Attachments to Oceana's Comment

The right whale mandatory ship
reporting system: a retrospective
Gregory K. Silber1 , Jeffrey D. Adams2 , Michael J. Asaro3 ,
Timothy V.N. Cole4 , Katie S. Moore5 , Leslie I. Ward-Geiger6 and
Barbara J. Zoodsma7
1 Office of Protected Resources, National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration, Silver Spring, MD, USA
2 Ocean Associates, Inc., Under Contract to Office of Protected Resources, National Marine

Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Silver Spring MD, USA
3 National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,

Gloucester, MA, USA
4 National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Woods

Hole, MA, USA
5 United States Coast Guard, Atlantic Area Command, Maritime Security & Law Enforcement

Section, Portsmouth, VA, USA
6 Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, Fish and Wildlife Research Institute,

St. Petersburg, FL, USA
7 National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,

Fernandina Beach, FL, USA

ABSTRACT

Submitted 8 December 2014
Accepted 10 March 2015
Published 31 March 2015
Corresponding author
Gregory K. Silber,
[email protected]
Academic editor
Mark Costello
Additional Information and
Declarations can be found on
page 18
DOI 10.7717/peerj.866
Copyright
2015 Silber et al.
Distributed under
Creative Commons CC-BY 4.0

In 1998, the United States sought and received International Maritime Organizationendorsement of two Mandatory Ship Reporting (MSR) systems designed to improve
mariner awareness about averting ship collisions with the endangered North Atlantic
right whale (Eubalaena glacialis). Vessel collisions are a serious threat to the right
whale and the program was among the first formal attempts to reduce this threat.
Under the provisions of the MSR, all ships >300 gross tons are required to report
their location, speed, and destination to a shore-based station when entering two
key right whale habitats: one in waters off New England and one off coastal Georgia
and Florida. In return, reporting ships receive an automatically-generated message,
delivered directly to the ship’s bridge, that provides information about right whale
vulnerability to vessel collisions and actions mariners can take to avoid collisions.
The MSR has been in operation continuously from July 1999 to the present. Archived
incoming reports provided a 15-plus year history of ship operations in these two
locations. We analyzed a total of 26,772 incoming MSR messages logged between
July 1999 and December 2013. Most ships that were required to report did so, and
compliance rates were generally constant throughout the study period. Self-reported
vessel speeds when entering the systems indicated that most ships travelled between
10 and 16 (range = 5–20+) knots. Ship speeds generally decreased in 2009 to 2013
following implementation of vessel speed restrictions. The number of reports into
the southern system remained relatively constant following a steady increase through
2007, but numbers in the northern system decreased annually beginning in 2008.
If reporting is indicative of long-term patterns in shipping operations, it reflects
noteworthy changes in marine transportation. Observed declines in ship traffic are
likely attributable to the 2008–2009 economic recession, the containerized shipping

OPEN ACCESS

How to cite this article Silber et al. (2015), The right whale mandatory ship reporting system: a retrospective. PeerJ 3:e866;
DOI 10.7717/peerj.866

industry making increased use of larger ships that made fewer trips, and diminished
oil/gas US imports as previously inaccessible domestic deposits were exploited. Recent declines in shipping activity likely resulted in lowered collision risks for right
whales and reduced their exposure to underwater noise from ships.
Subjects Conservation Biology, Marine Biology, Legal Issues, Science Policy
Keywords Endangered whale, US energy imports, North Atlantic right whale, Ship collisions,

International Maritime Organization, Shipping industry, Endangered whale, Underwater noise,
Economic recession

INTRODUCTION
By the mid-18th century, the North Atlantic right whale (Eubalaena glacialis) (hereafter
“right whale”) was depleted to near extinction by commercial whaling. Consequently, right
whales were among the first of the baleen whales to receive international protection. After
whaling for this species ended, attention turned to different threats: serious injury and
deaths caused by entanglement in commercial fishing gear and collisions with large ships
(Clapham, Young & Brownell, 1999; Kraus et al., 2005). Vessel collisions involving a number
of endangered large whale species are relatively common in US waters (Henry et al., 2012;
Laist et al., 2001; van der Hoop et al., 2014) and are regarded as a significant impediment to
the recovery of right whales (NMFS, 2005). In general, individuals of this species migrate in
coastal waters along the US eastern seaboard between feeding/socializing areas in waters off
New England and eastern Canada to/from nursery areas off the South Carolina to Florida
coasts. The right whale is vulnerable to collisions with vessels throughout its range, but
the threat may be particularly high in these aggregation areas where vessel traffic is also
concentrated (NMFS, 2005).
As one of the first efforts to reduce the threat of ship collisions with right whales, the
United States submitted a proposal to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in
June 1998 to establish two Mandatory Ship Reporting systems (MSR) (USG, 1998). The
goal of the MSR is to provide timely information about right whales and their vulnerability
to vessel strikes directly to individual vessels as they enter key right whale feeding and
nursery habitats.
The MSR proposal was approved by the IMO’s Subcommittee on Navigation in July
1998 and its Marine Safety Commmittee in December 1998 (Silber et al., 2012), becoming
the first time an IMO-endorsed measure was used to protect a particular marine species
(Johnson, 2004; Luster, 1999) and one of the first formal actions to reduce ship collisions
with the right whale. To implement the MSR, the US Coast Guard (USCG) issued a Final
Rule in the US Federal Register (USCG, 2001) that codified the systems by amending the
US Code of Federal Regulations (33 CFR 169). The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) then added the MSR areas to relevant nautical charts and
incorporated the new requirements into various navigational aids such as the US Coast
Pilot and elsewhere. As prescribed by the IMO, the two MSR systems became effective in

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Figure 1 Locations of the Mandatory Ship Reporting systems, Area To Be Avoided, and speed restriction seasonal management areas.

1 July 1999, and have been in operation continuously since that time. From July 1999 to
present, operation and administration of this program have been co-funded and -operated
by the USCG and NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). All ship-to-shore
and shore-to-ship communication costs are borne by these two agencies (including a
government contract to the communications provider).
Under the rule, self-propelled commercial ships ≥300 gross tons (gt) are required to
report to shore-based stations when they enter either of two regions off the eastern US
coast where and when right whales are known to occur: one off the state of Massachusetts
operating year-round (a total area of approx. 2,200 km2 ); the other, off the states of Georgia
and Florida, is operational annually from 15 November through 15 April (ca. 800 km2 )
(Silber et al., 2012) (Fig. 1). Reports are typically sent as text messages via INMARSAT-C
Internet (International Maritime Satellite) and include ship name, course, speed, and
destination among other things. Only reporting is required; no other aspect of vessel
operations is affected. Incoming reports were parsed and stored on a server for subsequent
analysis. An automatically-generated message is returned to the reporting vessel that

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includes information on locations of recently-sighted right whales; procedural guidance
to help prevent vessel/whale collisions; and information concerning additional regulations
(e.g., vessel speed restrictions) in place to protect whales from vessel strikes.
The dataset of incoming MSR reports represents a unique long-term record of vessel
activities in the areas, in that the system predates similar technologies (e.g., the Automatic
Identification System (AIS) and Long-Range Identification and Tracking) that are now
used for detailed monitoring of ship locations and operations. When the MSR was
established, minimal systematic data regarding vessels entering US ports existed—ships
were required only to establish radio contact with the captain of the port at least 24 h prior
to arrival. Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, systems
were developed to more closely monitor vessels making US port calls. Among these,
the USCG issued regulations requiring 96-hour notification from vessels (33 CFR 160)
(CFR, 2003), known as the Ship Arrival Notification System (SANS). Our study utilized
SANS data to assess vessel compliance with the MSR, as discussed below.
Here, we provide a cumulative summary of self-reported vessel activity entering key
right whale habitats from July 1999 through December 2013 derived from incoming MSR
reports. Our objectives in analyzing and presenting these data, while also recognizing their
limitations, were to (a) provide basic summary statistics and a general characterization of
vessel traffic in MSR areas since its inception; (b) indicate how trends in vessel activity may
reflect changes in various aspects of international shipping operations; and (c) describe
how changes in commercial shipping practices may have had unintended implications for
right whale conservation.

MATERIALS AND METHODS
Mandatory reporting information included the following: system location name
(i.e., WHALESNORTH or WHALESSOUTH), vessel name, INMARSAT (satellite
communication identification) number, vessel call sign, report date and time, entry
date and time, point of entry into these systems, vessel course (heading), vessel speed,
destination port, estimated time of arrival at destination, and routing information
(e.g., waypoints) (http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/shipstrike/msr.htm). At a minimum,
routing information was provided as a system entry location and a destination. Routing
information could also be provided as, or supplemented with, a series of waypoints.
Because the data are self-reported and manually entered, these data are not error-free.
As such, relevant data fields (entry date and time, entry location, vessel speed, destination
port, and routing information) from the MSR reports were vetted before conducting
analyses.

Data quality control
A number of data quality issues were identified when reviewing the incoming reports.
Determining whether these issues resulted from misinterpretations of the reporting
requirements or data entry issues was beyond the scope of this study. However, a number
of actions were taken to address reporting errors. Some reports were sent multiple times;
when duplicates were encountered only the most recently logged report was retained.

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Other reports contained missing entry date and time data or had entry date and time
values beyond the temporal bounds of the study period (July 1999 to December 2013).
These were removed from our analysis, as were messages that lacked entry latitude
and longitude values, had a value of 0 in the entry latitude and/or longitude field, or
had invalid entry latitude/longitude values (not between −90 to 90 or −180 to 180,
respectively). Reports with entry locations that were more than 5 nautical miles (nm)
from a MSR boundary were not included. Some messages contained entry locations
that were within 5 nm of a MSR system, but had identified the opposite system in their
report (e.g., WHALESNORTH vs. WHALESSOUTH). In these cases, the identified
MSR systems for these reports were changed to reflect the system corresponding to the
provided entry location. Review of destination port data revealed a number of typographic
errors and destination port name variants (e.g., BOSTON, BOSTONPILOT, BOSTOXN,
BOSTONMA, BOSTOON). Reasonable efforts were made to resolve these typographic
errors and variations.
To test whether transits associated with reported entry locations traveled through the
MSR, at least one additional valid location (destination port or waypoint) was required
so line features could be created and a spatial overlay performed (this was for validation
purposes only and are not presented here). For trips with destination ports located
within US waters, Morse Code Alpha (MoA) buoys associated with the port were used
as destination locations; the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, National Transportation
Atlas Database (NTAD) was used to determine coordinates for destination ports outside
the United States. Reports that did not include a valid entry location and at least one
additional valid location were removed from our analysis.
Line features were created for those reports containing a valid entry location and at
least one additional valid location. For simple transits (those reports that included only
an entry location and a destination port), line features were created by connecting a
rhumb line from the entry location directly to the destination location. Line features
for complex transits (those indicating an entry location and one or more waypoints) were
created by connecting rhumb lines between the entry location, provided waypoints, and
destination location (when available). For complex transits, initial waypoints that were
coincident with the entry location were removed. Similarly, final waypoints coincident to
provided destination locations were also removed. A spatial overlay was performed with
the resulting transits to determine if they intersected the MSR system associated with their
corresponding entry locations. Transits that did not intersect their corresponding MSR
system were removed from the analyses. In addition, a visual examination of the transit
line features indicated that some mariners submitted reports as they exited MSR systems
(reporting that is not required). To remove reports of outbound trips, we included only
those with at least 10 nm of travel within its corresponding MSR system.
Operators are also required to report vessel speed when entering the system. Some ships
that provided waypoints also indicated speeds for a subset or all of the waypoints; however,
for consistency purposes, only the entry speed (as required) was included in our analysis.

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Transits that met all of the previously described criteria for inclusion, but reported initial
speeds ≥50 knots were also excluded.
For the years 1999–2001, compliance requirements with the MSR were documented by
the USCG during routine vessel boarding inspections after a vessel arrived in port and were
conducted primarily in conjunction with safety and other vessel inspections. In these cases,
mariners were asked to provide a ‘hard-copy’ of the return message sent to the vessel via
the MSR. Since 2001, the USCG issued 106 civil penalties including warnings and financial
penalties to non-compliant mariners. From 2003 to present, SANS data were incorporated
into the MSR data base and compliance levels (i.e., each MSR vessel report as directly
compared to SANS reports) were computed automatically. Therefore, for compliance
rate information reported here, we used only 2003 to present data derived from these
SANS-MSR incoming reports comparisons, which we regard as an accurate measure of
compliance with the system.
From the vetted incoming reports, we analyzed the spatial and temporal distribution of
vessel activity, including: the number of reports, compliance, reported destinations, and
vessel entry speeds.

RESULTS
A total of 46,477 incoming MSR reports were logged between July 1999 and December
2013. Our data quality control eliminated 19,705 of these reports from analysis. We
removed 6,505 reports that were either duplicate reports, lacked date information or
indicated dates outside of the study period (July 1999 to January 2014), or whose entry
latitude and/or longitudes were either missing or invalid (Fig. 2 provides examples of
reports with erroneously indicated locations). As noted above, we restricted analyses to
reports that included at least one valid location (e.g., a destination or waypoint) other than
the entry location, provided an entry location within 5 nm of the MSR boundary, was
associated with an currently active MSR area (applies to WHALESSOUTH only), and in
which the ship made a trip that passed through the same MSR area as the area indicated in
the incoming report. Based on these criteria, 2,091 reports were removed because they did
not contain at least one valid location in addition to the entry location; 8,243 were excluded
because they did not have entry locations within 5 nm of the closest MSR boundary; and
2,032 were removed because they were reported for WHALESSOUTH when this system
was not active. We also eliminated 189 records because the trip did not intersect the MSR
area as indicated in the report. Another 487 records were removed because they contained
vessel speed values that were not between 0 and 50 knots; and 158 were excluded because
they represented outbound transits. In sum, a total of 26,772 reports were used in the
subsequent analyses.
Simple operator error appears to be responsible for a relatively large number of
incorrectly formatted reports. For example, the grid of reports that surrounds the
WHALESSOUTH reporting area, in which locations are offset by one latitude or longitude
digit from the reporting area boundary (Fig. 2) suggests that operators inadvertently
entered incorrect location information. In addition, a number of reports were submitted

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Figure 2 Locations of vessels reporting into WHALESSOUTH. Reports included in the analyses are
depicted by green circles. Reports were excluded from analysis if they described outbound trips (yellow
circles), were sent outside of the date ranges in which reporting was required (orange squares), or
contained starting locations that were >5 nm from the system boundary (blue circles). Of those reports
containing starting locations that were >5 nm from the system boundary, many appear to be the result
of (A) location data entry errors or (B) reports that were mistakenly provided when entering a North
Atlantic Right Whale Vessel Speed Restriction Seasonal Management Areas boundaries (B). Reports used
in this study are depicted by green circles. Criteria for selecting these reports are described in Methods.

by vessels when entering vessel speed seasonal management areas instead of MSR reporting
areas (Fig. 2).
Compliance with the south reporting system was below 70% for a number of years at
the outset of our study, but after 2006 compliance in both systems remained generally
constant, between 70% and 80%, each year thereafter (Fig. 3). With the exception
of years 1999–2002, the total number of vetted incoming reports was greater in the
WHALESSOUTH system than in the WHALESNORTH system (Fig. 4). The number of
reports for WHALESSOUTH (excluding 1999 which was a partial year of data collection)
ranged from 354 (in 2000) to 1,057 (in 2010) and averaged 791 reports per year. In
WHALESNORTH, the number of reports (excluding 1999) ranged from 724 (in 2013) to
1,446 (in 2007) and averaged 1,084 reports per year. Monthly counts for WHALESSOUTH

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Figure 3 Compliance rates for WHALESNORTH and WHALESSOUTH using MSR reports as compared to USCG SANS data (see text for explanations).

averaged 156 reports with a range of 61 (in March 2001) to 216 (in December 2006)
(partial months of April and November not included). In WHALESNORTH, the average
number of reports monthly was 90 and ranged from 39 (in December 2013) to 174 (in
September 2007).
The city of Boston and its associated suite of terminals and ports were listed as
the destination for a total of 8,823 vetted reports (Table 1). Jacksonville, Florida and
Brunswick, Georgia accounted for a combined total of 9,965 reported destinations
in WHALESSOUTH, and constituted the second and third highest, respectively, of
all reported destination ports (Table 1). Nearly all ships entering WHALESSOUTH
were bound directly for southeast US ports (Table 2), while many vessels entering
WHALESNORTH were traversing the area in route to locations outside the reporting
area, such as ports in Maine, Canada, mid-Atlantic US states, South and Central America,
and the Caribbean (Table 3).
The number of reports annually into WHALESSOUTH generally increased through
2007 and remained relatively constant thereafter (Fig. 4). Following a steady increase in
the number of reports that peaked in 2007, the number of WHALESNORTH reports
decreased annually beginning in 2008 (Fig. 4). A 2007–2013 annual decline in reports into
WHALESNORTH appears to be driven both by the number of ships bound for Boston
and, more strongly, by vessels traversing this system in route to locations outside of the
area (Fig. 4). A modest seasonal signal is evident for WHALESNORTH for all years,

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Figure 4 Number of reports into the MSR (meeting data quality criteria described in Methods) for
WHALESNORTH and WHALESSOUTH, 1999–2013. Indicated are trips with reported destinations
within the reporting area and those that indicated the vessel was traveling through the system to a
destination outside the reporting area.

Table 1 Number of reports into the MSR (meeting data quality criteria described in Methods) associated with destinations within WHALESNORTH and WHALESOUTH.
Destination

MSR

Reports

Boston and related portsa
Jacksonville, FL
Brunswick, GA
Fernandina Beach, FL
Kings Bay, GA

WHALESNORTH
WHALESOUTH
WHALESOUTH
WHALESOUTH
WHALESOUTH

8823
7803
2162
835
258

Notes.
a
This includes a relatively small number of reports that indicated destinations within or in areas adjacent to the
Boston Harbor, including for example, Braintree, Salem, Gloucester, Rockland, Buzzards Bay, Cape Cod Canal, and
Provincetown.

whereby the number of reports tended to be consistently higher July–October, and in
December–January than in other months (Fig. 5).
Reported ship speeds ranged from 5 to over 20 knots, with the majority between 10 and
16 knots (Figs. 6 and 7). The distribution of ship speeds reported for WHALESSOUTH
differed from WHALESNORTH, with the former appearing to be roughly bimodal
around 10–12 and 14–18 knots and the latter more closely approximating a bell-shaped
distribution. Reported ship speeds shifted lower in both locations in 2009 to 2013
following implementation of required vessel speed restrictions (Figs. 7A and 7B).

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Table 2 Number of reports into the MSR (meeting data quality criteria described in Methods) associated with destinations outside of WHALESNORTH and WHALESOUTH, summarized by region.
WHALESNORTH

WHALESSOUTH

Destination

Reports

% of Total

Reports

% of Total

US Ports
Canada
Central/South America
Caribbean
Europe
Middle East
Africa
Asia
Not reported

4480
1406
252
157
49
1
1
1
396

66.4
20.8
3.7
2.3
0.7
–
–
–
5.9

94
1
3
1
0
0
0
0
39

68.3
0.7
2.2
0.7
–
–
–
–
28.3

Table 3 Number of reports into the MSR (meeting data quality criteria described in Methods) associated with domestic destinations outside of WHALESNORTH and WHALESOUTH, summarized by
region.
WHALESNORTH

WHALESSOUTH

Destination

Reports

% of Total

Reports

% of Total

New England
Mid-Atlantic States
Florida/Georgia
Gulf of Mexico

1882
1839
671
88

42.0
41.1
15.0
2.0

0
15
74
5

–
16.0
78.7
5.3

DISCUSSION
Value of the MSR
The MSR was established to reduce the threat of vessel collisions with right whales and
has provided a means to alert mariners to this threat for over 15 years. While reporting
is required for vessels entering the prescribed MSR area, our analysis relies on accurate
self-reporting. We did not analyze those records that contained information falling outside
the reasonable range of values for the reporting variables. Aside from this, no attempts
were made to confirm the veracity of the information contained in the messages; and,
prior to the emergence of vessel tracking technologies, there were little or no means to do
so. In sum, only about 60% of the total incoming reports were used for the purposes of
this study. These limitations notwithstanding, we believe these data represent a reasonable
characterization, in relative numbers, of vessel operations in these areas over the 15-year
study period.
Regardless of reporting issues or data entry accuracy, reporting vessels received a
return message containing right whale conservation information. Thus, the MSR has
provided an important function: vessels associated with the over 46,000 incoming reports

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Figure 5 Temporal heatmap depicting the number of reports into the MSR (meeting data quality
criteria described in ‘Methods’) for WHALESNORTH and WHALESSOUTH, by month/year.

Figure 6 Reported vessel speeds for WHALESNORTH and WHALESSOUTH, 2000–2013.

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Figure 7 Reported vessel speeds for WHALESNORTH and WHALESSOUTH in (A) 2000–2009 and
(B) 2009–2013.

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received messages delivered directly to the ship’s bridge—hundreds of messages each
year—regarding right whale vulnerability to collisions by ships.
Reporting compliance rates have been generally constant throughout the 15-year
period, with a majority of the required vessels reporting. Due to finite resources and
the need to focus on multiple priorities, the USCG has not fined non-reporting vessels
since 2006—it has also relied on outreach/education and non-financial civil penalties
to encourage compliance. While it is important to enforce any requirement, the MSR
program was not intended to be punitive. Instead, the goal of the program was to
communicate information and raise awareness.
Clearly, there is some confusion for some mariners about where the MSR reporting
areas are located (relative to vessel speed restriction areas, for example) and what is
required of them when reporting (Fig. 2). For example, we are told, anecdotally, that
ocean-going tug boat operators may report on occasion but not always, when their
tug/barge combinations exceed 300gt, but the tug itself does not—representing another
example of a lack of clarification about reporting. Improved information and outreach
about MSR locations and requirements would improve this situation and would likely
enhance the conservation value of the system. In addition, simplifying the reporting
format might help reduce transcription errors observed in the data.

WHALESNORTH vs. WHALESSOUTH
The two reporting areas differed in overall size and the times/duration that they were in
effect; and their proximity to various ports had an influence on the character of the trips
through each area. When compared to WHALESOUTH, a far greater number of reports
for WHALESNORTH indicated trips destined for locations outside the system, including
ships bound for various New England ports as well as those that may have been engaged
in trade with a variety of US ports, the Caribbean, and European nations (e.g., those
inbound for New York from across the Atlantic Ocean) and other trading partner countries
(Tables 2 and 3). For these reasons, aggregated vessel operation information for this area
(particularly those on voyages through the area) may provide a unique glimpse into
patterns regarding commercial shipping activities and international trade, and provide
information relative to right whale feeding and socializing aggregations subjected to this
ship traffic. It is noteworthy that the overall (and, in some years, the annual) number
of reports into WHALESOUTH exceeded those in WHALESNORTH considering the
former is operational for only a portion of the year and is smaller in size than the latter,
reflecting the importance of the volume of port calls in this region and its implications for
key right whale nursery areas. A steady increase (in years 2000–2006) and then a leveling
(2007–2013) in the number of reports by vessels entering WHALESSOUTH may reflect
the steady or sustained growth of demand for products and services (which includes, for
example, popular cruise ship destinations (MARAD, 2012), and containerized, “break
bulk” and automobile cargos (Martin Associates, 2013) and the importance of these
commodities to the economy of this region and adjoining in-land areas.

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Ward-Geiger et al. (2005) provided an analysis of MSR reports, ship tracks, and vessel
speeds for July 1999 to June 2002. The distribution of reported ship speeds in our study
is generally similar to those presented by these authors, although we found somewhat
differing distributions in average speeds in the south versus the north reporting areas. It
is not clear why speed distributions differed in the two areas, although adherence with
the 2008 vessel speed restrictions (NMFS, 2008) was almost certainly a factor, particularly
as compliance with these regulations improved (Silber et al., 2014). Virtually all ships
entering the south reporting area were subject to required speed limits after 2008; however,
because the north reporting area is not completely concurrent in time and space with
speed restriction areas, not all vessels reporting into the north system were subject to
the restrictions. Other factors may also contribute to differences in speed distributions,
including possible differences in the composition of shipping in the two areas, but assessing
additional factors is beyond the scope of our analysis.

Trends in shipping
Various authors have indicated that the number of large vessels and volume of maritime
transport have steadily increased for decades and that continued growth is expected for
the foreseeable future (e.g., Corbett, 2004; Dalsøren et al., 2007; Vanderlaan et al., 2009).
While these observations may be generally true, they are not borne out in the MSR data,
which indicate little or no growth (in the south reporting area) or a decline (in the north)
in the number of reporting vessels from 2008 to the end of the study period, presumably
reflecting the amount of east coast ship passages and commerce. Thus, the expected trend
in traffic volume may be reversing.
The decrease in the number of reports for vessels entering, and in some cases travelling
through, the WHALESNORTH area (Figs. 4 and 5) coincides with the “great recession”
of 2008–2009 and related global economic dynamics. In 2009, Gross Domestic Product
growth dropped 0.6% throughout the world (Labonte, 2010). Between 2008 and 2009, the
volume of merchandise trade in the United States declined by 14.0% and 16.4% for exports
and imports, respectively; global import and export merchandise trade values likewise fell
(UNCTAD, 2013). As global demand for goods declined, the entire supply and delivery
chain slowed. The effects of the 2009 recession were largely reversed in 2010 with modest
but steady growth in subsequent years, whereby port calls in most locations (MARAD,
2013) and maritime trade and shipping activities returned to or exceeded pre-2007 levels
by 2011 (Ex-Im Bank, 2014). The port of Boston was an exception, where imports, as
measured by total shipping weight, exhibited a steady decline from a peak in 2004 (NOEP,
2014).
Several factors may be involved in the sustained 2009–2013 annual decline in MSR
reports, although determining with certainty the role, if any, of these factors is beyond the
scope of this study. The decrease in reports may reflect a continued eroding of commercial
shipping activities. However, this seems unlikely as many shipping activities (MARAD,
2013) and most international economies had begun to rebound to pre-recession levels by
mid-2010.

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Two additional right whale conservation measures, vessel speed restrictions in waters
along the US eastern seaboard in December 2008 (NMFS, 2008) and establishment of an
Area To Be Avoided (ATBA) in Great South Channel in July 2009 (Silber et al., 2012), may
have resulted in modifications of vessel operations or diminished reporting into the MSR.
Speed limits may have caused some ship operators to refrain from reporting (perhaps
for fear of retribution for reported ship speeds); however, MSR compliance information
(as a function of the rather rigorous USCG-SANS 96-hour call-in requirements) (Fig. 3)
suggests that the number of reporting ships, relative to those actually making port calls,
remained relatively constant after these regulations were established. No strong declines
in numbers of trips or vessels in the seasonal management areas were apparent (although
modest declines may have occurred in 2012 and 2013) after speed restrictions took effect
(Silber et al., 2014), suggesting that operators did not avoid these areas. In addition, we
made a cursory examination of vessel AIS data to examine traffic movement in and around
the ATBA and found no obvious modifications of routes that would have taken vessels
outside MSR reporting areas.
Instead, we believe the MSR reporting data were influenced, at least in part, by
significant changes in the composition of the industrial fleet and trade in energy-related
commodities. For example, in anticipation of the expansion of a number lock chambers
in the Panama Canal, the use of “Post-Panamax” vessels has expanded in recent years.
Capable of carrying up to three times the amount of bulk and containerized cargo as
most ships currently in use (Rodrigue & Notteboom, 2012), increased use of Post-Panamax
vessels is a harbinger of an era in which the transoceanic involves transport of enormous
amounts of goods. This will reduce the number of required trips. Post-Panamax ships
accounted for 17% of all containership calls at US ports in 2006 and 27% of all US calls
in 2011 (MARAD, 2013). From 2006 to 2011, the average vessel size per US port call
increased (and the average age of ships in the world’s fleet dropped as new large ships
are built and put into service) (DOT, 2013), while calls by smaller vessel classes decreased
(UNCTAD, 2013). Therefore, an increased use of large ships may account, at least in part,
for the reduction of reports into the MSR. Ports in New York and New Jersey, Baltimore,
Maryland, and Mobile, Alabama have already dredged their harbors to accommodate these
large ships, while Savannah, Georgia, Charleston, South Carolina, and Jacksonville, Florida
either have channel modifications underway or planned for this purpose.
Another large scale shift in US imports/exports took place in this same period. Natural
gas and crude oil production in the United States has steadily increased in the last five
years with the development of new (primarily shale gas) sites and with increased use
of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling technologies (EIA, 2014a; Humphries,
2014). As a result, US natural gas imports have declined annually since 2007; in 2009,
for the first time, the country’s domestic gas and oil production outpaced its imports
(EIA, 2014b). The Marcellus shale gas field of Pennsylvania and West Virginia, alone,
yielded virtually no natural gas in 2007, but is projected to provide nearly one-quarter
of the United States’ gas in 2015. As sources and destinations for oil have rapidly evolved
(PIRA, 2014) the complexion of water-borne shipment of these commodities has shifted

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in the areas we studied and elsewhere. As one example, liquefied natural gas (LNG)
imports from Trinidad/Tobago (the largest LNG exporter to the United States (EIA,
2014b)) to Everett, Massachusetts (a destination port in our data) declined each year
from over 180 million cubic feet in 2007 to 52 million cubic feet in 2013 (EIA, 2014b).
In addition, a number of locations, including the ports of Saint John, New Brunswick,
Canada (which hosts Canada’s largest crude oil refinery; Tremblay , 2013) and those in
Trinidad/Tobago and Venezuela (crude oil) MSR reported destinations for ships passing
through WHALESNORTH. Although our data lack sufficient specificity (e.g., vessel type
designations) to allow definitive statements regarding shifts in oil/gas trade, we believe the
observed 2009–2013 declines in vessel reports reflect the profound, ongoing changes in the
transport of these materials.
Considerable variation becomes clear when numbers of reports are considered on
a monthly basis (Fig. 5). In some years, certain seasonal fluctuations also appear to be
occurring which may reflect influxes of passenger, cruise, and large recreational vessels
in summer; or the movement of heating oil or other seasonally-important commodities
through WHALESNORTH.
In addition, several months exhibited atypically low numbers of reports relative to
months that preceded or followed it—or in the same month in other years. This pattern
may be attributed to hurricane activities and other significant large scale events that limited
maritime commerce. For example, one of the lightest reporting months (relative to the
same month in other years) occurred in September 2005 (Fig. 5) when hurricanes Katrina
(making landfall 30 August 2005) and Rita (landfall on 25 September 2005) battered
Gulf of Mexico coasts, keeping ships in port or at sea to avoid the storm and slowed
or stopped production of Gulf coast oil refinery facilities. August and September 2004
were also relatively light reporting months relative to those same months in other years
coincident with four Category 2 or greater hurricanes that struck the Gulf of Mexico,
Florida, and mid-Atlantic state coastlines. In contrast, we see no particularly strong signal
in the number of reports from hurricane Sandy (October 2012) and other storms that
brought destruction on large geographic scales. The Gulf of Mexico’s Deepwater Horizon
oil spill beginning in late April 2010, and related activities to rescue lives and contain oil,
likely disrupted supply chains and contributed to reduced vessel activities in the Gulf and
elsewhere and may account for relatively fewer MSR reporting in May and June of that year
relative to the same months in other years.

Shipping activities and right whales
Regardless of reasons for shifts in composition and evolving practices in international
shipping fleets, reductions in the relative amount of ship traffic in the last five years likely
resulted in important consequences for right whales and other large whale species. Several
authors have reported that the economic downturn of 2008–2009 resulted in reduced
ship traffic and, consequently, a corresponding decrease in the amount of oceanic noise as
introduced by large ships (Andrew, Howe & Mercer, 2011; McKenna et al., 2012; Miksis-Olds
& Bradley, 2013).

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And related to this, Rolland et al. (2012) reported that the absence of ships following
the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 resulted in less underwater
noise and lowered baseline levels of stress-related hormone metabolites (glucocorticoids)
in right whales in the Bay of Fundy, Canada. These and other authors noted the strong link
between chronic elevations of glucocorticoids and suppressed immune systems, impaired
individual health, and population declines in a number of vertebrate populations (e.g., von
der Ohe & Servheen, 2002; Romero, 2004). However, unlike the Bay of Fundy study, when
comparing (a) two-week periods before and after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks,
and (b) September 2001 to that month across all years, we found no change in the number
of ship reports including those reporting northbound transits into Canadian waters.
More generally, assuming that (a) the MSR data are truly indicative of relative levels
of (and declines in) shipping activity in US northeast ports, and (b) these declines are
accompanied by a decrease in radiated ship noise in waters in and around New England,
the Canadian maritime provinces and perhaps elsewhere throughout range of right whales,
then the species may have been exposed to a soundscape and disturbance from noise that
the species has not experienced for nearly two decades. Therefore, declines in supply and
demand for certain goods may have resulted in increasingly hospitable right whale habitat.
A decrease in the number of ship transits would also suggest that right whales and
other large whale species have experienced lowered exposure rates to the potential for
fatal collisions with large vessels. Recent decreases in both the number (Laist, Knowlton &
Pendleton, 2014) and probability (Conn & Silber, 2013) of fatal ship strikes of right whales
has been attributed to the 2008 creation of vessel speed restrictions in right whale habitat.
However, a reduction in the actual number of trips in these areas may also have had a role
in reducing strikes. Known fatal right whale/vessel collisions occurred at an average rate of
1.0 per year in 1996 to 2001; increased to 1.7 per year 2002 to 2007; and fell to 0.5 per year
2008 to 2013 (MMC, 2014).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Submitting a message into the MSR is required for certain vessel classes, but the content
and accuracy of these messages rely on “good faith” self-reporting. Numerous reports
contained mistakes such as transcription errors. Errors in incoming messages notwithstanding, all reporting ships received a return message; and hundreds of messages were sent
to reporting ships each year since the MSR’s inception. For this reason alone—and because
it was one of the first formal measures aimed at reducing the threat of ship collisions with
right whales—the MSR has probably provided an important function in notifying a broad
international community about vessel/whale collisions. Steps should probably be taken
to better equip ships’ captains and mates about reporting requirements and to further
enhance the overall conservation value of the information provided through the program.
The MSR has also provided a relatively long time series characterization of shipping
operations that, in part, pre-dates more rigorous vessel monitoring programs and
technologies. We believe the data set of accurately entered and transmitted reports provides
a reasonable15-year representation of maritime transportation activities in these areas.

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Among other things, reported speeds were largely consistent with those determined from
remote monitoring programs and reflect the maritime community’s response to additional
measures to minimize right whale ship-strike rates.
If the number of incoming reports is truly indicative of shipping practices, a number
of economically-driven changes in marine transportation activities, as well as large scale
meteorological events, appear to be reflected in the data. Although we are not able to
determine their role with certainty, it appears that global and industry-wide events may
have had unanticipated benefits in reducing shipping-related impacts to right whales.
Among these, a troubled worldwide economy in the late 2000’s and slowed or diminished
supply chains that move various commodities such as oil and gas resources likely reduced
the overall amount of ship traffic. Industry-wide shifts toward larger ships conveying
containerized goods have also altered the complexion of maritime transport during our
study period. As a result, right whales may have been exposed to a lowered risk of collisions
with ships and levels of anthropogenic underwater noise disturbance that the species has
not experienced for nearly two decades.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank US Coast Guard and NOAA leadership and many staff members from both these
agencies who have been instrumental in support of the creation and operation of the MSR
over the years.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND DECLARATIONS
Funding
Funding to operate and administer the Mandatory Ship Reporting system—the program
under study here—was provided completely, and shared equally, by the US Coast Guard
and the US National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). Staff time (e.g., salaries) to conduct
data analysis and prepare the manuscript was provided by NMFS’s Office of Protected
Resources. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision
to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

Competing Interests
The authors declare there are no competing interests.

Author Contributions
• Gregory K. Silber conceived and designed the experiments, performed the experiments,
wrote the paper, prepared figures and/or tables, reviewed drafts of the paper.
• Jeffrey D. Adams performed the experiments, analyzed the data, contributed
reagents/materials/analysis tools, wrote the paper, prepared figures and/or tables,
reviewed drafts of the paper.
• Michael J. Asaro, Timothy V.N. Cole, Katie S. Moore, Leslie I. Ward-Geiger and Barbara
J. Zoodsma wrote the paper, reviewed drafts of the paper.

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North Atlantic Right Whale off the Coast of France - Center For Ocean Life
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North Atlantic Right Whale off the
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Friday, July 5, 2019 by Heather Pettis
While the last few weeks have been consumed with the devastating news of six right whale deaths in the
Gulf of St. Lawrence, our hearts were lifted by the discovery of a very exciting and unusual sighting last
week. While four of us were attending a workshop on right whale health in Washington, D.C., we
received an email suggesting that there was a recent video posted on social media of a right whale
feeding off the coast of FRANCE! We were a bit skeptical at first. It’s not unusual to come across images
and videos misidentified as right whales or attributed to incorrect locations.
After a bit of sleuthing and enlisting the assistance of a French translator, we were able to connect with
the person who had posted the video and confirm that yes, they had in fact observed a right whale
feeding off Penmarch on the northwest coast of France on Friday, June 21. The video quality was
excellent and as such, we were able to identify the right whale as Catalog #3845 ((Mogul),
Mogul), an 11-yearold male.

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Mogul in the Bay of Fundy. Credit: Monica Zani, Anderson Cabot Center-NEAQ.

Mogul is a whale we know well. Born in 2008 to #1245 (Slalom), Mogul has been sighted in many of the
“typical” right whale habitats throughout his life, including the southeast U.S., Cape Cod Bay, Great
South Channel, and the Bay of Fundy. However, he threw us all for a bit of a loop when in July 2018 he
was sighted by a whale watch boat off the coast of Iceland!
Iceland! With this recent sighting off the coast of
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North Atlantic Right Whale off the Coast of France - Center For Ocean Life

France, we initially assumed that Mogul had taken an extended long-distance walkabout. However, we
just confirmed that he was seen repeatedly in Cape Cod Bay in March, just three months ago and nearly
3,200 miles away, so this in fact is his second trans-Atlantic walkabout in a year!

Mogul in Iceland! Credit: Guðlaugur Ottesen Karlsson, Elding Adventure at Sea.

Penmarch is at the mouth of the Bay of Biscay.

While this is the first contemporary sighting of a right whale off the coast of France, Penmarch sits at the
northern part of the Bay of Biscay, where the Basque whalers were the first to hunt North Atlantic right
whales beginning in the 11th century. Prior to these whaling efforts, North Atlantic right whales existed in
large numbers in the eastern North Atlantic, ranging from the northern coast of Spain to Norway,
including the Bay of Biscay. However, after several hundreds of years of intense activity, whalers
effectively eliminated the eastern population.
There have been a handful of right whale sightings in the eastern North Atlantic over the last few
decades, but these are primarily whales from the western stock taking long walkabouts like Mogul.
Thankfully, Mogul is safe from whaling, but we do worry about other threats he may face on his journey,
including entanglement in fishing gear and vessel strike. We are keeping our fingers crossed for a safe
journey for Mogul and look forward with great curiosity to seeing where he is sighted next!

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FINAL REPORT

Economic Analysis of North Atlantic
Right Whale Ship Strike Reduction Rule
Update of Economic Impact and Scoping Assessment for Study of
Potential Modifications

SUBMITTED TO

National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
National Marine Fisheries (NMFS)
Office of Protected Resources
SUBMITTED BY

Nathan Associates Inc.
www.nathaninc.com
December 2012

Contents
1. Introduction

1

Background

1

General Approach

2

2. Economic Impact on Shipping Industry

1

Direct Economic Impact

1

AIS Data and Approach

1

Average Operating Speeds by Vessel Type and Size

4

Average Delays due to Rule by Type and Size of Vessel

5

Vessel Operating Costs at Sea by Type and Size of Vessel

6

Direct Economic Impact of SMAs

8

Direct Economic Impact of DMAs

9

Other Direct Impacts on Shipping Industry

13

Total Direct Economic Impact on Shipping Industry

15

Estimated Indirect Economic Impact

18

3. Economic Impact of Rule on Other Market Segments

20

Commercial Fishing

20

Charter Fishing

23

Passenger Ferries

23

Impact on Ferry Operators

25

New England Whale Watching Industry

26

4. Total Direct and Indirect Economic Impact

28

5. Impact on Small Business

29

i

Size Standards for Small Entities

29

Number of Small Entities Affected

30

Economic Impact on Small Entities

34

Commercial Shipping

34

6. Scoping Assessment of Economic Analysis of Potential Rule Modifications

37

Update Analysis for 2010, 2011 and 2012

37

Reduce 65-Foot Vessel Length Threshold

37

Expansion of Off-Race Point and Great South Channel SMAs

38

Establishment of SMAs in Waters of Coastal Maine

38

Make all DMAs Mandatory

39

Illustrations
Figures
Figure 1-1. Locations of Vessel Speed Restriction Seasonal Management Areas

2

Figure 1-2. General Approach

4

Figure 2-2. Locations of DMAs in 2009

12

Figure 3-1 DMAs in Areas Relevant for Passenger Ferry Operators

26

Tables
Table 2-1. Total Vessel Transits through SMAs by Type and Size of Vessel, 2009

2

Table 2-2. Percent of Vessel Transits through SMAs during Effected Periods by Type
of Vessel, 2009

3

Table 2-3. Total Vessel Transits through SMAs by Type of Vessel, 2009

3

Table 2-4. Percent of Vessel Transits through SMAs by Type of Vessel

4

during Effected Periods, 2009

4

Table 2-5. Average Vessel Operating Speed through SMAs by Type and Size of Vessel
for Areas Subject to Rule During Periods When Rule Is Not in Effect, 2009

5

Table 2-6. Average Vessel Operating Speed through SMAs by Type and Size of Vessel
for Areas Subject to Rule During Periods When Rule Is in Effect, 2009

5

Table 2-7. Average Delays per Vessel Transit through SMAs due to Rule by Type
and Size of Vessel, 2009

6

Table 2-8. Type and Size of Vessels for which USACE Reports Vessel Operating Costs

7

Table 2-9. Hourly Vessel Operating Costs at Sea for Foreign Flag Vessels by Type and
Size of Vessel Using Average 2009

8

ii

Table 2-10. Hourly Vessel Operating Costs at Sea for U.S. Flag Vessels by Type Size of
Vessel Using Average 2009

8

Table 2-11. Direct Economic Impact of SMAs on Shipping Industry by Type and Size
of Vessel, 2009

9

Table 2-12. Direct Economic Impact of SMAs on Shipping Industry by SMA and
Type of Vessel, 2009

9

Table 2-13. DMAs Implemented in 2009

11

Table 2-14. Average Vessel Operating Speed through DMAs by Type of Vessel, 2009

13

Table 2-15. Direct Economic Impact on Shipping Industry, 2009

15

Table 2-16. U.S. East Coast Maritime Trade, 2005-2011 Value

16

Table 2-17 US. East Coast Vessel Import Charges as Percent of Vessel Import
Customs Value

17

Table 2-18. Economic Impact as a Percent of Value of U.S. East Coast Maritime Trade
and Ocean Freight Costs, 2009

17
17

Table 3-1. U.S. East Coast Commercial Fishery Landings by Port, 2002 through 2011

21

Table 3-2. Fishing Vessel Permits Issued to Vessels 65 Feet and Above in LOA
by Region, 2009-2011

22

Table 3-3. Estimated Economic Impact on Commercial Fishing Vessels by Region, 2009

22

Table 3-4. New England Ferry Operators, 2011

24

Table 3-5. Massachusetts Bay Whale Watching Operators, 2012

27

Table 4-1. Total Direct and Indirect Economic Impact, 2009

28

Table 5-1. Small Business Size Standards and Firms by Employment Size and
NAICS Code, 2008

30

Table 5-2. U.S. East Coast Vessel Arrivals by Vessels with U.S. or Foreign Parties, 2004

31

Table 5-3. U.S-Based Parties with U.S. East Coast Arrivals by Number of
Vessels Owned, 2004

32

Table 5-4. U.S. East Coast Vessel Arrivals by U.S.-Based Small Entities, 2004

33

Table 5-5. Number of Small Entities in Other Industries Affected, 2009

34

Table 5-6. Economic Impact on U.S. Small Entities by Vessel Type, 2009

35

Table 5-7. Estimated Economic Impact of Rule on Small Entities in Other Industries, 2009

36

iii

1. Introduction
Background
On December 9, 2008, the Right Whale Ship Strike Reduction Rule (Rule) issued by the U.S. National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) went into effect. The rule requires certain vessels to travel at 10 knots or less in
certain areas of right whale aggregation and near several key port entrances along the U.S. eastern seaboard.
The U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service’s (NMFS) Final Rule to reduce the severity and likelihood of vessel
strikes to North Atlantic right whales went into effect on 9 December 2008 (73 FR 60173; 10 October 2008). The
stated goal of the rule was “to reduce or eliminate the threat of ship strikes [of North Atlantic right whales] - the
primary source of mortality in the endangered population.” It requires that vessels 65 feet and greater in length
travel at speeds of 10 knots or less near several key port entrances and in certain areas of right whale
aggregation and along the U.S. eastern seaboard, known as “Seasonal Management Areas” (SMA) (Figure 1- 1).
As indicated in the preamble to the rule, a program of “Dynamic Management Areas” (DMA) was also
established whereby temporary zones (15 days in duration, generally) are created around aggregations of right
whales occurring outside of SMAs. Mariners are asked, but not required, to either avoid established DMAs
altogether or travel through them at speeds of 10 knots or less.
The rule is set to expire five years from the date of its publication. NMFS indicated that it would develop ways
to monitor the effectiveness of the rule. This report presents an updated assessment of the estimated economic
impact of the Rule. In large measure, the economic impact assessment is based on the approach and analysis
presented in the FEIS Report, Economic Analysis for the Final Environmental Impact Statement of the North
Atlantic Right Whale Ship Strike Reduction Strategy prepared by Nathan Associates Inc. for NMFS in August
2008.
Whereas the economic analysis included in the FEIS report were based on assumptions regarding the impact
on vessel operations, this updated assessment is based on actual vessel operations recorded during periods
when the rule was in effect and not in effect. There are also several important data and analytical
improvements that are incorporated in the present assessment that are further described herein.

1

Figure 1-1. Locations of Vessel Speed Restriction Seasonal Management Areas

General Approach
Our approach for the estimation of the potential economic impact of the proposed operational measures of the
Rule has been designed so that results can be identified and analyzed at a summary level or disaggregated by
port area, vessel type, vessel size, and vessel flag. An ancillary benefit of this approach is that it also enhances
the accuracy and rigor of the analysis. Key factors such as vessel operating speed vary significantly by vessel
type and size; vessel operating costs vary by those vessel characteristics as well as flag of registry. For this
study, we have used 10 knots as the base case.

2

As depicted in Figure 1-2, our general approach is organized into the following four principal tasks:
Task A. Identify and analyze vessels affected by the final rule. Detailed information regarding
vessels transiting SMAs during 2009 was obtained from the U.S. Coast Guard’s Automatic
Identification System (AIS) database. Vessel transits were analyzed for 10 SMAs on the U.S. East
Coast, 12 vessel types, 18 vessel DWT size ranges and U.S. and foreign flag registration.
Task B. Determine physical impacts of operational measures on vessel operations. Key information
include vessel service speed by type and size of vessel for periods when the SMAs were not in effect as
compared to when they were in effect. Similar information was analyzed for DMAs. Results of this
task include estimate of minutes of delay per vessel transit for SMAs and DMAs.
Task C. Estimate economic value of potential impacts. Key data include vessel operating costs at sea
by type and size of vessel and whether U.S. or foreign flag registry. Results include detailed estimates
of economic impact of speed restrictions by SMA, vessel type, vessel DWT size range, and flag of
registration.
Task D. Describe economic impact within context of U.S. East Coast maritime trade and shipping.
The estimated economic impact is assessed relative to the value of maritime trade and relative to
maritime freight charges. We also conducted separate economic impact analyses for sectors not
sufficiently included in the AIS database such as whale watching vessels, passenger ferries,
commercial fishing and charter fishing.
Chapter 2 provides a detailed assessment of the impact of the rule on the shipping industry, while Chapter 3
presents the assessment on other maritime sectors. Chapter 4 presents a summary of the total direct and
indirect economic impact. Chapter 5 presents the updated analysis of the impact of the rule on small business
entities, consistent with a Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) threshold assessment. Chapter 6 provides a scoping
analysis of the approach, data requirements and issues for the conduct of an economic analysis of potential
modifications of the current rule.

3

Figure 1-2. General Approach

A. Identify and analyze
vessels affected by final
rule and Alternatives

Detailed analysis of AIS
vessel transit database by:
•

SMA

•

12 vessel types

•

18 vessel DWT size
ranges

B. Determine physical
impacts of operational
measures on vessel
operations

Identify vessel service speed
w/o restrictions by type and
size of vessel and SMA

Calculate actual delay due
to slower speeds:
• SMAs

Individualized analysis of
other maritime sectors:
•

Commercial fishing

•

Passenger ferries

•

Whale watching

•

Charter fishing

• DMAs
• Cumulative effect of
multiport strings
(containerships)
• Re-routing of southbound
coastwise shipping

C. Estimate economic value of
potential impacts

Estimate vessel operating costs at
sea by:
• Type of vessel
• Size of vessel
• U.S. or foreign flag

Prepare model and calculate
economic impact of SMAs and
DMAs by:
• Vessel type
• Vessel size
• U.S. or foreign flag

Estimate secondary impact on
ports and intermodal operations

4

D. Describe economic impact
within context of maritime trade
and shipping

Compare economic impact with
value of U.S. East Coast maritime
trade

Compare economic impact with
maritime freight charges

Review economic impact on U.S.
small businesses (RFA analysis)

2. Economic Impact on Shipping
Industry
Direct Economic Impact
AIS DATA AND APPROACH
A key data improvement is the availability of Automatic Identification System (AIS) that uses
a Global Positioning System-linked, very high frequency radio signal that provides for shipto-ship and ship-to-shore information transfer. It transmits the ship’s name, call sign, position,
dimensions, speed, heading and other information multiple times each minute. The AIS signal
provides a suite of information, both dynamic (that is unique to a particular voyage) and
static (that is consistent for a given vessel). Dynamic information includes the vessel’s
position, speed over ground, course over ground, heading, rate of turn, and position accuracy
(< or > 10 m) which are determined by continuous GPS linked updates. Static information
includes the vessel name, call sign, type, cargo, and its Maritime Mobile Service Identity
(MMSI) number. Given the rate at which it provides this information, AIS is a precise means
to remotely track vessel speeds and other vessel operations.
AIS transponders are required on certain vessel types that transit U.S. waters. These include:
1) all commercial tugs, barges, tow and similar vessels that are 26 feet in length or greater; 2)
all passenger vessels (such as ferries and cruise ships) 150 gross tonnage or more; and 3) any
commercial self-propelled vessel that is 65 feet in length or greater, which consists of
commercial fishing vessels, tankers, cargo ships, etc.
The goal of the economic impact analysis is to estimate the impact on the shipping industry
and overall economy from the actual implementation of the Rule. For these reasons, the
economic impact analysis uses actual speeds of vessel transiting areas when the rule is not in
effect by vessel type, size and flag compares those speeds with those from transits when the
rule is in effect

We obtained access to the AIS for the areas relevant to the Rule for the full year of 2009 from
the NOAA Office of Protected Resources. We then spent a significant effort to review the data
and fill-in critical missing information for the economic analysis on vessel type and size. This
was accomplished by matching various vessel identifiers such as the Maritime Mobile Service
Identity (MMSI) number, call sign, and IMO number. In some instances, information on the
type and size of vessel were confirmed based on the name of the vessel, length and cargo
type. For vessels that the vessel type was known as well as the gross registered tonnage, the
deadweight tonnage was estimated using the regression analysis described in the 2008 FEIS
Report, Appendix A, Attachment 5.
As a result of the AIS data review and analysis, we were able to obtain for 2009, operating
information for 62,765 vessel transits through areas affected by the Rule 1. Table 2-1 presents
the distribution of the total vessel transits through SMA areas by type and size of vessel.
Containerships accounted for 18,540 transits followed by towing vessels with 14,425 transits
and tank ships with 10,002 transits.

Table 2-1. Total Vessel Transits through SMAs by Type and Size of Vessel, 2009
(includes periods when Rule is in effect and not in effect)
DWT Size Range
Vessel Type
0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-9090-100 00-12020-150 150+ Total
Bulk Carrier
1 276 257 206 134 312 239 565 258 297 380 251 767 177
3
22
20 4,165
Combination Carrier (e.g. OBO)
6
44
6
13
2
71
Container Ship
139 610 964 352 712 506 1,221 888 1,450 1,078 3,704 6,616
79 221
18,540
General Dry Cargo Ship
371 559 510 322 347 311 116 123 258 100
8
1
3,026
Industrial Vessel
1,270 125
13
6
1,414
Passenger Ship a/
3,143 933 159
4,235
Refrigerated Cargo Ship
4 225 265
54
1
2
96
5
26
678
Ro-Ro Cargo Ship
138 201 962 1,627 988 804 176
79 211
24 317
22
5,549
Tank Barge
2
2
Tank Ship
13 389 403 501 116 193 317 891 786 2,284 695 567 774 282 525 531 448 287 10,002
Towing Vessel
14,425
14,425
Other b/
1,900 148
18
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 2,072
Total
20,134 3,347 3,538 3,062 2,298 2,128 2,171 2,590 2,968 3,785 5,130 7,457 1,626 693 528 533 470 307 62,765
a/ Includes recreational vessels.
b/ Includes freight barges, fishing vessels, industrial vessels, research vessels, and school ships.
Source: Nathan Associates Inc.

Of total 62,765 transits, 28,543 vessel transits (45.5%) occurred during periods when the Rule
was in effect and 34,222 vessel transits (54.5%) occurred during periods when the Rule was
not in effect (Table 2-2).

1 The data file received from NOA had a total of 78,757 transit records. However, we excluded 15,992 records

due to vessels less than 65 feet LOA, non-commercial shipping vessels and where the vessel type or size
could not be determined.

2

Table 2-2. Percent of Vessel Transits through SMAs during Effected Periods by Type
of Vessel, 2009
Rule Not in
% Rule in
Effect
Vessel Type
Rule in Effect
Effect
Total
1,972
4,165
52.7
Bulk Carrier
2,193
46
Combination Carrier (e.g. OBO)
25
71
64.8
Container Ship
8,634
9,906
18,540
46.6
1,310
1,716
3,026
43.3
General Dry Cargo Ship
29.4
Passenger Ship
1,244
2,991
4,235
288
390
678
57.5
Refrigerated Cargo Ship
Ro-Ro Cargo Ship
2,648
2,901
5,549
47.7
Tank Barge
2
2
100.0
Tank Ship
4,494
5,508
10,002
44.9
Towing Vessel
6,751
7,674
14,425
46.8
Other b/
831
1,241
2,072
40.1
Grand Total
28,543
34,222
62,765
45.5
a/ Includes recreational vessels.
b/ Includes freight barges, fishing vessels, industrial vessels, research vessels, and school ships.
Source: Nathan Associates Inc.

Table 2-3 presents the number of transits through SMA areas in 2009 by SMA and type of
vessel. The New York SMA had the largest number of transits at 15,180 transits followed by
the SMA from North Carolina to Georgia with 13,437 transits and Norfolk with 9,549 transits.
Each of these areas had a large number of containership transits.

Table 2-3. Total Vessel Transits through SMAs by Type of Vessel, 2009 (includes
periods when Rule is in effect and not in effect)
Combinati
General Passeng Refrigerat
Bulk on Carrier Container Dry Cargo er Ship ed Cargo
SMA
Carrier (e.g. OBO)
Ship
Ship
a/
Ship
Off Race Point
177
341
51
192
2
Cape Cod Bay
44
17
27
69
Great South Channel
246
353
78
173
2
Block Island
326
4
55
138
109
25
New York
592
27
4,850
266
478
20
Philadelphia
430
5
870
532
1,308
567
Norfolk
1,424
27
3,988
632
235
10
Morehead City
50
15
49
40
North Carolina to Georgia 533
6
6,668
735
981
14
Southeast
343
2
1,383
518
650
38
Grand Total
4,165
a/ Includes recreational vessels.

71

18,540

3,026

4,235

Ro-Ro
Tank Tank Towing Other
Cargo
Barge Ship Vessel
b/
Total
Ship
92
672
446
53 2,026
21
166 1,633
107 2,084
89
618
24
32 1,615
237
605
826
141 2,466
1,056
2 3,173 4,294
422 15,180
333
1,779 2,687
189 8,700
1,198
622 1,130
283 9,549
8
72
429
54
717
843
1,707 1,338
612 13,437
1,672
588 1,618
179 6,991

678

b/ Includes freight barges, fishing vessels, industrial vessels, research vessels, and school ships.
Source: Nathan Associates Inc.

3

5,549

2

10,002 14,425 2,072 62,765

In terms of transits during periods when the SMAs were in effect, the Mid-Atlantic region
registered the highest percentage of transits, generally between 45-50 percent of total transits
(Table2-4). This is consistent with the 181-day period that the SMAs were in effect in these
areas from November 1 through April 30. Other areas also generally had the percentage of
transits through active SMAs matching the percent of the days of the year that they were in
effect.

Table 2-4. Percent of Vessel Transits through SMAs by Type of Vessel
during Effected Periods, 2009
SMA
Off Race Point
Cape Cod Bay
Great South Channel
Block Island
New York
Philadelphia
Norfolk
Morehead City
North Carolina to Georgia
Southeast
Grand Total
Source: Nathan Associates Inc.

Rule in
Effect

Rule Not in
Effect

316
882
477
1,121
7,520
3,979
4,652
182
6,499
2,915
28,543

1,710
1,202
1,138
1,345
7,660
4,721
4,897
535
6,938
4,076
34,222

Total
2,026
2,084
1,615
2,466
15,180
8,700
9,549
717
13,437
6,991
62,765

% Rule in
Effect
15.6
42.3
29.5
45.5
49.5
45.7
48.7
25.4
48.4
41.7
45.5

AVERAGE OPERATING SPEEDS BY VESSEL TYPE AND SIZE
Accurate information on current vessel operating speeds is clearly an important element for
the determination of the economic impact of the speed restriction required by the Rule. The
AIS information provides the most detailed and accurate information of vessels operating
speeds for the areas subject to the Rule. For each area subject to the Rule, we have computed
the average operating speeds by type and size of vessel for periods in 2009 when the Rule was
not in effect. This provides the most robust estimate for actual vessel operations and average
operating speeds without the influence of the Rule. In Table 2-5 below, we present the data by
vessel type and size but summarized across all of the areas affected by the Rule. The fastest
average vessel operating speed in these areas observed in 2009 was 14.0 knots for
containerships and 13.9 knots for refrigerated cargo ships. The overall weighted average
speed was 11.9 knots.

4

Table 2-5. Average Vessel Operating Speed through SMAs by Type and Size of Vessel
for Areas Subject to Rule During Periods When Rule Is Not in Effect, 2009 (knots)
Vessel Type
0-5
Bulk Carrier
4.6
Combination Carrier (e.g. OBO)
Container Ship
12.4
General Dry Cargo Ship
11.4
Passenger Ship
10.7
Refrigerated Cargo Ship
11.0
Ro-Ro Cargo Ship
8.4
Tank Ship
9.6
Towing Vessel
8.2
Total
9.3
Source: Nathan Associates Inc.

DWT Size Range
25-3030-35 35-40 40-4545-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100100-120120-150150+ Total
11.4 11.1 10.7 11.2 11.9 12.3 11.3 11.4 10.8
12.6 10.6 11.3
10.1
9.8
12.7
10.6
14.9 14.5 13.9 14.0 13.9 14.4 13.9 13.6 14.1
14.0
11.5 12.3 11.2 11.8 12.9 12.8
12.1
12.4
11.3
13.4
13.7
13.9
13.2 13.9 15.3 13.4 14.3 13.6 13.4
13.6
12.4 12.1 12.3 11.9 11.9 11.8 11.8 11.3 11.1 10.9 11.3 10.3 11.2 11.7
8.2
13.7 13.4 13.6 12.9 13.0 13.5 12.5 13.0 12.6 13.9 13.7 11.5 12.0 10.9 11.3 10.3 11.2 11.9

5-1010-15 15-2020-25
11.1 11.2 11.9 9.6
13.9
12.9 14.1 13.7 13.2
11.6 13.5 12.3 12.4
15.7 14.8
14.4 14.6 15.0
13.3 13.6 14.2 13.7
12.3 11.6 12.7 11.0

Average vessel operating speeds through SMAs in 2009 during period when the Rule was in
effect declined to an overall average of 10.0 knots (Table 2-6). Containerships slowed from an
average of 14 knots to 10.6 knots. Ro-ro vessels slowed from 13.6 knots to 10.5 knots. The
fastest average vessel speed through SMA active areas was by refrigerated cargo ships at 13.1
knots just slightly slower than the 13.9 knots recorded during non-active SMA periods.

Table 2-6. Average Vessel Operating Speed through SMAs by Type and Size of Vessel
for Areas Subject to Rule During Periods When Rule Is in Effect, 2009 (knots)
Vessel Type
0-5
Bulk Carrier
Combination Carrier (e.g. OBO)
Container Ship
12.3
General Dry Cargo Ship
10.5
Passenger Ship
9.1
Refrigerated Cargo Ship
Ro-Ro Cargo Ship
9.3
Tank Barge
Tank Ship
9.2
Towing Vessel
8.2
Total
8.6
Source: Nathan Associates Inc.

DWT Size Range
25-3030-35 35-40 40-4545-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100100-120120-150150+ Total
10.6 10.3 9.9 10.3 10.3 10.7 9.6 10.4 10.8
9.6
10.6 9.2 10.3
6.8
8.5 10.0
8.2
10.2 11.1 11.1 11.0 10.1 10.6 10.5 10.7 10.4
10.6
10.6 11.2 10.8 11.0 10.5 9.2 9.9
11.2
9.7
9.4 11.7
9.9
9.9
13.1
10.6 10.3 10.4 11.1 10.9 10.2 10.8
10.5
10.6
10.6
10.1 10.5 10.8 10.3 10.9 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.3 10.5 10.0 9.9
9.8
9.6 10.6
9.7 10.9 10.3
8.2
10.9 11.0 10.7 10.5 10.5 10.9 10.5 10.8 10.2 10.6 10.4 10.2 10.4
9.6 10.6
9.8 10.7 10.0

5-1010-15 15-2020-25
10.5 10.4 11.4 9.1
10.6
11.1 10.7 10.6 10.3
11.4 11.6 11.1 11.5
10.7 11.5
13.4 13.8 11.8 12.9
10.8 10.3 10.5 10.7

AVERAGE DELAYS DUE TO RULE BY TYPE AND SIZE OF VESSEL
The primary operational impact of the Rule on the shipping industry is the extra sailing time
incurred caused by vessels having to slow down within the restricted areas. Estimates of the
extra sailing time were calculated by subtracting the time required to sail through each
restricted area using the detailed average vessel operating speeds for that restricted area
during periods when the Rule was not in effect from the time required at a sailing speed of 10
knots. Only average vessel speeds of greater than 10 knots during non-Rule periods were
used for these calculations. A summary across all restricted areas of the average extra time per
vessel transit by vessel type and size is presented in Table 2-7. The average delay for all
vessels is 0.37 of an hour or 22 minutes. The highest average delay by vessel type is 37minutes
(0.62 hours) for combination carriers followed by 34 minutes for Ro-Ro carriers and 32

5

minutes for containerships. Refrigerated cargo ships only experienced an average delay of 5
minutes.

Table 2-7. Average Delays per Vessel Transit through SMAs due to Rule by Type and
Size of Vessel, 2009 (hours)
Vessel Type
Bulk Carrier
Combination Carrier (e.g. OBO)
Container Ship
General Dry Cargo Ship
Passenger Ship
Refrigerated Cargo Ship
Ro-Ro Cargo Ship
Tank Ship
Total
Source: Nathan Associates Inc.

0-5

0.02
0.19
0.17
0.00
0.14
0.19

5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40
0.12 0.17 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.16
0.75
0.93
0.36 0.61 0.46 0.47 0.78 0.49 0.45
0.04 0.29 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.19 0.08
0.84 0.42
0.11 0.08 0.32
-0.06
0.46 0.64 0.66 0.51 0.48 0.60 0.72
0.45 0.23 0.33 0.12 0.28 0.30 0.36
0.55 0.42 0.49 0.42 0.45 0.41 0.36

DWT Size Range
40-45 45-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100100-120120-150150+ Total
0.21 0.37 0.33 0.39 0.19 0.00
0.34 0.31 0.20
0.50
0.62
0.45 0.64 0.59 0.55 0.53 0.59
0.54
0.16 0.44 0.62
0.17
0.35
0.54
0.62
0.08
0.35 0.43 0.54 0.49
0.56
0.29 0.36 0.27 0.38 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.13 0.12 0.07 0.29
0.37 0.46 0.54 0.54 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.37

VESSEL OPERATING COSTS AT SEA BY TYPE AND SIZE OF VESSEL
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) prepares estimates of vessel operating costs to be
used by planners in studies to determine the potential benefits of harbor improvement
projects. Vessel operating costs include annual capital costs as determined by the replacement
cost of the vessels and application of capital recovery factors; estimates of fixed annual
operating costs such as for crew, lubricating materials and stores (supplies), maintenance and
repair, insurance and administration; the number of operational days per year; and fuel costs
at sea and in port.
The type and DWT size of vessels for which operating costs are reported by the USACE is
shown in Table 2-8 below. Vessel operating costs are presented separately for U.S. flag and
foreign flag vessels, for five vessel types, and up to 14 vessel DWT sizes within a vessel type.

6

Table 2-8. Type and Size of Vessels for which USACE Reports Vessel Operating Costs
(DWT)
General
cargo
vessel

Foreign flag
Container
ship

Bulk
carrier

Tanker
(double
hull)

Tanker
(single
hull

General
cargo
vessel

U.S. flag
Container
ship

Bulk
carrier

Tanker
(double
hull)

11,000
14,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
30,000

9,000
15,000
20,000
20,000
11,000
9,000
15,000
20,000
14,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
14,000
14,000
25,000
25,000
17,000
35,000
35,000
35,000
16,000
17,000
35,000
35,000
20,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
20,000
20,000
40,000
50,000
23,000
50,000
60,000
60,000
24,000
23,000
50,000
60,000
28,000
60,000
70,000
70,000
30,000
28,000
60,000
70,000
31,000
80,000
80,000
80,000
31,000
80,000
80,000
35,000
100,000
90,000
90,000
35,000
100,000
90,000
39,000
120,000
120,000
120,000
39,000
120,000
120,000
42,000
150,000
150,000
150,000
42,000
130,000
150,000
49,000
175,000
175,000
175,000
49,000
175,000
55,000
200,000
200,000
200,000
55,000
200,000
66,000
265,000
265,000
66,000
265,000
82,000
325,000
325,000
Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Economic Guidance Memorandum 02-06, Deep Draft Vessel Operating Costs

Tanker
(single
hull
20,000
25,000
35,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
120,000
150,000
175,000
200,000
265,000

As the USACE data includes more vessel size ranges than necessary for this economic impact
analysis We applied regression techniques to the USACE vessel operating cost data in order
to match with the vessel size categories with thoase used in this analysis of U.S. East Coast
vessel arrivals. A logarithmic equation was specified relating hourly operating costs at sea
with vessel DWT for each of the vessel types used in this economic impact analysis.
A concern over the use of the USACE operating cost estimates is the variability of actual
vessel operating costs due to the fluctuations in the price of bunker fuel.

The USACE

estimates include the assumed fuel consumption per day at sea for the primary propulsion
and auxiliary propulsion for each vessel type and DWT size. The primary propulsion is
assumed to use heavy viscosity oil while the auxiliary propulsion is assumed to use marine
diesel oil. We updated the USACE vessel operating costs to reflect the average bunker fuel
prices per ton for New York for using an annual average 2009 calculated from data reported
by Bunkerworld. The average price for heavy viscosity oil for 2009 was $347 per metric ton
and marine diesel oil was $685 per metric ton. The resulting estimates of vessel operating
costs by type and size of vessel for 2009 are presented for foreign flag and U.ZS.-flag vessels
in Table 2-9 and Table 2-10, respectively. These estimated vessel operating costs for 2009
represent the best method to value the actual impact on the shipping industry of the Rule that
year.
It is important to distinguish between foreign flag and U.S. flag vessels as their costs
structures differ considerably. Overall, U.S.-flag vessels have operating costs 40-70 percent

7

higher than foreign flag vessels. This is principally due to higher costs for U.S. crews, vessel
maintenance and insurance requirements that U.S.-flag vessels have to satisfy 2.

Table 2-9. Hourly Vessel Operating Costs at Sea for Foreign Flag Vessels by Type Size
of Vessel Using Average 2009 ($000s)

Vessel type

0-5

5-10

10-15

15-20

20-25

25-30

30-35

DWT Size Range (000s)
35-40 40-45 45-50 50-60

60-70

70-80

80-90

90-100 100-120 120-150

150+

Bulk Carrier
786
805
825
845
865
886
907
929
951
974
1,010 1,059 1,110 1,164
1,221
1,311
1,477 1,703
Combination Carrier (e.g. OBO) 826
846
866
887
908
930
952
975
999 1,023
1,060 1,112 1,166 1,223
1,282
1,377
1,551 1,789
Container Ship
788
888
1,000
1,126
1,267 1,427 1,607 1,809 2,037 2,294
2,740 3,474 4,405 5,584
7,080 10,107
Freight Barge
485
594
728
892
1,093 1,339 1,641 2,010 2,463 3,017
General Dry Cargo Ship
485
594
728
892
1,093 1,339 1,641 2,010 2,463 3,017
Passenger Ship a/
3,551 5,069
7,237 10,962 13,897
Refrigerated Cargo Ship
1,774 1,997
2,249
2,532
2,851 3,211 3,615 4,071 4,583 5,161
6,166
Ro-Ro Cargo Ship
867
977
1,100
1,238
1,394 1,570 1,767 1,990 2,241 2,523
3,014 3,822 4,845
Tank Ship
960
978
996
1,015
1,034 1,053 1,073 1,093 1,113 1,134
1,166 1,210 1,256 1,304
1,353
1,431
1,570 1,755
Towing Vessel
960
Other b/
485
594
728
892
1,093 1,339 1,641 2,010 2,463 3,017
a/ Includes recreational vessels.
b/ Includes fishing vessels, industrial vessels, research vessels, and school ships.
Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates Inc. as decribed in text from data provided in U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Economic Guidance Memorandum 05-01, Deep Draft Vessel Operating Costs and
adjusted for bunker fuel prices reported by Bunkerworld for IFO380 and MDO for New York.

Table 2-10. Hourly Vessel Operating Costs at Sea for U.S. Flag Vessels by Type Size of
Vessel Using Average 2009 ($000s)
5-10

10-15

15-20

20-25

25-30

30-35

35-40

DWT (000s)
40-45 45-50

50-60

60-70

70-80

80-90

Bulk Carrier
1,321
Combination Carrier (e.g. OBO) 1,387
Container Ship
1,064
Freight Barge
932
General Dry Cargo Ship
932

1,358
1,426
1,194
1,113
1,113

1,396
1,466
1,340
1,331
1,331

1,435
1,507
1,503
1,590
1,590

1,476
1,549
1,687
1,901
1,901

1,517
1,593
1,894
2,272
2,272

1,559
1,637
2,125
2,715
2,715

1,603
1,683
2,385
3,245
3,245

1,648
1,730
2,676
3,878
3,878

1,694
1,779
3,003
4,634
4,634

1,766
1,854
3,571
6,055
6,055

1,866
1,960
4,497
-

1,972
2,071
5,664
-

2,084
2,189
7,133
-

Passenger Ship a/
Refrigerated Cargo Ship

4,775
2,393

6,749
2,686

9,539 14,283 17,989
3,014 3,383 3,796

4,260

4,781

5,366

6,022

6,758

8,034

-

-

-

-

Ro-Ro Cargo Ship
Tank Barge
Tank Ship

1,170
1,784
1,784

1,313
1,818
1,818

1,474
1,853
1,853

2,083
1,960
1,960

2,337
1,998
1,998

2,623
2,036
2,036

2,944
2,074
2,074

3,304
2,114
2,114

3,928
2,174
2,174

4,947
2,258

6,230
2,344

2,434

2,528

Vessel type anf flag

0-5

1,654
1,888
1,888

1,856
1,924
1,924

90-100 100-120 120-150 150+
2,203 2,393
2,313 2,513
8,984 12,698
-

2,748
2,885
-

3,243
3,405
-

-

-

-

2,675

2,939

3,291

Towing Vessel
1,784
Other b/
932 1,113 1,331 1,590 1,901 2,272 2,715 3,245 3,878 4,634 6,055
Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates Inc. as decribed in text from data provided in U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Economic Guidance Memorandum 05-01, Deep Draft Vessel Operating Costs and
adjusated for bunker fuel prices reported by Bunkerworld for IFO380 and MDO for New York.

DIRECT ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SMAS
The estimated direct economic impact on the shipping industry of the Rule in 2009 is
presented in Table 2-11. Across all SMAs, the total direct economic impact is estimated $19.6
million. More than 63 percent of the total direct impact incurred by containerships at $12.4
million followed distantly by Ro-Ro cargo ships at $2.2 million, tank ships at $1.6 million and
passenger at $1.5 million.

2 Some studies report a much higher differential (up to 2.7 times) between U.S.-flag and foreign flag vessel

operating costs. However, those studies do not include fuel and capital costs in their comparisons.

8

Table 2-11. Direct Economic Impact of SMAs on Shipping Industry by Type and Size
of Vessel, 2009 ($000s)
Vessel Type
0-5
5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-60 60-70
Bulk Carrier
17
21
7
9
27
24 81 25
49
62
60
Combination Carrier (e.g. OBO)
3
- 16
Container Ship
1
90
267
78
203
286
446 353 625
668 2,881 6,128
General Dry Cargo Ship
24
3
53
27
19
14
19
9 42
60
Passenger Ship a/
405
806
245
Refrigerated Cargo Ship
28
28
28
7
23
Ro-Ro Cargo Ship
54
352
665
355
303
95 61 86
12
244
11
Tank Ship
0
73
39
85
7
22
51 227 116
438
127
118
Towing Vessel
194
Other b/
563
263
0
Total
1,187 1,336
1,005
889
594
651
634 746 902 1,227 3,338 6,318
a/ Includes recreational vessels.
b/ Includes freight barges, fishing vessels, industrial vessels, research vessels, and school ships.
Source: Nathan Associates Inc.

70-80
82
2
70
122
277

80-90 90-100100-120120-150 150+
7
6
295
24
68
49
32 19
319
68
49
39 26

The direct economic impact on the shipping industry by SMA is presented in Table 2-12. The
largest impact is recorded for the SMA from North Carolina to Georgia at $5.9 million
followed by New York at $5.5 million and Norfolk at $4.2 million. As previously mentioned
these areas have the majority of containership transits along the U.S. East Coast. These three
SMAs account for nearly 80 percent of the direct econom,ic impact of the Rule on the the
shipping industry.

Table 2-12. Direct Economic Impact of SMAs on Shipping Industry by SMA and Type
of Vessel, 2009 ($000s)
Combinatio
General
Refrigerate
Bulk
Ro-Ro
n Carrier Container Dry Cargo Passenger d Cargo
Carrier (e.g. OBO)
Ship
Ship a/
Cargo Ship
Ship
Ship

Tank

Towing

Ship
Vessel Other b/ Total
SMA
Off Race Point
9
74
2
4
7
37
3
0
136
Cape Cod Bay
7
2
1
1
3
25
20
6
65
Great South Channel
15
139
4
185
0
12
60
0
0
416
Block Island
55
1
37
11
27
5
84
129
10
4
362
New York
73
11
3,631
27
349
16
473
593
62 271
5,506
Philadelphia
48
375
43
169
73
137
229
38
26
1,138
Norfolk
174
8
2,830
61
187
8
505
111
16 267
4,166
Morehead City
5
8
2
4
2
7
2
87
117
North Carolina to Georgia 55
1
4,805
79
123
8
382
321
24 101
5,897
Southeast
37
490
41
406
5
634
103
20
64
1,800
Total
476
21 12,392
271
1,455
114
2,239 1,616
194 826 19,604
a/ Includes recreational vessels.
b/ Includes freight barges, fishing vessels, industrial vessels, research vessels, and school ships.
Source: Nathan Associates Inc.

DIRECT ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DMAS
The Rule specifies that voluntary dynamic management areas would be implemented along
the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone when right whale sightings occur.

Triggers for

implementing a DMA are based on those specified for the Atlantic Large Whale Take

9

Total
476
21
12,392
271
1,455
114
2,239
1,616
194
826
19,604

Reduction Plan (ALWTRP) Dynamic Area Management fishing restrictions. 3 A DMA action
would be triggered by a single reliable report from a qualified individual of an aggregation of
three or more right whales within 75 square nautical miles (nm2) (257 km2), such that right
whale density is equal to or greater than 0.04 right whales per nm2 (3.43 km2), equivalent to
four right whales per 100 nm2 (343 km2). Once a DMA is triggered, NMFS would use the
following procedures and criteria to establish a DMA:
•

A circle with a radius of at least 2.8 nm (5.2 km) would be drawn around the
location of each individual sighting. This radius would be adjusted for the
number of observed whales, so as to size the DMA to maintain a density of four
right whales per 100 nm2 (343 km2). Information on how to calculate the length of
the radius can be found in the Proposed Rule to amend the regulations that
implement the ALWTRP (67 FR 1133). For a group of three whales the DMA
would consist of a core area with a radius of 4.8 nm (8.9 km).

•

If any circle or group of contiguous circles includes three or more right whales,
this core area and its surrounding waters would be a candidate DMA zone.

Once NMFS identifies a core area containing three or more whales, the agency would expand
this initial core area to provide a buffer in which the whales could move and still be protected.
NMFS will determine the extent to the DMA zones as follows:
•

A large circular zone would be drawn extending 15 nm (27.8 km) from the
perimeter of a circle around each core area.

•

The DMA would be a polygon drawn outside, but tangential to, the circular
buffer zone(s), defined by the latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates of its
corners.

Hence each DMA consists of the core area with a radius of 4.8 nm (for a group of three
whales) plus the buffer with a radius of 15 nm for a total radius of 19.8 nm. The diameter of
the DMA is thus 39.6 nm. The DMA zone would automatically expire after 15 days from the
day of the original sighting, unless subsequent surveys within the 15-day period
demonstrated (a) whales are present in the zone, or (b) the aggregation had persisted, in
which case the period would be extended 15 days from the date of any subsequent sightings
in the zone.
Impact on Vessel Operations
In all regions, mariners have the option of either routing around the DMA or proceeding
through it at a restricted speed. The measures are voluntary and vessel operators are not

3See the January 9, 2002 Federal Register Proposed Rule (as amended by the October 28, 2002 technical

amendment to the final rule) for the definition of Procedures and Criteria to Establish a DAM Zone, Criteria
to Determine the Extent of the DAM Zone, and Duration of DAM Zones.

10

currently required to take either measure. For this analysis we have compared the average
speeds for each vessel type passing through areas where DMAs were implemented in 2009
with speeds for same types of vessel through those same areas when the DMA was not in
effect. The direct impact of a DMA on vessel operations is the increased time required to
transit through the DMA when it is in effect.
In 2009, there were18 DMAs implemented based on the sightings of right whales. Information
on each of these DMAs is presented in Table 2-11 and the locations of the DMAs are shown in
Figure 2-1. The average duration of the DMAs in 2009 was 18.6 days. The DMAs range in size
from 1448 nm2 to 4391 nm2.

Table 2-13. DMAs Implemented in 2009
DMA

No. of

Area

No.

Whales

(nm2)

Duration
Start date

End date

Days

NE_04
28
1997
1/13/2009
2/10/2009
28
NE_05
3
1605
1/16/2009
1/29/2009
13
NE_06
6
1448
2/11/2009
2/25/2009
14
NE_07
5
1456
2/11/2009
2/25/2009
14
NE_08
12
2419
2/11/2009
2/25/2009
14
NE_09
3
1592
3/17/2009
3/28/2009
11
NE_10
5
1764
4/13/2009
4/25/2009
12
NE_11
15
1926
5/12/2009
5/27/2009
15
NE_12
3
1602
5/13/2009
5/27/2009
14
NE_13
44
4391
6/2/2009
6/29/2009
27
NE_14
3
4391
7/9/2009
7/21/2009
12
NE_15
5
1644
9/2/2009
9/16/2009
14
NE_16
26
2124
10/15/2009 11/11/2009
27
NE_17
24
1918
10/22/2009 12/1/2009
40
NE_18
16
2441
10/27/2009 11/10/2009
14
NE_19
41
3661
11/10/2009 12/17/2009
37
NE_20
47
3403
11/10/2009 11/24/2009
14
NE_21
27
4198
12/4/2009
12/19/2009
15
Source: NOAA, Office of Protected Resources, National Marine Fisheries Service.

11

Figure 2-1. Locations of DMAs in 2009

The average vessel operating speeds by vessel type during periods when DMA were in effect
and not in effect in 2009 are presented in Table 2-14. There were 11,924 transits recorded in the
DMA areas at times when the DMAS were not in effect and 1,937 transits during the DMAs.
The overall weighted average speed during the non-active periods was 8.0 knots whereas an
average of 8.5 knots was recorded for the period when DMAs were in effect. Interestingly,
only six vessel types had average speeds greater than 10 knots through the DMA areas, and of
these only two vessel types, bulk carriers and passenger ships actually recorded a reduction in
speed during active DMAs. For bulk carriers the reduction was minor from 10.1 knots to 9.8
knots and for passenger vessels the speed reduction was from 12.0 knots to 9.0 knots.

12

Table 2-14. Average Vessel Operating Speed through DMAs by Type of Vessel, 2009
(knots)
Number of transits
Vessel type

Not in
effect

In
effect

Average speed

Total

Not in
effect

In
effect

Bulk Carrier

396

97

493

10.10

9.80

Container Ship

528

91

619

14.90

15.00

Freight Barge

86

9

95

8.90

9.54

163

26

189

11.36

11.67

42

7

49

6.09

9.23

Passenger Ship

544

72

616

12.00

9.00

Recreational

120

6

126

6.88

9.77

44

14

58

9.88

11.18

155

19

174

13.52

13.60

62

15

77

5.66

7.31

General Dry Cargo Ship
Industrial Vessel

Research Vessel
Ro-Ro Cargo Ship
School Ship
Tank Ship

1,697

431

2,128

11.34

11.53

Towing Vessel

2,075

310

2,385

7.53

7.60

#N/A

5,995

840

6,835

5.93

6.10

Total

11,924

1,937

13,861

8.01

8.49

Speed
reduction
0.29

3.00

Source: Nathan Associates Inc.

As previously mentioned, the speed restrictions under DMAs are voluntary. As such, a large
segment of the shipping industry did not reduce speeds through active DMAs in 2009. For
this reason, there was no or minimal economic impact of DMAs on the shipping industry in
2009.

OTHER DIRECT IMPACTS ON SHIPPING INDUSTRY
Cumulative Effect of Multi-Port Strings for Containerships
Many of the vessels calling at U.S. East Coast ports occur as part of a “string” of port calls by
the vessel. For containerships, Ro-Ro cargo ships and some specialty tankers these multi-port
calls constitute a scheduled cargo service offered by the shipping lines. Other types of vessels
may have multiple U.S. East Coast port calls as part of a coastwise cabotage service, for
delivery of specialty chemicals or other products, or to lighten or top off in order to maximize
vessel utilization. There are several reasons why the cumulative effect of multiple port calls at
restricted ports could impact a vessel more than the sum of the individual direct impacts
presented in the prior sections. First, the delays incurred from speed restrictions at one port
when combined with speed restrictions at a subsequent port may diminish the ability of the
vessel to maintain its schedule and could result in missed tidal windows. Second, even brief
delays at arrival at the second port could result in increased costs for scheduled, but unused,
port labor. Third, some shipping lines felt that the cumulative impact of three or four port
calls at port areas with restrictions could cause them to rework vessel itineraries and could
result in dropping of one of the port calls in order to maintain a weekly service without
having to add an additional vessel to the service.

13

However, these cumulative factors will not affect every vessel making multiple port calls at
restricted ports. Also the impact may vary from an 8-hour delay due to a missed tidal window
to incurring charges for unused labor if a vessel is late arriving at the port. 4 It is realistic to
assume that the shipping industry will revise their itineraries to account for the delays
imposed by the speed restrictions and that occurrences of missed tidal widows will be rare.
From the calculations described in detail in the 2008 FEIS Report, we have used the same
average additional delay of 11 minutes for each containership transit that is part of a multiport string to account for this cumulative impact. 5 The economic value of this additional time
has been calculated based on the average 2009 vessel operating and the 2009 vessel operating
costs for containerships. The estimated impact for 2009 is $3.1 million.

Re-routing of Southbound Coastwise Shipping
Coastwise shipping or cabotage trade along the U.S. East Coast has always been an important
segment of our nation’s maritime heritage. In recent years, attention has been focused on the
further development of coastwise shipping (also referred to as short-sea shipping) as a means
of reducing highway congestion on the Eastern Seaboard. Benefits of coastwise shipping also
include lowering transport and environmental costs and reducing our demand for imported
fuel. For these reasons, it is important that the speed restrictions not unduly affect the
development of increased coastwise shipping.
However, for commercial and navigation purposes, it appears unlikely that the speed
restriction would significantly affect coastwise shipping. Northbound vessels prefer to use
Gulf Stream further offshore and benefit from the enhanced operating speed and fuel
efficiency. Southbound traffic routes closer to the U.S. East Coast; generally within 7-10
nautical miles of the shoreline. However, during the proposed seasonal management periods,
masters of southbound vessels would likely route outside of seasonal speed restricted areas
incurring an overall increase in distance. This affects southbound vessels between the
entrance to the Chesapeake Bay and Port Canaveral.
The speed restrictions in the mid-Atlantic region are implemented for a radius of 20 nautical
mile buffer around each port area for port areas north of Wilmington, NC. 6 A continuous 20mile buffer was implemented from Wilmington, NC through Savannah to the northern
boundary of the Southeastern SMA. The additional distance incurred by southbound vessels
would be 56 nautical miles. The economic impact for this extra sailing distance is estimated at
$1.1 million using 2009 vessel operating costs.

4 While tides occur on 12-hour cycle, it is assumed that a tidal window is open for 2 hours before and after high

tide. This results in an 8-hour waiting period between tidal windows.

5 Only a small portion of vessel arrivals should be affected by this additional delay. It is assumed that 7.5

percent of vessels could be affected by as much as an additional 8-hour delay due to missing the tidal
window. This results in an average additional delay per vessel of 36 minutes.
6 The exception is the Block Island Sound speed restriction area that is configured as a rectangle with a width of
30 nautical miles.

14

TOTAL DIRECT ECONOMIC IMPACT ON SHIPPING INDUSTRY
The total direct economic impact on the shipping industry consists of the various impacts
analyzed above. These are the SMAs, DMAs, cumulative effect of multi-port strings and the
re-routing of southbound coastwise shipping. The total direct economic impact on the
shipping industry in 2009 is estimated at $23.8 million as shown in Table 2-15.

Table 2-15. Direct Economic Impact on Shipping Industry, 2009 ($millions)
Impact

Amount

Seasonal Management Areas (SMAs)
Dynamic Management Areas(DMAs)
Cumulative Effect of multi-port strings
Re-routing of southbound coastwise shipping
Total
Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates as described in text.

19.6
3.1
1.1
23.8

Direct Economic Impact Relative to Trade Value and Freight Costs
The U.S. Census Bureau data on U.S. imports of merchandise is compiled primarily from
automated data submitted through the U.S. Customs’ Automated Commercial System. 7 Data
are compiled also from import entry summary forms, warehouse withdrawal forms and
Foreign Trade Zone documents as required by law to be filed with the U.S. Customs Service.
Information on U.S. exports of merchandise is compiled from copies of Shipper’s Export
Declarations (SEDs) and data from qualified exporters, forwarders or carriers. Copies of SEDs
are required to be filed with Customs officials at the port of export.
For this study, the following data items have been used from the U.S. Census Bureau Foreign
Trade Statistics:
•

Customs import value – the value of imports appraised by the U.S. Customs
Services in accordance with the legal requirements of the Tariff Act of 1930, as
amended. This value is generally defined as the price actually paid or payable for
merchandise when sold for exportation to the U.S. excluding U.S. import duties,
freight, insurance and other charges incurred in bringing the merchandise to the
U.S.

•

Import charges – the aggregate cost of all freight, insurance and other charges
(excluding U.S. import duties) incurred in bringing the merchandise from
alongside the carrier at the port of exportation and placing it alongside the carrier
at the first port of entry in the U.S.

•

F.A.S. export value – the free alongside ship value of exports at the U.S. seaport
based on the transaction price, including inland freight, insurance and other

7 The description and definition of information from the U.S Census Bureau Foreign Trade Statistics is based on

the Guide to Foreign Trade Statistics: Description of the Foreign Trade Statistical Program available on the
U.S. census Bureau website.

15

charges incurred in placing the merchandise alongside the carrier at the U.S. port
of exportation. The value, as defined, excludes the cost of loading the
merchandise aboard the exporting carrier and also excludes freight, insurance and
any other charges or transportation costs beyond the port of exportation.
•

Shipping weight – the gross weight in metric tons including the weight of
moisture content, wrappings, crates, boxes and containers.

•

District of exportation – the customs district in which the merchandise is loaded
on the vessel which takes the merchandise out of the country.

•

Import district of unlading- the district where merchandise is unloaded from the
importing vessel.

Table 2-18 presents data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau on volume and value of goods
carried by vessels calling at U.S. East Coast ports.

Table 2-16. U.S. East Coast Maritime Trade, 2005-2011 Value ($ millions)
Vessel Import Vessel Export
Year
Custom Value
Value
Total
2005
296,478
96,861
393,339
2006
327,804
113,955
441,759
2007
347,337
140,728
488,065
2008
381,869
173,475
555,344
2009
272,445
126,884
399,329
2010
329,035
153,977
483,012
2011
390,148
190,803
580,952
Note: Includes Custom districts 1,4,5,10,11 and 13 through 18
Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates Inc. from U.S.
Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics for 2005 to 2011.

To measure the significance of the operational measures on the shipping industry, it is
interesting to compare the estimated direct economic impact with ocean freight costs
associated with U.S. East Coast trade. Ocean freight costs are considered as a conservative
proxy for shipping industry revenues. In 2009, ocean freight charges averaged 4.6 percent of
the value of imports. Given the composition of our trade, it is reasonable to assume that ocean
freight charges would represent no less than the same percentage of the value of our exports.

16

Table 2-17 US. East Coast Vessel Import Charges as Percent of Vessel Import Customs
Value ($ millions)
Year
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Vessel Import Vessel Import
Custom Value
Charges
293,065
14,921
324,220
16,509
344,068
16,558
378,250
17,745
269,814
12,418
326,126
14,242
386,358
15,171

Percent
5.1%
5.1%
4.8%
4.7%
4.6%
4.4%
3.9%

Note: Includes Custom districts 4,5,10,11 and 13 through
18. The Customs District of Portland has been excluded due
to incongruences between the customs and the CIF value.
Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates Inc. from U.S.

Table 2-18 presents the significance of the estimated economic impact of the operational
measures relative to the value of U.S. East Coast trade in 2009. This comparison is useful to
determine whether increased shipping costs associated with the proposed operational
measures would significantly affect the price and volume of traded goods via U.S. East Coast
ports. In 2009, the total annual direct economic impact on the shipping industry is $23.8
million while the value of U.S. East Coast trade is $399.3 billion. Thus the direct economic
impact represents six thousandth of one percent of the value of traded merchandise in 2009.
Table 2-18 also shows the direct economic impact on the shipping industry represents less
than two-tenths of one percent of the ocean freight costs for U.S. East Coast trade. These
results indicate that the implementation of the proposed operational measures had a minimal
impact on the financial revenues and hence the financial performance of the vessel operators
calling at U.S. East Coast ports.

Table 2-18. Economic Impact as a Percent of Value of U.S. East Coast Maritime Trade
and Ocean Freight Costs, 2009
Item

Amount

Direct economic impact ($millions)
East Coast trade merchandise value ($ millions)
Direct economic impact as a percent of trade value (% )
Ocean freight costs ($ millions)
Direct economic impact as a percent ofocean freight costs (% )
Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates as described in text.

17

23.6
399,329
0.0059
15,973
0.148

Estimated Indirect Economic Impact
Depending on the nature and significance of the direct economic impact, it is possible that
implementation of the proposed operational measures could have indirect economic impacts.
Potential indirect economic impacts include:
•
•
•

Increased intermodal costs due to missed rail and truck connections
Diversion of traffic to other ports
Impact on local economies of decreased income from jobs lost due to traffic
diversions

There are many factors that influence a shipping line’s decision to call at specific ports. These
include the adequacy and suitability of port facilities and equipment, the ability of the
terminal operator to quickly turnaround the vessel, overall cargo demand, efficiency of
intermodal transportation, port charges, and the port location relative to other ports and cargo
markets. If cargo is to divert to other ports this would be because the total additional costs
associated with those routes are less than the cost of vessel time due to delays at the current
port. Hence it would be double-counting to also include any additional overland transport
costs to the estimated impact already presented.
A good portion of a port’s traffic is often considered captive to that port. For cargoes that are
destined for the port’s immediate hinterland, it does not make economic sense to call at a
distant port and then to ship back to the port via expensive land transport. However, most
ports also accommodate traffic that is not destined for its immediate hinterland but is through
traffic that may have economically attractive routing alternatives. Port areas in the Northeast
and northern parts of the mid-Atlantic region serve as gateways to the inland population
centers and industrial areas such as western New York, western Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana,
Illinois and Michigan. These areas may be served via the Canadian ports of Halifax and
Montreal without incurring delays caused by the right whale ship strike reduction measures. 8
These Canadian ports currently compete with Northeast U.S. ports for cargo destined for the
mid-eastern U.S. and the speed restrictions implemented in the U.S. and not in Canada could
shift the current competitive balance to the advantage of Canadian ports.
The Maritime Administration (MARAD), an agency of the U.S. Department of Transportation
has developed a Port Economic Impact Kit that allows users to assess the economic impact of
port activity on a region’s economy.

The MARAD Port Economic Impact Kit uses an

adaptation of input-output analysis that is a widely established tool for undertaking economic
impact assessments. The model calculates the total economic impacts or multiplier effect of

8 Vessels may divert to other U.S. ports in addition to those diverting to Canada. While this is possible, for the

total economic impact analysis only diversions to non-U.S. ports are included. For diversion to ports within
the U.S. the negative economic impact for one U.S. port are offset by gains in another U.S. port.

18

deep-draft port industry and includes an indirect effect that reflects expenditures made by the
supplying firms to meet the requirements of the deep-draft port industry as well as
expenditures by firms stocking the supplying firms. The model also includes an induced
effect that corresponds to the change in consumer spending that is generated by changes in
labor income accruing to the workers in the deep-draft port industry as well as employment
in the supplying businesses.
We have estimated the indirect economic of port diversions based on the detailed
methodology described in the 2008 FEIS adjusted for the actual observed delays incurred in
2009 from the AIS data analysis and using the updated vessel operating costs for 2009. The
estimated indirect economic impact of port diversion for 2009 is $15.8million.

19

3. Economic Impact of Rule on
Other Market Segments
The AIS data captures the vast preponderance of commercial maritime activity that would be
subject to the speed restrictions and other operational measures. However, there are some
market segments that may be impacted by the speed restrictions and other operational
measures whose maritime activities are not adequately captured in the AISA data. In this
section, we identify the most relevant of these market segments and discuss the potential
economic impact. Those market segments or potential impacts include:
•
•
•
•

Commercial fishing
Charter fishing
Passenger ferries
Whale watching

The economic impact for each of these elements is presented below.

Commercial Fishing
Commercial fishing is a multimillion dollar industry along the U.S. East Coast. In 2011,
commercial fish landings at U.S. East Coast ports totaled $934 million (Table 3-1). The port of
New Bedford, MA is the leading U.S. port in terms of value of commercial fish landings with
$369.0 million in 2011.

20

Table 3-1. U.S. East Coast Commercial Fishery Landings
by Port, 2002 through 2011 (millions of dollars)
Port
New Bedford, MA

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

168.6

176.2

207.7

282.5

281.4

268.0

241.3

249.2

306.0

369.0

Cape May-Wildwood, NJ

35.3

42.8

60.2

68.4

37.6

58.8

73.7

73.4

81.0

103.0

Hampton Roads Area, VA
Gloucetser, MA

69.5
41.2

79.6
37.8

100.8
42.8

85.2
45.9

51.0
47.3

70.2
46.8

12.3
54.2

68.1
50.4

75.0
57.0

88.0
59.0

Stonington, ME
Point Judith, RI

21.7
31.3

20.5
32.4

22.4
36.0

32.3
38.3

34.3
46.8

23.5
36.7

15.4
36.9

26.5
32.4

45.0
32.0

48.0
40.0

Point Pleasnat, NJ
Reedville, VA

19.7
24.2

22.8
24.2

19.2
26.1

21.6
27.1

22.6
23.7

23.1
27.3

22.1
23.9

20.2
25.9

23.0
34.0

37.0
36.0

Long Beach-Barnegat, NJ

14.6

16.4

20.6

26.7

24.5

23.1

22.9

21.7

26.0

34.0

Portland,ME
Provincetown-Chatham, MA

40.4
15.2

28.7
13.5

34.6
14.2

34.6
19.8

27.8
20.6

24.1
18.3

22.6
18.3

16.6
20.0

19.0
20.0

28.0
27.0

4.3

4.1

2.7

7.4

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

11.0

24.0

Wanchese-Stumpy Point, NC

23.2

21.0

20.6

19.6

21.7

20.6

22.4

23.1

Montauk, NY
Newport, RI

11.1
n.a.

11.0
n.a.

13.1
n.a.

16.5
n.a.

16.8
20.8

15.7
12.4

14.3
n.a.

14.6
n.a.

22.0
18.0
n.a.

22.0
19.0
n.a.

Boston, MA
Beaufort- Morehead City, NC
Atlantic City, NJ

8.6
19.1
22.4

8.9
15.0
20.8

8.8
16.9
17.7

10.6
9.7
18.5

n.a.
n.a.
24.2

n.a.
n.a.
27.5

n.a.
11.1
24.1

11.9
23.1
22.2

15.1
n.a.
17.3

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

76.2
646.6

74.9
650.6

55.2
719.6

51.1
815.8

701.1

696.1

615.5

699.3

801.4

934.0

Rockland, ME

Other
Total
Source: NOAA Fisheries.

The right whale ship strike reduction operational measures apply to vessels with a length of
65 feet and above. Because the AIS data lacks adequate records on commercial fishing
vessels 9, we also evaluated data which included fishing vessels which are over 65 feet in
length and weigh less than 150 tons, using information provided by NMFS’ database of
commercial fishing permits.
Table 3-2 shows that for the Southeast region nearly 80 percent of the fishing vessels over 65
feet are less than 150 tons. For the Northeast region, 63 percent of the fishing vessels over 65
feet are less than 150 tons.

9 Commercial fishing vessels greater than 65 are required to have AIS transponders. However, the data set we

received only included 147 transits of fishing vessels on the entire US East Coast during 2009 which was felt
to be too small to be accurate.

21

Table 3-2. Fishing Vessel Permits Issued to Vessels 65 Feet and Above in LOA by
Region, 2009-2011
2009
Region
Southeast
Region
Northeast
Region

2010

2011

Fishing permits

%

Fishing permits

%

Fishing permits

%

All vessels
Vessels less than 150 GRT

279
220

100%
79%

260
204

100%
78%

247
195

100%
79%

All vessels
Vessels less than 150 GRT

807
523

100%
65%

773
496

100%
64%

722
453

100%
63%

Vessel size

Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates Inc. from data provided by NOAA Fisheries Service, Southeast Regional Office
(SERO) and Northeast Regional Office (NERO).

The estimated economic impact of the operational measures on commercial fishing vessels in
2003 is presented in Table 3-3. The analysis assumes that the commercial fishing vessels are
affected for an effective distance of 20 nautical miles each way as they steam to and from
fishing areas.
Many commercial fishing vessels steam at 10 knots or below and will not be affected by the
operational measures if they were implemented at the 10-knot speed restriction. The typical
steaming speed for other commercial fishing vessels is assumed at 12 knots.

Average

operating costs per hour of $400 includes fuel costs of June 2009. The duration of the speed
restrictions vary from 181 days per year for the mid-Atlantic to 61 days per year for the
Northeastern US. For purposes of the economic analysis, we have assumed that the speed
restrictions were in effect for 181 days for commercial fishing..

Table 3-3. Estimated Economic Impact on Commercial Fishing Vessels by Region, 2009
Item
Commercial fishing permits for vessels over 65 ft LOA and under 150

Northeast

Southeast

Region

Region

Total

523

220

743

Percent with steaming speed over 10 knots

40%

40%

40%

Vessels potentially affected by speed restrictions

209

88

297

Typical steaming speed of affected vessels (knots)

12

12

12

Number of trips per year per vessel

25

25

25

Minutes of delay per trip with restricted speed of 10 knots

38.0

38.0

38.0

Operating cost per hour of steaming (dollars)

400

400

400

657,022

276,376

933,398

Estimated impact per year (dollars)
Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates Inc.

The estimated impact in 2009 on commercial fishing vessels is estimated at $0.7 million for the
Northeast Region and $0.3 million for the Southeast Region. The combined Northeast and
Southeast regional economic impact of $0.9 million is only one-tenth of one percent of the
value of U.S. East Coast commercial fishery landings of $699 million in 2009.

22

These results indicate that the implementation of the operational measures will not have an
undue adverse impact on the commercial fishing industry along the U.S. East Coast.

Charter Fishing
In some areas, charter vessels travel up to 50 nautical miles offshore to reach prime fishing
areas. At vessel speeds of up to 17 knots they can reach their fishing areas in less than 3 hours.
Under the Rule, speed restrictions of 10 knots for 20 nautical miles add about 100 minutes to
the roundtrip steaming time, and could severely affect client demand.
The charter fishing industry is active along the U.S. East Coast with concentration in the
Carolinas, Virginia, Florida, New Jersey and Massachusetts. The industry consists of half-day
charters of about 6 hours that typically go up to 20 nautical miles offshore; full-day charters
of 11-12 hours that can go up to 40 nautical miles offshore; and extended full day charters that
can be from 18-24 hours and go up to 50 miles offshore. The vast majority of the charter
fishing industry consists of modern and well-equipped fishing boats of less than 65 feet LOA
and thus would not be subject to the speed restrictions and other operational measures.
A small segment of the industry referred to as head boats often uses vessels of 80 feet LOA
and above that can accommodate 60 to 100 passengers. These vessels go up to 50 miles
offshore stop and anchor over wreck and rock formations for fishing species as red snapper,
grouper, trigger fish, amberjack. The charter fee for a head boat is typically $50- $80 per
person.
As described above an increase of 100 minutes roundtrip steaming time would reduce the
competitiveness of the larger head boats (more than 65 foot LOA) particularly for the half-day
and full-day charters. It is likely that vessels of less than 65 foot LOA would increase their
share of those market segments, partially offsetting the economic impact incurred by the
larger head boats. For extended full-day charters, head boats of LOA in excess of 65 feet
would incur additional costs associated with the 100 minutes increase in roundtrip steaming
time. It is estimated that annual economic impact of the speed restriction of 10 knots for these
vessels over 20 nautical miles is approximately $1.0 million. 10

Passenger Ferries
The vast majority of passenger vessels operating along the U.S. East Coast sail within the
COLREGS line and as such will not be affected by the Rule. However, in the southern New
England area, there is a well-developed passenger ferry sector that operates beyond the
COLREGS line and hence is subject to the Rule’s operational measures. A list of major New

10 This calculation assumes 50 head boat vessels with 30 roundtrips during the off-season months of November

through April and an hourly steaming operating cost of $400. These calculations do not include any offsetting
impact of revenue gains by operators of smaller charter fishing vessels.

23

England passenger ferry operators, routes served and service characteristics are presented in
Table 3-4.

Table 3-4. New England Ferry Operators, 2011

Operator

Route

Max
Vessel
Speed
(knots)

Distance
(nm)

Summer
Schedule

Non-summer schedule

Summer
Season
Travel Adult Fare
Time
($) Round
(minutes)
trip

SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND
Fast Ferries
Bay State Cruise Company

Boston, MA-Provincetown, MA

30

50

6 trips daily

none

90

85

Boston Harbor Cruises

Boston, MA-Provincetown, MA

40

50

4 trips daily

none

90

83

Boston Harbor Cruises

Boston, MA-Salem, MA

33

25

8 trips daily

none

60

27

Cross Sound Ferry Sevices

New London, CT-Orient Point LI, NY

30

16

12 trips daily

All year long

45

34.25

Block Island Express

New London, CT-Block Island, RI

35

30

6 - 8 daily trips

none

75

45

Freedom Cruise Line

Harwich, MA-Nantucket, MA

24

30

6 trips daily

Spring, Fall

80

74

Hy-Line Cruises

Hyannis, MA- Nantucket, MA

30

27

12 trips daily

10 trips daily

60

77

Hy-Line Cruises

Hyannis, MA-Martha's Vineyard, MA

24

20

10 trips daily

4-6 trips daily

55

71

Block Island Ferry

Point Judith, RI-Block Island, RI

30

11

12 trips daily

Spring, Fall 8-10 trips daily

30

36

Seastreak

New Bedford, MA- Martha's Vineyard, MA

30

30

12 trips daily

Spring, Fall 4-10 trips daily

60

68

Seastreak

New York City, NY- Martha's Vineyard, MA

42

150

2 trips per weekend

Holidays

315

155

The Steamship Authority

Hyannis, MA- Nantucket, MA

35

26

10 trips daily

8 trips daily

60

67

Vineyard Fast Ferry

Quonset Point, RI-Martha's Vineyard, MA

33

50

6 trips daily

Srping, fall 4 daily trips

95

79

Bay State Cruise Company

Boston, MA-Provincetown, MA

16

50

2 trips Sat and Sun

none

180

46

Express Ferry

Plymouth, MA-Provincetown, MA

16

25

2 trips daily

none

100

43

Cross Sound Ferry Service

New London, CT-Orient Point LI, NY

15

16

30 trips daily

All year long

80

27

Hy-Line Cruises

Hyannis, MA- Nantucket, MA

15

26

6 trips daily

1-2 trips daily

110

45

Hy-Line Cruises

Hyannis, MA-Martha's Vineyard (Oak Bluffs), MA

12

20

2 trips daily

2 trips daily

100

45

Hy-Line Cruises

Nantucket, MA-Martha's Vineyard (Oak Bluffs), MA

16

20

2 trips daily

2 trips daily

70

70

Block Island Ferry

Point Judith, RI-Block Island, RI

16.5

11

18 trips daily

All year long

55

19

Block Island Ferry

Point Judith, RI- Newport, RI

13

10

2 trips daily

none

60

13

Block Island Ferry

Newport, RI-Block Island, RI

13

22

2 trips daily

none

120

17

Patriot Party Boats

Falmouth, MA- Martha's Vineyard (Oak Bluffs), MA

15

5

16 trips daily

All year long

20

20

Regular Ferries

Falmouth Ferry

Falmouth, MA-Martha's Vineyard (Edgadtown), MA 12

9

8 trips daily

Spring 6 daily trips each weekend

60

50

Island Queen

Falmouth, MA-Martha's Vineyard (Oak Bluffs), MA

12

5

14 trips daily

Spring, Fall 4-10 daily trips

35

20

The Steamship Authority

Woods Hole-Martha's Vineyard

16

7

32 trips daily

28 trips daily

35-45

16

The Steamship Authority

Hyannis, MA- Nantucket, MA

14

26

12 trips daily

6 trips daily

135

33

MAINE
Casco Bay Lines

Portland, ME - Peaks Island, ME

12.5

3

14 trips daily

All year long

20

8

Casco Bay Lines

Portland, ME - Little Diamond Island, ME

12.5

3

18 trips daily

All year long

20

8

Casco Bay Lines

Portland, ME - Great Diamond Island, ME

12.5

4

18 trips daily

All year long

25

9

Casco Bay Lines

Portland, ME - Diamond Cove, ME

12.5

5

22 trips daily

All year long

30

10

Casco Bay Lines

Portland, ME - Long Island, ME

12.5

6

24 trips daily

All year long

35

10

Casco Bay Lines

Portland, ME - Chebeague Island, ME

12.5

12

12 trips daily

All year long

70

11

Casco Bay Lines

Portland, ME - Cliff Island, ME

12.5

10

10 trips daily

All year long

60

12

Casco Bay Lines

Portland, ME - Bailey Island, ME

12.5

20

2 trips daily

none

105

25

Source: Prepared By Nathan Associates Inc. from data on operator websites and selected interviews.

24

Passenger ferry operations in southern New England generally fall into two categories- fast
ferry service with vessel speeds ranging from 24-39 knots and regular ferry service with vessel
speeds from 12-16 knots. As shown in Table 3-4 there are ten operators providing fast ferry
service on 12 routes. Key destinations include Provincetown, Block Island, Nantucket, and
Martha’s Vineyard, while important origins include Boston, New London, Hyannis, Harwich,
Point Judith and Quonset Point.
Regular ferry service in southern New England is provided by nine operators on eleven
routes. Vessel speeds range from 12-16 knots and serve many of the same origins and
destinations as the fast ferry service. Additional origins served by regular ferries include
Plymouth, Falmouth and Woods Hole.
Regular ferry service also operates in Southern Maine with 120 trips daily to eight
destinations served by Casco Bay Lines from Portland. Service is provided to local islands
including Peaks Island, Great Diamond Island, Cliff Island and Bailey Island.

IMPACT ON FERRY OPERATORS
Passenger ferry service generally is not impacted by the SMAs as they are not effective during
the summer season. Speed restrictions for Cape Cod Bay are implemented from January 1
through May 15. Speed restrictions for Block Island Sound are from November 1 through
April 30. In addition, the speed restricted area for Block Island Sound does not extend to the
shoreline and hence does not impact fast ferry operations. 11
However, voluntary DMAs established during the summer season could have an impact,
especially if they became mandatory. Interviews with passenger ferry operators identified
their particular concern of the situation where a DMA were to be implemented during the
peak summer season. For a fast ferry operator, a DMA implemented directly along their
route would result in the suspension of service for the entire period that the DMA is in
effect 12. There are several reasons for this conclusion. First, the demand for fast ferries that
normally operate between 24-39 knots would virtually disappear if the ferries were restricted
to a speed of 10 knots. Second, any remaining demand would not be sufficient to cover vessel
operating costs, and third, many of the handling and comfort characteristics of fast ferries
would suffer at these reduced speeds.
As reported in earlier in Table 2-11, there were 18 DMAs established in 2009. Figure 3-1 below
shows the seven DMAs in 2009 that are in locations relevant for ferry operations. However

11 The rectangular area proposed has its northern limits running approximately in a line from Montauk to the

southwestern coast of Block Island.

12 If a DMA were to be implemented say over a 15-day summer period, the two fast ferry operators on the

Boston-Provincetown route would lose net revenues of over $500,000, nearly 10 percent of their annual sales
and wipe out their annual profit. Multiple DMAs in one year or in consecutive years could force the
shutdown of these services.

25

each of these DMAs occurred in the winter months and did not affect ferry operations. Hence,
in 2009 there was no or minimal economic impact of DMAs on fast ferry operators.

Figure 3-1 DMAs in Areas Relevant for Passenger Ferry Operators

New England Whale Watching Industry
The New England whale watching industry also can be categorized into operations that
deploy high-speed vessels with speeds ranging from 25-38 knots; and operations that deploy
regular speed vessels with speeds from 16-20 knots. Table 3-5 presents information for the
major whale watching operators in Massachusetts Bay. There are nine operators of high-speed
vessels; three are based in Gloucester, three in Boston, one in Barnstable, one in Bar Harbor
and one in Boothbay Harbor. These operators make 18 daily trips during the summer months.
There are fifteen operators of regular speed vessels that have operations based in
Massachusetts (eight operators), New Hampshire (four), Maine (two) and Rhode Island (one).
Altogether these operators make 21 daily whale watching trips during the summer months.

26

Table 3-5. Massachusetts Bay Whale Watching Operators, 2012

Operator

Location

# Daily Trips
(per Vessel)

Trip Duration
(hr)

Adult Fare per
Trip ($)

Max Vessel
Speed (knots)

Number
of
Vessels

Regular-Speed Vessel
Yankee Fleet

Gloucester, MA

1

4

n.a.

20

2

Coastal Fishing Charters

Gloucester, MA

1

4-5

100

20

1

Newburyport Whale Watch

Newburtyport, MA

2

4 - 4 1/2

48

20

1

Captian John Whale Watching and Fishing Tours Plymouth, MA

4

3 1/2-4 1/2

45

17

4

Provincetown Whale Watches

Provincetown, MA

1

n.a.

37

20

1

The Dolphin Fleet of Provincetown

Provincetown, MA

8

3-4

44

16

4

Shearwater Excursions

Nantucket Island, MA

1

6

115

20

1

Al Gauron Whale Watching

Hapton Beach, NH

1

5

36

20

3

Atlantic Whale Watch

Rye Harbor, NH

1

4 - 4 1/2

36

20

1

Eastman's Docks

Seabrook Beach, NH

1

4 1/2

33

20

4

First Chance WhaleWatch

Kennebunk, ME

1

4 1/2

48

18

1

Odyssey Whale Watch

Portland, ME

2

4

48

20

1

Capt. Bill & Sons Whale Watch

Gloucester, MA

2

3 1/2

48

20

1

Granite State Whale Watch

Rye Harbor, NH

2

4-5

36

18

1

Frances Fleet Whale Watching

Narragansett, RI

1

4 1/2

n.a.

18

Subtotal

21

2
28

High-Speed Vessels
Capt'n Fish's Whale Watch

Boothbay Harbor, ME

2

3-3 1/2

48

33

3

Boston Best Cruises

Boston, MA

2

4

45

33

2

Bar Harbor Whale Watch Company

Bar Harbor, ME

3

3-3 1/2

59-56

33

3

New England Aquarium Whale Watch

Boston, MA

1

3-4

45

30

1

Boston Harbor Cruises

Boston, MA

4

3

45

35

2

7 Seas Whale Watch

Gloucester, MA

2

3 1/2-4

48

35

1

Cape Ann Whale Watch

Gloucester, MA

2

3-4

48

25

1

Yankee Fleet

Gloucester, MA

1

4

n.a.

33

1

Hyannis Whale Watcher Cruises

Barnstable, MA

1

3 1/2-4

47

38

Subtotal

18

1
15

Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates from data on operator websites and selected interviews.

Speed restrictions for Cape Cod Bay are implemented from January 1 through May 15. Hence,
the peak summer whale watching season are not affected for high-speed or regular speed
vessels. Similarly, the speed restrictions for an extended Off Race Point from March through
April would not impact the whale watching season.
As shown earlier in Figure 3-1, there were no DMAs implemented in 2009 that were during
periods that affected whale watching operations. Further, if a DMA were to be established, a
whale watching operator will select an alternative location where humpback whales are
present and not right whales. The whale watching community has developed an informal
communications network to advise them of whale sightings. As State and Federal regulations
restrict any vessel from approaching closer than 500 yards to a right whale, they would avoid
right whale as a matter of course.

27

4.Total Direct and Indirect
Economic Impact
In the sections above we have presented the analysis of individual components of the
economic impact analysis of the Rule in 2009. The total direct and indirect economic impact of
is $44.7 million in 2009 (Table 4-1). This cosists of $23.8 million of direct impact on the
shipping industry, 1.9 million on commercial fishing and charter fishing combined, and $19.0
million of indirect impacts.

Table 4-1 Total Direct and Indirect Economic Impact, 2009 ($ millions)
Impact

Amount

Direct iimpact on shipping industry
Seasonal Management Areas (SMAs)

19.6

Dynamic Management Areas(DMAs)

-

Cumulative Effect of multi-port strings

3.1

Re-routing of southbound coastwise shipping

1.1

Subtotal

23.8

Direct impact on other other market segments
Commercial fishing

1.0

Charter fishing

0.9

Passenger ferries

-

Whale watching

-

Subtotal

1.9

Indirect impact

19.0

Total impact

44.7

Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates as described in text.

28

5.Impact on Small Business
Size Standards for Small Entities
According to the U.S. Small Business Administration 13, a small business is a concern that is
organized for profit, with a place of business in the United States, and which operates
primarily within the United States or makes a significant contribution to the U.S. economy
through payment of taxes or use of American products, materials or labor. Further, the
concern cannot be dominant in its field, on a national basis. Finally, the concern must meet
the numerical small business size standard for its industry. SBA has established a size
standard for most industries in the U.S. economy.
Size standards for the industries potentially affected by the final rule are presented in Table 51. For international and domestic commercial shipping operators, the SBA size standard for a
small business is 500 employees or less. The same threshold applies for international cruise
operators and domestic ferry service operators. For whale watching operators and charter
fishing operators the SBA threshold is $7.0 million of average annual receipts. For commercial
fishing operators, the SBA threshold is $4.0 million of average annual receipts.

13 United States Small Business Administration, Frequently Asked Questions About Small Business Size

Standards, www.sba.gov/size/indexfaqs.html

29

Table 5-1. Small Business Size Standards and Firms by Employment Size and NAICS
Code, 2008
Firms
NAICS
Code
NAICS U.S. Industry Title

Type of entity

Size Standard
($ millions) Employees

Employment size
Total < 20 < 500 500+

International commercial shipping operator 483111 Deep Sea Freight Transportation

n.a.

500

230

120

96

14

International cruise operator
Domestic commercial shipping operator
Domestic ferry service operator

483112 Deep Sea Passenger Transportation
483113 Coastal and Great Lakes Freight Transportation
483114 Coastal and Great Lakes Passenger Transportation

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

500
500
500

64
379
155

29
207
103

30
136
48

6
36
4

Whale watching operators
Charter fishing operators

487210 Scenic & sightseeing transportation, water
487210 Scenic & sightseeing transportation, water

7
7

n.a.
n.a.

1,704
1,704

1,540
1,540

152
152

12
12

Commerical fishing

114111 Finfish Fishing

4

n.a.

1,060

1,017

41

2

114112 Shellfish Fishing
4
n.a.
877
858
19 114119 Other Marine Fishing
4
n.a.
34
31
3 Source: U.S. Small Business Administration,Table of Small Business Size Standards matched to North American Industry Classification System Codes, October 24,
2012 and SBA Office of Advocacy, Firm Size Data provided by U.S. Census Bureau on Employer Firms and Employment by Employment Size of Firm by
NAICS Codes, 2008.

Table 5-1 also presents information on the total number of firms in the U.S. in 2008 by
employment size ranges for these industries. The preponderance of firms involved in these
industries is considered as small entities by the SBA size standards. In 2008, there were 230
firms involved in deep sea freight transportation industry of which 216 firms had 500
employees or less. In the deep sea passenger transport industry, 58 firms of the total 64 firms
had 500 or fewer employees. In the Coastal and Great Lakes freight transportation industry,
343 firms of the total 379 firms had 500 or fewer employees. In the Coastal and Great Lakes
passenger transportation industry, all but four firms of the 155 total firms had 500 or fewer
employees.
There were 1,704 firms providing scenic and sightseeing water transportation in 2008 of
which 1,692 firms had 500 or fewer employees. For the finfish fishing industry 1,058 firms of
the total 1,060 firms had 500 or fewer employees; while all 877 firms involved in shellfish
fishing had 500 or fewer employees.

Number of Small Entities Affected
For the FEIS Report of 2008, Nathan Associates conducted a detail analysis to determine the
number of small entities involved in commercial shipping along the U.S. East Coast. Many of
the firms operating within the international commercial shipping industry and international
cruise industry have foreign ownership and have their primary place of business outside the
U.S. and hence would not qualify as a U.S. small entity.
To identify vessel owned by U.S. entities, we analyzed information provided by the U.S.
Coast Guard regarding parties owning vessels that had arrivals at the U.S. East Coast in 2004.

30

We were able to identify the vessel owner and/or managing owner for 99.6 percent of the
vessels that had U.S. East Coast vessel arrivals in 2004. 14 The USCG data provides information
on the address of the vessel owner and/or managing owner in terms of zip code, state and
country. Using that information we identified vessels with U.S. East Coast arrivals in 2004
that were owned by U.S. entities or foreign entities.
Of the 27,385 U.S. East Coast vessel arrivals in 2004, 6,540 arrivals or 23.9 percent were
recorded by vessels owned by parties with U.S. address (Table 5-2). The U.S. East Coast
arrivals were made by 4,114 vessels of which 620 or 15.1 percent were by vessels owned by
parties with a U.S. address. In terms of number of parties, the 2004 vessel arrivals were made
by 3,505 parties of which 432 or 12.3 percent had a U.S. address.

Table 5-2. U.S. East Coast Vessel Arrivals by Vessels with
U.S. or Foreign Parties, 2004
Item

Party address
Foreign
U.S

Total

Number of vessel arrivals
Percent

6,540
23.9%

20,845
76.1%

27,385
100.0%

Number of vessels
Percent

620
15.1%

3,494
84.9%

4,114
100.0%

3,505
Number of parties
432
3,073
12.3%
87.7%
100.0%
Percent
Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates Inc. from analysis of U.S. Coast
Guard as described in text.

We then conducted an analysis of the entire U.S. Coast Guard vessel characteristics database
to identify the number and type of vessels owned by the U.S. parties with U.S. East Coast
arrivals in 2004. 15 Approximately 71 percent of the U.S.-based parties owned only one vessel
and 90.7 percent owned 4 or less vessels (Table 5-3).

14 We were not able to match party information for 198 vessels of the 4,114 vessels that had U.S. East Coast

arrivals in 2004. These vessels accounted for 3.8 percent of 2004 U.S. East Coast arrivals (1,004 of the 27,385
arrivals). However using information on U.S. or foreign flag of registry, we assigned these vessels by country
of ownership.

15 For this analysis, we included all vessels owned by the party, not just those with vessel arrivals at U.S. East

Coast ports in 2004.

31

Table 5-3. U.S-Based Parties with U.S. East Coast Arrivals
by Number of Vessels Owned, 2004
Number of
Vessels
Owned
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
15
16
17
20
24
35
38
61

Number of Percentage Number of Percentage
of Parties
Parties
Vessels of Vessels
306
49
24
13
6
7
6
3
4
1
3
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1

70.8
11.3
5.6
3.0
1.4
1.6
1.4
0.7
0.9
0.2
0.7
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.5
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2

306
98
72
52
30
42
42
24
36
10
33
12
15
16
34
20
24
35
38
61

30.6
9.8
7.2
5.2
3.0
4.2
4.2
2.4
3.6
1.0
3.3
1.2
1.5
1.6
3.4
2.0
2.4
3.5
3.8
6.1

Total:
432
100
1,000
100
Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates inc. from U.S. Coast
Guard data as described in text.

The next step was to determine which of these U.S. based parties should be considered a
small-business for the RFA analysis. Information on the number of employees is not readily
available for U.S.-based parties that own vessels with arrivals at the U.S. East Coast. However,
we reviewed the list of U.S-based parties and removed the 53 parties that obviously do not
qualify as a small business such as Carnival Cruise Lines, Chevron, Maersk, Holland America
Line, BP Oil Shipping, etc. A further classification was made to exclude an additional 17
parties that own 5 or more vessels from the set of small businesses on the assumption that a
business with 5 or more capital intensive commercial cargo vessels would employ at least 500
employees throughout its organization. We assume that the remaining set of 362 US-based
parties that own vessels that had U.S. East Coast arrivals in 2004 be assumed to be small
businesses for the purposes of the RFA analysis. Table 5-4 presents information on vessels and
vessel arrivals for this set of vessels assumed to be operated by U.S.-based small entities.

32

Table 5-4. U.S. East Coast Vessel Arrivals by U.S.-Based
Small Entities, 2004
Number of 2004
Number of Number of
vessels
parties
Vessel Arrivals
Vessel Type
142
25
24
Bulk Carrier
Container Ship
502
30
28
Freight Barge
77
13
12
22
General Dry Cargo Ship
99
24
49
31
Multiple
435
Passenger Ship
463
33
31
Refrigerated Cargo Ship
51
6
6
Ro-Ro Cargo Ship
433
25
22
Tank Barge
702
61
51
79
Tank Ship
784
83
43
44
Towing Vessel
209
13
Other a/
65
14
407
362
Total:
3,962
a/ Other includes fishing vessels, industrial vessels, and research vessels.
Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates Inc. from U.S. Coast Guard data
as described in text.

The 362 parties assumed to be small businesses operated 407 vessels that had 3,962 vessel
arrivals at U.S. East Coast ports in 2004. Tank ships and tank barges are the vessel types with
the most parties, vessels and vessel arrivals for the set of vessels assumed to be owned by U.S.
based small businesses.
Other Industries
In Chapter 3, we presented information on entities involved in other maritime industries that
would potentially be affected by the operational measures of the final rule. For purposes of
this RFA analysis we have assumed that all U.S. East Coast entities involved in commercial
fishing industry, domestic ferry service industry, and charting fishing industry are considered
as small entities. In the whale watching industry all entities (except the New England
Aquarium) are considered as small entities.
Thus as shown in Table 5-5, we estimate that there are 373 small entities potentially affected
Rule. Of these, 209 entities are involved in commercial fishing in the Northeast Region and 88
entities in the Southeast region. There are 14 entities identified involved in Southern New
England passenger ferry service 16, 8 entities providing whale watching services in
Massachusetts Bay and 40 entities providing charter fishing service along the U.S. East Coast.
Note that only the subset of charter fishing entities operating larger head boats that
accommodate 60 to 100 passengers is included in this analysis. The majority of charter fishing

16 In Table 3-4, ten entities are listed as operating fast ferries in Southern New England and eight entities that

operate regular ferries. However, four of the entities operate both fast ferries and regular ferries and hence,
there are only 14 entities involved in Southern New England passenger ferry service.

33

entities operates fishing boats of less than 65 LOA and thus are not subject to the operational
measures of the Rule.

Table 5-5. Number of Small Entities in Other Industries
Potentially Affected, 2009
Number of Small Entities

Industry

Potentially Affected
Commercial Fishing
Northeast Region

209

Southeast Region

88

Southern New England Passenger Ferries

14

Massachusetts Bay Whale Watching

22

Charter Fishing

40

Total
373
Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates Inc. as described in Section 3,
and presented in Table 3-2, Table 3-4 and Table 3-7.

Economic Impact on Small Entities
In this section, we first present the economic impact on the small entities involved in the
commercial shipping industry 17 followed the estimated impact on small entities in other
maritime industries.

COMMERCIAL SHIPPING
All of the operational measures of the final rule described in Section 3 are assumed to apply to
commercial shipping vessel operated by small entities. Table 5-6 presents the number of
vessel arrivals by U.S. small entities in 2004 and total vessel arrivals by all U.S. entities. Those
figures are used to calculate the percent of U.S. vessel in 2004 that were made by small
entities. The resulting percentages are then applied to the current analysis of the 2009
economic impact on all U.S.- flagged vessels to determine the economic impact on U.S. small
entities 18.
The economic impact of the Rule on U.S. small entities in the commercial shipping industry is
estimated at $2.2 million in 2009. This estimate includes the direct economic impact of speed
restrictions during seasonal management periods and dynamic management periods plus the
cumulative effect of multi-port strings and the re-routing of southbound coastwise shipping.
Containerships ($0.8 million) ro-ro cargo ships ($0.4 million) and passenger ships ($0.3
million) together account for 68 percent of the economic impact on small entities in the
commercial shipping industry.

17 Passenger cruise vessels are included in this section as the data sources, approach and methodology applied

for this market segment is same as those of the commercial shipping industry.

18 The 2004 data and relationships were used because there wass no information on the transits in 2009 by U.S.

small entities within the shipping industry.

34

Table 5-6. Economic Impact on U.S. Small Entities by Vessel Type, 2009
2004 Vessel Arrivals
Arrivals by Arrivals by Percent by
Vessel type

U.S. Small

All U.S.

US Small

Entities

Entities

Entities

On all

2009 Economic Impact
On U.S.
As a %

U.S. Entities Small Entities
($000s)

($000s)

of Annual
Revenues

Bulk Carrier

142

150

94.7

99.1

93.8

0.044%

Container Ship

502

874

57.4

1,449.6

832.6

0.106%

Freight Barge

77

270

28.5

398.4

113.6

0.307%

General Dry Cargo Ship

99

124

79.8

18.1

14.5

0.008%

272

310

87.7

319.7

280.6

0.037%

51

51

100.0

-

Passenger Ship
Refrigerated Cargo Ship

-

0.000%

Ro-Ro Cargo Ship

433

450

96.2

404.3

389.0

0.063%

Tank Barge
Tanker

702
731

1,474
784

47.6
93.2

199.2
220.5

94.9
205.6

0.010%
0.021%

Towing Vessel

209

691

30.2

194.2

58.8

0.012%

65

65

100.0

199.2

199.2

0.267%

3,283

5,243

62.6

3,502.4

2,193.1

0.042%

Other a/
Total

a/ Other includes fishing vessels, industrial vessels, research vessels, school ships.
Note: Annual revenue estimated as average of daily operating cost at sea and daily operating cost in port by
vesel type and size for 365 days for vessels accounting for 2009 SMA transits.
Daily operating cost in port was assumed at 60 percent of daily operating cost at sea.
Source:Nathan Associates Inc.

-

Table 5-6 also presents the economic impact on small entities as a percent of annual revenues
by vessel type. For vessels operated by small entities it was assumed that they spend equal
amounts of days at sea and in port.
Overall, the economic impact of the Rule represents about 4 one-hundredth of one percent of
the annual revenues of vessels operated on the U.S. East Coast by small entities. For small
entities operating containerships, the economic impact increases to up to one-tenths of one
percent.
Based on these findings, we conclude that the operational measures of the final rule would
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities involved in
commercial shipping along the U.S. East Coast.
Other Industries
The estimated economic impact on small entities in other maritime industries is presented in
Section 3. The impact on small entities in the charter fishing industry in 2009 is estimated at
$1.0 million (Table 5-7). The estimated economic impact on small entities in the commercial
fishing industry is $0.9 million. There was no or minimal impact in 2009 on ferry operators
and whale watching operators.

35

Table 5-7. Estimated Economic Impact of Rule on Small Entities in
Other Industries, 2009 ($000s unless otherwise specified)

Industry
Commercial fishing
Charter fishing

Estimated

No. of

Average Economic

Economic Impact as

Economic

Small

Impact per Small

a % of Annual

Impact ($000s)

Entities

Entity ($000s)

Revenues

933.4

307

3.0

0.4%

1,000.0

40

25.0

4.3%

Source: Prepared by Nathan Associates Inc.

The economic impact on commercial fishing vessels is estimated at $3,000 per vessel per year
and constitutes less than one-half of one percent of their annual revenues. This is not
considered to be a significant economic impact.
The annual revenue of a small entity operating a charter fishing head boat is estimated at $504
thousand based on an average of 80 passenger paying $80 for 90 charters. The estimated
economic impact of the final rule at is 4.3 percent of their estimated annual revenue and for
purposes of the FRFA determination is not considered to be a significant economic impact.

36

6. Scoping Assessment of Economic
Analysis of Potential Rule
Modifications
As initially mandated, the Rule is due for renewal or modification in 2013. In this section, we
assess the data requirements and level of analyses that would be needed to estimate the
economic impact of some issues.

Update Analysis for 2010, 2011 and 2012
The economic impact analysis presented in this report is based on 2009 AIS data. By early
2013, it should be possible to obtain AIS data for 2010 through 2012. It is most efficient for
data cleaning and review if the data for these years are provided together rather than at
separate times. The key issue for using the additional years of AIS data is the matching of
newly appearing vessels with our detailed twelve categories of vessel types and 18
deadweight ton ranges.
We have been provided AIS data for the first 11 months of 2010. Based on a review of that
data, an additional year would require matching more than 2,000 newly appearing vessels,
requiring about 7 days for an analyst and 4 days for a senior economist. If the three years of
2010 through 2012 were analyzed at the same time, this work could be completed with 14
days for an analyst and 8 days for a senior economist.

Reduce 65-Foot Vessel Length Threshold
The current Rule applies to vessels that are 65 feet and above in overall length (LOA). For
2009, we have worked with the AIS for vessels that are affected by the current Rule. If the
length threshold was reduced to say 30 feet, this would require matching additional vessels
with our detailed twelve categories of vessel types and 18 deadweight ton ranges. In terms of

37

the conduct of the economic impact analysis, this modification would be difficult and costly to
undertake as less information is available on smaller vessels. Lowering the length threshold
will also require renewed and expanded analyses for commercial fishing, ferry boats, whale
watch vessels and charter fishing vessels. It is estimated that this would require 15 days for an
analyst and 10 days for a senior economist.

Expansion of Off-Race Point and Great South Channel SMAs
Under this modification, the existing Off-Race Point SMA and the Great South Channel SMA
would be expanded to incorporate areas where DMAs regularly occur. As the vessel transits
through DMAs have already been analyzed for 2009, the characteristics of those vessels have
already been matched and identified. We would need to receive from NOAA a revised SMA
database incorporating transits that would applicable to the newly defined geographic
boundaries of the expanded SMAs. Since there would little need for matching of vessels, the
economic impact for 2009 could be determined with 5 days for an analyst and 2 days for a
senior economist. Other years could be conducted with the time already included for 20102012 update described above.

Establishment of SMAs in Waters of Coastal Maine
The current Rule does not include a SMA for waters off of Maine’s coast. However, this has
been an active area for right whales in recent years, as evidenced by the number of DMAs that
have been implemented. The possible location of the SMA which would be effective from
October 1 through February 28 is shown in Figure 5-1.
Figure 5-1. Possible Location of SMA off of Coastal Maine

38

We have been provided by NOAA, an AIS database that shows transits in 2009 for this
possible SMA. Of the 1,734 transits made through this area in 2009 by 404 vessels, we have
been able to match 1,397 transits by 305 vessels. Matching of the remaining vessels and
determining the economic impact will require 3 days for an analyst and 1 days for a senior
economist.

Make all DMAs Mandatory
As the vessel transits through DMAs have already been analyzed for 2009, the characteristics
of those vessels have already been matched and identified. That analysis compared the
amount of time needed to transit a DMA based on actual recorded speeds for the DMA areas
when they were in effect and not in effect. However, since this data only corresponds to
voluntary speed restrictions, it does not provide the impact for a mandatory DMA. The best
estimate of the average observed speeds would be those recorded in SMAs in 2009 for each
type/ size of vessel. Those speeds could b used to then calculate the impact of a mandatory
DMA.
The analysis described in the paragraph above applies to the shipping industry vessels.
However, making all DMAs mandatory will also require renewed and expanded analyses for
commercial fishing, ferry boats, whale watch vessels and charter fishing vessels. It is
estimated that this entire task would require 5 days for an analyst and 10 days for a senior
economist.

39

12/9/2019

North Atlantic Right Whale | NOAA Fisheries

North Atlantic Right Whale
North Atlantic Right Whale
Eubalaena glacialis

Protected Status
ESA ENDANGERED

Throughout Its Range
CITES APPENDIX I

Throughout Its Range
MMPA PROTECTED

Throughout Its Range
MMPA DEPLETED

Throughout Its Range

Quick Facts
WEIGHT

Up to 70 tons

LIFESPAN

Up to 70 years

LENGTH

Up to 52 feet

THREATS

Entanglement in fishing gear,
Vessel strikes, Ocean noise,
Climate and ecosystem change,
Disturbance from whale watching
activities, Small population size,
Lack of food

REGION

New England/Mid-Atlantic,
Southeast

About The Species
The North Atlantic right whale is one of the world’s most endangered large whale species, with only
about 400 whales remaining. Two other species of right whale exist in the world’s oceans: the North
Pacific right whale, which is found in the Pacific Ocean, and the southern right whale, which is found
in the southern hemisphere. Right whales are baleen whales, feeding on shrimp-like krill and small
fish by straining huge volumes of ocean water through their baleen plates, which act like a sieve.

https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/species/north-atlantic-right-whale

1/13

12/9/2019

North Atlantic Right Whale | NOAA Fisheries
By the early 1890s, commercial whalers had hunted right whales in the Atlantic to the brink of
extinction. Whaling is no longer a threat, but human interactions still present the greatest danger to
this species. Entanglement in fishing gear and vessel strikes are among the leading causes of North
Atlantic right whale mortality.
NOAA Fisheries and our partners are dedicated to conserving and rebuilding the North Atlantic right
whale population. We use a variety of innovative techniques to study, protect, and rescue these
endangered whales. We engage our partners as we develop regulations and management plans that
foster healthy fisheries and reduce the risk of entanglements, create whale-safe shipping practices,
and reduce ocean noise.

Status
North Atlantic right whales have been listed as endangered under the Endangered Species Act since
1970. Today researchers estimate there are about 400 North Atlantic right whales in the population
with fewer than 100 breeding females left. Only 12 births have been observed in the three calving
seasons since 2017, less than one-third the previous average annual birth rate for right whales. This,
together with an unprecedented 30 mortalities since 2017 (part of a declared Unusual Mortality
Event), accelerates the downward trend that began around 2010, with deaths outpacing births in this
population.

Protected Status
ESA Endangered
Throughout Its Range

CITES Appendix I
Throughout Its Range

MMPA Protected
Throughout Its Range

MMPA Depleted
Throughout Its Range

Appearance
North Atlantic right whales have stocky black bodies with no dorsal fin, and their spouts are shaped
like a “V.” Their tails are broad, deeply notched, and all black with a smooth trailing edge. Their
stomachs and chests may be all black or have irregularly shaped white patches. Pectoral flippers are
relatively short, broad, and paddle-shaped. Calves are about 14 feet at birth and adults can grow to
lengths of up to 52 feet.
Their characteristic feature is raised patches of rough skin, called callosities, on their heads, which
appear white because of whale lice (cyamids). Each right whale has a unique pattern of these
callosities. Scientists use these patterns to identify individual whales, an invaluable tool in tracking
population size and health. Aerial and ship-based surveys and the North Atlantic Right Whale
Consortium’s photo-identification database  maintained by our partners at the New England
Aquarium help track populations over the years using a right whale’s unique pattern of callosities.

Behavior and Diet
When viewing right whales, you might see these enormous creatures breaching—propelling
themselves up and out of the water—and then crashing back down with a thunderous splash. You
might also see them slapping their tails (lobtailing) or their flippers (flippering) on the water’s surface.
Groups of right whales may be seen actively socializing at the water’s surface, known as surfaceactive groups, or SAGs. Mating occurs in SAGs, observed during all seasons and in all habitats, but
SAGs likely serve other social purposes as well.
Right whales produce low-frequency vocalizations best described as moans, groans, and pulses.
Scientists suspect that these calls are used to maintain contact between individuals, communicate
threats, signal aggression, or for other social reasons.
Right whales feed by opening their mouths while swimming slowly through large patches of minute
zooplankton and copepods. They filter out these tiny organisms from the water through their baleen,
where the copepods become trapped in a tangle of hair-like material that acts like a sieve. Right
whales feed anywhere from the water’s surface to the bottom of the water column.

Where They Live

https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/species/north-atlantic-right-whale

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12/9/2019

North Atlantic Right Whale | NOAA Fisheries

World map providing approximate representation of the North Atlantic right whale's range.

North Atlantic right whales primarily occur in Atlantic coastal waters or close to the continental shelf,
although movements over deep waters are known.
Right whales migrate seasonally and may travel alone or in small groups. In the spring, summer, and
into fall, many of these whales can be found in waters off New England and further north into the
Canadian Maritimes, where they feed and mate.
Each fall, some right whales travel more than 1,000 miles from these feeding grounds to the shallow,
coastal waters of South Carolina, Georgia, and northeastern Florida. These waters in the southern
United States are the only known calving area for the species—an area where females regularly give
birth during winter. While this is the typical pattern, migration patterns vary for some of these whales.
NOAA Fisheries has designated two critical habitat areas to provide important feeding, nursery, and
calving habitat for the North Atlantic population of right whales:
Off the coast of New England (foraging area).
Off the southeast U.S. coast from Cape Fear, North Carolina, to below Cape Canaveral, Florida
(calving area).

Lifespan & Reproduction
Right whales can probably live at least 70 years, but data on their average lifespan is limited. Ear wax
can be used to estimate age in right whales after they have died. Another way to determine life span
is to look at groups of closely related species. There are indications that some species closely related
to right whales may live more than 100 years. However, female North Atlantic right whales are now
only living to around 45 and males only to around 65.
In recent years, we've recorded more deaths among adult females than males. There are now more
males than females in the population, and that gap is widening. Females, by going through the
energetic stress of reproduction, are more susceptible than males to dying from entanglement or ship
strike injuries. Today, we believe there are about 95 reproductively active females.
Female right whales become sexually mature at about age 10. They give birth to a single calf after a
year-long pregnancy. Three years is considered a normal or healthy interval between right whale
calving events. But now, on average, females are having calves every 6 to 10 years. In the last three
calving seasons (2017-2019) there were only 12 births, which is about one-third of the average
annual birth rate. Biologists believe that the additional stress caused by entanglement is one of the
reasons that females are calving less often.

Threats
Entanglement
Entanglement in fishing lines attached to gillnets and traps on the ocean floor is one of the greatest
threats to the critically endangered North Atlantic right whale. Becoming entangled in fishing gear can
severely stress and injure a whale, and lead to a painful death. Studies suggest that more than 85
percent of right whales have been entangled in fishing gear at least once, and about 60 percent have
been entangled multiple times.

Vessel Strikes
Vessel strikes are a major threat to North Atlantic right whales. Their habitat and migration routes are
close to major ports along the Atlantic seaboard and often overlap with shipping lanes, making the
whales vulnerable to collisions with ships and other vessels.

Ocean Noise
Underwater noise pollution interrupts the normal behavior of right whales and interferes with their
communication.

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Scientific Classification
Kingdom

Animalia

Phylum

Chordata

Class

Mammalia

Order

Cetacea

Family

Balaenidae

Genus

Eubalaena

Species

glacialis

What We Do
Conservation & Management

Science

We are committed to the protection and

We conduct various research activities on the

recovery of the North Atlantic right whale

biology, behavior, and ecology of the North

through implementation of various conservation,

Atlantic right whale. The results of this research

regulatory, rescue, and enforcement measures.
Our work includes:

are used to inform management decisions and
enhance recovery efforts for this critically

Protecting habitat and designating critical

endangered species. Our work includes:

habitat.

Identifying habitat and when it is used by right

Rescuing entangled right whales.

whales.

Reducing the threat of vessel collisions.

Investigating unusual mortality events.

Reducing injury and mortality by fisheries and

Performing stock assessments to gather

fishing gear.

population information.

Minimizing the effects of vessel disturbance

Tracking individuals over time to monitor

and noise.

important population traits.

Learn more about our conservation efforts 

Learn more about our research 

How You Can Help
Report a Right Whale Sighting
Please report all right whale sightings from Virginia to Maine at (866) 755-6622, and from Florida to North Carolina
at 877-WHALE-HELP (877) 942-5343. Right whale sightings in any location may also be reported to the U.S. Coast
Guard via channel 16 or through the WhaleAlert app .

Stay 500 Yards Away
To protect right whales, NOAA Fisheries has regulations that prohibit approaching or remaining within 500 yards
(1,500 feet) of a right whale—500 yards is the length of about four football fields. These regulations apply to vessels
and aircraft (including drones), and to people using other watercraft such as surfboards, kayaks, and jet skis. Any
vessel within 500 yards of a right whale must depart immediately at a safe, slow speed.
Call the NOAA Fisheries Enforcement Hotline at (800) 853-1964 to report a federal marine resource violation. This
hotline is available 24 hours a day, 7 days week for anyone in the United States.
Learn more about our marine life viewing guidelines 

Report Marine Life in Distress
Report a sick, injured, entangled, stranded, or dead animal to make sure professional responders and scientists
know about it and can take appropriate action. Numerous organizations around the country are trained and ready to
respond.
Learn who you should contact when you encounter a stranded or injured marine animal 

Be Informed and Get Involved
Stay updated on right whale take reduction and other conservation measures. For accurate information, check your
sources or confirm them by reviewing our news and announcements. Participate in public meetings and share your
perspectives with Take Reduction Team members who represent your constituency.

In the Spotlight
The North Atlantic right whale is NOAA Fisheries' newest Species in the Spotlight. This initiative is a
concerted, agency-wide effort to spotlight and save marine species that are among the most at risk of

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extinction in the near future.
North Atlantic right whales, which got their
name from being the “right” whales to hunt
because they floated when they were killed,
have never recovered to pre-whaling
numbers. These whales have been listed as
endangered under the Endangered Species
Act since 1970 and have been experiencing
a steady population decline for nearly a
decade. NOAA and our partners are
continuing to prioritize stabilizing and preventing extinction of this species, and this Species in the
Spotlight designation will help focus federal and non-federal resources on these many efforts.

Right Whales’ Role in a Balanced Ecosystem
The natural system is balanced through food webs and nutrient transport, with every species
contributing to that balance. Right whales play an important role in this balanced ocean ecosystem.
The majority of the Earth's oxygen is produced by marine phytoplankton. These tiny ocean plants also
help to absorb CO2, so healthy phytoplankton levels also help to combat climate change. When they
defecate at the surface, marine mammals such as right whales provide essential nitrogen and
phosphorus to those phytoplankton.
When whales die, they also provide essential nutrient resources to the ocean floor ecosystems.
Scavengers consume the soft tissue in a matter of months. Organic fragments, or detritus, enrich the
sediments nearby for over a year, and the whale skeleton can provide habitat for invertebrate
communities for decades.
Better understanding right whales’ behavior and biology also provides us with information about
changing ocean conditions, giving us insight into larger environmental issues that could have
implications for human health.
Sometimes we don’t know how vital a species’ role is in maintaining this balance until it’s too late, and
sometimes those unforeseen impacts can have a direct effect on our own existence. The Marine
Mammal Protection Act and Endangered Species Act recognize that managing species to make sure
they can fulfill their role in the bigger picture is to everyone’s benefit. A diverse environment is a
healthier environment. It’s part of our responsibility as stewards of the nation’s living marine resources
to make sure that we protect right whales and have healthy fisheries.

NOAA’s Commitment to Right Whale Recovery
As the federal agency with the lead on recovering the North Atlantic right whale population, we
believe that the right steps, people, and knowledge are in place to help us make decisions that will
contribute to recovery and reduce entanglement risk significantly. Our mandate under the Marine
Mammal Protection Act has provided the structure, through the Take Reduction Process, to make
sure all voices on this issue are heard and that innovation comes from the people who will be most
impacted by future regulatory action.
Under the Endangered Species Act, we are looking at how the threats right whales face impact their
recovery and how we manage those threats to facilitate their recovery.
Learn more about NOAA’s commitment to saving North Atlantic right whales 

Where They Live
North Atlantic right whales are found mostly along the Atlantic coast in shallower waters. Each fall,
some right whales travel more than 1,000 miles from their feeding grounds along the coasts of
Canada and New England to the warm coastal waters of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. Here
they give birth and nurse their young.

Population Status
Today researchers estimate there are about 400 North Atlantic right whales in the population with
fewer than 100 breeding females left. Only 12 births have been observed in the three calving seasons
since 2017, less than one-third the previous average annual birth rate for right whales. This, together
with an unprecedented 30 mortalities since 2017 (part of a declared Unusual Mortality Event),
accelerates the downward trend that began around 2010, with deaths outpacing births in this
population.

Threats

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Illustration of how North Atlantic right whales get entangled in fishing gear. Entangled whales sometimes tow fishing
gear for hundreds of miles. Credit: WHOI Graphic Services, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution.

Entanglement in vertical buoy lines, or ropes, connected to fishing gillnets, traps, and pots on the
ocean floor is one of the greatest threats to North Atlantic right whales. NOAA Fisheries and our
partners estimate that over 85 percent of right whales have been entangled at least once. These lines
can cut into a whale’s body, cause serious injuries, and result in infections and mortality. Even if gear
is shed or disentangled, the time spent entangled can severely stress a whale, which weakens it,
prevents it from feeding, and saps the energy it needs to swim and feed. Biologists believe that this
additional stress is one of the reasons that female right whales are having fewer calves; females used
to have calves every 3 to 5 years, and now are having calves every 6 to 10 years.
Ship strikes are a second major threat to right whales. Their habitat and migration routes are close to
major ports along the Atlantic coastline and often overlap with shipping lanes, making them
vulnerable to collisions with ships. These collisions can cause broken bones and massive internal
injuries or cuts from vessel propellers. As large as right whales are, most vessels are larger, and the
faster a vessel is going when it hits a whale, the higher the likelihood of serious injury or death.
Underwater noise from human activities such as shipping, recreational boating, development, and
energy exploration has increased along our coasts. Noise from these activities can interrupt the
normal behavior of right whales and interfere with their communication with potential mates, other
group members, and their offspring. Noise can also reduce their ability to avoid predators, navigate
and identify physical surroundings, and find food.

Species Recovery
Recovery Plan
NOAA Fisheries formed a recovery team of scientists and stakeholders to help develop a North
Atlantic right whale recovery plan, which was finalized in 2005. The recovery plan helps guide our
efforts to prevent extinction of the right whale. These strategies include reducing vessel collisions and
fishing gear entanglement, protecting whale habitat, maximizing efforts to free entangled right whales,
and monitoring the population. NOAA Fisheries appointed a recovery team in the Northeast and a
team in the Southeast to implement the recovery plan. Partnerships are a critical component of North
Atlantic right whale recovery.

Critical Habitat Designation
NOAA Fisheries has designated critical habitat for the North Atlantic right whale, which includes a
foraging area in the Northeast and a calving area in the Southeast. This designation means that
federal agencies must ensure that any activities in these areas do not adversely modify those areas.

Reducing Vessel Strikes
The most effective way to reduce the threat of vessel collisions with North Atlantic right whales is to
keep whales and traffic apart. If that is not possible, the next best option is for vessels to slow down
and keep a lookout. NOAA Fisheries has taken a number of steps to reduce this threat such as:
Requiring ships to slow down in specific areas (Seasonal Management Areas) based on right
whales’ migration patterns and timing.
Asking vessels to slow down when whales are seen in an area outside of these Seasonal
Management Areas.
Modifying international shipping lanes.

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Developing right whale sighting and alert systems.
Requiring large ships to report when they enter key right whale habitats. In return, the vessel
receives a message about right whales, precautionary measures to avoid hitting a whale, and
locations of recent sightings.
Regulating how close a vessel or aircraft may get to a right whale. This reduces disturbance to the
animal and the potential for negative interaction.

Reducing Entanglement in Fishing Gear
NOAA Fisheries has developed management measures to reduce whale entanglements with the help
of the Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Team—a group of advisors consisting of fishermen,
scientists, environmental organizations, and state and federal officials. The Team’s Take Reduction
Plan requires commercial fishermen to use certain fishing gear types that are less harmful to right
whales, and specifies areas where fishing cannot take place when whales are present.
The main focus of our entanglement reduction effort has been to understand where along the East
Coast the risk of entanglement is greatest and to reduce line in the water column that could pose a
risk to right whales.
Because we have evidence that trap/pot and gillnet fishing gear pose the greatest risk of
entanglement to large whales, we have several seasonal fishing closures during times when we know
whales will be present. We’ve also required that fishermen use sinking groundline in between their
traps and between gillnet panels and the anchoring system. Before that decision, the line would float,
sometimes meters off the ocean floor, and whales traveling in between the traps or between gillnets
and anchors and would get caught in the line. Sinking groundline is not in the water column, which
reduces the risk of entanglement.
We’ve also taken steps to reduce the number of endlines. Endlines connect the first and last traps to
the buoys that sit at the surface. By fishing with only one endline where safety allows it, or adding
more traps to a set, we’ve managed to reduce the number of endlines. Again, any fishing line
removed from the water column helps reduce the risk of entanglement.
All in all, our measures have helped to remove around 42,000 miles of fishing line from the water
column across the entire U.S. Atlantic region. That’s enough line to circle the Earth one and a half
times. Removing fishing line from the water undoubtedly removes risk of entanglement for right
whales and other protected species, even if statistically these benefits are hard to see.
In addition, when entangled whales are reported anywhere along the East Coast, the NOAA-funded
Atlantic Large Whale Disentanglement Network is called upon to try to help. The Network is made up
of emergency responders from 20 public and private organizations who have extensive training in
how to disentangle large whales and increase their odds of surviving. Examining gear removed from
entangled animals is one of the key ways for us to determine whether regulations are working and
fishing gear modifications are effective.

Overseeing Stranding Response
We work with volunteer networks in all coastal states to respond to marine mammal strandings,
including large whales. When stranded animals are found alive, NOAA Fisheries and our partners
assess the animal’s health. When stranded animals are found dead, our scientists work to understand
and investigate the cause of death.

International Collaboration
NOAA Fisheries is actively collaborating with Canada through ongoing bilateral negotiations on the
science and management gaps that are impeding the recovery of North Atlantic right whales in both
Canadian and U.S. waters.

Management Overview
Right whales are protected under both the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the Marine Mammal
Protection Act. They have been listed as endangered under the ESA since 1970. This means that
North Atlantic right whales are in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of their
range. NOAA Fisheries is working to protect this species in many ways, with the goal that its
population will increase.

Recovery Planning and Implementation
Recovery Plan
Under the ESA, NOAA Fisheries is required to develop and implement recovery plans for the
conservation and survival of listed species. The ultimate goal of the North Atlantic right whale plan is
to recover the species, with an interim goal of down-listing its status from endangered to threatened.

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The major actions recommended in the plan are:
Reduce or eliminate injury and mortality caused by vessel collisions or by fisheries and fishing
gear.
Protect habitats essential to the survival and recovery of the species.
Minimize effects of vessel disturbance.
Continue international ban on hunting and other directed take.
Monitor the population size and trends in abundance of the species.
Maximize efforts to free entangled or stranded right whales and acquire scientific information from
dead specimens.
Read the recovery plan for the North Atlantic right whale 

Implementation
The ESA authorizes NOAA Fisheries to appoint recovery teams to assist with the development and
implementation of recovery plans. Two regional North Atlantic right whale recovery plan
implementation teams were established to assist with issues related to the status and conservation of
right whales.
Learn more about the Southeast U.S. Implementation Team 
Learn about the Northeast U.S. Implementation Team 

Critical Habitat Designation
Once a species is listed under the ESA, NOAA Fisheries evaluates and identifies whether any areas
meet the definition of critical habitat. Those areas may be designated as critical habitat through a
rulemaking process. The designation of an area as critical habitat does not create a closed area,
marine protected area, refuge, wilderness reserve, preservation, or other conservation area; nor does
the designation affect land ownership. Rather, federal agencies that undertake, fund, or permit
activities that may affect these designated critical habitat areas are required to consult with NOAA
Fisheries to ensure that their actions do not adversely modify or destroy designated critical habitat.
NOAA Fisheries designated critical habitat for the North Atlantic right whale in 1994 (59 FR 28805)
and revised the designation in 2016 (81 FR 4838).
Critical habitat for the North Atlantic right whale includes two areas—a foraging area in the Northeast
and a calving area in the Southeast:
North Atlantic Right Whale critical habitat map and GIS data
Final rule establishing critical habitat for North Atlantic Right whales

Conservation Efforts
Reducing Vessel Strikes
The most common vessel-related threats to right whales are blunt force trauma and propeller cuts.
Collisions between whales and large vessels often go unnoticed and unreported, even though whales
can be injured or killed and ships can sustain damage.
Reducing vessel speeds where whales are present, developing recommended shipping lanes outside
of specific ports, making mariners aware when whales are around, and implementing a 500-yard “noapproach” safety zone around right whales are among the measures we use to reduce these threats.
Specifically, we have taken both regulatory and non-regulatory steps to reduce the threat of vessel
collisions to North Atlantic right whales, including:
Requiring vessels to slow down in specific areas during specific times (Seasonal Management
Areas).
Advocating for voluntary speed reductions in Dynamic Management Areas.
Recommending alternative shipping routes and areas to be avoided.
Modifying international shipping lanes.
Developing right whale alert systems.
Developing mandatory vessel reporting systems.
Increasing outreach and education.
Improving our stranding response.

Implementing Vessel Speed Restrictions for North Atlantic Right Whales
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The most effective way to reduce collision risk is to keep whales and vessels apart. If that is not
possible, the next best option is for vessels to slow down and keep a lookout. There are several
areas, known as seasonal management areas, along the U.S. East Coast where vessels 65 feet or
longer must slow to 10 knots or less during times of the year when right whales are likely to be in the
area. The idea behind the 10-knot limit is that the more slowly a vessel goes, the more time the whale
has to get out of the way, and a strike at that speed is less likely to be fatal. We have fined companies
for violating these speed reductions.
Outside of these areas, if three or more right whales are sighted within 75 nautical miles of each
other, we implement a short-term voluntary speed reduction area around those whales and do our
best to get the word out to all vessels to use extra caution in these areas. Unfortunately, studies have
found that these voluntary measures are not very effective in modifying vessel speed or direction of
travel, and therefore likely do little to reduce vessel collisions.

Implementing a Mandatory Vessel Reporting System for North Atlantic Right
Whales
To further reduce the number of vessel strikes, NOAA Fisheries and the U.S. Coast Guard developed
and implemented a mandatory vessel reporting system for North Atlantic right whales. When large
vessels enter one of two key right whale habitats—one off the U.S. northeast coast and one off the
U.S. southeast coast—they must report to a shore-based station. In return, the vessel receives a
message about right whales, their vulnerability to ship strikes, precautionary measures to avoid hitting
a whale, and locations of recent sightings.
Learn more about the mandatory ship reporting system for North Atlantic right whales 

Implementing Right Whale Sighting and Notice Systems
To reduce collisions with right whales, mariners are urged to use caution and proceed at safe speeds
in areas where right whales occur. NOAA Fisheries and our partners developed an interactive
mapping application that provides up-to-date information on North Atlantic right whale sightings along
the East Coast of the United States.
Learn more about reducing vessel strikes to North Atlantic right whales 

Addressing Ocean Noise
Underwater noise threatens whale populations, interrupting their normal behavior and driving them
away from areas important to their survival. Increasing evidence suggests that exposure to intense
underwater sound in some settings may cause some whales to strand and ultimately die. NOAA
Fisheries is investigating all aspects of acoustic communication and hearing in marine animals, as
well as the effects of sound on whale behavior and hearing. In 2016, we issued technical guidance for
assessing the effects of anthropogenic sound on marine mammals’ hearing.
Learn more about ocean noise 

Reducing Entanglement in Fishing Gear
Entanglement in fishing gear is a primary cause of serious injury and death for many whale species,
including the North Atlantic right whale. With the help of the Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction
Team—a group of advisors consisting of fishermen, scientists, and state and federal officials—we
have developed management measures to reduce whale entanglements. We require commercial
fishermen to use certain gear types that are less harmful to North Atlantic right whales, and have
established areas where fishing cannot take place during certain times when North Atlantic right
whales are present. We are currently developing management measures to reduce the number of
buoy lines in the water column in an effort to further reduce the risk of entanglement in fishing gear.
In addition, when entangled whales are reported anywhere along the East Coast, the NOAA-funded
Atlantic Large Whale Disentanglement Network is called upon to try to help. The network is made up
of emergency responders from 20 public and private organizations who have extensive training in
how to disentangle large whales and increase their odds of surviving. The Network has successfully
disentangled close to 30 North Atlantic right whales over the years. And examining gear removed
from entangled animals is one of the key ways for us to determine whether regulations are working
and fishing gear modifications are effective.
Learn more about the Take Reduction Team’s efforts to reduce whale entanglements 
Learn more about bycatch and fisheries interactions 

Overseeing Marine Mammal Health and Stranding Response
We work with volunteer networks in all coastal states to respond to marine mammal strandings,
including large whales. When stranded animals are found alive, NOAA Fisheries and our partners
assess the animal’s health. When stranded animals are found dead, our scientists work to understand
and investigate the cause of death. Although the cause often remains unknown, scientists can
sometimes identify strandings due to disease, harmful algal blooms, vessel strikes, fishing gear
entanglements, pollution exposure, and underwater noise. Some strandings can serve as indicators

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of ocean health, giving insight into larger environmental issues that may also have implications for
human health and welfare.
Learn more about the Marine Mammal Health and Stranding Response Program 

Key Actions and Documents
Actions & Documents

Incidental Take

Five-Year Reviews of North Atlantic and North Pacific Right Whales
NMFS announces a 5-year review of North Atlantic right whale (Eubalaena glacialis) and North Pacific
right whale (Eubalaena japonica) under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), as amended. A 5year review is based on the best scientific and


Notice of Initiation (77 FR 16538, 03/21/2012)

Notice , Alaska , New England/Mid-Atlantic , West Coast , Foreign
PUBLISHED

March 21, 2012

Listing North Atlantic Right Whale Under the ESA
We, NMFS, completed a status review of right whales in the North Pacific and North Atlantic Oceans
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in December 2006 and are listing the currently endangered
northern right whale (Eubalaena spp.) as two separate


Final Rule

Final Rule , New England/Mid-Atlantic
PUBLISHED

April 7, 2008

Regulations Governing the Approach to North Atlantic Right Whales
Disturbance is identified in the Final Recovery Plan for the Northern Right Whale (Recovery Plan) as
among the principal human-induced factors impeding recovery of the northern right whale (Eubalaena
glacialis) (NMFS, 1991). NMFS is issuing this interim


Final Rule, technical amendment (69 FR 69536)



Final Rule (62 FR 6729)

Final Rule , New England/Mid-Atlantic , Southeast
PUBLISHED

February 13, 1997

Science
NOAA Fisheries conducts various research activities on the biology, behavior, and ecology of the
North Atlantic right whale. The results of this research are used to inform management decisions and
enhance recovery efforts for this endangered species.
We use a variety of methods to determine where right whales are located, including aerial surveys
(planes), directed shipboard surveys, underwater acoustic listening devices, habitat modeling, and
anecdotal sightings reports. To better inform the public of the most recent right whale sightings,
NOAA scientists maintain a Right Whale Sightings database. Our database includes more than 40
years of reliable sightings data, spanning the entire range of the species from Canada through
Florida.
NOAA is working hard to develop a tracking device that will stay attached to right whales and not
compromise the health of these animals. Right whales present a unique challenge to tagging efforts
because they are social animals that often engage in physical contact with each other, putting
tremendous stress on tags attached to their bodies.

Aerial Surveys
Scientists use small aircraft to spot North Atlantic right whales and photograph them to identify
individuals and record their seasonal distribution. Understanding the whales’ migration patterns helps
managers establish measures to reduce vessel strikes and limit the overlap between fisheries and
whales. NOAA Fisheries and our partners also use small unmanned aircraft systems—commonly

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called “drones”—to assess individual right whale size and body condition, as well as taking breath
samples to analyze factors such as genetics and stress hormones.

North Atlantic right whale mother and calf as seen from a research drone called a hexacopter. Hexacopters allow
researchers to conduct right whale photo identification and photogrammetry studies. Photogrammetry techniques
allow scientists to get body measurents from aerial photographs. Photo: NOAA Northeast Fisheries Science
Center/Lisa Conger and Elizabeth Josephson.

Shipboard Studies
In addition to aerial surveys, we conduct research cruises that investigate the whales’ habitat
preferences and feeding ecology, as well as collect photographic and genetic identification.
Information from this research can be used to inform management actions that protect the North
Atlantic right whale.
The goals of many of our aerial and shipboard surveys are to photograph as many individual right
whales as possible, so we concentrate on places where we are most likely to find them at the surface,
aggregating to feed or engage in social behaviors. This helps us most accurately estimate the
population size and monitor population trends. The photographs and other data collected when the
image is made (time, date, location, behavior) are used by researchers around the region to
investigate things like body condition, behavior, and life history. Over time, these data can also reflect
changes in distribution.
If the whales aren’t feeding or socializing at the surface, their behavior can make them hard to spot
from a plane or large research vessel (for example, if they’re engaged in deep dives or traveling while
submerged). Sea state and weather also make it more complicated to spot individual right whales
from a plane.

Acoustic Science
We use underwater microphones to listen for right whale calls. This is another way to learn more
about where and when these whales are present in different areas (at least during times they are
vocalizing) where visual surveys are not likely to be effective. For example, while we do not generally
send planes up in the winter to look for right whales, acoustic detections have shown that at least
some right whales can be detected year-round in locations we thought were once only seasonally
used.
Other research is focused on the acoustic environment of cetaceans, including North Atlantic right
whales. Acoustics is the science of how sound is transmitted. This research involves increasing our
understanding of the basic acoustic behavior of whales, dolphins, and fish; mapping the acoustic
environment; and developing better methods using autonomous gliders and passive acoustic arrays
to locate cetaceans.
Learn more about acoustic science 

Marine Mammal Unusual Mortality Events
To understand the health of North Atlantic right whale populations, scientists study unusual mortality
events (UMEs). Understanding and investigating marine mammal UMEs is important because they

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can serve as indicators of ocean health, giving insight into larger environmental issues that may also
have implications for human health and welfare.
Learn more about North Atlantic right whale UMEs 

Stock Assessments
Determining the size of the North Atlantic right whale population—and whether it is increasing or
decreasing from year to year—helps resource managers assess the success of the conservation
measures enacted. Our scientists collect population information on right whales from various sources
and present the data in an annual stock assessment report.
Learn more about marine mammal stock assessments 

Documents
DOCUMENT

National Report on Large Whale Entanglements (2017)
This report provides a summary of large whale entanglements that occurred in U.S. waters in 2017…
National

DOCUMENT

Vessel Operations in Right Whale Protection Areas in 2009
NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-OPR-44 Published Date: 2010
New England/Mid-Atlantic , Southeast

DOCUMENT

North Atlantic Right Whale Calving Area Surveys: 2015/2016 Results
This report briefly summarizes the results of aerial surveys conducted in the Southeast United…
Southeast

DOCUMENT

North Atlantic Right Whale Recovery Plan Southeast Implementation Team Meeting
Summary and Outcomes, November 2017
Meeting summary and key outcomes from the November 15-16, 2017 Southeast U.S. Implementation
Team…
Southeast

More Documents 

Data & Maps
MAP

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Vessel Trip Reporting in the Greater Atlantic Region | NOAA Fisheries

Vessel Trip Reporting in the Greater
Atlantic Region
All commercial and for-hire vessels fishing in federal waters (3 miles to 200 miles offshore)
must report their catch.

Vessel Trip Reporting
Operators of federally permitted vessels must submit a vessel trip report (VTR) for each fishing trip.
VTRs are important because they provide data that informs fishery management decisions. You may
report electronically or by paper. Read the VTR Instructions.

Electronic Vessel Trip Reporting (eVTR)
Operators have the option to submit their VTRs electronically. Electronic reporting will make the
collection of important data on fishing vessel activity more efficient, convenient, and timely for the
fishing industry, fishery managers, and other data users. eVTR, has been authorized for all federally
permitted vessels in the Greater Atlantic region.

GARFO Fish Online Web-Based Reporting
With our new NOAA Fish Online web-based reporting, you can now submit your electronic Vessel
Trip Reports (eVTRs) using your tablet or computer. With web-based reporting, you can:


Create a new eVTR



Edit an existing report



Print existing reports



Be alerted to any errors made



Auto-fill forms



Start and complete a form at different times prior to landing

Reports submitted via web-based reporting will meet all of GARFO’s reporting requirements for both
commercial (except ITQ clams) and recreational fishing.
If you have a valid federal fishing permit and would like to use NOAA Fish Online web-based
reporting, contact our IT Help Desk at (978) 281-9188 or [email protected] to obtain
NOAA Fish Online log-in information.
In addition to our Fish Online web-based reporting, we have also approved other applications for
electronic reporting.

eVTR Software Options
You may choose to use any of the following software applications to submit your eVTRs:

1. NOAA Fish Online iOS App Reporting 
NOAA Fish Online for iOS App How-To Card (provides basic assistance for using the NOAA Fish
Online app)
Search for "NOAA EVTR" in the Apple App Store
For assistance, call (978) 281-9188 or email [email protected]

2. Fisheries Logbook and Data Recording Software (Study Fleet vessels only)
For assistance, contact Jon O’Neil, Northeast Fisheries Science Center, (508) 495-2207.

3. SAFIS Software 
For assistance, call eTrips/mobile helpdesk at (800) 984-0810 or
email [email protected]

4. Ecotrust Canada Elog Software 
For assistance, contact Amanda Barney, Ecotrust Canada, (250) 624-4191

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Vessel Trip Reporting in the Greater Atlantic Region | NOAA Fisheries

eVTR app compatibility summary
App

Web-based

NOAA/GARFO Fish Online iOS
App Reporting

X

Windows- Windows Windows Windows
based
– based 10-based 10-based iPhone iPad
Computer Tablet
Computer Tablet

X

X

X

X

(Free)
NOAA/GARFO
Fish Online

X

X

X

X

Web Based Reporting (Free)
NOAA/NEFSC Fisheries Logbook
and Data Recording Software
(FLDRS - Study Fleet vessels
only)

X

(Free)
ACCSP SAFIS 
eTrips/Mobile2

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

(Free)
Electric Edge (FACTS )
Pending
For purchase, contact Bryan
Recertification
Stevenson, 250-480-0642 or
[email protected]
Olrac DDL 
For purchase, contact Heidi
Henninger at 603-828-9342 or
[email protected]

Pending
Recertification

Ecotrust Canada 
(Elog) 

X

To obtain an eVTR password
All vessel operators who will be completing an eVTR must obtain a confidential password which
will serve as an electronic signature and is required to submit an eVTR. To obtain an eVTR password,
please contact us at (978) 281-9188 or email us.
The only exception is for vessel operators who intend to use SAFIS eTrips as their electronic
reporting application, in which case your SAFIS username and password will serve as your electronic
password. To obtain a SAFIS eTrips username and password please call (800) 984-0810 or
email [email protected].

Reporting assistance and resources:
For general questions about vessel trip reporting, call (978) 281-9246 or email us.
For questions about Fish Online, call (978) 281-9188
To request reporting forms and logbooks, call (978) 281-9246

For additional eVTR support, contact:
Lindsey Bergmann, (978) 281-9418
Jim St.Cyr, (978) 281-9369

eVTR Software Developers
All eVTR software applications must meet specific technical requirements. Upon request, GARFO
can test and confirm for developers whether their applications meet the technical requirements.

eVTR Technical Requirements
The eVTR Technical Requirements document provides the technical information that you need to
satisfy the programming requirements for electronic reporting.

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Vessel Trip Reporting in the Greater Atlantic Region | NOAA Fisheries

Support Tables
The eVTR Support Tables provide standard industry information that developers need to build their
eVTR applications.
Table 1 - eVTR Dealer Listing
Table 2 - eVTR Gear Codes
Table 3 - eVTR Location to Area
Table 4 - eVTR Port Listing
Table 5 - eVTR Species Codes
Table 6 - eVTR Trip Activity Types
Table 7 - eVTR Trip Types

Interactive Voice Response System
There are several specific situations in which fishermen fishing in federal waters in the Greater
Atlantic Region must report their landings via our Interactive Voice Response System (IVR):
1) If you are not required to report via a Vessel Monitoring System
2) If you fish for quota-monitored species
3) If you land fish caught under an Exempted Fishing Permit
4) If you fish in a Research Set-Aside Program
All vessels reporting via IVR must report their trip start times 24 hours prior to leaving the dock, and
report trip end times within 24 hours of returning to the dock for these types of trips:
Handgear A trips in the Common Pool and small vessel category
Multispecies (Common Pool and Sector) and scallop trips that fish inside and outside of the VMS
demarcation line on the same trip.
Common Pool DAS block reporting
Herring VTR trips
Monkfish fish only trips (and not required to use VMS given groundfish requirements)
Monkfish RSA trips
Tilefish trips
VMS re-declaration trips
Exempted Fishing Permits - participants in non-VMS fisheries have the option to report via VMS or
IVR

Two ways to report via IVR:
Option 1: Report online. To access this simple system, log in to Fish Online and click the ‘"IVR
Reporting" link to the left.
You will need a PIN number to log in to Fish Online. If you do not have one or have technical issues
with the IVR system, call (978) 281-9188.
Option 2: Report via telephone. You may call (888) 284-4904 to report your landings. If you need
assistance, call:
IVR and VMS reporting requirements and questions: (978) 281-9315
IVR system technical difficulties: (978) 281-9227
Additional help is available in our Current Year's Reporting Weeks.

Paper Reporting
You may still report using paper vessel trip reports. Call (978) 281-9246 or log in to Fish Online to
request new logbooks.

Last updated by Greater Atlantic Regional Fisheries Office on 11/21/2019

https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/new-england-mid-atlantic/resources-fishing/vessel-trip-reporting-greater-atlantic-region

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NORTH ATLANTIC RIGHT WHALE CONSORTIUM - Home

NORTH ATLANTIC RIGHT WHALE CONSORTIUM

There are 409 North Atlantic Right Whales Left in the World
Started in 1986 as a collaborative data sharing group, the North Atlantic Right Whale Consortium (NARWC) has grown to include more than 200 individuals from various
research and conservation organizations, shipping and shing industries, technical experts, U.S. and Canadian government agencies, and state and provincial authorities, all
of whom are dedicated to the conservation and recovery of the North Atlantic right whale. The Consortium is internationally recognized and has been identi ed as a model
for establishing other species-related consortia.

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1399

RAPID COMMUNICATION / COMMUNICATION RAPIDE

Striking the right balance in right whale
conservation
Robert S. Schick, Patrick N. Halpin, Andrew J. Read, Christopher K. Slay, Scott
D. Kraus, Bruce R. Mate, Mark F. Baumgartner, Jason J. Roberts, Benjamin
D. Best, Caroline P. Good, Scott R. Loarie, and James S. Clark

Abstract: Despite many years of study and protection, the North Atlantic right whale (Eubalaena glacialis) remains on
the brink of extinction. There is a crucial gap in our understanding of their habitat use in the migratory corridor along the
eastern seaboard of the United States. Here, we characterize habitat suitability in migrating right whales in relation to
depth, distance to shore, and the recently enacted ship speed regulations near major ports. We find that the range of suitable habitat exceeds previous estimates and that, as compared with the enacted 20 nautical mile buffer, the originally proposed 30 nautical mile buffer would protect more habitat for this critically endangered species.
Re´sume´ : Malgre´ de nombreuses anne´es d’e´tude et de protection, la baleine franche du nord (Eubalaena glacialis) de l’Atlantique Nord demeure au bord de l’extinction. Il y a une faille essentielle dans notre compre´hension de leur utilisation de
l’habitat dans le corridor de migration le long de la coˆte est des E´tats-Unis. Nous caracte´risons ici la convenance des habitats pour les baleines franches en migration en relation avec la profondeur, la distance de la rive et la re´glementation re´cemment en vigueur sur la vitesse des navires pre`s des ports principaux. Nous trouvons que la gamme d’habitats ade´quats
de´passe les estimations pre´ce´dentes et que, par comparaison a` la zone tampon de 20 milles marins pre´sentement en vigueur, la zone tampon de 30 milles marins propose´e a` l’origine prote´gerait plus d’habitats pour cette espe`ce se´rieusement
menace´e de disparition.
[Traduit par la Re´daction]

Introduction
Despite many years of study and protection, the North Atlantic right whale (Eubalaena glacialis) remains on the
brink of extinction (Fujiwara and Caswell 2001; Kraus et
al. 2005). Although a more complete understanding of right
whale movement, feeding, and distribution patterns on their
northern foraging and southern calving grounds has emerged
(Kraus and Rolland 2007), the space used by right whales
along their migratory corridor remains almost entirely un-

known. This lack of knowledge impedes management of the
segment of this critically endangered species, namely pregnant females and nursing mothers, whose death most impacts population survival (Fujiwara and Caswell 2001). As
right whales migrate, they pass several of the largest ports
on the eastern seaboard (Knowlton et al. 2002) (Fig. 1).
Ship strikes are one of the primary factors limiting recovery
of this species; more than a quarter of known ship strike
mortalities for right whales occur in this region (Knowlton

Received 13 March 2009. Accepted 2 July 2009. Published on the NRC Research Press Web site at cjfas.nrc.ca on 14 August 2009.
J21103
R.S. Schick,1 J.J. Roberts, and B.D. Best. Nicholas School of the Environment and Earth Sciences, Box 90328, Levine Science
Research Center, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708-0328, USA.
P.N. Halpin and C.P. Good. Nicholas School of the Environment and Earth Sciences, Box 90328, Levine Science Research Center,
Duke University, Durham, NC 27708-0328, USA; Duke University Marine Laboratory, 135 Duke Marine Lab Road, Beaufort, NC
28516-9721, USA.
A.J. Read. Duke University Marine Laboratory, 135 Duke Marine Lab Road, Beaufort, NC 28516-9721, USA.
C.K. Slay. Coastwise Consulting, Athens, GA 30601, USA.
S.D. Kraus. Edgerton Research Laboratory, New England Aquarium, Boston, MA 02110, USA.
B.R. Mate. Marine Mammal Institute, Oregon State University, Newport, OR 97365, USA.
M.F. Baumgartner. Biology Department, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Woods Hole, MA 02543, USA.
S.R. Loarie. Department of Global Ecology, Carnegie Institution, 260 Panama Street, Stanford, CA 94305, USA.
J.S. Clark. Nicholas School of the Environment and Earth Sciences, Box 90328, Levine Science Research Center, Duke University,
Durham, NC 27708-0328, USA; Department of Biology, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708-0338, USA; Department of Statistical
Science, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708-0251, USA.
1Corresponding

author (e-mail: [email protected]).

Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. 66: 1399–1403 (2009)

doi:10.1139/F09-115

Published by NRC Research Press

1400

Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. Vol. 66, 2009

Fig. 1. The portions of two movement paths that cross the migratory corridor are depicted in relation to the proposed (red) and enacted
(blue) seasonal management areas (SMA). Light grey and dark grey circles are estimated locations of NEA 1812 and NEA 2320. Major
ports are in beige. The upper inset map shows the last four locations of NEA 2320’s track in grey with the buffered track shown in light
grey. The lower inset map highlights the study area. TEU, twenty foot equivalent units; EEZ, exclusive economic zone.

et al. 2002). Knowledge of how right whales perceive and
move through this area will help inform the risk of ship
strikes near these ports. Accordingly, we fit a new movement model to the migratory paths of two female right
whales to estimate habitat suitability along the Mid-Atlantic
corridor. In fitting this model, we emphasize (i) the general
suitability of this important migratory corridor and (ii) the
spatial relationship between habitat suitability and recently
enacted vessel speed restrictions near shipping ports along
the east coast (NOAA 2008).

Data
The data used here come from portions of movement
paths from two female right whales: NEA 1812, tagged in
1996 (C.K. Slay and S.D. Kraus, unpublished data), and
NEA 2320, tagged in 2000 (Baumgartner and Mate 2005).
Both animals were tagged with ARGOS satellite-monitored
radio tags. NEA 1812 is a reproductively active female at
least 20 years old. She was first identified in Roseway Basin
on the Nova Scotian Shelf in September 1988 and was last
seen in August 2008 in the Bay of Fundy. NEA 1812 was
Published by NRC Research Press

Schick et al.

accompanied by a newborn calf at the time of tagging.
NEA 2320 is a reproductively active female first identified
in January 1993 off Florida and last seen in March 2008 in
Cape Cod Bay. Information about age, sighting history, and
reproductive status comes from The North Atlantic Right
Whale Catalog (http://rwcatalog.neaq.org/Default.aspx, last
accessed 12 December 2008). The track of NEA 1812 originated off Fernandina Beach, Florida, on 21 February 1996
and ended in the Gulf of Maine on 2 June 1996 (Fig. 1).
(Note that the ports are symbol coded according to TEU
(twenty foot equivalent units), where 1 TEU approximately
represents the capacity of a standard shipping container, or
1360 ft3, information taken from the United States Army
Corps of Engineers, Navigation Data Center (http://www.
iwr.usace.army.mil/ndc/wcsc/by_portname06.htm, last accessed 19 February 2009).) The track of NEA 2320 originated in the Bay of Fundy on 11 August 2000 and ended
just north of the calving grounds in Florida and Georgia on
15 December 2000 (Fig. 1). In both cases, we ignored the
Gulf of Maine portion of the tracks because this comprised
a demonstrably different behavioral state and locations were
no longer in the migratory corridor. For NEA 1812, 24 locations spanned the calving ground and migratory corridor; for
NEA 2320, 16 locations spanned the migratory corridor.
NEA 1812 transmitted for 103 days and covered 2676 km
(average of 26.0 km
day–1). NEA 2320 transmitted for
127 days and covered 5612 km (average of 44.2 km
day–1).

Methods
Because the model from Schick et al. (2008) assumes
equal time intervals between locations, we fit the model
from Jonsen et al. (2005) to the data as a first-stage filter to
obtain an estimate of the true path. The model from Jonsen
et al. (2005) is a state-space model that uses a directed correlated random walk as the process model and that returns
daily estimates of the animal’s true position and, where appropriate, estimates of a behavioral state. We then buffered
positions along this estimated path to compare actual location visited at time t versus a range of possible locations.
We chose a 100 km spatial buffer around each location at
time t because this distance slightly exceeded the maximum
daily distance covered by the individual whales (97 km).
Using GIS, we sampled two environmental covariates, water
depth (metres) and distance to shore (kilometres), at each of
these possible locations along the path of the individual as
well as at the centroid of each 4 km grid cell within the buffered track (Fig. 1, inset). Because there is no literature describing the response of migrating right whales to dynamic
covariates such as sea surface temperate, we did not include
them in our model. In certain cases where shorter movements by the animal resulted in overlap of the spatial buffers, a separate time index was derived for each of the
points. In other words, at time t = 3, the possible locations
were, for example, 100. At t = 4, the locations were also
100, but since the animal only moved 5 km, 90 of these
100 possible locations were the same as the previous time
step. In this case, we calculated and kept the space and time
index of each patch in relation to when it could have been
visited by the moving animal (Fig. 1, inset). We built upon
these two covariates by separately calculating quadratic
terms for both water depth and distance to shore. We used

1401

quadratic terms to see if there was an optimal range for
each of these covariates and because without them, the assumption would be that right whales prefer the smallest possible values for each covariate, i.e., the closer right whales
are to shore, the higher the suitability. In addition, we calculated the distance from the animal’s position at time t – 1 to
the current location of possible patches at time t. This allowed us to make inference on how distance from the animal affects suitability.
To these data, we applied the Bayesian movement model
from Schick et al. (2008) that embeds a resource selection
function (Manly and McDonald 2002) inside a movement
model in an effort to infer the parameters governing relative
habitat suitability h, where h is a function of environmental
covariates. That is, how does the suitability of the patch
chosen differ from those the animal could have chosen to
visit? We modeled suitability as a function of the two environmental covariates, including both linear and quadratic
terms for both. The model from Schick et al. (2008) exploits
observed movement relative to the options available as the
basis for inference on habitat preference.
We used these covariates and regression parameters to
model the suitability h of areas along the track. At each
point along the movement track, the animal chooses one location of many possible locations. We used a multinomial
for the likelihood based on the assumption that the animal
chooses the location with probability q. Probability q was
mechanistically derived from the relative suitability h of the
visited patch. Suitability h was normalized by dividing by
the sum of h for all other patches. Suitability h had a functional form Xb. We constructed X, and in a Gibbs sampling
framework, we drew bs from a truncated multivariate normal distribution with mean values based on the current values of b(g), where the g superscript represents the current
step in the Gibbs loop. The density a of the proposed value
is determined in relation to the current value, and if a > 1,
the proposed values were accepted. We derived and used an
empirical covariance matrix V for this multivariate distribution. A default covariance matrix was used at the start of the
Gibbs sampler, and we then twice calculated and employed
the empirical covariance matrix after 1000 and 100 000 steps
through the Gibbs sampler. We used uninformative flat priors centered on 0 with large variance. We ran the Gibbs
sampler for 250 000 steps, saving the last thinned 150 000
values. Summary statistics were calculated for each of the
posterior estimates of the parameters. To display habitat
suitability, we used median estimates of the regression parameters and plotted estimates of suitability around each
point. For the global suitability, we fixed distance and depth
at their mean values while calculating suitability as a function of distance to shore.

Results
Results from the two migratory tracks analyzed here
(whales NEA 1812 and NEA 2320) indicate that the estimate of habitat suitability should be revised farther offshore
(Fig. 2a). Peak suitability values for distance to shore are
slightly farther offshore for NEA 1812 than for NEA 2320
(Fig. 2a). In particular, NEA 1812, a migrating female with
a newborn calf, occurred relatively far offshore during some
Published by NRC Research Press

1402

Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. Vol. 66, 2009

Fig. 2. (a) Posterior estimates of habitat suitability as a function of distance to shore across the entire migration for NEA 2320 (blue line)
and NEA 1812 (red line). The vertical grey line corresponds to 75 km (40 nautical miles) offshore. Posterior estimates of habitat suitability
are shown for (b) NEA 2320 near the mouth of Delaware Bay, and (c) NEA 1812 near the mouth of Chesapeake Bay. Suitable habitat is
colored from high (dark green colors) to low (light blue colors). Shown are the southbound (Fig. 2b) and northbound (Fig. 2c) paths of the
animal (grey dots and lines) as well as the 37 km (20 nautical miles) and the originally proposed 55.6 km (30 nautical miles) buffer around
these two ports (blue line and red line, respectively). SMA, seasonal management area.

points in her migration (Figs. 1 and 2a). Because the analysis was Bayesian, uncertainty the parameters indicate a
range of peak suitability as a function of distance to shore
from 32 to 200 km for NEA 1812 and from 14 to 75 km
for NEA 2320. Results thus indicate that the migratory corridor may be broader than originally thought (Fig. 2)
(Knowlton et al. 2002).

Discussion
We estimated habitat suitability around all seasonal management areas (NOAA 2008) in relation to the new 37 km
(20 nautical miles) speed restriction buffers and earlier proposed 55.6 km (30 nautical miles) buffers (NOAA 2006).
Our analysis indicates that the enacted seasonal management
area boundary covers only a small portion of suitable habitat. Enacting the original proposed zones over the Mid-Atlantic would protect an additional 15 453 km2 of suitable
habitat as follows: (i) 3849 km2 around the southeastern
United States, a 22% increase, (ii) 3042 km2 around Morehead City, a 135% increase, (iii) 2052 km2 around Chesapeake Bay, a 123% increase, (iv) 2188 km2 around
Delaware Bay, a 119% increase, and (v) a 1761 km2 around
New York/New Jersey, a 107% increase (see detailed views
for Chesapeake Bay and Delaware Bay presented herein).
We prefer the contiguous border for the seasonal management areas from Savannah to Wilmington but feel it would
be improved by extending the boundary the full 30 nautical
miles from shore, as it is clear that peak suitability for both
whales ranges farther than 20 nautical miles.
While we do not undertake a full model selection analysis
herein, the fact that there is a Pearson r correlation value of
0.45 between the covariates bears some discussion. To determine the effect this has on the analysis, we reran the
model using one environmental covariate at a time, e.g., distance to future patch and depth, distance to future patch and
distance to shore. For example, the estimate for the b gov-

erning depth for NEA 1812 is 0.12 (Bayesian credible interval 0.02, 0.27) with just depth in the model and 0.069
(Bayesian credible interval 0.005, 0.21) with depth and distance to shore. Results are similar for distance to shore: 0.47
(Bayesian credible interval 0.05, 1.14) with just distance to
shore and 0.68 (Bayesian credible interval 0.1, 1.56) with
both covariates. In both cases, the credible intervals for the
single-covariate model contain the parameters estimated in
the two-covariate model, thereby giving us confidence in
the model formulation.
By taking a new approach to inference, we find that habitat suitability for migrating right whales extends farther offshore than previously thought (Knowlton et al. 2002). In
addition, we show that the original proposed boundary of
30 nautical miles would protect more suitable habitat near
ports. Future management and conservation activities should
take these two findings into account. While we cannot draw
too much inference from analysis of two tracks, we note the
following. First, the entire population is extremely small,
comprised of approximately 300–400 individuals, so two
tagged reproductively active females represent a significant
portion (2%) of the most valuable segment of the population
(current estimate is 97 breeding females, Philip Hamilton,
Edgerton Research Laboratory, New England Aquarium,
Central Wharf, Boston, Massachusetts, personal communication). Previous estimates of population viability have
stressed that if two females per year can be saved, the population growth will become positive (Fujiwara and Caswell
2001). Second, the migratory section of the species’ range
is the least understood but critical for pregnant females migrating southward from the Gulf of Maine to calving
grounds and for mothers with newborn calves migrating
northward to feeding grounds. Because these north- and
southbound migration routes pass close to several of the
largest shipping ports on the eastern seaboard, and because
a substantial number of ship strike mortalities occur in this
area (Knowlton et al. 2002), we argue that the speed restricPublished by NRC Research Press

Schick et al.

tion boundaries be revisited. While we are not estimating
risk of ship strike, previous work has documented the successful reduction in risk of ship strike to right whales with
a combination of traffic separation schemes and speed restrictions (Fonnesbeck et al. 2008; Vanderlaan et al. 2008).
Incorporating the results presented here in conservation and
management schemes would protect a larger portion of right
whale habitat in this critical yet understudied area of their
range.

Acknowledgements
We thank Martin Biuw and two anonymous reviewers
whose comments considerably strengthened this manuscript.
This work was supported in part by SERDP/DoD grant
W912HQ-04-C-0011 to A.J. Read and P.N. Halpin as well
as a James B. Duke Fellowship and a Harvey L. Smith Dissertation Year Fellowship to R.S. Schick.

References
Baumgartner, M.F., and Mate, B.R. 2005. Summer and fall habitat
of North Atlantic right whales (Eubalaena glacialis) inferred
from satellite telemetry. Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. 62(3): 527–
543. doi:10.1139/f04-238.
Fonnesbeck, C.J., Garrison, L.P., Ward-Geiger, L.I., and Baumstark, R.D. 2008. Bayesian hierarchichal model for evaluating
the risk of vessel strikes on North Atlantic right whales in the
SE United States. Endanger. Species Res. 6: 87–94. doi:10.
3354/esr00134.
Fujiwara, M., and Caswell, H. 2001. Demography of the endangered North Atlantic right whale. Nature, 414(6863): 537–541.
doi:10.1038/35107054. PMID:11734852.
Jonsen, I., Flemming, J.M., and Myers, R. 2005. Robust state-space
modeling of animal movement data. Ecology, 86(11): 2874–
2880. doi:10.1890/04-1852.

1403
Knowlton, A., Ring, J., and Russell, B. 2002. Right whale sightings
and survey effort in the mid-atlantic region: migratory corridor,
time frame, and proximity to port entrances. A report submitted
to the NMFS Ship Strike Working Group. Available from www.
nero.noaa.gov/shipstrike/ssr/midatanticreportrFINAL.pdf
Kraus, S., and Rolland, R. 2007. The urban whale: North Atlantic
right whales at the crossroads. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Kraus, S.D., Brown, M.W., Caswell, H., Clark, C.W., Fujiwara, M.,
Hamilton, P.K., Kenney, R.D., Knowlton, A.R., Landry, S.,
Mayo, C.A., McLellan, W.A., Moore, M.J., Nowacek, D.P.,
Pabst, D.A., Read, A.J., and Rolland, R.M. 2005. North Atlantic
right whales in crisis. Science, 309(5734): 561–562. doi:10.
1126/science.1111200. PMID:16040692.
Manly, B., and McDonald, T. 2002. Resource selection by animals:
statistical design and analysis for field studies. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, Mass.
NOAA. 2006. Endangered Fish and Wildlife; Proposed rule to implement speed restrictions to reduce the threat of ship collisions
(26 June 2006). Federal Register Vol. 71. No. 122. pp. 36299–
36313.
NOAA. 2008. Endangered Fish and Wildlife; Final rule to implement speed restrictions to reduce the threat of ship collisions
with North Atlantic right whales (10 October 2008). Federal
Register Vol. 73. No. 198. pp. 60173–60191.
Schick, R.S., Loarie, S.R., Colchero, F., Best, B.D., Boustany, A.,
Conde, D.A., Halpin, P.N., Joppa, L.N., McClellan, C.M., and
Clark, J.S. 2008. Understanding movement data and movement
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Published by NRC Research Press

ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 30 September 2019
doi: 10.3389/fmars.2019.00592

Active Whale Avoidance by Large
Ships: Components and Constraints
of a Complementary Approach to
Reducing Ship Strike Risk
Scott M. Gende 1* , Lawrence Vose 2 , Jeff Baken 2 , Christine M. Gabriele 3 , Rich Preston 2
and A. Noble Hendrix 4
1
Glacier Bay Field Station, National Park Service, Juneau, AK, United States, 2 Southeast Alaska Pilots’ Association,
Ketchikan, AK, United States, 3 Glacier Bay National Park and Preserve, National Park Service, Gustavus, AK, United States,
4
QEDA Consulting, LLC, Seattle, WA, United States

Edited by:
Jessica Redfern,
Southwest Fisheries Science Center
(NOAA), United States
Reviewed by:
Mason Weinrich,
Center for Coastal Studies,
United States
Paul Conn,
Alaska Fisheries Science Center
(NOAA), United States
*Correspondence:
Scott M. Gende
[email protected]
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Marine Conservation
and Sustainability,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Marine Science
Received: 31 March 2019
Accepted: 05 September 2019
Published: 30 September 2019
Citation:
Gende SM, Vose L, Baken J,
Gabriele CM, Preston R and
Hendrix AN (2019) Active Whale
Avoidance by Large Ships:
Components and Constraints of a
Complementary Approach
to Reducing Ship Strike Risk.
Front. Mar. Sci. 6:592.
doi: 10.3389/fmars.2019.00592

The recurrence of lethal ship-whale collisions (‘ship strikes’) has prompted management
entities across the globe to seek effective ways for reducing collision risk. Here we
describe ‘active whale avoidance’ defined as a mariner making operational decisions
to reduce the chance of a collision with a sighted whale. We generated a conceptual
model of active whale avoidance and, as a proof of concept, apply data to the model
based on observations of humpback whales surfacing in the proximity of large cruise
ships, and simulations run in a full-mission bridge simulator and commonly used
pilotage software. Application of the model demonstrated that (1) the opportunities
for detecting a surfacing whale are often limited and temporary, (2) the cumulative
probability of detecting one of the available ‘cues’ of whale’s presence (and direction
of travel) decreases with increased ship-to-whale distances, and (3) following detection
time delays occur related to avoidance operations. These delays were attributed to the
mariner evaluating competing risks (e.g., risk of whale collision vs. risk to human life,
the ship, or other aspects of the marine environment), deciding upon an appropriate
avoidance action, and achieving a new operational state by the ship once a maneuver is
commanded. We thus identify several options for enhancing whale avoidance including
training Lookouts to focus search efforts on a ‘Cone of Concern,’ defined here as the
area forward of the ship where whales are at risk of collision based on the whale and
ship’s transit/swimming speed and direction of travel. Standardizing protocols for rapid
communication of relevant sighting information among bridge team members can also
increase avoidance by sharing information on the whale that is of sufficient quality to
be actionable. We also found that, for marine pilots in Alaska, a slight change in course
tends to be preferable to slowing the ship in response to a single sighted whale, owing,
in part, to the substantial distance required to achieve an effective speed reduction in a
safe manner. However, planned, temporary speed reductions in known areas of whale
aggregations, particularly in navigationally constrained areas, provide a greater range
of options for avoidance, highlighting the value of real-time sharing of whale sighting
data by mariners. Development and application of these concepts in modules in full
mission ship simulators can be of significant value in training inexperienced mariners

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by replicating situations and effective avoidance maneuvers (reducing the need to
‘learn on the water’), helping regulators understand the feasibility of avoidance options,
and, identifying priority research threads. We conclude that application of active whale
avoidance techniques by large ships is a feasible yet underdeveloped tool for reducing
collision risk globally, and highlight the value of local collaboration and integration of
ideas across disciplines to finding solutions to mutually desired conservation outcomes.
Keywords: vessel strike, active whale avoidance, ship operations, speed, detection probability

decisions, such as a course change or speed reduction, with
the goal of reducing the chance of a collision with a sighted
whale. Active avoidance differs from more ‘passive’ regulatory
approaches in that the risk- reducing action is primarily initiated
by the mariner upon sighting of a whale surfacing forward of
the ship as opposed, for example, to a ship entering a mandatory
speed reduction area which requires a change in operational state
independent of whether a whale is present in the area and/or at
risk of collision.
Active whale avoidance has been developed and successfully
practiced for decades by marine pilots in Alaska (and possibly
elsewhere) and is not new in the maritime community.
However, a more formal exploration will help clarify (1) the
development and application of these techniques by other
mariners, (2) the regulatory language that makes implicit or
explicit assumptions about a ship’s ability to avoid whales, and
(3) important research questions with regard to the efficacy and
effectiveness of different maneuvers under varying operational
and environmental conditions. For example, the U.S. Code of
Federal Regulations (50 CFR §224.103) states that it is illegal to
approach [North Atlantic] right whales closer than 500 yards
(457 m) with some exceptions for vessels ‘restricted in her ability
to maneuver.’ In Alaska, federal regulation dictates that all vessels
must operate at a ‘slow, safe speed when near a humpback whale’
(50 CFR §223.214) which assumes that the ship can take proper
and effective action to avoid collision when near a humpback
whale or that ship operators have advance knowledge of where
whales are located. 36 CFR §13.1170 stipulates that a vessel in
Glacier Bay inadvertently positioned within 1/4 nautical mile of
a whale must “immediately slow the vessel to ten knots or less
without shifting into reverse”, and “direct or maintain the vessel
on as steady a course as possible away from the whale until at least
1/4 nautical mile of separation is established” – requirements that
were largely established pertaining to smaller craft and may be
unattainable by large ships.
Understanding the opportunities for, and feasibility of, active
whale avoidance also serves to benefit mariners by clarifying
conditions and actions that may facilitate effective whale
avoidance. For example, large ship operators undergo years of
training, including frequent maneuver testing in full-mission
bridge simulators, which are often focused on collision avoidance
with objects including reefs, shoals, and other vessels. Yet we
know of no simulator modules for whale avoidance, which would
provide opportunities for mariners to learn from others and
test new ideas for maneuvering, particularly if they incorporated
state-of-the-science information pertaining to whale behavior.

INTRODUCTION
Lethal collisions between large ships and large whales (ship
strikes) are a recurring and common threat to whale populations
across the globe (Thomas et al., 2016). In some cases, such as with
the critically endangered North Atlantic right whales (Fujiwara
and Caswell, 2001), and an important sub-population of sperm
whales in the Canary Islands (Fais et al., 2016), ship strikes have
direct implications for population persistence and biodiversity.
In other cases, such as with the population of blue whales in
the eastern North Pacific, ship strikes do not appear to regulate
population dynamics given the frequency of (known) ship strike
mortalities (Monnahan et al., 2015), although the number of
detected collisions may be an underestimate of the true number
that occur (Rockwood et al., 2017). Regardless, management
agencies and the general public value large cetaceans and seek
effective ways to reduce ship strikes, even when population
persistence is not at stake (Gende et al., 2018).
To date, most management efforts aimed at reducing ship
strike risk have focused either on modifying shipping lanes,
which can reduce the relative and absolute risk of strikes by
reducing spatial and temporal overlap between ships and whales
(Knowlton and Brown, 2007; Vanderlaan et al., 2008; van der
Hoop et al., 2015), and/or reducing ship speed, which may reduce
the probability of a collision (Conn and Silber, 2013) or the
likelihood of mortality should a collision occur (Vanderlaan and
Taggart, 2007). Yet each of these approaches has limitations.
Modifying shipping lanes will only be as effective as the spatial
persistence of whale aggregations, can require considerable
regulatory effort, or may be impractical in narrow straits or
for ships arriving into ports of call (Webb and Gende, 2015;
Monnahan et al., 2019). Speed restrictions can generate resistance
from the shipping industry owing to economic implications
of the additional at-sea time that results from lower speeds,
particularly when applied over large areas, which may be
one reason voluntary reductions in speeds tend to have low
compliance (McKenna et al., 2012). Regardless, whales can be
notably unresponsive to approaching ships (Nowacek et al., 2004;
McKenna et al., 2015), and thus any action that facilitates the
avoidance of whales by mariner training and active avoidance
techniques (lowering the reliance on whales to avoid ships) are
important to develop.
Here we describe active whale avoidance by mariners aboard
large ships which serves as a complementary, but comparatively
underexplored, means to reduce whale strike risk. Active whale
avoidance is defined here as a mariner making operational

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from simulations of large cruise ship operations in a fullmission bridge simulator and via commonly used pilotage
software. The conceptual model, generated to help deconstruct
this complex and highly variable process into components that
could be informed by data, was developed during a series
of meetings conducted since 2013 between a team of State
of Alaska marine pilots from the Southeast Alaska Pilots’
Association (SEAPA), and scientists from Glacier Bay National
Park, where ship strike reduction efforts have been implemented
and refined since the early 1980s. The conceptual model is
presented first (Figure 1) by describing each of the constituent
processes, and factors that influence them. Components include
availability and detection processes, reflecting how often and
how long whales are available to be detected, and the ability
of mariners to detect them once available; and command and
maneuver processes, reflecting the procedures that occur on
the bridge once a whale is detected, and the ability of a
ship to achieve a new operational state commanded by the
mariner that reduces collision risk. These components are
based upon existing literature (e.g., availability and detection
processes) and the collective experience of marine pilots
(command and maneuver). To that end, the ‘results’ of the
conceptual model include narrative describing how and why
certain factors are important, particularly as it relates to ship
operations and maneuvering, including events that transpire
on the ship’s bridge when a whale surfaces and is detected
forward of the ship. For our proof of concept, data collection
procedures are organized according to the different components
of the conceptual model. While more details on the fieldbased methods can be found elsewhere (see Gende et al.,
2011; Harris et al., 2012; Williams et al., 2016) they are
described briefly below.

Finally, clarifying research needs and models derived from
active whale avoidance will help scientists prioritize and/or refine
existing efforts that will have tangible conservation outcomes
and assist mariners in applications of these concepts. For
example, a suite of efforts currently exist to facilitate mariners
sharing information on whale sightings yet it’s unclear how
well these sightings equate to changes in maritime operations
and, ultimately, whether certain factors, such as the way the
information is transmitted or when its received by the operator,
equates to a reduction in ship strikes.
Our goal is to present a conceptual model of active whale
avoidance derived by coupling perspectives from biologists,
focused on the science of whale behavior, with the expertise
of ship operators. To that end, our research team included
Alaska marine pilots with over 90 years of combined experience
developing and practicing active whale avoidance while piloting
large ships. As proof of concept, we collected and applied data
to our conceptual model focused on avoidance of humpback
whales by large cruise ships transiting waters in Alaska. Data
informing our conceptual model originated from (1) a study that
has placed observers aboard large cruise ships in Alaska since
2006 focused on quantifying surfacing behavior of humpback
whales around the ships and the ability of mariners to detect
them; and (2) data collected during trial simulations in a fullmission bridge (ship) simulator to identify and quantify the
practices that occur on the ship’s bridge during active whale
avoidance. Large ship maneuvering capabilities were further
explored using SEAiq, a navigation software commonly used by
marine pilots to navigate and assess maneuvering possibilities1 .
Although our work is focused on a specific type of ship
(large cruise ships) and single species of whale (humpback),
variations of the components of our conceptual model can be
applied to whale avoidance by other types of ships and other
types of whales.
We emphasize that our goal is to generate a conceptual
foundation upon which specific processes, such as the
relationship between whale surfacing distance and appropriate
maneuver response, can be subject to more rigorous testing
and replication. To that end, our findings (at this stage) are
not intended to prescribe what mariners should (or shouldn’t)
do when in the vicinity of surfacing whales. Instead, we
draw some more general but important inferences from our
conceptual model and related data including the role of ship
operations (e.g., speed and heading variables) in active whale
avoidance. Ultimately we hope these ideas will help advance
the development and application of active whale avoidance
techniques on a global scale.

Availability of Whales for Detection
In the context of active whale avoidance, whales need to
be available for detection in order to be avoided. Thus the
availability is dictated by the type, frequency, and duration of
the opportunities for perception by the mariner. In Alaska,
humpback whales (and other whale species) regularly embark
on a repeated cycle of a foraging dive punctuated by a surface
interval. For clarification we define a surface interval as the time
the whale first comes to the surface following a dive to the
time it embarks on another dive. Therefore the surface interval
encapsulates one to many surfacing events defined as when
the whale breaks the surface of the water to respire. Surfacing
events are separated by brief submergences (e.g., Dolphin, 1987;
Stelle et al., 2008; Godwin et al., 2016; Garcia-Cegarra et al.,
2019). During each surfacing event (surfacing) the whale may
provide multiple ‘cues’ that can be perceived by the mariner to
infer the whale’s distance from the ship and direction of travel
(Hiby and Ward, 1986). Cues include spouts/blows/breaths and
presentation of the head, dorsal fin, back, or tail (flukes) breaking
the surface. Cues are available for only a second or two, occur
in rapid succession, and often overlap in time (such as when
the water vapor from a spout lingers long enough to be visible
when the whale’s flukes break the water’s surface). In contrast,
the surfacing events are separated by submergences that may

MATERIALS AND METHODS
Our goal for this paper was to present (1) a conceptual
model of active whale avoidance, and (2) provide a proof
of concept by utilizing empirical data of humpback whale
surfacing behavior collected from the bow of cruise ships and
1

http://seaiq.com/

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FIGURE 1 | Conceptual model depicting some components related to active whale avoidance by mariners aboard large ships. The first two rows reflect opportunity:
active whale avoidance can be practiced anywhere in the world where there is overlap between large ships and large whales, including within management areas
that already require (or encourage voluntary) speed reductions or within shipping lanes that have been altered to minimize ship-whale encounters. Lowermost boxes
represent a sampling of important factors that may influence their related processes either singly or in concert with other factors. The arrows among the lower boxes
reflect the general chronology of whale avoidance.

last 20–40 s or more, during which time the ship will move
up to several hundred meters closer to the whale (depending
upon speed). The change in ship-to-whale distances between
cues (within a surfacing event) will thus be inconsequential
(meters) whereas the change in distances between surfacing
events will be sufficiently large to affect the probability of
detection (see below).
To understand the nature by which humpback whales become
available to be detected by mariners, we utilized data collected
as part of an ongoing study that has placed an observer
aboard large cruise ships in Alaska since 2006 (Figure 2A) to
estimate (1) the frequency and duration of surfacing events
throughout a surfacing interval, and (2) the probability that one
or more surfacing events will be detected. We briefly summarize
the relevant methods of whale detection here, but reference
previously published work (Gende et al., 2011; Harris et al., 2012;
Williams et al., 2016) containing more details on data collection
and processing protocols.

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Surfacing Behavior of Humpback Whales
Near Cruise Ships
During the summers (May–September) of 2016 and 2017 a
marine mammal observer embarked on N = 67 large cruise ship
cruises (mean length = 268 m; Gende et al., 2018) while the
ship transited the waters in Glacier Bay National Park, Alaska.
The observer was transported out to the cruise ships just after
it entered the park (only 1 or 2 ships entered per day) and
boarded the ship via an NPS transport vessel. Regardless of
weather, the observer proceeded to the bow (the forward-most
point of the ship; Figure 2B) and conducted continuous nakedeye scans of the water in a 180-degree arc from directly forward
to directly abeam, on both sides of the ship. Scans were assisted
using Swarovski 10 × 42 binoculars and tripod-mounted laser
rangefinder binoculars (Leica Viper II; accuracy + 1 m at 1 km;
Leica, Charlottesville, VA, United States) to search for whales.
When the observer detected a humpback whale, the ship’s
position was recorded using a Global Positioning System

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distances were deemed unbiased, and typically within 10% of
the true distances (Williams et al., 2016). The relative bearing
of the surfacing event was recorded using a tripod-mounted
protractor along with group size, cue type (spout, fluke up,
etc.), direction of travel, and sighting conditions (see Williams
et al., 2016 for complete list). All data were recorded using a
voice-activated recorder and transcribed following each cruise.
Data were then summarized using (1) only whales with a group
size of 1 (i.e., singletons) to ensure that surfacing events were
not mixed in multi-whale groups (singletons constituted 91%
of all groups detected in 2016 and 2017), and (2) only from
a single surfacing interval per whale to insure independence.
Owing to the speed of the ships (typically 14–20 kts; Webb and
Gende, 2015), and foraging dives often lasting several minutes
or more, only one surfacing interval was typically recorded
(>90% of all sightings) before the whale passed abeam. To avoid
using surface intervals that were ongoing when the whale passed
abeam, the total number of surfacing events per surfacing interval
was summarized across all of the surface intervals where whale
flukes were displayed as the terminal cue (indicating a deep
dive). In contrast, the length of submergences between surfacing
events were summarized using all surface intervals, regardless
of the nature of the terminal cue. Both of these parameters aid
in understanding how many surfacing events are available for
mariners to detect and the time elapsed between available events.

Probability of Detecting a Humpback
Whale During a Surfacing Interval
Detection functions of humpback whales surfacing near cruise
ships have been published previously by Williams et al.
(2016) who used distance sampling applied to sighting data
collected since 2008. Importantly, unlike some studies focused
on estimating abundance of whales where detection functions
were derived using line transects, Williams et al. (2016) derived
detection functions tailored to the question of whale avoidance
by using a series of instantaneous samples as point transects, with
the ship-to-whale distances analyzed as radial measures from the
bow. Accordingly, the proper interpretation of these detection
functions is the instantaneous detection probability of a whale
that becomes temporarily available at a specific ship-to-whale
radial distance across the 180-degree arc forward of the ship.
In the context of active whale avoidance, the relevant inference
is the probability the mariner detects at least one of the available
surfacing events in a surfacing interval because whales often
engage in multiple surfacing events (per surfacing interval) and
mariners generally need only to detect one of the events to begin
evaluating whether a whale avoidance maneuver is necessary and
feasible. We thus utilized the Williams et al. (2016) estimates
to calculate the cumulative probability of detecting one of the
events in a series of surfacing events, i.e., the first or second
surfacing event in a 2-surfacing interval, the first or second or
third surfacing event in a 3-surfacing interval, and so on.
In this regard, the surfacing events are analogous to a series
of Bernoulli trials with one of two outcomes (detected, nondetect) each of which are mutually exclusive and complementary.
However, it is important to recognize two conditions when

FIGURE 2 | (A) A humpback whale surfaces in front of a large cruise ship,
Glacier Bay, Alaska. (B) An observer standing at the bow of a large cruise ship
in Alaska quantifying the frequency, proximity, and behavior of humpback
whales that surface forward of the ship. The Observer program has occurred
since 2006 and included more than 750 cruises. (C) The command center at
the AVTEC Full Mission Bridge simulator in Seward, Alaska, during simulations
whereby marine pilots simulated whale encounters and active whale
avoidance. Closed-circuit video of 2 pilots in the bridge room can be seen in
lower left of the photo enacting a whale avoidance maneuver.

(Garmin 76Cx GPS, Olathe, KS, United States), and the distance
between the observer and the whale was measured using
tripod-mounted laser rangefinder binoculars, or estimated if
the observer could not ‘ping’ the whale with the rangefinder.
Based on training and testing throughout the study, estimated

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Williams et al., 2016). R script (R Core Development Team)
written for calculating the cumulative detection probabilities
across any distance is provided in Supplementary Material.
To illustrate the cumulative chance that a mariner detects
a whale that initially surfaces at different distances, we then
plotted the cumulative probability of detecting at least one of
the surfacing events for a whale engaged in an average surfacing
interval of 3 surfacing events each separated by 20 s submergences
(from our data below) initially surfacing at distances of 4000,
3000, 2000, or 1000 m from a ship. Note that because the speed
of the ship is relevant to the changes in ship-to-whale distances
among surfacings, we modeled these probabilities based on a ship
traveling 19 knots.

estimating cumulative probability of detection. First, once a
whale is detected, it doesn’t matter (for detection) how many
subsequent trials (surfacings) occur because it only takes one
detected surfacing for the mariner to (1) know a whale is present
and forward of the ship, and (2) begin to evaluate whether
an avoidance maneuver may be necessary, effective, and safe
(recognizing that the first detection may be of variable quality
and that subsequent surfacings may need to occur to clarify
relevant information such as the whale’s direction of travel).
We assumed that once the mariner has detected the whale the
detection probability for any subsequent surfacing events = 1
owing to the highly concentrated search efforts that ensue in the
small area where the whale is likely to resurface.
Thus, if we characterize the two possible outcomes of a
surfacing event as D = Detect and N = Non-detect, assume
100% detection probability for any subsequent surfacing event
following detection, and that the initial surfacing is the key
parameter of interest, the five possible outcomes for detecting
at least one surfacing event in the series of (for example) five
surfacing events simplifies from:

Surfacing, Detection and Avoidance: An
Example of a Ship Strike Scenario
The combined variation from ship operations (course, speed,
etc.), whale behavior (swim speed, dive duration, surfacing
frequency, direction of travel, etc.), and initial whale surfacing
location (distance and relative bearing from the ship) produces
an extremely large number of scenarios in which a ship strike
can occur (final ship-to-whale distance and bearing = 0m). These
scenarios range from virtually no opportunities for avoidance,
such as when a whale initially surfaces from a dive just a few
meters from the bulbous bow, to scenarios where mariners
have an opportunity to avoid the whale, such as when it
initially surfaces at a distance sufficient to allow the mariner to
complete the command and maneuver processes and potentially
avoid the whale.
To understand the interplay between ship operational state
and whale avoidance, we chose a scenario where the mariner
has the opportunity to invoke an avoidance maneuver. For
our chosen scenario, we started at the point of collision, i.e.,
the ship and whale are in the same place and same time
(horizontal distance = 0 m, time to collision = 0 s) and
worked backward in time based on defined parameters of the
whale’s behavior (constant course traveling adjacent from, and
directly perpendicular toward, the ship’s path; constant swim
speed = 1.23 m/s; Barendse et al., 2010; Kavanagh et al., 2017)
and ship’s operational state (constant course; constant speed of
either 10 knots – 5.14 m/s – or 19 knots – 9.77 m/s). Thus if the
collision occurred at 0 s, at 100 s prior to collision the whale will
be 123 m from the point of collision and the ship will be 514 m
(slow ship) or 977 m (fast ship) from the point of collision.
Whales, however, may be at the same horizontal location
of the ship but owing to their dive behavior may pass safely
below the ship (vertical distance > 8m which is the average large
cruise ship draft from our study). To account for the vertical
movements of whales (surfacing events and dive intervals), we
further modeled the whale to surface 3 times during its surfacing
intervals (data from this study) with 20 s submergences (this
study), followed by a foraging dive of 5.4 min (324 s; a typical dive
length for foraging humpback whales in Alaska; Dolphin, 1987).
For simplicity, we assumed linear travel even though the whale
was diving. Using these parameters we then graphed the ship-towhale distances and time to collision through two whale surfacing

DDDDD, NDDDD, NNDDD, NNNDD, NNNND
to:
D, ND, NND, NNND, NNNND
Second, and perhaps more importantly, each trial (surfacing)
occurs at different distances influencing the distance-specific
instantaneous (radial) probability of detection. For example, if a
ship is approaching a whale at 19 knots (9.77 m/s) and the time
between surfacing events (duration of submergence) is 20 s, the
second surfacing event can occur at a ship-to-whale distance of
nearly 200 m less than the first surfacing event, the third surfacing
event nearly 400 m closer than the first, etc.
To account for these conditions, we utilized the Williams
et al. (2016) instantaneous detection probability estimates for the
initial surfacing event, and estimated the cumulative probability
of detection across the series of N surfacing events by adding
the probability of detecting the second surfacing event after the
first event went undetected (because if the first was detected,
the second is assumed to be detected), and so on. By extension,
the cumulative probability of detecting the second surfacing
event will always be greater than the instantaneous probability of
detecting the event at that distance because it represents the sum
of two probabilities. To illustrate, for a 5-surfacing event interval,
the cumulative probability of detection was calculated as:
Pr[at least 1 detection] = p1 + (1 − p1 )p2 + (1 − p1 )(1 − p2 )p3
+ (1 − p1 )(1 − p2 )(1 − p3 )p4 + (1 − p1 )(1 − p2 )(1 − p3 )
(1 − p4 )p5
The individual, radial distance-specific detection probabilities
were defined using the hazard rate function:
x

π = 1 − e(−( scale )∧−(shape))
where the scale parameter = e6.73157 and shape parameter = e0.747
is based on excellent sighting conditions (see Table 3 in

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operated the bridge of a ship, which had operational parameters
similar to that of the M/S Diamond Princess, a 115,875 gross
tonnage, 288 m cruise ship that is representative of the large
cruise ships calling in Alaska during the summer. Also on the
bridge was an observer who recorded the time of events including
(1) the start of simulation, (2) the first detected surfacing
event of a simulated humpback whale spout (the first actual
surfacing event – detected or not – was known only to the
simulator operator and scenario coordinator who were located
in a different room; Figure 2C), (3) the communications that
occurred between the pilot and helmsman, (4) when a command
was initiated and (5) the end of the simulation, once the ship
had passed the whale. Following each simulation, a de-brief
discussion was held to review the events and clarify the reasoning
related to the decision-making process. During the de-brief, the
elapsed time between first detection and the time of the ordered
command was quantified, and the common elements related to
the decision-making process were identified.
Our simulations were limited in number as was our
bridge team size, which would normally include a dedicated
Lookout and one or more deck officers. Thus, we did not
draw inferences on detection probability from the simulator.
Additional limitations existed due to the lack of fidelity of the
simulated whale/cues which are the subject of further refinement
and improvement. Nevertheless, the descriptive data on timeto-command and archive of commonalities that influenced
decision-making were appropriate as full-mission simulations
are regularly used to describe processes that occur on the ship’s
bridge, and can serve as realistic proxies for evaluating risk and
commanding new operational states (Hontvedt, 2015).

intervals and a foraging dive for mariners approaching a whale
that will ultimately be struck on a fast (19 knots) and slow ship (10
knots). To illustrate the trade-off between detection probability
and available time for ship personnel to decide on, and achieve,
an avoidance maneuver, the cumulative probability of detection
for each of the surfacing events were also plotted.

Where Whales Are at Risk: A Mariner’s
‘Cone of Concern’
Our estimates of the cumulative probability of detection
represent the probability of detecting at least one of the surfacing
events for a whale initially surfacing at different distances within
the entire 180-degree arc forward of the ship from beam-tobeam (Williams et al., 2016). However, throughout development
of our conceptual model, marine pilots in Alaska noted that when
assessing risk in active whale avoidance they often focus search
on a narrower area forward of the ship where a whale strike is
more probable, which they define as the ‘Cone of Concern.’ This
is because the relative bearing of the whale influences risk; a whale
initially surfacing directly forward of the ship (relative bearing:
000◦ ) at 3000 m is at a higher risk of a collision than a whale that
surfaces an order of magnitude closer (300 m), but directly abeam
(relative bearing: 090◦ ) because the closer whale is unable to swim
fast enough into the ship’s path to be struck.
We formalize this idea using simple vector analysis and a
trigonometric representation of a whale crossing a ship’s path
at a 90-degree angle. We contrasted ships traveling at 10 knots
(5.14 m/s) and 19 knots (9.77 m/s) with whales swimming at an
average speed of 1.23 m/s (2.4 knots) and at fast swimming speeds
of 2.46 m/s (4.8 knots) to explore how these parameters influence
the size of the Cone of Concern.

Ship Maneuverability During Active
Whale Avoidance

Decision-Making During Active Whale
Avoidance: Full-Mission Bridge
Simulation

Once a decision is made on an appropriate avoidance maneuver
(maintaining existing operations may also be an active decision;
see section Discussion), the rapidity by which the new operational
state is achieved can vary dramatically among ship types (e.g.,
bulk carriers vs. tankers vs. passenger vessels) and within
similar-type ships based on technical features such as hull
shape and maneuvering systems (e.g., Yasukawa et al., 2018;
Zaky et al., 2018). Further, variation can occur based upon
environmental conditions (e.g., Yasukawa et al., 2012; Rameesha
and Krishnankutty, 2019) and/or the existing operational
state of the ship (wave height, wind, ship’s existing speed,
acceleration/deceleration, whether or not the ship is already
engaged in a turn, etc.; Chen et al., 2017). Consequently,
determining how quickly a ship can achieve an avoidance
maneuver is well beyond the scope of this paper (although
our simulations were insightful for which factors should be
prioritized for further development).
We utilized the navigation software SEAiq, a commonly
used platform by pilots across the U.S. for understanding ship
maneuverability, and to focus on a simple and achievable
question: for a typical large cruise ship traveling at 10 vs. 19 knots,
how far in advance must a turn be initiated to achieve a CPA
of at least 100 m with a stationary whale while remaining

A ship’s bridge represents a classic example of a socio-technical
work environment because operational tasks, such as changing
course or speed, must be achieved by a team requiring joint
efforts of ‘human and technological interlocutors’ (Hontvedt,
2015). To that end, full-mission ship simulators are appropriate
for understanding the decision-making process by coupling
the human element with technology. To better understand the
elements of decision-making and time lags related to active
whale avoidance, we conducted familiarization and feasibility
exercises during 2 days in 2016 using the Kongsberg full-mission
bridge simulator (Figure 2C) at the Alaska Vocational Technical
Center (AVTEC) in Seward, Alaska2 . The full-mission simulator
at AVTEC is regularly used for training Alaska’s marine pilots
in the maneuvering of large ships as part of (re)certification and
continuing education, and mirrors the platforms used by marine
pilots at other training centers around the United States.
Seven simulations were conducted whereby a team of two
pilots, one serving as the pilot, the other as the helmsman,
2

https://www.kongsberg.com/digital/products/maritime-simulation/k-simnavigation/

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state resulting in a lower risk of a collision. Our conceptual
model (Figure 1) includes Observational (whale surfacing
behavior, detection) and Operational processes (commands and
maneuvering) that are structured sequentially. Each of these
components are described in more detail.

within defined safety parameters? We used a stationary whale
because it simplified the vectors and isolated the focus on
the maneuvering capacity of the ship. The 100 m CPA was
also for simplicity purposes and should be viewed simply as
a means to estimate maneuverability, not as a recommended
CPA for mariners. We did not introduce confounding factors,
instead simplifying the simulation to reflect ‘best case scenarios’
including unlimited visibility, calm water, no wind or current,
deep water maneuvering, no other vessel traffic or whales, and
the ship was initially traveling in straight line. Our defined safety
parameters were guided by our working history of the ship’s safety
parameters and a generalized Pilot Card describing the ship’s
sensitivity to heading changes (e.g., maximum rate-of-turn; ROT)
at varying speeds, as well as limitations in stopping distances. The
turn, based on non-emergency safety parameters, conservatively
did not exceed a 10-degree rate-of-turn and did not factor in
progressively higher rates of turn.
We note that we did not use SEAiq to estimate how much time
(and the total distance) it would take for the ship to slow down
(e.g., from 19 to 10 knots) because during the full mission bridge
simulations, pilots were found to avoid slowing speed in response
to a single sighted whale, reflecting their normal practice. During
de-briefings it was noted that while a moderate change in heading
can be achieved in a relatively short time period (following whale
detection), it takes much longer to achieve a moderate change in
speed, reducing the effectiveness of speed reduction as a reactive
response for whale avoidance, particularly avoidance of a single
observed animal. Moreover, pilots never practice ‘crash stops,’
i.e., a rapid stopping of the ship to avoid a collision with a
whale owing to the deleterious impacts it could have on the
infrastructure of the ship. Instead, to get a general idea regarding
how long it takes for a large cruise ship to reduce speed, and the
distance covered during that non-emergency transitional state,
we reproduce data from Nash (2009) and re-visit the role of speed
reduction as a pre-emptive avoidance maneuver in the Section
“Discussion.”
Finally, in typical ship operations, while only one person has
ultimate ‘command’ authority while on the bridge, the person
directing the movement of the vessel may vary depending upon
time and duties, and may be the pilot, captain or deck officer.
For simplicity, hereafter, we refer to this person collectively as the
Person Directing the Movement of the Vessel (PDMV).

Availability and Detection Process
The first step in this process is dictated by whale behavior because
whales need to be available for detection at the surface in order
to be avoided. The availability and detection processes have been
well studied owing to its relevance for abundance estimation (via
distance sampling), and we refer to these studies for describing
factors that influence cue frequency and behavior (Hiby and
Ward, 1986; Zerbini et al., 2006). Gray, blue, and humpback
whales (among many others) regularly embark on a cycle of
surface intervals, consisting of several shallow submergences
between respiration/surfacing events, punctuated by longer deep
dives (e.g., Dolphin, 1987; Godwin et al., 2016; Garcia-Cegarra
et al., 2019). Consequently, whales are infrequently but regularly
available to be detected. In general the most frequent cue available
during a surfacing event takes the form of the appearance of
the whale’s body in concert with a vertical spout/blow, which is
composed primarily of water vapor, air, and lung mucosa, that
may extend to several meters above the water and persist for
several seconds.

Command Process
Our conceptual model lists a series of steps that we have
termed the Command and Maneuver Processes. The Command
Process consists of Detection, Reporting, Assessment, Decision,
Command, and Compliance actions best described as time lags
because any time that elapses after a whale is detected reduces the
ship-to-whale distance (as the ship moves toward the whale in the
scenarios modeled) and decreases the options for an avoidance
maneuver to occur. The Maneuver Process represents the time
it takes for the ship, once commands have been executed, to
achieve the desired new operational state. We describe these steps
in more detail below.
The Detection Lag represents the time between when a bridge
team member detects an object in the water, confirms its identity,
and formulates their report to the PDMV. Based on anecdotal
observations from marine pilots aboard large cruise ships in
Alaska, this lag was estimated to vary from 1–2 s, as when a whale
spout is immediately recognizable, or as much 5–10 s if the nature
of the perceived object is not readily apparent (e.g., a whale lying
motionless on the surface or a floating log?). What’s more, many
Lookouts (personnel assigned to view the waters forward of the
ship) are trained to simply make a report of an “object in the
water,” if they cannot readily identify what it is, and then continue
to observe the object to develop clarifying information.
The Reporting Lag represents the time it takes for the
person making the observation to vocalize the observation
which, from our experience, may vary from 2 to 10 or more
seconds depending upon: (1) the volume or quality of the
initial sighting information (which may require dialogue with the
PDMV); (2) the observer’s ability to articulate the relative bearing,
distance, direction of travel, or other relevant information;

RESULTS
Conceptual Model of Active Whale
Avoidance by Large Ships
In its simplest terms, the process of active whale avoidance
can be described as occurring in five sequential events (1) a
whale surfaces somewhere forward of the ship where a collision
with the vessel is possible; (2) bridge personnel tasked with
ship navigational decisions detect the whale; (3) the PDMV
evaluates the situation and decides that an avoidance maneuver
is necessary, feasible, and safe; (3) the PDMV decides upon
and commands a new operational state such as a change in
course, speed or both; and (5) the ship obtains a new operational

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for course changes, or by the deck officer for speed changes),
and then confirmed by the PDMV. This lag is generally 5–
7 s in situations where all involved understand and are in
agreement, but can be longer (upwards of 60 s) if the command
is misunderstood, not heard, not acknowledged, or there is
disagreement on the appropriate avoidance action.

(3) existing bridge communications; and (4) language or cultural
communication issues. For example, the Lookout may spot a
whale spout and report, “whale two points to starboard” with no
additional information on distance, direction of travel, or speed.
At that point, the PDMV will look in the indicated direction
and engage the Lookout for information needed to make an
assessment which may result in an additional 10–20 s depending
upon the length of the submergence between surfacing events or
other ongoing action by the PDMV (e.g., communicating on the
radio with other traffic, establishing and monitoring navigational
parameters, etc.). In the meantime, the initial cue is often no
longer available. The elapsed time associated with Detection
and Reporting Lags will be minimized if the PDMV makes the
observation him/herself (with a high degree of certainty) and
immediately articulates the observation to the bridge team. In
these instances the total time elapsed may be as short as 5 s, but
more frequently it will be closer to 15 s.
The Assessment Lag represents time needed for the PDMV
to verify the information and subsequently assess if a collision
is possible. In the determination of collision risk, mariners
are trained not to make assumptions on the basis of “scanty”
information (see US Coast Guard Rule 7 Risk of Collision,
International Rules of the Road3 ), highlighting the need for
quality information before taking action. If, for example,
direction and travel speed of the whale are not available, the
process may cycle back to the Detection Lag, awaiting another
surfacing event upon which to formulate an avoidance decision.
Consequently, a simple report of a whale at a relative bearing and
distance may not provide sufficient information upon which to
base an avoidance action, even for a whale sighted directly ahead.
Consequently, the Assessment Lag, as with the other lags, may be
relatively quick (3–5 s) for the “obvious” situations or it may take
longer if inconsistent or incomplete information is reported.
The Decision Lag represents the time needed for the PDMV to
consider the available safe avoidance options based on competing
risks. The decision by marine pilots (serving in the capacity of
PDMV) is founded on the principle of do-no-harm, firstly to
people, secondly to the ship, and thirdly to the environment. In
practice, this results in a rapid and dynamic calculation of the
trade-offs in the risk of whale collision with the risks of harm to
people, the ship, or the environment (or some combination such
as a collision with another ship, a shoal, or even another whale).
Consequently, critical factors in the Decision Lag are based on
the situational awareness of the PDMV to the proximity to these
hazards and the operational state of the ship; i.e., what is in the
realm of possibility based on its speed, sea state, etc. Based on
opportunistic assessments, Decision lags can vary from a few to
20 s, based on complexity and competing risks.
The Command and Compliance Lag is the time needed for
the PDMV to articulate the avoidance decision into a specific
command and for the bridge team to comply. For example, the
PDMV may command the Helmsman to initiate a new heading.
For some shipping entities, the bridge procedures require ‘closed
loop communication’ whereby the command cannot be executed
until the initial order is first acknowledged (by the Quartermaster
3

Maneuver Process
The Maneuver Process is the time it takes for the ship,
once commands have been ordered, to achieve the desired
operational state. The maneuver process is also best considered
in the context of a time lag because the new commanded
operational state does not occur instantaneously. The Maneuver
Process can vary dramatically among ships although approximate
generalizations are appropriate for estimation and/or simulation
scenarios. Similar to other large ships, safe maneuvering of
large cruise ships encapsulate a range of turning and slowing
options based on the interaction between ship type, existing
operational state, and environmental conditions. Our experience,
based on informal sampling of whale avoidance maneuvers
during the past several summers in best-case scenarios,
has been that the maneuver process can vary from 25 to
180 s depending upon operating conditions and the type of
maneuver ordered.

Proof of Concept: Large Cruise Ships
Avoiding Humpback Whales
Availability
The data collected by observers stationed at the bow of cruise
ships transiting waters in Alaska demonstrate that humpback
whales surfacing around the ships often provide a small but
variable number of opportunities for detection. For all surfacing
bouts that ended with a fluke-up dive, whales embarked on an
average of 2.8 surfacing events per interval (N = 156 unique
intervals; range of surfacing events per interval: 1–15; Figure 3A).
We again clarify that this average is based on the number of
surfacing events per surfacing interval, not the number of cues
per surfacing event. Based on the empirical cumulative density
function, about 40% of all surfacing intervals included more than
three events (Figure 3A). As we only used surface intervals that
terminated in a fluke-up dive, the data on surfacing frequency was
not ‘right censored’ in that we had confidence that the surface
interval did not include unrecorded events that occurred after
the fluke-up dive. However, there is a possibility that Observers
may have missed a surfacing event (or two) prior to detection
(‘left censored’ data) resulting in the true number of events
likely being larger.
The time elapsed between surfacing events was also variable,
although the length of most submergences were centered in
groups of 10–15 and 15–20 s (Figure 3B). We feel confident
that, once a surfacing event was observed, detection probability of
subsequent events was very high as observers (and bridge teams)
focus on small area where whales are likely to resurface to gain
as much quality information as necessary to evaluate collision
risk. Together, the data suggest that mariners engaged in active
(humpback) whale avoidance in Alaska generally have about

https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/pdf/navRules/CG_NRHB_20151231.pdf

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FIGURE 4 | The cumulative probability of detecting at least one of the three
surfacing events for 3-event surfacing intervals that began with an initial
surfacing event at 4000, 3000, 2000, or 1000 m from a ship. Circles represent
the surfacing event number. The detection function used for calculating
cumulative probabilities were from Williams et al. (2016) based on excellent
sighting conditions.

Surfacing, Detection, and Avoidance: An
Example of a Ship Strike Scenario
In our chosen hypothetical ship-strike scenario (ultimate
CPA = 0 m) involving ships traveling at different speeds (19 or 10
knots), the whale was struck (PoC; ship-to-whale distance = 0 m,
time to collision = 0 s; Figures 5A,B) when it surfaced to take
its third respiration during its second surfacing interval (red
shaded area). Working backward in time (and space) from the
Point of Collision, at 40 s prior to collision the whale surfaced
about 211 m from the slower ship and about 394 m from the
faster ship. At both those distances, the cumulative probability of
detection was near certain (>0.99). Working further backward
in time, the whale embarked on a 324 s dive at 364 s prior to
collision which placed it over 3500 m from the faster ship but
just over 1900 m from the slower ship. At this point, which
represents the last chance to detect the whale before it dives, the
cumulative probability of having detected at least one of the 3
surfacing events during the first surfacing interval (green shaded
area, includes fast ship-to whale distances of 3978, 3781, and
3584 m; slow ship-to-whale distances = 2135, 2029, 1924 m) was
approximately 60% for the 10-knot ship but less than 15% for the
19-knot ship (red lines; Figures 5A,B). Owing to the near 4-fold
greater (cumulative) probability of detecting at least one of the
surfacing events during the first (earlier) surfacing interval, the
PDMV aboard the slower ship could have an additional 324 s
(post detection and during the whale’s dive) to decide upon and
implement an avoidance maneuver.
Note that, based on our estimates of the command and
maneuver lags (see above), both the slow and fast ship would
have limited (if any) opportunities to avoid the whale if it
went undetected during the first surfacing interval (green shaded
areas) because 40 s to collision (when the whale surfaced from its
dive) exceeded the aggregate time to implement these processes.

FIGURE 3 | Quantitative descriptions of whale surfacing behavior that help
describe the ‘availability’ of humpback whales to be detected by ship
personnel engaged in active whale avoidance in Alaska. (A) The average
number of detected surfacing events per surfacing interval of humpback
whales surfacing near large cruise ships, 2016–2017, with a curve
representing the empirical cumulative density function. (B) Histogram of the
average elapsed time between available surfacing events (submergence
duration) during surfacing intervals of humpback whales surfacing near cruise
ships, 2016–2017.

three opportunities for detecting the whale during its surface
interval, with an average of around 20 s between events.

Cumulative Probability of Detection
For a surfacing interval that included three surfacing events, the
cumulative probability of detecting at least one of the events
was lower at larger distances, and increased (non-linearly) with
decreasing ship-to-whale distances (Figure 4). For example,
based on detection functions for whales surfacing across the 180degree arc in front of the ship, mariners have a nearly 60% chance
of detecting at least one of the three surfacing events for a whale
that initially surfaces from a dive 2000 m from the ship, but a less
than 15% chance of detection for a whale that initially surfaced
4000 m from the ship (Figure 4). The doubling of the distance
resulted in four-fold lowering probability of detection because at
larger distances the cumulative increase in detection probability
was more linear in nature (e.g., for a surfacing interval that begins
at 4000 m) but more exponential in nature for intervals that began
at mid distances (e.g., 2000 m). Whales that surface close to the
ship (<1000 m) have near certainty of being detected (Figure 4).

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FIGURE 5 | Continued

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FIGURE 5 | The cumulative probability of detecting the first, second, or third surfacing event of a 3-event surfacing interval of a humpback whale for mariners aboard
a 10 knot ship (A) and a 19 knot ship (B) relative to the ship-to-whale distance and corresponding time to collision. In each scenario, the whale behavior is held
constant and modeled as traveling at 1.23 m/s (2.3 knots) perpendicular to but toward the path of a ship and, following the initial surfacing interval (green shaded
area) and a 5.4 min foraging dive, is struck when it surfaces a third time during the second surfacing interval (red shaded area) at the same location at same time as
the ship. Surfacing events are indicated by dots and surfacing intervals by shaded areas. From the first surfacing event (Surfacing 1, green shaded area), the time to
collision is held constant at 404 s for each scenario which results in an initial ship-to-whale distance of 2135 m from the slow ship (A) and 3978 m from the faster
ship (B). Curved line with gray 95% CI from Williams et al. (2016). A ship strike occurs in both scenarios unless the whale or ship deviates course or speed.
Distances are approximately to scale.

pilot’s maneuvering decisions were ubiquitously based on the
evaluation of competing risks. For instance, once the pilots
confirmed that a whale was within the Cone of Concern, a
primary consideration was how a change in course would
influence other risks, such as the risk of collision with other
navigation hazards including, but not limited to, other vessels,
reefs, or shoals. Likewise, in all simulations where the pilot
decided that a course change was needed to reduce collision risk
with a whale, an evaluation occurred whereby the efficacy of
the course change was considered relative to the time needed
to safely ‘build up’ to the required rate-of-turn. The rate-ofturn required to avoid the whale was then considered relative to
that particular ship’s safe rate-of-turn guidelines and heel angles
to mitigate the risk of deleterious impacts to the vessel and
its passengers.

Where Whales Are at Risk: A Mariner’s
‘Cone of Concern’
Figure 6 depicts the results of simple vector analysis
demonstrating how a whale’s swimming speed and a ship’s
transit speed influences the width of the Cone of Concern.
Figures 6A,B depicts ships traveling at 10 knots (5.14 m/s) and
19 knots (9.77 m/s) on a collision course (toward PoC) with a
humpback whale swimming at a typical speed (1.23 m/s; 6A) or
at a fast swimming speed (2.47 m/s; 6B) perpendicular to, and
toward, the ship’s path. For both scenarios, the opposite angle in
the right triangle (defined by the ratio of the whale’s swimming
speed and the ship’s travel speed) is maximized because the whale
is in a ‘crossing’ situation; i.e., it is headed directly toward the
ship’s path resulting in the shortest time for potential collision.
For the Fast Ship/Typical Whale (6A) scenario, the Cone of
Concern would be approximately 14 degrees (7.2 degrees on
either side of the ship) and encapsulate a search area of nearly
0.8 km2 . For the Slow Ship/Fast Whale scenario, the Cone of
Concern has a nearly equal search surface area (0.84 km2 ) even
though the search area is much wider (∼51.2 degrees).

Maneuverability
Using SEAiq and defined safety parameters, we found that
mariners aboard a ship traveling 10 knots (5.14 m/s) would
require action not less than approximately 741 m from the whale
to achieve a ‘near-miss CPA of 100 m’ (Figure 7A). In contrast,
a CPA of 100 m aboard the 19 knot ship occurred only after
it initiated a turn at least 1121 m from the confirmed sighting
(Figure 7B; both scenarios occurred under optimal conditions).
In both cases, the Command Lag was modeled as constant (based
on results from the simulator), occurring in approximately 25 s,
during which time the ship traveled 241 and 130 m closer to the
whale for the 19 and 10 knot ship respectively. The Maneuver
Lag was achieved over the course of approximately 90 s for
the fast ship when it traveled 880 m, and approximately 119 s
traveling just over 600 m for the 10 knot ship. Again, this was an
abstract, best-case scenario, limiting the Reporting, Assessment
and Decision Lags to minimums.

Command Process
As part of the simulations conducted in the full-mission
ship bridge simulator at AVTEC, the average elapsed time,
resulting from the aggregate of the Command time lags,
i.e., from detection of the simulated whale spout to initial
compliance with an ordered avoidance action, was 23 s. This
compared favorably with the informal observations conducted
by several pilots during opportunistic whale avoidance efforts
while navigating large cruise ships in 2016 and 2017. During the
debriefing meetings, we found that, following initial detection,
uncertainty in the whale’s direction of travel and swim speed
were common factors that contributed to the delay in a
command; the PDMV needed sufficient confidence in the
information (making it ‘actionable’), particularly on whether the
whale was swimming toward or away from the ship’s heading.
Consequently, the PDMV regularly communicated with the
Lookout and mate and, absent good information, waited for a
subsequent surfacing event before deciding on an appropriate
avoidance action.
During post-simulation de-briefs several common themes
were discovered. First, marine pilots rarely command a speed
reduction in response to a single sighted whale owing to their
familiarity with the time it takes to achieve the new speed (Nash,
2009, reproduced in part in Table 1) and that a course change
alone is most often more effective and efficient than a potential
speed reduction. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the

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DISCUSSION
We coupled whale-surfacing data collected using a ship-based
observer with data from simulations in a full-mission ship bridge
simulator, opportunistic data collected by marine pilots aboard
large cruise ships, and simulations using typical pilotage software
to generate the first holistic model of active whale avoidance by
large ships. While our goal was to provide a general introduction
of the constituent processes such that development and more
rigorous testing can build on our efforts, our results provided
some insight into the opportunities and constraints for increasing
the effectiveness of active whale avoidance and some priority
avenues of research, which we discuss below.

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FIGURE 6 | Two scenarios encapsulating different ship transit and whale swimming speeds that define the ‘Cone of Concern’ (shaded area), i.e., the area searched
by marine pilots to more efficiently detect surfacing whales that have the potential to be struck by the ship (at the bulbous bow). Figures depict the Cone for a
19-knot ship and 10-knot ship relative to an average swimming speed of a humpback whales (1.23 m/s; A) and a fast swimming whale (2.46 m/s; B) on a crossing
pattern and on a collision course with the ship (PoC, Point of Collision; CPA = 0 m). Cones range from 14.4◦ (7.2◦ on either side of ship for fast ship and slow whale)
to 51.2◦ (25.6◦ on either side of ship for a slow ship and fast whales). Distances are approximately to scale to a 284 m ship.

the initial (or several) surfacing events, particularly at large shipto-whale distances or limited to the mariner’s Cone-of-Concern.
While we initially sought to minimize the chance for this distance
bias by using only information from whales surfacing close to
the ship, ultimately we decided against subsetting the data (1)
because surfacing intervals that began close to the ship were often
still continuing when the ship passed abeam (when observers
terminated their observations of that whale) which would also
underestimate the number of surfacing events per interval, and
(2) to avoid biasing the inferences if, in fact, whales alter their
surfacing behavior as a function of distance.

Availability, Detection, and a Mariner’s
Cone of Concern
Based on data from hundreds of surfacing events of humpback
whales by observers, we demonstrate that mariners aboard large
ships in Alaska typically have about three opportunities, each
separated by about 20 s, to detect the whale and make a decision
about whether an avoidance maneuver is necessary, possible,
and safe. While these estimates were largely consistent with
other studies of humpback whales in Alaska (Dolphin, 1987), we
highlight that data on surfacing frequency was not corrected for
any negative biases owing to the observer’s chance of missing

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TABLE 1 | Approximate time (min) and distance (nautical miles) needed for slowing a large cruise ship with multiple engine configurations from various initial speeds to an
(arbitrary) target speed of 14.7 knots using a safe slowing speed reduction of 2 RPM per minute.
# of
Engines
needed

Initial Speed
(knots)

Propeller
(RPM) at
Initial Speed

Target Speed
(knots)

Target
Propeller
RPM

Time needed
(min)

Distance
needed (nm)

Distance
needed (m)

4+2

22.2

136

14.7

90

25

7.0

12,964

4+1

21.4

131

14.7

90

20

5.0

9,260

3+2

20.6

126

14.7

90

18

4.5

8,334

3+1

18.3

112

14.7

90

11

3.0

5,556

3

15.5

95

14.7

90

5

1.5

2,778

Note that slower (initial) speeds require less power (load) and thus fewer engines are needed to meet those power load demands for propulsion. Modified from Nash (2009).

aggregate lag contributes to the inverse relationship between
time available to make an avoidance maneuver and the range
of maneuver options available. Any activity or operation that
increases the chance of detection when a whale is first available
to be detected thus increases the options for avoiding the whale
and the odds of successful avoidance. We identified three factors
that may help PDMVs detect a whale and obtain sufficient
information to actively avoid it.
First, marine pilots in Alaska, based on decades of experience
encountering and avoiding (primarily humpback) whales
surfacing near large cruise ships, have developed a searching
pattern ‘Cone of Concern’ based on familiarity with approximate
travel speeds of humpback whales relative to the ships’ transit
speeds. In doing so, pilots and other bridge personnel narrow
their search efforts (by over 80% based on our simple vectors and
geometry; Figure 6) by delineating the ‘population’ of surfacing
whales at risk of collision vs. those that are not. This practice
could easily be standardized by integrating the concept into
transit planning and/or regular communications with the bridge
team to focus on parameters of, and need to search within, the
Cone of Concern.
Second, assigning a designated Lookout tasked solely with
searching for whales in the Cone of Concern could also enhance
detection probability and thus opportunities for whale avoidance.
While we did not test whether different configurations of
personnel (pilot, pilot + designated observer, etc.) produced
different detection functions, experiments aboard large fast
ferries have demonstrated that a dedicated whale ‘spotter’ vastly
improved detection probability and the distance at which whales
were detected (Weinrich et al., 2009). Research based on
line transect theory and distance sampling also demonstrate
that detection probability increases when additional observers
are utilized (Schmidt et al., 2017) including with whales
(Zerbini et al., 2006). While we recognize that transiting at
night or in heavy seas may reduce or eliminate detection, we
also highlight that technology continues to reduce barriers to
detection in some of these conditions (Zitterbart et al., 2013)
and application of the Cone of Concern may help inform
development of the technology to maximize effectiveness.
The third potential way to facilitate the effectiveness of
active whale avoidance is by reducing the time identified in
the Command process. Pilots in Alaska are regularly conveyed
unnecessary or incomplete information by members of the bridge
team following a whale sighting. If the information is incomplete,

FIGURE 7 | Example of the maneuvering capability of a large cruise ship
traveling at 10 knots (A) and 19 knots (B) to achieve a Closest Point of
Approach (CPA) of 100 m based on defined environmental conditions and
safe turning constraints and assumptions (maximum rate of turn = 10 degrees
per minute; see text). These scenarios depict situations that, should a mariner
want to achieve a ‘near miss’ of a surfacing humpback whale, the ship would
have to begin its turn at 741 and 1121 m away, owing to the constant time
lags (the same regardless of ship speed) related to the Command process
and maneuvering capability of a large ship. This distance represents a
minimum owing to uncertainty in the location, swim speed, and direction of
travel for a sighted whale.

Recognizing these biases, however, helps identify possible
ways in which the effectiveness of whale avoidance can be
increased. For example, a key finding of our conceptual model is
that processes that occur on the ship’s bridge such as reporting
a whale sighting, assessment of the risk, and compliance to
commands, couple with maneuvering constraints to produce a
variable, yet important time lag between detection and achieving
a new operational state (that reduces collision risk). This

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while transiting, and the hotel load, which is the electrical energy
needed to power the ship’s lights, heating/air conditioning, galley,
etc. Rapid changes in power use can negatively affect emissions,
damage the generators (engines) and, in a worst-case scenario,
cause a ‘blackout’ (total loss of power). To help guard against
these negative outcomes, large cruise ships typically have some
form of power management system, such as a ‘Load Control
Program’ that limits dramatic fluctuations in power use. Given
that propulsion is the primary power requirement, and that
propulsion is a function of the propeller’s rotations per minute
(RPM), as a general rule, when a large cruise ship is in Load
Control the propeller RPMs are generally not reduced by more
than 2–3 RPMs per minute. Consequently, gradual changes in
speed represent best load management practices and the gradual
change may not meet the more immediate change in operational
state necessary for avoiding a whale.
Pre-emptive (planned) reductions in speed are, however,
regularly used by pilots in Alaska as a strike risk reduction
strategy. Pre-emptive speed reductions are those initiated in
anticipation of, rather than in response to, a whale aggregation,
and are utilized in two general scenarios. The first is when
mariners are informed of a whale aggregation recently detected
along the ship’s route and communicated to the ship personnel.
The second general scenario is when the ship is approaching
a narrow navigational area that also historically has supported
whale aggregations. For example, with the cooperation of cruise
ship Masters, pilots regularly slow cruise ships to 14 knots in
Snow Passage, Alaska, because avoidance options are limited
and the area is often characterized by small to large whale
aggregations. Pilots have found that these pre-emptive speed
reductions tend to produce less resistance from other bridge
personnel when (1) they can be accounted for in transit planning
and (2) they do not adversely affect port arrival times.
We thus encourage continued development of software
applications4 , 5 in which mariners participate in a sighting
network that helps inform others vessels that whales have been
detected in their area. The type of information conveyed, its
timeliness, and receiving platform is, however, critical for its
utility. Receiving information via a mobile application (often
with sporadic cell coverage) is a more cumbersome means than,
for example, a ship’s Electronic Chart Display and Information
System (ECDIS) which could overlay historical (e.g., weekly)
and recent (e.g., <2 h) whale sightings to assist with transit
planning. Recently, the programmer for Whale Alert and the
developer for SEAiq coordinated to provide the ability to import
weekly whale sighting information automatically for display on
the electronic chart.
Our results also demonstrate how, in some scenarios, slower
ships may have increased opportunities for whale avoidance
acting through both the Maneuver and Detection processes.
Faster ships, by definition, travel further distances compared to
slower ships during set time periods, such as when whales are
submerged between surfacing events (averaged 20 s in our study),
on deep dives (324 s modeled based on literature), or during

the PDMV may have to wait for another surfacing event before
having information of sufficient quality to be ‘actionable.’ This
may equate to the ship traveling several hundred meters closer
to the whale (based on average submergence data and typical
transit speeds in Alaska) before the PDMV can confirm the
whale’s location and direction of travel. Training bridge personnel
with regards to what information is desirable and protocols
for communicating that information (e.g., ‘whale approximately
2000 m three points to starboard, moving away from the ship’)
can make a significant difference in time available for PDMV
to assess the situation and implement the maneuver without
further increasing the risk of harm to the people, the ship,
or other components of the marine environment. A simple
suggestion of utilizing the same training used for reporting of
a man-overboard to continuously point to the person (whale)
promotes the effectiveness of the PDMV’s detection and decision
process significantly.

Ship Speed
Throughout our effort we consistently contrasted scenarios
involving fast (19 knots) and slow ships (10 knots) to explore
how speed may influence the constituent processes in active
avoidance of a single whale surfacing near the ship. While our
objectives were not to rigorously test the role of ship speed in
these processes, nor were they to identify an optimal speed that
balances whale avoidance vs. transit efficiency (should one exist),
we highlight some insights based on our results that warrant
discussion and further development.
First, when simulations of whale encounters were conducted
in the full-mission ship simulator, pilots never attempted to slow
the ship in response to the sighted whale, instead preferring
slight changes in course. In the de-briefs that followed, pilots
communicated that, while change in speed may influence the
dynamics of a whale – ship encounter, the distance necessary
to slow the ship to speeds necessary for effective avoidance
based on speed change alone (mariner body of knowledge
relative to vessel avoidance actions) tended to exceed the sighted
distance to the whale owing to potential unsafe results of rapid
speed changes. Given the absence of this response, we did
not produce simulations that contrasted the efficacy of slowing
the ship vs. slight course changes, instead reproducing some
recommendations from Nash (2009) simply to provide context
with regards to the magnitude of space/distance needed to slow
(and recognizing that the target speeds listed in Nash were
arbitrary relative to whale avoidance). However we feel a brief
description as to why rapid changes in speed are not regularly
practiced is necessary owing to its prominent relevance in ship
strike dynamics and context for understanding the estimates
in Table 1.
For large cruise ships (and likely other large ships) power
management plays a major role in operational decision-making
(e.g., Ancona et al., 2018), not just in the context of managing
fuel costs and optimal fuel efficiency (and resulting levels of air
pollution; Khan et al., 2012), but also for safety reasons. For large
cruise ships, power needs are met using multiple engines that
are variably configured for two different power loads including
the propulsion load, which is typically about 80% of total load

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and how it may be influenced by environmental conditions
or other factors.
Refining estimates of detection probability, particularly as it
applies to the area with in the Cone of Concern also represents an
important research thread. The instantaneous detection estimates
of the radial ship-to-whale distances we utilized (from Williams
et al., 2016) were derived based on detecting whales across
the 180-degree arc (beam-to-beam) forward of the ship. We
assume that the probability of detection will be much higher at
a given distance, or much father at a given detection probability,
if similar detection functions were derived based on search
effort solely in the Cone of Concern. We acknowledge that
some of the ‘gains’ in detection from focused search in the
Cone would be offset somewhat if mariners tasked with sighting
whales are also tasked with other duties (e.g., monitoring radar
or responding to radio communications). However, updating
estimates of detection probability based on a Lookout’s focused
search within the Cone of Concern would provide more reliable
estimates and produce a more realistic range of feasible options
of avoidance maneuvers.
Another productive avenue of research is a more rigorous
examination of competing risks related to whale avoidance.
During our simulations, once pilots confirmed that a whale
was forward of the ship at some risk of collision, a primary
consideration was how to achieve a new (avoidance) heading
while not increasing other risks, such as collision with
other vessels, reefs, or shoals. For obvious reasons, ship
operators will rarely increase the risk of deleterious impacts to
passengers or damage to the electrical system that accompanies
dramatic and unsafe operations [e.g., a ‘crash stop’ (Wirz,
2012) or rapid turn], unless those maneuvers are offset by
reduction in risk to more consequential events such as a
grounding (for example). The risk of negative impacts from
dramatic changes in course or speed to avoid a whale will
thus always be weighed against the potential benefits of
whale avoidance. In all simulations where a course change
was needed, the pilot evaluated the efficacy of the course
change by considering the needed time to incrementally
‘build up’ to the desired rate-of-turn to minimize impacts to
passengers, the ship, and the environment, thereby avoiding
excess ‘heel.’ Larger heel angles aboard cruise ships increase
the chance that furniture will begin to slide and passengers
will be injured from falls/by falling objects, and swim pools
will spill, etc. As previously discussed, the electrical or
propulsions systems can be negatively impacted in extreme
instances of abrupt speed changes. We note that parameters
identified as “safe” often represent general guidance and can
be modified depending upon the PDMV’s experience and
the situation (e.g., commencing an initial rate-of-turn, within
defined parameters, and then after the ship has stabilized
at that rate-of-turn, incrementally increasing, and stabilizing
at greater rates-of-turn, while maintaining the ship within
safe heel angles).
The development of a whale avoidance module in a fullmission ship simulator can also advance whale avoidance by
training mariners, through repetition and experimentation,
who have less experience with conditions where whale

time lags related to decision-making and communications on
the bridge following detection. For example, if the Command
processes takes the same amount of time on fast and slow ships,
and total time elapsed following detection to the point the ship
begins to change course is approximately 115 s (Figure 7), we
demonstrate that the faster ship achieving a ‘near miss’ of 100 m
from a whale would need to detect the whale over 1100 m
from the Point of Collision as opposed to just over 700 m for
a slow ship, simply because the faster ship moves further over
the same time period given the conservative safe maneuvering
limitations imposed on the initial test scenarios. An alternative
way of interpreting those results is that, had the slow ship and
fast ship begun the Command and Maneuver process at the same
distance from the whale (as opposed to the same time), the slower
ship could have achieved a greater CPA because it would have had
a longer time period to continue its turn.
Ship speed can also influence whale avoidance by influencing
detection probability. To be clear our results do not indicate that
mariners on slower ships are able to detect whales any better
compared to mariners on faster ships – there is no logical reason
why detection probability would differ for a surfacing whale at a
set distance (e.g., 2000 m from the ship) for mariners aboard a fast
or slow moving ship. However, if we held the time to a collision
constant, as in the scenario in Figure 5, then, by definition,
the faster ship will be further from the point of collision than
a slower ship at the same time to collision. Thus, a surfacing
event critical for detection would occur closer to the slower ship
influencing the cumulative probability of detection, providing
more time for a maneuver.

Future Research and Training
The conceptual model of active whale avoidance was derived
primarily from the collective experience of pilots in Southeast
Alaska who have ‘learned by doing,’ which has required
significant time on the water. We thus submit a number
of ideas for priority research and training development to
hasten the adoption, applicability, and effectiveness of active
whale avoidance.
First, ship personnel need sufficient time to make a decision
related to an avoidance maneuver and achieve a new operational
state, assuming one is commanded, that reduces collision risk.
For example, marine pilots in Alaska are often challenged by
predicting where a whale is likely to surface following its dive
because, if they waited for the whale to resurface before initiating
a maneuver, the options for avoidance would be significantly
reduced. During simulation de-briefs pilots communicated that
they will, at times, choose to ‘turn behind’ a whale if they ascertain
it’s swimming direction based on a general rule of thumb that,
informed by years of encounters, humpback whales are more
likely to continue their general direction of travel than they are
to turn 180◦ following a dive. However, pilots are less likely
to enact the same maneuver if humpback whales are foraging
along a tidal rip, which they’ve found tends to produce more
unpredictable movements. Thus, a priority avenue of research
could be to explore the ‘linearity’ of whale movements, loosely
defined as the degree to which whales travel in a straight line
vs. turning (see also Williams et al., 2002; Barendse et al., 2010),

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speeds, are in place. Most importantly, continuing collaboration
between professional mariners, scientists, and natural resource
managers is vital to reaching mutually beneficial reductions
in whale strikes.

avoidance may be effective, avoidance techniques, and
range of maneuvers that may be possible. Training modules
can also lead to improved transit planning by scripting
exercises within a specific operating area where whales are
likely to be encountered while also accounting for local
environmental conditions (e.g., wind, current, sea state),
traffic situations, and other navigation hazards commonly
experienced (e.g., ice).
Finally training can assist in communicating the value of
whale avoidance to other members of the bridge team, such
as the ship captain/mates. Pilots in Southeast Alaska have
found that, upon boarding the ship, communicating with the
bridge team that whales may be encountered, emphasizing the
importance of whale avoidance, and discussion of avoidance
techniques has increased situational awareness of whales
while in transit (similar to communicating local knowledge
of navigational hazards) and, importantly, often reduced
resistance to implementing proactive avoidance maneuvers or
temporary reductions in ship speed. A recent study in the St.
Lawrence Estuary demonstrated the value that marine pilots
can have in implementing strike-risk reduction efforts, in part,
through elevating its importance for the larger bridge team
(Chion et al., 2018).
An important caveat is that the development of training
modules not generate a ‘recipe’ for proper maneuvers. The range
of variation in avoidance maneuvers is large, based on whale swim
speed, direction of travel, ship speed, and operational constraints,
as are the competing risks of an avoidance maneuver. In a whale
avoidance situation, mariners are often faced with making rapid
decisions to prevent making an undesirable situation (e.g., risk
of collision with a whale) become an even more harmful event
(to the whale, the passengers, the ship itself, the environment, or
all four). Marine pilots in Alaska, when asked what they do to
avoid a whale, answer ubiquitously: “it depends.” In “marinerspeak” avoidance actions are based upon all factors appropriate
to the prevailing circumstances and conditions, and with due
regard for good seamanship. And good seamanship is a direct
function of good training. To that end, we follow the reasoning
of De Terssac (1992), as cited in Chauvin et al. (2009) who
stated that, to achieve an overarching objective (which in this
case is a reduction in collision risk) the best approach is to
define “. . .a space of operation within which formal rules no
longer specify the solution to be implemented, but list a range
of permissible solutions among which the operator will have to
choose the one that seems most relevant in the context.” Within
that range of potential solutions may be a decision to maintain
course or speed either because the value of the information
available is insufficient or the risk of a worse outcome exceeds
the risk of the ship strike (e.g., the altered course resulting in
coming too close to shore, increasing the risk of grounding and
catastrophic oil spill).
Based on our findings and observations, we conclude that
active whale avoidance is feasible and, in most cases, can be
practiced without creating an increase in competing risks. What’s
more the practice can complement existing efforts that increase
situational awareness of whales (e.g., Whale Alert) even in areas
where other risk-reduction measures, such as operating at slower

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DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The datasets generated for this study are available on request to
the corresponding author.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
SG and LV conceived the idea and initiated the collaborative
efforts between the Southeast Alaska Pilots’ Association and the
National Park Service. SG led the writing of the manuscript
and construction of the figures including the data used
for detection and availability. SG, LV, CG, RP, and AH
participated in the simulator activities at AVTEC. JB and LV
collaborated on generating maneuvering graphics. SG, LV, CG,
and JB contributed to the writing of the manuscript and
idea development.

FUNDING
This effort represents an inter-institutional collaboration
between the U.S. National Park Service and the
Southeast Marine Pilots’ Association. Support from both
institutions has taken the form of in-kind support for
meetings, time, and travel. Both institutions jointly shared
expenses for rental of full mission bridge simulator
at AVTEC.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Foremost, we wish to acknowledge the input and participation
in simulator efforts from Barry Olver. We also wish to thank
Kirby Day of the Holland America Group, for his organizational
efforts of the Southeast Alaska Marine Safety Task Force where
some of these ideas were initially discussed. Glacier Bay National
Park and the Southeast Alaska Pilots’ Association provided
support and funding for simulator efforts and the formation
of these ideas. We also thank the efforts of Mike Angove,
programmer at AVTEC, for his help and expertise in running
successful simulations.

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online
at:
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2019.
00592/full#supplementary-material

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The remaining authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of
any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2019 Gende, Vose, Baken, Gabriele, Preston and Hendrix. This is an
open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the
original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic
practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply
with these terms.

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September 2019 | Volume 6 | Article 592

NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-NE-247

North Atlantic Right Whales- Evaluating
Their Recovery Challenges in 2018

US DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
National Marine Fisheries Service
Northeast Fisheries Science Center
Woods Hole, Massachusetts
September 2018

NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-NE-247
This series represents a secondary level of scientific publishing. All issues employ thorough internal
scientific review; some issues employ external scientific review. Reviews are transparent collegial
reviews, not anonymous peer reviews. All issues may be cited in formal scientific communications.

North Atlantic Right Whales - Evaluating
Their Recovery Challenges in 2018

Sean A. Hayes1, Susan Gardner1, Lance Garrison2,
Allison Henry1, Luis Leandro1
1

NOAA Fisheries, Northeast Fisheries Science Center, 166 Water Street, Woods Hole, MA 02543
NOAA Fisheries, Southeast Fisheries Science Center 75 Virginia Beach Drive Miami, Fl 33149

2

US DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
National Marine Fisheries Service
Northeast Fisheries Science Center
Woods Hole, Massachusetts
September 2018

Table of Contents
ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................................... 1
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
Signs of Trouble .......................................................................................................................... 1
Demographic Effects .................................................................................................................. 2
Distribution Change .................................................................................................................... 3
Increased Mortality ..................................................................................................................... 3
POTENTIAL CAUSES OF THE DECLINE ................................................................................. 4
Ecosystem Dynamics .................................................................................................................. 4
Whales and Fisheries Are On the Move ................................................................................. 4
Prey Availability Drives Reproductive Success ..................................................................... 4
Right Whales Follow Prey in a Changing Ocean ................................................................... 6
Reproduction Requires Robust Females ................................................................................. 6
Anthropogenic Stressors ............................................................................................................. 7
Ship Strikes ............................................................................................................................. 7
Entanglement .......................................................................................................................... 8
Increase in Entanglement Risk................................................................................................ 8
Sublethal Challenges- Skinny Whales and Few Calves ........................................................... 11
Biological Cost of Stressors .................................................................................................. 11
Biological Demands of Right Whale Pregnancy .................................................................. 12
HOW LONG DO NORTH ATLANTIC RIGHT WHALES HAVE?.......................................... 13
A Long-Lived Animal............................................................................................................... 13
An Illustration of Potential Decline, 2017-2067 ....................................................................... 14

iii

A Matrix Model .................................................................................................................... 14
Results ................................................................................................................................... 14
INDICATORS OF SUCCESSFUL MANAGEMENT MEASURES .......................................... 16
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................ 17
REFERENCES CITED ................................................................................................................. 17
APPENDIX 1 Data Sources for Figure 4 ..................................................................................... 22
APPENDIX 2 Model Inputs and Methods used for Population Projection .................................. 22

Figures and Tables
Figure 1

North Atlantic right whale serious injury/mortality rates 2000-2017 .......................... 2

Figure 2

American lobster landings in Maine ............................................................................ 5

Figure 3

Timeline of significant management actions focused on reducing fishing
entanglement ................................................................................................................ 9

Figure 4

Index of fishing effort, US and Canada ..................................................................... 10

Figure 5

Right whale entanglements from 1997 through 2017 with set location .................... 11

Figure 6

Cumulative annual probability of no entanglement ................................................... 13

Figure 7

Matrix population projection model output of North Atlantic right whale
female population trend under current population conditions ................................... 15

Table

Matrix projection model output of female North Atlantic population trends
for 5-year intervals, 2017-2067.................................................................................. 15

iv

ABSTRACT
The North Atlantic right whale (Eubalaena glacialis) population has been in decline for 8 years
due to increased mortality and sublethal effects from multiple factors. Together these have
contributed to a decrease in calving. Shifting ecosystem conditions have also changed North
Atlantic right whale behavior and fishing patterns. For example:
•
•
•
•

North Atlantic right whales have expanded their distribution farther into northern waters,
and are visiting different foraging areas.
Calanoid copepod distributions appear to be in a similar state of change and this may be
affecting available forage for North Atlantic right whales
The whales’ range expansion has exposed them to vessel traffic and fisheries in Canadian
waters, which did not have protections for right whales in place until late last summer
(2017).
American lobster (Homarus americanus) populations are also changing distribution,
moving north and into deeper, cooler waters of the Gulf of Maine. The US fisheries are
moving farther offshore to capitalize on this, increasing the overlap between their fishing
activity and North Atlantic right whale foraging areas and migration corridors.

The net result of these events is that severe entanglements have increased among North Atlantic
right whales. Animals are in poor body condition likely from a combination of repeated
entanglement stress, potentially limited forage and increased migratory costs- all contributing to
a decrease in female calving rate. Ship strikes are still a real threat to the population. At the
current rate of decline, all recovery achieved in the population over the past three decades will be
lost by 2029.

INTRODUCTION
Signs of Trouble
After several decades of recovery and years of collaboration among stakeholders, the North
Atlantic right whale (Eubalaena glacialis), hereafter referred to as the right whale, began to
decline (Pace et al. 2017). This trend was subtle at first, initially signaled by fewer sightings in
traditional survey areas, but other warning signs began to emerge (Kraus et al. 2016). The
number of documented mortalities increased markedly in 2016 and 2017 (Hayes et al. 2018;
Hayes et al. 2017) and an improved way of modeling the population’s numbers (Pace et al. 2017)
revealed a clearer picture of the population size and decline in numbers. Concern further
escalated throughout 2017 and 2018 when only 5 calves were born and there were 19 confirmed
mortalities through August.
Taken together these signs meant that risks posed to right whales and associated management
measures needed to be revisited for multiple US fisheries on the Atlantic coast. This occurs
through the biological opinion process under the federal Endangered Species Act, which was
reinitiated in October 2017, and through the take reduction team process under the federal
Marine Mammal Protection Act.
1

Demographic Effects
Increased mortality rates and decreased calving have moved the population into a decline that
has continued for at least the last 8 years. At present, right whale deaths attributable to human
activity are mostly caused by ship strikes and entanglement in pot/trap and anchored gillnet
fishing gear. An encounter with fishing gear is the most frequent cause of documented right
whale serious injuries and deaths in recent years. The odds of an entanglement event are now
increasing by 6.3% per year, while ship strikes events remain flat (Fig. 1). At the current rate of
decline, the population will have returned to its 1990 numbers, likely with comparatively
reduced genetic diversity, and could decline past a point of no return in just a few decades.

Fig. 1 North Atlantic right whale serious injury/mortality rates from known sources 2000-2017
(Henry et al 2017; 2016 & 2017 values preliminary). Models are simple logistic regressions
fit using maximum likelihood-based estimation procedures available in R. The right whale
population trend is overlaid and referenced to right y-axis (Hayes et al, 2018).

2

Distribution Change
Historically, right whales have returned to habitats in specific geographic locations annually,
ensuring that a large portion of the population could be seen in each year. Therefore annual
population estimates were conducted by simply sighting and counting as many animals as
possible each year. Resulting estimates also assumed that an animal had died if it were not seen
for 6 consecutive years.
Changes in this distribution pattern began around 2010 when the population peaked at 481
individuals. The whales were no longer using some of their established habitat areas in as great a
number, and not staying within them for as long. This meant a new method was needed to
account for animals, even those not sighted in a year. Once developed, this more advanced
assessment tool, based upon mark recapture methods, enabled rapid assessment of the population
with increased precision within one calendar year, much faster than the five or so years required
to get good confidence on an annual estimate using the previous method. It also provided
precise population estimates with greater resolution on the number of whales that likely died in
any given year. Estimates made using the new method confirmed that in recent years, many
deaths (around 10 to 20/yr) were going undetected annually and that by the end of 2016, the right
whale population had declined to 451 individuals. A revised population estimate accounting for
the many deaths and few births of 2017 is being developed and will be available later this year.

Increased Mortality
The large number of observed right whale mortalities in 2017 triggered an unusual mortality
event (UME) to investigate the causes. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) is
authorized to declare UMEs under the federal Marine Mammal Protection Act when an
unanticipated significant die-off occurs in a marine mammal population, requiring an immediate
response. Two other UMEs were declared that year due to 80 humpback whale and 40 minke
whale deaths. Ongoing investigations for these two species have preliminarily identified causes
of death that include entanglements, ship strikes, and disease.
In contrast to other large whale species, the problems of right whales are often more apparent
because they are monitored more intensely and their coastal distribution means more
opportunity for overlap with human activities, leading to it being nicknamed ‘the Urban Whale’
(Kraus et al. 2007).
While perhaps more attention is paid to the right whale given their more dire population status, it
can be an indicator of more chronic problems that need addressing, not just for the sake of right
whales but also for other populations of large whales. By example, although Gulf of Maine
humpback whale status has improved, entanglement mortalities still remain high for this stock
(Hayes et al. 2018).
There is considerable urgency to address the issues of mortalities that stem from human
activities. Large whales, including right whales, are long-lived and can breed multiple times
during their lives. This means these species can be resilient and able to recover after periods of
3

poor reproduction. However, recovery for any species cannot take place if the number of deaths
is more than the number of births in the population.

POTENTIAL CAUSES OF THE DECLINE
Ecosystem Dynamics
One of the constant challenges of resource management is that things change. While it is much
easier to make management decisions if conditions are static, ecosystems are inherently dynamic
and will change over time in response to a variety of influences. This is the case for the
emerging story for right whales.
Sometime around 2010, ecosystem shifts occurred within their habitat that changed right whale
movements and fishing practices in a way that has increased interaction between whales and
fishing gear, and that potentially presents other environmental challenges.
Currently the Gulf of Maine is warming faster than 99.9% of all other ocean regions on the
planet (Pershing et al. 2015). This is having dramatic impacts across the food web, from the
middle and upper trophic level organisms such as American lobster (Homarus americanus),
Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) and right whales (Greene 2016); to the zooplankton at the base of
the food web such as calanoid copepods (Grieve et al. 2017; NEFSC 2018).

Whales and Fisheries Are On the Move
American lobster are experiencing strong population fluxes and redistributions with temperature
warming. The southern New England lobster fishery has been severely limited by epizootic shell
disease, which lobsters become susceptible to at warmer temperatures. In the Gulf of Maine,
coastal waters remain cool enough and offshore, deeper waters have warmed enough for lobsters,
and lobster fishing, to expand farther offshore. As a result, Maine lobster landings have
increased steadily for the past 30 years, with an increasing portion of this caught 3 or more miles
offshore over the past 10 years (Fig. 2). Note that Maine lobster landings did downturn sharply
in 2017, and future trends are uncertain.

Prey Availability Drives Reproductive Success
It is essential to also recognize that environmental factors and lower trophic level dynamics also
contribute to right whale birth and mortality rates. Changes in prey availability influence right
whale health and reproduction. In particular, abundance of the copepod Calanus finmarchicus in
the Gulf of Maine is a strong predictor of right whale reproductive success (Greene and Pershing
2004; Meyer-Gutbrod and Greene 2014; Meyer-Gutbrod et al. 2015).

4

Fig 2. American lobster landings in Maine: a) total annual landings b) relative proportion of
landing by distance from shore c) increase in landings from 3-12 and >12 miles
offshore from Maine’s 10% harvester reporting, no VTR data included.
https://www.maine.gov/dmr/commercial-fishing/landings/

Meyer-Gutbrod and Greene (2018) followed individual whales over the past three decades to
evaluate the relationship of calving and mortality rates to prey availability. They found that prey
availability is a driver of decadal differences in the right whale population’s recovery. Periods of
5

low prey availability coincided with reduced birth rates (Meyer‐Gutbrod and Greene 2018) and
the interval between births has been observed to lengthen during periods when prey availability
is low (Meyer-Gutbrod et al. 2015).
Similarly, years with few births contribute to years of decline or stagnation in population growth,
indicating the pronounced effect of reproductive variability on species viability (Pace et al.
2017). That said, Meyer-Gutbrod and Greene (2018) modeled population growth rates under
scenarios of high and low prey availability and found that the population should continue to
grow even with poor prey availability and only fails to do so when whale mortalities reach 8 to
10 per year. It is worth noting natural mortality seems to be very rare in adult right whales: there
has been no confirmed case of natural mortality in adult right whales in the past several decades
(Corkeron et al. Accepted with revision; Henry et al. 2017; van der Hoop et al. 2013).

Right Whales Follow Prey in a Changing Ocean
The copepod C. finmarchicus has shifted in distribution and abundance in recent years due to
unprecedented warming in the Gulf of Maine, and this is likely to impact the right whale
population (Greene 2016; Mills et al. 2013; Reygondeau and Beaugrand 2011). It appears that in
the last decade (~2005-2015), that there has been a general decline in C. finmarchicus in the Gulf
of Maine (2009-2014, but 2015 was average abundance) and on Georges Bank (below average
abundance since 2008) (NEFSC 2018) as well as the Scotian Shelf (Johnson et al. 2017).
Changes in plankton forage species abundance likely played a role in the changing movement
patterns of right whales that began sometime in the past 10 years. There have been decreases in
both acoustic detections and physical observations of right whales in the northern Gulf of Maine
and the Bay of Fundy, and a concurrent increase in sightings of many of the same animals in the
Canadian Gulf of St. Lawrence (Daoust et al. 2018; Davis et al. 2017; Meyer-Gutbrod et al.
2018; Meyer‐Gutbrod and Greene 2018).
During winter, whales are spending more time offshore in the mid-Atlantic, and less time on the
coastal calving grounds just off the southeastern U.S., where in 2017 and 2018 calving has been
quite poor.

Reproduction Requires Robust Females
Reproduction depends on adequate adult female health and body condition. Reproductive
females are particularly vulnerable to prey reductions because pregnancy and lactation increases
caloric demand and they have less access to prey during migration to calving grounds (Fortune et
al. 2013; Miller et al. 2012; Rolland et al. 2016).
Several of the ecosystem shifts mentioned earlier are likely to have negative consequences for
reproduction in right whales. First, a reduction in prey will have energetics costs for females.
Northward shifts in the right whales’ feeding grounds, as a result of changes in prey availability,
will increase energetic cost of the calving migrations from the southern calving grounds off the
coast of Florida and Georgia, particularly if animals do not adapt to also calve farther north.

6

The cost of entanglement has also been shown to have direct and indirect consequences for right
whales (van der Hoop et al. 2017b; van der Hoop et al. 2017c). This will be detailed next, but in
the Gulf of Maine where ecosystem shifts are occurring more trap fishing is also occurring
offshore, increasing the overlap with right whale foraging areas.
Whales have also expanded their range, foraging into the Gulf of St. Lawrence. This increased
the whales’ exposure to risk from fixed gear fisheries. Some of this risk has reduced by strong
protections put in place by the Canadian government during the spring of 2018 (DFO/TC Canada
2018; DFO Canada 2018).

Anthropogenic Stressors
In a review of mortality sources for all large whales, entanglement in fishing gear was the
number one cause, followed by natural causes and then vessel strikes. An exception to this is
the right whale for which there is very little evidence of natural mortality in adult whales, likely
due to shortened life spans associated with anthropogenic causes (Corkeron et al. Accepted with
revision), as all confirmed causes of adult mortality and serious injury since 1970 have been due
to fishing gear and vessel strike (Henry et al. 2017; van der Hoop et al. 2013).
The relative contribution from these two causes was approximately equal through the year 2000
(van der Hoop et al. 2013), but entanglement events resulting in death or serious injury have
increased steadily since then, while ship strike frequency has remained lower with no specific
trend (Fig. 1). For the recent 19 known right whale mortalities (17 in 2017 and 2 to date in
2018), the cause of death could be determined for 10. Ship strikes are implicated in five blunt
force trauma cases and entanglement in the remaining five. In 2017, seven other entangled
whales were observed: three were disentangled, three shed the gear, and one was not seen again.

Ship Strikes
Reducing Risk
Ship strikes are currently the second most frequently documented cause of mortality in right
whales. The per capita mortality frequency has not varied much, hovering around 0.34% deaths
or serious injury events per year (Fig. 1). Several management actions were implemented in U.S.
and Canadian waters beginning in 2008 to reduce the risk of collisions between right whales and
large vessels. Major actions include:
● Voluntary two-way routes for commercial vessels off the Southeast U.S. and in Cape
Cod Bay
● Modification of the Boston, Massachusetts Traffic Separation Scheme
● Canada and the International Maritime Organization established the voluntary Area To
Be Avoided concept in the Roseway Basin
● Seasonal Management Areas in habitats off of Massachusetts, ports along the MidAtlantic coast, and the southeastern U.S. where vessels are required to slow to speeds less
than 10 knots during transits for vessels 65 ft in length or longer

7

● Intermittent implementation of voluntary speed restrictions in Dynamic Management
Areas within which right whale aggregations are observed outside the boundaries of the
Seasonal Management Areas
Several analyses have been conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of these management efforts
(Conn and Silber 2013; Lagueux et al. 2011; Silber et al. 2014; van der Hoop et al. 2012). In
general, while these analyses were based on a short time-series of available data, collectively
they suggest that after ship-strike rules put in place, a reduction in right whale mortality from
ship strikes followed, and in general were at the lowest on record per capita from 2010 through
2016.
Responding to Changing Risk
In 2017, right whale deaths by ship strike increased when 5 ship-strike mortalities were
confirmed, 1 in U.S. and 4 in Canadian waters (Fig. 1), likely caused in part when right whales
began to spend more time in new areas with high vessel traffic and no speed restrictions.
Increased survey effort in these areas also made it more likely that these events would be
observed and reported.

Entanglement
Reducing Risk
Management efforts to reduce entanglement risks in U.S. waters have focused on gear
technology to make entanglements less likely to harm or kill whales, restricting where and when
gear that poses a threat can be used when whales are likely to be present, and reducing the
amount of gear in the water column (Fig 3). Measures are recommended through a take reduction
team, as mandated under the federal Marine Mammal Protection Act. Each team comprises a
variety of experts and stakeholders, who assist NOAA Fisheries in developing a take reduction
plan when necessary.
Since 1997, a series of rules have been implemented based on the take reduction plan (Fig. 3).
These include the sinking groundline (2009) and vertical line (2015) rules. While there appears
to have been a subsequent reduction in entanglements caused by groundline (Morin et al. 2018),
which moved 27,000 miles of line from the water column to the bottom (NMFS, 2014), absolute
entanglement rates appear to be on the rise (Fig 1).

Increase in Entanglement Risk
Fewer but Stronger Lines in US Waters
There may also have been unintended consequences of the 2015 vertical line rule. The rule
required ‘trawling up’ (using more traps per trawl) in some regions. While this reduced the
number of lines, it also meant that lines had to be stronger to accommodate the increased load of
multiple traps. This natural adaptation, and the fact that stronger rope was available, contributed
to an increase in the severity of entanglements as found by Knowlton et al. (2016), who observed
very little evidence of entanglement with ropes weaker than 7.56 kN (1700 lbsf).
8

Fig 3. Timeline of significant management actions focused on reducing fishing entanglement

Entanglement Trends Upward
Knowlton et al.(2012) showed that nearly 85% of right whales have been entangled in fishing
gear at least once, 59% at least twice, and 26% of the regularly seen animals are entangled
annually. These findings represent a continued increase in the percentage of whales encountering
and entangling in gear, which grew from to 61.5% in 1995 (Hamilton et al. 1998), to 75.6% in
2002 (Knowlton et al. 2005), confirming further the growing severity of the problem.
More Vertical Line in Right Whale Habitat
Rough estimates are that approximately 622,000 vertical lines are deployed from fishing gear in
U.S. waters from Georgia to the Gulf of Maine. Notably until spring of 2018, very few
protections for right whales were in place in Canadian waters. In comparison to recent decades,
more right whales now spend significantly more time in more northern waters and swim through
extensive pot fishery zones around Nova Scotia and into the Canadian Gulf of St. Lawrence
(Daoust et al. 2018).
Taken together, these fisheries exceed an estimated 1 million vertical lines (100,000 km)
deployed throughout right whale migratory routes, calving, and foraging areas. Figure 4
illustrates the scale of the challenge by providing fishery statistics for the various regions (data
sources provided in Appendix 1).

9

Fig 4. Index of fishing effort. a) The change in number of vertical lines in US waters from 2011 to
2016, b.) The approximate number of traps in USA Northeastern states and Canadian
provinces. Data sources in Appendix 1.

Closures Are Effective, But May Not be Enough
A great deal of effort has been put into identifying entanglement ‘hot-spots’: relatively small
areas where focused management measures can have minimal impact to fishing while providing
great benefit to whales. Clear examples of this approach include the seasonal closure of Cape
Cod Bay, and now the static closure within the Area 12 fishing zone of the Canadian Gulf of St.
Lawrence. Both are relatively small areas where a significant portion (30 to 50+ %) of the right
whale population has reliably occurred for several weeks to months over the past few years.
Management actions have a population level benefit with impacts restricted to very local
portions of fisheries. While still difficult choices, this has been the preferred management
approach.
However, these closures, while likely very effective regionally, may not be enough. Each vertical
line out there has some potential to cause an entanglement. With a 26% annual entanglement rate
in a population of just over 400 animals, this translates to about 100 entanglements per year,
which is significant for such a small population. But from the perspective of an individual fixed
gear fisherman, they may never encounter a right whale. With more than 1 million lines out
there, any single line has perhaps a 1 in 10,000 chance of entangling a whale in any one-year
period. This can vary somewhat from regions with high to low densities of lines and/or whales.
However, in general, this means a fisherman and his or her descendants could go several
generations without ever entangling of a right whale. Given this, it’s easy to believe that ‘all
these entanglements are happening somewhere else’ regardless of where one fishes. Being able
to directly link an entanglement with specific gear deployed at a specific place in time is rare, but
by mapping known locations of gear that led to the entanglement of a right whale, one can see
that there is no place within the fished area along the East Coast of North America for which
entanglement risk is zero (Fig 5).
10

Fig 5. Right whale entanglements from 1997 through 2017 for which the set location and type of
gear are known, and gear was recovered from a whale.

Sublethal Challenges- Skinny Whales and Few Calves
Fundamentally, a population increases when there are more births than deaths. Much attention
has been paid to direct mortality caused by ship strikes and entanglement, but less focus has been
put on the secondary effects of these and other variables where animals survive but fail to thrive
because of the harm done. This is particularly evident in calving among mature females.

Biological Cost of Stressors
The abundance of photographs of known individual right whales taken over several decades have
been used to develop health indicators associated with natural and human-caused stressors
(Schick et al. 2013). This has been refined into a quantitative health score, including a predictive
threshold below which females seem incapable of having a calf (Miller et al. 2012; Rolland et al.
2016).

11

We understand that right whales are exposed to numerous sublethal stressors, including
fluctuating food resources (Meyer-Gutbrod and Greene 2014) and even underwater noise
(Rolland et al. 2012). Several recent studies have also focused on sublethal effects of
entanglement, the first of which includes increased swimming energy costs from dragging gear
(van der Hoop et al. 2016). Even if disentangled, there are several injuries that can have costs
lasting long after disentanglement. These include trauma wounds from rope cuts that may or
may not eventually heal, and damage to baleen plates that can prevent efficient filter feeding for
many years since these plates grow slowly.
Recent studies have also shown that even without accounting for injury, the drag from carrying
rope and other gear for long periods of time can be energetically more expensive for a female
than the migratory and developmental costs of a pregnancy (van der Hoop et al. 2017a; van der
Hoop et al. 2017b; van der Hoop et al. 2017c).

Biological Demands of Right Whale Pregnancy
While serious injuries represent 1.2% of all entanglements, there are often sublethal costs to less
severe entanglements. Should an entanglement occur but the female somehow disentangles and
recovers, it still has the potential to reset the clock for this “capital” breeder. She now has to
spend several years acquiring sufficient resources to get pregnant and carry a calf to term, the
probability of a subsequent entanglement is fairly high, and this will create a negative feedback
loop over time, where the interval between calving becomes longer. This is certainly a
contributing factor in the longer calving interval for females, which has now grown from 4 to 10
years (Pettis et al. 2017).
Figure 6 demonstrates a simple model for estimating the probability that an animal will NOT
become entangled over time. Similar to asking what are the odds of NOT getting ‘heads’ in 10
coin tosses, this model simply asks what are the odds of not getting entangled over time if there
is a 74% chance of not getting entangled each year (Knowlton et al. 2012). Historically the
median calving interval of a female right whale is 3 to 4 years (Pettis et al. 2017). The model
estimates that animals have a about a 30 to 40% chance of not getting entangled during that
period, or, conversely, a 60 to 70% chance of getting entangled.
With the calving interval now nearly twice as long as in the past, half as many calves are being
born. So while entanglements often do not kill an animal, they may have a large impact by
reducing or preventing births in the population. There is an additional variable, stress, which is
much harder to quantify but known to have costs in mammals that are foraging in an
environment with some mortality threat (Hernández and Laundré 2005).
It is difficult to tease out the relative effects of poor foraging conditions and the energetic costs
of entanglement on the increased frequency of thin whales and the subsequent decrease in
calving. Both are likely having some influence. While there are dozens of documented cases of

12

ship strikes and entanglement linked to right whale mortality, to date there is no confirmed
observation of a right whale starving to death from poor forage.

Fig 6. Cumulative annual probability of no entanglement (annual rate = 74%)

HOW LONG DO NORTH ATLANTIC RIGHT WHALES HAVE?
A Long-Lived Animal
Right whales have the potential to be a very long-lived species. In the southern hemisphere
where shipping and fishing pressures are much lower, there is little evidence of human activities
causing right whale mortality. There is also little evidence of natural mortality in adult animals
(Corkeron et al. Accepted with revision). Since the ban on commercial whaling of Southern right
whales in 1935 (Gambell 1993) these animals have not yet lived long enough to die of natural
causes.
Meyer-Gutbrod and Greene (2018) demonstrated that even under poor foraging conditions, right
whales should be able to recover if annual human-caused mortality is kept somewhere below 810 deaths per year. This means that in the absence of human-caused mortalities, right whales
could potentially endure several decades under poor foraging conditions and still recover once
environmental conditions improve. However, in the current situation in the northern hemisphere,
13

where animals are living much shorter lives, there is great cause for concern that the risk of
extinction is much higher than in the southern hemisphere, where animals are not regularly
subject to human caused mortality.

An Illustration of Potential Decline, 2017-2067
A Matrix Model
In order to measure current population trends, we used a three-stage (calf, juvenile, adult) matrix
population projection model (Caswell 2006) for female right whales, derived from Corkeron et
al. (Accepted with revision), to project the future abundance of right whales. Survival values used
for input into the population projection model were calculated using a Cormack-Jolly-Seber
(Pace et al. 2017) variant of a mark-resight model (see Appendix 2 for details) and determined
the population is declining at 2.33% per year.
We started the model estimating an abundance of 160 females alive at the end of 2017. With
approximately 1.5 males per female (Pace et al. 2017), 160 females would result in an overall
species abundance of about 400. It is possible that this abundance estimate may be marginally
low, but since the model overestimates calving success, we assumed that these biases should
cancel each other out.
Using the stage derived from the matrix model, we assumed that the 2017 starting population of
160 females was composed of 10 calves, 60 juveniles, and 90 adults. We ran 1000 stochastic
projections forward 50 years (Fig. 7).We then extracted median and 95% quantile estimates of
projected abundance from those projections, and estimates of the number of adult females
remaining, for 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 and 50 years. Results are shown in the Table.

Results
The model projects that in 2067, 50 years from 2017, there would be 49 female North Atlantic
right whales remaining, of which only 32 would be adults. In 20 to 25 years (2037-2042) there
would be fewer than 50 adult females. In the near term, at the current rate of decline, all recovery
in the population over the past 3 decades will be lost by 2029, with the population returning to
the 1990 estimate of 123 females.
Notably, the model does not adjust for varying environmental conditions, which are known to
fluctuate on a decadal time scale for North Atlantic Ecosystems (Nye et al. 2014) and are
presently unfavorable. This approach may overestimate the rate of population decline but not the
overall trajectory.

14

Fig. 7 Matrix population projection model output of North Atlantic right whale female population
trend under current population conditions.

Table of matrix projection model output of female North Atlantic population trends for 5-year
intervals, 2017-2067
Years from 2017

Number of females

Cis

Number of adult females

5

144

126 to 161

75

10

129

107 to 150

67

15

114

91 to 141

59

20

102

77 to 130

53

25

90

66 to 119

47

50

49

27 to 76

32

15

The threshold for functional extinction is very hard to define and likely varies by species. If the
population declines to the 1990 level, there is a new threat: a repeated genetic bottleneck.
Genetic bottlenecks happen when a population is so small that the genetic make-up of remaining
group is not the same as that of the initial population. The effect of repeated bottlenecks is likely
to mean that if the population returned to the 1990 level, that group would have less genetic
diversity than the group that existed in1990. This can lead to reduced resilience and contribute to
increased risk of extinction (Amos and Harwood 1998; Melbourne and Hastings 2008).

INDICATORS OF SUCCESSFUL MANAGEMENT MEASURES
Determining the management actions necessary to reverse the current population trend is beyond
the scope of this document. However, the scale of the actions will need to be quite significant to
be successful. Entanglement has increased dramatically and ship strikes continue to occur.
The population decline began in 2010 (Fig. 1), when entanglement was occurring at a rate of
26% among sited animals per year (Knowlton et al. 2012). Since then, the right whale range
expansion has put them in the path of more shipping and more fishing gear – encountering
almost twice the amount of gear owing to expansion of more fishing farther offshore in US
waters and northward into Canadian waters (Fig. 4).
It is logical to conclude that to reverse the right whale decline, it may be necessary to reduce the
impacts of entanglements and other harmful human interactions with right whales across their
expanded range to pre-2010 levels. For recovery it may be necessary to go further, considering
more modifications to fishing and shipping practices to compensate for potentially reduced
forage opportunity and increased migratory costs.
Several biological indicators can be recommended for monitoring the short- and long-term
effectiveness of any management actions that might be put in place to reduce the rate of both
ship strikes and fishing gear entanglement.
Short-term indicators include fewer observed numbers of ship strikes and entanglements. These
could be noticeable within 6 months to 1 year, but there is considerable variation around
detectability of these events and the results will initially have a great deal of uncertainty. It takes
approximately 1 year to conduct a population assessment and determine any changes in
abundance. The assessment will alleviate some the uncertainty in detecting mortality risks that
that might be mitigated by management actions. It should be noted that number of mortalities is
the bluntest indicator of management success.
However, teasing the relative effects of management actions and natural variability on
population size and condition will take several years of data and analysis. Metrics such as the
frequency of scarring, improvements in body condition, and overall health scores could be
detectable under stable environmental conditions in 2 to 3 years. Similarly, if environmental
conditions are adequate for females to accumulate enough resources to calve, it will likely take at
least 2 to 4 years to separate the impact of management action that reduced the frequency of, say,
costly entanglements from the impact of natural variability. Ultimately, confidence in any
estimate of population trajectory will emerge over 5 to 10 years.

16

In an ideal situation, evidence of human-caused injuries and mortality decreases, body condition
improves, and the birth rate exceeds the death rate, resulting in more North Atlantic right whales.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors want to thank Peter Corkeron and Richard Pace for multiple contributions made in
the form of contributed analysis, repeated discussions, figures, and critiques of the document.
We would also like to thank National Marine Fisheries Service colleagues at the Greater Atlantic
Regional Fisheries Office, the Northeast Fisheries Science Center, and the Office of Protected
Resources for constructive feedback that improved the content, with special thanks to Teri Frady.
Finally, little of the content is new here. Rather, we have pieced together a larger picture from
existing work and many informed discussions with stakeholders from all sides of this issue over
the past several years- thank you for the opportunity to have those discussions.

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21

APPENDIX 1 Data Sources for Figure 4
Several data sources were used to construct Fig 4. All vertical line estimates in 4A were provided
by Industrial Economics. Trap counts provided in 4B were acquired from a variety of sources.
Raw trap counts were provided for Maine and Massachusetts. Trap counts for New Hampshire
and all Canadian provinces were generated by multiplying license counts by trap limits. These
were quite variable across regions, in which case the multiplier used is reported in the Table in
the report.

APPENDIX 2 Model Inputs and Methods used for Population
Projection
In order to determine current rate of population decline we used a simple, three-stage matrix
population projection model (Caswell 2006) for female right whales, derived from Corkeron et
22

al. (Accepted with revision), to project the future abundance of North Atlantic right whales. The
model’s three stages are: calf, juvenile and adult. Survival values used for input into the
population projection model are derived from survival estimates calculated using a CormackJolly-Seber (as opposed to the published Jolly-Seber, Pace et al 2017) variant of a mark-resight
model (see Appendix 1 for details). We used the lower 95% credibility intervals of the median
estimates of survival for 2011-2015 from the model. These were: calves: 0.86137, juveniles:
0.92684, and adult females: 0.92684. The matrix projections also assume: a calving interval of
4.75 years (the mean of median inter-calf intervals for calving females 2011-2017, from the 2017
North Atlantic Right Whale Report Card (Pettis et al. 2017), ; females maturing at 11; and a
current maximum longevity of 50. With no calves born this year, this calving estimate is
arguably optimistic, but the inter-calf interval estimate for 2018 would be undefined, and so is
unusable. Survival and transition probabilities for stages were calculated as described in
Corkeron et al. (Accepted with revision).The model was run in R 3.4.3 (R_Core_Team 2017),
using the libraries diagram (Soetaert 2017), popbio (Stubben and Milligan 2007) and popdemo
(Stott et al. 2016).
The matrix used for analyses is:
calf immat adlt
calf 0.00000 0.00000 0.10526
immat 0.86137 0.86254 0.00000
adlt 0.00000 0.06430 0.92443

This gives an intrinsic rate of increase of 0.9767, or a decline of 2.33% per year.
To develop a stochastic projection from this model, we took a starting abundance estimate of 160
females alive at the end of 2017, as the unusually high observed mortality of right whales that
year (Meyer‐Gutbrod and Greene 2018) meant that starting earlier would not capture one
important recent anthropogenic impact on this species. With approximately 1.5 males per female
North Atlantic right whale now (Pace et al. 2017), 160 females would give an overall species
abundance of ~400. It is possible that this abundance estimate may prove to be marginally low,
but as the model overestimates calving success, we assume that these biases should cancel each
other out. When an abundance estimate for 2017 is available (by October-November 2018) the
model can be revised.

APPENDICES REFERENCES CITED
Corkeron P, Hamilton P, Bannister J, Best P, Charlton C, Groch KR, Findlay K, Rowntree V,
Vermeulen E, III, Pace RM. In review. The recovery of North Atlantic right whales, Eubalaena
glacialis, has been constrained by human-caused mortality.
Pace RM, Corkeron PJ, Kraus SD. 2017. State–space mark–recapture estimates reveal a recent
decline in abundance of North Atlantic right whales. Ecol Evol 7(21):8730-8741.
Pettis HM, Pace RM, Schick RS, Hamilton PK. 2017. North Atlantic Right Whale Consortium
2017 annual report card. Boston MA: North Atlantic Right Whale Consortium. [accessed 8-26-

23

2018] Report to the North Atlantic Right Whale Consortium, October 2017, amended 8-18-2018.
https://www.narwc.org/report-cards.html.
R_Core_Team. 2017. R: A language and environment for statistical computing. Vienna, Austria:
R Foundation for Statistical Computing. https://www.gbif.org/tool/81287/r-a-language-andenvironment-for-statistical-computing.
Soetaert K. 2017. diagram: Functions for Visualizing Simple Graphs (Networks), Plotting Flow
Diagrams. R package version 1.6.4. https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=diagram.
Stott I, Hodgson D, Townley T. 2016. popdemo: Demographic Modelling Using Projection
Matrices. R package version 0.2-3. https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=popdemo.
Stubben C, Milligan B. 2007. Estimating and Analyzing Demographic Models Using the popbio
Package in R. J Stat Soft 22(11).

24

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Assessing a Long-Standing Conservation Program:
Mariner’s Perspectives on the North Atlantic Right Whale,
Eubalaena glacialis, Mandatory Ship Reporting System
GREGORY K. SILBER and KRISTY WALLMO

doi: dx.doi.org/10.7755/MFR.78.3–4.3

rine Fisheries Service (NMFS), the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS),
and, less frequently, the U.S. Coast
Guard (USCG), are charged with developing and implementing strategies
and actions aimed at recovering these
species, most often through reduction
of ongoing anthropogenic threats.
Establishing conservation actions
may result in unintended economic or
operational impacts, but subsequent
assessments to determine whether they
are meeting expected conservation objectives are few (Halpern, 2003; Selig
and Bruno, 2010). Refining these actions through assessment and monitoring has the potential to improve both
their conservation value and their costeffectiveness (Bruner et al., 2004; Miteva et al., 2012).
In this paper we report findings
from an online survey of the maritime
industry designed to evaluate a Mandatory Ship Reporting (MSR) system—a long-standing program to raise
awareness about and to reduce ship

collisions with North Atlantic right
whales, Eubalaena glacialis. Since
1999, provisions of the MSR have required ships weighing 300 gross tons
(gt) or greater to report their location,
speed, and destination to a shore-based
station when entering key right whale
nursery and feeding areas off the U.S.
east coast.
In return, reporting ships receive a
message, automatically generated, delivered directly to the ship’s bridge,
providing information about the risk
of vessel collisions with right whales
and actions mariners can take to avoid
collisions (Silber et al., 2015). The
MSR system is distinct from and predates other regulations in place to reduce ship collisions with right whales,
such as ship speed reductions.
Our survey examined three aspects
of the MSR system: 1) the degree to
which mariners comply with the reporting requirements of the system, 2)
the operational burden of compliance
to captains and crew, and 3) their opin-

ABSTRACT—Measures established to
protect living marine resources, including
those for endangered marine species, are
only infrequently evaluated. In this paper we
report findings of an online survey designed
to solicit the views of maritime industries
about a long-standing endangered large
whale conservation program: the Mandatory Ship Reporting (MSR) system. The MSR
was established in 1999 to aid in reducing
the threat of vessel collisions with the highly
depleted North Atlantic right whale, Eubalaena glacialis. Under MSR provisions, vessels >300 gross tons are required to report
their location, speed, and destination when
entering two key right whale aggregation
areas. In return, reporting ships are sent an
automated message about right whale vulnerability to ship collisions. The survey was
intended to obtain views about the extent to
which vessel operations were interrupted by

the reporting requirement; how mariners
utilize, if at all, information provided in the
return message; whether vessel operations
were modified in response to guidance provided; and the overall importance and effectiveness of the reporting systems in helping
ships avoid right whale interactions.
A total of 119 mariners with broad representation of vessel types and decades of
experience at sea took part in the survey;
56 of these indicated they had entered one
of the MSR areas at least once. Most (ca.
70%) indicated that they comply with the
reporting requirement, distribute information on right whales and ship strikes to
crew members, that they were more alert
about avoiding/watching for right whales,
and that the ships operation may change to
avoid an interaction. Of the survey-takers
who had entered the system, about half indicated the MSR system is useful for educat-

ing captains and crew about right whales
and important for right whale conservation,
but only about a quarter indicated that it is
useful in helping ships avoid right whales.
About 40% said it is an unnecessary requirement for ships. We conclude that as an
outreach tool and a means to provide information directly to domestic and international mariners entering right whale habitat
for over 15 years (thus, tens of thousands
of ships entering these waters have received
the message), the MSR almost certainly
has been beneficial in educating mariners
about the issue of ship strike and in providing guidance on avoiding ship strikes. Views
reflected in the survey suggest that, at least
from the mariners’ perspective, the MSR
program has provided positive conservation value; however, not all mariners took
specific strike avoidance action after having
received the message.

Introduction
Policies and regulations established
to protect the marine environment include measures to reduce perturbations
of entire ecosystems (coral reefs: Bellwood et al., 2004), safeguard key habitats on large scales (Marine Protected
Areas: Hoyt, 2011, IUCN-WCPA,
2008), and conserve marine species
whose population sizes have declined
to unsustainable levels (threatened or
endangered species: NOAA, 2015).
In the United States, the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) provides legal protection for threatened and endangered
marine (and terrestrial) species, while
agencies including the National MaGregory K. Silber is with the Office of Protected
Resources, National Marine Fisheries Service,
NOAA, 1315 East West Highway, Silver Spring,
MD 20910. Kristy Wallmo is with the Office of
Science and Technology, National Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA, 1315 East West Highway,
Silver Spring, MD 20910.

22

Marine Fisheries Review

ions about the utility of the system for
reducing collisions and raising awareness about right whale conservation.
Though several studies have focused
on maritime industry compliance with
large whale conservation regulations
such as ship speed reduction in seasonally and dynamically managed areas
(Lagueux et al., 2011; Asaro, 2012;
Silber et al., 2014), few have examined the effectiveness of these regulations in reducing ship-whale collisions
(Silber and Betteridge, 2012; Laist et
al., 2014; van der Hoop et al., 2014).
Further, none of these studies utilized
data or observations from mariners
themselves.
To date, only Reimer et al. (2016)
have collected data directly from mariners in a survey about receptivity to
real-time conservation technology.
That study found that most mariners
surveyed would be interested in receiving information on endangered whales
and whale alerts via ships Navigational Telex (NAVTEX) and Automatic
Identification Systems (AIS), and that
most believed that receiving this information would not be disruptive to their
operations (Reimer et al., 2016).
To our knowledge no study has examined mariners’ perceptions of existing whale conservation measures and
their utility in reducing the likelihood
of ship-whale collisions. Our study
directly addresses this gap regarding
one such conservation measure by
directly canvassing mariner viewpoints
on use and compliance with reporting
into the MSR, its overall conservation
value, and impact on ship operations.
Our findings add to the limited literature on the burden and overall utility
of actions aimed at conserving large
whales.
Survey results suggest the conservation value of the MSR program is
likely positive because mariners indicated it raised awareness about the
whale-strike issue. However, because
the intent of the program is to provide
information only, and not all mariners
altered operations after receiving guidance in the return message, the overall
biological impact of program may be
somewhat limited.

78(3–4)

Background of Ship-Whale
Collisions and the MSR System
Most large whale species were the
focus of intensive commercial hunting
and were severely depleted globally.
Although a number of these populations began to rebound not long after
an international moratorium on commercial whaling in 1985–19861, unintended ship-whale collisions and other
threats to population recovery remain.
In the case of the North Atlantic right
whale, population growth has been
slow and deaths caused by violent
strikes from large ships and fatal entanglement in commercial fishing gear
are among the main impediments to
recovery of this species (Clapham et
al., 1999; Kraus et al., 2005; NMFS2).
North Atlantic right whales occur
near and migrate along the eastern
seaboard of Canada and the United
States, where large human population
centers and co-occuring water-borne
commerce, commercial fishing, and
other activities are also concentrated.
Right whale feeding/socializing aggregation areas occur in waters off New
England and eastern Canada and in
nursery areas off the South Carolina
to Florida coasts. The right whale is
vulnerable to collisions with vessels
throughout its range, but the threat
may be particularly high in these aggregation areas where substantial vessel traffic also occurs (NMFS2).
Recognizing the influence of human activities on the recovery of right
whales, the international community
began taking steps to reduce the impact of these threats in the 1990’s.
Not all ship operators, and maritime
commerce industries as a whole, were
familiar with the risk that vessels underway posed to right whales and
other large whale species. Thus, the
conservation community began addressing this concern by focusing pri-

marily on raising mariner awareness
about the issue.
Among these actions was the creation of two Mandatory Ship Reporting systems (MSR) as a means to
reduce the occurrence of “ship strikes”
with right whales (Silber et al., 2015;
USG3). A proposal initiated by the
United States, backed by other nations and publicly endorsed by President William J. Clinton in April 1998
(Clinton, 1998), to establish the MSR
was submitted to the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) in June
1998. It was approved by the IMO in
December 1998. This was the first formal IMO action to reduce the threat
of ship collisions with whales (Luster,
1999), and its first formal action on
behalf of any endangered marine species (Johnson, 2004).
Operation of the MSR
The goal of the MSR is to provide
timely information about ship-whale
collisions directly to individual vessels
as they enter key right whale feeding
and nursery habitats. Under the system, ships are required to report their
location and time of entry into the
system; in return, each reporting ship
receives an automated message providing information on ways to reduce
the chances of a striking a whale.
Under the rule, self-propelled commercial ships >300 gt are required to
report to shore-based stations when
they enter either of two regions off
the eastern U.S. coast where and when
right whales are known to occur: one
off the state of Massachusetts operates
year-round; the other, off the states
of Georgia and Florida, is operational annually from 15 Nov. through 15
Apr. (Silber et al., 2012a) (hereafter,
referred to as WHALESNORTH and
WHALESSOUTH, respectively) (Fig.
1).
Incoming messages are sent primarily via satellite and include ship

1International

Whaling Commission. Catch limits and catches taken (https://iwc.int/catches).
2
NMFS. 2005. Recovery plan for the North Atlantic Right Whale (Eubalaena glacialis). U.S.
Dep. Commer., NOAA, Natl. Mar. Fish. Serv.,
Off. Protect. Resourc., (http://www.nmfs.noaa.
gov/pr/pdfs/recovery/whale_right).

3U.S.

Government. 1998. Ship reporting systems
for the eastern coast of the United States. Proposal submitted to the IMO’s Sub-Committee
on Safety of Navigation. Online at http://www.
nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/shipstrike/imo_proposal.
pdf.

23

name, course, speed, and destination
among other things. Only reporting is
required; no other changes to vessel
operations are required. An automatically-generated message is returned
to the reporting vessel that includes
information on locations of recentlysighted right whales; procedural guidance to help prevent vessel-whale
collisions; and information regarding
protecting right whales from vessel
strike (Fig. 2). Only vessels entering
the prescribed areas are required to
send a report, therefore only these
vessels receive the automatic return
message.
Following IMO endorsement, the
USCG issued a Final Rule in the U.S.
Federal Register (USCG, 2001) that
codified the systems by amending the
U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (33
CFR 169). The National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
then added the MSR areas to relevant
nautical charts and incorporated the
new requirements into various navigational aids such as the U.S. Coast Pilot
and elsewhere.4
The two MSR systems became effective on 1 July 1999 and have been
in operation continuously since that
time. From July 1999 to present, operation and administration of this
program have been jointly run by the
USCG and NOAA’s NMFS. All shipto-shore and shore-to-ship communication costs are borne by these two
agencies (including a government contract to the communications provider).
Reporting data from these systems
have been useful in characterizing vessel operations within the areas (WardGeiger et al., 2005), particularly as it
relates to the recovery of right whales.
Among other things, incoming MSR
reports provided information on U.S.
east coast port arrivals and vessel operations which helped form the basis
for subsequent ship strike-reduction
measures.

4

See, for example USCG, Local Notice to Mariners. Coastal Waters from Eastport, Maine to
Shrewsbury, New Jersey. Special Notices, No.
27/99. Online at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/
pdfs/shipstrike/uscg_lnm0799.pdf.

24

Figure 1.—Mandatory Ship Reporting System Area Boundaries. Also shown are vessel speed
restriction seasonal management area boundaries (NOAA, 2008).

Marine Fisheries Review

Figure 2.— USCG Mandatory Ship Reporting System WHALESNORTH automated return message.

A recent 15-plus-year retrospective
analysis of incoming reports (Silber
et al., 2015) determined that hundreds
of individual ships made over 45,000
reports into the system between July
1999 and December 2013. While generally regarded as a successful and valued outreach tool, the current study is
the first attempt to gauge the attitudes
and perceptions of mariners regarding conservation benefits as well as
the potential impacts to reporting
vessels, and to evaluate the ongoing
utility and relative value of this longstanding program.
Materials and Methods
An online survey was developed by
NMFS economists and biologists during June–August 2014 to collect data
on mariner awareness, attitudes, and
use of the MSR system. Because the
sampling strategy was opportunistic
with an unknown universe, an important consideration in the survey design
was to minimize the overall survey
length and develop clear and concise

78(3–4)

questions. To help ensure that these
considerations were met and that the
overall survey was easy to comprehend, a draft instrument was tested
in a focus group on 17 Sept. 2014
in Baltimore, Md., at the Maritime
Institute of Technology and Graduate Studies/Pacific Maritime Institute
(MITAGS-PMI).
Focus group participants were recruited from a pool of mariners who
were attending a course at MITAGSPMI and agreed to participate in a
voluntary discussion about the MSR
system and the survey. Based on feedback from the focus group, a final
survey instrument was developed that
contained eight questions and an opportunity to provide open-ended comments at the end of the survey.
The survey (Appendix I), which
was implemented online in early June
2015, was programmed by a private
consulting firm, ECS Federal5, and
5Mention

of trade names or commercial firms
does not imply endorsement by the National
Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA.

hosted on a domain purchased specifically for the survey implementation.
The target survey population was ship
owners, operators, or captains who had
entered either WHALESNORTH or
WHALESSOUTH one or more times.
During an average year, several
thousand separate trips are made into
both areas (Silber et al., 2015) (some
ships and masters may enter multiple
times per year). The information needed to directly contact individual ship
captains, owners, and/or crews to conduct a survey is not available, making
a sampling frame infeasible to develop. For this reason, an opportunistic or
convenience sample was necessary.
We acknowledge that this type of
sampling has a number of limitations,
including the inability to a) examine
response bias, b) compute statistical errors, and c) make inferences to
a larger population. However in our
case, due to the lack of individual
contact information, an opportunistic
sample involving broad outreach to the
generalized community was the only

25

viable approach for contacting vessel operators. Ferber (1977) noted that
while opportunistic samples are less
desirable than samples derived from a
systematic approach, they have utility
for exploratory purposes or to obtain
different views on the dimensions of
an issue or problem.
To implement the survey, federal
and private entities who engage in activities or communicate regularly with
maritime entities were asked to distribute information about the survey
(Appendix II). Announcements of the
availability of the survey were also
sent via association and government
email distribution lists shortly after the
survey opened.
The announcements of the survey
provided potential respondents with
a brief description of the survey, why
their participation was important, and
a link to the online survey. Two additional announcements about the survey
were distributed in August and September 2015.
Respondents who chose to participate in the survey were asked eight
questions. The first set of questions
asked about familiarity with the MSR
system and their ship transits through
the MSR areas. The second set of questions asked about compliance with,
burden of, and conservation potential of the MSR system. The remaining questions asked for the number of
years in the industry and type of ship
the respondent currently worked on
(container ship, passenger vessel, etc.).
The survey remained open through 10
Jan. 2016, at which time the URL for
the survey was deactivated. The analysis included simple frequency counts
of responses to each question.
Results
Respondent Characteristics
A total of 119 mariners took part in
the survey. Of this number 85 respondents said they were aware of the MSR
system (34 people who accessed
the survey but entered no response
whatsoever or indicated they had no
experience or were not familiar with
the MSR, were excluded from the
analysis) and 56 indicated they had

26

entered one of the MSR areas at least
once.
Due to the publicity of the MSR and
its support from the IMO, it is possible that mariners who have never entered one of the MSR areas were still
familiar with the system and the reporting requirements, and therefore we
considered a total of 85 survey-takers
eligible to answer a subset of the survey questions. Questions that required
direct experience and use of the MSR
were only shown to respondents who
stated they had entered an MSR area
at least once.
Among the 85 respondents who
were aware of the MSR, representation of vessel types was broad, and
included container ships, tankers,
cargo or bulk carriers, RO-RO’s (i.e.,
car and vehicle carriers), cruise ships,
passenger vessels (i.e. ferries, whale
watching vessels), research ships, and
pleasure craft. According to Rodrigue
et al. (2017) the global maritime industry has about 100,000 vessels
(>100 t) consisting of passenger, bulk
carrier, general cargo, and roll-on/rolloff vessels; about 69% of shipping
ton-miles is accounted for by bulk carriers. Our sample consists of captains
and crew from all four types of vessels, and about 53% of respondents
cited they worked on bulk carriers.
The years of service in the maritime
industry ranged from 2 to 48 years,
with 23% working less than 20 years
and 77% working more than 20 years.
The average number of years respondents have worked in the maritime industry was 26, with an average of 11
years as a crew member and 11 years
as a captain.
Of the 56 respondents indicating
they had entered one of the MSR areas at least once, about 44% said they
entered one of the areas regularly.
The number of times respondents said
they entered one of the areas during
a year ranged from 1 to 100, with a
mean of 27.8. About 35% (n=20) indicated they enter WHALESNORTH
most frequently, 29% (n=16) entered
the WHALESSOUTH most often, and
35% (n=20) indicated they enter both
areas about the same amount.

As noted, our data is based on an
opportunistic sample of ship captains
and crew. While the vessel types in our
data are representative of the types of
vessels in the maritime industry as described by Rodrigue et al. (2017), we
cannot determine whether respondent’s
opinions and attitudes toward the MSR
system are representative of those of
the larger industry, and specifically
those ships that transit the MSR areas.
Compliance with
the MSR System
Most respondents comply with the
reporting requirement of the MSR
system. About 75% of respondents
(n=42) stated that they send the required report always or most of the
time; and slightly less than a fourth of
them (24%) said they rarely or never
send the report. About 82% (n=46) of
respondents stated that they receive a
return message about right whales after sending in their ships’ report, while
the remainder (n=10) indicated they
did not receive a return message via
the system.
Survey-takers were asked about
their level of agreement with four
statements related to the transmittal
of required ship information when entering an MSR area: 1) it is relatively
easy to send in the required report, 2) I
generally follow the report format exactly as specified in the instructions, 3)
I send in the report as soon as possible, and 4) sending in the required report takes time away from other duties
I have on the ship. Of those responding to this portion of the survey, half
(n=20) indicated it was easy to send
in the report, with over 70% stating
that they followed the required format
and they sent in the report as soon as
possible after entering the area. About
half said that sending in the report
takes time away from other duties on
the ship (Fig. 3).
Attitudes Toward
the MSR System
Following these statements respondents were asked about their level of
agreement with four statements related
to the automated right whale conser-

Marine Fisheries Review

tion; others said it had little utility in
reducing strikes of whales. A few of
those providing comments reiterated
that reporting into the systems was
not a significant or time-consuming
task, some suggested using alternative
vessel tracking systems in lieu of the
MSR. Apparently, a number of respondents believed the survey to include
discussion of vessel speed restrictions
in addition to the MSR, while others
took the opportunity to comment on
right whale vulnerability (or their lack
of vulnerability) to ship collisions, the
utility of right whale protective measures generally, or to offer suggestions
on ways to diminish the impact of
right whale conservation on maritime
industries.
Discussion

Figure 3.—Attitudes toward Mandatory Ship Reporting system ship requirements.

vation information they receive after
reporting into the system: 1) I generally don’t have time to read the entire message, 2) I am more alert about
avoiding or watching for right whales,
3) I find the information to be useful
for the captain and crew, and 4) some
aspect of the ship’s operation may
change (e.g., speed, post extra lookouts) to avoid an interaction. Among
those responding to all the questions
in this section of the survey (n=25),
60% don’t read the entire message, but
over half said they are more alert about
avoiding/watching for right whales
and may change the ships operation
to avoid an interaction. Nearly 80% of
respondents stated they distributed the
information in the message to captains
and/or crew (Fig. 4).
All respondents who stated that they
were aware of the system (n=85), even
if they had not entered an MSR area,
were asked about their level of agree-

78(3–4)

ment with four statements concerning
general perception of the MSR system: 1) the MSR system is important
for right whale conservation, 2) is an
unnecessary requirement for ships, 3)
has been useful in helping ships avoid
right whale interactions, and 4) is a
useful system for educating captains
and crews about right whales. Of those
responding to this set of questions
(n=64), over half (n=34) indicated the
MSR system is useful for educating
captains and crew about right whales
and important for right whale conservation, only about a quarter said it is
useful for helping ships avoid right
whale interactions, and about 40%
said it is an unnecessary requirement
for ships (Fig. 5).
In regard to the written comments
portion of the survey, several respondents provided additional views about
the importance of the MSR in the context of endangered whale conserva-

The invitation to participate in the
survey was distributed on a broad
scale, and we believe that hundreds
of mariners were at least aware of the
survey. However, the exact number of
individuals who received notification
of the survey remains unknown; therefore, a response rate is also not known.
We expected the number of respondents to be a small fraction of the total
number reached for several reasons.
First, previous studies (Ranmuthugala et al., 2008) have shown that opportunistic sampling generates relatively
low responses relative to the number
of individuals targeted through broadly
cast notification efforts, and there was
likely considerable overlap in the entities described in Appendix II.
Second, not all mariners are familiar with the MSR program, because
a) it applies only to ships sailing in
waters along parts of the U.S. eastern
seaboard; b) of these, not all ships enter certain U.S. east coast ports (e.g.,
Boston, Mass., Jacksonville, Fla.)
where MSR areas are situated; and c)
not all ships meet the 300 gt threshold
for reporting. And, finally, there is little reason to expect ship captains sailing under a non-U.S. flag to complete
a voluntary survey focused on a U.S.
policy implemented by U.S. Federal
agencies.
The nature of an opportunistic sam-

27

Figure 4.—Attitudes toward Mandatory Ship Reporting system automated return message
containing right whale information.

ple implies that the findings are not
generalizable to a larger population
nor can the extent of response bias
be formally identified (Pruchno et al.,
2008). Previous studies comparing opportunistic samples to random samples
are rare (Pruchno et al., 2008). Two
studies that have compared variables
of interest between these two sampling
approaches suggest that sample means
on variables of interest were significantly different between opportunistic
and random samples (Pruchno et al.,
2008; Ranmuthugala et al., 2008); thus
we suggest that the results best represent only those individuals in our survey sample population.
Comments provided via the survey
were varied: some indicated an awareness regarding the vulnerability of
right and other whales to ship strikes,
the severity of the problem, and the
need to reduce this threat; others indicated that reporting, and other mea28

sures, were not needed. However, we
note that responses about the efficacy
of the MSR may have come from mariners who had not actually entered the
systems.
A number of respondents confused
the MSR with a more recent action
to reduce ship collisions with right
whales: seasonal vessel speed restrictions (NOAA, 2008). This is consistent
with findings regarding the number
of reports made incorrectly outside
the boundaries of the MSR systems;
namely, reporting into MSR systems
was common along vessel-speed restriction seasonal management area
boundaries which are unrelated to the
MSR (Silber et al., 2015).
Speed restrictions likely have greater economic and operational impact to
commercial maritime industries—as
well as having a more quantitative,
documented influence on reducing
vessel strikes of right whales (Conn

and Silber, 2013; Laist et al., 2014;
van der Hoop et al., 2014; Martin et
al., 2016)—than does the MSR because the latter involves reporting
only. Therefore, some mariners may
have used the survey as an opportunity
to express their views about the speed
restrictions.
Our results are mixed on the ease of
use of the MSR system by mariners.
Of respondents with direct experience
with the system, about 70% followed
the reporting requirements and sent the
report as soon as possible after entering an MSR area, and only 15% indicated the reporting requirements were
difficult to follow. However, about half
of respondents felt that sending the
report took time away from other duties and nearly 60% said that they did
not have time to read the entire return
message. In addition, about 40% of all
respondents felt the MSR system is an
unnecessary requirement for ships.
As a conservation measure, our results suggest that the most important
function of the MSR is one of education and raising awareness, as most
respondents with direct experience
with the program indicated that information in the return message was distributed to their crews and that crew
members were generally more aware
of right whales after receiving the information. Further, about half of all
respondents (including those without
direct MSR experience) stated the system was good for whale conservation
and considered the system a good way
to raise awareness about ship-whale
collisions.
Being a metric difficult or impossible to reasonably quantify, mariners,
of course, cannot know the overall
impact of the MSR in reducing collisions with whales. However, the goal
was to attempt to ascertain whether
mariners disregarded the incoming
message, for example, or whether
their possible actions in response
to some aspect of the message may
have lowered the possibility of striking a whale.
Respondents were roughly equally
divided in their views on whether
the system was useful in avoiding

Marine Fisheries Review

whales. Thus, there is little doubt that
the MSR has served to raise mariner
awareness about the depleted status
of right whales and the species’ vulnerability to ship collisions because
hundreds of ships have made tens of
thousands of reports to (and received
return messages from) the MSR in
the period since its implementation
(Silber et al., 2015).
Inasmuch as return messages arrive in the bridge of reporting vessels
as they enter right whale habitat, this
feature alone has served as a frequent
reminder to those operating ships in
U.S. waters about an important conservation matter—and in this regard the
outgoing message has been a flexible
informational tool for alerting mariners about additional large whale
conservation measures as they have
been developed.
More broadly, an important aspect of the MSR, a feature with international implications, is that its
establishment, as one of the first formal measures to address the threat of
ship-whale collisions (Johnson, 2004),
helped facilitate the development of
additional whale conservation measures. For example, since the implementation of the MSR, the United
States and several other nations have
established related IMO-adopted routing measures in their waters (Silber et
al., 2012a).
In addition, outgoing MSR messages have been adapted to provide alerts
about other threat-reduction measures
(e.g., dynamically implemented and
seasonal vessel speed restrictions) and
have been used to provide written information on right whale sightings.
However, in regard to information dissemination, broad-based distribution
programs have also been developed
by a number of entities. For example,
a number of ports and government
agencies now rely on a number of
systems (e.g., the frequently updated
USCG Broadcast Notice to Mariners)
to transmit information to ships, including information about right whale
sightings.
The International Whaling Commission provides brochures for mariners

78(3–4)

Figure 5.—General attitudes toward the Mandatory Ship Reporting system.

regarding large whale ship strikes6;
numerous non-governmental organizations maintain web sites and actively
distribute information on this matter;
and NMFS has developed and routinely provides interactive CD’s, laminated cards, and booklets7 regarding the
threat of ship strikes of right whales.
Most of this material, however, is
“passive” and has neither the immediacy of notifying ships directly through
the MSR nor provides near real-time
information about sighted whales.
And, while various outlets provide
near real-time whale sighting information through interagency cooperative
efforts (NOAA, 2006), it is not clear
if, and to what extent, mariners consult
and use this information.

6Whales:

collisions prevents damage to ships,
and injuries to passengers, crew and whales.
(https://iwc.int/index.php?cID=3199&cType=
document).
7
Interactive items online at www.greateratlantic.
fisheries.noaa.gov/protected/shipstrike/training/
index.html.

Our results from respondents with
direct experience with the MSR indicate that the system may have some
utility for directly reducing the number of whale-ship collisions, as over
half stated that they are more alert after receiving the incoming MSR message and about half said some aspect
of the ships operation may change as
a result of the message. About 35% of
all respondents stated that the MSR
is useful for helping ships avoid right
whale interactions. Nonetheless, information on the number of known right
whale deaths from ship collisions is
noted below and in van der Hoop et
al. (2014), and no discernable differences are apparent in fatal strike rates
in the time after sighting information
was routinely provided beginning in
the mid-1990’s via aircraft survey programs and through the MSR beginning
in 1999. Therefore, the extent to which
whale sighting information provided via the MSR, or any other means,
plays a role in reducing the number of
ship struck whales is not clear.

29

One of the stated secondary purposes of the MSR was to enable the
gathering of data to facilitate a better understanding of vessel operations
in right whale habitat as a means to
further develop conservation measures (Merrick and Cole, 2007; Silber et al., 2012a). When the MSR was
established, routinely collected and
archived information on vessel operations on this scale did not exist.
However, since inception of the
MSR, advancing technologies are used
to monitor vessel activities. In regard
to monitoring U.S. port entries, systems to track vessel operations and
emerging reporting requirements are
far more comprehensive and precise
than self-reporting under MSR protocols. Among the most important of
these is the advent and use of GPSlinked VHF radio signal and satellitetransmitted Automatic Identification
Systems (AIS) which are required on
most ships and broadcast signals that
provide detailed information on ship
location, speed, and routes (Vanderlaan and Taggart, 2009; Reimer et al.,
2016; Robards et al., 2016). In addition, a number of U.S. ports have
Vessel Tracking Systems to aid in navigation, and some fishing vessels are
required to carry Vessel Monitoring
Systems.
Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, all vessels have been required to provide 96-h notice prior to
calling on a U.S. port. Some of these
technologies, AIS in particular, have
been used to assess changes in ship
operations in response to the implementation of various whale protection
measures, including routing scheme
changes (Vanderlaan and Tagart, 2009;
Lagueux et al., 2011), vessel speed restrictions (Lagueux et al., 2011; Wiley
et al., 2011; Silber et al., 2014), and
dynamically managed areas (Silber et
al., 2012b). Development and use of
these technologies and communication
systems have rendered the MSR a less
than optimal means to gather and relay information to and from ships and
have therefore largely supplemented
the tracking of ship operations functions of the MSR.

30

From 1999 (when the MSR was established) to June 2016, 11 confirmed
right whale deaths resulted from collisions with ships (Laist et al., 2014;
Henry8), an average of 0.7 per year.
This rate of known deaths attributed to
ship strikes is roughly comparable to
the 10 years prior to implementation
of the MSR (1990–99; 0.6 per year);
but the average decreased to 0.3 fatal strikes per year in the years 2007
through 2015 (Laist et al., 2014; Henry et al.5).
A number of factors could be involved in affecting these rates. We
contend that variables such as whale
distribution and shifts in distribution,
particularly relative to large-scale shipping lanes, and overall shipping traffic
volume, play roles in the occurrence
and frequency of whale strikes. In the
last decade, for example, the number of large vessel trips into U.S. east
coast ports has fluctuated in response
to shifting economic climates and increasing ship size and cargo capacities
(the latter being a feature that reduces the number of trips overall) (DOT,
2013; MARAD, 2013; Silber et al.,
2015).
In the context of these pervasive circumstances influencing the economics
of transporting goods on worldwide
scales, education and outreach efforts,
while still important, may have little
overall effect on rates of fatal ship
strikes. Regardless, while the rather
crude metric of annual deaths lacks
sufficient resolution to fully evaluate the effects of the MSR, we note
only that there were no immediate
or overt changes in right whale ship
strike-related death rates at the onset
or in the time the MSR was in place.
Protection of living marine resources can be challenging in light of
resource utilization by multiple industrial or commercial users. Conservation measures are generally established
8Henry, A.

G., T. V. N. Cole, L. Hall, W. Ledwell,
D. Morin, and A. Reid. 2014. Mortality determinations for baleen whale stocks along the Gulf
of Mexico, United States east coast, and Atlantic
Canadian provinces, 2008–12. U.S. Dep. Commer., Northeast Fish. Sci. Cent., Ref. Doc. 14-10,
17 p. (https://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/nefsc/publica
tions/crd/crd1410).

by incorporating the best available science and with maximum (practical)
protections in mind. But such programs are not always evaluated (Clark
et al., 2002; Ferraro and Pattanayak,
2006) or assessed to identify ways to
optimize use of limited resources (Kapos et al., 2008) or fully utilize the
provisions of available statutes.
The U.S. Government has faithfully
operated the MSR for years and there
is little doubt the program has conservation benefits by raising awareness
of the maritime industry. Further, the
MSR is one element in a suite of ship
strike reduction measures that include
IMO-adopted Areas To Be Avoided
(Vanderlaan and Taggart, 2009), modifications of shipping routes (USCG,
2007), and voluntary and mandatory vessel speed restrictions (NOAA,
2008). However, our survey results
suggest that, at least from the perspective of mariners who completed our
survey, benefits of the MSR in reducing the likelihood of ships colliding
with right whales are divided, but had
a role in promoting education and outreach opportunities.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful for the multi-year
collaboration with the USCG in designing and operating the MSR. The
USCG’s involvement has been invaluable. For the last several years,
NOAA’s Atlantic Oceanographic and
Atmospheric Laboratory has managed the operation of the MSR’s shipto-shore communication system. For
their assistance in distributing notifications of the survey, we are grateful to Jerome Hyman of the National
Geospatial Agency, Kathy Metcalf of
the Chamber of Shipping of America,
Bryan Wood-Thomas of the World
Shipping Council, Patrick Keown and
Rachel Medley of NOAA’s National
Ocean Service, James McLaughlin
and Peter Kelliher of NOAA’s Southeast Regional Office and Greater
Atlantic Fisheries Regional Office,
respectively, Michael Carter of the
Maritime Administration, Jodie Knox
of the U.S. Coast Guard, and Paula
Rychtar editor of the Mariner’s Weath-

Marine Fisheries Review

er Log. The paper was improved by review and comment by Courtney Smith
and three anonymous reviewers.
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31

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32

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Appendix 1.—Mandatory Ship Reporting systems survey instrument.

78(3–4)

33

34

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78(3–4)

35

Appendix 2.—Communications channels used to notify users of an online survey of Mandatory Ship Reporting systems.

Federal Agencies
NOAA’s Ocean Service. Regional
Navigation Managers work directly
with pilots, mariners, port authorities,
and recreational boaters to help identify and address marine transportation system navigational safety issues.
Based on our request, U.S. east coast
navigation managers used their regular
public and industry meetings, port facility functions, and other conduits to
notify mariners about the survey.
National Geospatial Agency (NGA).
The NGA’s Notice To Mariners (msi.
nga.mil/NGAPortal/MSI.portal?_
nfpb=true&_st=&_pageLabel=msi_
portal_page_61,) is the principal publication for ships engaged in international voyages. Designed to ensure
the safety of life at sea, this publication provides marine safety information and corrections to navigational
aids for all U.S. Government navigation charts and publications derived
from a variety of sources, both foreign
and domestic. A special notice about
the survey was posted in the NGA’s
Hydrogram and Marine Information sections of the weekly notice on
10 June 2015 (msi.nga.mil/MSISiteContent/StaticFiles/NAV_PUBS/
UNTM/201525/Marine_Info.pdf) and
again on 3 September 2015.
Maritime Administration (MARAD).
The Department of Transportation’s
MARAD is charged with ensuring that
the nation maintains adequate shipbuilding and repair services, efficient
ports, and reserve shipping capacity
for use in time of national emergency
(www.marad.dot.gov/). It promotes
maintenance of a well-balanced U.S.
merchant fleet for transport of waterborne commerce, and it is capable of
service as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war. MARAD promoted
the MSR survey with an announcement via its distributions list, contain-

36

ing perhaps several thousand active
mariners. Announcement by email distribution sent on 27 July 2015.
NOAA, NMFS, Northeast Regional
Office. Participating members of maritime contact distribution lists were
encouraged via email to take the survey by shipping industry liaisons from
both NOAA’s NMFS Southeast and
Northeast Regional Offices on 7 July
2015. The survey was also discussed
by liaisons at numerous industry
meetings.
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). The USCG’s outreach program posted a blog
about the survey on 6 November 2015.
On average, the blog receives approximately 40,000 unique (each coming
from a different IP address) views per
month.
Industry Associations
World Shipping Council (WSC).
With 26 companies, which utilize hundreds of ships and employ hundreds of
vessel operators, the WSC represents
over 90% of global liner vessel capacity and transport cabilities. At our request, the WSC sent notifications to all
of its member companies on two occasions (28 July and 30 August 2015).
Chamber of Shipping of America
(CSA). The CSA represents 35 U.S.based companies that own, operate, or
have commercial interest in oceangoing tankers, containers, and dry bulk
vessels engaged in domestic and international trades. These entities employ hundreds of vessel operators.
The CSA sent notifications about the
survey to each of its member companies on two occasions (15 July and 8
August 2015). The CSA also asked a
number of other industry associations
to notify their members; these included InterTanko, American Waterways
Operators (AWO), Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA), International Chamber of Shipping (ICS),

and Baltic and International Maritime
Council (BIMCO).
Just for information: InterTanko
has 204 members and 236 companies
whose combined fleet comprises some
3,077 tankers; AWO is the national
trade association for the U.S. tugboat,
towboat, and barge industry; CLIA is
the world’s largest cruise industry trade
association; ICS membership represents national shipowners’ associations
in Asia, Europe, and the Americas
whose member shipping companies
operate over 80% of the world’s merchant tonnage; BIMCO is the largest
of the international shipping associations representing shipowners and its
membership controls around 65 percent of the world’s tonnage.
Passenger Vessel Association. The
PVA represents companies who are
owners, operators, and leasers of shipboard operations of passenger vessels
on the waterways of the United States
and Canada including car and passenger ferries, tour and excursion vessels,
charter boats, eco-tour boats, and day
sailing vessels. These vessels move
over 200 million passengers each year.
The PVA sent notification of the MSR
survey to all its members on 5 August
2015.
Maritime Periodicals
Mariner’s Weather Log. A publication of the National Weather Service
(NWS), this journal (http://www.vos.
noaa.gov/mwl.shtml) allows the NWS
to maintain contact and communicate
with over 10,000 shipboard observers
worldwide. It is used to distribute meteorological information, worldwide
environmental impact concerns, climatology studies, and the like to the
maritime community. A special announcement (including a small story
and photograph) appeared in the August 2015 (Vol. 59, No. 2) issue (www.
vos.noaa.gov/MWL/201508/msrsurvey.shtml)

Marine Fisheries Review

Assessing a Long-Standing Conservation Program:
Mariner’s Perspectives on the North Atlantic Right Whale,
Eubalaena glacialis, Mandatory Ship Reporting System
GREGORY K. SILBER and KRISTY WALLMO

doi: dx.doi.org/10.7755/MFR.78.3–4.3

rine Fisheries Service (NMFS), the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS),
and, less frequently, the U.S. Coast
Guard (USCG), are charged with developing and implementing strategies
and actions aimed at recovering these
species, most often through reduction
of ongoing anthropogenic threats.
Establishing conservation actions
may result in unintended economic or
operational impacts, but subsequent
assessments to determine whether they
are meeting expected conservation objectives are few (Halpern, 2003; Selig
and Bruno, 2010). Refining these actions through assessment and monitoring has the potential to improve both
their conservation value and their costeffectiveness (Bruner et al., 2004; Miteva et al., 2012).
In this paper we report findings
from an online survey of the maritime
industry designed to evaluate a Mandatory Ship Reporting (MSR) system—a long-standing program to raise
awareness about and to reduce ship

collisions with North Atlantic right
whales, Eubalaena glacialis. Since
1999, provisions of the MSR have required ships weighing 300 gross tons
(gt) or greater to report their location,
speed, and destination to a shore-based
station when entering key right whale
nursery and feeding areas off the U.S.
east coast.
In return, reporting ships receive a
message, automatically generated, delivered directly to the ship’s bridge,
providing information about the risk
of vessel collisions with right whales
and actions mariners can take to avoid
collisions (Silber et al., 2015). The
MSR system is distinct from and predates other regulations in place to reduce ship collisions with right whales,
such as ship speed reductions.
Our survey examined three aspects
of the MSR system: 1) the degree to
which mariners comply with the reporting requirements of the system, 2)
the operational burden of compliance
to captains and crew, and 3) their opin-

ABSTRACT—Measures established to
protect living marine resources, including
those for endangered marine species, are
only infrequently evaluated. In this paper we
report findings of an online survey designed
to solicit the views of maritime industries
about a long-standing endangered large
whale conservation program: the Mandatory Ship Reporting (MSR) system. The MSR
was established in 1999 to aid in reducing
the threat of vessel collisions with the highly
depleted North Atlantic right whale, Eubalaena glacialis. Under MSR provisions, vessels >300 gross tons are required to report
their location, speed, and destination when
entering two key right whale aggregation
areas. In return, reporting ships are sent an
automated message about right whale vulnerability to ship collisions. The survey was
intended to obtain views about the extent to
which vessel operations were interrupted by

the reporting requirement; how mariners
utilize, if at all, information provided in the
return message; whether vessel operations
were modified in response to guidance provided; and the overall importance and effectiveness of the reporting systems in helping
ships avoid right whale interactions.
A total of 119 mariners with broad representation of vessel types and decades of
experience at sea took part in the survey;
56 of these indicated they had entered one
of the MSR areas at least once. Most (ca.
70%) indicated that they comply with the
reporting requirement, distribute information on right whales and ship strikes to
crew members, that they were more alert
about avoiding/watching for right whales,
and that the ships operation may change to
avoid an interaction. Of the survey-takers
who had entered the system, about half indicated the MSR system is useful for educat-

ing captains and crew about right whales
and important for right whale conservation,
but only about a quarter indicated that it is
useful in helping ships avoid right whales.
About 40% said it is an unnecessary requirement for ships. We conclude that as an
outreach tool and a means to provide information directly to domestic and international mariners entering right whale habitat
for over 15 years (thus, tens of thousands
of ships entering these waters have received
the message), the MSR almost certainly
has been beneficial in educating mariners
about the issue of ship strike and in providing guidance on avoiding ship strikes. Views
reflected in the survey suggest that, at least
from the mariners’ perspective, the MSR
program has provided positive conservation value; however, not all mariners took
specific strike avoidance action after having
received the message.

Introduction
Policies and regulations established
to protect the marine environment include measures to reduce perturbations
of entire ecosystems (coral reefs: Bellwood et al., 2004), safeguard key habitats on large scales (Marine Protected
Areas: Hoyt, 2011, IUCN-WCPA,
2008), and conserve marine species
whose population sizes have declined
to unsustainable levels (threatened or
endangered species: NOAA, 2015).
In the United States, the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) provides legal protection for threatened and endangered
marine (and terrestrial) species, while
agencies including the National MaGregory K. Silber is with the Office of Protected
Resources, National Marine Fisheries Service,
NOAA, 1315 East West Highway, Silver Spring,
MD 20910. Kristy Wallmo is with the Office of
Science and Technology, National Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA, 1315 East West Highway,
Silver Spring, MD 20910.

22

Marine Fisheries Review

ions about the utility of the system for
reducing collisions and raising awareness about right whale conservation.
Though several studies have focused
on maritime industry compliance with
large whale conservation regulations
such as ship speed reduction in seasonally and dynamically managed areas
(Lagueux et al., 2011; Asaro, 2012;
Silber et al., 2014), few have examined the effectiveness of these regulations in reducing ship-whale collisions
(Silber and Betteridge, 2012; Laist et
al., 2014; van der Hoop et al., 2014).
Further, none of these studies utilized
data or observations from mariners
themselves.
To date, only Reimer et al. (2016)
have collected data directly from mariners in a survey about receptivity to
real-time conservation technology.
That study found that most mariners
surveyed would be interested in receiving information on endangered whales
and whale alerts via ships Navigational Telex (NAVTEX) and Automatic
Identification Systems (AIS), and that
most believed that receiving this information would not be disruptive to their
operations (Reimer et al., 2016).
To our knowledge no study has examined mariners’ perceptions of existing whale conservation measures and
their utility in reducing the likelihood
of ship-whale collisions. Our study
directly addresses this gap regarding
one such conservation measure by
directly canvassing mariner viewpoints
on use and compliance with reporting
into the MSR, its overall conservation
value, and impact on ship operations.
Our findings add to the limited literature on the burden and overall utility
of actions aimed at conserving large
whales.
Survey results suggest the conservation value of the MSR program is
likely positive because mariners indicated it raised awareness about the
whale-strike issue. However, because
the intent of the program is to provide
information only, and not all mariners
altered operations after receiving guidance in the return message, the overall
biological impact of program may be
somewhat limited.

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Background of Ship-Whale
Collisions and the MSR System
Most large whale species were the
focus of intensive commercial hunting
and were severely depleted globally.
Although a number of these populations began to rebound not long after
an international moratorium on commercial whaling in 1985–19861, unintended ship-whale collisions and other
threats to population recovery remain.
In the case of the North Atlantic right
whale, population growth has been
slow and deaths caused by violent
strikes from large ships and fatal entanglement in commercial fishing gear
are among the main impediments to
recovery of this species (Clapham et
al., 1999; Kraus et al., 2005; NMFS2).
North Atlantic right whales occur
near and migrate along the eastern
seaboard of Canada and the United
States, where large human population
centers and co-occuring water-borne
commerce, commercial fishing, and
other activities are also concentrated.
Right whale feeding/socializing aggregation areas occur in waters off New
England and eastern Canada and in
nursery areas off the South Carolina
to Florida coasts. The right whale is
vulnerable to collisions with vessels
throughout its range, but the threat
may be particularly high in these aggregation areas where substantial vessel traffic also occurs (NMFS2).
Recognizing the influence of human activities on the recovery of right
whales, the international community
began taking steps to reduce the impact of these threats in the 1990’s.
Not all ship operators, and maritime
commerce industries as a whole, were
familiar with the risk that vessels underway posed to right whales and
other large whale species. Thus, the
conservation community began addressing this concern by focusing pri-

marily on raising mariner awareness
about the issue.
Among these actions was the creation of two Mandatory Ship Reporting systems (MSR) as a means to
reduce the occurrence of “ship strikes”
with right whales (Silber et al., 2015;
USG3). A proposal initiated by the
United States, backed by other nations and publicly endorsed by President William J. Clinton in April 1998
(Clinton, 1998), to establish the MSR
was submitted to the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) in June
1998. It was approved by the IMO in
December 1998. This was the first formal IMO action to reduce the threat
of ship collisions with whales (Luster,
1999), and its first formal action on
behalf of any endangered marine species (Johnson, 2004).
Operation of the MSR
The goal of the MSR is to provide
timely information about ship-whale
collisions directly to individual vessels
as they enter key right whale feeding
and nursery habitats. Under the system, ships are required to report their
location and time of entry into the
system; in return, each reporting ship
receives an automated message providing information on ways to reduce
the chances of a striking a whale.
Under the rule, self-propelled commercial ships >300 gt are required to
report to shore-based stations when
they enter either of two regions off
the eastern U.S. coast where and when
right whales are known to occur: one
off the state of Massachusetts operates
year-round; the other, off the states
of Georgia and Florida, is operational annually from 15 Nov. through 15
Apr. (Silber et al., 2012a) (hereafter,
referred to as WHALESNORTH and
WHALESSOUTH, respectively) (Fig.
1).
Incoming messages are sent primarily via satellite and include ship

1International

Whaling Commission. Catch limits and catches taken (https://iwc.int/catches).
2
NMFS. 2005. Recovery plan for the North Atlantic Right Whale (Eubalaena glacialis). U.S.
Dep. Commer., NOAA, Natl. Mar. Fish. Serv.,
Off. Protect. Resourc., (http://www.nmfs.noaa.
gov/pr/pdfs/recovery/whale_right).

3U.S.

Government. 1998. Ship reporting systems
for the eastern coast of the United States. Proposal submitted to the IMO’s Sub-Committee
on Safety of Navigation. Online at http://www.
nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/shipstrike/imo_proposal.
pdf.

23

name, course, speed, and destination
among other things. Only reporting is
required; no other changes to vessel
operations are required. An automatically-generated message is returned
to the reporting vessel that includes
information on locations of recentlysighted right whales; procedural guidance to help prevent vessel-whale
collisions; and information regarding
protecting right whales from vessel
strike (Fig. 2). Only vessels entering
the prescribed areas are required to
send a report, therefore only these
vessels receive the automatic return
message.
Following IMO endorsement, the
USCG issued a Final Rule in the U.S.
Federal Register (USCG, 2001) that
codified the systems by amending the
U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (33
CFR 169). The National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
then added the MSR areas to relevant
nautical charts and incorporated the
new requirements into various navigational aids such as the U.S. Coast Pilot
and elsewhere.4
The two MSR systems became effective on 1 July 1999 and have been
in operation continuously since that
time. From July 1999 to present, operation and administration of this
program have been jointly run by the
USCG and NOAA’s NMFS. All shipto-shore and shore-to-ship communication costs are borne by these two
agencies (including a government contract to the communications provider).
Reporting data from these systems
have been useful in characterizing vessel operations within the areas (WardGeiger et al., 2005), particularly as it
relates to the recovery of right whales.
Among other things, incoming MSR
reports provided information on U.S.
east coast port arrivals and vessel operations which helped form the basis
for subsequent ship strike-reduction
measures.

4

See, for example USCG, Local Notice to Mariners. Coastal Waters from Eastport, Maine to
Shrewsbury, New Jersey. Special Notices, No.
27/99. Online at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/
pdfs/shipstrike/uscg_lnm0799.pdf.

24

Figure 1.—Mandatory Ship Reporting System Area Boundaries. Also shown are vessel speed
restriction seasonal management area boundaries (NOAA, 2008).

Marine Fisheries Review

Figure 2.— USCG Mandatory Ship Reporting System WHALESNORTH automated return message.

A recent 15-plus-year retrospective
analysis of incoming reports (Silber
et al., 2015) determined that hundreds
of individual ships made over 45,000
reports into the system between July
1999 and December 2013. While generally regarded as a successful and valued outreach tool, the current study is
the first attempt to gauge the attitudes
and perceptions of mariners regarding conservation benefits as well as
the potential impacts to reporting
vessels, and to evaluate the ongoing
utility and relative value of this longstanding program.
Materials and Methods
An online survey was developed by
NMFS economists and biologists during June–August 2014 to collect data
on mariner awareness, attitudes, and
use of the MSR system. Because the
sampling strategy was opportunistic
with an unknown universe, an important consideration in the survey design
was to minimize the overall survey
length and develop clear and concise

78(3–4)

questions. To help ensure that these
considerations were met and that the
overall survey was easy to comprehend, a draft instrument was tested
in a focus group on 17 Sept. 2014
in Baltimore, Md., at the Maritime
Institute of Technology and Graduate Studies/Pacific Maritime Institute
(MITAGS-PMI).
Focus group participants were recruited from a pool of mariners who
were attending a course at MITAGSPMI and agreed to participate in a
voluntary discussion about the MSR
system and the survey. Based on feedback from the focus group, a final
survey instrument was developed that
contained eight questions and an opportunity to provide open-ended comments at the end of the survey.
The survey (Appendix I), which
was implemented online in early June
2015, was programmed by a private
consulting firm, ECS Federal5, and
5Mention

of trade names or commercial firms
does not imply endorsement by the National
Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA.

hosted on a domain purchased specifically for the survey implementation.
The target survey population was ship
owners, operators, or captains who had
entered either WHALESNORTH or
WHALESSOUTH one or more times.
During an average year, several
thousand separate trips are made into
both areas (Silber et al., 2015) (some
ships and masters may enter multiple
times per year). The information needed to directly contact individual ship
captains, owners, and/or crews to conduct a survey is not available, making
a sampling frame infeasible to develop. For this reason, an opportunistic or
convenience sample was necessary.
We acknowledge that this type of
sampling has a number of limitations,
including the inability to a) examine
response bias, b) compute statistical errors, and c) make inferences to
a larger population. However in our
case, due to the lack of individual
contact information, an opportunistic
sample involving broad outreach to the
generalized community was the only

25

viable approach for contacting vessel operators. Ferber (1977) noted that
while opportunistic samples are less
desirable than samples derived from a
systematic approach, they have utility
for exploratory purposes or to obtain
different views on the dimensions of
an issue or problem.
To implement the survey, federal
and private entities who engage in activities or communicate regularly with
maritime entities were asked to distribute information about the survey
(Appendix II). Announcements of the
availability of the survey were also
sent via association and government
email distribution lists shortly after the
survey opened.
The announcements of the survey
provided potential respondents with
a brief description of the survey, why
their participation was important, and
a link to the online survey. Two additional announcements about the survey
were distributed in August and September 2015.
Respondents who chose to participate in the survey were asked eight
questions. The first set of questions
asked about familiarity with the MSR
system and their ship transits through
the MSR areas. The second set of questions asked about compliance with,
burden of, and conservation potential of the MSR system. The remaining questions asked for the number of
years in the industry and type of ship
the respondent currently worked on
(container ship, passenger vessel, etc.).
The survey remained open through 10
Jan. 2016, at which time the URL for
the survey was deactivated. The analysis included simple frequency counts
of responses to each question.
Results
Respondent Characteristics
A total of 119 mariners took part in
the survey. Of this number 85 respondents said they were aware of the MSR
system (34 people who accessed
the survey but entered no response
whatsoever or indicated they had no
experience or were not familiar with
the MSR, were excluded from the
analysis) and 56 indicated they had

26

entered one of the MSR areas at least
once.
Due to the publicity of the MSR and
its support from the IMO, it is possible that mariners who have never entered one of the MSR areas were still
familiar with the system and the reporting requirements, and therefore we
considered a total of 85 survey-takers
eligible to answer a subset of the survey questions. Questions that required
direct experience and use of the MSR
were only shown to respondents who
stated they had entered an MSR area
at least once.
Among the 85 respondents who
were aware of the MSR, representation of vessel types was broad, and
included container ships, tankers,
cargo or bulk carriers, RO-RO’s (i.e.,
car and vehicle carriers), cruise ships,
passenger vessels (i.e. ferries, whale
watching vessels), research ships, and
pleasure craft. According to Rodrigue
et al. (2017) the global maritime industry has about 100,000 vessels
(>100 t) consisting of passenger, bulk
carrier, general cargo, and roll-on/rolloff vessels; about 69% of shipping
ton-miles is accounted for by bulk carriers. Our sample consists of captains
and crew from all four types of vessels, and about 53% of respondents
cited they worked on bulk carriers.
The years of service in the maritime
industry ranged from 2 to 48 years,
with 23% working less than 20 years
and 77% working more than 20 years.
The average number of years respondents have worked in the maritime industry was 26, with an average of 11
years as a crew member and 11 years
as a captain.
Of the 56 respondents indicating
they had entered one of the MSR areas at least once, about 44% said they
entered one of the areas regularly.
The number of times respondents said
they entered one of the areas during
a year ranged from 1 to 100, with a
mean of 27.8. About 35% (n=20) indicated they enter WHALESNORTH
most frequently, 29% (n=16) entered
the WHALESSOUTH most often, and
35% (n=20) indicated they enter both
areas about the same amount.

As noted, our data is based on an
opportunistic sample of ship captains
and crew. While the vessel types in our
data are representative of the types of
vessels in the maritime industry as described by Rodrigue et al. (2017), we
cannot determine whether respondent’s
opinions and attitudes toward the MSR
system are representative of those of
the larger industry, and specifically
those ships that transit the MSR areas.
Compliance with
the MSR System
Most respondents comply with the
reporting requirement of the MSR
system. About 75% of respondents
(n=42) stated that they send the required report always or most of the
time; and slightly less than a fourth of
them (24%) said they rarely or never
send the report. About 82% (n=46) of
respondents stated that they receive a
return message about right whales after sending in their ships’ report, while
the remainder (n=10) indicated they
did not receive a return message via
the system.
Survey-takers were asked about
their level of agreement with four
statements related to the transmittal
of required ship information when entering an MSR area: 1) it is relatively
easy to send in the required report, 2) I
generally follow the report format exactly as specified in the instructions, 3)
I send in the report as soon as possible, and 4) sending in the required report takes time away from other duties
I have on the ship. Of those responding to this portion of the survey, half
(n=20) indicated it was easy to send
in the report, with over 70% stating
that they followed the required format
and they sent in the report as soon as
possible after entering the area. About
half said that sending in the report
takes time away from other duties on
the ship (Fig. 3).
Attitudes Toward
the MSR System
Following these statements respondents were asked about their level of
agreement with four statements related
to the automated right whale conser-

Marine Fisheries Review

tion; others said it had little utility in
reducing strikes of whales. A few of
those providing comments reiterated
that reporting into the systems was
not a significant or time-consuming
task, some suggested using alternative
vessel tracking systems in lieu of the
MSR. Apparently, a number of respondents believed the survey to include
discussion of vessel speed restrictions
in addition to the MSR, while others
took the opportunity to comment on
right whale vulnerability (or their lack
of vulnerability) to ship collisions, the
utility of right whale protective measures generally, or to offer suggestions
on ways to diminish the impact of
right whale conservation on maritime
industries.
Discussion

Figure 3.—Attitudes toward Mandatory Ship Reporting system ship requirements.

vation information they receive after
reporting into the system: 1) I generally don’t have time to read the entire message, 2) I am more alert about
avoiding or watching for right whales,
3) I find the information to be useful
for the captain and crew, and 4) some
aspect of the ship’s operation may
change (e.g., speed, post extra lookouts) to avoid an interaction. Among
those responding to all the questions
in this section of the survey (n=25),
60% don’t read the entire message, but
over half said they are more alert about
avoiding/watching for right whales
and may change the ships operation
to avoid an interaction. Nearly 80% of
respondents stated they distributed the
information in the message to captains
and/or crew (Fig. 4).
All respondents who stated that they
were aware of the system (n=85), even
if they had not entered an MSR area,
were asked about their level of agree-

78(3–4)

ment with four statements concerning
general perception of the MSR system: 1) the MSR system is important
for right whale conservation, 2) is an
unnecessary requirement for ships, 3)
has been useful in helping ships avoid
right whale interactions, and 4) is a
useful system for educating captains
and crews about right whales. Of those
responding to this set of questions
(n=64), over half (n=34) indicated the
MSR system is useful for educating
captains and crew about right whales
and important for right whale conservation, only about a quarter said it is
useful for helping ships avoid right
whale interactions, and about 40%
said it is an unnecessary requirement
for ships (Fig. 5).
In regard to the written comments
portion of the survey, several respondents provided additional views about
the importance of the MSR in the context of endangered whale conserva-

The invitation to participate in the
survey was distributed on a broad
scale, and we believe that hundreds
of mariners were at least aware of the
survey. However, the exact number of
individuals who received notification
of the survey remains unknown; therefore, a response rate is also not known.
We expected the number of respondents to be a small fraction of the total
number reached for several reasons.
First, previous studies (Ranmuthugala et al., 2008) have shown that opportunistic sampling generates relatively
low responses relative to the number
of individuals targeted through broadly
cast notification efforts, and there was
likely considerable overlap in the entities described in Appendix II.
Second, not all mariners are familiar with the MSR program, because
a) it applies only to ships sailing in
waters along parts of the U.S. eastern
seaboard; b) of these, not all ships enter certain U.S. east coast ports (e.g.,
Boston, Mass., Jacksonville, Fla.)
where MSR areas are situated; and c)
not all ships meet the 300 gt threshold
for reporting. And, finally, there is little reason to expect ship captains sailing under a non-U.S. flag to complete
a voluntary survey focused on a U.S.
policy implemented by U.S. Federal
agencies.
The nature of an opportunistic sam-

27

Figure 4.—Attitudes toward Mandatory Ship Reporting system automated return message
containing right whale information.

ple implies that the findings are not
generalizable to a larger population
nor can the extent of response bias
be formally identified (Pruchno et al.,
2008). Previous studies comparing opportunistic samples to random samples
are rare (Pruchno et al., 2008). Two
studies that have compared variables
of interest between these two sampling
approaches suggest that sample means
on variables of interest were significantly different between opportunistic
and random samples (Pruchno et al.,
2008; Ranmuthugala et al., 2008); thus
we suggest that the results best represent only those individuals in our survey sample population.
Comments provided via the survey
were varied: some indicated an awareness regarding the vulnerability of
right and other whales to ship strikes,
the severity of the problem, and the
need to reduce this threat; others indicated that reporting, and other mea28

sures, were not needed. However, we
note that responses about the efficacy
of the MSR may have come from mariners who had not actually entered the
systems.
A number of respondents confused
the MSR with a more recent action
to reduce ship collisions with right
whales: seasonal vessel speed restrictions (NOAA, 2008). This is consistent
with findings regarding the number
of reports made incorrectly outside
the boundaries of the MSR systems;
namely, reporting into MSR systems
was common along vessel-speed restriction seasonal management area
boundaries which are unrelated to the
MSR (Silber et al., 2015).
Speed restrictions likely have greater economic and operational impact to
commercial maritime industries—as
well as having a more quantitative,
documented influence on reducing
vessel strikes of right whales (Conn

and Silber, 2013; Laist et al., 2014;
van der Hoop et al., 2014; Martin et
al., 2016)—than does the MSR because the latter involves reporting
only. Therefore, some mariners may
have used the survey as an opportunity
to express their views about the speed
restrictions.
Our results are mixed on the ease of
use of the MSR system by mariners.
Of respondents with direct experience
with the system, about 70% followed
the reporting requirements and sent the
report as soon as possible after entering an MSR area, and only 15% indicated the reporting requirements were
difficult to follow. However, about half
of respondents felt that sending the
report took time away from other duties and nearly 60% said that they did
not have time to read the entire return
message. In addition, about 40% of all
respondents felt the MSR system is an
unnecessary requirement for ships.
As a conservation measure, our results suggest that the most important
function of the MSR is one of education and raising awareness, as most
respondents with direct experience
with the program indicated that information in the return message was distributed to their crews and that crew
members were generally more aware
of right whales after receiving the information. Further, about half of all
respondents (including those without
direct MSR experience) stated the system was good for whale conservation
and considered the system a good way
to raise awareness about ship-whale
collisions.
Being a metric difficult or impossible to reasonably quantify, mariners,
of course, cannot know the overall
impact of the MSR in reducing collisions with whales. However, the goal
was to attempt to ascertain whether
mariners disregarded the incoming
message, for example, or whether
their possible actions in response
to some aspect of the message may
have lowered the possibility of striking a whale.
Respondents were roughly equally
divided in their views on whether
the system was useful in avoiding

Marine Fisheries Review

whales. Thus, there is little doubt that
the MSR has served to raise mariner
awareness about the depleted status
of right whales and the species’ vulnerability to ship collisions because
hundreds of ships have made tens of
thousands of reports to (and received
return messages from) the MSR in
the period since its implementation
(Silber et al., 2015).
Inasmuch as return messages arrive in the bridge of reporting vessels
as they enter right whale habitat, this
feature alone has served as a frequent
reminder to those operating ships in
U.S. waters about an important conservation matter—and in this regard the
outgoing message has been a flexible
informational tool for alerting mariners about additional large whale
conservation measures as they have
been developed.
More broadly, an important aspect of the MSR, a feature with international implications, is that its
establishment, as one of the first formal measures to address the threat of
ship-whale collisions (Johnson, 2004),
helped facilitate the development of
additional whale conservation measures. For example, since the implementation of the MSR, the United
States and several other nations have
established related IMO-adopted routing measures in their waters (Silber et
al., 2012a).
In addition, outgoing MSR messages have been adapted to provide alerts
about other threat-reduction measures
(e.g., dynamically implemented and
seasonal vessel speed restrictions) and
have been used to provide written information on right whale sightings.
However, in regard to information dissemination, broad-based distribution
programs have also been developed
by a number of entities. For example,
a number of ports and government
agencies now rely on a number of
systems (e.g., the frequently updated
USCG Broadcast Notice to Mariners)
to transmit information to ships, including information about right whale
sightings.
The International Whaling Commission provides brochures for mariners

78(3–4)

Figure 5.—General attitudes toward the Mandatory Ship Reporting system.

regarding large whale ship strikes6;
numerous non-governmental organizations maintain web sites and actively
distribute information on this matter;
and NMFS has developed and routinely provides interactive CD’s, laminated cards, and booklets7 regarding the
threat of ship strikes of right whales.
Most of this material, however, is
“passive” and has neither the immediacy of notifying ships directly through
the MSR nor provides near real-time
information about sighted whales.
And, while various outlets provide
near real-time whale sighting information through interagency cooperative
efforts (NOAA, 2006), it is not clear
if, and to what extent, mariners consult
and use this information.

6Whales:

collisions prevents damage to ships,
and injuries to passengers, crew and whales.
(https://iwc.int/index.php?cID=3199&cType=
document).
7
Interactive items online at www.greateratlantic.
fisheries.noaa.gov/protected/shipstrike/training/
index.html.

Our results from respondents with
direct experience with the MSR indicate that the system may have some
utility for directly reducing the number of whale-ship collisions, as over
half stated that they are more alert after receiving the incoming MSR message and about half said some aspect
of the ships operation may change as
a result of the message. About 35% of
all respondents stated that the MSR
is useful for helping ships avoid right
whale interactions. Nonetheless, information on the number of known right
whale deaths from ship collisions is
noted below and in van der Hoop et
al. (2014), and no discernable differences are apparent in fatal strike rates
in the time after sighting information
was routinely provided beginning in
the mid-1990’s via aircraft survey programs and through the MSR beginning
in 1999. Therefore, the extent to which
whale sighting information provided via the MSR, or any other means,
plays a role in reducing the number of
ship struck whales is not clear.

29

One of the stated secondary purposes of the MSR was to enable the
gathering of data to facilitate a better understanding of vessel operations
in right whale habitat as a means to
further develop conservation measures (Merrick and Cole, 2007; Silber et al., 2012a). When the MSR was
established, routinely collected and
archived information on vessel operations on this scale did not exist.
However, since inception of the
MSR, advancing technologies are used
to monitor vessel activities. In regard
to monitoring U.S. port entries, systems to track vessel operations and
emerging reporting requirements are
far more comprehensive and precise
than self-reporting under MSR protocols. Among the most important of
these is the advent and use of GPSlinked VHF radio signal and satellitetransmitted Automatic Identification
Systems (AIS) which are required on
most ships and broadcast signals that
provide detailed information on ship
location, speed, and routes (Vanderlaan and Taggart, 2009; Reimer et al.,
2016; Robards et al., 2016). In addition, a number of U.S. ports have
Vessel Tracking Systems to aid in navigation, and some fishing vessels are
required to carry Vessel Monitoring
Systems.
Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, all vessels have been required to provide 96-h notice prior to
calling on a U.S. port. Some of these
technologies, AIS in particular, have
been used to assess changes in ship
operations in response to the implementation of various whale protection
measures, including routing scheme
changes (Vanderlaan and Tagart, 2009;
Lagueux et al., 2011), vessel speed restrictions (Lagueux et al., 2011; Wiley
et al., 2011; Silber et al., 2014), and
dynamically managed areas (Silber et
al., 2012b). Development and use of
these technologies and communication
systems have rendered the MSR a less
than optimal means to gather and relay information to and from ships and
have therefore largely supplemented
the tracking of ship operations functions of the MSR.

30

From 1999 (when the MSR was established) to June 2016, 11 confirmed
right whale deaths resulted from collisions with ships (Laist et al., 2014;
Henry8), an average of 0.7 per year.
This rate of known deaths attributed to
ship strikes is roughly comparable to
the 10 years prior to implementation
of the MSR (1990–99; 0.6 per year);
but the average decreased to 0.3 fatal strikes per year in the years 2007
through 2015 (Laist et al., 2014; Henry et al.5).
A number of factors could be involved in affecting these rates. We
contend that variables such as whale
distribution and shifts in distribution,
particularly relative to large-scale shipping lanes, and overall shipping traffic
volume, play roles in the occurrence
and frequency of whale strikes. In the
last decade, for example, the number of large vessel trips into U.S. east
coast ports has fluctuated in response
to shifting economic climates and increasing ship size and cargo capacities
(the latter being a feature that reduces the number of trips overall) (DOT,
2013; MARAD, 2013; Silber et al.,
2015).
In the context of these pervasive circumstances influencing the economics
of transporting goods on worldwide
scales, education and outreach efforts,
while still important, may have little
overall effect on rates of fatal ship
strikes. Regardless, while the rather
crude metric of annual deaths lacks
sufficient resolution to fully evaluate the effects of the MSR, we note
only that there were no immediate
or overt changes in right whale ship
strike-related death rates at the onset
or in the time the MSR was in place.
Protection of living marine resources can be challenging in light of
resource utilization by multiple industrial or commercial users. Conservation measures are generally established
8Henry, A.

G., T. V. N. Cole, L. Hall, W. Ledwell,
D. Morin, and A. Reid. 2014. Mortality determinations for baleen whale stocks along the Gulf
of Mexico, United States east coast, and Atlantic
Canadian provinces, 2008–12. U.S. Dep. Commer., Northeast Fish. Sci. Cent., Ref. Doc. 14-10,
17 p. (https://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/nefsc/publica
tions/crd/crd1410).

by incorporating the best available science and with maximum (practical)
protections in mind. But such programs are not always evaluated (Clark
et al., 2002; Ferraro and Pattanayak,
2006) or assessed to identify ways to
optimize use of limited resources (Kapos et al., 2008) or fully utilize the
provisions of available statutes.
The U.S. Government has faithfully
operated the MSR for years and there
is little doubt the program has conservation benefits by raising awareness
of the maritime industry. Further, the
MSR is one element in a suite of ship
strike reduction measures that include
IMO-adopted Areas To Be Avoided
(Vanderlaan and Taggart, 2009), modifications of shipping routes (USCG,
2007), and voluntary and mandatory vessel speed restrictions (NOAA,
2008). However, our survey results
suggest that, at least from the perspective of mariners who completed our
survey, benefits of the MSR in reducing the likelihood of ships colliding
with right whales are divided, but had
a role in promoting education and outreach opportunities.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful for the multi-year
collaboration with the USCG in designing and operating the MSR. The
USCG’s involvement has been invaluable. For the last several years,
NOAA’s Atlantic Oceanographic and
Atmospheric Laboratory has managed the operation of the MSR’s shipto-shore communication system. For
their assistance in distributing notifications of the survey, we are grateful to Jerome Hyman of the National
Geospatial Agency, Kathy Metcalf of
the Chamber of Shipping of America,
Bryan Wood-Thomas of the World
Shipping Council, Patrick Keown and
Rachel Medley of NOAA’s National
Ocean Service, James McLaughlin
and Peter Kelliher of NOAA’s Southeast Regional Office and Greater
Atlantic Fisheries Regional Office,
respectively, Michael Carter of the
Maritime Administration, Jodie Knox
of the U.S. Coast Guard, and Paula
Rychtar editor of the Mariner’s Weath-

Marine Fisheries Review

er Log. The paper was improved by review and comment by Courtney Smith
and three anonymous reviewers.
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Appendix 1.—Mandatory Ship Reporting systems survey instrument.

78(3–4)

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34

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78(3–4)

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Appendix 2.—Communications channels used to notify users of an online survey of Mandatory Ship Reporting systems.

Federal Agencies
NOAA’s Ocean Service. Regional
Navigation Managers work directly
with pilots, mariners, port authorities,
and recreational boaters to help identify and address marine transportation system navigational safety issues.
Based on our request, U.S. east coast
navigation managers used their regular
public and industry meetings, port facility functions, and other conduits to
notify mariners about the survey.
National Geospatial Agency (NGA).
The NGA’s Notice To Mariners (msi.
nga.mil/NGAPortal/MSI.portal?_
nfpb=true&_st=&_pageLabel=msi_
portal_page_61,) is the principal publication for ships engaged in international voyages. Designed to ensure
the safety of life at sea, this publication provides marine safety information and corrections to navigational
aids for all U.S. Government navigation charts and publications derived
from a variety of sources, both foreign
and domestic. A special notice about
the survey was posted in the NGA’s
Hydrogram and Marine Information sections of the weekly notice on
10 June 2015 (msi.nga.mil/MSISiteContent/StaticFiles/NAV_PUBS/
UNTM/201525/Marine_Info.pdf) and
again on 3 September 2015.
Maritime Administration (MARAD).
The Department of Transportation’s
MARAD is charged with ensuring that
the nation maintains adequate shipbuilding and repair services, efficient
ports, and reserve shipping capacity
for use in time of national emergency
(www.marad.dot.gov/). It promotes
maintenance of a well-balanced U.S.
merchant fleet for transport of waterborne commerce, and it is capable of
service as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war. MARAD promoted
the MSR survey with an announcement via its distributions list, contain-

36

ing perhaps several thousand active
mariners. Announcement by email distribution sent on 27 July 2015.
NOAA, NMFS, Northeast Regional
Office. Participating members of maritime contact distribution lists were
encouraged via email to take the survey by shipping industry liaisons from
both NOAA’s NMFS Southeast and
Northeast Regional Offices on 7 July
2015. The survey was also discussed
by liaisons at numerous industry
meetings.
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). The USCG’s outreach program posted a blog
about the survey on 6 November 2015.
On average, the blog receives approximately 40,000 unique (each coming
from a different IP address) views per
month.
Industry Associations
World Shipping Council (WSC).
With 26 companies, which utilize hundreds of ships and employ hundreds of
vessel operators, the WSC represents
over 90% of global liner vessel capacity and transport cabilities. At our request, the WSC sent notifications to all
of its member companies on two occasions (28 July and 30 August 2015).
Chamber of Shipping of America
(CSA). The CSA represents 35 U.S.based companies that own, operate, or
have commercial interest in oceangoing tankers, containers, and dry bulk
vessels engaged in domestic and international trades. These entities employ hundreds of vessel operators.
The CSA sent notifications about the
survey to each of its member companies on two occasions (15 July and 8
August 2015). The CSA also asked a
number of other industry associations
to notify their members; these included InterTanko, American Waterways
Operators (AWO), Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA), International Chamber of Shipping (ICS),

and Baltic and International Maritime
Council (BIMCO).
Just for information: InterTanko
has 204 members and 236 companies
whose combined fleet comprises some
3,077 tankers; AWO is the national
trade association for the U.S. tugboat,
towboat, and barge industry; CLIA is
the world’s largest cruise industry trade
association; ICS membership represents national shipowners’ associations
in Asia, Europe, and the Americas
whose member shipping companies
operate over 80% of the world’s merchant tonnage; BIMCO is the largest
of the international shipping associations representing shipowners and its
membership controls around 65 percent of the world’s tonnage.
Passenger Vessel Association. The
PVA represents companies who are
owners, operators, and leasers of shipboard operations of passenger vessels
on the waterways of the United States
and Canada including car and passenger ferries, tour and excursion vessels,
charter boats, eco-tour boats, and day
sailing vessels. These vessels move
over 200 million passengers each year.
The PVA sent notification of the MSR
survey to all its members on 5 August
2015.
Maritime Periodicals
Mariner’s Weather Log. A publication of the National Weather Service
(NWS), this journal (http://www.vos.
noaa.gov/mwl.shtml) allows the NWS
to maintain contact and communicate
with over 10,000 shipboard observers
worldwide. It is used to distribute meteorological information, worldwide
environmental impact concerns, climatology studies, and the like to the
maritime community. A special announcement (including a small story
and photograph) appeared in the August 2015 (Vol. 59, No. 2) issue (www.
vos.noaa.gov/MWL/201508/msrsurvey.shtml)

Marine Fisheries Review