GAO-09-495 Report, "Motor Carrier Safety, Commercial Vehicle Registration Program Has Kept Unsafe Carriers from Operating, but Effectiveness Is Difficult to Measure"

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

Report to Congressional Committees

May 2009

MOTOR CARRIER
SAFETY
Commercial Vehicle
Registration Program
Has Kept Unsafe
Carriers from
Operating, but
Effectiveness Is
Difficult to Measure

GAO-09-495

May 2009

MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY
Accountability Integrity Reliability

Highlights
Highlights of GAO-09-495, a report to
congressional committees

Commercial Vehicle Registration Program Has Kept
Unsafe Carriers from Operating, but Effectiveness Is
Difficult to Measure

Why GAO Did This Study

What GAO Found

To reduce the number of crashes
involving commercial motor
carriers, the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration (FMCSA)
within the Department of
Transportation orders unsafe
carriers out of service. To help
keep these carriers off the road,
FMCSA’s voluntary Performance
and Registration Information
Systems Management (PRISM)
grant program, a small program
funded at $5 million per year, helps
states establish information
systems connections between state
vehicle registration and FMCSA’s
safety databases. These
connections provide states with upto-date information on carriers’
safety status when carriers try to
register or renew registrations with
the state. For states to deny,
suspend, or revoke registrations to
out-of-service carriers, states must
pass legislation enabling them to
do so.

Twenty-five states have implemented PRISM to the point where they are able
to keep carriers that FMCSA has ordered out of service from obtaining or
maintaining vehicle registrations. However, PRISM’s safety impact is hard to
measure. FMCSA data show that vehicles associated with 972 out-of-service
carriers in 2008 had registrations denied, suspended, or revoked—about 15
percent of carriers placed out of service that year. However, this is likely an
underestimate because the data can be difficult to track. Officials from the 13
states GAO contacted that are denying, suspending, or revoking vehicle
registrations of out-of-service carriers and representatives from safety and
industry associations said PRISM is worth the effort, but its impact on safety
is hard to measure. An evaluation of the program sponsored by FMCSA in
2007 concluded that PRISM states show some improved safety over time
compared with other states, indicating PRISM could have contributed to
lower crash rates. However, because all FMCSA programs are aimed at
reducing crash rates, isolating PRISM’s effect is difficult. Nonetheless, the
evaluation recommended that FMCSA adopt program measures to assess
PRISM’s effectiveness. FMCSA has not adopted all of these measures for
various reasons, including a lack of resources. In GAO’s view, applying such
measures, while ultimately useful, may be premature since PRISM’s success is
undercut by the 25 states—including states with the greatest numbers of
registered commercial motor vehicles—and the District of Columbia that do
not yet have the ability to deny, suspend, or revoke vehicle registrations of
out-of-service carriers.

As directed by a congressional
committee, GAO examined (1)
PRISM’s effectiveness and (2) the
potential to fully implement the
program nationally. GAO reviewed
FMCSA data and discussed PRISM
with a wide variety of federal, state,
industry, and safety stakeholders.

What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FMCSA
measure PRISM effectiveness when
a sufficient number of states have
the ability to deny, suspend, or
revoke registrations to out-ofservice carriers. In commenting on
a draft of this report, the
department generally agreed with
the recommendation.
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on GAO-09-495.
For more information, contact Susan A.
Fleming at (202) 512-2834 or
[email protected].

National implementation may not occur for years if PRISM continues as a
voluntary program. FMCSA data show that, on average, it took states about 3
years and 4 months to get to the point where they could deny, suspend, or
revoke registrations once they decided to implement PRISM—a process that
took as little as 10 months to more than 7 years. Officials in states GAO
contacted said that PRISM implementation was facilitated by such things as
hiring a contractor to help with the program’s technical components, and was
hindered by such things as difficulty in passing state legislation needed to
implement the program. According to officials in states GAO met with,
FMCSA has been helpful in encouraging states to adopt and implement the
program, but can do little in other areas, such as when state legislation is
needed. Officials in some states and representatives from safety associations
told GAO that Congress should require PRISM implementation so that no state
becomes a refuge for registering out-of-service carriers. Other officials said
that such a requirement is unnecessary, since only three states have not
committed to implementing PRISM. While there are benefits to a
congressional requirement that could lead to speedier national
implementation, there are several significant potential drawbacks to doing so
(for example, some states may require substantial money to adapt their
information systems to make PRISM work) that lead GAO not to recommend
such a requirement.
United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

Letter

1
Background
PRISM Has Helped Keep Unsafe Carriers from Registering, but Its
Impact on Safety Is Hard to Measure
National PRISM Implementation May Not Occur for Years if PRISM
Is Maintained as a Voluntary Program
Conclusions
Recommendation for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

5

19
31
31
32

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

33

Appendix II

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

37

11

Tables
Table 1: Applicability of Mandatory and Voluntary Approaches to
Implementing PRISM
Table 2: State Agencies and Industry and Safety Associations
Interviewed

25
35

Figures
Figure 1: States Participating in PRISM, as of April 2009
Figure 2: Time Taken for States to Reach Ability to Deny, Suspend,
or Revoke Vehicle Registrations
Figure 3: Progress in Implementing PRISM, 2000 through April 2009

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Abbreviations
BAC
DOT
FMCSA
IRP
NDR
PRISM

blood alcohol concentration
Department of Transportation
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
International Registration Plan
National Driver Registry
Performance and Registration Information Systems Management

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GAO-09-495 Motor Carrier Safety

United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

May 12, 2009
The Honorable Patty Murray
Chairman
The Honorable Christopher Bond
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing
and Urban Development, and Related Agencies
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable John W. Olver
Chairman
The Honorable Tom Latham
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing
and Urban Development, and Related Agencies
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
In the United States, commercial motor carriers account for fewer than 5
percent of all highway crashes, but these crashes result in about 13
percent of all highway deaths, or about 5,500 of the approximately 43,000
highway fatalities that occur nationwide each year. 1 In an attempt to
reduce the number and severity of crashes involving large trucks and
buses, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) within
the Department of Transportation (DOT) identifies unsafe motor carriers
and takes them off the road by ordering them out of service. Carriers that
have been ordered out of service by FMCSA may not operate until their
safety performance improves and FMCSA rescinds the out-of-service
order.
The primary way that FMCSA ensures that carriers the agency has ordered
out of service do not continue to operate is the Performance and

1

Commercial motor carriers operate large commercial trucks and buses. Large trucks are
those with a gross vehicle weight greater than 10,000 pounds. A bus is a motor vehicle that
carries more than eight passengers (including the driver). Crashes involving motor carriers
may result from errors by truck, bus, or passenger vehicle drivers; vehicle condition; and
other factors. The fatality rate (deaths per 100 million miles traveled) for commercial
motor vehicles has been fairly stable since 2002.

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Registration Information Systems Management (PRISM) grant program.
PRISM works by allocating grant money to states to establish information
systems connections between state commercial vehicle registration
databases and FMCSA’s safety databases that, when fully implemented, (1)
provides up-to-date information on the safety status of the carrier
responsible for the safety of a commercial vehicle prior to issuing or
renewing the vehicle registration and (2) generates a daily list of vehicles
registered in the state that are associated with carriers that have just been
ordered out of service by FMCSA. For new registrations or renewals, when
state personnel enter carrier and vehicle information into the system, it
automatically checks the information against FMCSA databases, and a
notice will appear to deny the registration if the carrier is out of service.
For vehicles already registered in the state, state personnel use the list the
state creates each night to suspend or revoke the vehicle registrations
associated with newly ordered out-of-service carriers. To implement
PRISM, states must pass enabling legislation, providing state registration
agencies (motor vehicle administrations) with the ability to deny, suspend,
or revoke vehicle registrations of carriers ordered out of service by
FMCSA.
PRISM’s innovation is that it associates vehicle identification numbers
with out-of-service carriers to prevent the carrier from registering or
reregistering its vehicles (either under the carrier’s original name or, more
importantly, disguised under a new name) until FMCSA lifts the out-ofservice order. Once the out-of-service order is lifted, the carrier may
obtain valid vehicle registrations. Preventing unsafe motor carriers from
obtaining or maintaining vehicle registrations deters these carriers from
operating, since state law enforcement agencies continually check
commercial vehicles for valid registrations. 2

2
There are three other components of PRISM. First, PRISM may provide state law
enforcement agencies with the funds to access systems to check the safety status of the
carrier for which vehicles stopped at the roadside are operating, to ensure vehicles are not
operating for carriers that have been ordered out of service—if this capability does not
already exist. Second, PRISM includes the deployment of roadside technologies, such as
wireless access to FMCSA databases and bar-code readers that read driver and vehicle
information and automatically populate data fields in roadside reports to improve the
efficiency and accuracy of data collection. Last, PRISM includes the Motor Carrier Safety
Improvement Process, which is a data-driven process that uses current safety event
information such as accidents, inspections, driver violations, compliance review data, and
other information, to assess and monitor motor carrier safety performance. This report
deals with the commercial vehicle registration aspects of PRISM and not these three other
components.

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In the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Congress
mandated the PRISM pilot demonstration project to evaluate the potential
benefits of using state commercial motor vehicle registration sanctions as
an incentive to improve motor carrier safety. Five states participated in the
pilot, which ended in 1997, and a final report assessing the program was
submitted to Congress in 1998. In 1998, Congress authorized additional
funding to implement the program nationwide. As of April 2009, 47 states
and the District of Columbia participate in it to some degree. Twenty-five
of these states have implemented PRISM to the extent that they can
automatically identify out-of-service carriers and then deny, suspend, or
revoke their vehicle registrations. 3
The Senate Committee on Appropriations directed that we assess (1) the
PRISM grant program’s effectiveness in removing unsafe motor carriers
from U.S. roadways and (2) the potential to fully implement the program
nationally.
To report on the extent to which the PRISM grants program has effectively
removed unsafe carriers from the roadway, we obtained FMCSA data on
the number of motor carriers that had vehicle registrations denied,
suspended, or revoked as a result of an FMCSA out-of-service order. We
interviewed FMCSA officials to discuss how data are collected and
verified and how the data are used to assess PRISM’s effectiveness. We
also conducted semistructured interviews with a nongeneralizable sample
of state motor vehicle administration officials and state law enforcement
officials from 13 states that deny, suspend, or revoke vehicle registrations
to discuss their experience implementing PRISM, how effective the
program has been, and the soundness of reported data. We obtained the
view of state officials and representatives from motor carrier industry and
safety associations on the extent to which PRISM has improved states’
ability to identify unsafe carriers and take them off the road by denying,
suspending, or revoking vehicle registrations and any factors that impact
PRISM’s effectiveness. We reviewed a 2007 Volpe National Transportation
Systems Center evaluation of the PRISM program that reported on the

3

According to FMCSA officials, in addition to the 25 states, 4 states suspend and revoke
vehicle registrations for of out-of-service carriers; however, they do so on a case-by-case
basis when requested by FMCSA and do not have the capability to check the safety status
at the time vehicle registration renewals are requested in order to deny registrations. These
4 states do not report any suspension or revocation information to FMCSA. Additionally,
there are 2 other states that also deny, suspend, and revoke vehicle registrations of out-ofservice carriers, but these states do so when requested by FMCSA, not through the regular
structure of the PRISM program. As such, we did not include these 6 states in our count.

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extent to which PRISM has improved the safety and limitations of
FMCSA’s data on the denial, suspension, or revocation of vehicle
registrations of out-of-service carriers. 4 We reviewed information from
interviews and the Volpe report to identify and describe the factors that
limit PRISM’s effectiveness.
To report on the potential to fully implement the program nationally, we
met with officials from FMCSA, state motor vehicle administrations, and
state law enforcement in 26 selected states, as well as representatives
from industry and safety associations. We conducted semistructured
interviews with state motor vehicle administrations from 13 states that
deny, suspend, or revoke vehicle registrations; 3 states that are
implementing PRISM but do not yet have the capability to affect vehicle
registrations; 8 states that have committed to implement PRISM but are
not far along in implementation; and 2 states that do not participate in
PRISM at all. We analyzed testimonial evidence to identify factors that
enabled states to deny, suspend, and revoke registrations and factors that
have delayed or prevented other states from moving forward with PRISM
implementation. We analyzed the information to identify the factors
FMCSA can affect and those it cannot. We also conducted a general
literature search to identify the conditions for when either a mandatory
approach or a voluntary approach is preferred for achieving program
participation and certain desired outcomes. In addition, we identified and
analyzed drawbacks to requiring state implementation of PRISM and
potential options available to Congress for encouraging—rather than
mandating—state legislative or regulatory action that could speed
nationwide PRISM implementation.
As part of our review, we assessed the reliability of FMCSA’s data on the
number of motor carriers that had vehicle registrations denied, suspended,
or revoked because of an FMCSA out-of-service order. While we identified
some shortcomings to the data (discussed later in this report), we
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purpose, which
was to provide a general sense of the extent to which PRISM
implementation has resulted in vehicle registration sanctions. We
conducted this performance audit from June 2008 to May 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those

4

John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, Motor Carrier Safety Division for
FMCSA Strategic Planning and Program Evaluation Division, Performance & Registration
Information Systems Management, Program Evaluation Final Report (August 2007).

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standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives. (See app. I for additional information on our
scope and methodology.)

Background

The interstate commercial motor carrier industry is large and dynamic.
According to FMCSA data, there are about 716,000 interstate carriers
registered with FMCSA to operate. While the largest motor carriers
operate upward of 50,000 vehicles, most carriers are small, with
approximately 80 percent operating between one and six vehicles.
Commercial motor vehicles travel over 222 billion miles each year over the
nation’s extensive road network.
FMCSA’s primary mission is to reduce the number and severity of crashes
involving large commercial trucks and buses involved in interstate
commerce. It carries out this mission by issuing, administering, and
enforcing federal motor carrier safety regulations and hazardous materials
regulations and gathering and analyzing data on motor carriers, drivers,
and vehicles, among other things. FMCSA also takes enforcement actions
itself and funds and oversees enforcement activities at the state level
through Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program grants.
FMCSA ensures that motor carriers comply with safety regulations
primarily through compliance reviews of carriers already in the industry
and safety audits of carriers that have recently started operations.
Compliance reviews and safety audits help FMCSA determine whether
carriers are complying with its safety regulations and, if not, to take
enforcement action against them, including placing carriers out of
service. 5 FMCSA makes its compliance determination based on a carrier’s
performance in six areas: one area is the carrier’s crash rate, and the other
five areas involve the carrier’s compliance with regulations, such as
insurance coverage, driver qualifications, and vehicle maintenance and
inspections. In addition, FMCSA places carriers out of service for failure to
pay civil penalties levied by FMCSA, failing a safety audit, and for failing to
schedule a safety audit. Out-of-service carriers must cease operations and

5

Safety audits and compliance reviews also provide education and outreach opportunities
for motor carriers and drivers on safety and hazardous materials regulations.

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cannot resume operations until FMCSA determines that they have
corrected the conditions that rendered them out of service. If a carrier
fails to comply with or disregards an out-of-service order, FMCSA may
assess a civil monetary penalty each time the vehicle is operated in
violation of the order. In 2008, FMCSA ordered 6,707 carriers out of
service.
FMCSA and state law enforcement agencies are dwarfed by the size of the
industry and, as a result, are only able to conduct compliance reviews on a
very small percentage of carriers—about 18,400 in fiscal year 2008. 6 Safety
audits are required for all new entrants to the trucking industry;
approximately 37,400 safety audits were conducted in fiscal year 2008. In
addition to compliance reviews and safety audits, FMCSA and state law
enforcement agencies conduct about 2.3 million vehicle inspections each
year at weigh stations and other locations to assess the safety compliance
of individual vehicles.
FMCSA and state law enforcement agencies use several methods to ensure
that carriers that have been ordered out of service do not continue to
operate. For example, FMCSA and its state partners monitor data on
roadside inspections, moving violations, and crashes to identify carriers
that may be violating an out-of-service order. FMCSA will visit some
suspect carriers that it identifies by monitoring crash and inspection data
to determine whether those carriers violated their orders. Also, recently,
the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance 7 began to require checking for
carriers operating under an out-of-service order during roadside
inspections and to take enforcement action against any that are. However,
given the large size of the industry, the nation’s extensive road network,
and the relatively small size of federal and state enforcement staffs, it is
difficult to catch motor carriers that are violating out-of-service orders. In
addition, some carriers change their identities by changing their names

6
FMCSA is developing a new initiative—Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010—to extend its
reach. See GAO, Motor Carrier Safety: The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
Has Developed a Reasonable Framework for Managing and Testing Its Comprehensive
Safety Analysis 2010 Initiative, GAO-08-242R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2007) and
FMCSA’s Web site at http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/safety-security/csa2010/home.htm.
7

The Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance is an international not-for-profit organization
comprised of local, state, provincial, territorial, and federal motor carrier safety officials
and industry representatives from the United States, Canada, and Mexico that establishes
minimum inspection and vehicle out-of-service criteria for highway enforcement officials.

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and obtaining new DOT numbers 8 —which are generally referred to as
chameleon carriers—to avoid being caught.
FMCSA allocates PRISM grants to states to address the problems of out-ofservice carriers registering or reregistering vehicles (when renewal is
needed), including chameleon carriers. PRISM grants enable states to
work through the registration protocol—known as the International
Registration Plan (IRP) 9 —that state motor vehicle administrations use to
register vehicles of carriers involved in interstate commerce. In 2008, over
2 million vehicles had IRP (interstate) registrations. PRISM grants provide
the state motor vehicle administration where the vehicle is registered—
called the “base state”—with the capability to check the safety status of
motor carriers, using the carrier’s DOT number and the vehicle
identification number, prior to issuing or renewing a carrier’s registration.
According to FMCSA, sanctioning the IRP (interstate) registrations of
commercial motor vehicles is a powerful enforcement tool in deterring
out-of-service carriers from operating on U.S. roadways. If the carrier or
vehicle is associated with an out-of-service order at the time of
registration, the state motor vehicle administration will deny the
registration of that carrier if the state has implemented PRISM to the point
where it can deny registrations to out-of-service carriers. In addition, state
motor vehicle administrations also suspend or revoke the registrations of
vehicles associated with out-of-service carriers, without waiting for the
carrier to attempt to reregister. States use various methods to inform a
carrier that its vehicle registrations have been suspended or revoked. For
example, some states notify the carrier via letter, and some states request
that the carrier return the vehicle license plates. Other states send motor
vehicle administration personnel or state law enforcement to the carrier’s
place of business to retrieve the license plates following a registration
suspension or revocation.

8

The DOT number serves as a unique identifier when collecting and monitoring a carrier’s
safety information acquired during audits, compliance reviews, crash investigations, and
inspections. Companies that operate commercial vehicles transporting passengers or
hauling cargo in interstate commerce must be registered with the FMCSA and must have a
DOT number. Also, commercial intrastate hazardous materials carriers that haul cargo
requiring a safety permit must have a DOT number.

9

IRP is used to register commercial motor vehicles with a gross vehicle weight of over
26,000 pounds that travel between two or more states or Canadian provinces to ensure an
equitable distribution of registration fees, which is based on vehicle miles traveled in each
state or Canadian province. All states (except Alaska and Hawaii) are members of IRP.

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Another benefit of PRISM is that it helps prevent an out-of-service carrier
from registering in a state other than its base state in an attempt to avoid
having its registration denied. This works to the extent that the nonbase
state or states in which the carrier seeks to register participate in and have
fully implemented the PRISM program (that is, deny, suspend, or revoke
vehicle registrations to out-of-service carriers). As of April 2009, 25 states
have this capability. (See fig. 1.) Six other states are collecting vehicle
identification numbers and the DOT number of the carriers associated
with those vehicles and may be checking the safety status of the carrier at
the time of registration. Sixteen other states and the District of Columbia
have entered into an agreement with FMCSA to implement PRISM grants
but have not yet moved forward substantially to implement the program.
The remaining three states do not participate.

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Figure 1: States Participating in PRISM, as of April 2009

Wash.
Maine

N.Dak.

Mont.

Vt.

Minn.

Ore.

N.H. (

Idaho

N.Y.

Wis.

S.Dak.

Mich.

Wyo.

R.I. (

Iowa

Pa.

Nebr.

Nev.

Ill.

Utah

Ind.
W.Va.

Colo.

Calif.

Kans.

Va.

Mo.

Ky.

N.Mex.

Ark.

Del. (

)

Md. (

)

D.C. (

)

S.C.
Miss.

Tex.

)
)

N.C.

Tenn.
Okla.

Ariz.

)
)

Conn. (
N.J. (

Ohio

)

Mass. (

Ala.

Ga.

La.

Alaska
Fla.

Hawaii

Entered into an agreement with FMCSA to implement PRISM but have
not yet moved forward substantially to implement the program (16 states and D.C.)
Collecting vehicle identification numbers and the DOT number of the carriers
associated with those vehicles and may be checking the safety status of the carrier
at the time of registration (6 states)
Denying, suspending, and revoking vehicle registrations of out-of-service carriers
(25 states)
Do not participate (3 states)
Source: FMCSA (data); and MapArt (map).

Note: While Alaska and Hawaii do not participate in IRP, each state has a system that provides them
with the capability to deny, revoke, or suspend the commercial vehicles regulated by FMCSA.

Within FMCSA’s 2008 budget (including grants) of about $530 million, the
PRISM grants program is very small. Under the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, PRISM is

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authorized $5 million annually from fiscal years 2005 through 2009. 10 These
amounts have been appropriated each year. FMCSA officials told us that
they annually allocate about $4 million to participating states in the form
of grants and $1 million for FMCSA program administration.
States use PRISM grant funds—approximately $500,000 per state—to
implement several requirements. 11 For example, for registration
requirements, states create and maintain information technology
connections to FMCSA’s safety databases and the state’s IRP system to
collect and validate the DOT number of the carrier each vehicle is
associated with and to check the safety status of those carriers. States also
develop the programs necessary to load and retrieve data and correctly
process the information to its system. In addition, in order to capture the
DOT number and other carrier information on each vehicle record, states
will need to modify existing forms, screen formats, and information
storage. States also develop procedures to check the carrier safety status
on each registration or renewal and train staff on how to do such checks.
Although PRISM grants are intended to pay for the total costs to carry out
all program requirements, states contribute some funds for program
implementation.
FMCSA uses its PRISM funds for technical support for its databases, as
well as for travel costs. Although FMCSA did not use PRISM funds to
support PRISM program personnel’s travel in fiscal year 2008, FMCSA
officials told us that it has done so to date in fiscal year 2009 due to
general agency travel budget constraints associated with the fiscal year
2009 continuing resolution.

10

Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005).

11

Grants have ranged from $180,700 to $750,000. FMCSA determines the grant amount
based on a variety of factors, such as whether the state uses a contractor for the IRP
program or uses in-house support, the level of current technology in the state, and the level
of communication for law enforcement. Also, some states receive a second grant
allocation. PRISM grants are reimbursable—that is, states incur costs, and ask FMCSA to
reimburse them with grant funds for eligible expenditures.

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PRISM Has Helped
Keep Unsafe Carriers
from Registering, but
Its Impact on Safety Is
Hard to Measure
PRISM Has Enabled 25
States to Identify and Keep
Unsafe Carriers from
Obtaining or Maintaining
Vehicle Registrations

FMCSA data show that PRISM has resulted in the denial, suspension, or
revocation of the commercial motor vehicle registrations of 972 carriers in
2008. 12 According to FMCSA data, 671 unsafe motor carriers had vehicle
registrations suspended or revoked, while 301 unsafe motor carriers had
vehicle registrations denied—together representing about 15 percent of
carriers that were ordered out of service in 2008. 13 These results are likely
understated because some states that are reporting are not able to track
the data in a systematic or verifiable way. Three of the 13 states we
contacted that deny, suspend, and revoke vehicle registrations based on
an out-of-service order do not track the number of registration denials.
Officials in one of those three states told us that no record is created when
registrations are denied. Rather, after a carrier attempting to register or
reregister a vehicle associated with an out-of-service DOT number in that
state is told the out-of-service order precludes registration, the carrier
typically leaves the office, ending the matter. Officials in another state
manually track denials, but have no method of verifying the data. FMCSA
officials acknowledge that there are limitations to the data and that the
data probably underestimate the number of denials, suspensions, and
revocations that occur.

12

FMCSA compiles state-reported data on a quarterly basis. Beginning in March 2006,
FMCSA added fields for states to report the number of denials, suspensions, and
revocations. Prior to 2006, FMCSA officials told us that they would call the limited number
of PRISM states that had implemented the denial, suspension, and revocation requirement
to gather the data. For 2008 data, at least 10 of the 25 states that provided reports to
FMCSA each quarter did not report data on denials, suspensions, and revocations. FMCSA
officials told us that they assume that these states did not deny, suspend, or revoke any
registrations during that quarter. Officials do not follow up with states to determine if this
is the case or if the state had mistakenly not reported data. As a result, data could be
underreported.

13
It is possible that carriers that were denied vehicle registrations had their registrations
suspended or revoked in the same year. An FMCSA official, however, told us that this is
unlikely since suspensions and revocations occur during the registration year and denials
occur the following year—when a carrier attempts to register new vehicles or reregister
vehicles.

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Stakeholders Contacted
View PRISM
Implementation as Worth
the Effort, Although Its
Impact on Safety Is
Difficult to Measure

Officials from each of the 13 states we contacted that deny, suspend, or
revoke registrations told us that they believe PRISM is worth the effort to
implement because the grant program provides a deterrent against unsafe
carriers. State officials told us that the deterrent can increase safety, but
they could not quantify improved safety outside of tracking the number of
denials, suspensions, and revocations of vehicle registrations to out-ofservice carriers. Law enforcement officials in one state we met with told
us that PRISM grants may enable them to identify these carriers by
providing officials with wireless connections to safety databases, allowing
officials to check a carrier’s safety status at weigh stations on the
roadside. As a result, several state officials believe that PRISM has helped
keep their roadways safer. For example, officials in one state told us that
PRISM implementation is worth the effort—even if it has only prevented a
few out-of-service carriers from registering. The state official said that if
PRISM implementation prevents a major, expensive crash, then the
program would be a success.
FMCSA officials told us that state denial of vehicle registrations associated
with out-of-service carriers serve as a sufficient deterrent to prevent some
unsafe carriers from attempting to obtain valid registrations.
Representatives from industry and safety groups echoed these comments.
Representatives from a safety association we met with told us that PRISM
is the only program that establishes a safety connection between a vehicle
and the motor carrier company on an up-to-date basis.
We believe that the PRISM program appears to have a very strong
potential cost-benefit component. The overall cost of implementing the
program ($5 million per year) is relatively small in comparison to the
potential benefit of increased roadway safety as a result of reduced out-of
service carriers operating on U.S. roadways, especially as more states
deny, suspend, and revoke the registrations of vehicles associated with
out-of-service carriers.

FMCSA Has Looked for
Ways to Measure PRISM’s
Impact on Safety, but Has
Not Yet Adopted Measures

FMCSA sought to understand PRISM’s effectiveness by sponsoring an
evaluation of the PRISM program and the extent to which PRISM has
improved safety. In 2007, the Volpe Center, which conducted this
evaluation, concluded that states with denial, suspension, and revocation
capability show some improved safety over time compared with other
states, indicating that PRISM, when fully implemented, could have

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contributed to lower crash rates, although its results were inconclusive in
several areas. 14 The Volpe report used two measures to assess how
PRISM’s registration sanction component affected commercial vehicle
safety: 15
•

Comparison of commercial vehicle crash rates in pre-PRISM versus
post-PRISM states and in PRISM versus non-PRISM states by year. The
report found that the comparison of crash rates in eight states that
progressed from nonparticipating to denying, suspending, and revoking
vehicle registrations between 2000 and 2005 revealed a potential
downward influence on crash rates in states that fully implemented
PRISM. While almost all eight states had rising crash rates over time, the
increase was lower for these states compared with other states that did
not fully implement PRISM over the same time period. Comparisons
between commercial vehicle crash rates in states that do not participate in
PRISM and states that deny, suspend, and revoke vehicle registrations by
year were inconclusive.

•

States’ success in denying registrations to out-of-service carriers. The
report found that, with few exceptions, PRISM states did not erroneously
issue registrations to out-of-service carriers.
The Volpe report concluded that PRISM cannot succeed alone, as it works
in conjunction with other FMCSA and state programs (for example,
compliance reviews, new entrant safety audits, and roadside inspections)
to reduce crashes and safety violation rates. Because all FMCSA programs
are aimed at reducing crash rates and because numerous factors
contribute to crash rates, isolating PRISM’s effect is difficult.
Although isolating PRISM’s impact on safety is difficult, measuring
performance when a significant number of states fully implement PRISM
could help FMCSA assess PRISM’s effectiveness in achieving the program
goal of improved safety. The 2007 Volpe report suggested that FMCSA
evaluate the program’s effectiveness by using the measures discussed

14

John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, Motor Carrier Safety Division for
FMCSA Strategic Planning and Program Evaluation Division, Performance & Registration
Information Systems Management, Program Evaluation Final Report (August 2007).

15

The Volpe report also compared driver and vehicle out-of-service violation rates in PRISM
to evaluate the effectiveness of one of PRISM’s other components—the Motor Carrier
Safety Improvement Process, which helps to target high safety-risk carriers for roadside
inspections to improve their safety status. The analysis did not show a conclusive
relationship between these violation rates and PRISM.

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above, which Volpe initially used to assess PRISM’s effect on commercial
vehicle safety (that is, comparison of crash rates and state success in
sanctioning registrations). FMCSA officials told us they have not evaluated
crash rates in states pre- and post-PRISM implementation because of
insufficient resources and because of the difficulty of isolating PRISM’s
effect on crash rates. For example, the benefits of PRISM implementation
may not be seen in the state that implemented the program (that is, a
vehicle denied registration in one state may have had a crash in another
state). As such, isolating PRISM’s effect on state crash rates is
complicated, particularly when only about half the states have fully
implemented PRISM. Consequently, changes in crash rates pre- and postPRISM may be attributable to other factors. FMCSA officials told us that
this may simply represent a correlation, rather than a cause and effect
relationship, or may be the result of the state implementing a variety of
safety-related actions. However, as the Volpe report noted, an effective
control method for factors that influence motor carrier crash occurrence
(for example, highway infrastructure or weather) is to observe the impact
of PRISM implementation one state at a time, comparing pre- and postPRISM crash rates within the same states over time. The Volpe report
added that while such an approach does not eliminate the problem of
external factors that influence crash rates, it provides a degree of control
not possible in simple comparisons of crash rates between PRISM and
non-PRISM states.
While the current FMCSA data on PRISM—the number of denials,
suspensions, and revocations—are useful, they do not fully measure
PRISM’s effectiveness. In particular, the number of denials is an imperfect
measure. As the Volpe report points out, a reduction in the number of
denials over time may imply either that PRISM is not doing a good job or
that PRISM has had a substantial positive influence by functioning as a
deterrent that discourages carriers from attempting to register vehicles
while under an out-of-service order. Over time and as more states
participate in PRISM, the number of denials may decrease because
carriers will know that they will not be able to receive valid registrations if
they are out of service. 16 Furthermore, until all—or nearly all—states are
fully implementing PRISM, the numbers of suspensions and revocations
are also imperfect measures, since out-of-service carriers can obtain
vehicle registrations in the states that are not fully implementing PRISM.

16

The number of carrier suspensions and revocations should be relatively consistent with
the number of carriers being ordered out of service in a given year.

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According to FMCSA officials, since the Volpe evaluation, PRISM has
implemented an alert report that identifies vehicles when they are placed
out of service. State officials then suspend these vehicles in a timely
manner, leaving very few vehicles that are available to fit into the category
of denial of registration at renewal.
FMCSA officials also told us that the number of carriers that have vehicle
registrations suspended and revoked under PRISM will not be equal to the
number of carriers ordered out of service in a given year for several
reasons. First, according to FMCSA data, the majority of carriers (about 87
percent) ordered out of service in 2008 were new entrants. These entrants
may not have tried to register vehicles, so there may not be any vehicle
registrations to suspend or revoke, or they may have mistakenly registered
as an interstate carrier when they should have registered as an intrastate
carrier or a registrant only. 17 According to FMCSA officials, these
registrants provide a DOT number at the time of registration for the carrier
responsible for safety. Since the DOT number is not associated with a
carrier that is out of service, the vehicles will not be suspended even if the
registrant’s number is associated with an out-of-service order. Second, for
those carriers ordered out of service for failure to pay fines (about 8
percent in 2008, according to FMCSA data), FMCSA advises states to
check with the state FMCSA Division Office before they go through the
work of denying, suspending, and revoking vehicles. FMCSA advises this
action because the fines may be resolved within a couple of days, and it
would not be worth the effort of sanctioning the registrations to reinstate
them hours or days later. In addition, there are also out-of-service carriers
in non-PRISM states that will not have their vehicle registrations
suspended. Last, the numbers of out-of-service carriers include interstate
carriers that operate vehicles that weigh between 10,000 and 26,000
pounds. IRP does not require carriers to register vehicles that weigh less
than 26,000 pounds. Since PRISM only affects IRP registrations—these
carriers are not included in PRISM.
The Volpe report indicated that PRISM will struggle to achieve its full
potential until most states (perhaps 90 percent) are implementing PRISM
to the extent that they can deny, suspend, and revoke vehicle registrations.

17

Registrant-only entities register commercial motor vehicles but do not operate as motor
carriers under any circumstances; these entities are usually comprised of leasing
companies that do not have operating authority and are not identified as the carrier
responsible for safety for IRP registration. Consequently, motor carriers that use the
registrant-only number may escape FMCSA oversight.

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FMCSA officials said that other than collecting data on the number of outof-service carriers that had vehicle registrations sanctioned, it is difficult
to measure PRISM’s effectiveness. One official told us that as long as the
program is executed correctly, PRISM enables states to deny, suspend, or
revoke the vehicle registrations of out-of-service carriers. When most
states have the capability to sanction registrations, it may be easier to
demonstrate PRISM’s effect on safety. FMCSA officials have suggested
that this might be from about 38 to 40 states.
In response to the Volpe evaluation, FMCSA developed performance
measures for state participants, such as suspending or revoking the
registration of vehicles associated with an out-of-service carrier for all
reasons permitted by state law, and for the PRISM team, such as
performing annual implementation reviews on six states, assisting states in
preparing their implementation plans, and publishing two newsletters each
year. For the most part, these measures seem to be process-oriented and
do not appear to demonstrate the achievements of the program.
In our view, applying outcome performance measures such as Volpe’s two
measures and measuring the percentage of out-of-service carriers affected
by PRISM, while ultimately useful, may be premature at this time.
Currently, PRISM’s success is undercut by the 25 states and the District of
Columbia that either do not yet have the capability to deny, suspend, or
revoke vehicle registrations of out-of-service carriers or do not participate
in the program.

Patchwork
Implementation Is One of
Several Factors Limiting
PRISM’s Effectiveness

According to FMCSA data, 22 states and the District of Columbia are not
far enough along in implementing PRISM to deny, suspend, or revoke
vehicle registrations of out-of-service carriers, and 3 states do not
participate in PRISM at all. As a result, out-of-service carriers in these 25
states and the District of Columbia can register and reregister vehicles and
keep operating with valid registrations, albeit in violation of FMCSA’s outof-service orders. In addition, carriers that had been denied registration in
PRISM states may be able to register vehicles in non-PRISM states or
PRISM states that do not yet have the capability to deny, revoke, or
suspend registrations for out-of-service carriers. Of the over 2 million
vehicles with IRP registrations in 2007, about 1.3 million vehicles (or 65
percent) were registered in states that are not denying, suspending, or
revoking vehicle registrations. States with some of the largest numbers of
commercial vehicle registrations, such as Indiana, Illinois, Oklahoma, New
Jersey, and California, have not fully implemented PRISM.

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In addition, charter buses are exempt from IRP (interstate) registration
and thus not subject to PRISM. 18 Charter bus crashes are relatively rare
but can be particularly deadly, since many people may be involved. The
American Bus Association commissioned a 2008 motor coach census,
which found that in 2007, over 3,400 carriers operated about 33,500 buses
in the United States and Canada. 19 Over 96 percent of carriers provided
charter services. Although some charter buses choose to register through
IRP, many do not and, therefore, are not included in PRISM.
Representatives from IRP, Inc., the American Association of Motor Vehicle
Administrators, and the United Motorcoach Association, as well as
officials from FMCSA, told us that charter buses are exempt from IRP
registrations because the vehicles are for hire and may not be able to
reliably predict which states they may travel to in order to properly
apportion registration fees. The representatives, however, were not able to
provide a rationale for why this exemption does not apply to for-hire
trucking companies that also may not be able to reliably predict the states
in which they may travel. Officials from FMCSA told us that charter buses
could be included in PRISM if charter buses were required to register
through IRP or if PRISM was expanded to include non-IRP vehicles.
Officials from nine states we met with that sanction vehicle registrations
of out-of-service carriers told us that charter buses should be included in
PRISM. According to representatives from IRP, Inc., there has been some
discussion on changing the exemption to require charter buses to register
through IRP; however, no changes have been formally submitted for
approval by its member states.
Finally, while PRISM helps states identify vehicles associated with an outof-service carrier, they are not always able to keep these vehicles from
being registered. Theoretically, when an out-of-service carrier attempts to
reregister a vehicle using a new carrier name and new DOT number, states
implementing PRISM would know that the vehicle identification number is
or has been associated with an out-of-service DOT number. In some states,
officials said that they deny registrations to carriers they suspect of being
chameleon carriers because the IRP system alerts them that the vehicles
are associated with an out-of-service carrier. However, officials from 6 of

18

Charter buses provide service to groups traveling together to a specified location or for a
particular itinerary.

19

Nathan Associates, Motorcoach Census 2008: A Benchmarking Study of the Size and
Activity of the Motorcoach Industry in the United States and Canada in 2007 (Dec. 18,
2008).

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the 13 states we contacted that deny, suspend, and revoke vehicle
registrations told us that they provide registrations because they cannot
conclusively link the new carrier to the old out-of-service carrier at the
time of registration—even if the vehicle identification number is or has
been associated with an out-of-service carrier—especially when the new
carrier is presenting legitimate documentation of the new company. In one
state, officials told us that if a vehicle identification number for a new
registration is identified through PRISM as being associated with an outof-service DOT number, the carrier is notified that the vehicle is attached
to the out-of-service DOT number. If the carrier provides proper
documentation to support ownership (for example, proof of an established
place of business in the state, proof of title for the vehicles being
registered, and other documents), the vehicle is registered. 20 Officials
added that they would also provide registration for these carriers because
it would be next to impossible to prove differently based on speculation.
In another state, officials told us that once a chameleon carrier obtains a
new DOT number, the motor vehicle administration is unable to prevent
the carrier from obtaining an IRP registration—even if they know the
carrier is a chameleon carrier—because they do not deny the registration
until FMCSA connects the identity of the “new” carrier with the out-ofservice carrier. According to those state officials, they issue new
registrations to carriers that have valid paperwork showing a new name
and DOT number, among other things. Those officials also told us that
they contact the state FMCSA division office when they suspect that a
carrier may be evading an out-of-service order. An official from the
FMCSA state division office told us they investigate the carrier by
reviewing carrier, driver, and vehicle records to determine whether the
carrier is in fact a chameleon carrier. If they are able to prove that the
carrier reinvented itself to evade an out-of-service order, the out-of-service
order will be transferred to the new DOT number, and the state can then
suspend the vehicle registrations associated with the new DOT number.
Chameleon carriers may also remain in operation in many states by
registering as intrastate carriers, but continuing to operate as interstate
carriers. By registering as intrastate carriers, these carriers are no longer
subject to federal regulation. Officials in 12 of the 13 states we contacted

20

Officials in this state also said that in many cases, when the out-of-service DOT number is
identified, it is usually an owner-operator trying to register their vehicle under a different
carrier that is not out of service. Owner-operators own their own vehicles and may act as a
driver for another employer at certain times or may be self-employed at other times.

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were not using vehicle identification numbers to check for federal out-of
service orders prior to issuing an intrastate registration to a carrier.
According to FMCSA officials, FMCSA has been recommending that states
modify their laws to prohibit the issuance of any vehicle registration to a
carrier that has received a federal out-of-service order. FMCSA has also
allocated a supplemental grant to Washington state to incorporate non-IRP
registrations into the PRISM network to ensure that state motor vehicle
administrations check federal out-of-service orders before issuing
registrations to non-IRP vehicles. Georgia officials told us they requested
funds to expand PRISM to non-IRP commercial vehicles. According to
FMCSA officials, the agency provides funds to expand PRISM’s
registration sanction framework to include vehicles exempt from IRP
registrations. Most states have two databases for registering motor
vehicles—one for vehicles that are required to obtain IRP registrations and
one for vehicles that are exempt, such as charter buses that are under
FMCSA’s oversight and intrastate carriers. Thus, even though intrastate
carriers are not generally under FMCSA’s regulatory authority, they are
included within the registration database of other vehicles that are under
FMCSA’s regulatory authority.

National PRISM
Implementation May
Not Occur for Years if
PRISM Is Maintained
as a Voluntary
Program
Time States Need to
Implement PRISM Varies

PRISM will be most effective when all—or nearly all—states have the
ability to deny, suspend, and revoke registrations; only about half of them
have this capability now. At the outset of PRISM implementation, FMCSA
works with each state to create an implementation plan, which includes
identifying responsible parties, how the state will meet the program
requirements, timelines for completion, and estimated costs. States are
also required to report their progress to FMCSA on a regular basis, as
designated in the implementation plan. While some states have
implemented PRISM relatively quickly, it has taken other states much
longer. FMCSA data show that the average time it took states to affect
vehicle registrations after the states committed to implementing PRISM

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was 3 years and 4 months, but it can take as little as 10 months or as long
as 7 years and 4 months. (See fig. 2.) In addition, FMCSA data show that
nine states have been implementing PRISM for 5 years or more but are not
yet able to deny, suspend, or revoke vehicle registrations of out-of-service
carriers for reasons discussed later in this report. FMCSA officials stated,
however, that in comparison with other voluntary programs, such as IRP
and the International Fuel Tax Agreement (a fuel use tax agreement that
establishes uniform administration of motor fuel taxation laws for
interstate motor vehicles), states are implementing PRISM at a satisfactory
pace. IRP began in 1973, while the International Fuel Tax Agreement
began in 1983. Neither program had participation among all 48 contiguous
states until the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991
encouraged state participation. 21

21
With IRP, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 stated that after
September 30, 1996, a nonparticipating state could not establish or enforce its own motor
vehicle registration laws and regulations on vehicles that are in the state but are registered
in participating states. With the International Fuel Tax Agreement, the act stated that after
September 30, 1996, a state may establish, maintain, or enforce a law or regulation that has
a fuel use tax reporting requirement (including any tax reporting form) only if the
requirement conforms with the International Fuel Tax Agreement.

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Figure 2: Time Taken for States to Reach Ability to Deny, Suspend, or Revoke
Vehicle Registrations
Number of states
7

6

5

4

3

2

1

5y
or ears
mo
re

Le

ss

th
1 y an
ea
r

1y
ea
tha r to
n 2 les
ye s
ars
2y
ea
r
tha s to
n 3 les
ye s
ars
3y
ea
r
tha s to
n 4 les
ye s
ars
4y
ea
r
tha s to
n 5 les
ye s
ars

0

Time taken
Source: GAO presentation of FMCSA data.

Note: Iowa and Minnesota also have the ability to deny, suspend, or revoke registrations. These
states were part of the pilot of PRISM and had this ability while in the pilot stage. Therefore, their data
are not included in this figure.

State officials we met with identified several factors that affected the time
states needed to fully implement PRISM. Officials in all 13 states we met
with that are denying, suspending, and revoking vehicle registrations
identified one or more of the following three key factors that facilitated
implementation:
•

Hiring a contractor to implement technical aspects of PRISM, rather
than implementing PRISM with current state staff. Ten states hired a
contractor to implement technical aspects of PRISM. State officials told us
that an experienced contractor often provides states with the expertise to
properly implement PRISM’s technical components in a timely manner.
Officials from one state told us that hiring a contractor that had been used
by other states to implement technical aspects of PRISM made
implementation easy.

•

Having one agency responsible for motor carrier issues. Officials from
five states told us that having one agency responsible for issuing motor

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carrier registrations and providing motor-carrier safety oversight helped
facilitate implementation. Officials from one of those states told us that
three separate motor vehicle agencies (registration, enforcement, and
oversight) came together into a single motor carrier services division,
which made PRISM implementation much easier. Prior to that time,
agreeing on an agenda and coordinating between the agencies was
difficult.
•

Sufficient financial support to fully implement the program. Each year,
FMCSA allocates $4 million to various states to implement PRISM. Some
states receive more grant funds or a second grant allocation. Officials from
11 states told us that these PRISM grant allocations were sufficient; 6 of
these 11 states received a second grant.
Officials from the 26 states we contacted identified one or more of the
following three key factors that prevented or delayed PRISM
implementation:

•

Overhauling outdated commercial vehicle registration systems that have
difficulty incorporating technical aspects of PRISM. Officials in nine
states cited having outdated state IRP registration systems that needed
significant updating to incorporate PRISM functions. One state was
implementing a new, updated IRP system. According to officials from that
state, the cost of the new system was approximately $11 million. FMCSA
officials told us that they were aware that the state had to improve its
technical connectivity because its system was insufficient to support
PRISM.

•

Competing priorities within state motor vehicle registration
administrations. Officials from eight states told us that competing
priorities within state motor vehicle administrations delayed or hampered
PRISM implementation. State motor vehicle administrations typically have
multiple responsibilities (such as licensing drivers and registering
passenger vehicles), and the registration of commercial vehicles may only
be a small part of these responsibilities. Officials in one state told us that
they prioritize programs that deal with licensing drivers and registering
passenger vehicles due to those registration volume demands. Also,
officials from four states said that they were working on other commercial
vehicle safety efforts, such as the commercial vehicle information
exchange window system, and unable to move forward with PRISM

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implementation. 22 Furthermore, PRISM may conflict with a state motor
vehicle administration’s focus on timely and efficient customer service.
State motor vehicle administrations often focus on processing registration
applicants as quickly as possible. PRISM may impose some timeconsuming requirements, depending on the state’s registration system
capabilities. For example, two states have to manually check an
applicant’s safety status and work with the carrier to update carrier
information (also required by PRISM), 23 which can slow down the
registration process.
•

FMCSA Is Limited in
Accelerating National
PRISM Implementation

Inability to or difficulty in passing enabling legislation needed to deny,
suspend, or revoke commercial vehicle registrations based on a federal
out-of-service order. Officials from five states told us that their states do
not have PRISM-enabling legislation to revoke, deny, or suspend
registrations of out-of-service carriers. States need the legal authority to
impose vehicle registration sanctions against motor carriers that FMCSA
has prohibited from operating. State trucking associations, however, may
stall or block such enabling legislation. For example, officials from one
state told us that in trying to pass legislation, the state trucking association
was initially concerned about the timeliness for carriers to get vehicle
registrations reinstated once the out-of-service order is rescinded. Once
the association understood that timeliness would not be an issue, it
supported PRISM.

FMCSA has worked to address some of the factors states cited that delay
or prevent PRISM implementation, but is limited in its ability to speed
national implementation. Due largely to its voluntary nature, FMCSA is
limited in its ability to compel states to pass PRISM-enabling legislation,
prioritize PRISM implementation, or overhaul outdated commercial
vehicle registration systems. However, FMCSA has taken some action to
address these factors. First, FMCSA has drafted model PRISM-enabling
legislation that is available on its Web site. State legislatures, however,

22

The commercial vehicle information exchange window system consists of a
comprehensive database of motor carrier safety and credential information, along with
software that ensures the smooth flow of these data to and from other federal and state
motor carrier, vehicle, and driver safety information systems. The system interfaces with a
state’s existing information systems and exchanges data with federal safety databases.

23

PRISM also requires carriers to update an FMCSA carrier form (the MCS-150), which
details company information such as how many vehicles a carrier operates. In PRISM
states, carriers are required to update this information annually, as opposed to once every 2
years.

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may meet infrequently and may not value PRISM-enabling legislation as an
important agenda item, thereby delaying the passage of needed legal
authority to deny, suspend, or revoke the registration of out-of-service
motor carriers. Second, FMCSA holds a 2-day training session with states
to identify and begin to work through the issues related to implementing
PRISM, and develops an implementation plan that presents step-by-step
procedures to implement PRISM. FMCSA cannot, however, compel states
to move quickly on taking those steps. Finally, FMCSA works with older
state registration systems (referred to as legacy systems) to facilitate
connectivity to FMCSA databases, and FMCSA staff provide technical
assistance to help states identify and address technical barriers to
establishing connectivity. FMCSA officials, however, told us that PRISM
grants cannot fund a multimillion dollar overhaul of the state’s legacy
system just to establish PRISM connectivity, since PRISM connectivity is a
relatively minor aspect of such a registration system.
States we contacted that do not have the ability to deny, suspend, or
revoke vehicle registrations had differing views regarding actions that
FMCSA could have taken to help them implement PRISM more quickly.
Officials in three of the nine states that have been implementing PRISM for
5 years or more without the ability to deny, suspend, or revoke vehicle
registrations of out-of-service carriers did not identify actions that FMCSA
could have taken to encourage them to implement PRISM more quickly. 24
Most state officials we contacted in states not fully implementing PRISM
told us that FMCSA consistently offered to provide whatever support it
could to help the state move forward with implementation, although as
previously mentioned, FMCSA was often limited in its ability to influence
certain factors. Officials in two states, however, told us that FMCSA
officials could have contacted them more often or otherwise put more
pressure on them to raise PRISM’s priority to ensure their state’s
participation in PRISM. In addition, states that have fully implemented
PRISM were generally satisfied with FMCSA’s actions to assist them in
continuing to operate PRISM.

24

We interviewed four of the nine states that have been implementing PRISM for 5 years or
more but do not yet have the ability to deny, suspend, or revoke vehicle registrations.

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Requiring Full PRISM
Implementation Would
Accelerate National
Implementation, but Faces
Significant Drawbacks

We conducted a general search of public policy literature for when a
mandatory or voluntary approach is preferred for program participation and
to achieve certain desired outcomes. Our review indicates that requiring
states to fully implement PRISM—thereby enabling them to deny, suspend,
or revoke the commercial vehicle registration of carriers that FMCSA has
ordered out of service (the desired outcome)—may be a quicker approach
toward achieving national PRISM implementation than the current
voluntary approach. PRISM implementation and the program’s desired
safety outcome are consistent with conditions indicating that a mandatory,
rather than voluntary, approach would work best. (See table 1.)

Table 1: Applicability of Mandatory and Voluntary Approaches to Implementing PRISM
Approach

Condition of success

Applicability of approach to implementing PRISM

Mandatory approach

Desired outcome cannot be
achieved through voluntary
efforts

Uncertain

Uniform application of a desired
outcome is sought

Yes

Regulating agency seeks
assurance that its compliance
policies will be followed and
establishes accountability

Yes

Some out-of-service carriers continue operating,
thereby increasing the public’s safety risk. Having
all states denying, suspending, or revoking the
registration of these carriers better provides
FMCSA with the assurance and accountability that
unsafe carriers are not operating.

Safety risks can be easily
identified

No

Out-of-service carriers are not easy to identify,
particularly chameleon carriers that change their
identities.

Regulator has a strong sense
of duty to achieve a desired
outcome

No

Denying, suspending, or revoking the registration
of out-of-service carriers is generally not the
principal concern of state motor vehicle
administrations.

Regulator faces a tight budget
and increasing pressure to find
cost-effective tools

Yes

Federal costs would almost certainly increase if the
remaining 25 states and the District of Columbia
were to fully implement PRISM over the short term.
Thus, voluntary approaches may enable cost
savings for FMCSA over mandates. In addition,
states are facing tight budgets in this recessionary
period.

Voluntary approach

After 10 years, 25 states and the District of
Columbia still do not deny, suspend, or revoke the
commercial vehicle registration of carriers that
FMCSA has ordered out of service. While all states
may eventually have this desired outcome, a
mandatory approach that includes timelines would
achieve the desired outcome more quickly.

Source: GAO analysis of public policy literature on preferable attributes of mandatory and voluntary approaches.

Stakeholders we met with differed on whether Congress should enact
legislation that would require states to fully implement PRISM. According
to officials in 12 states and representatives from safety associations we

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interviewed, Congress should require all states to fully implement PRISM.
These officials and representatives suggested that all states should be
required to implement PRISM to ensure nationwide coverage so that no
state becomes a “dumping ground” for unsafe or chameleon carriers. In
addition, requiring states to implement PRISM by a certain date could
result in timely national implementation. Conversely, officials in 3 of the
26 states supported keeping PRISM a voluntary program. 25 These officials
noted that a mandate was unnecessary, since only 3 states have not
committed to PRISM implementation. Furthermore, several state officials
that are currently implementing PRISM told us that even though they did
not implement PRISM quickly, the factors that prevented them from
moving forward were eventually overcome. In addition, states are making
progress in fully implementing PRISM. Since 2000, state participation and
implementation of PRISM has increased steadily. (See fig. 3.) For example,
in 2000, 33 states and the District of Columbia were not participating in
PRISM, and as of April 2009, only 3 states were not participating. FMCSA
data also indicate progress toward increased PRISM participation.

25

Officials from the remaining 11 states did not or preferred not to provide an opinion on
requiring PRISM implementation. Representatives from industry associations we met with
told us they did not support a mandate for various reasons. Those representatives said that
states lack the necessary resources to comply with such a mandate and that there is no
need for such a mandate, since roadside law enforcement has the ability to identify and
sanction any carrier operating after FMCSA has placed the carrier out of service.

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Figure 3: Progress in Implementing PRISM, 2000 through April 2009
Number of states
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

April-09

Year
States denying, suspending, or revoking vehicle registrations based on federal out-of-service order
States implementing or committed to implementing PRISM
States not participating in PRISM
Source: GAO presentation of FMCSA data.

Note: This figure does not include the District of Columbia, which began its participation in 2008 when
it committed to implementing PRISM. Its status remains unchanged as of April 2009.

While our review of public policy literature indicated that requiring states
to fully implement PRISM may be a quicker approach toward achieving
national PRISM implementation than the current voluntary approach,
requiring states to implement PRISM within a certain time frame faces
significant potential drawbacks and barriers—both technical and legal.
First, such a requirement will likely cause PRISM implementation to move
toward the top of a state motor vehicle registration administration’s
priority. PRISM implementation, however, may not be the most important
activity for a state motor vehicle administration and may inhibit the
administration’s ability to complete other responsibilities, such as
processing driver’s licenses. Second, some states with significant barriers
to PRISM implementation may need to obtain substantial funds in order to
comply with a PRISM requirement. States with legacy registration systems
that do not allow connectivity to FMCSA safety databases, for example,
may need substantially more funds to enable them to fully implement
PRISM than PRISM grants generally can provide. This could be

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problematic in today’s recessionary climate. PRISM grants are intended to
fund the costs of creating technology interfaces between the states’
systems and FMCSA databases and not to fund complete registration
system overhauls, which could cost millions of dollars. In addition to these
technical issues, Congress may not have the legal authority to require
states to implement PRISM. Congress can impose nationwide
requirements pursuant to authorities specified in the Constitution. Under
the Tenth Amendment, however, Congress cannot require states to enact
laws or regulations that would compel a state to enforce a federal
regulatory program. 26
While Congress is limited in its ability to require state adoption of PRISM,
it has three options that may enable it to strongly encourage state
participation. First, Congress can attach conditions upon the receipt of
federal funds. For example, as it has done in the past, Congress could
require that states will lose a certain percentage of highway construction
funds if they fail to fully implement PRISM within a given time. In DOT’s
2001 appropriations act, 27 Congress provided the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration with the ability to encourage states to adopt stricter
standards for making it illegal for people to drive with a specified blood
alcohol concentration (BAC) of .08 percent. 28 Under this provision, later
codified, states that did not adopt a conforming .08 percent BAC law by
October 1, 2003, would have a percentage of highway construction funds
withheld each year. 29 Consequently, by July 2004, the legislatures in all 50
states and the District of Columbia passed laws defining it as a crime to
drive with a BAC at or above .08 percent, whereas in 1999, only 16 states

26

The amendment states that “the powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.” See, for example, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); City of New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).

27

Pub. L. No. 106-346, 114 Stat. 1356 (2000).

28

A .08 percent BAC is the level at which a person’s blood contains 8/100ths of 1 percent
alcohol.

29

Specifically, states that did not adopt a conforming .08 percent BAC law by October 1,
2003, would have 2 percent of certain highway construction funds withheld. The statute
added that each year, the withholding percentage would increase by 2 percent, up to 8
percent in fiscal year 2007 and later. Those states that adopted a conforming .08 percent
BAC law within 4 years of any withholding would be reimbursed for those withheld funds.
If a state had not adopted a conforming .08 percent BAC law by October 1, 2007, portions
of the state’s withheld funds would begin to lapse and would no longer be available. 23
U.S.C. § 163(e).

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had enacted such a law. If this approach was applied to PRISM, a state
motor vehicle administration that chooses not to implement PRISM would
trigger a reduction in that state’s transportation department’s highway
construction funds. As a result, Congress may be withholding funds from a
state agency that is not responsible for implementing PRISM. But, such a
scenario is similar to states adopting .08 percent BAC laws.
A second option available to Congress is to provide financial incentives to
states that speed PRISM implementation. Congress can provide an
incentive payment, such as a one-time payment for implementing PRISM
within a predetermined number of years. Furthermore, Congress can
require states that do not stay in the program for a predetermined period
to return the payment to ensure states stay committed to full PRISM
implementation. States, however, may find that financial incentives such
as payments are insufficient to overcome the factors that prevent or delay
them from fully implementing PRISM—particularly in states that need
expensive overhauls of outdated registration systems. Furthermore, as
more states move forward with PRISM implementation, Congress may end
up allocating a substantial amount of financial incentives to states that
eventually would have fully implemented PRISM without such an
enticement. In addition, according to FMCSA officials, states that have
already implemented PRISM may find this option unfair.
Finally, Congress can strongly encourage state participation by developing
associated mandatory elements. As discussed earlier, Congress, through
the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, 30 developed
mandatory elements of enforcement, regulation, and reporting that
strongly encouraged states to participate in IRP and the International Fuel
Tax Agreement. With the IRP, the act stated that after September 1996, a
nonparticipating state could not establish or enforce its own motor vehicle
registration laws and regulations on vehicles that have IRP registrations
from other states. 31 With the International Fuel Tax Agreement, the act
stated that after September 1996, a state can establish or enforce a law or
regulation that has a fuel tax reporting requirement or provides for the
payment of fuel tax only if it does so in a way that meets the requirements
of the International Fuel Tax Agreement. 32 In applying a similar approach

30

Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (1991).

31

49 U.S.C. § 31704.

32

49 U.S.C. § 31705 (a), (b).

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to PRISM, Congress could condition states’ ability to issue IRP
registrations on using PRISM functions to check or deny a carrier’s
operating status prior to issuing such registrations. Such strong
encouragement to impose PRISM, however, may cause problems for states
that do not have the money needed to overhaul an outdated registration
system to enable PRISM functionality.
Similar to IRP and the International Fuel Tax Agreement, Congress can
look to the National Driver Registry (NDR) as a comparison of a voluntary
roadway safety initiative that achieved significant state participation
following strong federal encouragement. The National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration administers the NDR database system, which is
similar to PRISM in its purpose and framework. Similar to PRISM, states
are not required to participate in the NDR. The NDR facilitates the
exchange of driver information between participating states to ensure that
commercial vehicle drivers who have had their licenses suspended or
revoked or who have been convicted of serious traffic violations (for
example, driving while impaired by alcohol or drugs) in one state do not
receive a new or renewed license in another state. State motor vehicle
administrations provide the NDR with the names of individuals who have
lost driving privileges or who have been convicted of a serious traffic
violation. When a person applies or reapplies for a driver’s license, the
state queries the system—maintained by the American Association of
Motor Vehicle Administrators—to see if that applicant is listed on the
NDR. If a state has reported the applicant on the NDR as a problem driver,
the state may deny the applicant’s request for a license.
According to a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration official,
before 1986, the NDR was not fully effective since not all states were
checking the NDR prior to issuing commercial driver’s licenses. Congress,
however, passed the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, 33
which required states to check the NDR prior to issuing new commercial
driver’s licenses in the state. Still, while all states checked the NDR when
new licenses were issued, not all states were checking the system during
renewals. Consequently, commercial vehicle drivers who were convicted
of serious traffic violations in a state other than where they were licensed
were still able to have their licenses renewed in their home states.
Subsequently, Congress passed the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act

33

Pub. L. No. 99-570, title XII, § 12009(a)(20), 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).

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of 1999, 34 which required states to check the NDR for all new license
issues and renewals. 35 A National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
official told us that, partly due to this requirement, state queries of the
NDR went from 35 million per year in 2001 to over 100 million per year in
2008.

Conclusions

As a relatively small program, FMCSA’s PRISM grants appear to have great
potential to improve highway safety by preventing motor carriers that
FMCSA has ordered out of service from obtaining or maintaining valid
vehicle registrations, thereby inhibiting their ability to operate unlawfully.
Although 47 states and the District of Columbia are either committed to or
already implementing PRISM, the program’s impact is unknown because
FMCSA has not adopted measures of program effectiveness. This makes
some sense, since the program has not been fully implemented in 25 states
and the District of Columbia. Until a sufficient number of states have the
ability to prevent unsafe motor carriers from obtaining or maintaining
vehicle registrations, attempting to measure the effectiveness of PRISM
grants will not be particularly fruitful. FMCSA officials have suggested that
a sufficient number of states might be 38 to 40 states.
Finally, despite the potential safety advantages in having all states and the
District of Columbia fully implement PRISM and a variety of options for
doing so, we are not suggesting that Congress legislate such a requirement
because of the drawbacks and challenges of doing so.

Recommendation for
Executive Action

In order to assess PRISM’s effectiveness in keeping unsafe carriers off the
road, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the
Administrator of FMCSA to measure PRISM program effectiveness when
the number of states that have the ability to deny, suspend, or revoke
registrations to out-of-service carriers is sufficient to make such
measurements meaningful.

34

Pub. L. No. 106-159, 113 Stat. 1748 (1999).

35

49 U.S.C. § 30304(e).

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Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation for
its review and comment. The department generally agreed with the
recommendation. It also offered one technical comment, which we
incorporated.
We are sending copies of this report to congressional committees
interested in motor carrier safety issues; the Secretary of Transportation;
the Administrator of FMCSA; and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-2834 or [email protected]. Contact points for Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this report. Staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in
appendix II.

Susan A. Fleming
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues

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Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To report on the extent to which the Performance Registration
Information Systems Management (PRISM) grants program has effectively
removed unsafe carriers from the roadway, we obtained Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) data on the number of motor
carriers that had vehicle registrations denied, suspended, or revoked.
These data are to be reported to FMCSA on a quarterly basis by states that
have implemented PRISM to the point where they are denying,
suspending, and revoking vehicle registrations of out-of-service carriers.
We interviewed officials from FMCSA to discuss how data are collected
and verified and how the data are used to assess PRISM’s effectiveness.
We also conducted semistructured interviews with a nongeneralizable
sample of state motor vehicle administration officials and state law
enforcement officials from 13 states that deny, suspend, or revoke vehicle
registrations to discuss their state’s experience implementing PRISM, how
effective the program has been, and the soundness and conclusiveness of
reported data. We selected the 13 states based on their progress
implementing PRISM and their status as states with the largest numbers of
commercial vehicles registered through the International Registration Plan
(IRP). 1 We selected states with the most vehicles registered, assuming that
the proportion of out-of-service vehicles are distributed relatively evenly
across states. State data on out-of-service vehicles are incomplete, and we
did not test this assumption.
In determining the reliability of FMCSA’s data on the number of motor
carriers that had vehicle registrations denied, suspended, or revoked
because of an out-of-service order, we interviewed officials from FMCSA
who are knowledgeable about the data and how the data are collected and
analyzed. We also attempted to obtain similar information from states that
are fully implementing PRISM. We identified shortcomings with these
data, which we disclosed in this report, but found the data sufficiently
reliable for our purpose, which was to provide a general sense of the
extent to which PRISM implementation has resulted in vehicle registration
sanctions.
We met with state officials and representatives from motor carrier
industry and safety associations and obtained their views on the extent to
which PRISM has improved highway safety or had other benefits. (See

1

In two cases, we met with officials from states in the early stages of our engagement,
before we finalized our methodology. In another case, we met with a state that was not
fully implementing PRISM at that time, but subsequently obtained full implementation
status.

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Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

table 2 at the end of this appendix for a list of industry and safety
associations we interviewed.) We reviewed a 2007 Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center evaluation of the PRISM program that
reported on the extent to which PRISM has improved roadway safety and
the limitations to FMCSA’s data on the denial of commercial vehicle
registrations to motor carriers FMCSA placed out of service. Finally, we
reviewed information from interviews and the 2007 Volpe report to
identify and describe the factors that limit PRISM’s effectiveness.
To report on the potential to fully implement the program nationally, we
met with officials from FMCSA, state motor vehicle administrations, and
state law enforcement offices in 26 selected states, as well as
representatives from industry and safety associations. We conducted
semistructured interviews with state motor vehicle administrations from
13 states that have fully implemented PRISM; 3 states that are
implementing the grant program (that is, they are collecting vehicle
identification numbers and the DOT numbers of the carriers associated
with those vehicles and may be checking the safety status of the carrier at
the time of registration) but do not yet have the capability to affect vehicle
registrations; 8 states that have entered into an agreement with FMCSA to
implement PRISM grants but have not yet moved forward substantially to
implement the program; and 2 states that do not participate in PRISM at
all. (See table 2 for a list of state agencies we interviewed.) We selected
these states based on their progress implementing PRISM and their status
as states with the largest numbers of commercial vehicles registered
through the IRP in 2006, the latest year for which full data were available
at the time we selected states to interview. We reviewed FMCSA data
regarding the time states have taken to reach the ability to deny, suspend,
or revoke vehicle registrations of out-of-service carriers, after signing a
statement of intent to participate in the PRISM program. We analyzed
testimonial evidence to identify factors that enabled states to deny,
suspend, and revoke registrations and factors that have delayed or
prevented other states from moving forward. We also analyzed the
information to identify the factors FMCSA can affect and those it cannot.
As part of our work on the potential to implement the program nationally,
we conducted a general search of public policy literature for when a
mandatory or voluntary approach is preferred for program participation
and to achieve certain desired outcomes. Through our literature search,
which covered materials dating from 1998 to 2008, we identified and
analyzed five articles that listed conditions for when a mandatory or
voluntary approach works best. The articles described when a mandatory
or voluntary approach is preferable for implementing environmental,

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Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

animal production and processing, and food safety regulations on private
sector entities; we did not find literature that identified conditions for
when a federal agency should administer a mandatory or voluntary
approach on state governments to achieve a certain desired outcome.
Furthermore, we identified similar, comparative programs that have
mandatory elements. In addition, we identified and analyzed drawbacks to
mandating state implementation of PRISM and potential options available
to Congress for encouraging—rather than mandating—state legislative or
regulatory action that could speed nationwide PRISM implementation.
Finally, we assessed FMCSA’s oversight for those states that are denying,
suspending, and revoking registrations by obtaining testimonial
information on FMCSA’s efforts to assist them in continuing to operate
PRISM.
Table 2: State Agencies and Industry and Safety Associations Interviewed
States denying, suspending, or revoking vehicle registrations of out-of-service carriers
Alabama Department of Revenue
Alabama FMCSA Division Office
Georgia Department of Revenue
Georgia Department of Public Safety
Idaho Transportation Department
Iowa Department of Transportation
Iowa FMCSA Division Office
Minnesota Department of Public Safety
Minnesota FMCSA Division Office
Minnesota State Patrol, Commercial Vehicle Division
Missouri Department of Transportation
Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles
Nebraska State Patrol
New Mexico Commercial Vehicle Bureau, Taxation and Revenue Department
New Mexico Department of Public Safety
New Mexico FMCSA Division Office
North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles
North Carolina FMCSA Division Office
North Carolina State Highway Patrol
Ohio Department of Public Safety, Bureau of Motor Vehicles
Ohio Contractor, Affiliated Computer Services, Inc.
Ohio FMCSA Division Office
Ohio State Highway Patrol

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Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Tennessee Department of Revenue
Tennessee Department of Safety, Highway Patrol
Utah Division of Motor Vehicles
Utah Department of Public Safety, Highway Patrol
Washington Department of Licensing
Washington FMCSA Division Office
Washington State Patrol
States that implement PRISM but do not yet have capability to sanction vehicle registrations
Indiana FMCSA Division Office
Indiana Department of Revenue
Indiana State Police
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
Texas Department of Transportation
States committed to implementing PRISM
California Department of Motor Vehicles
California Highway Patrol
Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles
Illinois Office of the Secretary of State
Illinois FMCSA Division Office
Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles
Mississippi State Tax Commission
Oklahoma Corporation Commission, Transportation Division
Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles
Virginia State Police
Wisconsin Department of Transportation
States not participating in PRISM
Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration
Michigan Department of State
Industry associations
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators
American Trucking Associations
United Motorcoach Association
Safety associations
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety
Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance
Truck Safety Coalition
Source: GAO.

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Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
GAO Contact

Susan A. Fleming, (202) 512-2834 or [email protected].

Staff
Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, James Ratzenberger (Assistant
Director), Michelle Everett (Analyst-in-Charge), Samer Abbas, Brandon
Haller, Delwen Jones, Hannah Laufe, Joshua Ormond, and made key
contributions to this report.

(541043)

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