Emergency Memo

1652-0074 Rail Cyber Surf Modes Emergency memo (to DHS) FINAL_TSA sign.pdf

Cybersecurity Measures for Surface Modes

Emergency Memo

OMB: 1652-0074

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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Transportation Security Administration
6595 Springfield Center Drive
Springfield, Virginia 20598

ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Dominic Mancini
Deputy Administrator
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)
Office of Management and Budget (OMB)

THROUGH:

Eric Hysen
Chief Information Officer,
Department of Homeland Security

FROM:

Opeyemi Oshinnaiye
Assistant Administrator
Chief Information Officer
Authorizing Official
Office of Information Technology
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)

SUBJECT:

Emergency Information Collection Request: Revision Cybersecurity Measures
for Surface Modes (1652-0074)

ERIC N
HYSEN

Digitally signed by ERIC
N HYSEN
Date: 2022.10.26
08:53:58 -04'00'

signed by
OPEYEMI B Digitally
OPEYEMI B OSHINNAIYE
2022.10.21 14:31:34
OSHINNAIYE Date:
-04'00'

Purpose
This memorandum seeks the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approval of the Transportation
Security Administration’s (TSA’s) request for an emergency revision under the Paperwork Reduction Act
(PRA) to OMB Control Number 1652-0074, Cybersecurity Measures for Surface Modes, to address
cybersecurity risks and the ongoing cybersecurity threat to freight rail and passenger rail systems and
associated infrastructure.
To protect against escalating cybersecurity threats, TSA intends to publish a Security Directive (SD) which
will be mandatory, titled SD 1580/1582-2022-01 Rail Cybersecurity Mitigation Actions, Contingency
Planning, and Testing. The purpose of this SD will be to reduce the vulnerability of critical railroad
operations and facilities to cybersecurity threats through implementation of layered cybersecurity measures
that provide defense-in-depth. The SD 1580/1582-2022-01 would apply to Owner/Operators of freight and
passenger railroads, to include the “Higher Risk” Freight railroads identified in 49 CFR 1580.101 and
additional TSA-designated freight and passenger railroads. As this SD requires new information to be
submitted to TSA, TSA is requesting emergency approval for a revision of OMB Control Number 1652-0074,
Cybersecurity Measures for Surface Modes. TSA would continue to collect information under this

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Information Collection Request (ICR) for the previously issued SD-1580-21-01 1, SD -1582-21-01 2 and IC
2021-01 3 issued on December 31, 2021, which remain in effect.
Background
The United States (U.S.) surface transportation system is a complex interconnected and largely open network
including freight railroads, public transportation and passenger rail systems, and over-the-road-bus (OTRB)
Owner/Operators. Many of these modes employ increasingly integrated cyber and physical systems that
operate daily in close coordination with and proximity to each other nationwide. This growing dependence
on Operational Technology (OT) and Information Technology (IT) systems and assets puts these operations at
risk as malicious cyber actors have demonstrated their willingness to conduct cyber-attacks against critical
infrastructure by exploiting the vulnerability of these cyber systems.
In December 2021, OMB issued emergency approval of an ICR for TSA to collect information required by
SD-1580-21-01, SD-1582-21-01, and IC 2021-01 in order to address the growing threat to the integrated
cyber and physical systems that operate daily in close coordination with and proximity nation-wide, and its
uninterrupted secure and safe operation is critical for the U.S. economy. IC 2021-01 is an “information
circular (IC)”, which contains non-binding recommendations with the same measures for railroad
Owner/Operators, public transportation agencies, rail transit system Owner/Operators, and certain OTRB
Owner/Operators not specifically covered under SDs 1580-21-01 or 1582-21-02.
TSA’s SDs are issued under authority granted by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA).
Pursuant to ATSA, and delegated authority from the Secretary of Homeland Security, Congress granted the
TSA Administrator broad statutory responsibility and authority with respect to the security of the
transportation system. See 49 U.S.C. § 114(d). Under 49 U.S.C. § 114(f)(3) and (4), TSA may “develop
policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with the threats ... including coordinating countermeasures with
appropriate departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the United States.” Additionally, TSA may, at the
discretion of the Administrator, assist another Federal agency, such as CISA, in carrying out its authority in
order to address a threat to transportation. 4 TSA has the authority to issue SDs in order to protect
transportation security.

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law or executive order (including an executive order
requiring a cost-benefit analysis), if the Administrator determines that a regulation or security
directive must be issued immediately in order to protect transportation security, the
Administrator shall issue the regulation or security directive without providing notice or an
opportunity for comment and without prior approval of the Secretary.” 49 U.S.C. § 114(l)(2).
The SDs and the IC were developed in consultation with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency (CISA) and coordinated with applicable components of the Department of Transportation and
Department of Defense.

https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/sd-1580-21-01_signed.pdf
https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/sd-1582-21-01_signed.pdf
3
https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/20211201_surface-ic-2021-01.pdf
4
Id. §§ 114(m), granting the TSA Administrator the same authority as the FAA Administrator under 49 U.S.C. §
106(m).
1
2

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Since the issuance of TSA’s aforementioned SDs and IC, more information has developed regarding global
cybersecurity threats, requiring additional action to ensure the security of U.S. transportation systems. The
following highlights some of this new information.
•

•

•
•

February 7, 2022: The Office of the Director for National Intelligence released the Annual Threat
Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, which noted that “China almost certainly is capable of
launching cyber-attacks that would disrupt critical infrastructure services within the United States,
including against oil and gas freight rail and passenger rails and rail systems.” 5
April 13, 2022: CISA, FBI, NSA and DOE released Joint Cybersecurity Advisory (AA22-103A), APT
Cyber Tools Targeting ICS/SCADA Devices, which warned that certain advanced persistent threat (APT)
actors have exhibited the capability to gain full system access to multiple industrial control system
(ICS)/supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) devices. 6
On April 20, 2022: CISA, FBI, NSA, and International Partners issued Joint Cybersecurity Advisory (AA
22-110A), Demonstrated Threats and Capabilities of Russian State-Sponsored and Cyber Criminal
Actors. 7
June 7, 2022: CISA and NSA released Joint Cybersecurity Advisory (AA22-158A), People’s Republic of
China (PRC) State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Exploit Network Providers and Devices, which identified the
use of publicly known vulnerabilities in order to establish a broad network of compromised
infrastructure. 8

Securing the surface transportation network has become increasingly important to the U.S.
The degradation, destruction, or malfunction of systems that control this infrastructure could cause significant
harm to the national and economic security of the U.S. TSA’s cybersecurity measures are intended to reduce
the vulnerability of IT and OT systems and protect civilian higher-risk infrastructure from being attractive
targets for malicious cyber actors or foreign powers attempting to harm U.S. interests or retaliate for
perceived U.S. aggression.
To address this threat TSA is issuing an SD that includes the following requirements:
•

•

Implement a TSA-approved Cybersecurity Implementation Plan that describes the specific
cybersecurity measures employed by the Owner/Operator and the schedule for achieving the
performance outcomes in the SD.
o Develop network segmentation policies and controls to ensure that the Operational
Technology (OT) system can continue to safely operate in the event that an Information
Technology (IT) system has been compromised and vice versa;
o Create access control measures to secure and prevent unauthorized access to critical cyber
systems;
o Build continuous monitoring and detection policies and procedures to detect cybersecurity
threats and correct anomalies that affect critical cyber system operations; and
o Reduce the risk of exploitation of unpatched systems through the application of security
patches and updates for operating systems, applications, drivers and firmware on critical
cyber systems in a timely manner using a risk-based methodology.
Annually submit a Cybersecurity Assessment Program to proactively test and regularly audit the
effectiveness of cybersecurity measures and identify and resolve device, network and/or system
vulnerabilities.

2022 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (dni.gov)
https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-103a
7
https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-110a
8
https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-158a
5
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•

Upon request, provide documentation to establish compliance of records of common IT or OT
systems to be reviewed as part of a compliance inspection. In many situations, providing TSA with
access to documents and records on site will be sufficient.

Discussion
TSA is addressing this continuous global cyber threat to transportation security and implementing the
President’s Industrial Control System Cybersecurity Initiative 9 using its ATSA authority. The emergency
revision for the SD 1580/1582-2022-01 contains several collections of information to update the current
information collection requirements to address emerging cybersecurity concerns. This update requires TSA to
request emergency approval for a revision of OMB Control Number 1652-0074, Cybersecurity Measures for
Surface Modes 10.
TSA plans to collect the following information:
1) A Cybersecurity Implementation Plan (CIP) submitted to TSA for approval that addresses how the
Owner/Operator will achieve each of the following objectives:
• Identification of the Owner/Operator’s Critical Cyber Systems
• Implementation of network segmentation policies and controls to ensure that the Operational
Technology system can continue to safely operate in the event that an Information Technology
system has been compromised
• Implementation of access control measures to secure and prevent unauthorized access to critical cyber
systems;
• Implementation of continuous monitoring and detection policies and procedures to detect
cybersecurity threats and correct anomalies that affect Critical Cyber System operations; and;
• Reduction of the risk of exploitation of unpatched systems through the application of security patches
and updates for operating systems, applications, drivers and firmware on Critical Cyber Systems in a
timely manner using a risk-based methodology.
2) An annual plan that describes how the Owner/Operator will proactively and regularly assess the
effectiveness of cybersecurity measures, and identify and resolve device, network, and/or system
vulnerabilities.
3) Providing documentation as necessary to establish compliance, to be provided to TSA upon request.
The imminent and quickly evolving cybersecurity threats to surface transportation infrastructure necessitate
these collections. The information derived from this collection will directly support and facilitate TSA’s
cybersecurity mission, as well as TSA’s responsibility and authority for “security in all modes of
July 28, 2021, the White House issued a National Security Memorandum on Improving Cybersecurity for Critical
Infrastructure Control Systems stating, “The cybersecurity threats posed to the systems that control and operate the
critical infrastructure on which we all depend are among the most significant and growing issues confronting our Nation.
The degradation, destruction, or malfunction of systems that control this infrastructure could cause significant harm to
the national and economic security of the United States.” The President’s ICS Cybersecurity Initiative creates a path for
Government and industry to collaborate to take immediate action, within their respective spheres of control, to address
these serious threats.”
10
The SD-1580-01, SD-1582-01 and IC 2021-01 is being reissued to expand applicability, and is scheduled to expire on
September 30, 2023.
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transportation … including security responsibilities … over modes of transportation that are exercised by the
Department of Transportation.” 49 U.S.C. § 114(d).
TSA and federal partner agencies will use the information to respond to and contain emerging cybersecurity
threat to make a global assessment of the cyber risk posture of the industry and possibly impose additional
security measures as appropriate or necessary. TSA may also use the information, with company-specific
data redacted, for TSA’s intelligence-derived reports. In addition, TSA and CISA may use information
submitted for vulnerability identification, trend analysis, or to generate anonymized indicators of compromise
or other cybersecurity products to prevent other cybersecurity incidents. All reported information will be
protected in a manner appropriate for the sensitivity and criticality of the information.
Emergency clearance request
Regarding all proposed collections, TSA has explored other options for addressing the existing threat and
found it cannot do so without collecting information from covered Owner/Operators. The TSA Administrator
has determined that the cybersecurity threat facing the rail industry requires the issuance of a rail SD. This
emergency request is based on the information collection requirements in the SD. TSA is pursuing federal
cybersecurity rulemaking, but the current threat requires the issuance of this SD. Therefore, TSA is seeking
emergency approval of this information collection to require TSA-designated Owner/Operators to comply
with the collection requirements discussed above.
Without emergency approval, and instead going through the normal PRA clearance process, TSA will be
unable to address this continuous threat of cyberattacks, such as ransomware, to the nation’s surface
transportation systems. The use of normal PRA clearance procedures is reasonably likely to result in public
harm because TSA would not have the foundational cybersecurity posture of the covered Owner/Operators,
and thus, hinder TSA’s ability to quickly obtain information needed to address imminent, serious, quickly
moving and rapidly evolving threats to these systems, which is key to national and economic security and
would be impeded if Owner/Operators did not provide the information required by the SD in the near future.
In addition, delaying the effective date of the SD would impede the ability of the industry to effectively and
efficiently reduce the vulnerability of critical rail operations and facilities to cybersecurity threats, which is
fundamental to securing our nation’s national and economic security.
It is critical to ensure that SD -1580/1582-2022-01 is issued to address emerging cybersecurity threats.
National, state, and other actors with malicious intent could easily take advantage of even a temporary
diminution of security that could result without the issuance of this revision. The Department of Homeland
Security has determined that it is necessary to mandate these measures on an expedited basis to ensure they
are implemented as necessary to protect national security by mitigating the current risk to Rail
Owner/Operators from cybersecurity threats. The evolving cybersecurity threats to surface transportation
infrastructure necessitate these collections.
Conclusion
As part of the focused and aggressive continuing federal effort to mitigate this continuing cybersecurity threat
and reduce the risk across surface transportation, TSA respectfully requests that OMB grant TSA’s request for
emergency clearance for the revision of TSA’s Cybersecurity Surface Mode collection in order to address this
emergency need to protect transportation security consistent with TSA’s responsibilities and authorities. It is
imperative that TSA issue the SD as soon as possible to effectuate these goals.


File Typeapplication/pdf
File TitleMonth Day, Year
AuthorWalsh, Christina
File Modified2022-10-26
File Created2022-10-21

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