CN Comment

BEFORE THE
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD
___________________________
EX PARTE NO. 759
___________________________
DEMURRAGE BILLING REQUIREMENTS
___________________________
OPENING COMMENTS ON BEHALF OF CN
___________________________

Kathryn J. Gainey
Counsel, US Regulatory Affairs
CN
601 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
Suite 500, North Building
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 347-7840
[email protected]

Dated: November 6, 2019

Raymond A. Atkins
Matthew J. Warren
Sidley Austin LLP
1501 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 736-8000
[email protected]

248896

ENTERED
Office of Proceedings
November 6, 2019
Part of
Public Record

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. The Board Should Not Adopt Its Proposal To Micromanage Demurrage Invoicing
By Prescribing Specific Detailed Information on Invoices. ...................................... 3
A.

CN Already Provides Ample Demurrage Information To Customers. ............. 4

B. Prescribing National Invoicing Requirements Is Unnecessary and Could
Generate Needless Litigation. ................................................................................... 6
C. If the Board Chooses to Regulate the Content of Demurrage Invoices, It
Should Adopt a General Standard Requiring Sufficient Information to Allow the
Billpayer to Determine the Basis for Demurrage Charges. ..................................... 9
II. The Board’s Proposal to Allow Terminals To Force Direct Billing Without
Railroad Consent Should Not Be Adopted. ............................................................. 10
A. The Board’s Current Final Rule was Adopted After a Multi-Year Rulemaking
Process With Broad Stakeholder Participation in Ex Parte 707 and Struck the
Right Balance. .......................................................................................................... 11
B. The Baseline Demurrage Rules Should Not Be Altered By Contracts to which
a Railroad is not a Party .......................................................................................... 13
C.

The NPRM Misstates Important Aspects of the Law. ..................................... 17

D. The NPRM’s Paperwork Reduction Act Notice Substantially Understates the
Costs that the Proposed Rules Would Create. ........................................................ 20
III.
The Board Should Give Carriers Sufficient Time to Notify Customers of Any
Necessary Tariff Changes ........................................................................................ 22

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The U.S. rail operating subsidiaries of Canadian National Railway Company
(hereafter “CN”) respectfully submit these comments on the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking that the Board served on October 7, 2019 in the above-captioned
proceeding (“NPRM”).
CN shares the Board’s desire that demurrage invoices enable customers to
understand the basis of the charges and to dispute charges they believe to be
inappropriate. But the actions that the Board is proposing in this NPRM are not
commensurate with any documented problem. As CN showed at the hearing and in
its supplemental comments, CN already provides extensive information to its
customers that enables them to understand the basis of demurrage charges, to
manage their pipelines to avoid demurrage in the first place, and to dispute charges
that a customer believes to be wrong. No one contradicted this testimony or
produced any evidence that CN’s bills are insufficient or unclear.
Creating uniform national regulation of the content of demurrage invoices is
a re-regulatory decision. CN is concerned that the Board’s proposal would increase
potential disputes and generate unnecessary paperwork. This is inconsistent with
Congress’s directions to this agency, and it is a sharp break from this agency’s
policies of removing unnecessary demurrage regulations and from the instructions
that federal agencies have received about the need to reduce regulatory burdens. It
would be far more consistent with the statutory scheme for the Board to continue to
rely on market forces to incentivize a railroad to provide better customer service to
its customers so the agency regulate only where necessary to address specific,

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documented problems with a particular carrier’s demurrage billing practices as
demonstrated in an individual demurrage case. At most, the Board should make
clear that a carrier has a general duty to provide sufficient information for
customers to understand demurrage charges and that customers who believe that a
railroad’s invoicing is unreasonably deficient can challenge the carrier’s practices in
an individual case.
Even more concerning than the Board’s proposed changes to invoices are the
NPRM’s significant revisions to the final demurrage rules the Board adopted just
five years ago, primarily based on the unsupported claims of a single large terminal
operator. Allowing terminals and their customers to enter contracts regarding
demurrage that will bind a railroad who is not party to those contracts is
inconsistent with the sound findings the Board reached in Ex Parte 707 and would
undermine demurrage’s purpose of incentivizing efficient car and asset utilization.
And the NPRM’s proposal fails to grapple with multiple practical problems,
including the impossibility of a railroad attempting to enforce contracts to which it
is not a party and the unequal bargaining power that large terminals have over
their smaller customers. This proposal should not be adopted, although the Board
could confirm that a railroad has authority to enter contracts for direct billing if it
believes that such clarification is necessary.
I.

THE BOARD SHOULD NOT ADOPT ITS PROPOSAL TO
MICROMANAGE DEMURRAGE INVOICING BY PRESCRIBING
SPECIFIC DETAILED INFORMATION ON INVOICES.
The NPRM’s proposal to adopt uniform nationwide standards for demurrage

invoices is an unwise and unnecessary expansion of the Board’s regulatory reach.
3

The NPRM mandates that every demurrage invoice issued by a Class I carrier
include or be accompanied by eleven categories of detailed information. See NPRM
at 14. While CN already provides customers with each of these eleven categories of
information (and much more besides), it is inconsistent with the Board’s mission
and mandate to expand its regulations into a new area without sufficient cause.
And these regulations could have the counterproductive effect of increasing the
complexity of demurrage disputes and requiring a railroad to generate and
customers to receive unnecessary paperwork.
A.

CN Already Provides Ample Demurrage Information To
Customers.

The factual predicate for the NPRM’s proposal to regulate the content of
demurrage invoices appears to be a concern that some railroads are not providing
their customers with adequate supporting information for demurrage charges. This
concern has no application to CN, which already provides customers with each of
the eleven categories of information specified by the proposed regulations.
As demonstrated in the sample invoice documents in Attachment 1, this
information is included on the invoice itself (Figure 1) or on the Invoice Backup –
Summary or Invoice Backup – Details that are made available to every customer
(Figures 2 and 3). Attachment 1 demonstrates that none of the complaints that Ex
Parte 754 commenters made about railroad demurrage invoices apply to CN. Date
and time information for each car is clearly provided on the Invoice Backup –Detail
Page, as is consignee information for shipments to terminals. See Attachment 1
Figure 3. No commenter at the Ex Parte 754 hearing provided an example of an
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insufficiently detailed invoice or other concrete evidence of a systematic problem
with demurrage invoices that requires uniform regulation to address.
Indeed, CN already has gone far beyond the minimum invoicing
requirements set forth in the NPRM. CN’s testimony in Ex Parte 754 explained the
detailed tools that CN customers can use to assess and understand their demurrage
charges. In particular, the Verified Statement of Keith Courtoreille appended to
CN’s Supplemental Comments included examples of the different tools that CN has
developed for customers. 1 These sophisticated tools include a First Mile / Last Mile
eBusiness tool designed to give our customers transparent visibility into the
pipeline of railcars inbound into their facility, the cars currently at their facility,
and those that are outbound. Id. at 8-10. This allows customers (including
terminal receivers) to plan in advance for rail service at their facility, thereby
enabling them to minimize demurrage charges and promote efficient utilization of
cars and rail track and yard capacity.
CN similarly explained its electronic tools allowing customers to view railcars
en route to their facilities and to order in railcars before they arrive, while they are
still on a train. See id. at 10-11. This functionality was developed to help
customers (including terminal receivers) avoid delays and demurrage charges for
cars dwelling at the local serving yard. This tool facilitates a customer’s ability to

See V.S. of Keith Courtoreille, Supplemental Comments on Behalf of CN, Ex Parte
No. 754 (filed June 6, 2019) (enclosed as Attachment 2).

1

5

easily order cars before the cut off for its next scheduled service, especially for cars
arriving during the weekend or at times when the customer facility is closed.
The primary purpose of CN’s First Mile / Last Mile and order-in modules is to
give customers the tools to eliminate or minimize demurrage in the first place. But
CN’s tools do so by giving customers access to detailed real-time information that
affords them significant visibility into their supply chain and into the factors that
can cause demurrage charges to accumulate. In short, CN’s customers have access
to ample information that they can use to understand the basis of demurrage
charges and to dispute any charges they believe to be inappropriate. There is no
problem here that requires the agency to adopt nationwide, uniform regulation of
the content of demurrage invoices.
B.

Prescribing National Invoicing Requirements Is Unnecessary
and Could Generate Needless Litigation.

While CN believes that its current invoicing practices are already in
compliance with the NPRM proposal, the Board should not adopt the proposal, for
three reasons.
First, the Board does not have a sufficient factual record that could justify a
move in this re-regulatory direction. While the Ex Parte 754 hearing included
generalized complaints from some shippers alleging some railroads were not
providing sufficient information about demurrage bills, those complaints were
countered by hard evidence from CN about the extensive information that is
actually provided. The Board should not adopt an extensive set of prescriptive
national invoicing regulations without an adequate basis.
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Indeed, the Board’s predecessor agency long ago rejected policies that would
mandate nationwide paperwork requirements for demurrage bills. See Maintenance
of Records Pertaining to Demurrage, Detention, and Other Related Accessorial
Charges by Rail, Carriers of Property, Ex Parte No. 285, 47 Fed. Reg. 58273 (1982).
In that decision, the ICC repealed former rules mandating the records that
railroads were to keep to support demurrage charges, on the grounds that a railroad
should be given the flexibility to design its own systems in light of “the Federal
policy of less government interference in the day-to-day operations of the rail
industry.” Id. The Board should not reverse the principle underlying this ICC
decision by adopting requirements for the content of demurrage invoices that would
bind all Class I railroads.
Second, the NPRM’s proposed rules suggest that invoices will not be deemed
valid unless they include all eleven specific categories of information. This could
have unintended consequences and lead to increased demurrage litigation and
increasing complexity of the litigation. For example, what if a waybilling error by
the originating shipper causes a demurrage bill to show the wrong commodity for a
particular car? This would have no material effect on the demurrage billpayer’s
ability to understand and potentially dispute demurrage for that car, but under the
proposed new rules, a billpayer could argue that it should be deemed an invalid
invoice. Litigation over whether invoices comply with the Board’s new rules could
complicate future demurrage disputes and make resolving these disputes more
expensive and time-consuming for a railroad and its customers.

7

Third, CN has concerns about the proposed requirement that carriers “take
appropriate action to ensure that charges are accurate.” CN works to promote the
accuracy of its invoices, and has a process in place to review optional services
invoices to ensure they are accurate and to offset any impacts from CN service
failures before they are issued. As mentioned at the hearing, CN has a dedicated
team of more than ten full-time employees that reviews the accuracy of its invoices
using a highly structured process, with the focus being proactive adjustment of
optional services invoices before they are issued. See Ex Parte 754 Hearing Day 2
Tr. at 834-35 (May 23, 2019) (describing CN review process for optional services
invoices). But if the NPRM’s proposal were interpreted to require that every single
invoice be manually double-checked before it is sent, significant additional
resources would have to be deployed to perform busy work of reviewing invoices
that already have a high degree of accuracy. This would slow down the invoicing
process (ultimately making it harder for customers to evaluate invoices on a timely
basis) and would make it harder for CN to focus pre-invoicing time on the invoices
that are more likely to require review. This could also open up a new front for
litigation, as parties would now have to litigate over whether a railroad’s efforts to
ensure accuracy of its invoices constituted the requisite “appropriate action.”
CN is also concerned that a blanket requirement that every demurrage
invoice undergo a manual review could undermine CN’s 18-15-15 guarantee, under
which CN commits to bill for demurrage and other optional services within 18

8

business days of when the services were performed. 2 If the NPRM is adopted
unchanged, CN might be forced to reassess whether this guarantee will continue to
be realistic, and may be forced to change its practice to provide less prompt
invoicing and dispute resolution.
C.

If the Board Chooses to Regulate the Content of Demurrage
Invoices, It Should Adopt a General Standard Requiring
Sufficient Information to Allow the Billpayer to Determine the
Basis for Demurrage Charges.

For the above reasons, CN does not believe that any new regulation of the
content of demurrage invoicing is necessary. But if the Board nevertheless chooses
to adopt some specific regulation of the content of demurrage invoices, it should
consider a flexible standard rather than the detailed, eleven-category prescription
in the NPRM. The Board could accomplish the same purpose with a general
standard requiring a railroad to provide information sufficient to allow the party
responsible for demurrage to determine the basis for the demurrage charges and a
reasonable process to dispute those charges. Any such rule should make clear that
a railroad is free to provide this information through other electronic means and
platforms (and not “on or with” the invoice itself). The Board should not adopt
paperwork regulations that hamper a carrier’s ability to use more sophisticated
means to communicate with customers, including through electronic communication

In the second and third steps of the 18-15-15 guarantee, CN currently guarantees
that it will provide a response within 15 business days to a dispute of an invoice
that is made through CN’s electronic portal within 15 business days.
2

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or other means, such as software platforms or portals designed to share information
with customers.
In place of the Board’s proposed new 49 C.F.R. § 1333.4 language in the
NPRM, CN suggests that the Board consider the following alternative language:
Class I carriers shall ensure that recipients of demurrage
invoices have access to sufficient information to be able to
understand the basis for the charges and to dispute charges
believed to be unwarranted. This information can be provided
either on or with the demurrage invoice or through another
electronic means, including through a software platform or
portal.
II.

THE BOARD’S PROPOSAL TO ALLOW TERMINALS TO FORCE
DIRECT BILLING WITHOUT RAILROAD CONSENT SHOULD NOT
BE ADOPTED.
Under the NPRM proposal, shippers and receivers can unilaterally decide

demurrage responsibility amongst themselves without railroad involvement. This
is a sharp departure from the recognized purpose of demurrage, which is to make
sure that incentives to avoid demurrage are placed on the appropriate party to
reduce railcar delays by promptly loading and unloading railcars. The proposal that
a railroad would not be able to participate in a decision on whether a terminal or its
customer is responsible for demurrage would eliminate a railroad’s ability to ensure
that demurrage is creating an incentive for efficient utilization of cars and railroad
track and yard capacity consumed by dwelling cars.
The NPRM appears aimed at solving a problem that does not need a
regulatory solution: that a railroad supposedly refuses to agree to reasonable direct
billing arrangements, despite terminal customers who supposedly want to enter
agreements to accept all demurrage charges. CN is willing to reach agreement with
10

customers on billing arrangements when it is clear that all parties are interested in
that arrangement and that appropriate incentives are in place. Indeed, CN has
occasionally entered into confidential contracts agreeing to directly bill demurrage
to a terminal customer, if under the circumstances it is clear that demurrage will
continue to work as an effective incentive. Such agreements are only workable
where one entity assumes responsibility for payment of all demurrage bills. Any
dispute amongst the terminal and shipper regarding demurrage liability must be
resolved between themselves following payment to the railroad. But in many
situations “direct demurrage billing to terminal customers” is being advocated by
certain terminals who appear uninterested in facilitating efficient car utilization
and capacity of the interstate rail network and appear solely focused on not having
to pay demurrage for the delays they cause. CN is concerned that customers of
those terminals are not in the position to minimize demurrage where the terminal
orders in railcars from the serving yard and will not have information to
understand why a terminal orders in the cars of a different customer.
A.

The Board’s Current Final Rule was Adopted After a MultiYear Rulemaking Process With Broad Stakeholder
Participation in Ex Parte 707 and Struck the Right Balance.

The terminals advocating that demurrage liability be shifted to their
customers are making the exact same arguments that the Board rejected in Ex
Parte 707, where it found in its expertise that railcar receivers (including
warehousemen and terminals) are best positioned to reduce delays and avoid
demurrage. After compiling an extensive record through comments on both an
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the
11

Board concluded that it was appropriate to place responsibility for demurrage on
the receivers of railcars, who are “in the best position to expedite the loading or
unloading of rail cars at origin or destination.” Demurrage Liability, Ex Parte 707,
at 8 (Apr. 9, 2014) (“Ex Parte 707 Final Rule”). Allowing demurrage to be assessed
on railcar receivers “would enable carriers to adopt tariffs that place responsibility
for delaying the return of rail cars on the party in the best position to expedite the
movement of those cars.” Demurrage Liability, Ex Parte 707, at 10 (May 3, 2012)
(“Ex Parte 707 NPRM”).
The Board reached that conclusion with the support of customer interests,
who supported the Board’s appropriate allocation of demurrage responsibility to
railcar receivers. For example, the National Industrial Transportation League
argued that “the receiver of rail cars that caused the loading or unloading delays
[should] . . . be responsible for demurrage” and that adoption of “[t]his fault-based
approach properly places accountability on the party that fails to efficiently handle
the rail cars.” 3 While some terminals resisted the Ex Parte 707 approach, NITL
correctly observed that the concerns of these interests “were generally limited to an
assumption that the rule would increase their exposure for demurrage.” 4

Comments of National Industrial Transportation League at 4, Demurrage
Liability, Ex Parte No. 707 (filed Aug. 24, 2012).
3

Reply Comments of National Industrial Transportation League at 2, Demurrage
Liability, Ex Parte No. 707 (filed Sept. 21, 2012) (“The League and the railroad
commenters generally recognized the need for a clear rule that eliminates legal
uncertainties and allows for the reasonable use of demurrage to promote the
efficient use of railcars. Accordingly, the League and railroad commenters generally
supported the adoption of a conduct-based rule for demurrage liability. While many
of the intermediary commenters expressed concerns over the conduct-based
4

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CN believes that the Board, in reviewing the fully developed record in the
rulemaking and in its expertise, in Ex Parte 707 struck the right balance, by
holding that terminals, warehousemen, and other railcar receivers can generally be
liable for demurrage if they are provided with proper notice. Terminals and
warehousemen ultimately have the operational control over the last mile from
serving yard to facility because they order in the railcars and decide how to operate
their facility. Furthermore, terminals and warehousemen control the commercial
relationship with customers shipping to terminals and control what commercial
arrangements they will enter into with their own customers. They could choose to
manage the pipeline of goods flowing to the terminal to include terms in their
commercial contracts preventing shippers from “flooding” receivers with more cars
than they can handle and passing on charges for demurrage caused by a shipper’s
conduct rather than the terminal’s. See EP 707 Final Rule at 17 (expressing
preference that rules would “encourage[e] warehousemen . . . and shippers . . . to
address demurrage liability in their commercial arrangements”).
B.

The Baseline Demurrage Rules Should Not Be Altered By
Contracts to which a Railroad is not a Party

While the Board’s existing Part 1333 rules contemplate that parties can
contract for different arrangements, they make clear that the only contracts that
can alter the baseline rules are those between “a serving railroad and its
customers.” 49 C.F.R. § 1333.2. The Board has never held that the rule recognizing

approach, their concerns were generally limited to an assumption that the rule
would increase their exposure for demurrage.”).
13

receivers as appropriate recipients of a railroad’s demurrage invoices could be
altered by contracts between a receiver and its customers to which a railroad is not
a party. The courts have rejected arguments that such contracts could supplant the
legal rules. 5
The most vocal advocate of billing demurrage to terminal customers rather
than to terminals is Kinder Morgan, which is involved in multiple lawsuits with
railroads across the country over its nonpayment of demurrage invoices at its
terminals. CN filed one of these actions against Kinder Morgan over Kinder
Morgan’s failure to pay for the demurrage it incurs for cars that dwell in CN’s
Chicago-area Glenn Yard while awaiting Kinder Morgan’s instructions to deliver
them to its Argo terminal, a liquids and ethanol transloading facility. Kinder
Morgan has refused to pay a single demurrage invoice to CN in nearly four years,
because of an apparent decision by Kinder Morgan to simply ignore the Board’s
final rule in Ex Parte 707. 6
See, e.g., Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Kinder Morgan Liquids Terminals, LLC, No.
16-cv-8044 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2016) (“Kinder Morgan attempts to expand the scope of
the exclusion under 49 CFR § 1333.2 to include private contracts between a
terminal and its customers (shippers). This argument is misplaced. A plain reading
of the demurrage regulations clearly provides in the absence of a private contract
between a common carrier and its customers that the demurrage regulations will
apply. Therefore, Kinder Morgan is excused from demurrage liability only if CN is a
party to the agreements.”).
5

Indeed, KM has pressed an affirmative defense asserting that the Board’s final
rule in Ex Parte 707 is legally invalid (despite KM’s failure to appeal that final
rule). See Mem. in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Illinois Cent.
R.R. Co. v. Kinder Morgan Liquids Terminals LLC, 1:16-cv-08044 (N.D. Ill. filed
May 21, 2019) (Doc. 106); Answer to Amended Complaint at 19, Illinois Cent. R.R.
Co. v. Kinder Morgan Liquids Terminals LLC, 1:16-cv-08044 (N.D. Ill. Filed May
23, 2017) (Doc. 35).

6

14

CN’s litigation against Kinder Morgan is a telling illustration of the flaws
with the NPRM’s proposal to force a railroad to be governed by terminal-customer
agreements to which a railroad is not a party. While Kinder Morgan has alleged
that it has various agreements with its customers that assign demurrage liability to
its customers, those agreements have a host of conflicting provisions that have
added significant complexity to the demurrage litigation. Kinder Morgan has filed
a third party complaint against its customers, alleging that they breached their
contracts in which they agreed to pay for demurrage incurred by Kinder Morgan. 7
That third party complaint shows that in nearly all cases Kinder Morgan’s
customers did not accept demurrage liability in all circumstances. Some of Kinder
Morgan’s customers only agreed to accept demurrage that was not “attributable to”
Kinder Morgan. Some only agreed to accept demurrage not caused by Kinder
Morgan’s “negligence.” Some only agreed to accept demurrage not caused by Kinder
Morgan’s “negligence, willful conduct, or omission.” 8 Indeed, several of Kinder
Morgan’s customers have refused to accept liability for demurrage incurred at Argo
on the grounds that the demurrage is attributable to Kinder Morgan’s negligence or
contractual nonperformance. 9

Kinder Morgan Liquids Terminals, LLC’s Third Party Complaint, Illinois Cent.
R.R. Co. v. Kinder Morgan Liquids Terminals LLC, 1:16-cv-08044 (N.D. Ill. filed
July 12, 2019) (Doc. 122).
7

8

Id. at ¶¶ 43-49.

See, e.g., Third-Party Defendant Archer-Daniels-Midland Company’s Answer,
Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim to Kinder Morgan Liquids Terminals,
LLC’s Third Party Complaint, Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Kinder Morgan Liquids
Terminals LLC, 1:16-cv-08044 (N.D. Ill. filed Sept. 27, 2019) (Doc. 182).

9

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Kinder Morgan’s third party complaint against its customers illustrates both
the sheer complexities of potential terminal-customer contracts and the fact that
terminal customers often agree only to pay a portion of demurrage invoices, and
refuse to pay demurrage that the customer believes was caused by the terminal.
The NPRM rule does not contemplate any of these complexities. Indeed, the NPRM
would not even give a railroad the ability to see the actual demurrage liability
language between a terminal and its customer.
The NPRM also could create situations where a railroad could be compelled
to invoice demurrage differently at the same facility—directly billing to entities that
have signed an agreement with the terminal, while billing the remaining
demurrage to the terminal receiver. This would create considerable administrative
complexities, because a railroad would have to continually evaluate information on
the cars incurring demurrage at a particular facility in light of the current list of
direct billing customers, and would have to create separate bills for the same
facility on a regular basis. This would make it more challenging for a railroad to
issue accurate invoices on a timely basis.
Even if a terminal and its customer entered a contract in which the customer
unconditionally accepted responsibility for demurrage invoices accruing on its
traffic, the Board should not adopt a rule forcing a railroad to abide by a contract to
which a railroad is not a party. Demurrage is not simply a question of money. It is
a tool designed to incentivize efficient car utilization and compensate the railroad
for the use of its assets, whether cars or track. If a railroad is not a party to

16

contracts altering the default rules concerning which entity receives demurrage
invoices, they cannot be confident that the proper incentives are being set. That is
particularly true because terminals and their customers may have unequal
bargaining power. For example, if the NPRM is adopted, a large terminal could
condition access to its facility on a customer’s willingness to agree with the terminal
that the customer would accept all demurrage liability under all circumstances.
Such an arrangement would destroy the incentive demurrage creates for the
terminals to process railcars efficiently. (And the customer would have no recourse,
since terminals do not have an analogous common carrier obligation.)
C.

The NPRM Misstates Important Aspects of the Law.

The NPRM also appears to be based in some extent on misstatements of the
law that terminals pressed at the Ex Parte 754 hearing. For example, the NPRM’s
suggestions that a rail carrier is already permitted to issue direct bills to shippers
because they are “listed on the bill of lading” has no support in the actual language
of the Part 1333 regulations. 49 C.F.R. § 1333.2 clearly defines the parties who are
“subject to demurrage” to be “Any person receiving rail cars from a rail carrier for
loading or unloading who detains the cars beyond the period of free time set forth in
the governing demurrage tariff.” By only authorizing demurrage against persons
“receiving rail cars,” the regulations effectively forbid bills to nonreceivers in the
absence of an explicit agreement to that effect. The footnote in the NPRM
suggesting that a railroad could bill nonreceivers because they may be listed on the
bill of lading or because they were “historically responsible for demurrage” cannot
be reconciled with the final Ex Parte 707 rules, which explicitly and clearly changed
17

the law to “place demurrage liability on the receiver of rail cars, regardless of their
designation in the bill of lading, if the carrier had provided the receiver with notice
of its demurrage tariff.” EP 707 Final Rule at 5.
Moreover, the NPRM’s footnote suggestion that guarantees are “unsound in
law and policy” is unsupported and incorrect. Guarantees are a common feature in
multiple legal frameworks, and they are particularly common where one party is
assuming what would have ordinarily been another party’s liability. 10 The right of
an obligee 11 to demand a guarantee by a third party is recognized by both the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Uniform Commercial Code. 12 Indeed, the
regulations of a number of federal agencies provide that the agency may require a
third-party guarantee before the transaction is performed (typically in the context
of a grant or loan). 13

See, e.g., Jones Motor Co. v. Teledyne, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 490, 493 (D. Del. 1990)
(motor carrier tariff “required the shipper to guarantee to pay the shipping charges
if the third party [the consignor] refuses to do so”); McEntire v. Indiana Nat’l Bank,
471 N.E.2d 1216, 1219, 1222 (Ct. App. Ind. 1984) (“Equipment Lease Agreement”
between Bank and borrower required that third parties sign a guaranty upon
liabilities of borrower to the Bank.”).
10

An obligee is “[o]ne to whom an obligation is owed,” which would be the railroad
in the context of demurrage charges. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1104 (7th ed. 1999).
11

12

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251; UCC § 2-609.

See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 762.126(d)(4) (In program where USDA guarantees farm
loans, “The lender or agency may require additional personal and corporate
guarantees to adequately secure the loan.”); 10 C.F.R.§ 800.202 (d) (In making loans
to minority business enterprises seeking DOE contracts, the Secretary of DOE “may
require pledges, personal guarantees and other collateral security… in amounts and
on terms appropriate in the Secretary’s judgment, to protect the interests of the
United States.”); 49 C.F.R.§ 22.13(h): (In program providing short-term loans by
participating vendors for execution of contracts funded and supported by the
Department of Transportation, “individuals who own at least a 20% ownership

13

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Furthermore, the NPRM’s suggestion that a receiver’s guarantee of
demurrage billed to another party is inappropriate ignores that the primary reason
for a guarantee is not that the other party will become insolvent or simply refuse to
pay its bills, but rather that the shipper may refuse to pay demurrage charges that
it believes are the receiver’s fault. In agreements shifting demurrage payment
liability from a terminal to a third party, CN reserves all rights it may have to
pursue collection from the terminal if the third party disputes or does not pay CN’s
demurrage invoices. These provisions make sense given the example from Kinder
Morgan’s third-party agreements illustrating that most agreements between a
terminal and its customers do not in fact shift demurrage responsibility in all
circumstances, as illustrated above in Section II.B. Terminal customers often
refuse to accept liability that is caused by the terminal’s negligence or its
prioritization of other customers’ traffic. In those circumstances, it is appropriate
for terminals to be responsible for demurrage charges because they are the entity in
the supply chain in the best position to order in railcars and minimize dwelling cars
on rail tracks. A railroad should be able to collect demurrage from terminals in
these instances, as the Board recognized in its final rule in Ex Parte 707. If a
railroad is not allowed to reserve its ability to bill receivers for demurrage charges
that a customer refuses to pay, it would become impossible to hold terminals

interest in the borrower shall personally guarantee the STLP loan. DOT OSDBU,
in its discretion and in consulting with the participating lender, may require other
appropriate guarantees for loan as well.”).
19

accountable for delays they cause. This will have adverse impacts on car utilization
and rail track and yard capacity.
For all the above reasons, the Board should not mandate that a railroad be
forced to be bound by a demurrage billing arrangement between a terminal and its
customers to which the railroad is not a party. But CN would not object to a
statement from the Board making clear that the baseline rules of Ex Parte 707 can
be altered by contracts to which a railroad, a terminal, and terminal customers are
all parties. For example, the below additional language for § 1333.2 would clarify
that direct billing arrangements can be entered into by contract. (The proposed new
language is underlined.)
§ 1333.2 Who May Charge Demurrage
Demurrage shall be assessed by the serving rail carrier, i.e., the
rail carrier providing rail cars to a shipper at an origin point or
delivering them to a receiver at an end-point or intermediate
destination. A serving carrier and its customers (including those
to which it delivers rail cars at origin or destination) may enter
into contracts pertaining to demurrage, including contracts
allowing demurrage to be billed directly to a party other than
the railcar receiver, but in the absence of such contracts,
demurrage will be governed by the demurrage tariff of the
serving carrier.
D.

The NPRM’s Paperwork Reduction Act Notice Substantially
Understates the Costs that the Proposed Rules Would Create.

CN also notes that the NPRM’s Paperwork Reduction Act estimate is
substantially understated in multiple respects.
First, while CN does not believe that any of its billing systems would need to
be adjusted to comply with the proposed rules prescribing invoice elements, the
NPRM’s suggestion that billing system changes could be implemented with a one20

time investment of 40 hours per railroad does not appreciate the massive amount of
planning, testing, and implementation that must accompany any such billing
change, ranging from software development to internal training to communications
with customers about changes. The time could easily encompass hundreds of hours.
Second, the NPRM’s estimate of a one-time burden of 80 hours for a railroad
to establish protocols to ensure that demurrage charges would be “accurate and
warranted” is significantly understated. The NPRM appears to propose an ongoing
review requirement for every individual invoice, which will require substantial
ongoing time and effort. The NPRM does not address these costs, and instead acts
as though the Board’s addition of this requirement will require no additional hour
burdens going forward.
Third, the NPRM unrealistically claims that each Class I carrier would take
only 5 annual hours to implement the direct shipper billing proposal. The estimate
is predicated on a conclusion that it would take a railroad only 5 minutes to
permanently implement direct billing to a terminal customer. But in reality, direct
terminal customer billing would require continuing efforts to separate and generate
invoices. CN provides rail transportation to almost 500 terminals 14 in its United
States network. CN conservatively estimates that each large terminal of more than
5 shippers would require 1 hour of processing time per month, every month, and
each small terminal would require 30 minutes per month, plus additional time at

This number reflects locations where a receiver accepts shipment from multiple
customers at a single location.
14

21

start up were they to opt for direct billing. If some but not all terminal customers
are forced by terminals to agree to direct billing, a railroad could be required to
devote significant staffing needs to creating and separating the bills. And the
Paperwork Reduction Act analysis entirely ignores the burden that its regulations
would place on the small terminal customers who would be forced to begin
reviewing and disputing demurrage bills, despite being in no position to actually
control and understand decisions made by a terminal elsewhere in the country, such
as failing to efficiently unload railcars and failing to order in a railcar from a
serving yard.
III.

THE BOARD SHOULD GIVE CARRIERS SUFFICIENT TIME TO
NOTIFY CUSTOMERS OF ANY NECESSARY TARIFF CHANGES
If the Board were to adopt any changes to demurrage billing that require

tariff changes, it should be sure to provide a railroad with sufficient time to
implement conforming changes to its tariffs after publication of that rule. CN has
committed to provide 60 days’ notice of all major demurrage policy changes. If the
Board follows its typical practice of making its order effective 30 days after it is
served, then it would be impossible for CN to make any necessary amendments to
its tariffs and provide effective notice to its customers before the 30 days expire.
Therefore, if the Board were to adopt any change that would require a carrier
to alter its tariffs (such as the NPRM’s proposed change to the Ex Parte 707 rules),
CN suggests that a railroad should be allowed 30 days after the service date of any
final rule to publish conforming tariffs, and then 60 days for those changes to go
into effect.
22

Respectfully submitted,
Kathryn J. Gainey
Counsel, US Regulatory Affairs
CN
601 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
Suite 500, North Building
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 347-7840
[email protected]

/s/ Raymond A. Atkins
Raymond A. Atkins
Matthew J. Warren
Sidley Austin LLP
1501 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 736-8000
[email protected]

Dated: November 6, 2019

23

ATTACHMENT 1
SAMPLES OF CN OPTIONAL SERVICE INVOICE, INVOICE BACKUP
SUMMARY, AND INVOICE BACKUP DETAIL

Figure 1: Sample Optional Services Invoice

Figure 2: Invoice Backup – Summary

Figure 3: Invoice Backup – Details

ATTACHMENT 2
SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS OF CN,
FILED JUNE 6, 2019 IN EX PARTE 754

BEFORE THE
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD
___________________________
EX PARTE NO. 754
___________________________
OVERSIGHT HEARING ON DEMURRAGE AND ACCESSORIAL CHARGES
___________________________
SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS ON BEHALF OF CN
___________________________

Kathryn J. Gainey
Counsel, US Regulatory Affairs
CN
601 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
Suite 500, North Building
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 347-7840
[email protected]

Dated: June 6, 2019

BEFORE THE
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD
___________________________
EX PARTE NO. 754
___________________________
OVERSIGHT HEARING ON DEMURRAGE AND ACCESSORIAL CHARGES
___________________________
SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS ON BEHALF OF CN
___________________________
The U.S. rail operating subsidiaries of Canadian National Railway Company
(hereafter “CN”) thank the Board for the opportunity to supplement CN’s testimony
regarding demurrage and optional services.
It is tempting to assess the efficacy of demurrage and accessorial charges by
looking at the impact these may have on a specific customer (including terminals) in
a specific service setting. But that narrow focus would ignore the greater good
served by these charges. Demurrage policies are designed to increase capacity and
improve service by creating the right incentives for customers to “turn the assets” as
efficiently as possible. Railroads already have strong incentives to improve asset
utilization, since assets that sit idle or occupy valuable track space directly impact a
railroad’s ability to provide efficient and fluid service to its other customers on the
network. But customers do not have those natural incentives, since a customer’s
primary interest is in its own traffic—not the overall network. The solution cannot
be to throw more assets at the problem, creating further inefficiencies and
congestion, harming service, and increasing costs for all stakeholders. The solution

1

is to find a reasonable way to incentivize customers to move the assets efficiently.
Demurrage is endorsed by Congress as an essential tool to create those incentives.
While demurrage does not fully compensate railroads for the lost opportunity of a
non-productive asset, it creates the necessary motivations to promote the public
interest in a more efficient rail network.
While a casual observer of the May 22-23 hearing might conclude that the
Board is being asked to decide a dispute between shippers and railroads over the
proper role of demurrage and accessorial charges, the true divide is between the
vast majority of customers who depend on reliable rail service and who manage
their own operations efficiently and a minority of customers and their trade
associations who seek to impose inefficiencies on others without consequence.
Another divide is between the terminal operators who the Board has found are best
positioned to reduce or eliminate delays for loading or unloading shipments they
handle, and the terminal customers and other network users who the terminals
prefer to bear the consequences of their inefficiencies.
If the Board were to impair railroads’ statutory right to enforce reasonable
demurrage policies, service to the entire rail network would suffer. Chairman
Begeman is correct that “a continued focus on rail service is an overarching
responsibility of the Board.” 1 CN’s witness Derek Taylor explained how important
demurrage policies were to CN’s overarching focus on moving traffic safely and

Oversight Hearing on Demurrage and Accessorial Charges, STB Ex Parte No. 754,
Day 1 Transcript at 9 (May 22, 2019) (“Day 1 Tr.”).

1

2

efficiently and improving asset utilization so that we can provide the high level of
service that our customers demand.
As the Board considers concepts like fairness and reciprocity, it should
consider the overall interests of the supply chain in promoting network fluidity and
maximizing asset utilization. Many stakeholders in the supply chain depend on the
reliability and efficiency of CN’s service. As CN testified, approximately 80% of
CN’s customers operate without receiving a single demurrage invoice. 2 For CN, this
number confirms that its demurrage program is balanced and well-calibrated. It
enables a substantial majority of customers to operate with no demurrage charges,
while providing a continuing incentive for efficiency for the others.
Mindful of their role in the supply chain, most of CN’s customers have
structured their operations to make loading or unloading more efficient, have
worked to better match railcar orders with the output of their facilities (i.e.,
managing the pipeline from origin to destination for their moves), or have made
staffing changes or capital investments at their facilities to build resilience in their
own supply chain in the event of disruption. These efforts enhanced their ability to
turn equipment efficiently, which benefits the whole interstate freight rail network.
The Board should not disincentivize these efforts of the many or reward a minority

Oversight Hearing on Demurrage and Accessorial Charges, STB Ex Parte No. 754,
Day 2 Transcript at 835 (May 23, 2019) (“Day 2 Tr.”) (“I would like to add the last 5
weeks, 80% of our customers did not receive a demurrage invoice.”); see also
attached Supplemental Testimony of Keith Courtoreille.

2

3

who, at times, fail to operate efficiently and, as a consequence, are externalizing
their inefficiencies onto other participants in the supply chain.
The Board should also not forget that railroad demurrage practices are
already regulated in two ways. First, railroads must comply with the detailed
framework that the Board already has in place to ensure that demurrage policies
are reasonable and fair. The regulatory background requires fair notice and
protects against the collection of demurrage for delays caused by the railroad’s
conduct. Second, railroads are regulated and disciplined by the market, as
Congress intended. CN’s customers expect and demand that we deliver exceptional
service with high velocity and efficient transit times. CN wants to help its
customers compete in their markets. If we fail to meet those expectations, we risk
losing business in the highly competitive transportation markets that govern the
vast majority of our traffic.
CN’s supplemental comments first address some of the basic statutory and
regulatory principles governing demurrage. The Board’s notice for the hearing
asked parties to be prepared to address the application and effect of current
demurrage policies. 3 But some of the questions from members at the hearing—and
some of the incorrect assertions from other parties about the law in this area—
suggest that a review of the legal principles that Congress and the Board have
established would be helpful. Congress has given the Board clear instructions

Oversight Hearing on Demurrage and Accessorial Charges, STB Ex Parte No. 754
(STB served April 8, 2019).

3

4

about the importance of demurrage and about the limitations of the Board’s
authority that the Board cannot ignore—as much as some commenters may wish it
to. Moreover, the Board has established guidelines for addressing the
reasonableness of demurrage charges in both its case-by-case adjudications and its
recent Ex Parte No. 707 rulemaking. Suggestions that the Board ought to return to
a pre-Staggers regime of regulation are inconsistent with current governing
principles and should be rejected out of hand.
Second, CN responds to some discrete issues raised at the hearing where
supplemental testimony might be useful. For example, CN is addressing some of
the recurring questions at the hearing, such as the theoretical scenario of a shipper
who is unable to comply with a railroad’s demurrage policy; questions about how
“zero free time” policies work; and the suitability of a cost-benefit analysis for
individual demurrage adjudications. CN also responds to some of the incorrect
accusations lodged at the hearing.
Third, CN describes some of its takeaways from the hearing and some of the
commitments that it is making to respond to concerns raised by the Board and
stakeholders. CN understands that some shippers believe that they may need an
avenue for a cost effective forum to resolve demurrage disputes; CN therefore is
committing to join the STB’s arbitration program for demurrage disputes under
$200,000. CN also commits that it will develop mechanisms to collect broader
feedback from its customers on its demurrage policies.

5

CN has also attached supplemental testimony from Keith Courtoreille, which
provides some additional information to the Board about some of the topics
discussed at the hearing.
I.

THE BOARD SHOULD NOT ACCEPT THE INVITATION OF SOME
SHIPPERS TO FAVOR THEIR OWN INTERESTS TO THE
DETRIMENT OF OTHERS WHO DEPEND UPON THE
INTERCONNECTED RAIL NETWORK.
Some witnesses seem to want to use the Board’s oversight hearing to upend

the structure of demurrage charges and have the Board impose sweeping legal and
policy changes to serve narrow parochial interests. For example, multiple logistics
providers asked the Board to discard the 49 C.F.R. Part 1333 rules adopted just five
years ago and return to a regime where terminals could never be held accountable
for the delays they cause. 4 Other shippers asked the Board to make systematic
changes like instituting nationwide demurrage rules, making rail carriers liable for
demurrage, banning demurrage charges for private cars, or prohibiting demurrage
charges for cars in constructive placement when dwelling in rail yards. 5
These parties’ requests fail to recognize the statutory and regulatory
foundations governing demurrage and the regulatory structure that is already in
place to ensure that receivers have the ability to seek relief from unreasonable
demurrage charges. The Board is not writing on a blank slate, and it should not

See, e.g., Day 2 Tr. at 771-76 (asking STB to reverse rule allowing demurrage to be
billed to terminals).
4

See, e.g., Day 1 Tr. at 91-92 (suggesting that railroads should be charged
demurrage for private cars); Day 1 Tr. at 242-245 (advocating for nationwide
demurrage rule proposals).
5

6

lose sight of Congress’s express guidance or lightly abandon the demurrage policies
that the Board has carefully developed in recent rulemakings and adjudications.
Nor should it ignore the changes that have occurred in the regulatory framework
over the past four decades. The Board’s current precedent and governing rules have
long since left behind concepts deployed in the pre-Staggers era, and this oversight
hearing is no place to consider reviving them.
Four legal principles should guide the Board in any action it takes in relation
to demurrage:
1) Congress explicitly authorized demurrage and recognized its important
purpose in promoting efficient asset utilization and fluidity on the
interconnected rail network.
2) The Board’s regulatory role is circumscribed, and the Board’s regulatory
authority and mission are far different now than they were before the
Staggers Act.
3) Railroads cannot collect demurrage for delays caused by the railroad’s
conduct.
4) Railcar receivers are liable for demurrage if they are on notice of the
demurrage tariff, because they are best positioned to reduce delays.
A.

Principle 1: Congress explicitly authorized demurrage and
recognized its important purpose.

The first source for any question about the Board’s legal authority on a
subject is the statute. For demurrage, Congress provided clear instructions in 49
U.S.C. § 10746:
A rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Board under this part shall compute demurrage charges, and establish
rules related to those charges, in a way that fulfills the national needs
related to—
(1) freight car use and distribution; and
7

(2) maintenance of an adequate supply of freight cars to be
available for transportation of property.
Three points about the statute are of particular importance. First, Section
10746’s very existence is noteworthy. Demurrage was specifically endorsed and
encouraged in the Interstate Commerce Act—a clear signal that Congress has long
recognized the importance of demurrage to the functioning and efficiency of the rail
network. Second, the statute does not merely say that railroads “may” compute
demurrage charges and establish rules for those charges—it rather says that
railroads “shall” compute those charges. “Shall” is generally recognized to reflect
the mandatory language of command. 6 This mandatory language is again
noteworthy; Congress did not say that railroads can establish demurrage
programs—it said they must establish those programs. 7 Third, Congress framed
the purposes of demurrage not in terms of cost recovery or a penalty for poor
performance, but rather in terms of incentives. In Congress’s view, the purpose of
demurrage is to incentivize behavior that serves the national needs for freight car
use, distribution, and supply by encouraging loading and unloading to be done
efficiently so railcars can be placed at the next origin.

See, e.g., Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947) (“The word ‘shall’ is
ordinarily the ‘language of command’”) citing Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493
(1935).
6

The suggestion at the hearing that Congress’s mandate to “compute” demurrage
charges might not entail a mandate to “collect” these charges would frustrate
Congress’s plain legislative intent. The mere computation of charges without actual
collection could hardly create a meaningful incentive to fulfill the national needs for
freight car distribution and promote network fluidity.

7

8

Both the Board and courts have acknowledged Congress’s clear statutory
endorsement of demurrage “as an important tool in ensuring the smooth
functioning of the rail system.” Demurrage Liability, STB Ex Parte No. 707, at 2
(STB served April 11, 2014).
B.

Principle 2: The Board’s Role Is Limited, In Accordance With
Congress’s Deregulatory Purpose.

A second critical statutory principle is that Congress has sharply
circumscribed the Board’s regulatory role to review railroads’ demurrage practices
from what it once was. At the time that many older demurrage cases were decided,
the ICC was a top-down regulator that imposed detailed, uniform rules on how
demurrage had to be documented and collected and that regularly reviewed
nationwide agreements setting demurrage rates for the industry. 8
Now, however, Congress has made clear that railroads need to be given the
freedom to set their own demurrage policies and that the Board’s primary role is to
resolve individual complaints alleging that aspects of a carrier’s particular
demurrage policy are unreasonable. The Board’s limited jurisdiction means that its
role is not to define what demurrage policies are the “best”—it is rather to provide a
forum for shippers to challenge aspects of a carrier’s demurrage policies or
applications that shippers believe are unreasonable. Put differently, the Board is

See, e.g., Car Demurrage Rules Nationwide, 350 I.C.C. 777 (1975); see also
Railroads Per Diem, Mileage, Demurrage, and Storage Agreement, 1 I.C.C.2d 924,
934 (1985) (rejecting prior policy of nationwide decisionmaking because “a free
market approach to such charges will more effectively foster the goals of the
national rail transportation policy”).

8

9

not charged with developing and imposing the most reasonable demurrage policy—
it is instead charged with setting the boundaries of what is unreasonable. That
charge is one that the Board is to carry out as a case-by-case adjudicator—not as a
command-and-control regulator.
Nevertheless, the Board’s role is not insignificant. On the contrary, it is
vitally important and consistent with its mandate that the Board continue to
provide a forum for resolving disputes (in addition to individual disputes that are
resolved in courts or in arbitration), and the Board’s case-by-case precedents
provide important guidance on what policies are unreasonable. But except in
limited circumstances, 9 the Board is not a roving investigator charged with
reviewing and redefining railroad demurrage policies or imposing nationwide
uniform demurrage standards. It is rather an adjudicator available to resolve
demurrage complaints that are brought before it. 10
The Board has been rightly reluctant to use its rulemaking authority to set
nationwide demurrage policy, given the unique circumstances that can affect
whether a particular demurrage charge is unreasonable in an individual case. In
the aftermath of Staggers, the ICC specifically abandoned a prior nationwide

The Board now has limited authority to initiate investigations into potential
violations of the Interstate Commerce Act that are of national or regional
significance.

9

Cf. NAFCA v. BNSF Ry. Co., STB Docket No. 42060 (Sub-No. 1), at 13 n.46 (STB
served Jan. 26, 2007) (“The fact that a shipper might suffer hardship from a service
failure at a particular location or particular locations does not warrant overturning
the railroad’s entire storage or demurrage program, as there are other remedies
available for that situation.”).

10

10

demurrage regime in 1985, finding that “the need for uniform demurrage and
storage charges has been overstated, that such charges clearly can be established on
a unilateral basis, and that a free market approach to such charges will more
effectively foster the goals of the national rail transportation policy.” Railroad Per
Diem, Mileage, Demurrage – Agreement, 1 I.C.C.2d 924, 934 (1985).
The only recent exception has been Ex Parte 707, where the Board needed to
resolve a significant legal controversy over what type of notice of a demurrage tariff
is required for demurrage charges to be invoiced to railcar receivers like
warehousemen and terminal operators. See Demurrage Liability, Ex Parte No. 707.
In that rulemaking, the Board specifically declined to issue rules of general
applicability about fact-specific issues like bunching and actual placement, holding
that such issues were “best addressed in the context of individual disputes.” Id. at
23-24.
Finally, the Board’s authority is particularly circumscribed when addressing
allegations about the level of a rate or how rates are calculated. The D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals has held that the Board’s governing statute requires challenges to
the level of a rate to be brought under the Board’s rate jurisdiction, not under its
practices jurisdiction. Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. ICC, 867 F.2d 646, 649 (D.C. Cir.
1989). In the same vein, the Board’s investigative authority does not permit it to
initiate investigations concerning the level of a rate. See Rules Relating to BoardInitiated Investigations, STB Ex Parte No. 731, at 11 (Dec. 7, 2016) (“In addition,
there is no need to expressly exclude rate disputes in these rules—such disputes are

11

not subject to Board-Initiated Investigation under the statute (whether or not they
are of national or regional significance).”).
While several questions were asked about how railroads set demurrage rates
or the components of rates, these are not appropriate topics for a public hearing. In
the first place, asking railroads to publicly comment on considerations in setting
rates or charges in a forum alongside other railroads could cause serious
competitive harm. Moreover, questions suggesting that railroads are required to
separately calculate specific “cost” and “penalty” components of demurrage charges
stem from an antiquated line of cases that have long since lost their relevance. It is
true that in the 1970s the ICC held in several decisions that, if the shipper
affirmatively demonstrated “due diligence” in avoiding demurrage charges, a
railroad could only collect a “per diem” charge for demurrage (as compensation for
prescribed car hire expenses) and not any additional penalty component. 11 This due
diligence standard was exacting: it required “evidence that [the customer] made
special efforts to avoid or abate the accrual of demurrage.” See Prince Mfg. Co. v.
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 356 I.C.C. 702, 707 (1978). Moreover, any such waiver of the
full demurrage tariff charge required special dispensation from the ICC, which
might not be granted even if the railroad and the customer agreed. 12
11

See, e.g., Ormet Corp. v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 341 I.C.C 647, 651 (1972).

See Prince Mfg., 356 I.C.C. at 707 (“The parties are not at liberty to decide
between themselves that a particular charge was just and reasonable. Thus, in
numerous informal cases involving an allegation that demurrage charges were
unjust or unreasonable, we have denied special-docket applications (where carrierdefendants admitted allegations of unreasonableness) and later denied reparations
on the same matter.” (footnote omitted)).
12

12

These concepts have been left far behind. No one would suggest in 2019 that
a railroad and customer could not agree between themselves that a particular
demurrage charge should be waived or refunded. The filed rate doctrine is no
longer controlling, and there has not been a special docket or waiver proceeding
involving demurrage at the agency in more than thirty years. 13 Car hire rates have
been deprescribed and are now determined bilaterally and confidentially by rail
carriers, eliminating the basis for a fixed “compensation” component of a railroad’s
demurrage charge. Indeed, the idea that demurrage must be separated into
identified compensation and penalty components has been cited in only one agency
decision since the early 1980s, 14 and customers today receive relief from the entire
demurrage charge in appropriate circumstances, not just a “penalty” component.
Coupled with the fact that shippers are no longer required to prove their “due
diligence” to avoid demurrage, the development of demurrage jurisprudence since
the 1970s has in many ways been favorable for customers. Prior concepts of a
mathematical division of demurrage charges into identifiable components are no
longer relevant to how the Board adjudicates demurrage disputes. 15
See The Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. and Ulysses Irrigation Pipe Co. -- Exempt. To
Waive Demurrage Charges, ICC Docket No. 40129, 1987 WL 98283 (1987).
13

See R. Franklin Unger – Pet. for Decl. Order – Assessment and Collection of
Demurrage and Switching Charges, STB Docket No. 42030, 2000 STB LEXIS 333
(2000).

14

15In

any event, CN does not think of demurrage as being made up of a certain
percentage of cost recovery and a certain percentage of a “penalty.” CN views
demurrage as an incentive for efficiency, not a cost recovery mechanism. That said,
CN expects that in most situations the demurrage charge it receives is far
outweighed by the costs it incurs from dwelling railcars (which include both
operational costs, harms to fluidity, and opportunity costs for the railroad and other
13

C.

Principle 3: A railroad cannot collect demurrage if it is at
fault.

Third, the Board has made clear that a railroad may not collect demurrage if
it is at fault. As the Board recognized in Capitol Materials, “[a] shipper should not
be required to compensate a railroad for delay in returning the asset if the reason
for the delay is not the shipper’s, but the railroad’s fault.” Capitol Materials, Inc.—
Pet. for Declaratory Order, 7 S.T.B. 576, 577 (2004). Federal courts agree that
current law requires “that a shipper be allowed to demonstrate before the [agency]
that erratic service is the fault of the railroad and that a shipper should therefore
not be assessed a charge for idle track time caused thereby.” NAFCA v. STB, 529
F.3d 1166, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
The law is clear, however, that “the question of fault is fact-specific,” and that
“the burden is on a complaining shipper to show that demurrage fees are excessive
in a particular instance because of some fault on the railroad’s part.” Id. at 1173.
As the D.C. Circuit has observed, the fact that shippers have the burden of proving
railroad fault flows directly from the general principle that shippers have the
burden of proving that a railroad practice is unreasonable. Id. at 1173 n.6.
D.

Principle 4: The Board appropriately placed demurrage
responsibility on the receiver, if the receiver has actual notice
of a railroad’s demurrage tariff.

Finally, the Board made clear in its recent Demurrage Liability rules that
demurrage can properly be charged against any person receiving railcars from a rail

customers whose service is deteriorated and who are not able to get a car at origin
as quickly when cars are dwelling).
14

carrier for loading or unloading, so long as that person has actual notice of the
terms of the demurrage tariff prior to the carrier’s placement of the railcars. See
Demurrage Liability, STB Ex Parte No. 707, at 9-15 & App. A; 49 C.F.R. §§ 1333.1 1333.3. The Board’s rules were the result of a three-and-a-half-year rulemaking
proceeding in which it received comments from multiple parties and resolved a
significant divide among courts about the circumstances in which demurrage could
be charged to railcar receivers who were responsible for loading and unloading, but
who were often not named on the bill of lading. Indeed, in urging the Supreme
Court to deny certiorari on a petition seeking to resolve the circuit split, the
Solicitor General’s amicus brief urged the Court to “allow the Board to apply its
expertise to resolve the issue of demurrage liability for warehousemen, as well as
other related demurrage issues, through its pending rulemaking proceeding.” 16 The
Board concluded that the 1969 ICC precedent that led to this confusion was
inconsistent with the purpose of 49 U.S.C. § 10746 and with good policy.
Instead, the Board recognized as a policy matter that “responsibility for
demurrage should be placed upon the party in the best position to expedite the
loading or unloading of rail cars at origin or destination.” Demurrage Liability, STB
Ex Parte No. 707, at 8. And it found that terminals and warehousemen were in the
best position to minimize demurrage liability for the shipments they receive—
despite their protests to the contrary. See id. at 8-9. While many of the same

Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae at 9-10, Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v.
Groves, No. 09-1212 (filed Dec. 10, 2010).

16

15

parties who participated in Ex Parte 707 returned to this hearing to make the same
arguments they made before in an attempt to escape future liability for demurrage
charges, there is no cause for the Board to revisit its Ex Parte 707 conclusion.
II.

RESPONSES TO OTHER QUESTIONS AND ISSUES.
A.

CN Actively Works With Customers To Encourage Prompt
Loading and Unloading of Equipment and Address Unique
Issues.

Much of the discussion at the hearing focused on what to do about a customer
who alleges that it cannot comply with a demurrage tariff and has no choice but to
incur charges. While the Board’s concern about this hypothetical scenario is
understandable, it does not reflect CN’s experience with the vast majority of railcar
receivers.
CN cannot speak to the circumstances faced by individual customers of other
railroads, but CN can say that its general experience is that customers have
multiple options to minimize or avoid demurrage charges. Those options might be
operational fixes to improve the efficiency of loading or unloading. They might be
supply chain improvement and better pipeline management to ensure that the flow
of cars into a facility matches that facility’s ability to load or unload the cars. Or
they might be storage options, such as contracting with railroads or other parties to
use storage tracks or investing in internal storage capacity. While every customer
is different, most customers have viable options to substantially reduce or eliminate
demurrage.
CN works with its customers on an individualized basis to help them reduce
demurrage liability and increase efficiency through better pipeline management,
16

more economical storage, or other options. Mr. Courtoreille’s supplemental
testimony describes some of the eBusiness tools that CN provides to give customers,
including terminals, visibility into the railcars moving in their supply chains. CN
also maintains an internal fleet capacity planning group which leverages the same
tools and techniques that CN uses for its system cars for large private car
customers. This group assists customers in right-sizing their private car fleets to
improve network fluidity and help avoid demurrage charges. And where a customer
lacks sufficient storage options, CN works to help customers identify economical
alternatives.
In short, the hypothetical example of a customer who has no ability to avoid
demurrage charges remains, in CN’s experience, just a hypothetical. We work with
our customers to address their unique situations, and in our view customers have
multiple options to minimize or avoid demurrage charges.
B.

Customers Do Not Need Extra Free Time To Avoid Demurrage.

Some testimony at the hearing suggested that so-called “zero free time”
policies would “invariably” cause receivers to incur demurrage charges even when
they “perform perfectly.” 17 This is not accurate and is not borne out by CN’s
experience. As CN has testified, it does not issue credits for the storage of private
cars. But “no storage time” for private cars at CN does not in fact mean “zero time,”
rather, it means no extra free time will be provided if a customer does not ask that
cars be delivered in the first available service window. The fact that only 20% of

17

Day 1 Tr. at 28.
17

CN’s customers pay any demurrage is powerful evidence that its policies on private
car storage do not equal automatic demurrage.
When CN provides no additional storage time (as it does for private car
unloading), it does not mean that a customer immediately incurs demurrage. It
means that a customer is not given an extra day to order a car in for delivery. As
Mr. Courtoreille explains in his attached supplemental testimony, no demurrage is
charged if a customer orders cars in for the first available service after being
notified that the car is ready for delivery. The cut-off times for these orders are
specific to a customer’s service plan. Thus, if a customer is only served on Mondays
and Thursdays, and a car arrives for delivery on a Friday, the customer will not be
charged demurrage so long as the customer asks that the car be delivered on the
following Monday. The cut-off time for requesting that Monday delivery will be 4
hours before the customer’s scheduled time of service.
CN’s eBusiness tools make it even easier for customers to avoid demurrage,
by providing detailed tracking that allows customers to know in advance when cars
arrive and will be available for loading. Mr. Courtoreille’s supplemental testimony
includes a sample First Mile/Last Mile dashboard that shows the kind of visibility
that is available to customers, including terminals,to understand their pipeline.
Indeed, a customer does not need to wait for a notice of constructive placement to
order a car in for delivery. If the customer sees that a car is en route, it can order it
in before the car is actually constructively placed.

18

For all of these reasons, CN’s customers using private cars are able to
manage their pipelines without incurring demurrage charges, and most of them do.
C.

CN’s Demurrage Tariff Easily Passes a Proper Cost-Benefit
Analysis.

CN generally supports the Board’s use of cost-benefit analyses in carrying out
its regulatory role. But suggestions at the hearing that the Board might use a costbenefit analysis to resolve individual demurrage complaints are impractical. Any
cost-benefit analysis has to consider the effect of demurrage incentives on all
stakeholders. The Board cannot simply look at costs and benefits for the railroad
and the complaining customer; it must also look at other stakeholders who benefit
from a more efficient network and the costs to those stakeholders and costs to
network fluidity if a particular customer does not efficiently load or unload railcars
and cars are dwelling in CN’s serving yard.
CN is confident that such an analysis would show that the benefits of its
demurrage program far outweigh the costs. Indeed, Congress has already decided
that the benefits of demurrage outweigh the costs, when it legislated that railroads
“shall compute” demurrage charges and “statutorily recognized [demurrage] as an
important tool in ensuring the smooth functioning of the rail system.” 18 But it is not
practical for the Board to perform a full cost-benefit analysis in an individual
adjudication, because the benefits of demurrage are spread so widely among users
of the rail network and others who depend upon efficient rail operations.

18

Demurrage Liability, STB Ex Parte 707, at 2.
19

D.

Kinder Morgan’s Allegations About CN Are Meritless.

CN is in federal court litigation against Kinder Morgan (“KM”) over its
failure to pay for the demurrage it incurs for cars that back up in CN’s Chicago-area
Glenn Yard while awaiting KM’s instructions to deliver them to its Argo terminal.
The litigation did not arise from disputes about service problems or allegations of
unfair tariff changes. It stems from the fact that KM has refused to pay a single
demurrage invoice to CN in nearly four years, because of an apparent decision by
KM that the Board’s 2014 Demurrage Liability rules are not lawful. Indeed, KM has
pressed an affirmative defense asserting that the Board’s final rule holding that
terminals like KM are liable for demurrage is legally invalid (despite KM’s failure
to appeal that final rule). 19 KM is right that the amount at dispute in that
litigation now exceeds $8 million, but that is a function of the massive congestion
that KM has been causing in the Chicago terminal over the past several years and
its refusal to pay one penny of demurrage. While KM claimed to the Board that “we
will be responsible for the liabilities that we create,” its behavior to date has not
matched that claim in CN’s experience. (Tr. at 57).
Given the ongoing litigation, CN will not respond to each of the claims KM
makes. KM’s allegations that CN imposes “strict liability” for demurrage, that it
does not recognize “fault-based defenses,” and that it fails to provide effective

See Mem. in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Illinois Cent.
R.R. Co. v. Kinder Morgan Liquids Terminals LLC, 1:16-cv-08044 (N.D. Ill. filed
May 21, 2019) (Doc. 106); Answer to Amended Complaint at 19, Illinois Cent. R.R.
Co. v. Kinder Morgan Liquids Terminals LLC, 1:16-cv-08044 (N.D. Ill. Filed May
23, 2017) (Doc. 35).
19

20

invoice review or dispute resolution are not supported, and are not consistent with
any of the other testimony that the Board has heard regarding CN’s demurrage
policies. But two points require a specific response.
First, KM’s claims of retaliation are nonsense. It first claims that it was
“retaliation” for CN to increase the public tariff rate for ethanol shipments to Argo
by $300 in January 2019. That claim makes little sense, since KM does not pay
that line-haul rate; its customers do. KM further asserts that it is “discriminatory”
for CN’s tariff to charge higher demurrage fees in Chicago than it charges elsewhere
on its system in the United States. But as the Board well knows, congestion in
Chicago has an outsized impact on the fluidity of all rail networks, and CN has good
cause to incentivize efficient behavior in that vital area. (CN similarly sets
demurrage charges at a higher level in Vancouver and a higher charge that applies
during winter months across CN’s network.) There is nothing discriminatory about
a tariff that applies generally to Chicago carload receivers subject to CN 9000. 20
Second, KM alleged that CN “absolutely refused” to be part of three-party
agreements among KM and its customers for demurrage liability during the
settlement discussions KM and CN conducted under the Court’s guidance

At the hearing, KM was asked a question asserting that CN “raised the
demurrage charge to $300” and that “the demurrage charge is 1 and [a half] times
higher for you than for anybody else in the Chicago area.” But the premise of this
question about demurrage referred not to CN’s demurrage charge from CN 9000 for
receivers in Chicago; instead it referred to KM’s testimony about the increase in
CN’s rate for ethanol shipments to Argo. KM’s witness did not correct the
misunderstanding of its testimony and instead replied “We believe that was
retaliatory.” Day 1 Tr. at 106.
20

21

(settlement discussions that were confidential until KM unilaterally decided to air
them in a public hearing). Day 1 Tr. at 94. KM’s allegation is inaccurate. While CN
will limit its public response out of respect for the confidentiality of settlement
discussions, CN notes that litigation was stayed for 18 months in which CN
negotiated in good faith with KM seeking a potential resolution. Those negotiations
included discussions about agreements involving KM’s customers, but those
discussions were not successful.
III.

CN’S COMMITMENTS TO THE BOARD AND ITS CUSTOMERS.
At the close of the hearing, Chairman Begeman asked railroads to think

seriously about the comments at the hearing and to consider whether any changes
might be warranted. CN took that advice to heart, and it will continue to think
about better ways to communicate with our customers. CN believes that our
demurrage program and policies are already responsive to many of the Board’s
concerns and already embody best practices. In this regard, we were encouraged by
the general lack of comments from shippers regarding CN’s policies and practices. 21
While it is fair to say that CN was not a focus of concerns expressed at the
hearing, we listened to stakeholders and the Board, and we have reexamined our
program in light of the Chairman’s request that carriers consider taking actions in
response to the hearing. CN is prepared to make the following commitments at this
time:

Kinder Morgan, of course, is an exception, since it is opposed to paying any
demurrage under any circumstances and disagrees with the Board’s final rule
adopted in Ex Parte No. 707.
21

22

•

In the interest of ensuring that customers have another forum to
resolve disputes over demurrage, CN will file a notice in the STB Ex
Parte 699 docket of its intent to consent to participate in the Board’s
arbitration program under 49 C.F.R. § 1108 subject to certain
conditions. This will provide another method of alternative dispute
resolution to resolve certain disputes over demurrage, in addition to
informal resolution of disputes such as the Board’s informal mediation
process.

•

CN is also evaluating mechanisms to regularly gather feedback from
customers regarding service and optional services.

•

CN will continue to offer technology to assist customers and railcar
receivers with supply chain management, including the tools described
in Mr. Courtoreille’s attached supplemental testimony

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Kathryn J. Gainey
Kathryn J. Gainey
Counsel, US Regulatory Affairs
CN
601 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
Suite 500, North Building
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 347-7840
[email protected]
Dated: June 6, 2019

23

BEFORE THE
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD
___________________________
EX PARTE NO. 754
___________________________
OVERSIGHT HEARING ON DEMURRAGE AND ACCESSORIAL CHARGES
___________________________
SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY OF KEITH COURTOREILLE
___________________________

BEFORE THE
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD
___________________________
EX PARTE NO. 754
___________________________
OVERSIGHT HEARING ON DEMURRAGE AND ACCESSORIAL CHARGES
___________________________
SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY OF KEITH COURTOREILLE
___________________________
Following the Board’s May 21-22 hearing regarding demurrage, CN is
submitting this supplemental testimony to provide the Board with additional
information relevant to some of the issues that arose at the hearing. While most of
the testimony was not directed at CN, there were some areas where some additional
information regarding demurrage practices might be helpful to the Board. The
following supplemental testimony is intended to clarify and expand upon some of
the topics raised at the hearing to complete the record.
A.

Demurrage Promotes Asset Velocity and Network Fluidity.
As CN explained at the hearing, we do not treat demurrage as a revenue

stream. Instead, demurrage serves as an incentivizing device that encourages
customers to turn assets promptly, thereby improving network fluidity.
Imagine a customer who finds it more convenient to leave a rail car in a CN
yard for several days rather than ordering it immediately. From the narrow
perspective of the customer’s business needs, that decision might make economic
sense. But because the interconnected rail network in North American involves the
1

use of shared assets, that customer’s individual choice to dwell cars in a CN yard
can result in the deterioration of fluidity within that yard. The impacts of that
customer’s decision can flow throughout the system, impacting both local service for
other customers and through service for other traffic moving through the yard. In
such instances, demurrage ensures that the customer cannot impose costs to the
network and the overall supply chain through its choice to dwell cars in CN’s yard
without the customer paying a price for those costs. This incentivizes receivers of
rail cars to load or unload equipment as quickly as possible.
The impacts of dwelling cars in a yard cannot be overstated. In one instance,
CN found that shaving one day of dwell from a pool of 11,000 CN centre beam cars
translated into 400 additional loads at origin. As this example illustrates, asset
velocity is dependent upon capacity. Dwelling cars in a serving yard reduces the
capacity to move cars through the yard, which flows through the whole network.
B.

80% of CN Customers Incur No Demurrage Charges.
As I testified at the hearing, the vast majority of CN’s carload customers in

the United States incur no demurrage charges. 80% of CN customers incurred no
demurrage charges in the sample period we examined of five weeks from the Week
of Feb 24- March 24, 2019. See Table 1, below. This data is consistent with CN’s
approach to demurrage as an incentivizing tool to encourage its customers to
order/call their calls in from our serving yards, and to load and unload product as
quickly as possible and return equipment to the network to promote efficient asset
utilization. By ordering in and loading and unloading cars more quickly, the cars or
2

yard space can be released to CN and be used by the next customer. This in turn
reduces the number of cars on the network needed to meet customer demand and
increases fluidity of the tracks and yards, which benefits all participants in the
supply chain.
Table 1: Customer Demurrage Invoices from February 24-March 24, 2019

Sample Week
2019-02-24
2019-03-03
2019-03-10
2019-03-17
2019-03-24
Average %

Invoiced
Demurrage
20%
21%
19%
19%
19%
20%

Not Invoiced
Demurrage
80%
79%
81%
81%
81%
80%

The high percentage of CN customers who never incur a single demurrage
bill is compelling proof that customers can and do manage their business so as to
avoid demurrage, thereby improving asset velocity for the greater good of the
network. While other customers make business choices that mean they occasionally
incur demurrage charges, rhetoric at the hearing that customers are unable to avoid
demurrage charges is plainly overstated.
C.

Service Windows Provide for Extra Time for Private Cars.
“Zero free time” was a recurring topic of discussion at the hearing, and some

more information on that topic might be helpful. As I explained in my initial
comments, CN does not issue credits for dwelling private cars in CN’s yards or on
CN’s lines. CN heard the Board’s concern about the concept of “zero free time” at
the hearing. However, the concept of “no storage time” for private cars at CN does
3

not in fact mean “zero time.” Rather, it means “no extra time after a customer
chooses not to order/call in cars for its first available service.” At CN, a customer
does not begin to be charged demurrage for a constructively placed car until the
customer fails to order the car in the next available service delivery window—
delivery windows that are based on each customer’s individualized service schedule.
CN aligns its “order in” cutoff times to a customer’s individual service schedule, and
generally sets each customer’s cutoff time at four hours before its next scheduled
time of service. This ensures that customers who do not receive service on
weekends, for example, are not penalized if a car arrives in the serving yard during
a time when the customer’s facility is closed. All they have to do to avoid demurrage
is to ask for delivery before the cutoff time for their next scheduled service. If a
customer fails to ask for delivery at its scheduled service date, and instead leaves
the car in a CN serving yard while it awaits delivery instructions, then the
demurrage clock will start. That policy is entirely consistent with the purposes of
demurrage because it ensures that private equipment will not clog railway yards
and prevent smooth operations for the handling of all traffic. It creates an
appropriate incentive for efficiency while affording customers time to plan.
A few examples illustrate how CN’s practices in this area give customers
adequate time to order in the cars to avoid demurrage.
Example A: Customer has service two days per week: Tuesday and
Thursday, 10:00AM to 6:00PM, and has a closed gate facility. A car arrives Sunday
at 9:00PM. Customer orders the car on Monday at 4:00PM.
4

In this example, a car arrives at CN’s serving yard when the customer’s
facility is closed. The customer is a “closed gate” facility, which means that CN
cannot directly deliver cars when they arrive, and instead must notify the customer
that cars are ready for delivery and wait for delivery instructions. Thus, upon
delivery the car is constructively placed in the local CN serving yard, and the
customer is notified of the constructive placement.
The customer’s next service window is Tuesday at 10:00AM. The customer
has until Tuesday at 6:00AM to order the car. The customer orders the car on
Monday at 4:00PM for delivery on Tuesday. Because the customer orders the car in
advance of the Tuesday service cut-off, the customer incurs no demurrage charges,
even though the car occupied space in CN’s serving yard from Sunday through
Tuesday, for a total period of 37 hours.
Changing the example to an “open gate” facility means that cars will be
directly delivered to the customer facility without the customer needing to call/order
the cars in. Using the above example, the car, upon arriving at 9PM, would be
placed on the first available service, which in this case is Tuesday. The customer
would not incur any demurrage.
As these examples illustrate, CN’s program provides ample free time to its
customers whether they are closed gate or open gate.

5

Example B: Customer’s closed gate facility has service three times per week:
Monday, Wednesday, Friday, 10:00AM to 6:00PM. A car arrives on Saturday at
6:00PM Customer orders the car at 9:00AM on Tuesday.
In this example, a car arrives on a Saturday at 6:00PM. The customer’s next
service window is Monday at 10:00AM. The customer has until 6:00 AM on Monday
to order in the car to avoid demurrage. If the car is not ordered in time to meet the
Monday service cut off, demurrage charges would begin at 00:01 on Tuesday.
Demurrage stops when the customer requests delivery and the car is placed. Here,
because the customer did not order the car until 9:00AM on Tuesday morning, the
car would be delivered on Wednesday, the next available service date for that
facility. The customer would therefore be responsible for two days of demurrage by
not ordering in their car for the Monday service, and ordering it and having it
placed on the Wednesday service. The customer would not pay demurrage for
Saturday through Monday (even though the car was placed in the CN serving yard
on Saturday evening) because the clock does not start until the customer misses a
delivery window. In this example, the customer was not charged demurrage for a
total of 36 hours of dwell in a CN yard. Even in circumstances where a customer
ultimately pays demurrage, that customer does enjoy more than “zero” free time.
Example C: Customer has seven-day-a-week service at a busy facility, with
service scheduled between 1:00AM and 10:00AM. Customer receives a list of cars
that are ready for delivery each day at 11:00AM, and has until 9:00PM to order in
cars for delivery for the next day.
6

In this example, Customer has the ability every day to avoid demurrage by
ordering cars for delivery before the cut off for the next morning’s window. Indeed,
Customer does not have to wait for the 11:00AM notification of constructive
placement if it uses CN’s eBusiness tools to track car movement and to identify cars
that are en-route to the serving yard and will arrive within 24 hours. CN’s customer
service tools allow customers to track car movements and order cars in before
constructive placement occurs.
Example D: Customer has two-day-a-week service, on Tuesdays and
Thursdays between 6:00AM and 4:00PM. Customer orders 5 cars for the Tuesday
service, as they have 5 more arriving in 24 hours behind them. In this case, a CN
service issue affected the ordinary delivery schedule (a crew ran out of time and had
to return to the serving yard), and the Tuesday service was missed. The cars are
returned to the serving yard, and CN’s systems automatically apply system credits
to those 5 cars to offset the failure. Wednesday evening the other 5 cars arrive. The
customer is unable to accept all of the cars during its Thursday delivery window. In
this case, CN would work with the customer to develop a recovery plan, which
might include recovery service outside of the typical window if agreed, or an
alternate delivery plan over a longer horizon. Regardless of what recovery plan was
used, the customer would not be charged for any demurrage. CN would apply
manual credits to the cars left in the yard as result of the service failure.

7

D.

CN Focuses on First Mile/Last Mile Service and Provides Customers
With Effective Tools to Monitor First Mile/Last Mile Performance.
During the hearing, CN heard a number of comments from shippers

regarding first and last mile service. Shippers complained generally that some
carriers do not give customers sufficient visibility into car movements during the
first and last mile. While CN cannot address other carriers’ efforts in this area, CN
has invested in eBusiness tools that provide notifications and alerts in the
First/Last Mile to assist customers in making choices that limit demurrage. I visited
over 30 customers in the United States in 2014 to introduce these tools and
showcase their potential. Figure 1 is an example of the kind of visibility afforded to
customers using the First Mile/Last Mile tool. This same tool is available to railcar
receivers like terminal operators.

8

Figure 1: First Mile/Last Mile eBusiness Tool

In the example in Figure 1, the customer has 68 cars available to order in. Of
those 68, 45 are already in the CN serving yard, and 23 are slated to arrive in the
serving yard within 24 hours. CN provides information in its Alerts Dashboard,
which helps the customer plan: the five cars listed in this example exceed their
normal transit time, requiring a contingency plan. This customer has 103 cars
inbound to the serving yard – eight of those cars on CN’s system, 95 of them offline
(i.e., on another railroad). In outbound service, the customer can see that CN has

9

acknowledged four cars are slated to be pulled from the customer facility at the next
service and two cars are ready to depart the CN serving yard.
The electronic version of this tool is interactive, such that it allows customers
car-level detail views of their shipments. For example, if the customer clicked on the
blue “45” bubble indicating the number of cars in the serving yard available to order
in, it would receive car-level details, including, for example, commodity type and
shipment origin.
The details available in CN’s first mile/last mile eBusiness tool give our
customers transparent visibility into the pipeline of railcars inbound into their
facility, the cars currently at their facility, and those that are outbound. This allows
customers (and receivers) to plan in advance for rail service at their facility, thereby
minimizing demurrage charges.
In addition to the First Mile/Last Mile eBusiness tool, CN offers customers
tools specifically designed to help them reduce railcar dwell time, so as to minimize
demurrage fees, including the following:
•

Order in Railcars: This tool offers customers the capability to view railcars
en route to them and to order railcars in before they arrive. See Figure 2,
below. The customers can also view cars still in transit, within the next 48
hours, and order them in while they are still on the train. This functionality
was developed to help customers avoid delays and demurrage charges for
their cars dwelling at the local serving yard, especially for cars arriving
10

during the weekend or at times when the customer facility is closed. This tool
facilitates a customer’s ability to easily order cars before the cut off for its
next scheduled service.
Figure 2: Order in Railcars that are Enroute to Serving Yard

•

Asset Use: This tool was designed to give customers insight into equipment
that is at risk of being charged demurrage and highlights the action they
need to take to so that charges are not incurred. It also provides visibility into
equipment currently accruing demurrage, and what action is required to stop
the demurrage charges (e.g., provide delivery instructions to release a load).
Figure 3 illustrates a sample report customers can generate through this
eBusiness tool.
Figure 3: Asset Use Tool Sample Report

11

CN also offers customers the ability to subscribe to service notifications to improve
planning at their facility, which in turn will result in better asset turn-around and
reduced demurrage. Those notifications include:
•

Local Service Notifications: Provide customers with the ability to receive
an advanced notification of all work CN plans to perform during the
customer’s next scheduled assignment. These notifications are received before
the service assignment starts and are intended to allow customers to
complete planning / equipment/ crew setup for the day to safely increase the
speed and efficiency when the crew arrives. See Figure 4.
Figure 4: Local Service Notification

12

•

Service Exception Notifications: Provide customers the ability to receive
advanced warnings of exceptions if CN cannot execute all the work planned
at a customer’s facility during that day’s scheduled assignment. Service
Exceptions have two classifications: CN or Customer caused. CN caused are
typically operational items like crews running out of time or mechanical
breakdowns. Customer causes could include situations where the customer is
not ready to receive cars or not available or where a customer’s tracks are not
safe to operate on. When CN is at fault, we will attempt to recover on the
next service and will credit the customer for the service failure so it does not
incur demurrage. (If other cars in the yard are impacted, they are also
manually assessed and credited). I have a staff of 12 focused on detecting and
crediting customers in these types of scenarios.

•

If the failure is customer caused, CN will take the cars for that service back
to the serving yard and the customer will need to call/order them in again.
Demurrage will apply as if the cars had never left the yard. This policy
demonstrate that CN is fair and reciprocal with its customers, as it issues
credits when it fails and applies demurrage when a customer is responsible.
See Figure 5 for CN Failure and Figure 6 for Customer Failure.

13

Figure 5: Service Exception Notification – CN Failure

Figure 6: Service Exception Notification – Customer Failure

14

•

Temporary Outage/Disruption Notifications: Provide customers with a
notification of major track issues that could affect the traffic they are
receiving or shipping, so that they can formulate contingency plans. See
Figure 7.
Figure 7: Temporary Outage/Disruption Notification

15

E.

CN Helps Customers with Fleet Optimization.
CN maintains an internal fleet capacity planning group which leverages the

same tools and techniques that CN uses for its system cars for large private car
customers who agree to partner with CN. This group helps those customers to rightsize their fleets, which helps reduce congestion and promote network fluidity. CN
does not charge customers for this service. The actions of this group with customers
positively reinforce that the right-sized fleet is an integral part of managing the
pipeline and ultimately reducing or even eliminating demurrage.
F.

CN Provides Ample Advance Notification of Tariff Changes.
We aim to provide as much notice of our tariff renewals as possible to

customers. For the past three years, CN has provided a minimum of 52 days’ notice
of the annual renewal of its CN 9000 Optional Services tariff. The following table
identifies the amount of notice CN has recently provided:

G.

Effective Date

Notification Date

February 1, 2017

December 1, 2016

Number of
Days’ Notice
62

January 1, 2018

November 10, 2017

52

January 1, 2019

November 2, 2018

60

CN Customers Have Options to Avoid Demurrage Charges.
All of the tools and options identified above provide CN customers with

numerous means to meter the flow of their traffic, match their car orders to their
16

plant capacity, and plan their operations to avoid the accumulation of railcars. In
CN’s experience, these tools also assist customers in avoiding demurrage charges.
The majority of CN customers do not pay demurrage and we are convinced that the
tools we provide is the primary reason for this success rate.

17