60 Day Federal Register Notice

Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 93 / Friday, May 13, 2016 / Notices
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
[Docket No. PHMSA–2015–0205]

Pipeline Safety: Information Collection
Activities
Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice and request for
comments.
AGENCY:

In accordance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,
PHMSA invites comments on proposed
revisions to the following incident and
accident report forms and associated
instructions currently under OMB
Control No. 2137–0522:
• PHMSA F 7100.1 Incident
Report—Gas Distribution System.
• PHMSA F 7100.2 Incident
Report—Natural and Other Gas
Transmission and Gathering Pipeline
Systems.
• PHMSA F 7100.3 Incident
Report—Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)
Facilities.
PHMSA also intends to request a new
Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) Control Number to cover the
collection of these forms.
PHMSA also proposes revisions be
made to the following form currently
under OMB Control No. 2137–0047;
Accident Report—Hazardous Liquid
Pipeline Systems.
DATES: Interested persons are invited to
submit comments on or before July 12,
2016.
ADDRESSES: Comments may be
submitted in the following ways:
E-Gov Web site: http://
www.regulations.gov. This site allows
the public to enter comments on any
Federal Register notice issued by any
agency.
Fax: 1–202–493–2251.
Mail: Docket Management Facility;
U.S. Department of Transportation
(DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
West Building, Room W12–140,
Washington, DC 20590–0001.
Hand Delivery: Room W12–140 on the
ground level of DOT, West Building,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC, between 9:00 a.m. and
5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.
Instructions: Identify the docket
number, PHMSA–2015–0205 at the
beginning of your comments. Note that
all comments received will be posted
without change to http://
www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information provided. You
should know that anyone is able to
search the electronic form of all

mstockstill on DSK3G9T082PROD with NOTICES

SUMMARY:

VerDate Sep<11>2014

18:05 May 12, 2016

Jkt 238001

comments received into any of our
dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the
comment, if submitted on behalf of an
association, business, labor union, etc.).
Therefore, you may want to review
DOT’s complete Privacy Act Statement
in the Federal Register published on
April 11, 2000, (65 FR 19477) or visit
http://www.regulations.gov before
submitting any such comments.
Docket: For access to the docket or to
read background documents or
comments, go to http://
www.regulations.gov at any time or to
Room W12–140 on the ground level of
DOT, West Building, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between
9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
If you wish to receive confirmation of
receipt of your written comments,
please include a self-addressed,
stamped postcard with the following
statement: ‘‘Comments on: PHMSA–
2015–0205.’’ The Docket Clerk will date
stamp the postcard prior to returning it
to you via the U.S. mail. Please note that
due to delays in the delivery of U.S.
mail to Federal offices in Washington,
DC, we recommend that persons
consider an alternative method
(internet, fax, or professional delivery
service) of submitting comments to the
docket and ensuring their timely receipt
at DOT.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Angela Dow by telephone at 202–366–
1246, by email at [email protected],
by fax at 202–366–4566, or by mail at
DOT, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue
SE., PHP–30, Washington, DC 20590–
0001.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
Section 1320.8(d), Title 5, Code of
Federal Regulations, requires PHMSA to
provide interested members of the
public and affected entities an
opportunity to comment on information
collection and recordkeeping requests.
This notice identifies proposed changes
to information collections that PHMSA
will submit to OMB for approval. In
order to streamline and improve the
data collection processes, PHMSA is
revising the incident report forms for
both hazardous liquid and natural gas
operators.
OMB Control Number 2137–0047,
which covers the collection of
hazardous liquid incident data, expires
on December 31, 2016. OMB Control
Number 2137–0522, which currently
covers the collection of both annual
report and incident data for natural gas
operators, expires on October 31, 2017.

PO 00000

Frm 00112

Fmt 4703

Sfmt 4703

29943

To simplify the renewal process of these
data collections in the future, PHMSA
proposes collecting incident and annual
reports under separate OMB control
numbers. To achieve this, PHMSA plans
to request a new OMB control number
for the three gas incident forms
currently under OMB Control No. 2137–
0522. The remaining reports under this
information collection, the Gas
Transmission, LNG, and Mechanical
Fitting Failure annual reports will
remain under their current OMB control
number.
A. PHMSA F 7100.1 Incident Report—
Gas Distribution System
PHMSA proposes to reorganize the
existing questions and add more
detailed questions about incident
response, incident consequences,
operating conditions, cause, and
contributing factors.
1. Time Zone and Daylight Savings
PHMSA proposes adding the time
zone and daylight savings status at the
location and time of the incident. This
data would help PHMSA correlate our
incident investigation findings with the
form.
2. Remove ‘‘Incident Resulted From’’
Question
PHMSA proposes removing the
question which prompts operators to
characterize an incident as an
unintentional release, intentional
release, or no release. The data we
collect on the form is sufficient to
answer this question. This change
would reduce redundancies on the
form.
3. Volume Released
PHMSA proposes dividing reports of
volume released into categories of
‘‘unintentional’’ and ‘‘intentional’’.
During incident response, operators
often intentionally release gas from the
pipeline system to reduce the pressure
remaining within the pipeline. This
change would allow stakeholders to
understand the volume released both
before and after the operator begins
responding to the incident.
4. Part A Reorganization and Detailed
Questions About Incident Response
PHMSA proposes reorganizing the
existing questions to reflect the
sequence of operator actions and events
that take place during an incident
response. For example, the manner in
which an operator first learns of a
pipeline failure is currently collected in
Part E. PHMSA proposes to move this
item to Part A. PHMSA also proposes to
add new data fields to help build a

E:\FR\FM\13MYN1.SGM

13MYN1

29944

Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 93 / Friday, May 13, 2016 / Notices

complete timeline of events. This
includes adding fields to collect data on
operators’ interactions with emergency
responders and details about ignition.
This data would help stakeholders
develop a more thorough understanding
of the incident.
5. Multiple National Response Center
Reports
The vast majority of pipeline
incidents have only one National
Response Center (NRC) report. However,
during a response to protracted
incidents, pipeline operators may
submit multiple reports to the NRC. In
these rare instances, PHMSA proposes
to collect each NRC report number. This
change would help PHMSA ensure that
our incident report data correlates with
our incident investigation findings.
6. Flow Control Instead of Shutdown
PHMSA proposes removing questions
about a pipeline shutdown and adding
a question about methods of flow
control. Gas distribution systems are
typically the only source of gas to
customers. Rather than shutting down
gas distribution systems, pipeline
operators typically control the flow of
gas in the smallest possible portion of
the system. This change would allow
stakeholders to understand the actions
taken by the operator to control the flow
of gas during incident response.
7. Area of Incident Selections
PHMSA proposes adding ‘‘exposed
due to loss of cover’’ as an option to
describe the area of an incident when
‘‘underground’’ is selected. For
pipelines installed underground and
eventually exposed, the current form is
not clear about whether ‘‘underground’’
or ‘‘above ground’’ should be selected.
Adding ‘‘exposed due to loss of cover’’
as an underground option will clarify
how to report the incident. This change
would improve the consistency of
reports.

mstockstill on DSK3G9T082PROD with NOTICES

8. Other Underground Facilities
PHMSA proposes adding a question
to determine whether other
underground facilities are found within
twelve inches of the failure location. We
know from experience that other
underground facilities can damage
pipeline systems. The most common
cause of this damage is electrical arcing
from electric facilities to gas systems.
Generally, twelve inches of
underground separation is considered
adequate to prevent damage from nonpipeline facilities. This change would
allow stakeholders to verify if twelve
inches of separation is adequate.

VerDate Sep<11>2014

18:05 May 12, 2016

Jkt 238001

9. Water Crossing Details
PHMSA proposes to collect additional
data regarding water crossings. This
data would help stakeholders
understand the failure location along
the crossing.
10. Part of System and Age of Failed
Item
PHMSA proposes to modify the
selections used to describe the part of
the system responsible for a pipeline
failure. These modifications would
reduce the number of times ‘‘other’’ is
selected and allow a more meaningful
analysis of the data.
PHMSA also proposes collecting both
the date of manufacture and the date of
installation for the failed item. This
would allow stakeholders to understand
both the age of the failed item and how
long it had been in service.
11. Service Line Excess Flow and ShutOff Valves
PHMSA proposes adding questions
about Excess Flow Valves (EFV) and
shut-off valves when the failure occurs
on the service line. Our regulations
require EFVs in certain circumstances
and shut-off valves on all service lines.
The collection of this data would help
PHMSA address the requirements in
Section 22 of the Pipeline Safety,
Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation
Act of 2011 (Pub. L. 112–90) which
requires EFVs on service lines serving a
single-family residence. It would also
help to implement the National
Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB)
recommendation P–01–2 which urges
the installation of EFVs on branch
services, multi-family facility services,
and small commercial facility services.
The proposed change would help
stakeholders determine if EFV
requirements are adequate and effective.
12. Cost of Gas
PHMSA proposes to collect the cost of
gas per million standard cubic feet (mcf)
in order to calculate the cost of gas
released. Currently, the form collects the
volume of gas released and the cost of
the gas released. The cost per mcf in our
current incident data ranges from cents
to hundreds of dollars. By providing the
gas cost per mcf, operators will achieve
greater accuracy when converting the
per mcf gas cost to released gas costs.
13. Details About Consequences
Our departmental guidelines for
determining the benefit of proposed
regulations (http://
www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.dev/
files/docs/
VSL%20Guidance%202013.pdf)
includes a table of relative values based

PO 00000

Frm 00113

Fmt 4703

Sfmt 4703

on injury severity. Our forms currently
collect the number of injured persons
requiring in-patient, overnight
hospitalization. We propose adding two
less severe categories to the forms. This
data would enable a more thorough
determination of the benefits of
proposed regulations.
We are proposing to collect the
volume of product consumed by fire.
We already collect data about the
volume of product released and whether
ignition occurred. However, we cannot
identify the volume of product burned.
This data would allow us to more
accurately determine the social cost of
carbon and benefit of proposed
regulations.
We are proposing to collect the
number of buildings affected by the
incident. On the current forms, the
property damage values do not include
any details about the type of property
damaged. This data would provide more
details about the consequences of the
incident and enable a more thorough
determination of the benefit of proposed
regulations.
We propose collecting data about the
length of building evacuations. On the
current form, we collect the number of
persons evacuated from buildings. To
implement DOT guidelines (http://
www.transportation.gov/office-policy/
transportation-policy/guidance-valuetime) on the value of time, we need to
know the length of the evacuation. This
data would enable a more thorough
determination of the benefit of proposed
regulations.
14. Method and Date of Establishing
Maximum Pressure
We propose adding the method used
by the operator to establish the
maximum pressure for the pipeline
system. We also propose adding the date
the maximum pressure was established.
This data would help stakeholders
determine the maximum pressure
methods posing a greater risk and if the
risk changes over time.
15. Odorization
We propose adding questions about
the odorization of the gas. This change
would help PHMSA correlate our
incident investigation findings with the
form.
16. External Corrosion and Stray
Current
We propose collecting additional
details when stray current is the cause
of external corrosion. We have also
clarified the conditions under which
external corrosion cathodic protection is
expected. This data would help

E:\FR\FM\13MYN1.SGM

13MYN1

Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 93 / Friday, May 13, 2016 / Notices
stakeholders better understand the
cause of external corrosion.
17. Natural Force Damage Additional
Sub-Causes
We propose adding snow/ice and tree
root damage as sub-causes in the natural
force damage cause category. This
addition would reduce the number of
incidents reported with a cause of
‘‘other.’’
18. Excavation Details for All
Excavation Damage
In the current form, when a third
party causes the excavation damage, we
collect details about the excavation
work. We propose collecting details
about the excavation work when the
cause of the damage is first, second, or
third party. When pipeline operator
employees are excavating and damage
their own pipeline, the damage is
considered first party. When an
excavator is working under contract for
the pipeline operator and damages the
operator’s pipeline, they are considered
a second party. First and second party
excavation details would allow
stakeholders to understand the type of
excavation work being performed by
any party causing the excavation
damage.
19. State Damage Prevention Law
Exemptions
We propose adding data about
exemptions from state damage
prevention laws when the cause of the
incident is excavation damage. This
data would help stakeholders determine
states in which damage prevention law
exemptions may be leading to more
frequent excavation damage of
pipelines.

mstockstill on DSK3G9T082PROD with NOTICES

20. Other Outside Force Damage
Additional Sub-Cause
We propose adding ‘‘erosion of
support due to other utilities’’ as a subcause in the other outside force damage
cause category. This addition would
reduce the number of incidents reported
with a cause of ‘‘other.’’
21. Vehicular Damage Additional
Details
We propose collecting details about
driver performance and protection from
damage when the cause is identified as
‘‘damage by car, truck, or other
motorized vehicle/equipment not
engaged in excavation.’’ These questions
will not include personally identifiable
information or anything that violates the
privacy of the driver. PHMSA will
request information such as whether the
driver violated state or local driving
laws, whether they were in control of

VerDate Sep<11>2014

18:05 May 12, 2016

Jkt 238001

29945

the vehicle at the time of the collision,
and the estimated speed at time of
collision. ‘‘Unknown’’ will be allowed
for all driver performance questions.
Often times, the narrative section of
these incident reports mentions reckless
or intoxicated drivers. By adding
questions about driver performance and
protective barriers, stakeholders can
discern incidents that could have been
prevented by the operator and incidents
where the driver’s performance may
have been a factor.

B. PHMSA F 7100.2 Incident Report—
Natural and Other Gas Transmission
and Gathering Pipeline Systems
PHMSA proposes to reorganize
existing questions and add more
detailed questions about gas
transmission pipeline incident
response, incident consequences,
operating conditions, cause, and
contributing factors. Many of these
changes are similar to those proposed
for gas distribution pipelines in section
A above.

22. Overhaul Mechanical and
Compression Fittings

1. Change Form Name
We propose shortening the name of
the form to ‘‘Incident Report—Gas
Transmission and Gathering Systems’’.
This change would remove extraneous
words from the form name.

We propose combining ‘‘mechanical
fitting’’ and ‘‘compression fitting’’ subcauses into a single sub-cause and
collecting additional details. We are
combining the sub-causes because
compression fittings are a type of
mechanical fitting. When a mechanical
fitting fails and causes a hazardous leak,
operators are required submit form
PHMSA F 7100.1–2—MECHANICAL
FITTING FAILURE REPORT FORM FOR
CALENDAR YEAR 20___ FOR
DISTRIBUTION OPERATORS. We
modified the incident report to collect
the same data collected for hazardous
leaks on PHMSA F 7100.1–2. This
change would ensure consistency
between data for hazardous leaks and
incidents when a joint formed by a
mechanical fitting fails.
23. Valve Material
We propose adding a question for the
valve material when a valve is the subcause. This change would allow
stakeholders to assess the risk posed by
various valve materials.
24. Contributing Factors
Pipeline operators currently select
only one cause on the form. Factors
contributing to, but not causing an
incident are often relevant to preventing
future incidents. We propose collecting
data about contributing factors. The
proposal is similar to a recommendation
made by the NTSB in their January 2015
safety study report ‘‘Integrity
Management of Gas Transmission
Pipelines in High Consequence Areas’’
(http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safetystudies/Documents/SS1501.pdf). The
NTSB recommended revising the gas
transmission incident form to collect
multiple root causes. We are proposing
to collect contributing factors in
addition to the apparent cause on all
four forms. This data would help
stakeholders develop a more thorough
understanding of the incident and ways
to prevent future incidents.

PO 00000

Frm 00114

Fmt 4703

Sfmt 4703

2. Time Zone and Daylight Savings
We propose adding the time zone and
daylight savings status at the location
and time of the incident. This data
would help PHMSA correlate our
incident investigation findings with the
form.
3. Remove ‘‘incident resulted from’’
We propose removing the question
characterizing the incident as
unintentional release, intentional
release, or no release. We collect
adequate data on the form to answer this
question. This change would eliminate
a redundant question from the form.
4. Operational Status
We propose collecting the operational
status of the pipeline system at the time
the operator identified the failure. On
the current form, there is an assumption
that the pipeline was in service at the
time the operator identified the failure,
but this is often not true. This change
would help stakeholders understand the
status of the pipeline and clarify the
shutdown data.
5. Part A Reorganization and Detailed
Questions About Incident Response
We reorganized existing questions to
display the sequence of operator actions
and interactions as the incident
proceeds. For example, how the
operator first learned of the pipeline
failure is currently collected in Part E.
PHMSA proposes to move this item to
Part A. New items being added to build
a complete timeline include interactions
with emergency responders and details
about ignition. This data would help
stakeholders develop a more thorough
understanding of the incident.
6. Multiple NRC Reports
The vast majority of pipeline
incidents have only one NRC report.

E:\FR\FM\13MYN1.SGM

13MYN1

29946

Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 93 / Friday, May 13, 2016 / Notices

During response to protracted incidents,
pipeline operators may submit multiple
reports to the NRC. In these rare
instances, we are proposing to collect
each NRC report number. This change
would help PHMSA correlate our
incident investigation findings with the
form.
7. Flow Control and Valve Closures
We propose adding questions about
initial actions the operator took to
control the flow of product to the failure
location. When valves are used, we
propose collecting the date and time of
the valve closure. This change
implements a GAO recommendation
from GAO–13–168, ‘‘Pipeline Safety:
Better Data and Guidance Needed to
Improve Pipeline Operator Incident
Response.’’ This change would allow
stakeholders to understand the actions
taken by the operator to control the flow
of gas during incident response and
collect data about the elapsed time to
valve closure.
8. Area of Incident Selections
We propose adding ‘‘exposed due to
loss of cover’’ as a selection for the area
of incident when underground is
selected. For pipelines installed
underground and eventually exposed,
the current form is not clear about
whether underground or above ground
should be selected. Adding ‘‘exposed
due to loss of cover’’ as an underground
option clarifies how to report the
incident. This change would improve
the consistency of reports.

mstockstill on DSK3G9T082PROD with NOTICES

9. Other Underground Facilities
We propose adding a question for
whether other underground facilities are
found within 12 inches of the failure
location. We know from experience that
other underground facilities can damage
pipeline systems. The most common
cause is electrical arcing from electric
facilities to gas systems. Generally, 12
inches of underground separation is
considered adequate to prevent damage
from non-pipeline facilities. This
change would allow stakeholders to
verify if 12 inches of separation is
adequate.
10. Outer Continental Shelf Regions
We propose collecting the Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS) region when an
incident occurs on the OCS. This
change would provide stakeholders
with a more precise location of the
incident.
11. Item Involved and Age of Failed
Item
We propose modifying the selections
for the item that failed. We also propose

VerDate Sep<11>2014

18:05 May 12, 2016

Jkt 238001

collecting data about plastic pipe, which
is quite common in gas gathering
systems. These modifications would
reduce the number of times ‘‘other’’ is
selected and allow a more meaningful
analysis of the data.
We propose collecting both the date of
manufacture and the date of installation
for the failed item. This would allow
stakeholders to understand both the age
of the failed item and how long it had
been in service.
12. Additional Integrity Management
Consequences
We propose adding a description of
the cause of fatality or injury outside of
the Potential Impact Radius (PIR) and
impacts to wildlife when ignition
occurs. Harm to people outside of a PIR
is an important safety issue, and the
new question will collect a text
description of the cause. The cause of
fatality or injury outside the PIR could
help stakeholders determine if the PIR
concept is suitable for continued use.
The value of burnt wildlife habitat is
important in calculating the benefit of
proposed regulations.
13. Cost of Gas
We propose collecting the cost of gas
per mcf and calculating the cost of gas
released. Currently, the form collects the
volume of gas released and the cost of
the gas released. The cost per mcf in our
current incident data ranges from cents
to hundreds of dollars. By providing the
gas cost per mcf, operators will achieve
greater accuracy when converting the
per mcf gas cost to released gas costs.
14. Details About Consequences
Our departmental guidelines for
determining the benefit of proposed
regulations (http://
www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.dev/
files/docs/
VSL%20Guidance%202013.pdf)
includes a table of relative values based
on injury severity. Our forms currently
collect the number of injured persons
requiring in-patient, overnight
hospitalization. We propose adding two
less severe categories to the forms. This
data would enable a more thorough
determination of the benefit of proposed
regulations.
We are proposing to collect the
volume of product consumed by fire.
We already collect data about the
volume of product released and whether
ignition occurred. However, we cannot
identify the volume of product burned.
This data would allow us to more
accurately determine the social cost of
carbon and benefit of proposed
regulations.

PO 00000

Frm 00115

Fmt 4703

Sfmt 4703

We are proposing to collect the
number of buildings affected by the
incident. On the current forms, the
property damage values do not include
any details about the type of property
damaged. This data would provide more
details about the consequences of the
incident and enable a more thorough
determination of the benefit of proposed
regulations.
We propose collecting data about the
length of building evacuations. On the
current form, we collect the number of
person evacuated from buildings. To
implement DOT guidelines (http://
www.transportation.gov/office-policy/
transportation-policy/guidance-valuetime) on the value of time, we need to
know the length of the evacuation. This
data would enable a more thorough
determination of the benefit of proposed
regulations.
15. Gas Flow Rate
We propose adding the gas flow rate
at the point and time of the incident.
This change would help stakeholders
better understand the operating
conditions at the time of the failure.
16. Date of Establishing Maximum
Pressure and Flow Reversals
We propose adding the date the
operator established the maximum
pressure for the pipeline system. We
also propose adding a question about
flow reversals. This data would help
stakeholders have a better
understanding of the maximum pressure
determination method and whether a
flow reversal may have invalidated the
maximum pressure.
17. Odorization
We propose adding a question about
whether the gas was odorized. This
change would help stakeholders
understand if people near the failure
location should have been able to smell
the escaping gas.
18. Length of Segment Isolated
We propose modifying the question
about the length of pipeline isolated
during incident response. In the current
form, an assumption is made that valve
closures will always be used to initially
control flow to the failure location. This
change would clarify the length to be
reported when valves are not used to
initially control flow to the failure
location.
19. Function Choice Change
If a gas transmission failure occurs on
a pipeline within a storage field, the
current instructions are to select
‘‘storage gathering’’ as the function.
Since this question first appeared in

E:\FR\FM\13MYN1.SGM

13MYN1

Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 93 / Friday, May 13, 2016 / Notices
2010, both operators submitting reports
and analysts using our data have
assumed ‘‘storage gathering’’ is a type of
gas gathering, not gas transmission. To
ensure this data is used for reports and
analysis on systems having a
transmission function, not gathering
reports and analysis, we propose
renaming this function from ‘‘storage
gathering’’ to ‘‘transmission in storage
field.’’ PHMSA also intends to apply
this re-designation to the data collected
in all reports submitted since 1/1/2010,
This would facilitate the proper flow of
data through to PHMSA’s public
displays and data downloads. This
change would help improve the
accuracy of both gathering and
transmission reports and analysis since
the data will better correspond to the
function of the pipeline system.
20. External Corrosion and Stray
Current
We propose collecting additional
details when stray current is the cause
of external corrosion. We have also
clarified the conditions under which
external corrosion cathodic protection is
expected. This data would help
stakeholders better understand the
cause of external corrosion.

mstockstill on DSK3G9T082PROD with NOTICES

21. Natural Force Damage Additional
Sub-Cause
We propose adding tree root damage
as a sub-cause in the natural force
damage cause category. This addition
would reduce the number of incidents
reported with a cause of ‘‘other.’’

data would help stakeholders determine
states in which damage prevention law
exemptions may be leading to more
frequent excavation damage of
pipelines.
24. Vehicular Damage Additional
Details
We propose collecting details about
driver performance and protection from
damage when the cause is identified as
‘‘damage by car, truck, or other
motorized vehicle/equipment not
engaged in excavation.’’ These questions
will not include personally identifiable
information or anything that violates the
privacy of the driver. PHMSA will
request information such as whether the
driver violated state or local driving
laws, whether they were in control of
the vehicle at the time of the collision,
and the estimated speed at time of
collision. ‘‘Unknown’’ will be allowed
for all driver performance questions.
Often times, the narrative section of
these incident reports mention reckless
or intoxicated drivers. By adding
questions about driver performance and
protective barriers, stakeholders can
discern incidents that could have been
prevented by the operator and incidents
where the driver’s performance may
have been a factor.

22. Excavation Details for All
Excavation Damage
In the current form, when a third
party causes the excavation damage, we
collect details about the excavation
work. We propose collecting details
about the excavation work when the
cause of the damage is first, second, or
third party. When pipeline operator
employees are excavating and damage
their own pipeline, the damage is
considered first party. When an
excavator is working under contract for
the pipeline operator and damages the
operator’s pipeline, they are considered
a second party. First and second party
excavation details would allow
stakeholders to understand the type of
excavation work being performed by
any party causing the excavation
damage.

25. Material Failure Cause Changes
When material failure of pipe or weld
causes the incident, a sub-cause must be
chosen. Errors in the design of pipeline
facilities cause some incidents, but
design is not included in any sub-cause.
We propose adding a design to the
‘‘Construction-, Installation-, or
Fabrication-related’’ sub-cause. This
change would reduce the number of
reports with cause of ‘‘other.’’
We propose adding another
environmental cracking option, ‘‘hard
spot.’’ This is another type of
environmental cracking that should be
available for selection. This change
would reduce the number of reports
with cause of ‘‘other.’’
We propose adding a question to
collect the post-construction pressure
test value. When the pipe or a weld
fails, the value of the post-construction
pressure test is important to
determining if the cause of the failure
might have been present since original
construction. This change would
provide additional data to diagnose the
cause of the pipe or weld failure.

23. State Damage Prevention Law
Exemptions
We propose adding data about
exemptions from state damage
prevention laws when the cause of the
incident is excavation damage. This

26. Additional Integrity Inspection Data
In the current form, the same set of
integrity inspection questions appear in
four different cause sections. Only one
cause can be selected so three sets of
these questions are redundant. We

VerDate Sep<11>2014

18:05 May 12, 2016

Jkt 238001

PO 00000

Frm 00116

Fmt 4703

Sfmt 4703

29947

propose having the questions appear
once. For each report submitted since
January 1, 2010, PHMSA would modify
the database to have the questions
appear only once. This change would
simplify the form by reducing the
number of distinct data fields.
We propose collecting two sets of inline inspection results. Under PHMSA
regulations, operators are conducting a
second round of integrity inspections.
This change would provide a history of
in-line inspections rather than just the
most recent. The additional inspection
data may provide insights about the
effectiveness of the various types of inline inspections.
We propose collecting the type of
direct assessment when this inspection
method has been implemented. The
additional inspection data may provide
insights about the effectiveness of the
various types of direct assessments.
27. Contributing Factors
Pipeline operators currently select
only one cause on the form. Factors
contributing to, but not causing an
incident are often relevant to preventing
future incidents. We propose collecting
data about contributing factors. The
proposal is similar to a recommendation
made by NTSB in their January 2015
safety study report. NTSB recommended
revising the Gas Transmission/Gas
Gathering Form to collect multiple root
causes. We are proposing to collect
contributing factors in addition to the
apparent cause on all four forms. This
data would help stakeholders develop a
more thorough understanding of the
incident and ways to prevent future
incidents.
C. PHMSA F 7100.3 Incident Report—
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Facilities
PHMSA proposes to add more
detailed questions about LNG incidents
and their consequences.
1. Multiple NRC Reports
The vast majority of pipeline
incidents have only one NRC report.
During response to protracted incidents,
pipeline operators may submit multiple
reports to the NRC. In these rare
instances, we are proposing to collect
each NRC report number. This change
would help PHMSA correlate our
incident investigation findings with the
form.
2. Details About Consequences
Our departmental guidelines for
determining the benefit of proposed
regulations (http://
www.transportation.gov/
sites/dot.dev/files/docs/
VSL%20Guidance%202013.pdf)

E:\FR\FM\13MYN1.SGM

13MYN1

29948

Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 93 / Friday, May 13, 2016 / Notices

includes a table of relative values based
on injury severity. Our forms currently
collect the number of injured persons
requiring in-patient, overnight
hospitalization. We propose adding two
less severe categories to the forms. This
data would enable a more thorough
determination of the benefit of proposed
regulations.
We are proposing to collect the
volume of product consumed by fire.
We already collect data about the
volume of product released and whether
ignition occurred. However, we cannot
identify the volume of product burned.
This data would allow us to more
accurately determine the social cost of
carbon and benefit of proposed
regulations.
We are proposing to collect the
number of buildings affected by the
incident. On the current forms, the
property damage values do not include
any details about the type of property
damaged. This data would provide more
details about the consequences of the
incident and enable a more thorough
determination of the benefit of proposed
regulations.
We propose collecting data about the
length of building evacuations. On the
current form, we collect the number of
persons evacuated from buildings. To
implement DOT guidelines (http://
www.transportation.gov/office-policy/
transportation-policy/guidance-valuetime) on the value of time, we need to
know the length of the evacuation. This
data would enable a more thorough
determination of the benefit of proposed
regulations.
3. Contributing Factors

mstockstill on DSK3G9T082PROD with NOTICES

Pipeline operators currently select
only one cause on the form. Factors
contributing to, but not causing an
incident are often relevant to preventing
future incidents. We propose collecting
data about contributing factors. The
proposal is similar to a recommendation
made by NTSB in their January 2015
safety study report. The NTSB
recommended revising the GT/GG Form
to collect multiple root causes. We are
proposing to collect contributing factors
in addition to the apparent cause on all
four forms. This data would help
stakeholders develop a more thorough
understanding of the incident and ways
to prevent future incidents.
D. PHMSA F 7000–1 Accident
Report—Hazardous Liquid Pipeline
Systems
PHMSA proposes to reorganize
existing questions and add more
detailed questions about incident
response, incident consequences,

VerDate Sep<11>2014

18:05 May 12, 2016

Jkt 238001

operating conditions, cause, and
contributing factors.
1. Change Form Name
We propose changing the name of the
form to ‘‘Accident Report—Hazardous
Liquid and Carbon Dioxide Systems.’’
This change more accurately describes
the types of pipelines using the form.
2. Time Zone and Daylight Savings
We propose adding the time zone and
daylight savings status at the location
and time of the incident. This data
would help PHMSA correlate our
incident investigation findings with the
form.
3. Operational Status
We propose collecting the operational
status of the pipeline system at the time
the operator identified the failure. On
the current form, there is an assumption
that the pipeline was in service at the
time the operator identified the failure,
but this is often not true. This change
would help stakeholders understand the
status of the pipeline and clarify the
shutdown data.
4. Part A Reorganization and Detailed
Questions About Incident Response
We reorganized existing questions to
display the sequence of operator actions
and interactions as the incident
proceeds. For example, how the
operator first learned of the pipeline
failure is currently collected in Part E.
PHMSA proposes to move this item to
Part A. New items being added to build
a complete timeline include interactions
with emergency responders, spill
response resources, and details about
ignition. This data would help
stakeholders develop a more thorough
understanding of the incident.
5. Multiple NRC Reports
The vast majority of pipeline
incidents have only one NRC report.
During response to protracted incidents,
pipeline operators may submit multiple
reports to the NRC. In these rare
instances, we are proposing to collect
each NRC report number. This change
would help PHMSA correlate our
incident investigation findings with the
form.
6. Flow Control and Valve Closures
We propose adding questions about
initial actions the operator took to
control the flow of product to the failure
location. When valves are used, we
propose collecting the date and time of
the valve closure. This change
implements a GAO recommendation
from GAO–13–168 ‘‘Pipeline Safety:
Better Data and Guidance needed to

PO 00000

Frm 00117

Fmt 4703

Sfmt 4703

Improve Pipeline Operator Incident
Response.’’ This change would allow
stakeholders to understand the actions
taken by the operator to control the flow
of gas during incident response and
collect data about the elapsed time to
valve closure.
7. Area of Incident Selections
We propose adding ‘‘exposed due to
loss of cover’’ as a selection for the area
of incident when underground is
selected. For pipelines installed
underground and eventually exposed,
the current form is not clear about
whether underground or above ground
should be selected. Adding ‘‘exposed
due to loss of cover’’ as an underground
option clarifies how to report the
incident. This change would improve
the consistency of reports.
8. Water Crossing Evaluation
We propose adding a question to
collect the date of the most recent
evaluation of the water crossing. These
evaluations can provide information
critical to protecting the integrity of
water crossings. This change would
provide stakeholders with this critical
information.
9. OCS Regions
We propose collecting the OCS region
when an incident occurs on the OCS.
This change would provide stakeholders
with a more precise location of the
incident.
10. Item Involved and Age of Failed
Item
We propose modifying the selections
for the item that failed. These
modifications would reduce the number
of times ‘‘other’’ is selected and allow a
more meaningful analysis of the data.
We propose collecting both the date of
manufacture and the date of installation
for the failed item. This would allow
stakeholders to understand both the age
of the failed item and how long it had
been in service.
11. Volume of Soil
We propose adding a question for the
volume of contaminated soil. The
amount of soil contaminated provides
an indication of the spread of the liquid
product.
12. Details About Consequences
Our departmental guidelines for
determining the benefit of proposed
regulations (http://www
.transportation.gov/sites/dot.dev/files/
docs/VSL%20Guidance%202013.pdf)
includes a table of relative values based
on injury severity. Our forms currently
collect the number of injured persons

E:\FR\FM\13MYN1.SGM

13MYN1

Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 93 / Friday, May 13, 2016 / Notices
requiring in-patient, overnight
hospitalization. We propose adding two
less-severe categories to the forms. This
data would enable a more thorough
determination of the benefit of proposed
regulations.
We are proposing to collect the
volume of product consumed by fire.
We already collect data about the
volume of product released and whether
ignition occurred. However, we cannot
identify the volume of product burned.
This data would allow us to more
accurately determine the social cost of
carbon and benefit of proposed
regulations.
We are proposing to collect the
number of buildings affected by the
incident. On the current forms, the
property damage values do not include
any details about the type of property
damaged. This data would provide more
details about the consequences of the
incident and enable a more thorough
determination of the benefit of proposed
regulations.
We propose collecting data about the
length of building evacuations. On the
current form, we collect the number of
persons evacuated from buildings. To
implement DOT guidelines (http://
www.transportation.gov/office-policy/
transportation-policy/guidance-valuetime) on the value of time, we need to
know the length of the evacuation. This
data would enable a more thorough
determination of the benefit of proposed
regulations.
13. Establishing Maximum Pressure and
Flow Reversals
We propose adding the method used
by the operator to establish the
maximum pressure for the pipeline
system. We also propose adding the date
the maximum pressure was established.
This data would help stakeholders
determine the maximum pressure
methods posing a greater risk and if the
risk changes over time.
We also propose adding a question
about flow reversals. This data would
help stakeholders have a better
understanding of whether a flow
reversal may have invalidated the
maximum pressure.

mstockstill on DSK3G9T082PROD with NOTICES

14. Length of Segment Isolated
We propose modifying the question
about the length of pipeline isolated
during incident response. In the current
form, an assumption is made that valve
closures will always be used to initially
control flow to the failure location. This
change would clarify the length to be
reported when valves are not used to
initially control flow to the failure
location.

VerDate Sep<11>2014

18:05 May 12, 2016

Jkt 238001

15. External Corrosion and Stray
Current
We propose collecting additional
details when stray current is the cause
of external corrosion. We have also
clarified the conditions under which
external corrosion cathodic protection is
expected. This data would help
stakeholders better understand the
cause of external corrosion.
16. Natural Force Damage Additional
Sub-Cause
We propose adding tree root damage
as a sub-cause in the natural force
damage cause category. This addition
would reduce the number of incidents
reported with a cause of ‘‘other.’’
17. Excavation Details for All
Excavation Damage
In the current form, when a third
party causes the excavation damage, we
collect details about the excavation
work. We propose collecting details
about the excavation work when the
cause of the damage is first, second, or
third party. When pipeline operator
employees are excavating and damage
their own pipeline, the damage is
considered first party. When an
excavator is working under contract for
the pipeline operator and damages the
operator’s pipeline, they are considered
a second party. First and second party
excavation details would allow
stakeholders to understand the type of
excavation work being performed by
any party causing the excavation
damage.
18. State Damage Prevention Law
Exemptions
We propose adding data about
exemptions from state damage
prevention laws when the cause of the
incident is excavation damage. This
data would help stakeholders determine
states in which damage prevention law
exemptions may be leading to more
frequent excavation damage of
pipelines.
19. Material Failure Cause Changes
When material failure of pipe or weld
causes the incident, a sub-cause must be
chosen. Errors in the design of pipeline
facilities cause some incidents, but
design is not included in any sub-cause.
We propose adding a design to the
‘‘Construction-, Installation-, or
Fabrication-related’’ sub-cause. This
change would reduce the number of
reports with cause of ‘‘other.’’
We propose adding another
environmental cracking option, ‘‘hard
spot’’. This is another type of
environmental cracking that should be
available for selection. This change

PO 00000

Frm 00118

Fmt 4703

Sfmt 4703

29949

would reduce the number of reports
with cause of ‘‘other.’’
We propose adding a question to
collect the post-construction pressure
test value. When the pipe or a weld
fails, the value is the post-construction
pressure test is important in
determining if the cause of the failure
might have been present since original
construction. This change would
provide additional data to diagnose the
cause of the pipe or weld failure.
20. Vehicular Damage Additional
Details
We propose collecting details about
driver performance and protection from
damage when the cause is identified as
‘‘damage by car, truck, or other
motorized vehicle/equipment not
engaged in excavation.’’ These questions
will not include personally identifiable
information or anything that violates the
privacy of the driver. PHMSA will
request information such as whether the
driver violated state or local driving
laws, whether they were in control of
the vehicle at the time of the collision,
and the estimated speed at time of
collision. ‘‘Unknown’’ will be allowed
for all driver performance questions.
Often times, the narrative section of
these incident reports mention reckless
or intoxicated drivers. By adding
questions about driver performance and
protective barriers, stakeholders can
discern incidents that could have been
prevented by the operator and incidents
where the driver’s performance may
have been a factor.
21. Additional Integrity Inspection Data
In the current form, the same set of
integrity inspection questions appear in
four different cause sections. Only one
cause can be selected, so three sets of
these questions are redundant. We
propose having the questions appear
once. For each report submitted since
January 1, 2010, PHMSA would modify
the database to have the questions
appear only once. This change would
simplify the form by reducing the
number of distinct data fields.
We propose collecting two sets of inline inspection results. Under PHMSA
regulations, operators are conducting a
second round of integrity inspections.
This change would provide a history of
in-line inspections rather than just the
most recent. The additional inspection
data may provide insights about the
effectiveness of the various types of
inline inspections.
We propose collecting the type of
direct assessment when this inspection
method has been implemented. The
additional inspection data may provide

E:\FR\FM\13MYN1.SGM

13MYN1

29950

Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 93 / Friday, May 13, 2016 / Notices

insights about the effectiveness of the
various types of direct assessments.

mstockstill on DSK3G9T082PROD with NOTICES

22. Contributing Factors
Pipeline operators currently select
only one cause on the form. Factors
contributing to, but not causing an
incident are often relevant to preventing
future incidents. We propose collecting
data about contributing factors. The
proposal is similar to a recommendation
made by NTSB in their January 2015
safety study report. The NTSB
recommended revising the GT/GG Form
to collect multiple root causes. We are
proposing to collect contributing factors
in addition to the apparent cause on all
four forms. This data would help
stakeholders develop a more thorough
understanding of the incident and ways
to prevent future incidents.
II. Summary of Impacted Collection
Section 1320.8(d), Title 5, Code of
Federal Regulations, requires PHMSA to
provide interested members of the
public and affected agencies an
opportunity to comment on information
collection and recordkeeping requests.
This notice identifies several
information collection requests that
PHMSA will submit to OMB for
renewal. PHMSA expects many of the
new data elements are already known
by the operator and no report requires
the completion of all fields on the
forms. PHMSA has estimated the
burdens below by adding 20% to the
previous burdens—12 hours instead of
10.
The following information is provided
for each information collection: (1) Title
of the information collection; (2) OMB
control number; (3) Current expiration
date; (4) Type of request; (5) Abstract of
the information collection activity; (6)
Description of affected public; (7)
Estimate of total annual reporting and
recordkeeping burden; and (8)
Frequency of collection. PHMSA will
request a three-year term of approval for
each information collection activity.
PHMSA requests comments on the
following information collections:
1. Title: Incident Reporting for Gas
and LNG.
OMB Control Number: PHMSA will
request from OMB.
Current Expiration Date: N/A.
Type of Request: Approval of a new
collection.
Abstract: PHMSA is proposing
revision to the following incident report
forms to improve the granularity of the
data collected in several areas: Gas
Distribution Incident Report (PHMSA F.
7100.1); Incident Report—Natural and
Other Gas Transmission and Gathering
Pipeline System (PHMSA F 7100.2); and

VerDate Sep<11>2014

18:05 May 12, 2016

Jkt 238001

Incident Report—Liquefied Natural Gas
Facilities (PHMSA F 7100.3). PHMSA is
also requesting a new OMB Control
Number to collectively cover these
forms.
Affected Public: Pipeline Operators.
Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping
Burden:
Estimated number of responses: 301.
Estimated annual burden hours:
3,612.
Frequency of collection: On occasion.
2. Title: Transportation of Hazardous
Liquids by Pipeline: Recordkeeping and
Accident Reporting.
OMB Control Number: 2137–0047.
Current Expiration Date: 7/31/2015.
Type of Request: Revision.
Abstract: This information collection
covers recordkeeping and accident
reporting by hazardous liquid pipeline
operators who are subject to 49 CFR part
195. PHMSA is proposing to revise the
form PHMSA F7000–1 to improve the
granularity of the data collected in
several areas.
Affected Public: Hazardous liquid
pipeline operators.
Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping
Burden:
Annual Responses: 847.
Annual Burden Hours: 56,229.
Frequency of collection: On occasion.
Comments are invited on:
(a) The need for the renewal and
revision of these collections of
information for the proper performance
of the functions of the agency, including
whether the information will have
practical utility;
(b) The accuracy of the agency’s
estimate of the burden of the proposed
collection of information, including the
validity of the methodology and
assumptions used;
(c) Ways to enhance the quality,
utility, and clarity of the information to
be collected; and
(d) Ways to minimize the burden of
the collection of information on those
who are to respond, including the use
of appropriate automated, electronic,
mechanical, or other technological
collection techniques.
Authority: The Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1995; 44 U.S.C. Chapter 35, as amended;
and 49 CFR 1.48.
Issued in Washington, DC, on May 9, 2016,
under authority delegated in 49 CFR 1.97.
Alan K. Mayberry,
Acting Associate Administrator for Pipeline
Safety.
[FR Doc. 2016–11304 Filed 5–12–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–60–P

PO 00000

Frm 00119

Fmt 4703

Sfmt 4703

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade
Bureau
[Docket No. TTB–2016–0001]

Proposed Information Collections;
Comment Request (No. 59)
Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and
Trade Bureau (TTB); Treasury.
ACTION: Notice and request for
comments.
AGENCY:

As part of our continuing
effort to reduce paperwork and
respondent burden, and as required by
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,
we invite comments on the proposed or
continuing information collections
listed below in this notice.
DATES: We must receive your written
comments on or before July 12, 2016.
ADDRESSES: As described below, you
may send comments on the information
collections listed in this document
using the ‘‘Regulations.gov’’ online
comment form for this document, or you
may send written comments via U.S.
mail or hand delivery. TTB no longer
accepts public comments via email or
fax.
• http://www.regulations.gov: Use the
comment form for this document posted
within Docket No. TTB–2016–0001 on
‘‘Regulations.gov,’’ the Federal erulemaking portal, to submit comments
via the Internet;
• U.S. Mail: Michael Hoover,
Regulations and Rulings Division,
Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade
Bureau, 1310 G Street NW., Box 12,
Washington, DC 20005.
• Hand Delivery/Courier in Lieu of
Mail: Michael Hoover, Alcohol and
Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, 1310 G
Street NW., Suite 400, Washington, DC
20005.
Please submit separate comments for
each specific information collection
listed in this document. You must
reference the information collection’s
title, form or recordkeeping requirement
number, and OMB number (if any) in
your comment.
You may view copies of this
document, the information collections
listed in it and any associated
instructions, and all comments received
in response to this document within
Docket No. TTB–2016–0001 at http://
www.regulations.gov. A link to that
docket is posted on the TTB Web site at
http://www.ttb.gov/forms/comment-onform.shtml. You may also obtain paper
copies of this document, the
information collections described in it
and any associated instructions, and any
SUMMARY:

E:\FR\FM\13MYN1.SGM

13MYN1