Under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)and delegated authority from the Secretary of Homeland Security, TSA is tasked with developing policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with transportation security. TSA carries out this responsibility in the pipeline mode by assessing current industry security practices by way of its Pipeline Corporate Security Review (PCSR) program.
On May 8, 2021, the Colonial Pipeline Company announced that it had halted its pipeline operations due to a ransomware attack. This attack received national attention as it temporarily disrupted critical supplies of gasoline and other refined petroleum products throughout the East Coast. Such attacks pose significant threats to the countryâs infrastructure and economic well-being. Since then the federal government has been working closely with industry partners to address the threat.
The pipeline sector continues to face a significant cybersecurity threat. Recent Joint Cybersecurity Advisories from CISA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National Security Agency (NSA) highlight this threat:
⢠February 7, 2022: The Office of the Director for National Intelligence released the Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, which noted that âChina almost certainly is capable of launching cyber-attacks that would disrupt critical infrastructure services within the United States, including against oil and gas pipelines and rail systems.â
⢠March 24, 2022: CISA, FBI, and the Department of Energy (DOE) released Joint Cybersecurity Advisory (AA22-083A), Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted State-Sponsored Russian Cyber Actors Targeting the Energy Sector.
⢠March 24, 2022: The FBIâs Cyber Division released a Private Industry Notification (PIN 20220324-001), Triton Malware Remains Threat to Global Critical Infrastructure Industrial Control Systems (ICS), which warned that Russian actors continue to conduct activity targeting the global energy sector.
⢠April 13, 2022: CISA, FBI, NSA and DOE released Joint Cybersecurity Advisory (AA22-103A), APT Cyber Tools Targeting ICS/SCADA Devices, which warned that certain advanced persistent threat (APT) actors have exhibited the capability to gain full system access to multiple industrial control system (ICS)/supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) devices.
⢠On April 20, 2022: CISA, FBI, NSA, and International Partners issued Joint Cybersecurity Advisory (AA 22-110A), Demonstrated Threats and Capabilities of Russian State-Sponsored and Cyber Criminal Actors.
⢠June 7, 2022: CISA and NSA released Joint Cybersecurity Advisory (AA22-158A), Peopleâs Republic of China (PRC) State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Exploit Network Providers and Devices, which identified the use of publicly known vulnerabilities in order to establish a broad network of compromised infrastructure.
To protect against this escalating cybersecurity threat, TSA is preparing to issue SD Pipeline-2021-02C, which would cancel and supersede SD Pipeline-2021-02B. SD Pipeline-2021-02C contains several collections of information that require TSA to amend its currently approved OMB control number 1652-0056, Pipeline Corporate Security Review (PCSR). There is no change to the collection requirements regarding the voluntary Pipeline Corporate Security Review Program (PCSR). TSA is requesting emergency approval for a revision of OMB Control Number 1652-0056 to update the information collection requirements from SD Pipeline-2021-02C.
US Code:
6 USC 1207
Name of Law: 9/11 Commission Act
US Code:
49 USC 114(d)
Name of Law: US Code 49, Transportation
On behalf of this Federal agency, I certify that the collection of information encompassed by this request complies with 5 CFR 1320.9 and the related provisions of 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3).
The following is a summary of the topics, regarding the proposed collection of information, that the certification covers:
(i) Why the information is being collected;
(ii) Use of information;
(iii) Burden estimate;
(iv) Nature of response (voluntary, required for a benefit, or mandatory);
(v) Nature and extent of confidentiality; and
(vi) Need to display currently valid OMB control number;
If you are unable to certify compliance with any of these provisions, identify the item by leaving the box unchecked and explain the reason in the Supporting Statement.
1652-0056 Pipeline CSR Emergency ICR memo (to DHS)_OIRA 7.26.2022 (signed).pdf
1652-0056 Pipeline CSR SS.docx
Compliance Documentation