FERC-725B, (NOPR in RM17-11-000) Mandatory Reliability Standards for Critical Infrastructure Protection [CIP] Reliability Standards

ICR 201710-1902-008

OMB: 1902-0248

Federal Form Document

Forms and Documents
Document
Name
Status
Supporting Statement A
2017-11-03
Supplementary Document
2017-10-26
Supplementary Document
2017-10-26
Supplementary Document
2017-10-26
Supplementary Document
2017-10-26
Supplementary Document
2017-10-26
ICR Details
1902-0248 201710-1902-008
Historical Inactive 201601-1902-001
FERC FERC-725B
FERC-725B, (NOPR in RM17-11-000) Mandatory Reliability Standards for Critical Infrastructure Protection [CIP] Reliability Standards
Revision of a currently approved collection   No
Regular
Comment filed on proposed rule and continue 03/28/2018
Retrieve Notice of Action (NOA) 11/22/2017
OMB files this comment in accordance with 5 CFR 1320.11( c ). This OMB action is not an approval to conduct or sponsor an information collection under the Paperwork Reduction Act of1995. This action has no effect on any current approvals.
  Inventory as of this Action Requested Previously Approved
03/31/2019 36 Months From Approved 03/31/2019
1,415 0 1,415
1,569,410 0 1,569,410
0 0 0

Pursuant to sec. 215 of Federal Power Act (FPA), in the Final Rule in RM15-14, FERC approves 7 critical infrastructure protection (CIP) Reliability Standards: CIP-003-6 (Security Management Controls), CIP-004-6 (Personnel & Training), CIP-006-6 (Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems), CIP-007-6 (Systems Security Management), CIP-009-6 (Recovery Plans for BES Cyber Systems), CIP-010-2 (Configuration Change Management & Vulnerability Assessments), & CIP-011-2 (Information Protection) (proposed CIP Reliability Stds.). North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), FERC-certified Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), submitted 7 proposed CIP Reliability Stds.in response to Order 791. FERC also approves NERC’s implementation plan & violation risk factor & violation severity level assignments. In addition, FERC approves NERC’s new or revised definitions for inclusion in NERC Glossary of Terms Used in Reliability Stds., subject to modification. Further, FERC approves retirement of Reliability Stds.CIP-003-5, -004-5.1, -006-5, -007-5, -009-5, -010-1, & -011-1. Proposed CIP Reliability Stds. are designed to mitigate cybersecurity risks to bulk electric system facilities, systems, & equipment, which, if destroyed, degraded, or otherwise rendered unavailable as a result of a cybersecurity incident, would affect reliable operation of Bulk-Power System. As discussed below, FERC finds that proposed CIP Reliability Stds. are just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, & in public interest, & address directives in Order 791 by: (1) eliminating “identify, assess, & correct” language in 17 of CIP version 5 Std. requirements; (2) providing enhanced security controls for Low Impact assets; (3) providing controls to address risks posed by transient electronic devices (e.g., thumb drives & laptop computers) used at High & Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems; & (4) addressing in an equally effective & efficient manner need for a NERC Glossary definition for term “communication networks.” Accordingly, FERC approves proposed CIP Reliability Stds. because they improve base-line cybersecurity posture of applicable entities compared to current Commission-approved CIP Reliability Stds. In addition, pursuant to FPA section 215(d)(5), FERC directs NERC to develop certain modifications to improve CIP Reliability Stds. First, NERC is directed to develop modifications to address protection of transient electronic devices used at Low Impact BES Cyber Systems. Modifications developed by NERC should be designed to effectively address, in an appropriately tailored manner, risks posed by transient electronic devices to Low Impact BES Cyber Systems. Second, FERC directs NERC to develop modifications to CIP-006-6 to require protections for communication network components & data communicated between all bulk electric system Control Centers according to risk posed to bulk electric system. With regard to questions raised in NOPR concerning potential need for additional remote access controls, NERC must conduct a comprehensive study that identifies strength of CIP version 5 remote access controls, risks posed by remote access-related threats & vulnerabilities, & appropriate mitigating controls. Third, FERC directs NERC to develop modifications to its definition for Low Impact External Routable Connectivity. FERC, in NOPR, also proposed to direct that NERC develop requirements relating to supply chain mgt. for industrial control system hardware, software, & services. After review of comments on this topic, FERC scheduled a staff-led technical conference for 1/28/2016, in order to facilitate a structured dialogue on supply chain risk mgt. issues identified by NOPR. Accordingly, this Final Rule does not address supply chain risk mgt. issues;rather, FERC will determine appropriate action on this area after scheduled conference.

PL: Pub.L. 109 - 58 1211, Title XII, Subtitle A Name of Law: Energy Policy Act of 2005
   US Code: 18 USC 824o Name of Law: Federal Power Act
  
None

1902-AF44 Proposed rulemaking 82 FR 49541 10/26/2017

No

Yes
Miscellaneous Actions
No
Proposed Reliability Standards CIP-003-7 clarify, consolidate, streamline, and enhance the Reliability Standards that entities, subjecting the entities to the increase burden of: • creation of plans to provide security controls for (TCAs) to mitigate the risk of malicious code being introduced to low impact BES Cyber System; • ongoing review and updating of the plans and documentation that the planned security controls are implemented for TCAs at low impact BES Cyber System; • modification of plans to provide electronic security controls for low impact BES Cyber Systems; and • the ongoing review and updating of the plans/documentation for methodology regarding how planned security controls are implemented for low impact BES Cyber System . Other factors that impact the burden are the frequency of: • the entity modifying or updating their security controls for the low impact BES Cyber Systems or TCA used at low impact BES Cyber Systems; • modification of low impact BES Cyber Systems that impact the security controls; and • using TCA at low impact BES Cyber Systems.

$5,723
No
    No
    No
No
No
No
Uncollected
Kevin Ryan 202 502-6840 [email protected]

  No

On behalf of this Federal agency, I certify that the collection of information encompassed by this request complies with 5 CFR 1320.9 and the related provisions of 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3).
The following is a summary of the topics, regarding the proposed collection of information, that the certification covers:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    (i) Why the information is being collected;
    (ii) Use of information;
    (iii) Burden estimate;
    (iv) Nature of response (voluntary, required for a benefit, or mandatory);
    (v) Nature and extent of confidentiality; and
    (vi) Need to display currently valid OMB control number;
 
 
 
If you are unable to certify compliance with any of these provisions, identify the item by leaving the box unchecked and explain the reason in the Supporting Statement.
11/22/2017


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