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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 140 / Thursday, July 21, 2016 / Notices

and is no longer authorized by State law
to engage in the . . . dispensing of
controlled substances.’’ This Agency has
further held that notwithstanding that
this provision grants the Agency
authority to suspend or revoke a
registration, other provisions of the
Controlled Substances Act ‘‘make plain
that a practitioner can neither obtain nor
maintain a DEA registration unless the
practitioner currently has authority
under state law to handle controlled
substances.’’ James L. Hooper, 76 FR
71371, 71372 (2011), pet. for rev.
denied, Hooper v. Holder, 481 F. App’x
826 (4th Cir. 2012).
These provisions include section
102(21), which defines the term
‘‘practitioner’’ to ‘‘mean[] a
physician . . . licensed, registered, or
otherwise permitted, by . . . the
jurisdiction in which he practices . . . to
distribute, dispense, [or] administer . . .
a controlled substance in the course of
professional practice,’’ 21 U.S.C.
802(21), as well as section 303(f), which
directs that ‘‘[t]he Attorney General
shall register practitioners . . . to
dispense . . . controlled substances . . .
if the applicant is authorized to
dispense . . . controlled substances
under the laws of the State in which he
practices.’’ Id. § 823(f). Based on these
provisions, the Agency has long held
that revocation is warranted even where
a state board has summarily suspended
a practitioner’s controlled substances
authority and the state’s order remains
subject to challenge in either
administrative or judicial proceedings.
See Gary Alfred Shearer, 78 FR 19009
(2013); Carmencita E. Gallora, 60 FR
47967 (1995).
Respondent nonetheless maintains
that the proposed revocation of his
registration would violate his right to
due process because the Hearing Officer
applied the wrong standard of proof
when he upheld the Emergency
Suspension Order. Response to Govt’s
Mot. for Summ. Judgment, at 4–8.
According to Respondent, this is so
because in holding that the Suspension
Order was justified by Respondent’s
indictment, the Hearing Officer applied
a probable cause standard rather than
the substantial evidence standard as
required by Kentucky law, and thus, the
Hearing Officer’s decision is arbitrary
and capricious. Id. at 5. Respondent
argues that he ‘‘established with
overwhelming and uncontested
evidence that his practice of medicine is
NOT a danger to the health, welfare, and
safety of his patients or the general
public.’’ Id. And he further argues that
‘‘the Hearing Officer improperly placed
the risk of non-persuasion on [him] and
applied the [Board’s] unconstitutional

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regulatory provisions allowing an
indictment alone to serve as substantial
evidence of a violation of law.’’ Id. at 7.
However, ‘‘‘DEA has repeatedly held
that a registrant cannot collaterally
attack the results of a state criminal or
administrative proceeding in a
proceeding brought under section 304
[21 U.S.C. 824] of the CSA.’’’ Calvin
Ramsey, 76 FR 20034, 20036 (2011)
(quoting Hicham K. Riba, 73 FR 75773,
75774 (2008) (other citations omitted));
see also Shahid Musud Siddiqui, 61 FR
14818 (1996); Robert A. Leslie, 60 FR
14004 (1995). DEA is not vested with
authority to adjudicate either the
constitutionality of the Board’s
Suspension Order, or whether the
Board’s Order is arbitrary and
capricious. Respondent must therefore
seek relief from the State Board’s Order
in those administrative and judicial
forums provided by the State.
In a revocation proceeding brought
under section 824(a)(3), the only issue is
whether a respondent holds current
authority to dispense controlled
substances. Respondent’s various
contentions as to the validity of the
Board’s order are therefore not material
to this Agency’s resolution of whether
he is entitled to maintain his DEA
registration. Because it is undisputed
that Respondent does not hold authority
under the laws of Kentucky to dispense
controlled substances, he no longer
meets the definition of a practitioner
under the CSA and thus, he is not
entitled to maintain his registration.
See, e.g., Hooper, 76 FR at 71372.
Accordingly, I will order that
Respondent’s registration be revoked
and that any pending application to
renew or modify this registration be
denied.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Order

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Pursuant to the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. 824(a) and 823(f), as well
as 28 CFR 0.100(b), I order that DEA
Certificate of Registration BC8483430
issued to James Dustin Chaney, D.O., be,
and it hereby is, revoked. I further order
that any application of James Dustin
Chaney, D.O., to renew or modify this
registration, be, and it hereby is, denied.
This Order is effective August 22, 2016.

Service Contract Inventory; Notice of
Availability
In accordance with Section
743 of Division C of the FY 2010
Consolidated Appropriations Act,
Public Law 111–117, the Department of
Justice is publishing this notice to
advise the public of the availability of
its FY 2015 Service Contracts Inventory
and Inventory Supplement. The
inventory includes service contract
actions over $25,000 that were awarded
in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015. The inventory
supplement includes information
collected from contractors on the
amount invoiced and direct labor hours
expended for covered service contracts.
The Department of Justice analyzes this
data for the purpose of determining
whether its contract labor is being used
in an effective and appropriate manner
and if the mix of federal employees and
contractors in the agency is effectively
balanced. The inventory and
supplement do not include contractor
proprietary or sensitive information.
The FY 2015 Service Contract
Inventory and Inventory Supplement is
provided at the following link: https://
www.justice.gov/jmd/service-contractinventory.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tara
M. Jamison, Procurement Policy Review
Group, Justice Management Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, Washington,
DC 20530; Phone: 202–616–3754; Email:
[email protected].
SUMMARY:

Dated: July, 19, 2016.
Jerri Murray,
Department Clearance Officer for PRA, U.S.
Department of Justice.
[FR Doc. 2016–17248 Filed 7–20–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–DH–P

Office of the Secretary
Privacy Act of 1974; Publication in Full
of All Notices of Systems of Records,
Including Several New Systems,
Substantive Amendments to Existing
Systems, Decommissioning of
Obsolete Legacy Systems, and
Publication of Proposed Routines
Uses

[FR Doc. 2016–17250 Filed 7–20–16; 8:45 am]

Office of the Secretary, Labor.
Notice: Response to Comments
on the Department’s April 29, 2016
System of Records Notice.

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P

SUMMARY:

Dated: July 11, 2016.
Chuck Rosenberg,
Acting Administrator.

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AGENCY:
ACTION:

This notice announces a
response to public comments on the
Department’s April 29, 2016 System of

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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 140 / Thursday, July 21, 2016 / Notices

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Records Notice. In response to
comments, the Department is revising
one SORN. That SORN, and the
remainder of SORNs published on April
29, 2016, will become effective on the
date of publication of this notice.
DATES: The effective date for the
Department’s System of Records Notice
is the date of publication of this notice.
Effective Date: The date of publication
of this notice.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Joseph J. Plick, Counsel for FOIA and
Information Law, Office of the Solicitor,
Department of Labor, 200 Constitution
Avenue, NW., Room N–2420,
Washington, DC 20210, telephone (202)
693–5527, or by email to plick.joseph@
dol.gov.
Background: On April 29, 2016, the
Department of Labor issued a
Publication In Full of All Notices of
Systems of Records, including several
new systems; substantive amendments
to systems; decommissioning of obsolete
legacy systems; and publication of new
universal routine uses for all system of
records. The Department received
several public comments and one
Federal agency comment on this System
of Records Notice during the public
comment period, which ended June 8,
2016. The Department required
additional time to review and address
the comments, so, by Federal Register
notice of June 21, 2016, 81 FR 40352,
the effective date was postponed to July
23, 2016.
The Department is now publishing
this notice to address the eleven
comments to and revise SORN DOL/
Central-5 in response to those
comments.
Comment: Several comments
criticized Universal Routine Use #14,
which ‘‘permits the Department to
disclose information to the United
States Department of Justice (DOJ) and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
that will be included in the National
Instant Criminal Background Check
System (NICS).’’ The commenters
argued that this Routine Use
impermissibly infringes on Second
Amendment rights. One commenter
stated, for example:
This rule (which refers specifically to 23
executive actions that Obama took on Jan. 16,
2013) infringes on the Second Amendment
by having developed through rule, manner in
which protected health information (PHI) is
now authorized to be released
unconstitutionally by HHS to agenc(ies) of
the federal government without the affected
individual’s consent, and the PHI is thus
used in a manner to target individuals and
unconstitutionally remove access to weapons
in connection with NICS.

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Response: The Department is required
by law—the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act, as amended by the NICS
Improvement Amendments Act of
2007—to provide information to the
Attorney General to carry out its
provisions. Therefore, the Department is
declining to make changes to Universal
Routine Use #14.
Comment: One comment was critical
of Universal Routine Use #13, which
allows the Department to disclose
information to a state or local
government agency in charge of issuing
licenses to attorneys and health care
professionals. The commenter raised the
concern that state laws, particularly
California’s state laws, prohibit
information sharing with state and local
agencies.
Response: Under the Supremacy
Clause, federal law takes precedence
over state law. But to the extent that
state law in California may apply, the
Department has not identified any laws
which prohibit the disclosure
contemplated by Universal Routine Use
#13. On the contrary, California’s most
broadly applicable privacy law—the
Information Practices Act of 1977—
explicitly allows sharing ‘‘To a law
enforcement or regulatory agency when
required for an investigation of unlawful
activity or for licensing, certification, or
regulatory purposes, unless the
disclosure is otherwise prohibited by
law.’’ The Department declines to make
changes in response to this comment.
Comment: Several comments did not
specifically reference or provide
substantive feedback on any section of
the SORN. One commenter stated, for
example, ‘‘I do not favor the use of
funds for rail support that is not directly
supportive of General Aviation or
Airline services, viz. flights.’’ Another
argued ‘‘No undocumented alien should
have the same ability to sue for
discrimination because of their country
of origin, as an American Citizen does.’’
Response: The Department was
unable to identify any sections of the
SORN relevant to these comments, and,
therefore, is making no changes in
response.
Comment: Three commenters,
including the Office of Government
Information Services (OGIS) (within the
National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA)) suggested
changing the text of Routine Use (b) in
the DOL/Central-5 SORN, which covers
the Department’s Freedom of
Information Act files, to follow model
language drafted by OGIS and to
explicitly note that disclosure to OGIS
is a permissible routine use for FOIA
files. Specifically, the OGIS model
language states:

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To the National Archives and Records
Administration, Office of Government
Information Services (OGIS), to the extent
necessary to fulfill its responsibilities in 5
U.S.C. 552(h), to review administrative
agency policies, procedures and compliance
with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),
and to facilitate OGIS’ offering of mediation
services to resolve disputes between persons
making FOIA requests and administrative
agencies.

Response: The Department agrees that
additional language can be helpful to
clarify that the scope of permissible
disclosures of FOIA files under Routine
Use (b) of DOL/Central 5 SORN includes
disclosure to OGIS in order to facilitate
its responsibilities related to FOIA
compliance and mediation.
Accordingly, the Department is revising
this routine use to incorporate this
model language. Routine Use (b) will
now read:
Information to other Federal agencies (e.g.,
Department of Justice or the Office of
Government Information Services within the
National Archives and Records
Administration) in order to obtain advice and
recommendations concerning matters on
which the agency has specialized experience
or particular competence; for use in making
required determinations; to fulfill agency
responsibilities to review administrative
agency policies, procedures, and compliance
under the Freedom of Information Act or the
Privacy Act of 1974; or to facilitate mediation
services between administrative agencies and
persons making Freedom of Information
requests.

The SORN will become effective, with
the change to DOL/Central-5, on the
date of publication of this notice.
Signed at Washington, DC this 15th July,
2016.
Thomas E. Perez,
Secretary of Labor.
[FR Doc. 2016–17209 Filed 7–20–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510–HL–P

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Petitions for Modification of
Application of Existing Mandatory
Safety Standards
Mine Safety and Health
Administration, Labor.
ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:

Section 101(c) of the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 and
Title 30 of the Code of Federal
Regulations Part 44 govern the
application, processing, and disposition
of petitions for modification. This notice
is a summary of petitions for
modification submitted to the Mine

SUMMARY:

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