Privacy Impact Assessment

Privacy Impact Assessment
for the

Fraud Detection and National Security
Directorate
DHS/USCIS/PIA-044
July 30, 2012
Contact Point
Donald K. Hawkins
Privacy Officer
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
202-272-8000
Reviewing Official
Mary Ellen Callahan
Chief Privacy Officer
Department of Homeland Security
202-343-1717

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Abstract
The Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
created the Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate to strengthen the integrity of the nation’s
immigration system and to ensure that immigration benefits are not granted to individuals that may pose a
threat to national security and/or public safety. In addition, the Fraud Detection and National Security
Directorate is responsible for detecting, deterring, and combating immigration benefit fraud. The United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services is conducting this Privacy Impact Assessment to document
and assess how the Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate collects, uses, and maintains
personally identifiable information.

Overview
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) implements immigration law and policy through the processing and adjudication of
applications and petitions submitted for citizenship, asylum, and other immigration benefits. Benefits
may include adjustment of immigration status (granting lawful permanent residence), naturalization
(granting United States citizenship), asylum and refugee status, and other immigrant and nonimmigrant
benefits. USCIS supports the DHS statutory mandate of protecting the nation by identifying applicants
who threaten national security or public safety and denying them immigration benefits that would allow
them to legally enter or remain in the United States. In addition, USCIS enhances the integrity of the
nation’s legal immigration system by detecting and deterring immigration benefit fraud. In order to
support this DHS statutory mandate, USCIS collects applicant, petitioner, and beneficiary information to
adjudicate applications and petitions so that immigration benefits are only granted to eligible individuals
in an accurate, efficient, and timely manner. 1 This information is also used to determine if and when
those benefits should be rescinded or revoked.
In 2004, USCIS established the Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate (FDNS) in
response to a Congressional recommendation to establish an organization “responsible for developing,
implementing, directing, and overseeing the joint USCIS-Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
anti-fraud initiative and conducting law enforcement/background checks on every applicant, beneficiary,
and petitioner prior to granting immigration benefits.” 2 FDNS fulfills the USCIS mission of enhancing
both national security and the integrity of the legal immigration system by: (1) identifying threats to
national security and public safety posed by those seeking immigration benefits; (2) detecting, pursuing,
and deterring immigration benefit fraud; (3) identifying and removing systemic vulnerabilities in the
process of the legal immigration system; and (4) acting as USCIS’s primary conduit for information
sharing and collaboration with other governmental agencies. FDNS also oversees a strategy to promote a
1

For more information about the USCIS adjudication process, please see “USCIS Benefits Processing of Applicants
other than Petitions for Naturalization, Refugee Status, and Asylum (CLAIMS 3)” and “USCIS Computer Linked
Application Information Management System (CLAIMS 4)” PIAs at http://www.dhs.gov/privacy.
2
Conference Report, Fiscal Year 2005 Appropriations Act.

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balanced operation that distinguishes USCIS’s administrative authority, responsibility, and jurisdiction
from ICE’s criminal investigative authority.
FDNS serves as the primary liaison between USCIS and the law enforcement and intelligence
community. This effort includes establishing and developing relationships and collaborating with law
enforcement; intelligence; and federal, state, and local agencies to ensure criminals, terrorists, and other
individuals who pose a threat to national security and/or public safety are not able to exploit the
immigration system to gain access to, or remain in, the United States. In addition, FDNS works with
adjudications on cases of suspected fraud and where the security vetting process has indicated possible
national security or public safety-related concerns (please see the Appendix for a detailed description of
the FDNS vetting initiatives).
There are two main personnel positions in USCIS discussed in this document —the FDNS
Immigration Officer (FDNS IO) and the Adjudications Immigration Services Officer (ISO). FDNS IOs
perform administrative investigations to obtain relevant information needed to render the appropriate
adjudicative decision. Upon conclusion of an administrative investigation, FDNS IOs report their
findings to USCIS adjudications. The ISO makes the adjudicative decision. These two entities — FDNS
IOs and Adjudications ISOs — work together to ensure that fraud, national security, and public safety
concerns are fully investigated prior to the decision on a benefit.

Headquarters Operations
Headquarters FDNS (HQFDNS) develops, oversees, and maintains policies, procedures, and
other efforts within USCIS’s administrative authorities to detect, identify, and combat threats to the
security of the United States and the integrity of its legal immigration system. This includes collaboration
with law enforcement; intelligence; and federal, state, and local agencies to ensure criminals, terrorists,
and other individuals posing a threat to public safety or national security are not able to exploit the legal
immigration system to gain access to, or remain in, the United States. USCIS and ICE, which is
responsible for the criminal investigation and prosecution of immigration benefit fraud, have
implemented a joint anti-fraud strategy through FDNS. This strategy promotes balanced operations that
distinguish USCIS’ administrative authority, responsibility, and jurisdiction from ICE’s criminal
investigative authority.
HQFDNS also works with other components of USCIS to develop operational policy to detect
fraud, and to identify and combat threats to security. Field Operations (FOD); Service Center Operations
(SCOPS); and Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations (RAIO) directorates supervise field FDNS
Immigration Officers. HQFDNS develops and implements operational policies and procedures that
address fraud and national security concerns in coordination with these directorates. FDNS also works
with the Enterprise Services Directorate (ESD) on policies and procedures related to biometric and other
security checks. In addition, the USCIS Privacy and Office of the Chief Counsel advise FDNS on the
privacy and legal considerations of policies and initiatives.
HQFDNS consists of three operational divisions: the National Security Division, the Fraud
Division, and the Intelligence Division, all of which provide guidance to field and HQ FDNS IOs.

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HQFDNS does not directly supervise FDNS IOs in the field, but provides operational policy and
guidance to FDNS field IOs.
National Security Division
The National Security Division (NSD) is responsible for developing agency policies, procedures,
priorities, and objectives relating to the detection and resolution of national security concerns in
immigration benefit petitions and applications. NSD focuses on: (1) the national security vetting
processes; (2) oversight of procedures for handling national security concerns; and (3) information
sharing with the law enforcement and intelligence community. NSD works closely with the Intelligence
Division (ID) to ensure coordination within USCIS.
Improving National Security Vetting
NSD develops and monitors the protocol that FDNS IOs must follow when a potential national
security concern has been identified during the vetting of individuals who have requested an immigration
benefit. NSD provides technical assistance to FDNS IOs and ISOs in the field when vetting has identified
a possible national security concern. This includes reaching out to partner agencies to resolve any such
concerns and providing information for use in the adjudication process. The NSD Screening
Coordination Office (SCO) reviews the existing processes for national security vetting, which includes
national security and criminal checks and identifying areas for improvement.
Conducting Oversight
NSD is responsible for tracking and reporting the volume of national security workload within
USCIS. NSD regularly reports processing information to leadership to ensure these special cases are
receiving proper attention.
Facilitating Information Sharing
In addition to its security vetting responsibilities, NSD serves as the primary oversight entity for
HQFDNS employees detailed to other government agencies to facilitate information sharing with the law
enforcement and intelligence community. These officers have access to USCIS information and facilitate
efficient and appropriate information sharing. In addition, they serve as subject matter experts regarding
immigration laws and policies. NSD also handles the adjudication of sensitive cases sponsored by other
government agencies.
Fraud Division
The Fraud Division (FD) is responsible for developing and overseeing anti-fraud policies and
procedures, detecting fraudulent immigration activities, and identifying fraudulent benefit applications.
FD is also responsible for developing operational policy and administering the Administrative Site Visit
and Verification Program (ASVVP), a program in which FDNS IOs and contractors conduct random,
administrative site visits to the work sites of petitioners and beneficiaries of religious workers and certain
employment-based benefits.

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Intelligence Division
The Intelligence Division (ID) is responsible for representing USCIS interests to the DHS Office
of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), the DHS Operations Coordination and Planning, and other agencies
within the law enforcement and intelligence community. ID manages the analysis, reporting, production,
and dissemination of USCIS immigration-based intelligence products both in the field and at HQFDNS.
These products provide information on patterns, trends, and indicators of fraud or national security
concerns. ID is also responsible for preparing specific intelligence reports addressing national security
and/or public safety concerns involving immigrants and/or immigration processes, as well as for
responding to internal and external requests for information (RFI) through the DHS I&A single point of
service.
FDNS Operations in the Field
FDNS IOs are located at all USCIS service centers, field offices, asylum offices, and some
overseas offices and are directly supervised by their respective field leadership. FDNS IOs are
responsible for conducting administrative inquiries into suspected benefit fraud and aiding in the
resolution of national security or criminal concerns. FDNS IOs may also refer egregious public safety
cases, national security concerns, and fraud cases to ICE.
To initiate the administrative inquiry process, 3 FDNS IOs receive written fraud, national security,
and criminal referrals from ISOs. FDNS IOs may also receive referrals or Requests for Assistance
(RFAs) 4 from law enforcement partners and internal USCIS entities, or tip letters from the public. FDNS
IOs perform systems checks and research on the subject of the referral and then determine whether to take
any further action or decline the referral. If an investigation is deemed necessary, FDNS IOs will perform
further checks in USCIS, DHS, and federal databases, as well as public information 5 to verify information
provided on, and in support of, applications and petitions. If a referral is declined, FDNS IOs record the
case in the FDNS Data System (FDNS-DS), which is described below, and return the case to the ISO with
the reason for declination.
In conducting an administrative inquiry, FDNS IOs may perform one, or a combination, of the
following:
•
•
•
•
•
3

research in government and commercial databases and public records;
Internet searches of open source information;
searches of social media sites;
file reviews;
telephone calls;

USCIS conducts administrative inquiries, ICE conducts criminal investigations.
RFAs may be satisfied with subject matter expertise, operational assistance, information, or a combination of any
of these. RFAs may be made by USCIS officers, in addition to external law enforcement and intelligence
organizations.
5
Public information includes any open source information legally accessible by anyone such as records of tax liens,
court documents, and information drawn from the Internet.
4

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•
•
•
•
•
•

site visits;
interviews of applicants, beneficiaries, petitioners, and others;
requests for evidence;
administrative subpoenas;
requests for assistance; and
overseas verifications.

In addition to FDNS-DS, FDNS uses an unclassified SharePoint Services-based repository to
manage internal policy and operational documents, content, and reports. Role-based access is granted for
officers with a need to know. The repository provides a secure environment to facilitate collaboration
among HQFDNS personnel and between HQFDNS and its field officers. The data are protected using
security safeguards established by DHS.
In keeping with the audit controls and role-based access safeguards established under the DHS
SharePoint and Collaboration Sites PIA, 6 the FDNS SharePoint site has a designated site owner, or
administrator, responsible for determining the user base and ensuring the site is only used for approved
purposes such as internal collaboration and document and workflow management. The site owner
ensures that only users with a verifiable need to know have access privileges to the information on the
FDNS SharePoint site. The FDNS SharePoint environment includes a template with a “Sensitive
Personally Identifiable Information Allowed” banner at the top of pages approved to manage and share
sensitive PII. In addition, the FDNS SharePoint site follows the compliance restrictions placed on
SharePoint usage by completing this PIA and the accompanying SORN. FDNS regularly reviews the
information posted to the SharePoint site, and if inappropriate posting of PII is discovered, FDNS ensures
its immediate removal from the site and reports the posting as a privacy incident.
Social Media Sites
USCIS is finalizing its policy for use of Social Media in compliance with the DHS Directive 11001, Privacy Policy for Operational Use of Social Media and Instruction 110-01-001. When completed,
FDNS IOs will be permitted to access social media sites when conducting administrative investigations
only after they have completed an annual training on use of social media and signed a “Rules of
Behavior” form. When conducting official government business, FDNS IOs may not establish accounts
on social media sites using fictitious names or information, or use personal accounts for official
government business. FDNS IOs must use government-issued equipment to access social media. FDNS
IOs cannot communicate with users of social media sites, and may only passively review information.
Further, any information, whether it is derogatory or not, found on a social media site that is used in an
investigation must be printed and saved in the applicant’s file and electronically within FDNS-DS. As
with all derogatory information found from publicly available sources, the applicant and/or petitioner

6

See DHS/ALL/PIA-037 DHS SharePoint and Collaboration Sites
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_dhswide_sharepointcollaboration.pdf

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must be provided with an appropriate opportunity to explain or refute any information that conflicts with
information he or she provided to USCIS before a decision is made regarding the requested benefit. 7
Access to these sites is helpful to FDNS in that the information contained therein may facilitate
validation or invalidation of information provided by the applicant and/or petitioner. Although USCIS
does not deny benefits solely based on publicly available information, the FDNS IO can use information
found in open sources to formulate a Request for Evidence (RFE), for a Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID)
to the applicant or petitioner, or during an interview with the petitioner and/or beneficiary. The applicant
and/or petitioner will have the opportunity to explain and resolve any inconsistencies among information
sources prior to issuance of an adjudicative decision. The applicant and/or petitioner will have an
opportunity to file motions or appeals if the application or petition is denied.
Administrative Site Visit and Verification Program (ASVVP)
HQ FDNS developed the Administrative Site Visit and Verification Program (ASVVP). Under
ASVVP, field FDNS IOs and contractors conduct site inspections to verify information, better identify
and target fraud cases for follow-up, and when appropriate, refer cases to ICE for investigation.
Currently, all religious organizations are subject to site inspections/compliance reviews prior to
adjudication of Form I-360 (Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special Immigrant) or Form I-129 (R)
(Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker). In addition, site inspections are conducted on H-1B applications
(foreign workers in specialty occupations) after adjudication of extension or change of status requests.
Field FDNS IOs and contract site inspectors verify information submitted with the petition, including
supporting documentation submitted by the petitioner. Field FDNS IOs and contract site inspectors also
verify the existence of the petitioning entity, take digital photos, review documents, and speak with
organizational representatives to confirm the beneficiary’s work location, employment workspace, hours,
salary, duties, and overall employer-employee relationship. Field FDNS IOs record their findings in
FDNS-DS and submit a report to the case adjudicator for final determination. Contract site inspectors
submit their findings to Field FDNS IOs, who consider the information in determining whether the
petitioner and beneficiary are in compliance with the terms and conditions outlined in the petition and the
Field FDNS IOs forward a report on to the case adjudicator for final determination. Petitioners are given
the opportunity to address USCIS’s derogatory findings.
Fraud Detection and National Security Data System
The Fraud Detection and National Security Data System (FDNS-DS) 8 is a central data repository
that FDNS IOs use to record, track, and manage the background check process related to immigration
applications and petitions, as well as information related to beneficiary applications with suspected or
confirmed fraud, criminal activity, public safety and/or national security concerns, and cases randomly
selected for benefit fraud assessments. FDNS-DS maintains information on all individuals who have
been reviewed for these concerns. In instances where no fraud, criminal activity, public safety and/or

7

8 CFR Part 103.2(b)(16).
For further information, see the FDNS-DS PIA
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_cis_fdns.pdf.
8

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national security concerns were found, the information maintained may be used to demonstrate an
assessment was conducted so that additional resources do not have be used for a second review.
FDNS IOs may share FDNS-DS data with law enforcement and intelligence agencies in response
to Requests for Information (RFIs) to support criminal and administrative investigations and background
checks involving immigrant benefit fraud, criminal activity, and public safety and/or national security
concerns. For example, information may be shared with the Department of State (DoS), Bureau of
Consular Affairs to provide a comprehensive picture of a visa applicant’s status, and to reduce the
likelihood that an individual or group might fraudulently obtain an immigration benefit under the INA, as
amended. Also, selected ICE representatives have “read-only” access to FDNS-DS, which allows them
access and use of the most current information for purposes of criminal investigations.

Section 1.0 Authorities and Other Requirements
1.1

What specific legal authorities and/or agreements permit and
define the collection of information by the project in question?

The INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq. provides the legal authority to collect information used for the
adjudication of immigration benefits. In addition to other delegations, the Secretary of Homeland
Security in Homeland Security Delegation No. 0150.1 paragraphs (H), (I), (J), (M), and (S) has delegated
the following authorities to USCIS:
•
•

•
•
•

Authority under section 103(a)(1) of the INA, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1), to
administer the immigration laws (as defined in Section 101(a)(17) of the INA);
Authority to investigate alleged civil and criminal violations of the immigration laws,
including but not limited to alleged fraud with respect to applications or determinations
within the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) [predecessor to USCIS]
and make recommendations for prosecutions or other appropriate action when deemed
advisable;
Authority to fingerprint and register aliens;
Authority to maintain files and records systems as necessary; and
Authority to take and consider evidence.

The joint USCIS-ICE anti-fraud strategy was established by the Conference Report, FY 2005
Appropriations Act. The Appropriations Act authorized USCIS to conduct law enforcement and
background checks on every applicant, beneficiary, and petitioner prior to granting immigration benefits.

1.2

What Privacy Act System of Records Notice(s) (SORN(s)) apply
to the information?

Concurrent with the publishing of this PIA, DHS is publishing an updated system of records
notice of DHS/USCIS-005 Fraud Detection National Security Records, to clarify that the SORN covers
both those records maintained in the Fraud Detection and National Security Data System (FDNS-DS) as
well as records maintained in other collaborative workspaces specifically set up for FDNS and any paper

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records. FDNS information derived from other USCIS systems is covered under that system’s respective
SORN until there is an indication of possible fraud, public safety or national security concern, or criminal
concern referred to FDNS by the public, other agencies, or USCIS employees.

1.3

Has a system security plan been completed for the information
system(s) supporting the project?

Yes. The USCIS Office of Information Technology has completed and implemented a system
security plan, which complies with the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA). FDNSDS has also completed the Certification and Accreditation process and received an Authority to Operate,
granted in August 2011, which is effective through 2014.
The FDNS SharePoint sites are protected using security safeguards established by DHS. The
privacy risks associated with the use of SharePoint to manage assets containing PII and/or SPII are
misuse of information, data spills, and unauthorized account access. To mitigate these risks, the FDNS
SharePoint site has a designated site owner, or administrator, responsible for determining the user base
and ensuring the site is only used for approved purposes such as internal collaboration and document and
workflow management. The site owner ensures that only users with a verifiable need to know have
access privileges to the information on the FDNS SharePoint site. In addition, the FDNS SharePoint site
follows the compliance restrictions placed on SharePoint usage by completing this PIA and updating the
DHS/USCIS-006 SORN.

1.4

Does a records retention schedule approved by the National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA) exist?

Yes. The Retention Schedule for FDNS was approved on September 1, 2005. NARA approved a
records retention schedule of 15 years from the date of the last interaction between FDNS personnel and
the individual for records maintained in FDNS and its associated subsystems.

1.5

If the information is covered by the Paperwork Reduction Act
(PRA), provide the OMB Control number and the agency number
for the collection. If there are multiple forms, include a list in an
appendix.

There are no forms associated with this collection. However, FDNS may collect data from
USCIS applications and petitions that are covered by the PRA. See the CLAIMS 3 and CLAIMS 4 PIAs 9
for more information on the various forms that cover the initial collection of information from the
individual.

9

See the CLAIMS 3 and CLAIMS 4 PIAs at www.dhs..gov/privacy for additional information on the forms
individuals submit during the initial collection of information.

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Section 2.0 Characterization of the Information
2.1

Identify the information the project collects, uses, disseminates, or
maintains.

When FDNS initiates or considers a case for administrative inquiry because of suspected or
confirmed fraud, criminal activity, public safety and/or national security concerns, or reviews a case
randomly selected for benefit fraud assessments, it will collect and use some or all of the following data:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Individual’s name;
Alias(es);
Social Security number (SSN);
Alien Number (A-Number);
Associated A-Numbers of close relatives and associates;
Application Receipt Number;
Address (home and business);
Date of birth;
Place of birth;
Driver’s License number;
Country of citizenship;
Citizenship status;
Gender;
Telephone number(s);
E-mail address;
Place of employment and employment history;
Associated organizations (e.g., corporate information relating to employing entity if
employment-based immigration benefits are being sought, and place of business or place of
worship if such organization is sponsoring the applicant);
Family lineage;
Bank account information and/or financial transaction history;
Marriage record;
Civil or criminal history information;
Publically available information provided by the applicant on social media websites;
Education record;
Information from commercial data providers in order to verify information provided on the
application;
Biometric identifiers (e.g., photographic facial image, fingerprints, signature);
TECS, National Crime Information Center, and data and analysis resulting from the
investigation or routine background checks performed as part of the adjudication process; and
Other unique identifying numbers or characteristics such as passport number(s), visa

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•

number(s), account numbers, and identifiers associated with travel.
FDNS-DS will also maintain the status of a particular case whether it is open or closed, what
information was passed to the ISOs, and the recommendation made to ISO.

FDNS may also retain information on Representatives and Preparers in the event their
information is linked to a case in FDNS-DS. Collected information includes the following data:
• Representative and/or Preparer information maintained in the G-28, Notice of Entry
of Appearance as Attorney or Accredited Representative;
• Name;
• Address;
• Phone number;
• Fax number;
• Email address;
• Bar number;
• State of bar membership;
• Date of filing; and
• Associated client case information.
In addition, FDNS may gather additional data on Representatives or Preparers that are the subject or
associated with a fraud, public safety, or national security concern based on applications submitted on
behalf of individuals seeking an immigration benefit.

2.2

What are the sources of the information and how is the
information collected for the project?

FDNS collects and maintains information on individuals with suspected or confirmed fraud,
criminal activity, public safety and/or national security concerns, and cases randomly selected for benefit
fraud assessments. In order to carry out this mission, FDNS collects information from multiple sources
and stores it in FDNS-DS. In addition to FDNS-DS, FDNS uses an unclassified Sharepoint Servicesbased repository to manage internal policy and operational documents, content, and other information
relating to cases. The repository provides an environment to facilitate collaboration among HQFDNS
personnel and between HQFDNS and its field offices. This data is protected using security safeguards
established by DHS.
The sources include applications and supporting documents submitted by the applicant;
interviews with current/past employers, family members, petitioners or applicants; results of ASVVP site
visits; direct access to other federal law enforcement systems; information obtained from commercial data
providers; state and local government databases; and public source information, such as newspapers
and/or the internet. Information is also compiled during the process of answering RFIs from law
enforcement and intelligence agencies, as well as when FDNS refers cases to law enforcement entities
such as ICE and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
USCIS Sources

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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

ELIS
Service Center Computer Linked Adjudication Information Management System
(SCCLAIMS);
Benefits Biometric Support System (BBSS);
Enterprise Service Bus/Person Centric Query System (ESB/PCQS);
CLAIMS 3;
CLAIMS 4;
Central Index System (CIS);
Change of Address Form (AR11 System and Form);
Refugee, Asylum, and Parole System (RAPS);
Asylum Pre-Screening System (APSS);
Interim Case Management Solution (ICMS);
Customer Profile Management System (CPMS);
National File Tracking System (NFTS);
Enterprise Citizenship and Immigration Service Centralized Oracle Repository
(eCISCOR);
External Data Interface Standards (EDIS);
Customer Representative System;
Validation Initiative for Business Enterprise (VIBE);
Scheduling Notification for Applicant Processing (SNAP); and
Electronic Document Management System (EDMS).

Other DHS Sources
•

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) TECS;

•

United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) Automated
Biometric Identification System (IDENT); and

•

United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) Arrival
and Departure System (ADIS).

Other Federal Agency Sources
FDNS receives information from the FBI on applicants as a result of fingerprint and name checks.
FDNS may also receive information from the Department of State’s Consular Consolidated Database
(CCD) and other government databases when needed to address national security concerns and facilitate
pilot programs.10
As part of the RFI where USCIS is requested to provide relevant information to another agency
for law enforcement, national security, and/or fraud purposes, the request will be maintained in FDNS-DS
along with any response.
For an RFA process where USCIS is requesting information on a particular individual or group of
individuals, FDNS maintains the information requested and provided from other agencies in FDNS-DS.
10

See Appendix A.

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This information is compiled during the process of reviewing and answering requests for assistance or
information from law enforcement and intelligence agencies, as well as when FDNS refers cases to law
enforcement components such as ICE and the FBI.
Public Sources, including Commercial Data
FDNS uses a number of open source and publicly available web-based resources when
investigating potential fraud leads or cases with national security and intelligence implications. The use
of public and commercial sources is discussed in detail below.
Other Data Sources
Finally, FDNS receives information from external governmental and non-governmental entities
related to suspected fraud, public safety, and national security concerns. FDNS may receive unsolicited
information regarding applications and petitions by outside parties via email, letter, phone call, or inperson. Any information received through these methods may be considered in the adjudication process,
but will not be relied upon as the sole basis for an adverse determination by USCIS. Rather, the applicant
and/or petitioner will have the opportunity to provide additional information to explain and resolve any
discrepancies produced as a result of this information. This information may contain PII and is handled in
accordance with DHS and USCIS policy and procedures, including this PIA and accompanying SORN.

2.3

Does the project use information from commercial sources or
publicly available data? If so, explain why and how this
information is used.

Yes. FDNS obtains information from a limited number of commercial data providers and
manually records relevant data in FDNS-DS. FDNS also consults public sources such as the Internet,
social media, news feeds, and state and local public records, including court records, to verify the
historical, biographical, financial, and personal information presented by applicants to detect the
possibility of immigration benefit fraud and public safety and national security concerns.
In addition to FDNS-DS, FDNS uses an unclassified Sharepoint Services-based repository to
manage internal policy and operational documents, content, and reports. The repository provides an
environment to facilitate collaboration among HQFDNS personnel and between HQFDNS and its field
officers. If during the search of publicly-available sources FDNS identifies relevant information to a
case, it will maintain it in either FDNS-DS or the FDNS SharePoint Services site pursuant to the FDNS
system of records notice. FDNS does not make fraud, national security, and/or public safety
determinations solely on this publicly-available information; rather, FDNS uses it as a verification of
information already provided by the applicant and/or petitioner. The applicant and/or petitioner will be
provided the opportunity to refute any inconsistencies arising from commercial, public records, or
publicly available data sources.

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2.4

Discuss how accuracy of the data is ensured.

All information obtained by FDNS IOs and reviewed by ISOs is reviewed in accordance with a
strict set of internal procedures intended to ensure that actionable derogatory information meets the
standards for evidence established by the USCIS Administrative Appeals Office, the Department of
Justice (DOJ), Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), and the federal court system. Most of
the information collected and maintained within USCIS systems is provided directly from immigration
benefit applicants. FDNS-DS primarily relies on information collected by other USCIS systems at the
point of application intake and therefore relies on the accuracy of those systems. In addition, all USCIS
forms notify the applicant and petitioner that information provided may be further verified and, in many
cases, in-person interviews are conducted to ensure the accuracy of the provided information.
FDNS incorporates strenuous verification procedures to ensure accuracy of data before an
immigration benefit decision is made by adjudications. These procedures include direct queries of DHS
and other government agency databases as well as USCIS ISO interviews with applicants or petitioners.
Public source information is used to verify or identify inconsistencies with information provided by
applicants or petitioners as part of their application for immigration-related benefits. In any case where
USCIS contemplates denial, rescission, or revocation of an immigration benefit based on evidence of
fraud, the petitioner or applicant will be given an opportunity to review and rebut the evidence.

2.5

Privacy Impact Analysis: Related to Characterization of the
Information

Privacy Risk: There is a risk of collecting more information than necessary.
Mitigation: FDNS collects extensive information on individuals in the course of a review of
possible national security concerns, public safety threats, or indications of fraud. FDNS has determined
that in order to have the best evidence available to support a case, it is necessary to collect large amounts
of sensitive PII. This information is required to ensure that FDNS makes the correct determination about
the correct individual regarding national security, public safety, or fraud cases and enables adjudications
to make a decision on the benefit application.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk in relying on data obtained through commercial data, public
sources, or social media.
Mitigation: Public source information is not used as the sole basis upon which to deny an
immigration benefit, investigate benefit fraud, or identify public safety and national security concerns due
to the inherent lack of data integrity. The commercial source and public information is used to attempt to
identify immigration benefit fraud and public safety and national security concerns by comparing
historical, biographical, financial, and personal information presented by the immigration benefits
applicant or petitioner against third-party sources, wherever possible.
All FDNS Officers are trained to consider information derived from sources other than the
applicant and/or petitioner, but are also cautioned about its accuracy. Due to its inherent lack of data

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integrity, public source information is not used as the sole basis upon which to deny an immigration
benefit, investigate benefit fraud, or identify public safety and national security concerns.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk of obtaining data from new sources that have not been approved for
use in determining possible benefit fraud, public safety, and national security concerns.
Mitigation: In order to reduce the risk of new data being incorporated into FDNS that has not
been reviewed for privacy and legal concerns, this PIA has been drafted to allow routine review of new
data sources and updates to be made as necessary. Additionally, DHS has issued a directive on the use of
social media web sites to bring additional education to the risks of using such data sources.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk of obtaining inaccurate data.
Mitigation: In order to improve the accuracy of the information, USCIS has developed policies
and procedures for safeguarding data aggregated within FDNS from several different sources. This
includes using public record data, data from commercial data providers, as well as other publicly
available data including social media and news and reviewing existing data in USCIS’s files with
information outside of USCIS. If inaccurate information is found during the process of reviewing a file,
FDNS will contact personnel within the USCIS Records Division who are authorized to make the changes
to the data in the source system. FDNS will also correct inaccuracies in FDNS-DS and other locations
where FDNS records are maintained. Additionally, if information is found that will impact whether an
individual is granted a benefit, the individual will be provided the opportunity to review the information.

Section 3.0 Uses of the Information
3.1

Describe how and why the project uses the information.

FDNS-DS is the central data repository that permits HQ and Field FDNS IOs to record, track, and
manage the background check and adjudicative process related to immigration applications and petitions,
as well as beneficiary applications with suspected or confirmed fraud, criminal activity, public safety
and/or national security concerns, and cases randomly selected for benefit fraud assessments. In addition
to FDNS-DS, FDNS has created collaborative workspace that allows employees in HQ and the field share
information consistent with the SORN for FDNS records.
The information collected and maintained within FDNS system of records is used as part of a
variety of National Security Vetting Initiatives to determine benefit fraud, criminal activity, public safety,
and national security concerns within the immigration benefit determination process. FDNS-DS is used
as a central repository of information collected from the applicant, other government databases, and open
sources to assist HQ and FDNS IOs in determining whether immigration fraud or other criminal acts have
occurred. FDNS also uses the information to determine whether there may be additional cases that might
be associated with identified fraud schemes or national security concerns. FDNS conducts different pilots
to identify improvements in its security vetting. FDNS will use the PTA process and the appendix to this
PIA to document the new processes, including sharing agreements.

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Commercial data, public records, data from social media web sites and publicly available data are
also used to help validate or identify inconsistencies with information already on file as part of an
application with USCIS; however, the information is not used as the sole basis upon which to deny an
immigration benefit.
Any additional data may be stored in FDNS-DS or in an appropriate location in the FDNS
SharePoint Services site. Case information is stored and managed in FDNS-DS. SharePoint allows
officers to access informational reports that may contain individual case information.

3.2

Does the project use technology to conduct electronic searches,
queries, or analyses in an electronic database to discover or locate
a predictive pattern or an anomaly? If so, state how DHS plans to
use such results.

No. Neither FDNS-DS nor the other information technology tool run pattern-based queries or
searches for FDNS. FDNS-DS only runs reports to allow employees to analyze data relating to cases
involving suspected fraud, public safety, or national security. FDNS may use the results to facilitate the
identification of fraud patterns or trends, as well as previously unknown associations between applicants
involved in fraud who pose national security or public safety concerns. FDNS will place the information
it collects, derogatory or not, in the FDNS-DS record for each individual.

3.3

Are there other components with assigned roles and
responsibilities within the system?

A limited number of ICE personnel have “read-only” access to FDNS-DS. FDNS may share
specific information with ICE to determine whether criminal investigation or law enforcement action is
required. In addition, FDNS may share information with DHS I&A if a potential nexus to terrorism is
identified or if the information has intelligence value. Only FDNS employees have access to the
collaborative workspace.
When another DHS component such as CBP requests information on an individual because of
concerns related to fraud, criminal activity, public safety and/or national security, FDNS IOs review the
request, log it in FDNS-DS, and provide the requested information to the component, as appropriate.
Responsive information will be shared via secure government networks. FDNS information may be used
to assist CBP in their decision on whether to allow an alien to enter the country.

3.4

Privacy Impact Analysis: Related to the Uses of Information

Privacy Risk: There is a risk that information contained within FDNS system is not used
consistently with its original purpose and authority.
Mitigation: Consistent with FDNS’ mission of detecting, deterring, and combating immigration
benefit fraud, all information contained within FDNS is used to identify and track possible benefit fraud,
criminal activity related to immigrants and non-immigrants, public safety, and national security concerns.

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These uses are consistent with the notice provided to individuals in the Privacy Act Statements on all
USCIS forms, as well as this PIA and the corresponding SORN.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that use of commercial or public information, or information
obtained through social media, may contribute to an erroneous adverse affect on an individual, such as
denial of an immigration benefit.
Mitigation: Information collected from commercial and public data sources are only used to
corroborate and enhance information obtained by USCIS directly from an individual during the
immigrant benefit application process. Immigration benefit determinations are not based solely on
commercial and public data, but instead this information is used to corroborate an individual’s identity or
benefit claim requests. FDNS trains IOs on the appropriate use of commercial and public source
information to preserve the data accuracy and integrity of the original information submitted by the
applicant.
There is also a risk that new information produced during the research and investigation process
may be inaccurate or incorrect and may lead to the determination of a denial of a benefit for an individual.
Public source information is only used to verify or identify inconsistencies with information provided by
applicants or petitioners as part of their application for immigration-related benefits. In any case where
USCIS contemplates denial, rescission, or revocation of an immigration benefit based on evidence of
fraud, the petitioner or applicant will be given an opportunity to review and rebut the evidence.
Additionally, USCIS maintains audit logs for all individuals who access social media websites,
and these, along with information placed into FDNS-DS as the result of social media use, are reviewed
periodically by the USCIS Privacy Officer for compliance with DHS policy on sue of social media
websites.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that information contained within FDNS system will be shared
outside DHS for a purpose incompatible with the original collection.
Mitigation: Information shared outside of USCIS is shared in accordance with departmental
information sharing guidance and is consistent with the original collection of enhancing both national
security and the integrity of the legal immigration system. Information is only shared outside of the
Department consistent with applicable information sharing access agreements and Routine Uses
documented in the published SORN.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk of an inappropriate assumption that all individuals listed within
FDNS-DS or other FDNS records maintained outside of FDNS-DS have engaged in fraudulent
immigration-related practices or pose a public safety or national security risk.
Mitigation: Cases within FDNS-DS as well as the collaborative workspace that are resolved
without a finding of fraud are documented clearly in FDNS-DS. These cases are marked with “no fraud
found” and contain a statement of findings within the system. This statement will contain a summary of

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the case and FDNS IO’s recommendations to ISOs as to fraud and/or national security concerns.
Privacy Risk: For certain security vetting projects, FDNS must make a copy of the data in
FDNS-DS and share with other IT systems. There is a risk that data will be inaccurately copied. There is
also a risk that the data may be taken out of context.
Mitigation: FDNS reconciles data to ensure that the data transferred from FDNS-DS to other
systems is transferred accurately and completely. FDNS performs regular audits if an ongoing feed is
used. FDNS also ensures that the data copied out of FDNS-DS and the collaborative workspace are
deleted at the end of any security vetting projects. If information from FDNS-DS is shared with
individuals who are not regular users of the system, FDNS will train the user or reviewer to ensure that
the nature and purpose of the data in FDNS system is understood.

Section 4.0 Notice
4.1

How does the project provide individuals notice prior to the
collection of information? If notice is not provided, explain why
not.

Notice is provided to all applicants/petitioners at the time of collection through a Privacy Act
Statement on all USCIS forms. Records within FDNS system are primarily based on records from
underlying USCIS systems, which intake the information directly from the applicant/petitioner. Notice of
collection by the underlying USCIS systems performing the original collection is described in the
individual PIAs and SORNs for those systems. Notice to individuals is also provided through the
publication of this PIA and the corresponding FDNS SORN.
In addition to Privacy Act Statements on all USCIS forms, USCIS forms also notify the applicant
and petitioner that information provided may be verified by USCIS. FDNS IOs may verify information
by conducting interviews during site visits. Upon identifying themselves and notifying the applicant or
beneficiary of the reason for the site visit, the FDNS IO will request permission to speak with an
applicant, petitioner, or beneficiary immediately prior to beginning the interview. Prior to scheduling an
interview with an applicant or petitioner, the ISO must send a Form G-56 Interview Notice to the
applicant and his or her attorney or accredited representative. Notice is given to an applicant’s attorney
when an administrative site visit or interview will occur, unless notice would jeopardize the site visit or
interview.

4.2

What opportunities are available for individuals to consent to
uses, decline to provide information, or opt out of the project?

Applicants who seek USCIS benefits are presented with a Privacy Act Statement and a signaturerequired release authorization for the relevant benefit application/petition. The Privacy Act Statement
details the authority for requesting the information and purpose of the information collection. The
applicant’s signature on the form serves as certification that the applicant authorizes the release of any
information from the applicant’s record that USCIS will access to determine eligibility. Applicants are

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notified at the point of data collection (generally in the form itself) of the right to decline to provide the
required information; however, such action may result in the denial of the applicant’s benefit request.
The particular use policies of the underlying USCIS systems that originally collected the
applicant/petitioner information from which FDNS draws and accesses data are set by those systems
individually. FDNS itself does not give individuals the right to consent to particular uses of information,
as doing so would limit the usefulness of the information for fraud detection and national security
purposes.

4.3

Privacy Impact Analysis: Related to Notice

Privacy Risk: There is a risk that individuals are unaware of the uses for which their information
is collected.
Mitigation: Applicants for USCIS benefits are made aware that the information they are
providing is being collected to determine whether they are eligible for immigration benefits. As part of
the application process, applicants authorize USCIS to release any information provided, as needed, to
other federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement and regulatory agencies during the course of the
investigation so that the immigration benefit eligibility determination can be made. This release includes
sharing with FDNS, which has the dual mandate to enhance both national security and the integrity of the
legal immigration system.

Section 5.0 Data Retention by the project
5.1

Explain how long and for what reason the information is retained.

USCIS retains application information to assist in identifying applicants who threaten national
security and public safety; detecting, pursuing, and deterring immigration benefit fraud; and identifying
and removing systemic vulnerabilities in the process of the legal immigration system.
USCIS retains FDNS-DS records for 15 years from the date of the last interaction between FDNS
personnel and the individual, no matter the determination. Upon closure of a case pertaining to an
individual, any information that is pertinent to the adjudicative decision (such as a Statement of Findings
(SOF)), whether there was or was not an indication of fraud, criminal activity, egregious public safety, or
national security concerns, is transferred to the associated A-File. USCIS retains the A-File for 100 years
from the subject’s date of birth. The file is then retired to NARA for permanent storage. All data
contained in other USCIS data systems, such as RAPS and CLAIMS, are governed by their respective
retention schedules.
Records maintained in the SharePoint site follow the same retention period as FDNS-DS.
SharePoint allows FDNS to note when a document is loaded onto the site, and FDNS administrators of
the site will regularly review the creation date of content and remove it when the retention period expires.

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5.2

Privacy Impact Analysis: Related to Retention

Privacy Risk: The primary risk associated with retention is retaining the data longer than
necessary. This would increase the risk of unauthorized access, use, and loss of the data.
Mitigation: FDNS mitigates this risk by destroying FDNS-DS and SharePoint data in accordance
with approved NARA records retention schedules.
The 15-year retention schedule for FDNS data provides access to information that can be critical
to research related to suspected or confirmed fraud, criminal activity, egregious public safety, or national
security concerns for applicants/petitioners who may still be receiving immigration benefits. In addition,
should the individual apply for another benefit, retention of the information can eliminate the need for
research on concerns that were previously addressed. This time frame also allows FDNS to ensure that
cases that were reviewed and determined to have no nexus to fraud, criminal activity, egregious public
safety, or national security concerns are not opened again because old information is recycled.

Section 6.0 Information Sharing
6.1 Is information shared outside of DHS as part of the normal
agency operations? If so, identify the organization(s) and how the
information is accessed and how it is to be used.
Yes. FDNS shares information outside of DHS when USCIS receives an RFI, when it
proactively discloses based on information in the record, and when asking an outside organization for
additional information related to an individual. Access may be provided through direct user accounts
through copying of data to electronic device.
Specific requests for information are governed by the originating system of records notice for the
underlying USCIS records, e.g., DHS/USCIS – 007 Benefits Information System (BIS). In such
instances, USCIS may share the PII listed in Section 2.1 of this PIA with federal, state, tribal, local,
international, or foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies, in response to an RFI in support of
criminal and administrative investigations and background checks involving immigrant benefit fraud,
criminal activity, public safety, and national security concerns.
Through direct user account access, FDNS may share information with DoS, Bureau of Consular
Affairs, to provide a comprehensive picture of a visa applicant’s status and to reduce the likelihood that
an individual or group might fraudulently obtain an immigration benefit under INA, as amended. DoS
has read-only access to FDNS-DS.
Proactive disclosure based on information in the system occurs when FDNS has an indication of
possible fraud, national security, or public safety concerns. In these cases, FDNS may proactively share
information with other government entities as described under the DHS/USCIS-006 FDNS-DS SORN
(August 18, 2008, 73 FR 48231).

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At the request of DHS, RFIs for national security purposes from external entities are coordinated
through DHS I&A. USCIS responses are provided via government secure networks. All other requests
are processed by USCIS. Responses provided by field offices are also provided via secure methods.

6.2

Describe how the external sharing noted in 6.1 is compatible with
the SORN noted in 1.2.

Direct account access by DoS, Bureau of Consular Affairs, is covered by routine use I, which
permits FDNS to share PII with DoS, Bureau of Consular Affairs, in the processing of petitions or
applications for benefits. This is compatible with the original collection under INA which requires
USCIS to administer immigration laws. Information may also be shared with DoS, Bureau of Consular
Affairs, to provide a comprehensive picture of a visa applicant’s status, and to reduce the likelihood that
an individual or group might fraudulently obtain an immigration benefit under INA, as amended.
Proactive disclosures are covered by routine use H, which permits FDNS to share PII with
federal and foreign government intelligence or counterterrorism agencies when USCIS reasonably
believes there is a threat or potential threat to national or international security. This is compatible with
the original collection because the INA requires USCIS to investigate alleged civil and criminal violations
of immigration laws, including alleged fraud with respect to applications or determinations within USCIS.
In addition, the INA provides for terrorist-related bars that may serve as the basis for denial of a requested
benefit. The INA also requires USCIS to make recommendations for prosecutions or other appropriate
actions when deemed advisable.

6.3

Does the project place limitations on re-dissemination?

Yes. A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between USCIS and DoS, Bureau of Consular
Affairs, fully outlines responsibilities of the parties, security standards, and limits of use of the
information, including re-dissemination. Methods and controls over dissemination of information are
coordinated between USCIS and DoS, Bureau of Consular Affairs, prior to information sharing.
Depending on the context of other sharing, DHS may place additional controls on the re-dissemination of
the information.

6.4

Describe how the project maintains a record of any disclosures
outside of the Department.

FDNS maintains a record of disclosure of FDNS information made with agencies in accordance
with the routine use or with whom it has an information sharing agreement. A record is kept on file of
each disclosure and system audit trail logs are maintained to identify transactions performed by both
internal and external users.

Field FDNS IOs are detailed to various government agencies as immigration subject matter
experts. All Field FDNS IOs must abide by all privacy laws and legal requirements before sharing any
immigration information.

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6.5

Privacy Impact Analysis: Related to Information Sharing

Privacy Risk: There is a risk of misuse, unauthorized access to, or disclosure of, information.
Mitigation: As discussed above, FDNS maintains a record of each disclosure of FDNS
information made with every agency in accordance with the routine use or with whom it has an
information sharing agreement. Otherwise, FDNS does not share its information. A record is kept on file
of each disclosure, including the date the disclosure was made, the agency to which the information was
provided, the purpose of the disclosure, and a description of the data provided.
The electronic sharing of data with external agencies is conducted over government secure
networks. All personnel within the receiving agency and its components are trained on the appropriate
use and safeguarding of data. In addition, each external agency with whom the information is shared has
policies and procedures in place to ensure there is no unauthorized dissemination of the information
provided by FDNS. Any disclosure must be compatible with the purpose for which the information was
originally collected and only authorized users with a need to know may have access to the information
contained in FDNS-DS. DHS information is covered by the third-party discovery rule, which precludes
agencies outside of DHS that have received the information from DHS from sharing with additional
partners without the consent of DHS.
Risks are further mitigated by provisions set forth in MOAs or Memoranda of Understanding
(MOUs) with federal and foreign government agencies and United States government employees must
undergo annual privacy and security awareness training.

Section 7.0 Redress
7.1

What are the procedures that allow individuals to access their
information?

Because FDNS contains sensitive information related to possible immigration benefit fraud and
national security concerns, DHS has exempted FDNS from the notification, access, and amendment
provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(2). Notwithstanding the applicable
exemptions, USCIS reviews all such requests on a case-by-case basis. Where such a request is made, and
access would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the national or homeland security of the
United States or activities related to any investigatory material contained within this system, the
applicable exemption may be waived at the discretion of USCIS, and in accordance with procedures and
points of contact published in the applicable SORN.
Any individual seeking to access information maintained by FDNS should direct his or her
request to:
National Records Center
Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act Program
P. O. Box 648010
Lee's Summit, MO 64064-8010

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Requests for access to records must be in writing. Such requests may be submitted by mail or
in person. If a request for access is made by mail, the envelope and letter must be clearly marked
“Privacy Access Request” to ensure proper and expeditious processing. The requester should provide his
or her full name, date and place of birth, and verification of identity in accordance with DHS regulations
governing Privacy Act requests (found at 6 CFR 5.21), and any other identifying information that may be
of assistance in locating the record.
The information requested may; however, be exempt from disclosure under the Privacy Act
because FDNS records, with respect to an individual, may sometimes contain law enforcement sensitive
information. The release of law enforcement sensitive information could possibly compromise ongoing
criminal investigations.
Additional information about Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for
USCIS records can be found at http://www.uscis.gov.

7.2

What procedures are in place to allow the subject individual to
correct inaccurate or erroneous information?

The data accessed by FDNS from underlying USCIS source systems may be corrected by means
of the processes described in the PIAs and SORNs for those systems. In addition, prior to using
commercial, public, and other agency information to render adjudicative decisions, applicants and
petitioners are given an opportunity to refute the derogatory information. Petitioners are also afforded
appeal and motion opportunities. In the event inaccuracies are noted, files and FDNS-DS records will be
updated.

7.3

How does the project notify individuals about the procedures for
correcting their information?

Individuals are notified of the procedures for correcting their information on USCIS forms, the
USCIS website, the SORN, and this PIA.

7.4

Privacy Impact Analysis: Related to Redress

Privacy Risk: There is a risk that individuals may be unaware of their ability to make requests
for access to their records in FDNS-DS.
Mitigation: Notice on how to file a Privacy Act request about records contained in FDNS-DS is
provided by this PIA and the FDNS SORN. Individuals can request access to information about
themselves through the Privacy Act/FOIA process, and may also request that their information be
amended by contacting the National Records Center. The nature of FDNS-DS and the data it collects,
processes, and stores is such that it limits the ability of individuals to access or correct their information.
Each request for access or correction is individually evaluated.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk of access and redress restrictions of law enforcement sensitive

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systems.
Mitigation: Access to the records contained in this system could potentially inform the subject of
an investigation about actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violations, or reveal investigative
interest on the part of DHS or another agency. Furthermore, access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the investigation, tamper with witnesses or evidence,
and avoid detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere with ongoing
investigations and law enforcement activities, and would impose an impossible administrative burden on
investigative agencies. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to homeland security. Nonetheless, individuals
may seek access to records maintained in FDNS-DS as outlined in the Record Access Procedures of the
SORN. Requests for such access will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

Section 8.0 Auditing and Accountability
8.1

How does the project ensure that the information is used in
accordance with stated practices in this PIA?

Access and security controls have been established to mitigate privacy risks associated with
authorized and unauthorized uses, specifically misuse and inappropriate dissemination of data. Access to
FDNS-DS is generally read-only. Some FDNS-DS users have “read,” “write,” and “modify” privileges.
All account access and privileges are approved by the USCIS business owner. When employment at
USCIS is terminated or an employee’s responsibilities no longer require access to FDNS records and
FDNS-DS, access privileges are removed.
Audit trails are kept in order to track and identify unauthorized uses of FDNS-DS information.
The audit trails include the ability to identify specific records each user accesses. A warning banner is
provided at all access points to inform users of the consequences associated with unauthorized use of
information. The banner warns authorized and unauthorized users about the appropriate uses of the
system, that the system may be monitored for improper use and illicit activity, and the penalties for
inappropriate usage and non-compliance. A user must click on the agreement to proceed with login.
In addition, user access to FDNS-DS is limited to personnel who need the information to perform
their job functions. Only users with proper permissions, roles, and security attributes are authorized to
access the system. Each user is obligated to sign and adhere to a user access agreement, which outlines
the appropriate rules of behavior tailored for FDNS-DS. The system administrator is responsible for
granting the appropriate level of access. Furthermore, all employees are properly trained on the use of
information in accordance with DHS policies, procedures, regulations, and guidance.
FDNS conducts annual security assessments of FDNS-DS in accordance with FISMA
requirements. Furthermore, FDNS-DS complies with the DHS 4300A security guidelines, which provide
hardening criteria for securing networks, computers, and computer services against attack and

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unauthorized information dissemination. Additionally, FDNS is subject to random Office of Inspector
General (OIG) and/or any DHS assigned third-party security audits.
In keeping with the audit controls and role-based access safeguards established under the DHS
SharePoint and Collaboration Sites PIA, 11 the FDNS SharePoint site has a designated site owner, or
administrator, responsible for determining the user base and ensuring the site is only used for approved
purposes such as internal collaboration and document and workflow management. The site owner
ensures that only users with a verifiable need to know have access privileges to the information on the
FDNS SharePoint site. The FDNS SharePoint environment includes a template with a “Sensitive
Personally Identifiable Information Allowed” banner at the top of pages approved to manage and share
sensitive PII. In addition, the FDNS SharePoint site follows the compliance restrictions placed on
SharePoint usage by completing this PIA and the accompanying SORN. FDNS regularly reviews the
information posted to the SharePoint site, and if inappropriate posting of PII is discovered, FDNS ensures
its immediate removal from the site and reports the posting as a privacy incident.

8.2

Describe what privacy training is provided to users either
generally or specifically relevant to the project.

USCIS employees receive the required annual Computer Security Awareness training and
Privacy Act training. In addition, FDNS requires that all FDNS-DS users receive training in the use of
FDNS-DS prior to being approved for access to the system. This training addresses the use of the system
and appropriate privacy concerns, including Privacy Act obligations (e.g., SORNs, Privacy Act
Statements).

8.3

What procedures are in place to determine which users may
access the information and how does the project determine who
has access?

Users receive access to FDNS records and FDNS-DS only on a need-to-know basis. This needto-know is determined by the individual’s current job functions. Users may have read-only access to the
information if they have a legitimate need to know as validated by their supervisor and the system owner,
and have successfully completed all personnel security and privacy training requirements.
A user requesting access must complete and submit Forms G-872A and B, USCIS and End User
Application for Access. This application provides the justification for the level of access requested. The
requestor’s supervisor, the system owner, and the USCIS Office of the Chief Information Officer will
review this request; if approved, the requestor’s clearance level is independently confirmed and the user
account established.

11

See DHS/ALL/PIA-037 DHS SharePoint and Collaboration Sites
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_dhswide_sharepointcollaboration.pdf

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Criteria, procedures, controls, and responsibilities regarding FDNS systems access are contained
in the Sensitive System Security plan for FDNS. Additionally, there are several department and
government-wide regulations and directives that provide additional guidance and direction.

8.4 How does the project review and approve information sharing
agreements, MOUs, new uses of the information, new access to the system by
organizations within DHS and outside?
MOAs/MOUs between USCIS and other components of DHS, as well as MOAs/MOUs between
USCIS or DHS and other agencies, define information sharing procedures for data maintained by FDNS.
MOAs/MOUs document the requesting agency or component’s legal authority to acquire such
information, as well as USCIS’s permission to share in its use under the legal authority granted by the
INA. All MOAs/MOUs have been reviewed by the program, USCIS Privacy Officer, and the DHS Chief
Privacy Officer.

Responsible Officials
Donald K. Hawkins
Privacy Officer
Department of Homeland Security

Approval Signature

________________________________
Mary Ellen Callahan
Chief Privacy Officer
Department of Homeland Security

Privacy Impact Assessment
USCIS, Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate
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APPENDIX
Administrative Site Visit and Verification Program Load Balancing Utility
(ASVVP Load Balancing Utility)
Summary: FDNS is launching the ASVVP Load Balancing Utility which is a Microsoft Access data
form linked to a secure SQL server database to collect receipt data and manage the case selection
process. FDNS employees will manually enter the application receipt number, the date the
application was adjudicated as “approved,” the validity period of the application, and the
beneficiary’s work site address located within the file. Cases subject to review include all applications
that FDNS currently conducts an ASVVP site visit and are considered relevant to the ASVVP project
mission, by type of form, class preference, and other pertinent criteria.12
The database will also contain tables that provide geographical connections between USCIS Field
Offices and all zip codes throughout the U.S. and protectorates. The ASVVP Load Balancing Utility
combines the geographical zip code/Field Office information with the zip code of the Work Site
Address to pre-filter the eligible applications into groups based on proximity to a Field Office.
Regional managers can then select a Field Office, and the utility will then present the total number of
eligible records located within range of the selected Field Office. The regional managers will enter a
number representing the estimated work load limit for the selected Field Office and submit a request
for randomization. The utility will then randomly select the requested number of applications from
the displayed list and provide an exportable workload list for the selected office. Each randomly
selected petition will be flagged in the utility so it cannot be selected twice.
The spreadsheets derived from the utility will contain the field office identifier, the receipt number for
the application, the approval and validity dates, and the work site address. This information will be
attached to an email and sent via secure means (i.e., encrypted) to the Service Center Fraud Detection
Operation (CFDO) units 13 to be utilized by Service Center personnel in pulling the records that are to
be entered into FDNS-DS under the existing FDNS-DS PIA.
The expected result of the use of this utility will be a level playing field that affords reasonable
workloads to USCIS Field Offices while maintaining as much of the random selection process as
possible.
This is a desktop type utility that uses non-sensitive data from recognized sources to enhance the
workload balancing for the entire ASVVP. The overall benefit of this utility will be to enforce the
stability and efficiency of the ASVVP.
Data Elements: Data will include the application receipt number, the date the application was
adjudicated as “approved,” the validity period of the application, the beneficiary’s work site address
located within the file, and geographical Zip code/Field Office information.
12

ASVVP site visits are currently conducted on: 1) pre and post adjudication religious worker cases; and 2)
approved, post adjudication H-1B (non-immigrant, specialty occupation worker) cases.
13
Currently, only the California and Vermont CFDOs process ASVVP cases.

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Population: Cases subject to review under ASVVP.
Privacy Mitigation: Access to the ASVVP Load Balancing Utility is determined by the FDNS ASVVP
program which approves access on an individual basis. User login information is recorded in the data
structure and is used to validate access. Unless the user’s login information is validated, neither access to
the SQL database nor the Microsoft Access front end is allowed. General users have read only access and
there are a small number of manager level users. Manager level users access data based on their location
only. The data are of limited scope. Users can only select and/or edit within regional/office profiles that
are controlled by rigid filtering. No deletions are permitted except on request to the data managers.