the
presence of lithium ion batteries
involving the cargo compartment of a
passenger aircraft.
Incident-related contaminated debris
entering the air, water (possible when
aircraft make transoceanic flights or a

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Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 44 / Wednesday, March 6, 2019 / Rules and Regulations
cargo’s manifest involves a segment of
transportation aboard an ocean vessel),
and soil media would be avoided or
mitigated and thus benefit the natural
environment under this provision.
Additionally, fewer and mitigated
incidents involving lithium batteries
will result in less contaminated debris
to be landfilled. PHMSA expects that
the prohibition on transporting lithium
ion batteries on domestic passenger
aircraft will have an incremental benefit
to human safety and the environment
over the current state since most U.S.
passenger air carriers have already
voluntarily stopped carrying this cargo
on their passenger aircraft.
PHMSA acknowledges that the
medical device exception poses an
increase in safety risk and
environmental risk due to the dangers
posed by lithium ion cells and batteries.
The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018
requires the implementation of a
medical device exception but did not
fully specify how the exception applies.
By providing this exception, PHMSA
has considered the needs of individuals
who require the replacement of lithium
ion cells or batteries for medically
necessary purposes as required by the
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018.
PHMSA further concludes that this
amendment, which will increase
standardization and consistency of
regulations, will result in greater
protection of human health and the
environment. Consistency between U.S.
and international transportation
requirements enhances the safety and
environmental protection of
international hazardous materials
transportation through:
• Better understanding of the
regulations;
• An increased level of industry
awareness and hence, compliance;
• The smooth flow of hazardous
materials from their points of origin to
their points of destination; and
• Consistent emergency response in
the event of a hazardous materials
incident.
Protections for human safety and
environmental protection will also be
enhanced through more targeted and
effective training. This amendment will
eliminate inconsistent hazardous
materials regulations, which hamper
compliance training efforts. For ease of
compliance with appropriate
regulations, air carriers engaged in the
transportation of hazardous materials
generally elect to comply with the ICAO
Technical Instructions, as appropriate.
By maintaining consistency between
these international regulations and the
HMR, shippers and carriers are able to
train their hazmat employees in a single

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set of requirements for classification,
packaging, hazard communication,
handling, stowage, etc., thereby
minimizing the possibility of
improperly preparing and transporting a
consignment of hazardous materials
because of differences between domestic
and international regulations.
Greenhouse gas emissions would
remain the same under this amendment.
(2) Require all lithium ion cells and
batteries to be shipped at not more than
a 30 percent state of charge on cargoonly aircraft.
Requiring all lithium ion cells and
batteries on cargo-only aircraft to be
shipped at not more than a 30 percent
state of charge will provide safety
benefits to air cargo operators and the
public by reducing the available energy
and limiting the propagation of heat and
fire in the event of thermal runaway in
lithium ion cells and batteries. The FAA
Technical Center report, Summary of
FAA Studies Related to the Hazards
Produced by Lithium Cells in Thermal
Runaway in Aircraft Cargo
Compartments, FAA Report DOT/FAA/
TC–16/37, June 2016, found that ‘‘the
volume of gases emitted by lithium ion
cells in thermal runaway is dependent
on the state of charge of the cell. Higher
states of charge yield greater volumes of
flammable gases. Reducing the state of
charge of lithium ion 18650 LiCoO2
cells to thirty percent or less resulted in
a less energetic thermal runaway event
and greatly reduced the likelihood of
thermal propagation from cell to cell.’’
As such, the state of charge requirement
in this rulemaking will serve to mitigate
the likelihood of thermal propagation
for lithium ion cells stored in cargo
holds of cargo-only aircraft, particularly
for lithium ion 18650 LiCoO2 cells, by
preventing propagation of thermal
runaway.
In addition to human safety benefits,
incident-related contaminated debris
entering the air, water (possible when
aircraft make transoceanic flights or a
cargo’s manifest involves a segment of
transportation aboard an ocean vessel),
and soil media would be avoided or
mitigated and thus benefit the natural
environment under this provision.
Additionally, fewer and mitigated
incidents involving lithium batteries
will result in less contaminated debris
to be landfilled.
PHMSA acknowledges that the
medical device exception poses an
increase in safety risk and
environmental risk due to the dangers
posed by lithium ion cells and batteries.
The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018
requires the implementation of a
medical device exception but did not
fully specify how the exception applies.

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8025

By providing this exception, PHMSA
has considered the needs of individuals
who require the replacement of lithium
ion cells or batteries for medically
necessary purposes as required by the
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018.
PHMSA further concludes that the
amendment, which will increase
standardization and consistency of
regulations, will also result in greater
protection of human health and the
environment. Consistency between U.S.
and international transportation
requirements enhances the safety and
environmental protection of
international hazardous materials
transportation through:
• Better understanding of the
regulations;
• An increased level of industry
awareness and hence, compliance;
• The smooth flow of hazardous
materials from their points of origin to
their points of destination; and
• Consistent emergency response in
the event of a hazardous materials
incident.
Enhanced environmental protection
will also be achieved through more
targeted and effective training. This
amendment will eliminate inconsistent
hazardous materials regulations, which
hamper compliance training efforts. For
ease of compliance with appropriate
regulations, air carriers engaged in the
transportation of hazardous materials
generally elect to comply with the ICAO
Technical Instructions, as appropriate.
By maintaining consistency between
these international regulations and the
HMR, shippers and carriers are able to
train their hazmat employees in a single
set of requirements for classification,
packaging, hazard communication,
handling, stowage, etc., thereby
minimizing the possibility of
improperly preparing and transporting a
consignment of hazardous materials
because of differences between domestic
and international regulations.
Greenhouse gas emissions would
remain the same under this amendment.
(3) Restrict the number of packages
that may be offered under current
provisions for small cells and batteries
to one package per consignment or
overpack.
Restricting each consignment and
overpack to one package will provide
human safety benefits to air cargo
operators and the public by addressing
the fire hazards associated with
shipping large quantities of small
lithium cells and batteries, which were
previously being consolidated in
overpack pallets, in single unit load
devices and in single aircraft cargo
compartments. Under this provision, air
cargo operators will be able to more

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accurately control the number of
batteries loaded on an aircraft and thus
prevent fires that could result in injuries
and loss of life. The number of
consignments and paperwork for air
operators and offerors will increase with
only one package allowed per
consignment. However, the additional
amount of administrative work is
expected to be small and would be
offset by the much greater savings in
avoided and mitigated incidents.
In addition to human safety benefits,
incident-related contaminated debris
entering the air, water (possible when
aircraft make transoceanic flights or a
cargo’s manifest involves a segment of
transportation aboard an ocean vessel),
and soil media would be avoided or
mitigated and thus benefit the natural
environment under this provision.
Additionally, fewer and mitigated
incidents involving lithium batteries
will result in less contaminated debris
to be landfilled.
PHMSA further concludes that the
amendment, which will increase
standardization and consistency of
regulations, will also result in greater
protection of human health and the
environment. Consistency between U.S.
and international transportation
requirements enhances the safety and
environmental protection of
international hazardous materials
transportation through:
• Better understanding of the
regulations;
• An increased level of industry
awareness and hence, compliance;
• The smooth flow of hazardous
materials from their points of origin to
their points of destination; and
• Consistent emergency response in
the event of a hazardous materials
incident.
Enhanced environmental protection
will also be achieved through more
targeted and effective training. This
amendment will eliminate inconsistent
hazardous materials regulations, which
hamper compliance training efforts. For
ease of compliance with appropriate
regulations, air carriers engaged in the
transportation of hazardous materials
generally elect to comply with the ICAO
Technical Instructions, as appropriate.
By maintaining consistency between
these international regulations and the
HMR, shippers and carriers are able to
train their hazmat employees in a single
set of requirements for classification,
packaging, hazard communication,
handling, stowage, etc., thereby
minimizing the possibility of
improperly preparing and transporting a
consignment of hazardous materials
because of differences between domestic
and international regulations.

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Greenhouse gas emissions would
remain the same under this amendment.
Alternative 1: No Action Alternative:
Under the No Action Alternative,
current regulations would remain in
place, and PHMSA would not add new
provisions to the HMR. Not adopting the
environmental and safety requirements
in the IFR under the No Action
Alternative would result in a lost
opportunity for reducing the number of
and mitigating the damage from
environmental and safety-related
incidents.
Additionally, efficiencies gained
through harmonization in updates to
transport standards would not be
realized. Foregone efficiencies in the No
Action Alternative include freeing up
limited resources to concentrate on air
transport hazard communication issues
of potentially much greater
environmental impact. Greenhouse gas
emissions would remain the same under
the No Action Alternative.
Alternative 2: Partial Harmonization
Alternative:
Under the Partial Harmonization
Alternative, PHMSA would adopt the
passenger aircraft prohibition provision,
as well as the 30 percent state of charge
provision into the HMR. The Partial
Harmonization Alternative does not,
however, include the consignment and
overpack provision. Improvements in
human safety and reduction in potential
for environmental impacts from an
incident under this alternative would
therefore lie somewhere between the No
Action Alternative and those in the IFR.
Referring to the regulation portion of the
probable environmental impacts section
above, the same increases in human
safety and reduction in potential for
environment impacts from an incident
would occur for human safety and the
environment as those discussed under
provisions (1) and (2). Similarly, as
discussed under provisions (1) and (2),
PHMSA acknowledges that there are
some safety and environmental risks to
allowing the transportation of lithium
cells and batteries for the purposes of
medically necessary care, with the
approval of the Associate Administrator,
on passenger aircraft and at a state of
charge greater than 30 percent, but that
those risks are outweighed by the
benefits to those individuals needing
the replacement lithium cells and
batteries for their medical devices.
Those human safety and environmental
benefits discussed under provision (3)
would not be expected to occur.
The main difference between the
Partial Harmonization Alternative and
the regulation’s environmental benefits
is that the regulation will allow for
better control of fires and consequent

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deaths, injuries, and environmental
contamination through smaller, more
controlled consignments, whereas the
Partial Harmonization Alternative will
not offer these protections.
4. Agencies Consulted
PHMSA has coordinated with the
FAA in the development of this
rulemaking.
5. Finding of No Significant Impact
The requirements in this IFR reduce
the likelihood of lithium batteries
causing or contributing to accidents on
a cargo-only aircraft and virtually
eliminate the likelihood on passenger
aircraft. This rulemaking would reduce
the possibility of an incident on
passenger aircraft by prohibiting the
transportation of lithium ion batteries as
cargo on passenger flights. Secondly,
reducing the charge of lithium ion
batteries has been shown to reduce the
likelihood of thermal runaway, thereby
reducing the likelihood of a lithium
battery fire on aircraft. Finally, the
restriction of a consignment or overpack
to one package is intended to ensure
that consignments that currently meet
the letter of, but not the spirit of, the
alternative hazard communication
provisions are shipped and labeled as
Class 9 hazardous material.
In response to the hazard posed by the
transport of lithium ion batteries by air,
and recent developments in the
international community, these
amendments are intended to promote
environmental protection, safety,
international harmonization, and
clarity. These regulatory revisions will
offer more efficient and effective ways
of achieving PHMSA’s goal of safe and
secure transportation, protecting both
people and the environment from
hazardous materials in commerce.
The IFR provides more protection to
human health and the environment than
the ‘‘No Action’’ and ‘‘Partial
Harmonization’’ Alternatives discussed
above. The IFR thus comprises the most
environmentally preferable alternative.
The provisions of this IFR build on
current regulatory requirements to
enhance the transportation safety and
security of consignments of hazardous
materials transported by aircraft,
thereby reducing the risks of an
accidental or intentional release of
hazardous materials and consequent
environmental damage. PHMSA
therefore believes that the net
environmental impact will be slightly
positive. PHMSA finds that there are no
significant environmental impacts
associated with this IFR.

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K. Privacy Act
Anyone may search the electronic
form of written communications and
comments received into any of our
dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the document (or signing the
document, if submitted on behalf of an
association, business, labor union, etc.).
The DOT posts these comments,
without edit, including any personal
information the commenter provides, to
www.regulations.gov, as described in
the system of records notice (DOT/ALL–
14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at
www.dot.gov/privacy.
L. Executive Order 13609 and
International Trade Analysis
Under Executive Order 13609,
agencies must consider whether the
impacts associated with significant
variations between domestic and
international regulatory approaches are
unnecessary or may impair the ability of
American business to export and
compete internationally. In meeting
shared challenges involving health,
safety, labor, security, environmental,
and other issues, international
regulatory cooperation can identify
approaches that are at least as protective
as those that are or would be adopted in
the absence of such cooperation.
International regulatory cooperation can
also reduce, eliminate, or prevent
unnecessary differences in regulatory
requirements.
Similarly, the Trade Agreements Act
of 1979 (Pub. L. 96–39), as amended by
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act

Symbols

Hazardous
materials
descriptions
and proper
shipping names

Hazard
class or
division

(2)

(3)

(1)

.........

*
Lithium ion batteries including lithium ion
polymer batteries.

9

*

Identification
No.

*
UN3480 ......

*
..........

*

Special Provisions.

*
*
(c) * * *
(2) * * *

VerDate Sep<11>2014

*

*

18:28 Mar 05, 2019

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Special
provisions
(§ 172.102)

Label
codes

PG

(6)

*
422, A54,
A100.

*

Frm 00049

In consideration of the foregoing,
PHMSA amends 49 CFR chapter I as
follows:
PART 172—HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
TABLE, SPECIAL PROVISIONS,
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
COMMUNICATIONS, EMERGENCY
RESPONSE INFORMATION, TRAINING
REQUIREMENTS, AND SECURITY
PLANS
1. The authority citation for part 172
continues to read as follows:

■

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101–5128, 44701; 49
CFR 1.81, 1.97.

2. In § 172.101, the Hazardous
Materials Table is amended by revising
the entry for ‘‘Lithium ion batteries
including lithium ion polymer
batteries’’ to read as follows:

■

*

*

*

*

(8)

(9)

(10)

Packaging
(§ 173.* * *)

Quantity limitations
(see §§ 173.27 and
175.75)

Vessel
stowage

Nonbulk

Bulk

Passenger
aircraft/
rail

Cargo
aircraft
only

Location

Other

(8A)

(8B)

(8C)

(9A)

(9B)

(10A)

(10B)

185 ...

185 ...

*
35 kg ........

A ......

*
185 ...........

*

Fmt 4700

Hazardous materials transportation,
Incorporation by reference, Packaging
and containers, Radioactive materials,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Uranium.

*

*

A51 For aircraft batteries, irrespective
of the quantity limitations specified in
Column (9A) of the § 172.101 Table or
§ 175.75(c), wet cell batteries, UN2794
or UN2795, up to a limit of 100 kg net
mass per package may be transported
aboard passenger aircraft. Transport in

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49 CFR Part 173

Exceptions

(7)

9

Incorporation by reference, Labeling,
Markings, Packaging and containers,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.

§ 172.101 Purpose and use of the
hazardous materials table.

49 CFR Part 172
Education, Hazardous materials
transportation, Hazardous waste,

(5)

3. In § 172.102, in paragraph (c)(2),
revise special provision A51 and add
special provision A100 in appropriate
alphanumerical order to read as follows:

*

List of Subjects

(4)

■

§ 172.102

(Pub. L. 103–465), prohibits Federal
agencies from establishing any
standards or engaging in related
activities that create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the
United States. For purposes of these
requirements, Federal agencies may
participate in the establishment of
international standards, so long as the
standards have a legitimate domestic
objective, such as providing for safety,
and do not operate to exclude imports
that meet this objective. The statute also
requires consideration of international
standards and, where appropriate, that
they be the basis for U.S. standards.
PHMSA participates in the
establishment of international standards
in order to protect the safety of the
American public, and we have assessed
the effects of the IFR to ensure that it
does not cause unnecessary obstacles to
foreign trade. In this case, the IFR will
fully harmonize U.S. lithium battery
provisions with the ICAO international
standards. Further, the DOT engaged the
public by highlighting the provisions of
this IFR in a domestic public meeting
prior to their adoption. DOT also
requested comments from stakeholders
on the effect of these provisions.
Accordingly, this rulemaking is
consistent with Executive Order 13609
and PHMSA’s obligations under the
Trade Agreement Act, as amended.

Sfmt 4700

*
Forbidden

*

*

accordance with this special provision
must be noted on the shipping paper.
*
*
*
*
*
A100 Lithium ion cells and batteries
must be offered for transport at a state
of charge not exceeding 30 percent of
their rated capacity. Lithium ion cells
and batteries at a state of charge greater
than 30 percent of their rated capacity

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Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 44 / Wednesday, March 6, 2019 / Rules and Regulations

may only be transported under
conditions approved by the Associate
Administrator in accordance with the
requirements in 49 CFR part 107,
subpart H. Guidance and methodology
for determining the rated capacity can
be found in sub-section 38.3.2.3 of the
UN Manual of Tests and Criteria (IBR,
see § 171.7 of this subchapter).
*
*
*
*
*
PART 173—SHIPPERS—GENERAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPMENTS
AND PACKAGINGS
4. The authority citation for part 173
continues to read as follows:

■

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101–5128, 44701; 49
CFR 1.81, 1.97.

5. In § 173.185:
a. Revise the introductory text and
paragraphs (c)(1)(iii) and (c)(4)(ii)
through (vi);
■ b. Add paragraphs (c)(4)(vii) and
(c)(5);
■ c. Redesignate paragraph (g) as
paragraph (h); and
■ d. Add new paragraph (g).
The revisions and additions read as
follows:
■
■

§ 173.185

Lithium cells and batteries.

As used in this section, consignment
means one or more packages of
hazardous materials accepted by an
operator from one shipper at one time
and at one address, receipted for in one
lot and moving to one consignee at one
destination address. Equipment means
the device or apparatus for which the
lithium cells or batteries will provide
electrical power for its operation.
Lithium cell(s) or battery(ies) includes
both lithium metal and lithium ion
chemistries. Medical device means an
instrument, apparatus, implement,
machine, contrivance, implant, or in
vitro reagent, including any component,
part, or accessory thereof, which is
intended for use in the diagnosis of
disease or other conditions, or in the
cure, mitigation, treatment, or
prevention of disease, of a person.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(1) * * *
(iii) Except when lithium cells or
batteries are packed with or contained
in equipment in quantities not
exceeding 5 kg net weight, the outer
package that contains lithium cells or
batteries must be appropriately marked:
‘‘PRIMARY LITHIUM BATTERIES—
FORBIDDEN FOR TRANSPORT
ABOARD PASSENGER AIRCRAFT’’,
‘‘LITHIUM METAL BATTERIES—
FORBIDDEN FOR TRANSPORT
ABOARD PASSENGER AIRCRAFT’’,

VerDate Sep<11>2014

18:28 Mar 05, 2019

Jkt 247001

‘‘LITHIUM ION BATTERIES—
FORBIDDEN FOR TRANSPORT
ABOARD PASSENGER AIRCRAFT’’ or
labeled with a ‘‘CARGO AIRCRAFT
ONLY’’ label specified in § 172.448 of
this subchapter.
*
*
*
*
*
(4) * * *
(ii) Not more than one package
prepared in accordance with this
paragraph (c)(4) may be placed into an
overpack. When a package displays the
‘‘CARGO AIRCRAFT ONLY’’ label, the
paragraph (c)(1)(iii) mark, or the
paragraph (c)(3)(i) lithium battery mark
and is placed in an overpack, the
appropriate label or mark must either be
clearly visible through the overpack, or
the label or mark must also be affixed
on the outside of the overpack, and the
overpack must be marked with the word
‘‘OVERPACK’’.
(iii) A shipper is not permitted to offer
for transport more than one package
prepared in accordance with the
provisions of this paragraph in any
single consignment.
(iv) Each shipment with packages
required to display the paragraph
(c)(3)(i) lithium battery mark must
include an indication on the air waybill
of compliance with this paragraph (c)(4)
(or the applicable ICAO Technical
Instructions Packing Instruction), when
an air waybill is used.
(v) Packages and overpacks of lithium
batteries prepared in accordance with
this paragraph (c)(4) must be offered to
the operator separately from cargo
which is not subject to the requirements
of this subchapter and must not be
loaded into a unit load device before
being offered to the operator.
(vi) For lithium batteries packed with,
or contained in, equipment, the number
of batteries in each package is limited to
the minimum number required to power
the piece of equipment, plus two spares,
and the total net quantity (mass) of the
lithium cells or batteries in the
completed package must not exceed 5
kg.
(vii) Each person who prepares a
package for transport containing lithium
cells or batteries, including cells or
batteries packed with, or contained in,
equipment in accordance with the
conditions and limitations of this
paragraph (c)(4), must receive
instruction on these conditions and
limitations, corresponding to their
functions.
(5) For transportation by aircraft, a
package that exceeds the number or
quantity (mass) limits in the table
shown in paragraph (c)(4)(i) of this
section, the overpack limit described in
paragraph (c)(4)(ii) of this section, or the

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Frm 00050

Fmt 4700

Sfmt 4700

consignment limit described in
paragraph (c)(4)(iii) of this section is
subject to all applicable requirements of
this subchapter, except that a package
containing no more than 2.5 kg lithium
metal cells or batteries or 10 kg lithium
ion cells or batteries is not subject to the
UN performance packaging
requirements in paragraph (b)(3)(ii) of
this section when the package displays
both the lithium battery mark in
paragraph (c)(3)(i) and the Class 9 label.
This paragraph does not apply to
batteries or cells packed with or
contained in equipment.
*
*
*
*
*
(g) Limited exceptions to restrictions
on air transportation of medical device
batteries. Irrespective of the quantity
limitations described in column 9A of
the § 172.101 Hazardous Materials Table
of this subchapter, up to two
replacement lithium cells or batteries
specifically used for a medical device as
defined in this section may be
transported as cargo on a passenger
aircraft. Packages containing these cells
or batteries are not subject to the
marking requirement in paragraph
(c)(1)(iii) of this section or the ‘‘CARGO
AIRCRAFT ONLY’’ label required by
§ 172.402(c) of this subchapter and may
be transported as cargo on a passenger
aircraft when approved by the Associate
Administrator and provided the
following conditions are met:
(1) The intended destination of the
cells or batteries is not serviced daily by
cargo aircraft if a cell or battery is
required for medically necessary care;
and
(2) Lithium ion cells or batteries for
medical devices are excepted from the
state of charge limitations in § 172.102,
special provision A100, of this
subchapter, provided each cell or
battery is:
(i) Individually packed in an inner
packaging that completely encloses the
cell or battery;
(ii) Placed in a rigid outer packaging;
and
(iii) Protected to prevent short
circuits.
*
*
*
*
*
Issued in Washington, DC on February 27,
2019, under authority delegated in 49 CFR
part 1.97.
Howard R. Elliott,
Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration.
[FR Doc. 2019–03812 Filed 3–5–19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–60–P

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