No
material or nonsubstantive change to a currently approved
collection
No
Emergency
04/24/2025
07/31/2025
Requested
Previously Approved
09/30/2025
09/30/2025
7,442,778
5,811,000
2,808,175
2,001,567
0
0
To mitigate fraud concerns, in April
2025, SSA will increase the level of identity proofing needed for
customers to make payment method changes during phone interactions.
While necessary to protect the public and the integrity of SSA’s
programs, this limits the accessibility of the phone as a service
channel for direct deposit requests (including post
entitlement/post-eligibility direct deposit changes). To bridge
this gap, SSA developed a hybrid identity proofing process called
the Security Authentication PIN (SAP) that will provide identity
proofing parity with our online modality, as well as in-person
verification. Utilizing the SAP process will provide the necessary
identity verification to allow payment method changes to direct
deposit records via phone or in person, while ensuring fraud
protection through verification of the identity of the individual
prior to accessing or revising their account. SSA is implementing
the new hybrid Security Authentication PIN (SAP) to digitally
verify the identity of a telephone or in person customer when
requesting changes to their direct deposit information. This
supports the agency’s changes to its identity proofing policy for
post-entitlement/ post-eligibility actions for direct deposit
enrollments, updates or cancellations. To ease the burden on
customers, SSA created a vanity URL that will navigate customers
directly to the Security Settings page within their online mySocial
Security account, allowing them to quickly and easily generate the
SAP after accessing their account. This feature will reduce the
burden on the customer to navigate within their online account to
the Security Settings pages where they may generate the SAP. The
code generates immediately once the customer selects the “Generate
PIN” button. To allow for continued security for respondent’s
personal information, and to ensure SSA is able to accurately
verify the callers’ identities prior to accessing any SSA number
holders’ sensitive information, we are implementing this hybrid SAP
process for telephone access to the direct deposit services. In
this way, we continue to offer maximum flexibility and options to
the public while ensuring the security of the public’s social
security number and benefits payments. We expect this new identity
proofing will be a powerful fraud prevention tool. The respondents
are individuals who wish to do business with SSA over the telephone
or in person for the purposes of direct deposit enrollments,
updates or cancellations. We are submitting a Non-Substantive
Change Request to increase the scope of the SAP to more telephone
services, and update the documentation to show that the SAP process
is voluntary.
To allow for continued
security for respondent’s personal information, and to ensure SSA
is able to accurately verify the callers’ identities prior to
accessing any SSA number holders’ sensitive information, we are
implementing this hybrid SAP process for telephone access to the
direct deposit services. In this way, we continue to offer maximum
flexibility and options to the public while ensuring the security
of the public’s social security number and benefits payments. We
expect this new identity proofing will be a powerful fraud
prevention tool. The respondents are individuals who wish to do
business with SSA over the telephone or in person for the purposes
of post-entitlement/post-eligibility actions for direct deposit
enrollments, updates or cancellations, or to discuss flagged
initial claims for all Title II non-disability benefits
(Retirement, Survivors, Auxiliary Spouses, Lump Sum Death Payments
(LSDP), and Children benefits applications).
SSA is submitting this Change
Request to increase the scope of use for this new Internet-based
tool that increases the public reporting burden. See the chart
above for updated burden figures. * Note: The total burden
reflected in ROCIS is 2,808,175 while the burden cited in the
Change Request document is 990,072. This discrepancy is because the
ROCIS burden reflects the average teleservice center and field
office waiting times as well as the burden per response. In
contrast, the chart in the attached Justification for the
Non-Substantive Changes document reflects actual burden.
On behalf of this Federal agency, I certify that
the collection of information encompassed by this request complies
with 5 CFR 1320.9 and the related provisions of 5 CFR
1320.8(b)(3).
The following is a summary of the topics, regarding
the proposed collection of information, that the certification
covers:
(i) Why the information is being collected;
(ii) Use of information;
(iii) Burden estimate;
(iv) Nature of response (voluntary, required for a
benefit, or mandatory);
(v) Nature and extent of confidentiality; and
(vi) Need to display currently valid OMB control
number;
If you are unable to certify compliance with any of
these provisions, identify the item by leaving the box unchecked
and explain the reason in the Supporting Statement.
Emergency Supporting Statement - 0960-NEW (Security Authentication PIN (SAP) Process) - Revised.docx
RE_ ACOSS Approval for the New Emergency ICR for the mySocial Security -- Security Authentication PIN (SAP).pdf
Respondents who decline to use SAP and instead use KBA