FRA Emergency Order No. 31, Notice No. 1

30534

Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 102 / Thursday, May 28, 2015 / Notices

information collection, including: (1)
Whether the proposed collection is
necessary for the FMCSA’s performance
of functions; (2) the accuracy of the
estimated burden; (3) ways for the
FMCSA to enhance the quality,
usefulness, and clarity of the collected
information; and (4) ways that the
burden could be minimized without
reducing the quality of the collected
information. The agency will summarize
or include your comments in the request
for OMB’s clearance of this information
collection.
Issued under the authority of 49 CFR 1.87
on: May 18, 2015.
G. Kelly Regal,
Associate Administrator for Office of
Research and Information Technology.
[FR Doc. 2015–12855 Filed 5–27–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–EX–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
[Emergency Order No. 31, Notice No. 1]

Emergency Order Under 49 U.S.C.
20104 Establishing Requirements for
the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation To Control Passenger
Train Speeds at Certain Locations
Along the Northeast Corridor
FRA is issuing this emergency
order (EO or Order) to require that the
National Railroad Passenger Corporation
(Amtrak) take actions to control
passenger train speed at certain
locations on main line track in the
Northeast Corridor (as described by 49
U.S.C. 24905(c)(1)(A)). Amtrak must
immediately implement code changes to
its Automatic Train Control (ATC)
System to enforce the passenger train
speed limit ahead of the curve at
Frankford Junction in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, where a fatal accident
occurred on May 12, 2015. Amtrak must
also identify each main track curve on
the Northeast Corridor where there is a
significant reduction (more than 20
miles per hour (mph)) from the
maximum authorized approach speed to
those curves for passenger trains.
Amtrak must then develop and comply
with an FRA-approved action plan to
modify its existing ATC System or other
signal systems (or take alternative
operational actions) to enable
enforcement of passenger train speed
limits at the identified curves. Amtrak
must also install additional wayside
passenger train speed limit signage at
appropriate locations on its Northeast
Corridor right-of-way.

asabaliauskas on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES

SUMMARY:

VerDate Sep<11>2014

18:18 May 27, 2015

Jkt 235001

Ron
Hynes, Director, Office of Safety
Assurance and Compliance, Office of
Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590,
telephone (202) 493–6404; Joseph St.
Peter, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief
Counsel, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue
SE., Washington, DC 20590, telephone
(202) 493–6047, [email protected];
or Matthew Navarrete, Trial Attorney,
Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC
20590, telephone (202) 493–0138,
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Introduction
FRA has determined that public safety
compels issuance of this EO. This
determination is made in light of the
Amtrak train derailment that occurred
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on May
12, 2015, in which eight persons were
killed and a significant number of others
were seriously injured. While the cause
of the accident has not yet been
determined, preliminary investigation
into this derailment indicates the train
was traveling approximately 106 mph
on a curve where the maximum
authorized passenger train speed is 50
mph. This was a serious overspeed
event and FRA has concluded that
additional action is necessary in the
form of this EO to eliminate an
immediate hazard of death, personal
injury, or significant harm to the
environment.
Authority
Authority to enforce Federal railroad
safety laws has been delegated by the
Secretary of Transportation to the
Administrator of FRA. 49 CFR 1.89 and
internal delegations. Railroads are
subject to FRA’s safety jurisdiction
under the Federal railroad safety laws.
49 U.S.C. 20101, 20103. FRA is
authorized to issue emergency orders
where an unsafe condition or practice
‘‘causes an emergency situation
involving a hazard of death, personal
injury, or significant harm to the
environment.’’ 49 U.S.C. 20104. These
orders may immediately impose
‘‘restrictions and prohibitions . . . that
may be necessary to abate the
situation.’’ Id.
Amtrak Derailment
On Tuesday, May 12, 2015, Amtrak
passenger train 188 (Train 188) was
traveling timetable east (northbound)
from Washington, DC, to New York City.
Aboard the train were five crew
members and approximately 238
passengers. Train 188 consisted of a
conventional set-up with a locomotive

PO 00000

Frm 00104

Fmt 4703

Sfmt 4703

in the lead and seven passenger cars
trailing. Shortly after 9:20 p.m., the train
derailed while traveling through a curve
in the track at Frankford Junction in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. As a result
of the accident, eight people were
killed, and a significant number of
people were seriously injured.
The National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) has taken the lead role
conducting the investigation of this
accident under its legal authority. 49
U.S.C. 1101 et seq.; 49 CFR 800.3(a) and
831.2(b). As is customary, FRA is
participating in the NTSB’s
investigation and also investigating the
accident under its own authority. While
NTSB has not yet issued any formal
findings, the information it has released
makes it obvious that train speed was a
likely factor in the derailment. As Train
188 approached the curve from the
west, it traveled over a straightaway
with a maximum authorized passenger
train speed of 80 mph. The maximum
authorized passenger train speed for the
curve was 50 mph. NTSB determined
that the train was traveling
approximately 106 mph within the
curve’s 50-mph speed restriction,
exceeding the maximum authorized
speed on the straightaway by 26 mph,
and 56 mph over railroad’s maximum
authorized speed for the curve.1 NTSB
also determined the locomotive
engineer operating the train made an
emergency application of Train 188’s air
brake system, and the train slowed to
approximately 102 mph before derailing
in the curve.
2013 Metro-North Derailment
Upon evaluating the Amtrak accident
described above, FRA found similarities
to an accident that occurred in
December 2013, on the New York State
Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s
Metro-North Commuter Railroad
Company (Metro-North) track. The
Metro-North accident was the subject of
FRA’s Emergency Order No. 29. 78 FR
75442, Dec. 11, 2013. That accident
occurred when a Metro-North passenger
train was traveling south toward Grand
Central Terminal in New York City. The
train traveled over a straightaway with
a maximum authorized passenger train
speed of 70 mph before reaching a sharp
curve in the track with a maximum
authorized speed of 30 mph. NTSB’s
investigation of the Metro-North
accident determined the train was
traveling approximately 82 mph as it
entered the curve’s 30-mph speed
1 FRA regulations provide, in part, that it is
unlawful to ‘‘[o]perate a train or locomotive at a
speed which exceeds the maximum authorized
limit by at least 10 miles per hour.’’ 49 CFR
240.305(a)(2).

E:\FR\FM\28MYN1.SGM

28MYN1

Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 102 / Thursday, May 28, 2015 / Notices

asabaliauskas on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES

restriction before derailing. That
derailment resulted in four fatalities and
at least 61 persons being injured.
Overspeed Protections
Amtrak’s passenger trains are
normally operated with only one
crewmember in the cab of a passenger
train’s locomotive. Amtrak’s controlling
locomotives are typically equipped with
an alerter to help ensure the
attentiveness of the locomotive engineer
operating the train. Amtrak’s locomotive
controls and its signal systems also
incorporate an ATC System, which is a
train speed control system where trains
are automatically slowed or stopped if
a locomotive engineer fails to comply
with signal indication or is otherwise
unable to take action to slow a train.
The ATC system is used to enforce
compliance with certain signal
indications in a particular territory, but
it is not typically used to enforce civil
passenger train speed restrictions that
are below the maximum authorized
operating speed for the broader territory.
However, Amtrak’s ATC System is
capable of being used in a manner to
enforce civil speed restrictions that are
below the maximum authorized
operating speed in some situations. This
is accomplished by installing a code
change point at or near the location
where the speed restriction is to be
enforced. As mentioned above, Amtrak’s
existing ATC System is not currently
coded to slow trains to comply with
applicable speed limits in all
circumstances, and such coding may not
be operationally feasible in all
instances.2 As demonstrated by the May
12, 2015, accident, if a locomotive
engineer fails to take action to slow a
train when approaching such a speed
restriction, currently, Amtrak’s ATC
System will not slow the train to
comply with the required speed
reduction.
In light of the May 12 derailment that
is the subject of this Order, and in an
effort to immediately prevent similar
incidents from occurring that could
result in an emergency situation
involving a hazard of death, personal
injury, or significant harm to the
environment, in this Order FRA is
requiring Amtrak take certain
immediate actions. First, FRA is
ordering Amtrak to implement code
changes to its ATC System near the
Frankford Junction curve in
Philadelphia where the May 12 accident
occurred in the timetable east
2 FRA understands that on the date of the
accident the ATC system enforced the curve’s speed
restriction for the timetable west (southbound)
trains at this curve but not for the timetable east
(northbound) trains.

VerDate Sep<11>2014

18:18 May 27, 2015

Jkt 235001

(northbound) direction. The changes
implemented must provide enforcement
of the relevant passenger train speed
limit of 50 mph for passenger trains
approaching that curve. Amtrak has
already completed actions to implement
such changes.
Next, Amtrak must identify all other
main track curves on the Northeast
Corridor where there is a significant
reduction (more than 20 mph) in the
authorized passenger train approach
speed upon the approach to those
curves. After identifying such curves,
Amtrak must develop and submit to
FRA for review and approval an action
plan to make appropriate code
modifications to its existing ATC
System or other signal systems to enable
warning and enforcement of relevant
passenger train speed restrictions. This
requirement does not apply to portions
of the Northeast Corridor where
Amtrak’s operations are governed by a
Positive Train Control (PTC) system that
is in use. To the extent that other
railroads operate passenger trains at the
same maximum authorized speeds as
Amtrak in the curves affected by this
Order, the modifications Amtrak makes
to its ATC System or signal systems
must also enforce the relevant speed
restrictions for those trains.
If such code changes at identified
curves will interfere with the timely
implementation of PTC or are otherwise
not viable, Amtrak must identify other
actions it will take to ensure compliance
with speed reductions (e.g., a procedure
whereby a locomotive engineer and a
second qualified employee
communicate via radio ahead of
relevant speed reductions, and where
the second qualified employee may
make an emergency brake application to
slow the train if the locomotive engineer
fails to do so). These alternative
operational actions must be described in
Amtrak’s action plan submitted to FRA
for approval. In addition, any alternative
operational actions Amtrak adopts to
ensure compliance with speed
restrictions at identified curve locations
on the Northeast Corridor also apply to
passenger trains operated by other
railroads at those curve locations.
FRA notes that other railroads have
coded their ATC systems to prevent
overspeed events from occurring at
locations where there are civil or other
speed restrictions. FRA’s Emergency
Order No. 29, issued after the December
2013 accident discussed above, required
Metro-North to take similar actions in
response to that accident. FRA is
ordering Amtrak to take similar steps to
prevent accidents similar to the May 12,
2015, accident from occurring in the
future if a locomotive engineer fails (or

PO 00000

Frm 00105

Fmt 4703

Sfmt 4703

30535

is otherwise unable) to take action to
appropriately slow or stop a passenger
train.
In addition to the above requirements,
Amtrak must also enhance speed
restriction signage along its rights-ofway on the Northeast Corridor. Amtrak
must identify in the action plan it
submits to FRA the locations at which
it intends to install such additional
signage, and provide notice to FRA
when such additional signage has been
installed. Increasing the amount and
frequency of signage provides a
redundant means to remind engineers
and conductors of the authorized speed,
in addition to information they receive
from the ATC System and operational
documents such as timetable or bulletin.
FRA recognizes that Amtrak has been
diligent in implementing PTC on the
Northeast Corridor by December 31,
2015, as required by section 104 of the
Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008.
(Pub. L. 110–432, Division A, 122 Stat.
4848, 4856 (49 U.S.C. 20157)). Amtrak
has indicated that it intends to meet the
RSIA’s statutory deadline to install PTC
on the Northeast Corridor. Once in use,
the PTC system will enforce the speed
restriction at the curve where the May
12, 2015, accident occurred, but the
interim action of implementing the code
change in the ATC System, as required
by this EO, will provide overspeed
derailment protection until the PTC
system is in use. As discussed above,
Amtrak has already taken action to
enforce appropriate passenger train
speed limits near the curve where the
May 12, 2015, accident occurred prior to
its resumption of passenger train
service, and plans to take similar actions
at certain other locations on the
Northeast Corridor. Amtrak also has
stated it intends to increase radar
checks, locomotive event recorder
downloads, and efficiency tests aimed at
ensuring compliance with relevant
speed restrictions. Finally, Amtrak
intends to hold listening sessions with
its employees to learn about, and
address, any additional safety concerns.
Nonetheless, due to the significant
safety concerns presented by the May
12, 2015, accident, FRA believes
immediate enforceable action is
necessary to address the emergency
situation that contributed to that
derailment. FRA will continue to review
additional actions to address safety
concerns on the Nation’s passenger rail
systems as its investigation into the May
12, 2015, derailment continues. FRA
will revisit the necessity of the
requirements in this Order upon
reviewing Amtrak’s actions taken to
comply with the EO, or upon PTC
systems governing Amtrak’s operations

E:\FR\FM\28MYN1.SGM

28MYN1

30536

Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 102 / Thursday, May 28, 2015 / Notices

asabaliauskas on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES

on the Northeast Corridor becoming
operative.
Finding and Order
FRA recognizes that passenger rail
transportation is generally extremely
safe. However, FRA finds that the recent
May 12, 2015, accident on Amtrak, and
the lack of overspeed protections in
place at certain locations on Amtrak’s
system, create an emergency situation
involving a hazard of death, personal
injury, or significant harm to the
environment. Accordingly, under the
authority of 49 U.S.C. 20104, delegated
to the Administrator of FRA by the
Secretary of Transportation, 49 CFR 1.89
and internal delegations, it is hereby
ordered that:
1. Amtrak must immediately
implement code changes to its ATC
System or other signal systems near the
Frankford Junction curve in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania where the
fatal May 12, 2015, accident occurred.
The changes must enforce the passenger
train speed limit of 50 mph for timetable
east (northbound) trains approaching
that curve.
2. Amtrak must survey its main line
track system located on the Northeast
Corridor (as described by 49 U.S.C.
24905(c)(1)(A)) and identify each main
track curve where there is a reduction
of more than 20 mph from the
maximum authorized approach speed to
that curve for passenger trains, and
provide a list of each location to the
FRA Associate Administrator for
Railroad Safety and Chief Safety Officer
(Associate Administrator) within 5 days
of the date of this Order. For purposes
of compliance with this Order, the
speed reductions of more than 20 mph
that existed on the date of the issuance
of this Order apply.
3. After identifying the curves above,
Amtrak shall develop and submit to
FRA for approval an action plan that
accomplishes each of the following:
a. Identifies appropriate modifications
to Amtrak’s existing ATC System or
other signal systems that Amtrak will
make to enable warning and
enforcement of applicable passenger
train speeds at the identified curves. If
such coding changes will interfere with
the timely implementation of a PTC
system or are not otherwise feasible,
Amtrak’s plan must describe why such
changes are not feasible and may
describe alternative operating
procedures that it will adopt at the
identified curves to ensure compliance
with applicable speed reductions.
b. Contains milestones and target
dates for implementing each identified
modification to Amtrak’s existing ATC
System or other signal systems (or

VerDate Sep<11>2014

18:18 May 27, 2015

Jkt 235001

alternative operational changes) to
enable warning and enforcement of
passenger train speeds at the identified
curves.
4. Amtrak must submit the action
plan to the Associate Administrator
within 20 days of the date of this Order.
FRA will review and approve, approve
with conditions, or disapprove Amtrak’s
action plan within 15 days of the plan’s
submission to FRA. Once FRA approves
its action plan, Amtrak must make all
identified modifications to the existing
ATC System or other signal systems (or
alternative operational changes) in the
timeframes and manner that complies
with all conditions FRA places on its
approval of Amtrak’s action plan.
5. As soon as possible, but not later
than 30 days after the date of this Order,
Amtrak must begin to install additional
wayside signage alerting engineers and
conductors of the maximum authorized
passenger train speed throughout its
Northeast Corridor system, with
particular emphasis on additional
signage at the curve locations where
speed reductions implicated by this
Order must occur. Amtrak must identify
the locations where it intends to install
the additional wayside speed limit signs
in the action plan submitted under
paragraphs 3 and 4 above, and must
notify the Associate Administrator upon
the completion of the installation of
those signs.
Nothing in this Order precludes FRA
from using any of the other enforcement
tools available to the agency under its
regulatory authority to address noncompliance with the Federal railroad
safety laws, regulations, and orders by
Amtrak. If necessary, FRA may issue
additional emergency orders or
compliance orders, impose civil
penalties against Amtrak (including
individuals who may be liable for civil
penalties for willful violations of the
Federal railroad safety laws and
regulations), or disqualify individuals
from performing safety-sensitive
functions.
Relief

Frm 00106

Penalties
Any violation of this EO shall subject
the person committing the violation to
a civil penalty of up to $105,000. 49
U.S.C. 21301. Any individual who
willfully violates a provision stated in
this order is subject to civil penalties
under 49 U.S.C. 21301. In addition, any
individual whose violation of this order
demonstrates the individual’s unfitness
for safety-sensitive service may be
removed from safety-sensitive service
on the railroad under 49 U.S.C. 20111.
If appropriate, FRA may pursue
criminal penalties under 49 U.S.C.
522(a) and 49 U.S.C. 21311(a), as well
as 18 U.S.C. 1001, for the knowing and
willful falsification of a report required
by this Order. FRA may, through the
Attorney General, also seek injunctive
relief to enforce this Order. 49 U.S.C.
20112.
Effective Date and Notice to Affected
Persons
This EO is effective upon Amtrak’s
receipt of an electronic copy, and
Amtrak shall immediately initiate steps
to implement this Order to comply with
the Order’s deadlines.
Review
Opportunity for formal review of this
EO will be provided under 49 U.S.C.
20104(b) and 5 U.S.C. 554.
Administrative procedures governing
such review are at 49 CFR part 211. See
49 CFR 211.47, 211.71, 211.73, 211.75,
and 211.77.
Issued in Washington, DC, on May 21,
2015.
Sarah Feinberg,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2015–12774 Filed 5–27–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–06–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
[Docket No. FRA–2015–0007–N–15]

Amtrak, or any other passenger
railroad affected by this Order, may
petition for special approval to take
actions not in accordance with this EO.
Petitions must be submitted to the
Associate Administrator, who is
authorized to act on those requests
without amending this EO. In reviewing
any petition for special review, the
Associate Administrator shall grant
petitions only if the petitioner has
clearly articulated an alternative action
that will provide, in the Associate
Administrator’s judgment, at least a

PO 00000

level of safety equivalent to that
provided by compliance with this EO.

Fmt 4703

Sfmt 4703

Agency Request for Emergency
Processing of Collection of
Information by the Office of
Management and Budget
Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), United States
Department of Transportation (USDOT).
ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:

FRA hereby gives notice that
it is submitting the following
Information Collection request (ICR) to
the Office of Management and Budget

SUMMARY:

E:\FR\FM\28MYN1.SGM

28MYN1