Pipeline Corporate Security Review

ICR 202207-1652-001

OMB: 1652-0056

Federal Form Document

Forms and Documents
Document
Name
Status
Supplementary Document
2022-07-27
Supplementary Document
2016-08-17
Supplementary Document
2016-07-21
Supporting Statement A
2022-07-26
Supplementary Document
2016-07-21
IC Document Collections
IC ID
Document
Title
Status
254848 New
250231 Unchanged
250230 Modified
250229 Modified
250228 Modified
195561 Modified
ICR Details
1652-0056 202207-1652-001
Received in OIRA 202111-1652-001
DHS/TSA
Pipeline Corporate Security Review
Revision of a currently approved collection   No
Emergency 07/27/2022
07/27/2022
  Requested Previously Approved
6 Months From Approved 07/31/2023
440 331
60,220 12,830
0 0
Under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)and delegated authority from the Secretary of Homeland Security, TSA is tasked with developing policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with transportation security. TSA carries out this responsibility in the pipeline mode by assessing current industry security practices by way of its Pipeline Corporate Security Review (PCSR) program.
On May 8, 2021, the Colonial Pipeline Company announced that it had halted its pipeline operations due to a ransomware attack. This attack received national attention as it temporarily disrupted critical supplies of gasoline and other refined petroleum products throughout the East Coast. Such attacks pose significant threats to the country’s infrastructure and economic well-being. Since then the federal government has been working closely with industry partners to address the threat. The pipeline sector continues to face a significant cybersecurity threat. Recent Joint Cybersecurity Advisories from CISA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National Security Agency (NSA) highlight this threat: • February 7, 2022: The Office of the Director for National Intelligence released the Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, which noted that “China almost certainly is capable of launching cyber-attacks that would disrupt critical infrastructure services within the United States, including against oil and gas pipelines and rail systems.” • March 24, 2022: CISA, FBI, and the Department of Energy (DOE) released Joint Cybersecurity Advisory (AA22-083A), Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted State-Sponsored Russian Cyber Actors Targeting the Energy Sector. • March 24, 2022: The FBI’s Cyber Division released a Private Industry Notification (PIN 20220324-001), Triton Malware Remains Threat to Global Critical Infrastructure Industrial Control Systems (ICS), which warned that Russian actors continue to conduct activity targeting the global energy sector. • April 13, 2022: CISA, FBI, NSA and DOE released Joint Cybersecurity Advisory (AA22-103A), APT Cyber Tools Targeting ICS/SCADA Devices, which warned that certain advanced persistent threat (APT) actors have exhibited the capability to gain full system access to multiple industrial control system (ICS)/supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) devices. • On April 20, 2022: CISA, FBI, NSA, and International Partners issued Joint Cybersecurity Advisory (AA 22-110A), Demonstrated Threats and Capabilities of Russian State-Sponsored and Cyber Criminal Actors. • June 7, 2022: CISA and NSA released Joint Cybersecurity Advisory (AA22-158A), People’s Republic of China (PRC) State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Exploit Network Providers and Devices, which identified the use of publicly known vulnerabilities in order to establish a broad network of compromised infrastructure. To protect against this escalating cybersecurity threat, TSA is preparing to issue SD Pipeline-2021-02C, which would cancel and supersede SD Pipeline-2021-02B. SD Pipeline-2021-02C contains several collections of information that require TSA to amend its currently approved OMB control number 1652-0056, Pipeline Corporate Security Review (PCSR). There is no change to the collection requirements regarding the voluntary Pipeline Corporate Security Review Program (PCSR). TSA is requesting emergency approval for a revision of OMB Control Number 1652-0056 to update the information collection requirements from SD Pipeline-2021-02C.
US Code: 6 USC 1207 Name of Law: 9/11 Commission Act
   US Code: 49 USC 114(d) Name of Law: US Code 49, Transportation
  
None
Not associated with rulemaking
No
  Total Request Previously Approved Change Due to New Statute Change Due to Agency Discretion Change Due to Adjustment in Estimate Change Due to Potential Violation of the PRA
Annual Number of Responses 440 331 0 109 0 0
Annual Time Burden (Hours) 60,220 12,830 0 47,390 0 0
Annual Cost Burden (Dollars) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yes
Miscellaneous Actions
No
TSA is making program changes as a result of the collections to be implemented upon issuance of SD Pipeline 2021-01C.
$1,149,765
No
    Yes
    No
No
No
No
No
Christina Walsh 571 227-2062 [email protected]
  No
On behalf of this Federal agency, I certify that the collection of information encompassed by this request complies with 5 CFR 1320.9 and the related provisions of 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3).
The following is a summary of the topics, regarding the proposed collection of information, that the certification covers:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    (i) Why the information is being collected;
    (ii) Use of information;
    (iii) Burden estimate;
    (iv) Nature of response (voluntary, required for a benefit, or mandatory);
    (v) Nature and extent of confidentiality; and
    (vi) Need to display currently valid OMB control number;
 
 
 
If you are unable to certify compliance with any of these provisions, identify the item by leaving the box unchecked and explain the reason in the Supporting Statement.
07/27/2022
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