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Transfer and Advancement Act
(NTTAA) (15 U.S.C. 272 note).
XI. Congressional Review Act
Pursuant to the Congressional Review
Act (5 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), EPA will
submit a report containing this rule and
other required information to the U.S.
Senate, the U.S. House of
Representatives, and the Comptroller
General of the United States prior to
publication of the rule in the Federal
Register. This action is not a ‘‘major
rule’’ as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2).

List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 180
Environmental protection,
Administrative practice and procedure,
Agricultural commodities, Pesticides
and pests, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
Dated: March 12, 2015.
Susan Lewis,
Director, Registration Division, Office of
Pesticide Programs.

Therefore, 40 CFR chapter I is
amended as follows:
PART 180—[AMENDED]
1. The authority citation for part 180
continues to read as follows:

Authority: 21 U.S.C. 321(q), 346a and 371.

2. In § 180.960, the table is amended
by alphabetically adding an entry for ‘‘2Propenoic acid, polymer with ethenyl
acetate, ethenylbenzene, 2-ethylhexyl 2propenoate and ethyl 2-propenoate,
minimum number average molecular
weight (50,149 Daltons)’’ after the entry
for ‘‘2-propenoic acid polymer, with 1,3butadiene and ethenylbenzene,
minimum number average molecular
weight (in amu), 9400’’ to read as
follows:

■

§ 180.960 Polymers; exemptions from the
requirement of a tolerance.

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Polymer
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CAS No.
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2-Propenoic acid, polymer with ethenyl acetate, ethenylbenzene, 2-ethylhexyl 2-propenoate and ethyl 2-propenoate, minimum
number average molecular weight (50,149 Daltons) .......................................................................................................................
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[FR Doc. 2015–06227 Filed 3–17–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560–50–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
49 CFR Chapter II
[Railworthiness Directive, Notice No. 1]

Railworthiness Directive for Railroad
Tank Cars Equipped With Certain
McKenzie Valve & Machining LLC
Valves
Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of railworthiness
directive.
AGENCY:

Recent FRA investigations
identified several railroad tank cars
transporting hazardous materials and
leaking small quantities of product from
the cars’ liquid lines. FRA’s
investigation revealed that the liquid
lines of the leaking tank cars were
equipped with a certain type of 3″ ball
valve marketed and sold by McKenzie
Valve and Machining (McKenzie)
(formerly McKenzie Valve & Machining
Company), an affiliate company of
Union Tank Car Company (UTLX). FRA
further found certain closure plugs
installed on the 3″ valves cause
mechanical damage to the valves, which
leads to the destruction of the valves’
seal integrity and that the 3″ valves, as
well as similarly-designed 1″ and 2″
valves provided by this manufacturer
are not approved for use on tank cars.

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SUMMARY:

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FRA is issuing this Railworthiness
Directive (Directive) to all owners of
tank cars used to transport hazardous
materials within the United States to
ensure they identify and appropriately
remove and replace these valves with
approved valves consistent with Federal
regulations.
DATES: This Directive is effective March
18, 2015. This Directive is applicable
March 13, 2015.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl
Alexy, Staff Director, Hazardous
Materials Division, Office of Technical
Oversight, FRA, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590,
telephone (202) 493–6245; Karl.Alexy@
dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Recent
FRA investigations identified several
DOT Specification 111 railroad tank
cars transporting hazardous materials
and leaking small quantities of
product.1 One instance occurred during
the week of January 11, 2015, and
involved a train of 100 tank cars loaded
with crude oil being transported by
BNSF Railway (BNSF) from Tioga, ND,
1 DOT Specification 111 tank cars are general
purpose, nonpressure railroad tank cars commonly
used to transport a variety of regulated hazardous
materials, as well as nonregulated commodities. In
2011, through issuance of Casualty Prevention
Circular 1232, the Association of American
Railroads (AAR) adopted an industry standard
intended to improve the crashworthiness of DOT
Specification 111 tank cars used in crude oil and
ethanol service. These cars, known as CPC 1232
cars, include a thicker shell, head protection, top
fittings protection, and relief valves with a greater
flow capacity as compared to baseline DOT
Specification 111 cars. The leaking tank cars
identified in this Directive include both a baseline
DOT 111 Specification car and CPC–1232 cars.

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to a refinery in Anacortes, WA. BNSF
discovered 14 tank cars leaking crude
oil en route and in accordance with the
applicable regulations, notified FRA of
the releases. Upon discovery of the
defective condition of these cars, BNSF
removed the cars from the train (at
Hauser, ID; Vancouver and Auburn,
WA, respectively). When the train
arrived at its final destination in
Anacortes, the consignee, Tesoro
Refining, discovered two additional cars
leaking product. In all, BNSF and
Tesoro identified 16 leaking tank cars
from the original train consist.
On January 15, 2015, FRA inspected
seven of the identified leaking tank cars
that BNSF removed from the train in
Vancouver. The FRA inspector observed
crude oil on the sides of each of these
cars, and upon inspection of each tank
car’s top fittings, found product leaking
from the liquid line ball valves and
around each valve’s closure plug. FRA
also found the standalone closure plugs
in each of these valves loose. Further
inspection revealed that the valve balls
had visual signs of mechanical damage.
The mechanical damage FRA observed
indicated that the bottom face of the
closure plug came in contact with the
valve ball, consequentially preventing
complete engagement of the closure
plug.
A second instance involved a single
tank car loaded with mineral spirits (a
Class 3 flammable liquid) found leaking
on January 15, 2015, in a BNSF yard in
Denver, CO. FRA’s preliminary
investigation shows that the leak
occurred through the liquid line valve

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while the car was en route to its
destination.
UTLX owns all 17 of the cars found
leaking as described above. Each of the
leaking cars was configured with liquid
line ball valves sold by UTLX’s affiliate,
McKenzie, and each valve was
configured with a 3″ standalone plug as
a closure. FRA identified the leaking
valves as 3″ McKenzie UNNR threaded
ball valves (McKenzie valves).
McKenzie provided FRA several valve
configuration drawings indicating that
the valve was a full port valve. This
configuration requires a 3″ x 2″ reducer
bushing with a 2″ plug to prevent
contact between the closure plug and
the valve ball. McKenzie also informed
FRA that it markets and sells the same
design of valve in 1″ and 2″ models. For
the 2″ valve, McKenzie specified the use
of a 1″ plug and an appropriately sized
reducer.
At FRA’s request, UTLX provided
FRA drawings of the top fittings
arrangements for these cars. However,
unlike the drawings provided by
McKenzie, the UTLX drawings provided
by UTLX did not include a full port
valve with a reducer bushing. Instead,
consistent with the physical
configuration of the tank cars FRA
inspected, the drawings showed a full
port threaded valve along with a 3″ plug
and chain.
On January 27, 2015, FRA conducted
field testing of the McKenzie valves at
UTLX’s Altoona, PA, tank car repair
facility. FRA tested new 1″, 2″, and 3″
McKenzie valves at the facility’s valve
shop. The field testing included two
cycles of application and removal of
each valve’s plug. FRA found that the 1″
and 2″ McKenzie valves showed no
signs of contact between the valve ball
when a 1″ or 2″ closure plug was
installed and tightened. However, when
a 3″ closure plug was applied and
tightened in the 3″ McKenzie valve, the
plug contacted and damaged the ball.
The damage observed during this testing
was consistent with the type of damage
observed on the leaking UTLX tank cars
described above.
FRA’s field testing further found that
the application of downward force on
the valve ball applied by the 3″ plug
resulted in the over-compression,
damage, and misalignment of the
inboard seal, causing the valve to leak.
FRA also observed that once a valve’s
ball is damaged, when the valve is
subsequently opened, the damaged
surface of the ball also damaged the
valve’s top seals by tearing the seals.
This further compromises the valve’s
seal. Additionally, FRA understands
that with repeated opening and closing
(exemplifying in-service use), the

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valve’s threads will degrade,
necessitating further engagement of the
threads during subsequent applications
of the plug. This continual degradation
of the threads will require increasingly
more tightening of the plug,
exacerbating the damage to the ball and
seals. In summary, FRA found that
normal application and tightening of the
3″ plug in a 3″ McKenzie valve destroys
the valve seal integrity.
FRA conducted a followup
investigation at the UTLX facility in
Altoona to perform a leak test of the 3″
McKenzie valve that was field tested
and damaged on January 27, 2015.
Although the designed leak-free
working pressure of this valve is up to
500 pounds per square inch (psi), the
leak test procedure requires that the
valve hold a minimum pressure of 30
psi. The subject McKenzie valve failed
to retain the minimum 30 psi of
compressed air test pressure. The valve
showed signs of a significant leak.
As required by Title 49 Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) 179.100–13
and 179.200–16 of the Federal
Hazardous Materials Regulations (49
CFR parts 171–180; (HMR)), all valves
applied to tanks cars must be of an
approved design. The term ‘‘approved″
is defined in 49 CFR 179.2 as ‘‘approved
by the [AAR] Tank Car Committee.’’ 2
McKenzie provided FRA with the
Association of American Railroads
(AAR) approval letters for the McKenzie
valves. While McKenzie may have
believed these approvals were
sufficient, the provided AAR approvals
demonstrate clear inconsistencies
between the type of valve design that
AAR approved versus the design of the
valve actually being used and the design
depicted on the valve configuration
drawings both McKenzie and UTLX
provided to FRA. AAR Approval E–
077035 (October 26, 2007) is a renewal
of previous AAR approvals,3 and
describes a 3″ standard port threaded
ball valve. The original approvals that
AAR renewed described and referred to
UTLX Drawing 72916, which depicts a
2 As background, the Tank Car Committee is
composed of various railroad industry
representatives, including railroads, tank car
shipper and owner organizations, tank car builders,
and chemical and industry associations. FRA and
the DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration also participate in the Tank Car
Committee’s processes. The Tank Car Committee
has traditionally been the body with the expertise
to develop tank car design, construction, and
maintenance standards in this country. DOT sets
minimum tank car specifications at 49 CFR part
179, and AAR approves designs meeting the
requirements of part 179.
3 AAR Approval E–977030 (April 9, 1997). AAR
Approval E–977030 was a renewal of AAR
Approval E–897047 (June 21, 1989), which also
referred to UTLX Drawing 72916.

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3″ standard port threaded ball valve. In
contrast, the 3″ McKenzie valve at issue
is a full port ball valve. A full port valve
is different from a standard port valve.4
The dimensions of the valve body that
AAR approved is significantly longer
than the bodies of the valves depicted
on the McKenzie drawings and the
bodies of the valves actually installed
on the leaking tank cars. McKenzie also
provided a copy of a September 29,
2008, application for approval of a 3″
threaded full port valve (AAR
application number E–087016), but
neither McKenzie nor AAR have
provided evidence of that valve’s
subsequent approval.
McKenzie provided information to
FRA indicating that from 2009 through
the present, it sold approximately
11,200 of the 3″ valves to a variety of
tank car owners and tank car facilities.
McKenzie indicates that since 2012, its
sales of these valves were
predominantly to replace in-kind valves
previously installed on existing tank
cars. Further, McKenzie informed FRA
that as of January 26, 2015, the company
has stopped selling the 3″ valves as a
result of the noted safety concerns.
Overall, McKenzie and UTLX provided
information leading FRA to conclude
that approximately 6,000 DOT
Specification railroad tank cars are
equipped with the unapproved 3″
McKenzie UNNR valves. In addition,
McKenzie indicates that it has sold over
37,000 1″ and 2″ valves to a variety of
tank car owners and tank car facilities.
To date, FRA has identified only a
small number of relatively minor
hazardous materials leaks directly
attributable to the identified McKenzie
valves. FRA believes that the number of
leaks potentially attributable to the
identified McKenzie valves used in tank
car liquid lines could be much higher.
Based on FRA’s field testing, the 3″
McKenzie valve appears to present an
immediate safety issue in certain
circumstances. While the 1″ and 2″
McKenzie valves do not appear to
present similar concerns, based on the
information that AAR, McKenzie, and
UTLX have provided to date, it does not
appear that any size of the McKenzie
valves (i.e., the 1″, 2″, or 3″ UNNR
valves) are currently approved for use
4 The difference between a full port and standard
port ball valve is the size of the ball’s bore diameter
as related to nominal pipe sizes, with the ball size
being in proportion to the bore size diameter. The
bore size in a full port valve is that of its nominal
pipe size, where the bore size in a standard port
valve is that of the next smallest nominal pipe size.
For example, the bore diameter for a 3″ standard
port ball valve is approximately 2.25″, or one pipe
size smaller, and for a full port ball valve, the bore
diameter is approximately 3″ in diameter (the actual
size of the pipe).

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on railroad tank cars. Accordingly, use
of such valves on tank cars is in
violation of the HMR. At this time, FRA
is not aware of any non-accident
releases or other releases from railroad
tank cars involving the 1″ or 2″
McKenzie valves, but since the valves
have not been approved by AAR they
have not been shown to be safe for use
on railroad tank cars.
McKenzie and UTLX have taken
independent actions to address some of
the safety concerns with the 3″ valves.
However, FRA believes those actions
fail to adequately address the safety
issue the valves present.
Railworthiness Directive: Based on the
above discussion, and acting under the
authority granted in 49 CFR
180.509(b)(4), FRA finds that the
continued use of railroad tank cars
equipped with the unapproved
McKenzie UNNR threaded ball valves
(including the 1″, 2″, and 3″ UNNR
valves) to transport hazardous materials
by rail in the United States presents an
unsafe operating condition. The use of
such tank cars equipped with these
valves could result in the release of
hazardous materials. Further, the use of
tank cars equipped with these McKenzie
valves used to transport hazardous
materials in the United States violates
the requirements of the HMR. FRA is
issuing this directive to ensure public
safety, ensure compliance with the
applicable Federal regulations
governing the safe movement of
hazardous materials by rail, and restore
the railworthiness of all tank cars
equipped with the above-described
McKenzie valves.
Upon the applicability date of this
Directive, any railroad tank car
equipped with an unapproved
McKenzie UNNR threaded ball valve
(McKenzie valve) is prohibited from
being loaded with any hazardous
material described in 49 CFR 172.101
and offered into transportation until the
requirements listed below are met. Tank

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car owners 5 of tank cars equipped with
McKenzie valves must:
(1) Identify the railroad tank cars in
their fleet equipped with any McKenzie
valve.
(2) Provide to FRA: (a) The reporting
mark and number of each car equipped
with any McKenzie valve; and (b) the
type of valve each car is equipped with.
(3) Create and maintain for a
minimum of 6 months from the
applicability date of this directive a
record of the inspection of each
McKenzie valve. The record must
include, at a minimum, the inspection
date and location, as well as the results
of the inspection (i.e., whether the valve
was removed or not). The record must
be made available to FRA for inspection
upon request.
(4) Immediately inspect the 3″
McKenzie valves on each affected car. If
any valve is configured with a 3″
standalone plug, ensure that the car is
not loaded and offered into
transportation until that valve is
replaced with an approved valve
consistent with 49 CFR part 179. In
addition, any tank car equipped with an
unapproved 3″ McKenzie valve is
prohibited from being offered into
transportation (whether loaded or
residue) after May 12, 2015.
(5) Immediately inspect the 1″ and 2″
McKenzie valves on each affected car. If
any valve shows evidence of mechanical
damage, ensure that the car is not
loaded and offered into transportation
until that valve is replaced with an
approved valve consistent with 49 CFR
part 179. Even if a valve is not damaged,
a tank car equipped with an unapproved
1″ or 2″ McKenzie valve is prohibited
from being offered into transportation
(whether loaded or residue) after June
11, 2015.
(6) Ensure that each unapproved
McKenzie valve is removed and
5 The term ‘‘tank car owners’’ is as defined in 49
CFR 180.503.

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replaced by an entity permitted to
perform such work in accordance with
49 CFR part 179.
(7) Ensure the valve application is
properly qualified as required by
subpart F of 49 CFR part 180.
After tank car owners have inspected
and/or replaced the unapproved valves
on each affected tank car as required
above, and have provided the necessary
information regarding that car to FRA,
tank car owners may load the cars with
hazardous materials and offer those cars
for transportation. Alternatively, if upon
an adequate showing demonstrating the
safety of the 1″ and 2″ valves, McKenzie
obtains AAR’s approval for the use of
those valves on DOT Specification 111
tank cars, cars equipped with these 1″
or 2″ McKenzie valves may be returned
to hazardous materials service.
Tank car owners must send the
information required to be submitted to
FRA under this Directive to:
Mr. Randy M. Keltz, Jr., Tank Car
Quality Assurance Specialist, Office of
Railroad Safety, Federal Railroad
Administration, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590,
Telephone: (202) 236–7460, Email:
[email protected].
Regardless of any entity’s compliance
with this directive, FRA reserves the
right to seek civil penalties or to take
any other appropriate enforcement
action for violations of the HMR that
have occurred. FRA will be conducting
an investigation to ensure that all tank
cars equipped with the valves in
question are identified and repaired
consistent with the requirements of this
Directive.
Issued in Washington, DC, on March 13,
2015.
Robert C. Lauby,
Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety,
Chief Safety Officer.
[FR Doc. 2015–06213 Filed 3–17–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–06–P

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