NERC Petition for Reliability Standard CIP-003-7

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

North American Electric Reliability
Corporation

)
)

Docket No. _______

PETITION OF THE
NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION
FOR APPROVAL OF PROPOSED RELIABILITY STANDARD CIP-003-7
Shamai Elstein
Senior Counsel
Marisa Hecht
Counsel
North American Electric Reliability
Corporation
1325 G Street, N.W., Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20005
202-400-3000
[email protected]
[email protected]
Counsel for the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation

March 3, 2017

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY..................................................................................................... 2

II.

NOTICES AND COMMUNICATIONS ................................................................................ 8

III. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................... 8
A.

Regulatory Framework ..................................................................................................... 8

B.

NERC Reliability Standards Development Procedure ..................................................... 9

C.

Order No. 822 Directives ............................................................................................... 10

D.

Development of the Proposed Reliability Standards ...................................................... 15

IV. JUSTIFICATION FOR APPROVAL................................................................................... 16

V.

A.

Electronic Access Controls for Low Impact BES Cyber Systems ................................. 16

B.

Protection of Transient Electronic Devices Used for Low Impact BES Cyber Systems 26

C.

CIP Exceptional Circumstance Policy ........................................................................... 31
EFFECTIVE DATE .............................................................................................................. 33

VI. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 34

Exhibit A

Proposed Reliability Standard

Exhibit B

Proposed Definitions for the Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability
Standards

Exhibit C

Implementation Plan

Exhibit D

Order No. 672 Criteria

Exhibit E

Consideration of Issues and Directives

Exhibit F

Analysis of Violation Risk Factors and Violation Severity Levels

Exhibit G

Summary of Development History and Complete Record of Development

Exhibit H

Standard Drafting Team Roster

i

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

North American Electric Reliability
Corporation

)
)

Docket No. _______

PETITION OF THE
NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION
FOR APPROVAL OF PROPOSED RELIABILITY STANDARD CIP-003-7
Pursuant to Section 215(d)(1) of the Federal Power Act (“FPA”), 1 Section 39.5 of the
regulations of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “Commission”), 2 and
Order No. 822, 3 the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) 4 hereby submits
for Commission approval proposed Reliability Standard CIP-003-7 – Cyber Security – Security
Management Controls. The modifications in the proposed Reliability Standard address
Commission directives from Order No. 822 regarding: (1) electronic access control requirements
for low impact BES Cyber Systems; and (2) protection for transient electronic devices (e.g., thumb
drives, laptop computers, and other portable devices frequently connected and disconnected from
systems) used for low impact BES Cyber Systems. 5 NERC requests that the Commission approve
proposed Reliability Standard CIP-003-7, provided in Exhibit A hereto, as just, reasonable, not
unduly discriminatory, or preferential, and in the public interest.

1

16 U.S.C. § 824o (2012).

2

18 C.F.R. § 39.5 (2016).

3

Order No. 822, Revised Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards, 154 FERC ¶ 61,037, 81
Fed. Reg. 4177 (2016).
4
The Commission certified NERC as the electric reliability organization (“ERO”) in accordance with
Section 215 of the FPA on July 20, 2006. N. Am. Elec. Reliability Corp., 116 FERC ¶ 61,062 (2006).
5

Order No. 822 at PP 32, 73. Unless otherwise designated, all capitalized terms used herein shall have the
meaning set forth in the Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards (“NERC Glossary”), available at
http://www.nerc.com/files/Glossary_of_Terms.pdf.

1

NERC also requests approval of:
•

revised definitions to be incorporated into the NERC Glossary for the following terms: (1)
Removable Media; and (2) Transient Cyber Asset (Exhibit B);

•

the associated Implementation Plan (Exhibit C);

•

the associated Violation Risk Factors (“VRFs”) and Violation Severity Levels (“VSLs”)
(Exhibit F); and

•

the retirement of Commission-approved Reliability Standard CIP-003-6 and the NERC
Glossary definitions of Low Impact External Routable Connectivity (“LERC”) and Low
Impact BES Cyber System Electronic Access Point (“LEAP”).
As required by Section 39.5(a) of the Commission’s regulations, 6 this Petition presents the

technical basis and purpose of the proposed Reliability Standard, a summary of the development
history (Exhibit G), and a demonstration that the proposed Reliability Standard meets the criteria
identified by the Commission in Order No. 672 7 (Exhibit D). The NERC Board of Trustees
(“Board”) adopted proposed Reliability Standard CIP-003-7 on February 9, 2017.
I.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of NERC’s cybersecurity Critical Infrastructure Protection (“CIP”) Reliability

Standards is to mitigate cybersecurity risks to Bulk Electric System (“BES”) Facilities, systems,
and equipment, which, if destroyed, degraded, or otherwise rendered unavailable as a result of a
cyber-attack would affect the reliable operation of the BES. The CIP Reliability Standards apply
a risk-based construct, requiring Responsible Entities 8 to identify and categorize BES Cyber
Systems as high, medium, or low impact, and then protect those BES Cyber Systems

6

18 C.F.R. § 39.5(a).

7
Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability Organization; and Procedures for the
Establishment, Approval, and Enforcement of Electric Reliability Standards, Order No. 672, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶
31,204, at P 262, 321-37, order on reh’g, Order No. 672-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,212 (2006).
8
As used in the CIP Reliability Standards, a Responsible Entity refers to the registered entity responsible for
the implementation of and compliance with a particular requirement.

2

commensurate with the risks they present to the reliable operation of the BES. 9 Reliability
Standard CIP-003-6, which was approved in Order No. 822, contains all the requirements
applicable to low impact BES Cyber Systems, covering the following four subject matter areas:
(1) cyber security awareness; (2) physical security controls; (3) electronic access controls; and (4)
Cyber Security Incident response.
The modifications in proposed Reliability Standard CIP-003-7 improve upon the existing
protections applicable to low impact BES Cyber Systems, consistent with the Commission’s
directives in Order No. 822, 10 by: (1) clarifying the electronic access control requirements
applicable to low impact BES Cyber Systems; (2) adding requirements related to the protection of
transient electronic devices used for low impact BES Cyber Systems; and (3) requiring
Responsible Entities to have a documented cyber security policy related to declaring and
responding to CIP Exceptional Circumstances for low impact BES Cyber Systems. The following
is a brief overview of the modifications in the proposed Reliability Standard:
Electronic Access Controls for Low Impact BES Cyber Systems – To reduce risks
associated with uncontrolled communications to low impact BES Cyber Systems, Commissionapproved Reliability Standard CIP-003-6 requires Responsible Entities to implement electronic
access controls to permit only necessary inbound and outbound access to low impact BES Cyber
Systems for certain communications using routable protocol. 11 Specifically, Section 3.1 of
Attachment 1 to CIP-003-6 provides that where there is Low Impact External Routable
Connectivity (or LERC), Responsible Entities must “implement a [Low Impact BES Cyber System

9

Order No. 791, Version 5 Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards, 145 FERC ¶ 61,160, 78
Fed. Reg. 72,755 (2013), order on clarification and reh’g, Order No. 791-A, 146 FERC ¶ 61,188 (2014).
10

Order No. 822 at PP 32, 73.

11
See CIP-003-6, Requirement R2, Attachment 1, Section 3. Under Section 3 of Attachment 1, Responsible
Entities must also authenticate all Dial-up Connectivity that provides access to low impact BES Cyber System(s).

3

Electronic Access Point (or a LEAP)] to permit only necessary inbound and outbound bidirectional routable protocol access.”
The NERC Glossary term LERC defines the circumstances under which Responsible
Entities must implement electronic access controls, or a LEAP, for low impact BES Cyber
Systems. 12 As explained in the Guidelines and Technical Basis section appended to CIP-003-6 and
NERC’s pleadings in Docket No. RM15-14-000, the LERC definition uses the term “direct” in the
phrases “direct user-initiated interactive access” and “direct device-to-device connection” to
distinguish between the scenarios where an external user or device could electronically access the
low impact BES Cyber System without a security break (i.e., “direct” access) from those situations
where an external user or device could only access the low impact BES Cyber System following
a security break (i.e., “indirect” access). 13 As further explained, under CIP-003-6, Responsible
Entities are required to implement a LEAP only when there is “direct” electronic access as there
are no existing defenses to control access. In contrast, if an external user or device could only
access the low impact BES Cyber System indirectly, there is no requirement to implement a
LEAP. 14
Although the Commission approved CIP-003-6 and the LERC definition in Order No. 822,
the Commission also directed NERC to modify the LERC definition to reflect the clarification
provided in the Guidelines and Technical Basis section and NERC’s pleadings. 15 The Commission
expressed concern that absent such clarification, the use of the term “direct” in the LERC definition
is ambiguous and could lead to complications in the implementation of the proposed CIP

12

The NERC Glossary definition of LEAP is “a Cyber Asset interface that controls [LERC].”

13

Comments of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation in Response to Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, Docket No. RM15-14-000 at 28-31 (filed Sept. 21, 2015) (“NOPR Comments”).
14

Id.

15

Order No. 822 at PP 73-75.

4

Reliability Standards, hindering the adoption of effective security controls for low impact BES
Cyber Systems. 16
In response to the Commission’s directive, NERC proposes to: (1) retire the NERC
Glossary terms LERC and LEAP; and (2) modify Section 3 of Attachment 1 to CIP-003-7 to more
clearly delineate the circumstances under which Responsible Entities must establish electronic
access controls for low impact BES Cyber Systems. The proposed retirement of LERC and LEAP
and modifications to Section 3 of Attachment 1 are designed to simplify the electronic access
control requirements for low impact BES Cyber Systems to avoid the ambiguities associated with
the term “direct” and help ensure that Responsible Entities implement the required security
controls effectively.
As explained in greater detail in Section IV.A below, the language in proposed Reliability
Standard CIP-003-7 incorporates the concepts from the definitions of LERC and LEAP but does
not distinguish between direct and indirect electronic access. Specifically, proposed Section 3 of
Attachment 1 to CIP-003-7 simply provides that the Responsible Entity must implement electronic
access controls for any communications, whether direct or indirect, “between a low impact BES
Cyber System and a Cyber Asset outside the asset containing low impact BES Cyber System” that
use “a routable protocol when entering or leaving the asset containing the low impact BES Cyber
System,” unless that communication is “used for time-sensitive protection or control functions
between intelligent electronic devices (e.g., communications using protocol IEC TR-61850-90-5
R-GOOSE).”
This simplified approach improves the clarity of the electronic access requirements by
disentangling the type of communications requiring controls from controls that are already in place

16

Order No. 822 at PP 67, 73.

5

to address that communication. The existence of a complete security break is no longer used to
determine whether electronic access controls are required; instead, the use of a complete security
break is treated as another form of electronic access control that is intended to meet the security
objective. The proposed modifications avoid overemphasis on identifying LERC and focuses
Responsible Entities on the security objective of the requirement. Importantly, the proposed
modifications to Section 3 of Attachment 1 and the retirement of LERC and LEAP do not alter the
security objective of or the controls required by Section 3 of Attachment 1. As in Reliability
Standard CIP-003-6, under proposed Reliability Standard CIP-003-7 entities are required to
mitigate risks associated with routable communications by implementing controls to permit only
necessary inbound and outbound electronic access to low impact BES Cyber Systems.
Protection of Transient Electronic Devices – As the Commission recognized in Order No.
791, transient electronic devices are potential vehicles for cyber-attacks absent appropriate
controls. 17 To that end, in Order No. 822, the Commission (1) approved revisions to Reliability
Standard CIP-010-2 to include mandatory protections for transient electronic devices, referred to
as Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media, used at high and medium impact BES Cyber
Systems and (2) directed NERC to include mandatory protections for transient electronic devices
used for a low impact BES Cyber Systems to improve the defense-in-depth approach of the CIP
Reliability Standards. 18
In response to this directive, NERC proposes additional revisions in Attachment 1 to CIP003-7 to require entities to take steps to mitigate the risk to the BES related to malware propagation
through the use of transient electronic devices at low impact BES Cyber Systems. Specifically,

17

Order No. 791 at PP 134-135.

18

Order No. 822 at P 32.

6

Attachment 1 is expanded to include a fifth section requiring entities to implement a plan to protect
transient electronic devices to “achieve the objective of mitigating the risk of the introduction of
malicious code to low impact BES Cyber Systems.” The requirements in Section 5 of Attachment
1 are tailored to the risks posed by low impact BES Cyber systems and differentiate between
Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media and between Transient Cyber Assets managed by
the Responsible Entity and Transient Cyber Assets managed by a party other than the Responsible
Entity (e.g. vendors or contractors), as is the case in Reliability Standard CIP-010-2 for high and
medium impact BES Cyber Systems. Additionally, NERC modified the definitions of Transient
Cyber Asset and Removable Media to accommodate the use of the terms for all impact levels, as
discussed below.
CIP Exceptional Circumstance Policy – NERC also proposes revisions in Requirement R1
of proposed Reliability Standard CIP-003-7 to require Responsible Entities to have a policy for
declaring and responding to CIP Exceptional Circumstances related to low impact BES Cyber
Systems, as is already required for high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems in CIP-003-6. As
implementation of existing requirements applicable to low impact BES Cyber Systems is not
subject to CIP Exceptional Circumstances, such a policy was not previously included in CIP-0036 for low impact BES Cyber Systems. Because implementation of the proposed transient electronic
device requirements applicable to low impact BES Cyber Systems in Section 5 of Attachment 1 to
CIP-003-7 is subject to CIP Exceptional Circumstances, NERC proposes to require entities to have
such a policy at this time.
For the reasons discussed herein, NERC respectfully requests that the Commission approve
the proposed Reliability Standard as just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory, or preferential,
and in the public interest.

7

II.

NOTICES AND COMMUNICATIONS
Notices and communications with respect to this filing may be addressed to the

following: 19
Shamai Elstein*
Senior Counsel
Marisa Hecht*
Counsel
North American Electric Reliability
Corporation
1325 G Street, N.W., Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20005
202-400-3000
[email protected]
[email protected]
III.

Howard Gugel*
Senior Director, Standards and Education
North American Electric Reliability
Corporation
3353 Peachtree Road, N.E.
Suite 600, North Tower
Atlanta, GA 30326
404-446-2560
[email protected]

BACKGROUND
A.

Regulatory Framework

By enacting the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 20 Congress entrusted the Commission with the
duties of approving and enforcing rules to ensure the reliability of the Nation’s Bulk-Power
System, and with the duty of certifying an ERO that would be charged with developing and
enforcing mandatory Reliability Standards, subject to Commission approval. Section 215(b)(1) of
the FPA states that all users, owners, and operators of the Bulk-Power System in the United States
will be subject to Commission-approved Reliability Standards. 21 Section 215(d)(5) of the FPA
authorizes the Commission to order the ERO to submit a new or modified Reliability Standard. 22
Section 39.5(a) of the Commission’s regulations requires the ERO to file for Commission approval

19
Persons to be included on the Commission’s service list are identified by an asterisk. NERC respectfully
requests a waiver of Rule 203 of the Commission’s regulations, 18 C.F.R. § 385.203 (2013), to allow the inclusion
of more than two persons on the service list in this proceeding.
20

16 U.S.C. § 824o.

21

Id. § 824(b)(1).

22

Id. § 824o(d)(5).

8

each Reliability Standard that the ERO proposes should become mandatory and enforceable in the
United States, and each modification to a Reliability Standard that the ERO proposes to make
effective. 23
The Commission has the regulatory responsibility to approve Reliability Standards that
protect the reliability of the Bulk-Power System and to ensure that such Reliability Standards are
just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory, or preferential, and in the public interest. Pursuant to
Section 215(d)(2) of the FPA and Section 39.5(c) of the Commission’s regulations, the
Commission will give due weight to the technical expertise of the ERO with respect to the content
of a Reliability Standard. 24
B.

NERC Reliability Standards Development Procedure

The proposed Reliability Standards were developed in an open and fair manner and in
accordance with the Commission-approved Reliability Standard development process. 25 NERC
develops Reliability Standards in accordance with Section 300 (Reliability Standards
Development) of its Rules of Procedure and the NERC Standard Processes Manual. 26 In its ERO
Certification Order, the Commission found that NERC’s proposed rules provide for reasonable
notice and opportunity for public comment, due process, openness, and a balance of interests in
developing Reliability Standards and thus satisfies certain of the criteria for approving Reliability
Standards. The development process is open to any person or entity with a legitimate interest in

23

18 C.F.R. § 39.5(a).

24

16 U.S.C. § 824o(d)(2); 18 C.F.R. § 39.5(c)(1).

25
Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability Organization; and Procedures for the
Establishment, Approval, and Enforcement of Electric Reliability Standards, Order No. 672 at P 334, FERC Stats. &
Regs. ¶ 31,204, order on reh’g, Order No. 672-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,212 (2006).
26

The NERC Rules of Procedure are available at http://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/Pages/Rules-ofProcedure.aspx. The NERC Standard Processes Manual is available at
http://www.nerc.com/comm/SC/Documents/Appendix_3A_StandardsProcessesManual.pdf.

9

the reliability of the Bulk-Power System. NERC considers the comments of all stakeholders.
Further, a vote of stakeholders and adoption by the NERC Board is required before NERC submits
the Reliability Standard to the Commission for approval.
C.

Order No. 822 Directives

In Order No. 822, the Commission approved revisions to seven CIP Reliability Standards
to help improve the base-line cybersecurity posture of Responsible Entities. Among other things,
the approved revisions, filed in response to Order No. 791, included (1) enhanced security controls
for low impact BES Cyber Systems related to cyber security awareness, physical security,
electronic access control, and Cyber Security Incident response; and (2) mandatory protections for
Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media used for high and medium impact BES Cyber
Systems.
Pursuant to FPA Section 215(d)(5), in Order No. 822, the Commission also directed NERC
to develop the following modifications to improve the CIP Reliability Standards, among other
things:
•

Clarify the electronic access control requirements for low impact BES Cyber Systems by
modifying the NERC Glossary definition for LERC to reflect the commentary in the
Guidelines and Technical Basis section of CIP-003-6 and eliminate ambiguity
surrounding the term “direct” as it is used in the LERC definition. 27

•

Develop modifications to address the protection of transient electronic devices used at
low impact BES Cyber Systems. 28

•

Develop modifications to protect communication links and sensitive BES data
communicated between Control Centers. 29

27

Order No. 822 at P 73.

28

Id. at P 32.

29

Id. at P 53.

10

NERC was directed to file the modification related to LERC within one year of the
effective date of Order No. 822, which is March 31, 2017. No deadline was set for filing
modifications to address the other directives. This Petition addresses modifications associated with
the LERC and transient electronic device directives. NERC is currently developing modifications
to the CIP Reliability Standards to address the directive related to communication links and
sensitive BES data. Additional information on the LERC and transient electronic device directives
is set forth below.
1. LERC Directive
As noted above, Commission-approved Reliability Standard CIP-003-6 requires
Responsible Entities to implement electronic access controls to permit only necessary inbound and
outbound access to low impact BES Cyber Systems for certain communications using routable
protocol. Specifically, Section 3 of Attachment 1 to CIP-003-6 provides, in relevant part:
Section 3. Electronic Access Controls: Each Responsible Entity shall:
3.1

For LERC, if any, implement a LEAP to permit only necessary
inbound and outbound bi-directional routable protocol access; and

The purpose of the LERC definition is to delineate the circumstances under which
Responsible Entities are required to establish electronic access controls for low impact BES Cyber
Systems that have bi-directional routable protocol communication with devices external to the
asset containing the low impact BES Cyber Systems. LERC is defined in the NERC Glossary as
follows:
Direct user-initiated interactive access or a direct device-to-device connection to a
low impact BES Cyber System(s) from a Cyber Asset outside the asset containing
those low impact BES Cyber System(s) via a bidirectional routable protocol
connection. Point-to-point communications between intelligent electronic devices
that use routable communication protocols for time-sensitive protection or control
functions between Transmission station or substation assets containing low impact
BES Cyber Systems are excluded from this definition (examples of this
11

communication include, but are not limited to, IEC 61850 GOOSE or vendor
proprietary protocols).
In the Commission’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NOPR”) in Docket No. RM15-14000, the Commission requested comment on the clarity of the proposed LERC definition. 30
Specifically, the Commission sought comment on: (1) the purpose of the meaning of the term
“direct” in relation to the phrases “direct user-initiated interactive access” and “direct device-todevice connection” within the proposed definition; and (2) the implementation of the “layer 7
application layer break” contained in certain reference diagrams in the Guidelines and Technical
Basis section of Reliability Standard CIP-003-6. 31
In its NOPR Comments, NERC explained that the intent of the proposed LERC definition
and Section 3 of Attachment 1 to CIP-003-6 was to require Responsible Entities to implement
security controls (i.e., a LEAP) where no such controls or other barriers to electronic access would
otherwise exist. As discussed in the Guidelines and Technical Basis section, the purpose of using
the term “direct” in the LERC definition was to distinguish between the scenarios where an
external user or device could electronically access the low impact BES Cyber System without a
security break (i.e., “direct” access) from those situations where an external user or device could
only access the low impact BES Cyber System following a security break (i.e., “indirect” access). 32
The standard drafting team for Reliability Standard CIP-003-6 then designed the electronic access
requirements for low impact BES Cyber Systems such that if an external user or device could
connect to the low impact BES Cyber System without a security break, then the entity should
implement a LEAP to control communication into either the asset containing low impact BES

30

Revised Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 152
FERC ¶ 61,054, at PP 69-70, 80 Fed. Reg. 43,354 (2015).
31

NOPR at P 70.

32

NOPR Comments at 28-30.

12

Cyber System(s) or to the low impact BES Cyber System. In contrast, if an external user or device
could access the low impact BES Cyber System only following a security break, such that there
were existing defenses to prevent connecting to the low impact BES Cyber System, then there is
no need to implement a LEAP. Under either scenario, the standard drafting team concluded there
would be sufficient barriers to accessing low impact BES Cyber Systems. 33
NERC further explained, consistent with statements in the Guidelines and Technical Basis
section, that LERC exists where communication from an external user or device flows through an
intermediate Cyber Asset (e.g., an IP/Serial converter) and the intermediate Cyber Asset only does
a “pass-through” of the communication (i.e., it does nothing more than extend the communication
between the low impact BES Cyber System and the Cyber Asset external to the asset containing
the low impact BES Cyber System). Only where the intermediate Cyber Asset provides a complete
security break (i.e., prevents extending access to the low impact BES Cyber System from the
external Cyber Asset) is there no LERC. In that scenario, NERC explained, there is no need to
implement a LEAP as the security break provides sufficient protection commensurate to the risks
presented by low impact BES Cyber Systems. The reference to the layer 7 application break in the
Guidelines and Technical Basis section was used to demonstrate that if an entity implemented such
a break to provide a complete security break, there would be no LERC.
In Order No. 822, the Commission concluded that it is necessary to modify the LERC
definition to reflect the commentary in the Guidelines and Technical Basis section of CIP-003-6
so as to provide needed clarity to the definition and eliminate ambiguity surrounding the term

33

For instance, if the external user or device could connect to a low impact BES Cyber System only after
going through another Cyber Asset, the user or device would have to know about that intermediate Cyber Asset and
then figure out how to access the low impact BES Cyber System from the intermediate Cyber Asset, which provides
a similar barrier to access that a LEAP is intended to provide.

13

“direct” as it is used in the proposed definition. 34 The Commission fundamentally agreed with
NERC that, as clarified in the Guidelines and Technical Basis section and NERC’s pleadings, the
construct established in CIP-003-6 provided sufficient electronic access protections for low impact
BES Cyber Systems. 35
2. Transient Electronic Device Directive
In Order No. 822, the Commission approved revisions to Reliability Standards CIP-010-2
to include mandatory protections for Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media used for high
and medium impact BES Cyber Systems. The Commission also directed NERC to include
mandatory protections for transient electronic devices used for low impact BES Cyber Systems,
concluding that it “will provide an important enhancement to the security posture of the BES by
reinforcing the defense-in-depth nature of the CIP Reliability Standards at all impact levels.” 36
The Commission stated that “the modifications developed by NERC should be designed to
effectively address the risks posed by transient electronic devices to Low Impact BES Cyber
Systems in a manner that is consistent with the risk-based approach reflected in the CIP version 5
Standards.” 37 The Commission recognized that the protections for transient electronic devices
used at low impact BES Cyber Systems “may be less stringent than the provisions that apply to
medium and high impact BES Cyber Systems – commensurate with the risk.” 38

34

Order No. 822 at P 73.

35

Order No. 822 at P 75.

36

Id. at P 32.

37

Id. at P 32

38

Id. at P 35.

14

D.

Development of the Proposed Reliability Standards

As further described in Exhibit G hereto, following the issuance of Order No. 822, NERC
initiated a standard development project, Project 2016-02 Modifications to CIP Standards
(“Project 2016-02”), to address the directives from Order No. 822 as well as issues identified
during implementation of the CIP Reliability Standards approved in Order No. 791.
Given the filing deadline associated with the LERC directive, NERC prioritized
development of revisions to address that directive. On July 21, 2016, NERC posted the initial draft
of proposed Reliability Standard CIP-003-7 addressing only the LERC directive for a 45-day
comment period and ballot. The initial ballot did not receive the requisite stakeholder approval.
After considering comments to the initial draft, NERC posted a second draft of CIP-003-7 for
another 45-day comment period and ballot on October 21, 2016. The second draft received the
requisite stakeholder approval with an affirmative vote of 85.56%. NERC conducted a final ballot
of this draft, which received an affirmative vote of 87.95%.
During the development of the second draft of CIP-003-7, the standard drafting team also
began to develop language in response to the transient electronic device directive. On November
1, 2016, NERC posted draft revisions to CIP-003-7 to also address the transient electronic device
directive for a 17-day informal comment period. On December 12, 2016, after considering
comments received on the informal posting, NERC posted a third draft of CIP-003-7 that included
the modifications to address the LERC directive, which had already received the requisite
stakeholder approval, as well as modifications to address the transient electronic device directive
for a 45-day comment period and ballot. 39 This draft received the requisite stakeholder approval,

39

During development, the third draft of CIP-003-7 was balloted as CIP-003-7(i). Romanette (i) was included
in the version numbering to differentiate it from the earlier ballot of CIP-003-7 that only addressed the LERC
directive.

15

with an affirmative vote of 81.30%. The final ballot for this draft of CIP-003-7, presented herein
for Commission approval, received an affirmative stakeholder vote of 78.55%. The Board adopted
proposed Reliability Standard CIP-003-7 on February 9, 2017.
IV.

JUSTIFICATION FOR APPROVAL
As discussed below and in Exhibit C, the proposed Reliability Standard satisfies the

Commission’s criteria in Order No. 672 and is just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory, or
preferential, and in the public interest. The following section provides an explanation of the
manner in which the proposed Reliability Standard addresses the Order No. 822 directives related
to electronic access and transient electronic devices for low impact BES Cyber Systems.
A.

Electronic Access Controls for Low Impact BES Cyber Systems

As noted above, in response to the Commission’s directive to modify the LERC definition,
NERC proposes to: (1) retire the NERC Glossary terms LERC and LEAP; and (2) modify Section
3 of Attachment 1 to Reliability Standard CIP-003-7 to more clearly delineate the circumstances
under which Responsible Entities must establish electronic access controls for low impact BES
Cyber Systems. The proposed retirement of LERC and LEAP and modifications to Section 3 of
Attachment 1 are designed to simplify the electronic access control requirements for low impact
BES Cyber Systems to avoid the ambiguities associated with the term “direct” and help ensure
that Responsible Entities implement the required security controls effectively. NERC recognized
that distinguishing between “direct” and “indirect” electronic access within the LERC definition
added a layer of unnecessary complexity to identifying the circumstances under which entities
must establish electronic access protection.
As discussed below, proposed Reliability Standard CIP-003-7 presents a straightforward
approach, requiring Responsible Entities to implement electronic access controls for any
communication, whether direct or indirect, between a low impact BES Cyber System and a Cyber
16

Asset outside the asset containing low impact BES Cyber System that use a routable protocol when
entering or leaving the asset containing the low impact BES Cyber System. The proposed
modifications to Section 3 of Attachment 1 improve the clarity of the electronic access
requirements by untangling the type of communications requiring electronic access controls from
whether controls are already in place to address that communication. The existence of a complete
security break (i.e., indirect access) is simply treated as another form of electronic access control
that is intended to meet the security objective. The proposed approach avoids overemphasis on
identifying LERC and focuses Responsible Entities on the security objective of controlling
electronic access to permit only necessary inbound and outbound electronic access to low impact
BES Cyber Systems.
Proposed Section 3 of Attachment 1 to CIP-003-7 provides as follows:
Section 3.

Electronic Access Controls: For each asset containing low impact BES
Cyber System(s) identified pursuant to CIP-002, the Responsible Entity
shall implement electronic access controls to:

3.1

Permit only necessary inbound and outbound electronic access as
determined by the Responsible Entity for any communications that are:

3.2

i.

between a low impact BES Cyber System(s) and a Cyber Asset(s)
outside the asset containing low impact BES Cyber System(s);

ii.

using a routable protocol when entering or leaving the asset
containing the low impact BES Cyber System(s); and

iii.

not used for time-sensitive protection or control functions between
intelligent electronic devices (e.g., communications using protocol
IEC TR-61850-90-5 R-GOOSE).

Authenticate all Dial-up Connectivity, if any, that provides access to low
impact BES Cyber System(s), per Cyber Asset capability.

The following is a discussion of each of the basic elements in Section 3 of Attachment 1
and the manner in which the proposed modifications improve the Reliability Standard. As NERC
is not proposing any substantive modifications to Section 3.2 of Attachment 1 regarding Dial-up
17

connectivity, the following discussion focuses on the modifications related to Section 3.1. As
discussed below, there are three basic elements to Section 3.1: (1) identifying routable protocol
communications from outside the asset containing the low impact BES Cyber System; (2)
determining necessary inbound and outbound electronic access; and (3) implementing electronic
access controls to permit only necessary inbound and outbound electronic access to the low impact
BES Cyber System. Each of these elements is discussed below, in turn.
i.

Identifying Routable Protocol Communications
As in Commission-approved Reliability Standard CIP-003-6, the initial step in determining

whether a Responsible Entity must implement electronic access controls for its low impact BES
Cyber systems under Section 3.1 of Attachment 1 to proposed CIP-003-7 is to identify whether
there are any communications requiring electronic access controls. Whereas Reliability Standard
CIP-003-6 references the LERC definition to define those communications, proposed Reliability
Standard CIP-003-7 defines those circumstances within Section 3.1. Section 3.1 provides that
communications with the following characteristics are subject to the electronic access control
requirements, each of which had been included in the LERC definition:
(1) The communication is between the low impact BES Cyber System and a Cyber Asset
outside the asset containing low impact BES Cyber System.
(2) The communication uses a routable protocol when entering or leaving the asset
containing the low impact BES Cyber System.
(3) The communication is not used for time-sensitive protection or control functions
between intelligent electronic devices (e.g., communications using protocol IEC TR61850-90-5 R-GOOSE).

18

As NERC previously explained in discussing the LERC definition, the first characteristic
helps to properly focus the electronic access controls. 40 Specifically, considering the wide array of
low impact BES Cyber Systems and the risk-based approach to protecting different types of BES
Cyber Systems, the requirement focuses the electronic access controls on communication between
the low impact BES Cyber System and a Cyber Asset outside the asset containing the low impact
BES Cyber System and not on inter-asset communication. From a risk perspective, controlling the
accessibility to or from the asset containing the low impact BES Cyber System significantly
reduces the scale of threats to low impact BES Cyber Systems.
As with the LERC definition, given the various types of assets containing low impact BES
Cyber Systems, proposed Section 3.1 does not specify a bright line rule as to what constitutes
communication from outside the asset. In demonstrating compliance with Section 3 of Attachment
1, Responsible Entities would be required to show the manner in which they identify external
communications. Whether the Responsible Entity uses a logical border as a demarcation point or
some other understanding of what is inside or outside the asset, it would have to provide a
reasonable justification for its determination.
The second characteristic provides that the communication use a routable protocol when
entering or leaving the asset because routable connections present increased risks to the security
of the BES Cyber System and require additional protections. Whereas the LERC definition uses
the phrase “bi-directional routable protocol connection,” proposed Section 3.1 uses the phrase
“uses routable protocol when entering or leaving the asset.” The modification recognizes that
Responsible Entity’s may use a uni-directional gateway to control electronic access. The intent,

40

Petition of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation for Approval of Proposed Critical
Infrastructure Reliability Standards CIP-003-6, CIP-004-6, CIP-006-6, CIP-007-6, CIP-009-6, CIP-010-2, AND
CIP-011-2 at 29, Docket No. RM15-14-000 (Feb. 13, 2015).

19

however, is the same. Namely, if communication with a low impact BES Cyber System involves
routable connections to or from the asset containing the low impact BES Cyber System, the
Responsible Entity must implement protections, such as a uni-directional gateway, to address the
risk of uncontrolled communication.
As to the third characteristic, the exclusion of communications for time-sensitive protection
or control functions between intelligent electronic devices was included in proposed Section 3.1,
as in the LERC definition, so as not to inhibit the functionality of the time-sensitive requirements
related to this technology nor to preclude the use of such time-sensitive reliability enhancing
functions if they use a routable protocol in the future. The time-sensitive communications subject
to the exclusion typically have communication delay allowances of less than 10 milliseconds. The
standard drafting team was concerned that the introduction of the required access control
processing would unacceptably impact the communications throughput in some cases. As
explained in the Guidelines and Technical Basis section:
Time-sensitive in this context generally means functions that would be negatively
impacted by the latency introduced in the communications by the required
electronic access controls. This time-sensitivity exclusion does not apply to
SCADA communications which typically operate on scan rates of 2 seconds or
greater. While technically time-sensitive, SCADA communications over routable
protocols can withstand the delay introduced by electronic access controls.
Examples of excluded time-sensitive communications are those communications
which may necessitate the tripping of a breaker within a few cycles.
If a Responsible Entity invokes this exclusion, may have to demonstrate to the ERO that applying
electronic access controls would introduce latency that would negatively impact functionality.
The language in proposed Reliability Standard CIP-003-7 for the exclusion is different
from the language in the LERC definition but was not intended to substantially modify the
exclusion. Specifically, NERC removed the reference to “Transmission stations” to allow for the

20

exemption to apply to communications to a generation station and a control center, and modified
the reference to “61850” to provide additional clarity.
As discussed above, the most significant difference between the LERC definition and the
communications described in proposed Section 3.1 is that proposed Section 3.1 does not include
“direct user‐initiated interactive access or a direct device‐to‐device connection” as a characteristic
for determining whether the communication is subject to electronic access controls. This
modification does not change the electronic access control protections afforded to low impact BES
Cyber Systems. Any communication, whether direct or indirect, using routable protocol from
outside the asset is subject to the requirement to implement electronic access controls, unless the
communication meets time-sensitive exclusion described above. Under proposed Reliability
Standard CIP-003-7, implementing a security break would be a form of electronic access control
that may be implemented to meet the objective of the requirement. By untangling the type of
communications requiring electronic access controls from whether controls are already in place to
address that communication, the proposed modifications establish a more straightforward
approach that avoids confusion and helps promotes effective implementation.
ii.

Determining Necessary Inbound and Outbound Electronic Access

As in Reliability Standard CIP-003-6, after identifying whether the communication is
subject to electronic access controls, the next step is for Responsible Entities to determine whether
to permit electronic access to or from the low impact BES Cyber System for the communicatio n.
Specifically, Section 3.1 provides that for communications subject to this requirement,
Responsible Entities may “permit only necessary inbound and outbound electronic access as
determined by the Responsible Entity.”
Considering the wide array of assets containing low impact BES Cyber Systems and the
myriad of reasons a Responsible Entity may need to allow electronic access to or from a low impact
21

BES Cyber System, Section 3.1 does not specify a bright line as to what constitutes “necessary
inbound and outbound access.” Entities have the flexibility to identify the necessary electronic
access to meet their business and operational needs. To demonstrate compliance with Section 3.1,
however, a Responsible Entity must document the necessity of its inbound and outbound electronic
access permissions and provide justification of the need for such access. 41 Provided the
Responsible Entity documents a reasonable business or operational need for the electronic access
consistent with the security objective of the requirement, the ERO would not override the
Responsible Entity’s determination.

42

Absent a documented, reasonable justification for

permitting electronic access, the ERO may find that the Responsible Entity was not compliant with
Section 3.1.
During development of proposed Reliability Standard CIP-003-7, there were questions
about the addition and meaning of the phrase “as determined by the Responsible Entity” in Section
3.1, as such language is not in Section 3.1 of CIP-003-6. In short, the purpose of the phrase is to
indicate that the determination as to whether electronic access is necessary is to be made in the
first instance by the Responsible Entity given the facts and circumstances of each case. The use of
that phrase does not preclude the ERO from engaging in effective compliance oversight of the
electronic access requirements in CIP-003-7. Specifically, when assessing compliance with

41

As the standard drafting team stated in the Guidelines and Technical Bases section for CIP-003-7,
“[h]owever the Responsible Entity chooses to document the inbound and outbound access permissions and the need,
the intent is that the Responsible Entity is able to explain the reasons for the electronic access permitted.”
(Emphasis added)
42

As such, the draft of the Reliability Standard Audit Worksheet (“RSAW”) for CIP-003-7 provides as
follows in the Note to Auditor section for Requirement R2: “The entity must document its determination as to what
is necessary inbound and outbound electronic access and provide justification of the business need for such access.
Once this determination has been made and documented, the audit team’s professional judgment cannot override the
determination made by the Responsible Entity.” The draft RSAW is available at
http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Project%20201602%20Modifications%20to%20CIP%20Standards%20DL/RSAW_
CIP-003-7(i)_v2_Clean_01202017.pdf.

22

Section 3.1, the ERO has the authority to review the Responsible Entity’s documented justification
for permitting the electronic access and to determine whether it is a reasonable exercise of the
entity’s discretion in light of the reliability objective of the requirement. As noted above, a failure
to provide a reasonable justification may result in a finding of noncompliance.
The phrase “as determined by the Responsible Entity” or substantially similar language is
used in 11 other instances in the Commission-approved CIP Reliability Standards, including
Section 2 of Attachment 1 to Reliability Standard CIP-003-6, which provides:
Each Responsible Entity shall control physical access, based on need as determined
by the Responsible Entity [emphasis added], to (1) the asset or the locations of the
low impact BES Cyber Systems within the asset, and (2) the Cyber Asset(s), as
specified by the Responsible Entity, that provide electronic access control(s)
implemented for Section 3.1, if any.
In addition, the phrase “as determined by the Responsible Entity” or substantially similar language
is used in the following instances in the CIP Reliability Standards: CIP-004-6, Requirement R4,
Part 4.1; CIP-004-6, Requirement R4, Part 4.3; CIP-004-6, Requirement R4, Part 4.4; CIP-004-6,
Requirement R4, Part 5.2; CIP-004-6, Requirement R4, Part 5.5; CIP-007-6, Requirement R1, Part
1.1; CIP-007-6, Requirement R1, Part 4.2; CIP-007-6, Requirement R4, Part 4.4; CIP-008-5,
Requirement R3, Part 3.2; and CIP-009-6, Requirement R3, Part 3.2. Substantially similar
language is also used in Commission-approved Reliability Standards IRO-002-4, Requirement R3;
IRO-010-2, Requirement R1, Part 1.1; and TOP-003-3, Requirement R1, Part 1.1.
In each instance in which the “as determined by” or substantially similar language is used,
the ERO has the authority to evaluate the reasonableness of the Responsible Entity’s determination
when assessing compliance to ensure it is consistent with the reliability objective of the
requirement. To interpret this language otherwise would be inconsistent with NERC’s statutory

23

obligation to engage in meaningful compliance oversight and the long-standing rule of statutory
construction that requires courts to construe statutory language to avoid absurd results. 43
For example, if the “as determined by” language in Section 2 of Attachment 1 to CIP-0036 is interpreted to preclude the ERO from assessing the reasonableness of a Responsible Entity’s
determination as to whom to provide physical access to low impact BES Cyber Systems, a
Responsible Entity could comply with the Reliability Standard even if it granted physical access
to individuals based on the letter of the alphabet with which their last name begins. Implementing
the requirement in this manner would be inconsistent with the security objective of the
requirement, yet the ERO would have no authority to find the Responsible Entity noncompliant if
it could not assess the reasonableness of the Responsible Entity’s determination of need. Language
in a Reliability Standard should not be read to allow for such a patently absurd result and limit the
ERO’s and the Commission’s statutory authority to engage in meaningful compliance oversight
and enforcement. Accordingly, when enforcing Sections 2 and 3 of Attachment 1 to CIP-003-7, as
well as the other requirements that include the “as determined by” or substantially similar
language, NERC would assess the reasonableness of the Responsible Entity’s determination in
light of the reliability and security objective in the requirement.

43
Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551
U.S. 47, 59-61 (2007); Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 533-534 (2004); United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68-69 (1994); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989); United States
ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 494-95 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Moreover, even in absence of a plainly
absurd result, courts construe statutes so as to further the statutory purpose. K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S.
281, 316 (1988); Dolan v. Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006); Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F.,
526 U.S. 66, 73 (1999); McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139 (1991); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152,
158 (1990); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982); RICHARD J. P IERCE, FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 567-69 (2010 ed.); Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 405, 425-428 (1989).

24

iii.

Implementation of Electronic Access Controls

The last element of Section 3.1 is to implement electronic access controls to permit only
necessary electronic access to or from the low impact BES Cyber System. Whereas Reliability
Standard CIP-003-6 references the LEAP definition, proposed CIP-003-7 replaces the reference
to LEAP with a statement that Responsible Entities must “implement electronic access controls to
permit only necessary inbound and outbound access….” The reference to LEAP was replaced
because there are many different technical solutions that can be used to implement electronic
access controls in addition to implementing a LEAP. The proposed modifications and the
retirement of LEAP, however, do not fundamentally alter the security objective of, or the controls
required by, Section 3 of Attachment 1. In short, once a Responsible Entity determines that there
is communication between a low impact BES Cyber System and a Cyber Asset outside the asset
containing the low impact BES Cyber System that uses a routable protocol when entering or
leaving the asset, the Responsible Entity must implement an electronic access control to permit
only necessary inbound and outbound electronic access.
As in Reliability Standard CIP-003-6, Responsible Entities have the flexibility under the
proposed Reliability Standard to determine the controls necessary to meet this security objective.
In the Guidelines and Technical Basis section, the standard drafting team provided conceptual
illustrations of various electronic access controls that, if implemented effectively, may meet the
security objective. Examples include, among other things:
•

Implementation of a host-based firewall technology on the low impact BES Cyber
System(s) itself that manages the inbound and outbound electronic access permissions so
that only necessary inbound and outbound electronic access is permitted to the low impact
BES Cyber Asset.

•

Use of a security device that permits only necessary inbound and outbound electronic access
to the low impact BES Cyber Asset, or to the network to which the low impact BES Cyber
Asset is connected.

25

•

Use of a non-BES Cyber Asset that requires authentication for communication from Cyber
Assets outside the asset containing the low impact BES Cyber System before allowing the
connection to the low impact BES Cyber Asset to be established.

•

Physical or logical isolation of the low impact BES Cyber System from other communications.

In assessing compliance with Section 3 of Attachment 1 to proposed Reliability Standard CIP003-7, the ERO would evaluate the manner in which the Responsible Entity implemented its
electronic access controls to determine whether it meets the security objective.
Lastly, with the proposed retirement of the LEAP definition, NERC is also proposing
modifications to Section 2 of Attachment 1 (physical security controls) to replace references to
LEAP with the more generic phrase “the Cyber Asset(s), as specified by the Responsible Entity,
that provide electronic access control(s) implemented for Section 3.1, if any.” This proposed
modification does not substantively modify the obligation from CIP-003-6 to implement physical
access controls for those Cyber Assets that control electronic access to low impact BES Cyber
Systems.
B.

Protection of Transient Electronic Devices Used for Low Impact BES Cyber
Systems

Consistent with the Commission’s directive in Order No. 822, proposed Reliability
Standard CIP-003-7 includes mandatory protections for transient electronic devices used at low
impact BES Cyber Systems. Specifically, NERC proposes to add a fifth section to Attachment 1
to CIP-003-7 to require entities to include in their cyber security plans controls to mitigate the risk
of the introduction of malicious code to low impact BES Cyber Systems through the use of
Transient Cyber Assets or Removable Media. Proposed Section 5 of Attachment 1 provides as
follows:
Section 5.

Transient Cyber Asset and Removable Media Malicious Code Risk
Mitigation: Each Responsible Entity shall implement, except under CIP
Exceptional Circumstances, one or more plan(s) to achieve the objective of
mitigating the risk of the introduction of malicious code to low impact BES
26

Cyber Systems through the use of Transient Cyber Assets or Removable
Media. The plan(s) shall include:
5.1

5.2

5.3

For Transient Cyber Asset(s) managed by the Responsible Entity, if
any, the use of one or a combination of the following in an ongoing
or on-demand manner (per Transient Cyber Asset capability):
•

Antivirus software, including manual or managed updates of
signatures or patterns;

•

Application whitelisting; or

•

Other method(s) to mitigate the introduction of malicious code.

For Transient Cyber Asset(s) managed by a party other than the
Responsible Entity, if any, the use of one or a combination of the
following prior to connecting the Transient Cyber Asset to a low
impact BES Cyber System (per Transient Cyber Asset capability):
•

Review of antivirus update level;

•

Review of antivirus update process used by the party;

•

Review of application whitelisting used by the party;

•

Review use of live operating system and software executable
only from read-only media;

•

Review of system hardening used by the party; or

•

Other method(s) to mitigate the introduction of malicious code.

For Removable Media, the use of each of the following:
5.3.1

Method(s) to detect malicious code on Removable Media
using a Cyber Asset other than a BES Cyber System; and

5.3.2

Mitigation of the threat of detected malicious code on the
Removable Media prior to connecting Removable Media to
a low impact BES Cyber System.

Requiring the Responsible Entity to develop and implement these controls will provide enhanced
protections against the propagation of malware from transient electronic devices.
The language in proposed Section 5 parallels the Commission-approved language in
Attachment 1 to Reliability Standard CIP-010-2 related to mitigating the risks of the introduction
27

of malicious code to high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems through the use of Transient
Cyber Assets and Removable Media. As in Reliability Standard CIP-010-2, proposed Section 5 of
Attachment 1 to CIP-003-7 distinguishes between Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media
and between Transient Cyber Assets managed by the Responsible Entity and those managed by a
party other than the Responsible Entity. The security controls required for a particular transient
electronic device must account for the functionality of that device and, for Transient Cyber Assets,
whether the Responsible Entity or another party manages the device. Because Transient Cyber
Assets and Removable Media have different capabilities, they present different levels of risk to the
BES, and the protections required under the proposed Reliability Standards must reflect those
differences. Similarly, because a Responsible Entity lacks complete control over Transient Cyber
Assets managed by a third party, it may not be able to implement the same controls for those
devices as it does for the devices it manages. The Responsible Entity, however, still has the
responsibility to mitigate the risks associated with Transient Cyber Assets managed by a third
party prior to connection. 44
Further, as in Reliability Standard CIP-010-2, proposed Section 5 of Attachment 1 does
not prescribe a standard method or set of controls that each Responsible Entity must implement to
protect its transient electronic devices. Instead, Section 5 requires Responsible Entities to meet
certain security objectives by implementing the controls that the Responsible Entity determines
necessary to meet its affirmative obligation to mitigate the risks of the introduction of malicious
code. This approach provides the Responsible Entity the flexibility to implement the controls that
best suit the needs and characteristics of its organization. To comply with the requirements in

44

Given the functionality of Removable Media, the standard drafting team concluded that it was not
necessary to distinguish between Removable Media managed by the responsible entity and those managed by a third
party. That is because, no matter who manages Removable Media, the same type of security controls can be applied
(e.g., the scanning of a thumb drive prior to connection).

28

Section 5, however, the Responsible Entity must demonstrate that its selected controls were
designed to meet the security objective to mitigate the risk of the introduction of malicious code.
In contrast to Attachment 1 of Reliability Standard CIP-010-2, Section 5 of Attachment 1
to CIP-003-7 does not include requirements related to authorization or software vulnerabilities.
Consistent with the risk-based approach of the CIP Reliability Standards and the underlying
principle of concentrating limited industry resources on protecting those BES Cyber Systems with
greater risks to the BES, proposed Section 5 focuses directly on the primary risk associated with
the use of Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media, which is the introduction of malicious
code. The protections required in proposed Section 5 are commensurate to the cybersecurity risk
of low impact BES Cyber Systems and would not divert Responsible Entities’ focus from the
protection of high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems. As the Commission recognized in
Order No. 791, the requirements applicable to low impact BES Cyber Systems, given their lower
risk profile, should not be overly burdensome to divert resources from the protection of medium
and high impact BES Cyber Systems. 45
Further, as compared to the requirements in Attachment 1 to CIP-010-2, proposed Section
5 of Attachment 1 to CIP-003-7 does not include language explicitly stating that for the method(s)
used to mitigate the introduction of malicious code from Transient Cyber Assets managed by a
party other than the Responsible Entity, the Responsible Entity shall determine whether any
additional mitigation actions are necessary and implement such actions prior to connecting the
Transient Cyber Assets. Nevertheless, NERC’s expectation is that if another party’s processes and
practices for protecting its Transient Cyber Assets do not provide reasonable assurance that they

45
Order No. 791 at P 111 (finding that it would be unduly burdensome to require responsible entities to create
and maintain an inventory of Low Impact assets for audit purposes).

29

are designed to effectively meet the security objective of mitigating the introduction of malicious
code, the Responsible Entity must take additional steps to meet the stated objective. In assessing
compliance with the proposed Reliability Standard, NERC will focus on whether the Responsible
Entity implemented one or more controls designed to achieve the security objective. Accordingly,
if a Responsible Entity reviews the policies and practices of another party and those practices and
policies do not provide reasonable assurance that the party’s transient electronic devices would be
protected from malicious code, simply reviewing those policies and procedures without taking
other steps to mitigate the risks of introduction of malicious code may not constitute compliance.
In addition to the modifications in Attachment 1 to CIP-003-7, NERC also proposes
modifications to the definitions of Transient Cyber Asset and Removable Media to accommodate
the use of those terms for all impact levels. As those definitions were originally drafted for use of
transient electronic devices at high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems only, they include
references to other NERC Glossary terms – Electronic Security Perimeter and Protected Cyber
Asset – that specifically relate to concepts or requirements associated with high and medium
impact BES Cyber Systems only. So as to avoid confusion as to the application of Electronic
Security Perimeters and Protected Cyber Assets at low impact BES Cyber Systems, the definitions
of Transient Cyber Asset and Removable Media were modified.
As provided in Exhibit B hereto, the proposed definition for Transient Cyber Asset is as
follows:
A Cyber Asset that is:
1. capable of transmitting or transferring executable code,
2. not included in a BES Cyber System,
3. not a Protected Cyber Asset (PCA) associated with high or medium
impact BES Cyber Systems, and
30

4. directly connected (e.g., using Ethernet, serial, Universal Serial Bus, or
wireless including near field or Bluetooth communication) for 30
consecutive calendar days or less to a:
•

BES Cyber Asset,

•

network within an Electronic Security Perimeter (ESP) containing
high or medium impact BES Cyber Systems, or

•

PCA associated with high or medium impact BES Cyber Systems.

Examples of Transient Cyber Assets include, but are not limited to, Cyber Assets
used for data transfer, vulnerability assessment, maintenance, or troubleshooting
purposes.
Similarly, the proposed definition for Removable Media is as follows:
Storage media that:
1. are not Cyber Assets,
2. are capable of transferring executable code,
3. can be used to store, copy, move, or access data, and
4. are directly connected for 30 consecutive calendar days or less to a:
•

BES Cyber Asset, a

•

network within an Electronic Security Perimeter (ESP) containing
high or medium impact BES Cyber Systems, or a

•

Protected Cyber Asset associated with high or medium impact BES
Cyber Systems.

Examples of Removable Media include, but are not limited to, floppy disks,
compact disks, USB flash drives, external hard drives, and other flash memory
cards/drives that contain nonvolatile memory.
C.

CIP Exceptional Circumstance Policy

NERC also proposes revisions in Requirement R1 of CIP-003-7 to require Responsible
Entities to have a policy for declaring and responding to CIP Exceptional Circumstances related
to low impact BES Cyber Systems, as is already required for their high and medium impact BES
Cyber Systems. As defined in the NERC Glossary, a CIP Exceptional Circumstance is:
31

A situation that involves or threatens to involve one or more of the following, or
similar, conditions that impact safety or BES reliability: a risk of injury or death; a
natural disaster; civil unrest; an imminent or existing hardware, software, or
equipment failure; a Cyber Security Incident requiring emergency assistance; a
response by emergency services; the enactment of a mutual assistance agreement;
or an impediment of large scale workforce availability.
In the existing CIP Reliability Standards, a number of requirements applicable to high and
medium impact BES Cyber Systems specify that Responsible Entities need not implement (or
continue implementing) the requirement during CIP Exceptional Circumstances. 46 The purpose of
this exception is not to require implementation when the Responsible Entity would be physically
unable to implement due to the CIP Exceptional Circumstance or implementation would hinder
the Responsible Entity’s ability to timely and effectively respond to the CIP Exceptional
Circumstance. To that end, under Reliability Standard CIP-003-6, Requirement R1, Part 1.1, a
Responsible Entity must have cyber security policies for its high and medium impact BES Cyber
System that addresses, among other topics, declaring and responding to CIP Exceptional
Circumstances. These policies would outline the procedures Responsible Entities would take to
address a CIP Exceptional Circumstance in the context of its cyber security requirements.
As the existing requirements in CIP-003-6 applicable to low impact BES Cyber Systems
are not subject to CIP Exceptional Circumstances, such a policy was not included in CIP-003-6,
Requirement R1, Part 1.2 for low impact BES Cyber Systems. Now that the proposed requirements
related to transient electronic devices used at low impact BES Cyber Systems include an exception
for CIP Exceptional Circumstances, 47 NERC is proposing to add a new part to Requirement R1 of

46
See, e.g., CIP-004-6, Requirement R2, Part 2.2; CIP-004-6, Requirement R4, Part 4.1; CIP-006-6,
Requirement R2, Part 2.1.
47

The Commission-approved requirements applicable to the protection of transient electronic devices at high
and medium impact BES Cyber Systems also includes an exception for CIP Exceptional Circumstances. See CIP010-2, Requirement R4.

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CIP-003-7, Part 1.2.6, to require entities to have a CIP Exceptional Circumstance policy applicable
to low impact BES Cyber Systems.
V.

EFFECTIVE DATE
NERC respectfully requests that the Commission approve proposed Reliability Standard

CIP-003-7 and the revised definitions of Transient Cyber Asset and Removable Media to become
effective as set forth in the proposed Implementation Plan, provided in Exhibit C hereto. The
proposed Implementation Plan provides that the proposed Reliability Standard and revised
definitions shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is 18 calendar
months after the effective date of the Commission’s order approving the proposed Reliability
Standard. The 18-month implementation period is designed to afford Responsible Entities
sufficient time to revise their cyber security plans for low impact BES Cyber Systems under
proposed Reliability Standard CIP-003-7, Requirement R2 to account for the proposed
modifications and implement the required controls.
Additionally, as entities must implement the current version of Sections 2 and 3 of
Attachment 1 to Reliability Standard CIP-003-6 on September 1, 2018, the proposed
Implementation Plan provides that the compliance dates for CIP-003-6, Requirement R2,
Attachment 1, Sections 2 and 3 shall be replaced with the effective date of proposed Reliability
Standard CIP-003-7. This provision is to avoid the situation where Responsible Entities would
have to have their cyber security plans and implement electronic access protections using the
LERC and LEAP construct and then a short time later modify those plans to account for the
changes proposed herein.

33

Lastly, the Implementation Plan provides that Reliability Standard CIP-003-6 and the
current definitions of LERC, LEAP, Removable Media, and Transient Cyber Asset shall be retired
immediately prior to the effective date of proposed Reliability Standard CIP-003-7.
VI.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, NERC respectfully requests that the Commission approve:
•

proposed Reliability Standard CIP-003-7 and associated elements included in Exhibit
A, effective as proposed herein;

•

the proposed Implementation Plan included in Exhibit C;

•

the proposed revised definitions for removable Media and Transient Cyber Asset to
be incorporated into the NERC Glossary included in Exhibit B; and

•

the retirement of Reliability Standards CIP-003-6, and the current definitions for
LERC, LEAP, Removable Media, and Transient Cyber Asset, effective as proposed
herein.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Shamai Elstein
Shamai Elstein
Senior Counsel
Marisa Hecht
Counsel
North American Electric Reliability Corporation
1325 G Street, N.W., Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20005
202-400-3000
[email protected]
[email protected]
Counsel for the North American Electric Reliability Corporation

Date: March 3, 2017

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