Regulatory Analysis for Proposed Rule

Regulatory Analysis for the Proposed Rule—
Regulatory Improvements for Production and
Utilization Facilities Transitioning to
Decommissioning
NRC-2015-0070; RIN 3150-AJ59

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
February 2022

CONTENTS
List of Figures ........................................................................................................................ vi
List of Tables.......................................................................................................................... ix
Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................................................. x
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................ 1
1
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................ 2
Background .......................................................................................................... 3
Statement of the Problem .................................................................................... 5
Objectives ............................................................................................................ 5
Sections in the Proposed Rulemaking ................................................................. 6
2
DECOMMISSIONING INPUTS ...................................................................................... 6
Decommissioning Levels ..................................................................................... 6
Level 1 .................................................................................................... 6
Level 2 .................................................................................................... 7
Level 3 .................................................................................................... 7
Level 4 .................................................................................................... 7
Decommissioning Experience of Recent Plants .................................................. 8
3
Identification of affected attributes ................................................................................. 9
4
IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES FOR THE
DECOMMISSIONING AREAS ....................................................................................... 9
Emergency Preparedness ................................................................................. 10
Alternative EP-1 (No-action alternative) ............................................... 11
Alternative EP-2 (Rulemaking to amend regulations to provide a graded
approach to emergency preparedness / emergency plan changes
between levels with NRC approval) ...................................................... 12
Assumptions ......................................................................................... 23
Affected Attributes ................................................................................ 24
Physical Security ............................................................................................... 24
Alternative PS-1 (No-action alternative) ............................................... 25
Alternative PS-2 (Rulemaking) ............................................................. 26
Assumptions ......................................................................................... 29
Affected Attributes ................................................................................ 29
Cyber Security ................................................................................................... 29
Alternative CS-1 (No-action alternative) ............................................... 30
Alternative CS-2 (Rulemaking to remove all cyber security requirements
when spent fuel has sufficiently decayed) ............................................ 30
Assumptions ......................................................................................... 31
Affected Attributes ................................................................................ 31
Drug and Alcohol Testing................................................................................... 32
Alternative DA-1 (No-action alternative) ............................................... 32
Alternative DA-2 (Rulemaking to require Fitness for Duty program
elements that support IMP for power reactors)..................................... 33
Assumptions ......................................................................................... 33
Affected Attributes ................................................................................ 33
Certified Fuel Handler Definition and Elimination of Shift Technical Advisor ..... 34
Alternative CFH/STA-1 (No-action alternative) ..................................... 35
Alternative CFH/STA-2 (Rulemaking regarding CFH definition and Shift
Technical Advisor) ................................................................................ 35
Assumptions ......................................................................................... 36
Affected Attributes ................................................................................ 36
ii

Decommissioning Funding Assurance............................................................... 37
Alternative DTF-1 (No-action alternative) ............................................. 38
Alternative DTF-2 (Rulemaking to amend regulations to minimize
exemptions and reduce the ambiguity in the decommissioning trust fund
regulations) ........................................................................................... 38
Assumptions ......................................................................................... 39
Affected Attributes ................................................................................ 40
Offsite and Onsite Financial Protection Requirements and Indemnity
Agreements ....................................................................................................... 40
Alternative FP-1 (No-action alternative) ............................................... 41
Alternative FP-2 (Rulemaking to codify the current exemption process)
.............................................................................................................. 42
Assumptions ......................................................................................... 44
Affected Attributes ................................................................................ 44
Environmental Considerations ........................................................................... 45
Alternative ENV-1 (No Action) .............................................................. 45
Alternative ENV-2 (Rulemaking) ........................................................... 45
Assumptions ......................................................................................... 46
Affected Attributes ................................................................................ 46
Record Retention Requirements........................................................................ 46
Alternative R-1 (No-Action) ................................................................... 47
Alternative R-2 (Rulemaking to Decrease Record Retention
Requirements during Decommissioning) .............................................. 47
Assumptions ......................................................................................... 48
Affected Attributes ................................................................................ 48
Low-Level Waste Transportation ....................................................................... 48
Alternative TR-1 (No-Action) ................................................................ 49
Alternative TR-2 (Rulemaking to Change Low Level Waste
Transportation Requirements) .............................................................. 49
Assumptions ......................................................................................... 49
Affected Attributes ................................................................................ 49
Spent Fuel Management Planning..................................................................... 50
Alternative SFM-1 (No-Action) .............................................................. 50
Alternative SFM-2 (Rulemaking to clarify and update Spent Fuel
Management Planning) ........................................................................ 50
Assumptions ......................................................................................... 51
Affected Attributes ................................................................................ 51
Backfit Rule ........................................................................................................ 51
Alternative B-1 (No-action alternative) .................................................. 53
Alternative B-2 (Conduct rulemaking to clarify how the NRC applies the
Backfit Rule to licensees in decommissioning) ..................................... 54
Affected Attributes ................................................................................ 54
Foreign Ownership, Control, or Domination (FOCD) ......................................... 54
Alternative F-1 (No Action) ................................................................... 54
Alternative F-2 (Rulemaking to specify FOCD)..................................... 55
Assumptions ......................................................................................... 56
Affected Attributes ................................................................................ 56
Clarification of Scope of License Termination Plan Requirement ...................... 56
Alternative T-1 (No-Action) ................................................................... 56
Alternative T-2 (Rulemaking to clarify license termination plan) ........... 57
Assumptions ......................................................................................... 57
iii

5

6

7

EVALUATION OF COSTS AND BENEFITS FOR AREAS OF DECOMMISSIONING
CONSIDERED FOR RULEMAKING ............................................................................ 57
Analytical Methodology ...................................................................................... 57
Regulatory Baseline ............................................................................. 58
Discount Rates ..................................................................................... 58
Cost/Benefit Inflators ............................................................................ 58
Labor Rates .......................................................................................... 59
Affected Entities .................................................................................... 59
Sign Conventions ................................................................................. 61
Base Year ............................................................................................. 61
Time Period of Analysis ........................................................................ 61
Cost Estimation .................................................................................... 61
PRESENTATION OF RESULTS FOR AREAS OF DECOMMISSIONING
CONSIDERED FOR RULEMAKING ............................................................................ 62
Industry Implementation .................................................................................... 62
Averted Industry Implementation Costs ................................................ 63
Additional Industry Implementation Costs ............................................ 64
Industry Operation ............................................................................................. 65
Averted and Additional Industry Recurring Costs ................................. 66
NRC Implementation.......................................................................................... 66
Averted NRC Implementation Costs ..................................................... 67
Additional NRC Implementation Costs ................................................. 67
NRC Operation .................................................................................................. 68
Regulatory Efficiency ......................................................................................... 69
Other Government ............................................................................................. 69
General Public ................................................................................................... 70
Environmental Considerations ........................................................................... 70
Disaggregation ................................................................................................... 70
Uncertainty Analysis .......................................................................................... 71
Emergency Preparedness .................................................................... 72
Physical Security .................................................................................. 75
Cyber Security ...................................................................................... 77
Drug and Alcohol Testing ..................................................................... 79
Certified Fuel Handler Definition and Elimination of the Shift Technical
Advisor .................................................................................................. 81
Decommissioning Funding Assurance ................................................. 83
Offsite and Onsite Financial Protection Requirements and Indemnity
Agreements .......................................................................................... 85
Environmental Considerations .............................................................. 87
Record Retention Requirements .......................................................... 89
Low-Level Waste Transportation .......................................................... 91
Spent Fuel Management Planning ....................................................... 93
Backfit Rule .......................................................................................... 95
Foreign Ownership, Control, or Domination (FOCD) ............................ 97
Summary ........................................................................................................... 99
Quantified Net Benefit .......................................................................... 99
Qualitative Costs and Benefits ........................................................... 100
Safety Goal Evaluation .................................................................................... 101
DECISION RATIONALE FOR THE AREAS OF DECOMMISSIONING..................... 102
Emergency Preparedness ............................................................................... 105
Physical Security ............................................................................................. 105
iv

Cyber Security ................................................................................................. 105
Drug and Alcohol Testing................................................................................. 106
Certified Fuel Handler Definition and Elimination of the Shift Technical Advisor
......................................................................................................................... 106
Decommissioning Funding Assurance............................................................. 106
Offsite and Onsite Financial Protection Requirements and Indemnity
Agreements ..................................................................................................... 106
Environmental Considerations ......................................................................... 107
Record Retention Requirements...................................................................... 107
Low-Level Waste Transportation ..................................................................... 107
Spent Fuel Management Planning................................................................... 108
Backfit Rule ...................................................................................................... 108
Foreign Ownership, Control, or Domination (FOCD) ....................................... 108
Clarification of Scope of License Termination Plan Requirement .................... 109
8
NRC PROPOSED RULE ........................................................................................... 109
9
GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS ........................................................................................ 110
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................... 112
APPENDIX A: INDUSTRY LABOR RATES ....................................................................... A-1
APPENDIX B: UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS VARIABLES .................................................. B-1

v

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1

Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the Emergency Preparedness
cost drivers (Alternative EP-2) ................................................................................. 72

Figure 2

Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the Emergency Preparedness cost
drivers (Alternative EP-2) ......................................................................................... 73

Figure 3

Variation of total cost (industry, NRC, State and local governments and general
public) due to the uncertainty in the Emergency Preparedness cost drivers
(Alternative EP-2)..................................................................................................... 73

Figure 4

Tornado chart showing the variation of total cost due to each Emergency
Preparedness cost driver (Alternative EP-2)............................................................ 74

Figure 5

Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the Physical Security cost drivers
(Alternative PS-2)..................................................................................................... 75

Figure 6

Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the Physical Security cost drivers
(Alternative PS-2)..................................................................................................... 75

Figure 7

Variation of total cost industry, NRC, State and local governments and general
public) due to the uncertainty in the Physical Security cost drivers
(Alternative PS-2)..................................................................................................... 76

Figure 8

Tornado chart showing the variation of total cost due to each Physical Security cost
driver (Alternative PS-2)........................................................................................... 76

Figure 9

Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the cyber security cost drivers
(Alternative CS-2) .................................................................................................... 77

Figure 10 Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the cyber security cost drivers
(Alternative CS-2) .................................................................................................... 77
Figure 11 Variation of total cost (industry, NRC, State and local governments and general
public) due to the uncertainty in the cyber security cost drivers
(Alternative CS-2) .................................................................................................... 78
Figure 12 Tornado chart showing the variation of total cost due to each cyber security cost
driver (Alternative CS-2) .......................................................................................... 78
Figure 13 Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the Drug and Alcohol Testing cost
drivers (Alternative DA-2)......................................................................................... 79
Figure 14 Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the Drug and Alcohol Testing cost
drivers (Alternative DA-2)......................................................................................... 79
Figure 15 Variation of total cost (industry, NRC, State and local governments and general
public) due to the uncertainty in the Drug and Alcohol Testing cost drivers
(Alternative DA-2) .................................................................................................... 80
Figure 16 Tornado chart showing the variation of total cost due to each Drug and Alcohol
Testing cost driver (Alternative DA-2) ...................................................................... 80
Figure 17 Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the Certified Fuel Handler
Definition and Elimination of the Shift Technical Advisor cost drivers
(Alternative CFH/STA-2) .......................................................................................... 81

vi

Figure 18 Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the Certified Fuel Handler Definition
and Elimination of the Shift Technical Advisor cost drivers
(Alternative CFH/STA-2) .......................................................................................... 81
Figure 19 Variation of total cost (industry, NRC, State and local governments and general
public) due to the uncertainty in the Certified Fuel Handler Definition and Elimination
of the Shift Technical Advisor cost drivers (Alternative CFH/STA-2) ....................... 82
Figure 20 Tornado chart showing the variation of total cost due to each Certified Fuel Handler
Definition and Elimination of the Shift Technical Advisor cost driver
(Alternative CFH/STA-2) .......................................................................................... 82
Figure 21 Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the Decommissioning Funding
Assurance cost drivers (Alternative DTF-2) ............................................................. 83
Figure 22 Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the Decommissioning Funding
Assurance cost drivers (Alternative DTF-2) ............................................................. 83
Figure 23 Variation of total cost (industry, NRC, State and local governments and general
public) due to the uncertainty in the Decommissioning Funding Assurance cost
drivers (Alternative DTF-2)....................................................................................... 84
Figure 24 Tornado chart showing the variation of total cost due to each Decommissioning
Funding Assurance cost driver (Alternative DTF-2) ................................................. 84
Figure 25 Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the Financial Protection cost
drivers (Alternative FP-2) ......................................................................................... 85
Figure 26 Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the Financial Protection cost drivers
(Alternative FP-2) ..................................................................................................... 85
Figure 27 Variation of total cost (industry, NRC, State and local governments and general
public) due to the uncertainty in the Financial Protection cost drivers
(Alternative FP-2) ..................................................................................................... 86
Figure 28 Tornado Chart showing the variation of total cost due to each Financial Protection
cost driver (Alternative FP-2) ................................................................................... 86
Figure 29 Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the cost input variables
(Alternative ENV-2) .................................................................................................. 87
Figure 30 Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the cost input variables
(Alternative ENV-2) .................................................................................................. 87
Figure 31 Variation of total cost (industry, NRC, State and local governments and general
public) due to the uncertainty in the cost input variables (Alternative ENV-2) ......... 88
Figure 32 Tornado chart showing the variation of total cost due to each cost driver
(Alternative ENV-2) .................................................................................................. 88
Figure 33 Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the cost input variables
(Alternative R-2) ....................................................................................................... 89
Figure 34 Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the cost input variables
(Alternative R-2) ....................................................................................................... 89
Figure 35 Variation of total cost (industry, NRC, State and local governments and general
public) due to the uncertainty in the cost input variables (Alternative R-2) .............. 90

vii

Figure 36 Tornado chart showing the variation of total cost due to each cost driver
(Alternative R-2) ....................................................................................................... 90
Figure 37 Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the cost input variables
(Alternative TR-2)..................................................................................................... 91
Figure 38 Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the cost input variables
(Alternative TR-2)..................................................................................................... 91
Figure 39 Variation of total cost (industry, NRC, State and local governments and general
public) due to the uncertainty in the cost input variables (Alternative TR-2) ............ 92
Figure 40 Tornado chart showing the variation of total cost due to each cost driver
(Alternative TR-2)..................................................................................................... 92
Figure 41 Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the cost Input variables
(Alternative SFM-2) .................................................................................................. 93
Figure 42 Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the cost input variables
(Alternative SFM-2) .................................................................................................. 93
Figure 43 Variation of total cost (industry, NRC, State and local governments and general
public) due to the uncertainty in the cost input variables (Alternative SFM-2) ......... 94
Figure 44 Tornado chart showing the variation of total cost due to each cost driver
(Alternative SFM-2) .................................................................................................. 94
Figure 45 Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the Backfit Rule cost drivers
(Alternative B-2) ....................................................................................................... 95
Figure 46 Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the Backfit Rule cost drivers
(Alternative B-2) ....................................................................................................... 95
Figure 47 Variation of total cost due to the uncertainty in the Backfit Rule cost drivers
(Alternative B-2) ....................................................................................................... 96
Figure 48 Tornado Chart showing the variation of total cost due to each Backfit Rule cost
driver (Alternative B-2) ............................................................................................. 96
Figure 49 Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the FOCD cost drivers
(Alternative F-2) ....................................................................................................... 97
Figure 50 Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the FOCD cost drivers
(Alternative F-2) ....................................................................................................... 98
Figure 51 Variation of total cost due to the uncertainty in the FOCD cost drivers
(Alternative F-2) ....................................................................................................... 98
Figure 52 Tornado Chart showing the variation of total cost due to each FOCD cost driver
(Alternative F-2) ....................................................................................................... 99

viii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1

Decommissioning Areas under Proposed Rulemaking.............................................. 2

Table 2

Licensing Activity Summary for Recent Permanently Shutdown Reactors ................ 8

Table 3

Licensing Actions Summary for Recent Permanently Shutdown Reactors ............... 9

Table 4

Two-Step Graded Approach .................................................................................... 42

Table 5

Consumer Price Index—All Urban Consumers, U.S. City Average ......................... 59

Table 6

Averted Industry Implementation Costs ................................................................... 64

Table 7

Additional Industry Implementation Costs ................................................................ 65

Table 8

Averted Industry Operation Costs ............................................................................ 66

Table 9

Averted NRC Implementation Costs ........................................................................ 67

Table 10

Additional NRC Implementation Costs..................................................................... 68

Table 11

Averted NRC Operation Costs ................................................................................. 68

Table 12

Costs to Other Government ..................................................................................... 69

Table 13

Costs to the General Public ..................................................................................... 70

Table 14

Total Net Benefits and Costs for Industry .............................................................. 100

Table 15

Total Net Benefits and Costs for NRC ................................................................... 100

Table 16

Summary of Totals for the Recommended Alternatives ........................................ 110

ix

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ADAMS
AEA
AMP
ANPR

Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
aging management program
advance notice of proposed rulemaking

BLS
BWR

Bureau of Labor Statistics
boiling-water reactor

CFH
CFR
COL
CPI-U
CSP

certified fuel handler
Code of Federal Regulations
combined license
Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers
cyber security plan

DBA
DBT
DCE
DCSS
DOE
DP
DTF

design-basis accident
design-basis threat
decommissioning cost estimate
dry cask storage system
U.S. Department of Energy
decommissioning plan
decommissioning trust fund

EA
EAL
ECL
EIS
EOS
EP
EPA
EPZ
ERDS
ERO
ETE

environmental assessment
emergency action level
emergency classification level
environmental impact statement
Emergency Operations Facility
emergency preparedness
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
emergency planning zones
Emergency Response Data System
Emergency Response Organization
evacuation time estimate

FEMA
FFD
FR
FTE

Federal Emergency Management Agency
fitness for duty
Federal Register
full-time equivalent

GEIS
GL
GWd

Generic Environmental Impact Statement
generic letter
gigawatt-day

x

HAB

hostile action-based

IFMP
IMP
IOEP
IP
ISFSI
IT

Irradiated Fuel Management Plan
insider mitigation program
independent spent fuel storage installation-only emergency plan
inspection plan
independent spent fuel storage installation
information technology

LAR
LLW
LTP

license amendment request
Low-Level Radioactive Wastes
License Termination Plan

MOU
MTHM

memorandum of understanding
metric ton of heavy metal

NAICS
NEI
NEPA
NLO
NOUE
NPP
NPV
NRC
NUREG

North American Industry Classification System
Nuclear Energy Institute
National Environmental Policy Act
Non-Licensed Operator
notification of unusual event
nuclear power plant
net present value
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRC technical report

OMB
ORO

Office of Management and Budget
Offsite Response Organization

PA
PAA
PAGS
PAR
PDEP
PERT
PS
PSDAR
PSEP
PWR

Protected Area
Price-Anderson Act
protective action guides
protective action recommendation
permanently defueled emergency plan
program evaluation and review technique
physical security
Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report
Post-Shutdown Emergency Plan
pressurized-water reactor

QAP

Quality Assurance Program

RAI
RB

Request for Additional Information
Regulatory Basis

xi

RCS
REP
RG

reactor coolant system
radiological emergency preparedness
regulatory guide

SAE
SSC
SSCE
SER
SFP
SNF
SOC
SRM
STA

site area emergency
structures, systems, and components
site-specific cost estimate
safety evaluation report
spent fuel pool
spent nuclear fuel
standard occupational classification (code)
staff requirements memorandum
shift technical advisor

TSC

Technical Support Center

UA
UAA

Unescorted Access
Unescorted Access Authorization

VA

Vital Area

xii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The NRC is proposing to amend its regulations related to the decommissioning of production
and utilization facilities. The Commission directed the NRC staff to proceed with an integrated
rulemaking on power reactor decommissioning to address: a graded approach to emergency
preparedness (EP); lessons learned from the plants that have already gone through (or are
currently going through) the decommissioning process; the advisability of requiring a licensee’s
post-shutdown decommissioning activities report (PSDAR) to be approved by the NRC;
maintaining the three existing options for decommissioning and the associated timeframes; the
role of State and local governments and non-governmental stakeholders in the
decommissioning process; and any other issues deemed relevant by the NRC staff.
Major provisions of the proposed rule include changes in the areas of: emergency
preparedness, physical security, cyber security, drug and alcohol testing, certified fuel handler
training, decommissioning funding assurance, offsite and onsite financial protection
requirements and indemnity agreements, environmental considerations, records retention
requirements, low-level waste transportation time, spent fuel management planning, NRC’s
backfit rule, foreign ownership, control, or domination, and scope of the license termination plan
requirement.
In this regulatory analysis, the NRC presents the costs, benefits and other impacts to industry,
government and society from the proposed rule. The regulatory analysis evaluated the
economic impact of the proposed changes to the above areas of decommissioning and
concludes that the proposed rule should be adopted because it would result in a cost benefit to
the nuclear power industry, government, and society as summarized in Table 1 below.

1

Table 1 Decommissioning Areas under Proposed Rulemaking
Area of Decommissioning
Emergency Preparedness
Physical Security
Cyber Security
Drug and Alcohol Testing
Certified Fuel Handler Definition and
Elimination of the Shift Technical Advisor
Decommissioning Funding Assurance
Offsite and Onsite Financial Protection
Environmental Considerations
Record Retention Requirements
Low-Level Waste Transportation Time
Spent Fuel Management Planning
Backfit Rule
Foreign Ownership, Control, or Domination
a
b
c

1

Proposed
Alternative
EP-2
PS-2
CS-2
DA-2

Total Net Benefit (Cost) a,b
(2018 million dollars, 7% NPVc)
$7.74
$0.88
$0.08
$7.02

CFH/STA-2

$0.37

DTF-2
$1.18
FP-2
$0.56
ENV-2
($0.04)
R-2
$0.24
TR-2
$0.16
SFM-2
($0.30)
BF-2
($0.06)
F-2
$0.08
Total:
$7.91
These estimates are based on preliminary inputs and are subject to change.
The total net benefit results are sensitive to the timing of when costs and benefits occur and
to the discount rate for these decommissioning areas.
NPV is defined as net present value.

INTRODUCTION

This document presents the regulatory analysis for the proposed rule, “Regulatory
Improvements for Production and Utilization Facilities Transitioning to Decommissioning.” The
NRC last amended its requirements for the decommissioning of nuclear power plants in 1996.
Staff proposed improvements to the decommissioning requirements in 1999, but after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC discontinued work on the decommissioning
rulemaking and redirected resources toward higher priority work related to safeguards and
security. Because no reactors were planning to shut down at that time, the NRC decided there
was no immediate need to complete the rulemaking. However, in 2013, four power reactor units
permanently shut down and defueled without significant advance notice or preplanning. These
licensees and the associated shutdown reactors were: Duke Energy Florida for Crystal River
Unit 3 Nuclear Generation Plant; Dominion Energy Kewaunee for Kewaunee Power Station; and
Southern California Edison for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3. On
December 29, 2014, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., shut down Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Station (Vermont Yankee), and on January 12, 2015, the licensee certified that Vermont
Yankee had permanently ceased operation and removed fuel from the reactor vessel. In
addition, the Omaha Public Power District board of directors shut down Fort Calhoun Station on
October 24, 2016. Furthermore as of the time of this writing, the following operating nuclear
power stations have announced plans to permanently shut down between 2018 and 2025:
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station plans to shut down by October 31, 2018; Pilgrim
Nuclear Power Station plans to shut down by June 1, 2019; Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,
Unit 1 is planning to shut down on or about September 30, 2019; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power
Station, Unit 1 plans to shut down by May 31, 2020; Indian Point Nuclear Generating, Units 2
and 3 plans to shut down by April 30, 2021; Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 plans to shut
2

down by May 31, 2021; Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 plans to shut down by
October 31, 2021; Palisades Nuclear Plant plans to shut down by spring of 2022; and Diablo
Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 plans to shut down in 2025.
Both the decommissioning reactor licensees and the NRC expended substantial resources
processing licensing actions for these power reactors during their transition period to a
decommissioning status. These licensing actions come in the form of exemptions and
amendments to reduce requirements no longer needed to protect public health and safety and
the common defense and security for permanently shutdown reactors. To date, the NRC has
not identified any safety or security concerns in the current regulatory framework for
decommissioning power reactors. However, insights from the recent licensing activities
associated with decommissioning power reactors indicate that the decommissioning process
can be improved to be more efficient, predictable, and less costly by reducing the processing of
individual licensing actions and revising the NRC regulations to achieve a long-term regulatory
framework for decommissioning. Therefore, the NRC’s goal is to take the appropriate approach
for making regulatory changes that reduce the number of licensing actions needed during
decommissioning, while still ensuring safety. Furthermore, as stated previously, the staff,
consistent with Commission direction, has considered, as part of this rulemaking effort, other
issues deemed relevant to decommissioning.

Background
Detailed regulations for the decommissioning of nuclear power reactors were not included in the
NRC rules before 1988. In that year, the NRC published a final rule in the Federal Register
(FR) (Ref. 1), establishing decommissioning requirements for various types of licensees (53 FR
24018). By the early 1990s, the NRC recognized a need for more changes to the power reactor
decommissioning regulations and published a proposed rule to amend its regulations for reactor
decommissioning in 1995 (Ref. 2). In 1996, the NRC amended its regulations for reactor
decommissioning to clarify ambiguities, make generically applicable procedures being used on
a case-by-case basis, and allow for greater public participation in the decommissioning process
(Ref. 3). However, as an increasing number of power reactor licensees began
decommissioning their reactors in the 1990s, it became apparent that the NRC should consider
conducting rulemaking on specific topics in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
the decommissioning process.
In a series of Commission papers issued between 1997 and 2001, the NRC staff provided
options and recommendations to the Commission to address regulatory improvements related
to power reactor decommissioning. In the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) to
SECY-99-168, “Improving Decommissioning Regulations for Nuclear Power Plants” (Ref. 4), the
Commission directed the NRC staff to proceed with a single, integrated, risk-informed
decommissioning rule, addressing the areas of EP, insurance, safeguards, staffing and training,
and backfitting. The objective of this rulemaking was to clarify and remove certain regulations
for decommissioning power reactors as informed by the reduction in radiological risk to public
health and safety and the common defense and security compared to the radiological risk of
operating reactors.
During reactor decommissioning, the principal safety concern is the storage of spent fuel in the
spent fuel pool (SFP) or an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI). Based on
NUREG-1738, “Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear
Power Plants” (Ref. 5), the only accident that might lead to a significant radiological release at a
decommissioning reactor is a zirconium fire from an SFP accident, within a few months after the
3

reactor has been permanently shut down. The zirconium fire scenario is a postulated, but highly
unlikely, beyond-design-basis accident that involves a major loss of water inventory from the
SFP, resulting in a significant heatup of the spent fuel, thus leading to substantial zirconium
cladding oxidation and fuel damage. The analyses of spent fuel heatup scenarios that might
result in a zirconium fire take into consideration the decay heat of the irradiated fuel stored in
the SFP and the exothermic reactions of the zirconium with oxygen, water, or both. Therefore,
the probability of a zirconium fire scenario continues to decrease as a function of the time that
the decommissioning reactor has been permanently shut down. With the permanent cessation
of reactor operations and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor core, the risk of an
accident at decommissioning plants and the number of events that can have significant offsite
consequences are significantly reduced. As a result of the shutdown and removal of fuel from
the reactor vessel, the reactor, reactor coolant system, and supporting systems no longer
operate and, therefore, have no function. Hence, postulated accidents involving failure or
malfunction of the reactor, reactor coolant system, or supporting systems are no longer
applicable for a power reactor that has decommissioned.
On June 28, 2000, the NRC submitted SECY-00-0145 (Ref. 6) to the Commission, proposing an
integrated decommissioning rulemaking plan that would amend regulations in the areas of
emergency preparedness, insurance, safeguards, staffing and training, and backfitting for
licensees who certified, pursuant to Title10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) section
50.82(a) that they permanently ceased facility operation(s) and permanently removed fuel from
the reactor vessel. The rulemaking plan was contingent on the completion of a zirconium fire
risk study provided in NUREG-1738. NUREG-1738 could not completely rule out the possibility
of a zirconium fire after extended spent fuel decay times. However, NUREG-1738 did
demonstrate that storage of spent fuel in a high-density configuration in SFPs is safe, and that
the risk of accidental release of a significant amount of radioactive material to the environment
is extremely low.
Because of uncertainty in the NUREG-1738 conclusions about the risk of SFP fires, the NRC
faced a challenge in developing a generic decommissioning rule for EP, physical security, and
insurance. To seek additional Commission direction, on June 4, 2001, the NRC submitted to
the Commission SECY-01-0100, “Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and
Emergency Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants Storing Fuel
in Spent Fuel Pools” (Ref. 7). However, given the zirconium fire risk study in NUREG-1738 that
showed the risk of a SFP fire to be extremely low, and the reactor security implications of the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC redirected its rulemaking priorities to focus on
programmatic regulatory changes related to safeguards and security.
In the SRM for SECY-14-0118, “Request by Duke Energy Florida, Inc., for Exemptions from
Certain Emergency Planning Requirements,” dated December 30, 2014 (Ref. 8), the
Commission directed the NRC to proceed with rulemaking on reactor decommissioning and set
an objective of early 2019 for its completion. The Commission also stated that this rulemaking
should address the following:
•
•
•
•
•

Issues discussed in SECY-00-0145 such as the graded approach to EP.
Lessons learned from the plants that have already (or are currently) going through the
decommissioning process.
The advisability of requiring a licensee’s PSDAR to be approved by the NRC.
Maintaining the three existing decommissioning options and the associated timeframes.
The role of State and local governments and non-governmental stakeholders in the
decommissioning process.
4

•

Any other issues deemed relevant by the NRC.

In SECY-15-0014, “Anticipated Schedule and Estimated Resources for a Power Reactor
Decommissioning Rulemaking,” (Ref. 9), the NRC committed to proceed with a rulemaking on
reactor decommissioning with the goal of submitting a final rule to the Commission by the end of
fiscal year 2019. As a result, the NRC issued a draft regulatory basis (RB) on March 15, 2017
(Ref. 10) and the associated regulatory analysis (RA) for the draft RB on May 9, 2017 (Ref. 11)
for public comments. Public comments were received by the NRC staff, which resulted in the
issuance of the regulatory basis on November 27, 2017 (Ref. 12) in the Federal Register and
the associated RA for the RB (Ref. 13), which form the basis for this regulatory analysis
document for the proposed rule.

Statement of the Problem
Once a licensee enters the decommissioning phase, certain regulations that applied during the
operating phase might not be necessary during decommissioning due to the shutdown condition
of the plant. During its review of the overall decommissioning regulations, the NRC identified
areas where the existing regulations could be updated or clarified to be more consistent with, or
more appropriately reflect, the requirements necessary to maintain reasonable assurance of
adequate protection of public health and safety and the common defense and security at a
decommissioning power reactor. These areas of decommissioning are discussed in more detail
below with NRC recommendations to address the potential changes.
In developing the regulatory basis, the NRC explored multiple alternatives for each area of
decommissioning, including developing guidance, pursuing rulemaking, and maintaining the
status quo. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, “Specific exemptions,” the Commission may grant
exemptions from regulations if the Commission determines the exemptions are authorized by
law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and are consistent with the
common defense and security, and when special circumstances are present, such as when
application of the regulation is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
rule. Experience has demonstrated that licensees for decommissioning power reactors seek
multiple exemptions and license amendments per site to establish a long-term licensing
framework for decommissioning. By issuing a decommissioning rule, the NRC would be able to
modify its regulations commensurate with the reduced risk associated with permanently
shutdown and defueled reactors and maintain safety and security at sites transitioning to
decommissioning, without the need to grant specific exemptions, approvals, or issue license
amendments related to certain subject matters (e.g., EP, physical security, certified fuel handler
training, decommissioning financial assurance, and onsite/offsite liability insurance).

Objectives
The objectives for the decommissioning rulemaking include:
•
•
•

Continue to provide assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety and
the common defense and security at decommissioning power reactor sites.
Ensure that the requirements for decommissioning power reactors are clear and
appropriate.
Codify those issues that are found to be generically applicable to all decommissioning
power reactors and have resulted in the need for exemptions or license amendments.

5

•

Identify, define, and resolve additional areas of concern related to the regulation of
decommissioning power reactors.

Sections in the Proposed Rulemaking
The following list shows how each section of this regulatory analysis document corresponds to
the technical areas discussed in the proposed rule, part IV, Scope of the Proposal.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

2

Section 4.1 corresponds to section A, “Emergency Preparedness”
Section 4.2 corresponds to section B, “Physical Security”
Section 4.3 corresponds to section C, “Cyber Security”
Section 4.4 corresponds to section D, “Drug and Alcohol Testing”
Section 4.5 corresponds to section E, “Certified Fuel Handler Definition and
Elimination of the Shift Technical Advisor”
Section 4.6 corresponds to section F, “Decommissioning Funding Assurance”
Section 4.7 corresponds to section G, “Offsite and Onsite Financial Protection
Requirements and Indemnity Agreements”
Section 4.8 corresponds to section H, “Environmental Considerations”
Section 4.9 corresponds to section I, “Record Retention Requirements”
Section 4.10 corresponds to section J, “Low-Level Waste Transportation”
Section 4.11 corresponds to section K, “Spent Fuel Management Planning”
Section 4.12 corresponds to section L, “Backfit Rule”
Section 4.13 corresponds to section M, “Foreign Ownership, Control, or
Domination”
Section 4.14 corresponds to section N, ”Clarification of Scope of License
Termination Plan Requirement”

DECOMMISSIONING INPUTS

The purpose of this section is to define the inputs that support the definition of the alternatives
and cost-benefit analysis.

Decommissioning Levels
The NRC is proposing to amend its regulations to provide an efficient regulatory framework
during decommissioning using a graded approach for certain technical areas. This graded
approach is commensurate with the reductions in radiological risk at four levels of
decommissioning: (1) permanent cessation of operations and removal of all fuel from the
reactor vessel, (2) sufficient decay of fuel in the SFP such that it would not reach ignition
temperature within 10 hours under adiabatic heatup conditions, (3) transfer of all spent fuel to
dry storage, and (4) removal of all fuel from the site. These levels are discussed further as
follows:
Level 1
Level 1 commences after the NRC’s docketing of the licensee’s certifications of permanent
cessation of operations and permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor vessel pursuant to
10 CFR 50.82, “Termination of license,” or 10 CFR 52.110, “Termination of license.” In this
level, a decommissioning reactor is defueled and permanently shut down, but the spent fuel in
the SFP is still susceptible to a zirconium fuel cladding fire within 10 hours under adiabatic
6

heatup conditions if the SFP is unexpectedly drained. This configuration encompasses the
period from immediately after the core is removed from the reactor to just before the decay heat
of the hottest assemblies is low enough that no rapid zirconium oxidation would take place
within 10 hours. The NRC staff has determined that a baseline decay time period of 10 months
for a boiling-water reactor (BWR) or 16 months for a pressurized water reactor (PWR)
conservatively bounds the anticipated decay time for the operating fleet at the time of this
rulemaking. Therefore, the proposed rule establishes these two time periods as the default time
licensees will remain in Level 1, for reactors operating using fuels with zirconium cladding at a
burnup of less than or equal to 72 Gigawatt-days/Metric Ton of Heavy Metal (GWd/MTHM),
averaged across the assembly. During these time periods, an appropriate level of EP must be
maintained to respond to applicable design basis accidents and to ensure a prompt response to
the low likelihood possibility that a rapid drain down of the SFP could cause a subsequent
zirconium fire and release in less than 10 hours. Licensees have the ability to submit an
analysis to support a shorter decay time period, just as in the regulatory baseline, and licensees
would be required to submit this analysis if the burnup exceeds the above specified fuel
characteristics.
This regulatory analysis discusses the regulatory change implementing these two decay time
periods in further detail in the applicable sections below, for the areas of decommissioning that
are impacted by the decay time periods.
Level 2
In Level 2, the reactor is defueled and permanently shut down, and spent fuel in the SFP has
decayed and cooled sufficiently that it cannot heat up to clad ignition temperature within
10 hours under adiabatic conditions. In this configuration, the spent fuel can be stored long
term in the SFP. The NRC anticipates that spent fuel in this decommissioning level will be
stored in the pool for at least five years after the spent fuel is moved from the reactor vessel to
the SFP. In addition, the site may possess a radioactive inventory of liquid radiological waste,
radioactive reactor components, and contaminated structural materials. The radioactive
inventory during this configuration may change, depending on the licensee’s proposed
shutdown activities and schedule.
Level 3
In Level 3, the NRC anticipates that more than 5 years have elapsed since the reactor
permanently ceased operation and was defueled and that all spent nuclear fuel is in dry cask
storage (e.g., an ISFSI facility). The decision for a licensee to transfer all fuel to an ISFSI facility
is based, in part, on such plant-specific factors as the timing and method of plant
decommissioning, the preexistence of a licensed ISFSI, and the anticipated start of fuel
shipments to a Federal high level waste repository or a monitored retrievable storage (MRS)
facility. To evaluate the potential effects of alternatives considered in this analysis, the NRC
assumed that the spent fuel is stored in an onsite ISFSI for 16 years before the spent fuel is
transmitted to either an offsite ISFSI or a permanent geologic repository. This is based on a
recently submitted decommissioning plan for transferring all the spent fuel to a U.S. Department
of Energy (DOE) long-term storage repository (Ref. 14).
Level 4
In Level 4, all spent nuclear fuel has been removed from the site. The site may possess a
radioactive inventory of liquid radiological waste, radioactive reactor components, and
7

contaminated structural materials. The radioactive inventory during this configuration may
change, depending on the licensee’s proposed decommissioning activities and schedule. There
are no credible accident sequences that can result in significant offsite radiological
consequences. As a result, the potential accidents that could occur during the
decommissioning of a nuclear power reactor in Level 4 have negligible offsite and onsite
consequences.

Decommissioning Experience of Recent Plants
Between early 2013 and the end of 2014, the licensees of five power reactor units, as listed in
Table 2, permanently ceased operation. It is the NRC’s understanding that economics
associated with low wholesale electricity prices, the costs of capital improvements, or the costs
of major facility repairs were the primary reasons leading to the decisions to permanently shut
down these reactors. These were the first reactors to transition to decommissioning since 1998
– an interval of nearly 15 years without a power reactor permanently shutting down. These
recent reactor shutdowns were unexpected and involved minimal preplanning.
During approximately a three-year period (2013-2016), over 70 decommissioning related
licensing actions and other regulatory actions were processed for the five decommissioning
reactor units. This period of increased licensing activity for plants shutting down is commonly
referred to as the decommissioning transition process. These decommissioning transition
licensing actions established a regulatory framework for decommissioning reactors, and are
based, in large part, on the reduced risks to public health and safety and the common defense
and security posed by the facility. For decommissioning reactors, the number of potential
accidents is fewer and risks of radiological releases are reduced when compared to an
operating reactor. Therefore, decommissioning licensees request certain amendments to their
licenses and certain exemptions from the NRC’s operating regulations that reflect this reduction
in risk.
Table 2 and Table 3 summarize the licensing activities associated with the five reactor units that
recently went through the decommissioning transition process.
Table 2

Licensing Activity Summary for Recent Permanently Shutdown Reactors
Site

Kewaunee
Crystal River Unit 3
SONGS, Units 2 and
3
Vermont Yankee
Totals
a

Permanent
Shutdown Date
May 2013
February 2013

Decommissioning
Strategy a
SAFSTOR
SAFSTOR

Public Meetings
and Briefings
3
3

Licensing
Actions
22
16

June 2013

DECON

8

15

December 2014

SAFSTOR

2
16

26
79

Decommissioning strategies are discussed in Section 3.2 of this document.

8

Table 3

Licensing Actions Summary for Recent Permanently Shutdown Reactors

Site
Kewaunee
Crystal River Unit 3
SONGS, Units 2 and 3
Vermont Yankee
Totals

3

Exemptions Amendments
9
4
5
5
6
4
9
7
29
20

Order Rescissions
3
2
2
4
11

Other
6
4
3
6
19

Total
22
16
15
26
79

IDENTIFICATION OF AFFECTED ATTRIBUTES

The NRC developed an inventory of impacted attributes that can be found in Chapter 5 of the
NRC’s “Regulatory Analysis Technical Evaluation Handbook” (Ref. 15). These attributes are as
follows:

4

•

Industry Implementation: This attribute accounts for the one-time projected net
economic effect on the affected licensees to implement the rulemaking objectives.

•

Industry Operation: This attribute accounts for the projected net economic effect caused
by routine and recurring activities that impact all affected licensees. The economic effect
includes procedural and administrative activities to process license amendments and
exemptions.

•

NRC Implementation: This attribute accounts for the one-time projected net economic
effect on the NRC to place the proposed alternative into operation.

•

NRC Operation: This attribute accounts for the projected net economic effect on the
NRC caused by routine and recurring activities after the proposed action is implemented.
The economic effect includes procedural and administrative activities to process license
amendments and exemptions.

•

Other Government: This attribute is an impact which measures the net economic effect
of the proposed action on the federal government (other than the NRC) and state and
local governments resulting from the action's implementation or operation.

•

General Public: This attribute accounts for out-of-pocket costs paid by members of the
general public as a result of implementation or operation of proposed action.

•

Environmental Considerations: This attribute accounts for environmental improvements
resulting from the implementation of the proposed alternative relative to the regulatory
baseline that have not been addressed through use of a generic or programmatic
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment.

•

Regulatory Efficiency: This attribute accounts for regulatory and compliance
improvements resulting from the implementation of the proposed alternative relative to
the regulatory baseline.

IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES FOR THE
DECOMMISSIONING AREAS

9

The NRC considered the following general approaches to address the regulatory problem
identified in Section 1.2:
•

Alternative 1: Take no action

•

Alternative 2: Amend the decommissioning requirements through rulemaking

Fourteen areas of decommissioning are considered individually. Each area of decommissioning
includes the above alternatives, the assumptions for the alternatives, and the impacted
attributes.

Emergency Preparedness
The EP requirements in 10 CFR 50.47, “Emergency plans,” and Appendix E, “Emergency
Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities,” to 10 CFR Part 50
continue to apply to a nuclear power reactor after permanent cessation of operations and
removal of fuel from the reactor vessel. Currently, no explicit regulatory provisions distinguish
EP requirements for a power reactor that has permanently ceased operations from those for an
operating power reactor. To establish a level of EP commensurate with the risk at a
decommissioning site, licensees request exemptions from the regulatory EP requirements early
in the decommissioning process, and the NRC thoroughly reviews each one on a case-by-case
basis.
The NRC has previously approved exemptions from the emergency planning regulations in
10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 at permanently shutdown and defueled power
reactor sites. The agency granted these exemptions based, in part, on the NRC’s determination
that the spent fuel at the decommissioning licensee’s facility had sufficiently decayed to
eliminate applicable design-basis events that could result in an offsite radiological release
exceeding the limits established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) early
phase protective action guides (PAGs) of 1 rem at the exclusion area boundary.
The NRC also relied on analyses that showed that a beyond-design-basis zirconium fire in the
SFP is highly unlikely. This conclusion was based on the amount of time necessary before the
spent fuel could reach the zirconium ignition temperature during a SFP draindown event. Based
on reasonably conservative adiabatic heatup calculations, a minimum of 10 hours for the time to
heatup to zirconium ignition temperature has been used as part of the basis to support the
approval of exemptions from portions of the EP regulations. The 10-hour period allows for the
licensee to take onsite mitigation measures or, if necessary, for offsite authorities to take
appropriate response actions using an all-hazards approach emergency management plan.
Between 1987 and 1999, the NRC issued exemptions from EP requirements for ten licensees.
In EP exemptions issued in 2014 and 2015 for four decommissioning licensees,1 the NRC
required the licensees to have sufficient trained personnel on shift, and equipment and
procedures to implement their site-specific preplanned mitigation strategies within a 2-hour
timeframe. These mitigation strategies are required by a license condition until the spent fuel is
removed from the SFP. Licensees that have been granted EP exemptions must maintain an
1

The recent exemptions for emergency planning have been granted for Kewaunee Power Station (Ref. 18),
Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant (Ref. 19), San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and
3 (Ref. 20), and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Ref. 21).

10

onsite emergency plan addressing the classification of an emergency, notification of
emergencies to licensee personnel and offsite authorities, and coordination with designated
offsite government officials following an event declaration so that, if needed, offsite authorities
may implement appropriate response actions. The EP exemptions also relieve the licensee
from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 as they pertain to
offsite radiological emergency preparedness (REP), including the requirement to maintain the
10-mile plume exposure pathway and the 50-mile ingestion pathway emergency planning zones
(EPZs).
In addition, licensees must pay fees to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
and the participating states and localities to fund their activities that support the offsite
radiological EP program. FEMA regulations in 44 CFR Part 350, “Review and Approval of State
and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness” (Ref. 16), address the review and
approval of offsite response organizations’ emergency plans and procedures for responding to
radiological emergencies at commercial nuclear power plants. Under 44 CFR Part 354, “Fee for
Services to Support FEMA’s Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program” (Ref. 17),
FEMA establishes the methodology to assess and collect user fees. The fees are to recover the
obligated amounts for the radiological EP program. FEMA has established both site-specific
and flat fees. The site-specific component is related to plume exposure pathway exercises
(Ref. 22). Pursuant to 44 CFR 354.4(e), licensees are required to pay these fees until FEMA
receives a copy from the NRC of its approval of exemptions from 10 CFR 50.54(q) requirements
stating that offsite radiological emergency planning and preparedness are no longer required at
the exemption-requesting licensee’s nuclear power plant site. Following the receipt of these
approved exemptions, FEMA will no longer assess a user fee for that site from the beginning of
the next fiscal year.
Because there are no explicit regulatory provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a nuclear
power reactor that has permanently ceased operations from those for an operating power
reactor, the NRC is proposing to amend the EP requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, including
10 CFR 50.47, 10 CFR 50.54(q), (s), and (t), and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and add
alternative requirements in new Section 10 CFR 50.200. The objectives of this rulemaking are
to: (1) define the level of EP appropriate for a decommissioning nuclear power plant site from
the time of permanent cessation of operations until such time that no EP would be required and
(2) minimize the need for licensees to request, and the staff to review, exemptions from
emergency preparedness regulations for relief from requirements that are no longer necessary.
Alternative EP-1 (No-action alternative)
Under the no-action alternative, the EP requirements in 10 CFR 50.47, 10 CFR 50.54(q) and
Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 would remain unchanged and would continue to apply to a
nuclear power reactor after permanent cessation of operations and removal of fuel from the
reactor vessel. Every nuclear power reactor licensee must establish and maintain emergency
plans and preparedness in accordance with these regulations. The regulations include
standards for both onsite and offsite emergency response plans. These regulations and the
planning basis for EP are based upon an anticipated prompt response to a wide spectrum of
events. But for a decommissioning site, the number of accidents that can have significant
offsite consequences is greatly reduced and dominated by the zirconium fire scenario. The
current regulations do not address that there is considerably more time to respond to a
postulated zirconium fire incident at a decommissioning site than for postulated operating
reactor accidents.

11

Because certain EP requirements designed for operating reactors impose regulatory burden on
licensees undergoing decommissioning that is not necessary to protect the public health and
safety, licensees generally request exemptions from these requirements. Under the current
exemption process described in NSIR/DPR-ISG-02 (Ref. 23), exemptions to offsite EP
requirements must be supported by a number of analyses, including a site-specific analysis
demonstrating that fuel stored in the SFP would not reach the zirconium ignition temperature in
less than 10 hours following a beyond-design-basis accident that involves a major loss of water
inventory from the SFP. These exemption requests require extensive analysis by the licensee
and review by the NRC for each application. The no-action alternative would not relieve the
burden imposed on both licensees and the NRC resulting from this case-by-case EP exemption
process. In addition, while the exemption process could be further enhanced, this process
would not result in the efficiency gains possible through Alternative EP-2. By continuing to
assess EP exemptions for individual licensees, licensees and the NRC would continue to
expend resources to prepare and process exemption requests. The RG 1.184
“Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors,” gives an overview of the current
decommissioning process and illustrates that the majority of the administrative burden incurred
by licensees and the NRC is in the first several years of decommissioning.
The NRC’s approval of the requests for exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 50.47
and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 allows licensees to initiate the process of establishing a
permanently defueled emergency plan (PDEP) and a permanently defueled emergency action
level (EAL) scheme. A licensee could submit the PDEP to the NRC for prior review and
approval and the NRC would document its determination on the PDEP in a safety evaluation
report (SER). The NRC approval of the PDEP would document that the licensee has
maintained reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in a
radiological emergency and would provide an approved emergency plan as a licensing basis
against which future changes could be compared. Alternatively, a licensee could determine that
the adoption of the PDEP would not constitute a reduction in effectiveness of the emergency
plan per 10 CFR 50.54(q) because of the change in the licensing basis for the plant resulting
from the granting of the exemption request, and as such, the licensee could opt to implement
the change without prior NRC review and approval. With respect to the permanently defueled
EAL scheme, its adoption is considered to be a scheme change, and per the requirements of
Section IV.B.2 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, the licensee would submit it to the NRC for
prior review and approval as a license amendment request pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90,
“Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit.”
Alternative EP-2 (Rulemaking to amend regulations to provide a graded approach
to emergency preparedness / emergency plan changes between levels with NRC
approval)
In this alternative, the NRC would propose a graded approach to EP that is commensurate with
the reductions in radiological risk at the four levels of decommissioning discussed in Section
2.1. The levels and proposed areas of EP requirements are discussed below. This alternative
differs from Alternative EP-1 because the reduction of EP requirements occurs in
Alternative EP-1 only if exemptions are requested by the nuclear power plant licensees and
approved by the NRC.
Under this alternative, the NRC and FEMA must establish a notification process that would
replace the existing NRC/FEMA process for terminating the assessment of FEMA user fees
following the receipt from the NRC of its approved exemptions from pertinent 10 CFR 50.47(b)
and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 requirements. The new notification process would inform
12

FEMA that offsite radiological emergency planning and preparedness are no longer required at
a particular commercial nuclear power plant site after the spent fuel has cooled for a period of
10 months for BWRs or 16 months for PWRs and the licensee has submitted its certifications
required by 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) or 10 CFR 52.110(a). This change also requires FEMA to
perform a rulemaking to amend 44 CFR 354.4(e), “Discontinuation of charges,” to reflect this
new process.
Level 1: Post Shutdown Emergency Plan (PSEP)
Licensees would enter Level 1 after the NRC’s docketing of the licensee’s certifications of
permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) or 10 CFR 52.110(a). A PSEP provides a transition period from
the EP requirements for an operating reactor to the requirements for a decommissioning reactor
where the spent fuel has decayed for at least 10 months for a BWR or 16 months for a PWR.
This transition would reduce the regulatory burden associated with EP requirements that are no
longer necessary at a permanently shutdown and defueled power reactor facility. For this
analysis, the NRC estimates that licensees will remain in Level 1 for a period of 10 months for
BWRs or 16 months for PWRs from the date of permanent cessation of operations. As
discussed in Section 2.1.1, these time periods are based on a burnup of less than or equal to 72
GWt/MTHM; a licensee that exceeded this burnup prior to decommissioning would have to
calculate decay time using NRC guidance to determine the appropriate time period. This
calculation is the same as that being performed under the regulatory baseline by licensees
seeking to transition from Level 1 to Level 2 PDEP, and would apply to any such licensee with a
higher burnup under the regulatory baseline. Therefore, there is no incremental cost due to this
requirement in the proposed rule. Furthermore, by providing the limiting burnup value, the NRC
could potentially avert costs for a licensee that may decide not to perform the calculation, but
instead use the 10- or 16-month time periods in the proposed rule language, due to having a
burnup that conforms with the limit. This benefit is considered qualitatively in this regulatory
analysis.
The following discussion addresses current requirements that the NRC proposes to amend to
support a transition from Level 1 to a Level 2 PDEP while still providing for adequate protection
of the public health and safety during this transition period.
PSEP Staffing and Emergency Response Organization
In Level 1, the proposed rule would allow a licensee transitioning to a PSEP to revisit staffing
levels and the staffing analysis performed under Section IV.A.9 of Appendix E to
10 CFR Part 50 for the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) in order to align staffing with
the reduced spectrum of credible accidents for a permanently shutdown and defueled power
reactor facility. The proposed amended requirement would acknowledge that the spectrum of
credible accidents requiring a response from the ERO at a facility that is permanently shutdown
and defueled is reduced as compared to an operating plant, and the principal public safety
concern involves the potential radiological risks associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite
in the SFP. The reactor, reactor coolant system (RCS), and reactor support systems are no
longer in operation and have no function related to the storage of spent fuel. Therefore,
postulated accidents involving a failure or malfunction of the reactor, RCS, or reactor support
systems are no longer applicable. As such, certain ERO positions and emergency functions as
detailed in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, Table B-1 (Ref. 24), may not be applicable
or necessary in Level 1 under a PSEP. Commensurate with the reduced spectrum of credible
accidents, the NRC is proposing changes to the guidance on ERO staffing levels for Level 1.
13

The NRC has developed a draft of a new guidance document, DG-1346, “Emergency Planning
for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Reactors,” as part of this rulemaking.
PSEP Emergency Action Levels
Section IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 requires licensees to develop a set of emergency
action levels (EALs) based not only on onsite and offsite radiation monitoring information but
also on readings from a number of sensors that indicate a potential emergency, such as the
pressure in containment and the response of the emergency core cooling system. The
proposed rule would allow licensees transitioning to a PSEP to revise EALs consistent with the
profile of a permanently shutdown and defueled power reactor facility. Although there may be
no credible event that could result in significant radiological release beyond the site boundary
when a facility enters Level 1, the purpose of Level 1 is to ensure that adequate EP is in place
to ensure a prompt response even if a highly-unlikely event should occur. To accompany the
proposed rule, the NRC would prepare guidance, in DG-1346, for a permanently shutdown and
defueled power reactor facility desiring to make an EAL scheme change.
PSEP Evacuation Time Estimate Studies
Section IV.3 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 requires licensees to use evacuation time
estimates (ETEs) in the formulation of PARs and to provide the ETEs to State and local
governmental authorities for use in developing offsite protective action strategies. Licensees
must update ETEs on a periodic basis in accordance with the requirements in
10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and Sections IV.4, IV.5, and IV.6 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. In the
2011 EP Final Rule (Ref. 25), the NRC amended its regulations regarding ETEs to require
licensees to periodically assess changes to the EPZ population. As a result, licensees are
required to update their ETE analysis after every decennial census and at any time during the
decennial period if the EPZ permanent resident population increases such that it causes the
longest ETE value for specific zones to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less.
The NRC concludes that updates to the ETE during Level 1 would provide limited benefit for the
enhancement of protective action strategies or offsite evacuation planning. Even if the criteria
for updating the ETE analysis were met within the Level 1 timeframe, updating an ETE report
may take several months of analysis. After the ETE is updated, the regulations in Section IV.6
of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 require an additional 180 days before an updated ETE can be
used to inform PARs and offsite protective action strategies. The additional time and effort
needed to develop and implement a revised protective action strategy may exceed the time that
a facility would spend in Level 1 and would also be counter to the purpose of Level 1 as a
transition period during the decommissioning process. Additionally, based on the NRC’s review
of submitted ETEs, population changes within a period comparable to the Level 1 timeframe are
unlikely to impact ETEs enough to affect the formulation of protective action strategies.
Because formal offsite REP planning and pre-planned PARs for evacuations in response to a
radiological emergency would not be requirements of Level 2 (see discussion below), updates
to the ETE during Level 1 would provide almost no benefit. For these reasons, the NRC is
proposing to amend 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.4 to clarify that the ETE
requirements of paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV would no
longer be applicable to licensees after the NRC dockets the certifications of permanent
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel. Existing ETE
analyses would remain effective within the emergency plan until no longer required with PDEPs
(i.e., in Level 2).

14

PSEP Annual Dissemination of Public Information
Section IV.D.2 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 currently requires licensees to make annual
dissemination of basic emergency planning information to the public within the plume exposure
pathway EPZ. Several commenters stated that this requirement should no longer apply to
decommissioning sites. Section II.G of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1 (Ref. 26),
contains criteria for the information that should be included in the annual dissemination of public
information, including educational information on radiation, points of contact, protective
measures, and information for special needs populations. During the period of plant operation,
EPZ residents will have had adequate opportunity to become aware of this information and
much of this information is likely to remain unchanged from year to year. Starting in Level 2,
and consistent with the removal of requirements for formal offsite REP for decommissioning
sites (including the removal of EPZ requirements), the NRC would not require annual
dissemination of public information. However, for Level 1, the change in the plant’s operating
status and the ensuing changes to the EP program prompt the need to provide a final
dissemination of information to the public. This final dissemination would explain the
decommissioning process and the resultant changes to the onsite and offsite EP that are likely
to occur over the next several years. Although, the NRC is not proposing regulatory changes
related to disseminations of public information, the NRC is issuing DG-1346 for public comment
in conjunction with this proposed rule that provides guidance on one method acceptable to the
NRC for this final dissemination of information for licensees with PSEPs. This new guidance
would be developed as part of Alternative EP-2.
PSEP Drill and Exercises
Section IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) include requirements
for periodic drills and exercises for licensees. Given the low probability of design-basis
accidents (DBAs) or other highly unlikely events that could result in exceeding the EPA PAGs,
as well as the available time to initiate mitigation measures consistent with plant conditions, the
previously routine progression to a General Emergency in power reactor site scenarios is not
applicable to a decommissioning site. Therefore, the licensee would not be expected to
demonstrate response to as wide a spectrum of events as it was during its operating phase.
Beginning in Level 1, exercise scenarios could be reduced commensurate with the permanent
cessation of power reactor operations and removal of fuel from the reactor vessel to reflect a
smaller suite of potential accident scenarios.
Section IV.F.2.c of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 also requires that offsite REP plans for each
site be exercised biennially with full participation by each offsite authority having a role under
the radiological emergency plan. Depending upon when the licensee starts the
decommissioning process, a full participation exercise could potentially be required during
Level 1. As the risk of an accident resulting in a radiological release offsite is significantly
reduced in Level 1 and because regulatory standards for offsite REP programs would not be a
requirement of Level 2, there would be limited safety benefit to performing full-scale participation
exercises simulating a release with offsite consequences during the time a licensee is in
Level 1. The NRC anticipates that it will need to clarify further through regulation or guidance
the timing and scope of full participation drills and exercises in relation to the licensee’s 8-year
exercise cycle and the timeline for decommissioning. The NRC will make any potential changes
to the timing and scope of drill and exercise requirements in consultation with FEMA. This new
regulation would be developed as part of Alternative EP-2.

15

PSEP Emergency Response Data System
Section VI of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 outlines a set of system, testing, and
implementation requirements for the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). These
systems transmit near real-time electronic data directly between the licensee’s onsite computer
system and the NRC Operations Center. Nuclear power facilities that are shut down
permanently or indefinitely are currently not required to provide hardware to interface with the
NRC receiving system under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.
Under Alternative EP-2, the NRC is proposing to require licensees in Level 1 to maintain the
capability to provide meteorological, radiological, and SFP data (e.g., level, flow, and
temperature data) to the NRC within a reasonable timeframe. The NRC assumes in this
regulatory analysis that this clarification does not represent a material change in how the ERDS
is implemented for Alternative EP-1.
Hostile Action Requirements
In the 2011 EP Final Rule, the NRC amended its regulations to include enhancements to EP in
response to a hostile action event. In Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, Section IV.B.1 includes
providing EALs for hostile action, Section IV.E.8.d includes alternative facilities for the staging of
ERO personnel, Section IV.l provides for protective actions for onsite personnel, and
Section IV.F.2.c.4 and Section IV.F.2.i include hostile action scenarios in drills and exercises.
These EP requirements related to hostile action are separate and distinct from physical
protection regulations in 10 CFR Part 73. As discussed below, hostile action requirements
would not apply to decommissioning sites that have progressed to Level 2. The NRC has
determined that maintaining provisions for hostile action within onsite and offsite radiological
emergency plans is prudent given the condition of the facility in Level 1.
As such, the NRC is proposing to maintain EP requirements related to hostile action during
Level 1. However, consistent with the above discussion on drill and exercise requirements, the
NRC concludes that continuing with full-participation hostile-action-based (HAB) exercises
would provide limited safety benefit to a facility that is decommissioning. Under
Alternative EP-2, NRC proposes to amend the regulations to remove the HAB exercise
requirement from the 8-year exercise cycle starting in Level 1, although security-based EALs
would remain in place as potential initiating events for drills and exercises. The removal of the
full-participation HAB exercise requirement would be performed as part of Alternative EP-2.
Level 2: Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan
For plants that have permanently shut down and defueled (Level 1), the proposed EP approach
is based primarily on conditions that: (1) a postulated radiological release would not exceed the
EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary for DBAs applicable to a permanently shutdown and
defueled reactor, and (2) sufficient time would exist to take prompt mitigative actions in
response to a postulated zirconium fire accident scenario in the SFP and, if warranted, for
offsite officials to take appropriate response actions to protect public health and safety. The
NRC’s analysis of spent fuel decay times provided information on fuel heatup time to 900°C as
a function of cooling time for both PWR and BWR assemblies. The analysis also included
sensitivities to the mass of the racks and the fuel configuration in the SFP. Based on this
analysis, the NRC concludes that after a cooling period of 10 months for BWRs or 16 months for
PWRs, the spent fuel cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours.
The NRC proposes to amend the regulations to allow licensees to transition to a permanently
16

defueled emergency plan, or PDEP (Level 2) after a specified time. Also, the proposed change
would allow licensees to submit an analysis for NRC approval demonstrating that an alternate
(e.g., shorter) spent fuel decay period would ensure that spent fuel would not heat up to 900°C
in less than 10 hours under adiabatic conditions. Under the proposed rulemaking Alternative
EP-2, licensees would be required to submit this analysis under 10 CFR 50.90 and the analysis
would need to be approved by the NRC in order for a licensee to transition to a PDEP (Level 2)
in less than 10 months (for a BWR) or 16 months (for a PWR). This analysis is the same as that
being performed under the regulatory baseline by licensees seeking to transition from Level 1 to
Level 2 PDEP. Therefore, there is no incremental cost due to this requirement in the proposed
rule. Furthermore, by providing the limiting burnup value, the NRC could potentially avert costs
for a licensee that may decide not to perform the calculation, but instead use the 10- or 16month time periods in the proposed rule language, due to having a burnup that conforms with
the limit. This benefit is considered qualitatively in this regulatory analysis. The NRC would
issue DG-1346 for public comment in conjunction with this proposed rule that provides guidance
on one method acceptable to the NRC for conducting the spent fuel heatup analysis.
PDEP Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plans
Under the proposed rule, NRC planning standards would no longer apply to offsite radiological
emergency response plans in Level 2. The transition to a PDEP would be conditioned upon
analyses performed by the NRC that the licensee is wholly capable of and responsible for
mitigating the consequences of an event. In its review of several exemption requests, the NRC
has concluded that as long as a period of at least 10 hours is available to initiate mitigation
measures or to implement appropriate response actions offsite, formal offsite radiological
emergency plans required under 10 CFR Part 50 are not necessary for permanently shutdown
and defueled nuclear power reactor licensees with a PDEP.
For transition to a PDEP, site conditions would need to provide a period of at least 10 hours to
initiate mitigation measures or to implement appropriate response actions off site. The NRC
concludes that such time is ample to take appropriate actions without the extensive preplanning
and other requirements of the EP framework for operating plants, and, therefore, regulatory
standards for offsite radiological emergency plans would no longer be necessary for the
adequate protection of public health and safety. Licensees with PDEPs would still maintain a
variety of onsite capabilities that may be available to support OROs in EP and response,
including radiological training; regular coordination with OROs; radiological assessment
capabilities; memoranda of understanding for firefighting, law enforcement, and
ambulance/medical services; and the ability to make PARs upon request. For licensees with
PDEPs, no action would be expected or required from State or local government organizations
in response to an event at a decommissioning site other than onsite firefighting, law
enforcement, and ambulance/medical services. The NRC contends that this clarification to the
offsite radiological emergency response plans does not represent a material change in how
licensees meet the EP requirements from Alternative EP-1 after the NRC grants the exemption
request.
PDEP Staffing and Emergency Response Organization
For licensees with PDEPs, the proposed rule would include staffing requirements similar to the
current requirements in § 50.47(b)(1), § 50.47(b)(2), and paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to
10 CFR Part 50 with the exception of changes made to reflect the small staffing levels required
to operate the facility and the removal of formal offsite radiological emergency response
requirements for licensees with PDEPs. For example, licensees with PDEPs would not have to
17

comply with the requirement under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.3 to augment the
ERO with staff from licensee headquarters. Decommissioning sites typically have a level of
emergency response that does not require response by headquarters personnel. Licensees
would not have to identify State and/or local officials responsible for protective actions, as
currently required under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.8 because offsite
emergency measures are limited to onsite support provided by local police, fire departments,
and ambulance and hospital services, as appropriate. The proposed rule would require
licensees with PDEPs to include in their emergency plans plant staff emergency assignments.
In addition, the staffing analysis required under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.9
would no longer apply to licensees with PDEPs. In the 2011 EP Final Rule, the NRC concluded
that the staffing analysis requirement was not necessary for non-power reactor licensees
because of the small staffing levels required to operate the facility. For this same reason,
licensees with PDEPs would no longer be required to perform this analysis under the proposed
rule.
As licensees transition to a PSEP, staffing levels may be reduced but must remain
commensurate with the need to safely store spent fuel at the facility in a manner that is
protective of public health and safety. New guidance would be developed as part of Alternative
EP-2 to provide one method acceptable to the NRC for ERO staffing during Level 2.
PDEP Emergency Classification Levels and Emergency Action Levels
Section IV.C.1 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that emergency action levels are
based, in part, on onsite and offsite radiation monitoring data. The proposed rule would require
licensees with PDEPs to establish a standard emergency classification level (ECL) and EAL
scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters. The proposed EAL
and ECL requirements for licensees with PDEPs would be analogous to 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix E, Sections IV.B and IV.C with the exceptions of the requirements to base EALs on
offsite monitoring information and the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B.1 requirement
to include hostile action based EALs. For facilities with PDEPs, the proposed rule would specify
that only the ECLs of Notification of Unusual Event and Alert would apply (and not the ECLs of
Site Area Emergency and General Emergency that apply to operating reactors). The proposed
requirements would be accompanied by new guidance as part of Alternative EP-2.
PDEP Emergency Assessment, Classification, and Declaration
Section IV.C.2 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 currently requires licensees to maintain the
capability to assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes. A
decommissioning power reactor has a low likelihood of a credible accident resulting in
radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures and the event progression is much
slower compared to that for operating reactors. For these reasons under Alternative EP-2, the
NRC proposes to amend the regulations so that licensees with PDEPs (in Level 2) would not be
required to assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes. Instead,
the NRC is proposing that licensees with PDEPs must document and maintain the capability to
assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition as soon as possible and within 60
minutes after the availability of indications that an EAL has been exceeded and must promptly
declare the emergency condition as soon as possible following identification of the appropriate
ECL. The NRC estimates in this analysis that this change in the reporting timing requirement
from 15 minutes to as soon as possible and within 60 minutes would result in an

18

inconsequential cost burden difference from Alternative EP-1 for the case that the licensee
submits and the NRC grants an exemption request.
PDEP Notification Requirement to State and Local Governmental Agencies
Section IV.D.3 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 currently requires licensees to have the
capability to notify OROs of an emergency declaration within 15 minutes. Under this alternative,
licensees in Level 2 would be required to promptly notify OROs and to make this notification no
later than 60 minutes after declaring an emergency. Because of the low probability of DBAs or
other credible events that would be expected to exceed the EPA PAGs and the available time to
initiate mitigation measures consistent with plant conditions or, if necessary, to implement
protective actions, the NRC concludes that 60 minutes provides sufficient time for ORO
notification in Level 2.
Under Alternative EP-2, the NRC proposes to amend the regulations to require licensees to
promptly notify to State and local governmental agencies and to make this notification as soon
as possible and within 60 minutes after declaring an emergency. The NRC estimates in this
analysis that this change in the notification time requirement from 15 minutes to as soon as
possible and within 60 minutes would result in an inconsequential cost burden difference from
Alternative EP-1 for the case that the licensee submits and the NRC grants an exemption
request.
PDEP Public Alert and Notification Systems
Section IV.D.3 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 currently requires licensees to demonstrate
that appropriate governmental authorities have the capability to make a public alerting and
notification decision promptly on being informed of an emergency condition. Because of the low
probability of DBAs or other credible events that would be expected to exceed the limits of EPA
PAGs offsite and the available time for event mitigation, the NRC concluded that the public alert
and notification system would not be required for licensees in Level 2. Similarly, exercises of
this system, as required under Section IV.F.2 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 would no longer
be required for licensees with PDEPs (in Level 2).
Under Alternative EP-2, the NRC proposes to amend the regulations to provide a
non-mandatory relaxation of this alert and notification system requirement. However, licensees
in Level 2 would still be required to maintain the capability to notify responsible State and local
governmental agencies within 60 minutes after declaring an emergency, and research has
shown sufficient time would be available to inform the public and implement protective actions, if
necessary. The NRC estimates in this analysis that the proposed change would result in an
inconsequential cost burden difference in how the public alert and notification system is
maintained and exercised from Alternative EP-1 for the case that the licensee submits and the
NRC grants an exemption request.
PDEP Emergency Planning Zones
Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) are defined as the areas for which planning is needed to
assure prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect the public in the event of an
incident. The requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 state that the EPZs associated with each nuclear
power plant must be defined both for the shorter-term plume exposure pathway and the
longer-term ingestion exposure pathway. Because of the low probability of DBAs or other
credible events that would be expected to exceed the EPA PAGs offsite, and the available time
19

to initiate mitigation measures consistent with plant conditions, the potential offsite
consequences would not warrant maintaining the plume exposure pathway and ingestion
exposure pathway EPZs in Level 2. If necessary, sufficient time would be available for OROs to
implement appropriate response actions even for the worst-case severe accident.
Therefore, under Alternative EP-2, the NRC proposes to amend the regulations to clarify that
the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) do not apply to offsite radiological emergency
response plans if the licensee’s emergency plan is not required to meet these planning
standards or if the plume exposure pathway EPZ does not exceed the site area boundary. In
addition to licensees with PDEPs (in Level 2), future licensees of small modular reactors or
other nuclear technologies may be permitted to have a plume exposure pathway EPZ that does
not exceed the site area boundary, and this proposed paragraph would clarify applicability of the
10 CFR 50.47(b) planning standards to these facilities as well.
PDEP Offsite Radiological Protective Action Recommendations
Licensees must develop a range of protective actions for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for
emergency workers and the public and to give consideration to evacuation, sheltering, and the
use of potassium iodide per the current requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b). Also, licensees must
develop and put in place guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency
and develop protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ.
Under Alternative EP-2, licensees with PDEPs (in Level 2) would be required to continue to
develop a range of protective actions for emergency workers and the public but, consistent with
the removal of regulatory standards for offsite radiological EP for these licensees, would not
reference specific offsite protective actions or pre-planned activities for the public in the EPZs.
The proposed requirement would require preplanned PAR strategies for emergency workers
who may have to respond to the decommissioning site for firefighting, law enforcement, and
ambulance/medical services and members of the public present within the owner-controlled
area during a radiological emergency. For licensees in Level 2, preplanned offsite protective
actions to ensure a prompt response to a radiological emergency on site are not necessary
given the time available for OROs to implement appropriate response actions. Although the
likelihood is extremely low for events that would result in doses in excess of the EPA PAGs to
the public beyond the owner-controlled area boundary based on the permanently shutdown and
defueled status of the reactor, the NRC would require licensees in Level 2 to determine the
magnitude of and continually assess the impact of a radiological release and, if a release is
occurring, the licensee staff would be required to communicate that information to offsite
authorities within 60 minutes for their consideration in taking appropriate response actions.
The NRC estimates in this analysis that the proposed change would result in an inconsequential
cost burden difference in how the licensee maintains the range of protective actions for the
plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public from Alternative EP-1 for
the case that the licensee submits and the NRC grants an exemption request.
PDEP Evacuation Time Estimate Studies
Currently licensees are required to develop and update Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs) in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Section IV.3 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
Section IV.3 requires licensees to use ETEs in the formulation of protective action
recommendations (PARs) and to provide ETEs to State and local governmental authorities for
use in developing offsite protective actions strategies. Under Alternative EP-2 and consistent
20

with the determination for EPZs and PARs, the NRC would not require licensee with PDEPs (in
Level 2) to maintain ETEs.
PDEP Emergency Facilities and Equipment
Section IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 requires licensees to maintain and describe
adequate provisions for emergency facilities and equipment, including equipment at the site for
personnel monitoring, equipment for radiological assessment, facilities and supplies for
decontaminating onsite individuals, first aid facilities and medical supplies, arrangements for
qualified medical service providers and the transportation of contaminated injured individuals,
and arrangements for the treatment of individuals injured in support of licensed activities.
Decommissioning licensees have not received exemptions or license amendments for these
requirements to date and the NRC has determined that licensees with PSEPs (in Level 1) and
PDEPs (in Level 2) would still need to maintain these capabilities. As a result, the NRC has not
proposed an alternative for how the licensee maintains and describes adequate provisions for
emergency facilities and equipment from Alternative EP-1.
PDEP Hostile Action Requirements
Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7 defines “hostile action” as an act directed toward a nuclear
power plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take
hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end, as it applies to the capability of
implementing EP during such events. However, in the Statement of Considerations for the
2011 EP Final Rule, the NRC excluded nonpower reactors from the definition of “hostile action”
because a nonpower reactor as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, “Definitions,” is not a nuclear power
plant, and a regulatory basis had not been developed to support the inclusion of nonpower
reactors in the definition of “hostile action.” A facility with a PDEP (in Level 2) would be similar
to a nonpower reactor in that it has a small operating staff and a low likelihood of a credible
accident resulting in radiological releases requiring response actions off site. As such, power
reactor facilities transitioning to a PDEP do not fall within the scope of “hostile action,” and
enhancements to EP in response to hostile action, such as alternative facilities for the staging of
ERO personnel, protection of onsite personnel, and challenging drills and exercises involving
hostile action, are not warranted. However, elements for security-based events would be
maintained for these facilities, including EALs for security-based events. For physical security,
the objective for these facilities relates to protection of the spent fuel against sabotage. A level
of security commensurate with the consequences of a sabotage event is required and is
evaluated on a site-specific basis. The severity of the consequences declines as fuel ages and
thereby removes over time the underlying concern that a sabotage attack, under the current
definition, could cause offsite radiological consequences.
Under Alternative EP-2, power reactor licensees transitioning to a PDEP (Level 2) would be
required to identify ORO resources that would respond to a security event, and the assistance
licensees expect from those resources would be maintained in PDEPs. The NRC estimates in
this analysis that the treatment of hostile action requirements does not represent a change in
burden from Alternative EP-1 after the NRC grants the exemption request.
PDEP Drills and Exercise
The proposed rule would require licensees with PDEPs to conduct periodic exercises to
evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, conduct periodic drills to develop
and maintain key skills, and correct deficiencies identified as a result of exercises and drills.
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The proposed requirements differ from the existing requirements under 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix E, Section IV.F to account for changes in principal functional areas, offsite radiological
emergency response requirements, offsite PAR requirements, and the spectrum of accidents
possible at a PDEP facilities. The regulatory analysis assumes that this will not represent a
change in burden from Alternative EP-1 after the NRC grants an exemption request.
PDEP Offsite Response Organization Participation in Drills and Exercises
Section IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) include requirements
for periodic EP drills and exercises for licensees. Paragraph IV.F.2.c of Appendix E to
10 CFR Part 50 requires offsite REP plans for each site to be exercised biennially with full
participation by offsite authorities having a role under the radiological response plan. Under the
proposed rule, because no action is required from State and local government organizations in
response to an event other than onsite firefighting, law enforcement, and ambulance/medical
services, the requirements related to ORO participation in radiological drills and exercises would
no longer be relevant for licensees with PDEPs. Licensees with PDEPs would be required to
enable any State or local government to participate in the licensee’s drills when requested. The
regulatory analysis assumes that relaxing ORO participation in radiological drills and exercises
from mandatory participation to an opportunity to participate (i.e., voluntary participation) does
not represent a change in burden from Alternative EP-1 after the NRC grants an exemption
request.
Level 3: All Spent Fuel Transferred to an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
A licensee with all of its spent fuel in dry cask storage that terminates its 10 CFR Part 50 or
10 CFR Part 52 license must first obtain a 10 CFR Part 72 specific license before transitioning
to the EP requirements already provided in § 72.32(a). A licensee maintaining its
10 CFR Part 50 or 10 CFR Part 52 license, and thus its 10 CFR Part 72 general license
authorized under § 72.210, “General license issued,” may opt to change its EP program to align
it with the requirements of § 72.32 once all spent fuel is transferred to dry cask storage. In
addition, licensees with 10 CFR Part 72 general licenses would need to continue to comply with
all applicable 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52 requirements until the 10 CFR Part 50 or 10
CFR Part 52 license is terminated. The proposed rule would require that licensees with an
independent spent fuel storage installation-only emergency plan (IOEP) must follow and
maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in § 72.32(a).
Level 4: All Spent Fuel Removed from Site
Once all spent fuel has been permanently removed from the site, a licensee can terminate its
EP program because the site no longer poses any risk of a radiological release.
Additional Amendments for Emergency Preparedness
Change to Emergency Plans
Licensees are required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) to follow and maintain the effectiveness of an
emergency plan that meets the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements in
Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. In addition, 10 CFR 50.54(q) contains the conditions under
which the licensee may make changes to its emergency plan without prior application to and
approval by the NRC, provided that the changes do not reduce the effectiveness of the plan and

22

that the plan, as changed, continues to meet the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the
requirements in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
The proposed rule would add new requirements, similar to § 50.54(q)(2) and § 50.54(q)(3),
referencing the requirements that emergency plans for decommissioning power reactors must
meet and the process for making these changes. The proposed rule would establish the
process for: (1) transitions between EP decommissioning levels (i.e., PSEP, PDEP, IOEP) and
(2) changes to emergency plans within an EP decommissioning level. The NRC does not
anticipate any EP-related changes to 10 CFR 50.59 as a result of this rulemaking alternative.
Program Element Review under 10 CFR 50.54(t)
Under 10 CFR 50.54(t), licensees must conduct reviews of EP program elements either: (1) at
intervals not to exceed 12 months, or (2) as necessary, based on an assessment by the
licensee against performance indicators, and as soon as reasonably practicable after a change
occurs in personnel, procedures, equipment, or facilities that potentially could adversely affect
EP. If a licensee chooses the second option, it must still review all program elements at least
once every 24 months. The proposed rule would amend § 50.54(t) such that, starting after the
NRC’s docketing of certifications under § 50.82(a)(1) or § 52.110(a), licensees would be able to
conduct program element reviews under § 50.54(t) at intervals not to exceed 24 months (rather
than 12 months) without conducting an assessment against performance indicators. As a
result, it is expected that licensees would conduct a program element review shortly after
implementing a PDEP. With this proposed change, the NRC seeks to ensure that a licensee
evaluates its EP program soon after it transitions to a PDEP.
Reasonable Assurance and Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness
Every 10 CFR Part 50 or 10 CFR Part 52 license includes as a condition of the license the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(s)(2)(ii) and (s)(3), regarding findings and determinations of
reasonable assurance. For decommissioning power reactors, the proposed rule would state
that if regulatory standards for offsite radiological EP are not required, then findings and
determinations by FEMA would not be needed in order for the NRC to make determinations
regarding reasonable assurance under § 50.54(s)(2)(ii). Therefore, the proposed rule would
clarify that FEMA findings and determinations are only necessary when the NRC’s planning
standards apply to offsite radiological emergency response plans. As a result, FEMA fees
would no longer apply in these cases. The regulatory analysis did not identify any change in
burden for this provision between that required for Alternative EP-1 after the NRC grants the
exemption request and for Alternative EP-2.
Development of Regulatory Guides
Under Alternative EP-2, the NRC would develop a new EP-specific guidance document for
decommissioning facilities that would be issued for public comment with the proposed rule.
Assumptions
The regulatory analysis has made the following assumptions:
•

In Alternative EP-1, all nuclear power plant licensees would file exemption requests and
amendment requests from pertinent 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50
requirements so that they may obtain the benefits described in Alternative EP-2 above.
23

•

For Alternative EP-2, each licensee would not submit a site-specific analysis, but instead
would wait the pre-determined time, which will be specified by rulemaking, before
transitioning from Level 1 to Level 2.

•

For Alternative EP-2, the regulatory analysis assumes that the notification requirements
performed for Alternative EP-1 will be reflected in the proposed guidance.

•

For Alternative EP-2, the regulatory analysis assumes that staffing and emergency
response organization requirements do not represent a material change in burden from
Alternative EP-1 after the NRC grants the exemption requests.
Affected Attributes

Industry Implementation: Under Alternative EP-2, the number of requests for exemptions that
licensees typically submit from EP requirements would be reduced, resulting in a one-time
benefit (i.e., averted cost) to industry for plants that enter decommissioning after issuance of the
rule. Additionally, the licensees would commit additional resources to participate in the public
meeting and comment period for the proposed rule.
Industry Operation: Under Alternative EP-2, licensees might avoid recurring FEMA fees due to
the time period between when the fuel in the SFP has sufficiently decayed such that it would not
reach ignition temperature within 10 hours under adiabatic heatup conditions and the finalization
of the exemption from emergency preparedness.
NRC Implementation: To implement Alternative EP-2, the NRC incurs a one-time cost in order
to develop the rule and the EP specific guidance. For Alternative EP-2, the number of
exemptions from and amendments to 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50
requirements would be reduced, which would result in a benefit (i.e., averted cost) to the NRC
due to lack of reviewing these exemptions and amendments.
Other Government: To implement Alternative EP-2, the NRC and FEMA would establish a
notification process that replaces the existing NRC/FEMA process for terminating the
assessment of FEMA user fees. The FEMA would also incur one-time costs to develop and
issue a final rule to amend 44 CFR 354.4(e) to reflect this new process. Under Alternative EP-2
the state, local governments and FEMA would commit additional resources to participate in the
public meeting and comment period for the proposed rule.
General Public: Under Alternative EP-2, the general public would commit additional resources
to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed rule.

Physical Security
Whether they hold a license under 10 CFR Part 50 or 10 CFR Part 52, nuclear power reactor
licensees are subject to various security requirements in 10 CFR Part 73, ‘‘Physical Protection
of Plants and Materials.’’ Such requirements include those in Appendix B to Part 73, “General
Criteria for Security Personnel,” Appendix C to Part 73, “Safeguards Contingency Plans,”
10 CFR 73.54, “Protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks, and
10 CFR 73.55, “Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power
reactors against radiological sabotage.” If the power reactor site has an associated
independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) under the general license granted by 10 CFR

24

72.210, “General license issued,” the licensee must protect the ISFSI in accordance with
10 CFR 72.212, “Conditions of general license issued under 10 CFR 72.210.”
Under the existing regulations, each nuclear power reactor licensed under 10 CFR Part 50 or
10 CFR Part 52, remains subject to the requirements in 10 CFR 73.55 to maintain a
Commission-approved physical security plan, training and qualification plan, safeguards
contingency plan, and cyber security plan. The regulations in 10 CFR 73.55(b)(3) require the
physical protection program to be designed to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel
sabotage. The regulations further require the licensee to have a physical protection program
that ensures that the capabilities to detect, assess, interdict, and neutralize threats (up to and
including the design-basis threat (DBT) of radiological sabotage, as stated in 10 CFR 73.1,
“Purpose and scope,”) are maintained at all times. The regulations in 10 CFR 73.55(b)(3) also
require that the licensee’s physical protection program provides defense in depth through the
integration of systems, technologies, programs, equipment, supporting processes, and
implementing procedures to ensure the program’s continued effectiveness.
During the initial transition from operation to decommissioning, the reactor is permanently
shutdown and the spent fuel is permanently moved from the reactor vessel to an SFP. Although
the potential adversary targets are fewer, and in fewer locations, the licensee is currently
responsible for identifying and analyzing the “new” site-specific conditions to account for
possible adversary approaches consistent with the changes in facility configuration. At this step
in the process, licensees with reactors in the decommissioning process have submitted to the
NRC various changes and requests for exemptions from the NRC security requirements under
10 CFR 73.5, “Specific Exemptions,” requests for license amendments under 10 CFR 50.90,
and security plan changes under 10 CFR 50.54(p). In accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p)(2), a
licensee may make security plan changes that do not decrease the safeguards effectiveness of
the security plan without prior NRC approval. Licensees must provide a report of the security
plan change to the NRC within 2 months of the change.
Currently, there are no regulatory provisions distinguishing physical security requirements for a
power reactor that has permanently ceased operation from those for an operating power
reactor. As a result, decommissioning reactor licensees and the NRC have expended
resources for processing security-related licensing actions, such as exemption and license
amendment requests. Licensees that have transitioned to decommissioning have sought and
received NRC approval of exemptions and amendments to reduce physical security
requirements no longer needed or no longer relevant because the configuration of the site has
changed, and the risk presented by a decommissioning plant is much less than when it was
operating.
Additionally, licensee and NRC resources are also spent reviewing security plan changes to
ensure all revisions either do not reflect a decrease in safeguards effectiveness or are submitted
to the NRC for review and approval prior to implementation in accordance with
10 CFR 50.54(p). The lack of a regulatory definition for “a decrease in safeguards
effectiveness” complicates this process, therefore the NRC is proposing to amend the current
regulation to provide clarity for licensees and staff for security plan changes.
Alternative PS-1 (No-action alternative)
The no-action alternative would retain the current physical security regulatory structure for
power reactor licensees during operation and decommissioning. Each nuclear power reactor
licensed under 10 CFR Part 50 or 10 CFR Part 52 would continue to remain subject to the
25

current requirements in 10 CFR 73.55 to maintain a Commission approved physical security
plan, training and qualification plan, safeguards contingency plan, and cyber security plan.
Under this alternative, the NRC would continue to process requests from licensee undergoing
decommissioning for exemptions from certain requirements and to process license amendment
for the security commitments in existing license conditions.
Alternative PS-2 (Rulemaking)
Under this alternative, the NRC would streamline the decommissioning process by allowing
licensees to make changes to NRC-required security programs during decommissioning that
reflect the reduced number of target sets and therefore a reduction in risk without having to
request either an exemption or amendment. These changes include commonly requested
exemptions and amendments made by decommissioning licensees and typically approved by
the NRC. Under this alternative, the NRC will continue to review security plan change reports
submitted by licensees and will continue to provide oversight of licensee security programs at
decommissioning power reactors through a security inspection program that verifies the
licensees’ compliance with applicable regulatory requirements.
In addition, this alternative would pursue rulemaking to implement proposed changes, which are
discussed in detail below, to the physical security requirements for decommissioning power
reactors. Once a licensee certifies under 10 CFR 50.82, “Termination of License,” that it has:
(1) permanently ceased operation and (2) permanently removed fuel from the reactor vessel,
and these certifications have been docketed by the NRC, changes to the operations of the plant
will support a step-down in the physical security requirements currently imposed on operating
reactors through regulations and orders. The following areas of physical security will be
considered for modification in the rulemaking:
•

Security Plans. The NRC is proposing to revise § 50.54(p) to include definitions of the
terms “change” and “decrease in safeguards effectiveness.” The application of these
definitions is limited to the revised § 50.54(p) and will apply to operating,
decommissioning, and decommissioned reactor licensees. The term “change” would be
defined in a new § 50.54(p)(1)(i) to mean an action that results in a modification of,
addition to, or removal from, the licensee’s security plans. The term “decrease in
safeguards effectiveness” would be defined in a new § 50.54(p)(1)(ii) to mean a change
or series of changes to an element or component of the security plans referenced in this
section that reduces or eliminates the licensee’s ability to perform or maintain the
capabilities set forth in § 73.55(b)(3)(i) without compensating changes to other security
plan elements or components.
The NRC is proposing that decommissioning and operating reactor licensees include in
the required § 50.54(p)(2) report a summary of the supporting analysis for the licensee’s
determination that the change does not decrease safeguards effectiveness. The
summary must be sufficient to demonstrate that the change does not decrease the
safeguards effectiveness of the plan.

•

Dry Cask Storage. Power reactor licensees that operate an ISFSI may hold either a
general or specific license for the ISFSI. Under 10 CFR 72.212(b)(9), general license
ISFSIs are subject to the same physical security requirements in 10 CFR 73.55 as
power reactors, with some exceptions. By contrast, licensees that hold a specific license
under 10 CFR Part 72 are subject to the physical security requirements of 10 CFR

26

73.51, “Requirements for the physical protection for spent nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste,” which are less stringent than the 10 CFR 73.55 requirements.
During the decommissioning process, power reactor licensees with a general license
ISFSI will transition to a phase when all the spent fuel has been removed from the SFP
and placed in a dry cask storage system (DCSS). At this point, the security measures
needed to protect the facility from radiological sabotage decrease significantly. Once the
reactor ceases to operate, certain requirements in 10 CFR 73.55, (e.g., protection
against significant core damage) are no longer necessary because there is no fuel in the
reactor core. General ISFSI licensees must submit license amendments and requests
for regulatory exemptions to obtain relief from the more stringent requirements. The
NRC has previously exempted decommissioning licensees that have placed all fuel in a
DCSS from the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55, and has allowed the licensees to commit
to following the ISFSI-specific physical security requirements in 10 CFR 73.51 which
reflect a level of physical protection significantly less than that required at operating
power reactors and decommissioned facilities with fuel in the SFP.
The NRC is proposing that once all spent nuclear fuel (SNF) has been placed in dry
cask storage, licensees may elect to follow the proposed § 72.212(b)(9)(vii) and protect
a general license ISFSI in accordance with the physical security requirements in § 73.51.
A licensee may use the process set forth in the revised and renumbered § 50.54(p)(3) to
make this change and submit its revised physical security plan to the NRC. These
security plans must continue to address the applicable security-related orders
associated with an ISFSI that are conditions of the license. The NRC is also proposing
conforming changes to § 72.13, “Applicability,” to reflect the requirements that would
apply to a licensee that elects to follow the proposed § 72.212(b)(9)(vii).
•

Significant Core Damage. Under 10 CFR 73.55(b)(3), a nuclear power reactor
licensee’s physical protection program must be designed, in part, to prevent significant
core damage. A nuclear power reactor that has permanently ceased operations no
longer has fuel in the reactor vessel. Therefore, there is no potential for an emergency
shutdown to prevent significant core damage or a radiological release because there is
no core that would pose a radiological risk. Accordingly, licensees no longer need to
protect against significant core damage once all fuel is in the SFP or in a DCSS.
Training of security personnel for this condition is also no longer warranted. Therefore,
the NRC is proposing that a licensee of a decommissioning nuclear power reactor no
longer be required to meet the requirement in § 73.55(b)(3) to protect against significant
core damage once the reactor has permanently ceased operating and all fuel has been
removed from the reactor vessel. The requirement to protect against spent fuel
sabotage would remain in place as long as spent fuel remains on the site.

•

Vital Areas. Under 10 CFR 73.55(e)(9), licensees are required to protect the reactor
control room as a vital area. A vital area is defined in 10 CFR 73.2 as any area which
contains vital equipment; under 10 CFR 73.2, vital equipment means any equipment,
system, device, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or
indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation. The NRC also
considers the equipment or systems that would be required to function to protect public
health and safety following such a failure, destruction, or release to be vital. The role of
the reactor control room at an operating plant is described in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix
A, General Design Criterion 19. General Design Criterion 19 specifies that the control

27

room must be a protected space from which actions can be taken to operate the nuclear
power plant safely and without interruption under normal or accident conditions.
For a permanently shutdown and defueled facility, the vital equipment associated with
operating the reactor vessel is no longer needed and the remaining vital equipment (e.g.,
associated with SFP cooling) may no longer be needed or may be relocated to a vital
area separate from the control room. Once a reactor has permanently ceased
operations, the need for a reactor control room is eliminated if all of the vital equipment
is removed and if the area does not serve as the vital area boundary for other vital
areas. The NRC is proposing to revise § 73.55(e)(9)(v) to provide that a licensee of a
decommissioning nuclear power reactor would no longer need to designate the reactor
control room as a vital area if it does not otherwise meet the definition of a vital area in
§ 73.2.
•

Communications. Under 10 CFR 73.55(j)(4)(ii), the NRC requires that a system for
continuous communication capabilities with the control room must terminate in the
central and secondary alarm stations to ensure effective command and control during
both normal and emergency conditions. One purpose of this requirement is to ensure
that communications are maintained between security operations and reactor operators
who are normally located in the control room. A nuclear power reactor that has
permanently ceased operations and no longer has fuel in the reactor vessel may no
longer have reactor operators or a control room; therefore, the NRC is proposing to
amend § 73.55(j) to require continuous and redundant communications be maintained
between the central alarm station and the certified fuel handler (CFH), as defined in
10 CFR 50.2, or senior on-shift licensee representative once the reactor has ceased
operations and the licensee no longer has licensed senior operators in the control room.
The intention of this change is to allow licensees flexibility in maintaining
communications with one or both of these individuals.

•

Suspension of security measures. The NRC is proposing to amend 10 CFR 73.55(p)
to permit a CFH to approve the temporarily suspension of security measures during
certain emergency conditions or during severe weather at decommissioning nuclear
power reactors whose 10 CFR 50.82(a) certifications have been docketed. Currently,
the security requirements in 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) provide that a “licensee may suspend
any security measures under this section in an emergency when this action is
immediately needed to protect the public health and safety…. This suspension of
security measures must be approved as a minimum by a licensed senior operator before
taking this action.” Similarly, 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(ii) provides that a licensee may
suspend security measures during “severe weather when the suspension of affected
security measures is needed to protect the personal health and safety of security force
personnel…. This suspension of security measures must be approved, as a minimum,
by a licensed senior operator, with input from the security supervisor or manager, before
taking this action.” The licensee for a nuclear power reactor that has permanently
ceased operations and no longer has fuel in the reactor vessel may no longer employ or
have on site a licensed senior operator. As currently written, these provisions are not
clear as to whether the suspension of security measures to protect the public or the
security personnel in the instance of severe weather could be accomplished at a
decommissioning reactor without first requesting an exemption. The NRC proposes to
modify the regulatory language to clarify that a licensed senior operator or CFH can
make this decision.

28

Assumptions
The regulatory analysis assumes the following for the cost-benefit analysis of Physical Security:
•
•

All nuclear power plant licensees will file exemption and amendment requests to reduce
their physical security requirements that are commensurate with the benefits for the
recommended rulemaking.
Docketing of the certifications submitted under 10 CFR 50.82 meets the requirements for
stepping down the physical security requirements.
Affected Attributes

Industry Implementation: Under Alternative PS-2, licensees would not need to apply for
exemptions and amendments for reducing their physical security requirements. This would
result in a one-time benefit (i.e., averted cost) for industry. Under Alternative PS-2, the industry
would commit additional resources to participate in the public meeting and comment period for
the proposed rule.
NRC Implementation: To implement Alternative PS-2, the NRC would incur a one-time cost
relative to the status quo for developing the rule. Under Alternative PS-2, licensees would not
need to apply for exemptions and amendments to reduce their physical security requirements,
which results in a benefit (i.e., averted cost) for the NRC due to lack of reviewing these
exemptions and amendments.
Other Government: Under Alternative PS-2, the State and local governments would commit
additional resources to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed
rule.
General Public: Under Alternatives PS-2, the general public would commit additional resources
to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed rule.
Regulatory Efficiency: The current regulatory process of removing certain 10 CFR Part 73
requirements through exemptions and the process of changing license conditions related to
physical security by amendments introduces regulatory burden to licensees and the NRC.
Under Alternative PS-2, licensees that proceed through decommissioning would no longer need
to submit physical security exemption requests, license amendment requests, or order
withdrawal requests to the NRC to receive certain relaxation from physical security
requirements. This would allow licensees to complete their decommissioning operations without
diverting resources to submit these requests.

Cyber Security
As stated in § 73.54, applicants and licensees must provide high assurance that their digital
computer and communication systems and networks associated with safety and important-tosafety, security, and emergency preparedness functions are adequately protected against cyber
attacks, up to and including the design basis threat described in § 73.1, “Purpose and scope.”
To accomplish this, each holder of a nuclear power reactor operating license under 10 CFR Part
50 has submitted a cyber security plan (CSP) to the NRC that has been approved by the NRC.
Further, combined license (COL) applicants are required to submit their CSP as part of their
COL application for review and approval. Approved CSPs are referenced as license conditions
in each Part 50 license and continue to apply until the license is terminated or the license
29

condition is removed by license amendment. A COL holder does not have an equivalent cyber
security license condition.
The cyber security requirements in § 73.54 apply to licensees currently licensed to operate a
nuclear power plant. Once the NRC has docketed a licensee’s § 50.82(a)(1) or § 52.110(a)
certifications, that licensee is no longer authorized to operate a nuclear power plant. Therefore,
the requirements in § 73.54 would no longer apply to such a licensee. However, each Part 50
licensee has a license condition requiring the licensee to maintain its CSP, and this license
condition remains in effect during decommissioning. A COL holder, without the license
condition, is not required to maintain its CSP when it begins decommissioning.
Alternative CS-1 (No-action alternative)
Under the no-action alternative, the NRC would not change the current cyber security
requirements set forth in 10 CFR 73.54. These requirements are applicable to 10 CFR Part 50
licensees and applicants, and to applicants and holders of COLs in accordance with
10 CFR 52.79(a)(36)(iii). Once a licensee has filed the certifications required by either 10 CFR
50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) or 10 CFR 52.110(a) and those certifications have been docketed by the
NRC, the licensee is no longer authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor. Therefore, by its
terms, 10 CFR 73.54 does not apply to such licensees, because they are no longer licensed to
operate a nuclear power reactor.
Although the cyber security rule no longer applies to a licensee that has filed the certifications
required by 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) or 10 CFR 52.110(a) and those certifications have
been docketed by the NRC, the license still incorporates the licensee’s CSP as a license
condition. As such, a licensee must abide by its CSP until the licensee submits a license
amendment request to remove the CSP from its license. If a license amendment request is not
submitted and approved, in whole or in part, the existing CSP would remain in force even after
the submittal and docketing of the 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) or 10 CFR 52.110(a) certifications.
Under the no-action alternative, the NRC expects that licensees would continue to submit
license amendment requests to have the CSP rescinded once the spent fuel has sufficiently
decayed.
Alternative CS-2 (Rulemaking to remove all cyber security requirements when
spent fuel has sufficiently decayed)
Under this alternative, the NRC is proposing to update cyber security requirements set forth in
§ 73.54, “Protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks” for nuclear
power reactor licensees. This update would clarify the cyber security requirements applicable to
a nuclear power reactor during each stage of the decommissioning process. In order to clarify
the applicability of the cyber security rule to decommissioning nuclear power reactor licensees,
the NRC is proposing to add two subsections to § 73.54. A new § 73.54(i) would state that the
requirements of § 73.54 will remain in effect until: (1) the NRC has docketed the licensee’s
§ 50.82(a)(1) or § 52.110(a) certifications, and (2) at least 10 months for a BWR or 16 months
for a PWR have elapsed since the date of permanent cessation of operations or an NRC
approved alternative to the 10 or 16 month spent fuel decay period, submitted under proposed
§ 50.54(q)(7)(ii)(A)–(B), has elapsed. As discussed in Section 2.1.1, these time periods are
based on a burnup of less than or equal to 72 GWt/MTHM; a licensee that exceeded this burnup
prior to decommissioning would have to calculate decay time using NRC guidance to determine
the appropriate time period. This calculation is the same as that being performed under the
regulatory baseline by licensees seeking to remove all cyber security requirements, and would
30

apply to any such licensee with a higher burnup under the regulatory baseline. Therefore, there
is no incremental cost due to this requirement in the proposed rule. Furthermore, by providing
the limiting burnup value, the NRC could potentially avert costs for a licensee that decides not to
perform the calculation, but instead use the 10- or 16-month time periods in the proposed rule
language, due to having a burnup that conforms with the limit. This benefit is considered
qualitatively in this regulatory analysis.
A new § 73.54(j) would state that, after both requirements of § 73.54(i) have been met, the
licensee’s license condition that requires implementation and maintenance of a cyber security
plan would be removed from the license. The NRC is also proposing the removal of the first
paragraph of § 73.54 and revising the language of § 73.54(a). This is a conforming change to
clarify that the applicability of § 73.54 is not limited to “operating” reactors, i.e., that § 73.54
would still be applicable after the NRC has docketed a licensee’s § 50.82(a)(1) or § 52.110(a)
certifications, and to remove language that is no longer needed concerning the initial
submission of cyber security plans by existing licensees. Further, the NRC is proposing a
change to § 73.55(c)(6), which requires the licensee to establish, maintain, and implement a
Cyber Security Plan. This is a conforming change to reflect the scenario in which a
decommissioning power reactor licensee is no longer required to maintain a cyber security plan
(i.e., the fuel in the SFP has sufficiently decayed) , but is still required to comply with § 73.55(c).
Extending the requirement to maintain a CSP during decommissioning would be a new
requirement imposed on COL holders and so would constitute a violation of issue finality.
Assumptions
The regulatory analysis assumes that all future sites would submit license amendment requests
to remove cyber security requirements during decommissioning.
Affected Attributes
Industry Implementation: Under this alternative, industry would not need to submit an
amendment to remove their cyber security plans once the spent fuel has met the appropriate
conditions when the spent fuel has sufficiently decayed per Alternative CS-2. Under Alternative
CS-2, the industry would commit additional resources to participate in the public meeting and
comment period for the proposed rule.
Industry Operation: In Alternative CS-2, COL licensees would remain subject to cyber security
protection requirements until the fuel in the spent fuel pool has sufficiently cooled (i.e.,
10 months for BWRs and 16 months for PWRs). This alternative will result in additional costs to
the COL licensees due to labor hours expended to implement the cyber security requirements
for 10 or 16 months.
NRC Implementation: To implement Alternative CS-2 the NRC would incur a one-time cost
relative to the status quo for developing the rule.
Other Government: Under Alternative CS-2, the State and local governments would commit
additional resources to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed
rule.
General Public: Under Alternative CS-2, the general public would commit additional resources
to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed rule.

31

Drug and Alcohol Testing
The requirement in 10 CFR 26.3(a) lists those licensees that are required to comply with
designated subparts of 10 CFR Part 26, “Fitness for Duty Programs,” including “[l]icensees who
are authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor under 10 CFR 50.57, “Issuance of operating
license,” and holders of a COL under 10 CFR Part 52 after the Commission has made the
finding under 10 CFR 52.103(g)….” In accordance with this language, 10 CFR Part 26 does not
apply to a holder of a power reactor license issued under 10 CFR Part 50, “Domestic Licensing
of Production and Utilization Facilities,” that is no longer authorized to operate a nuclear power
reactor because the NRC has docketed the certifications required under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)
(i.e., a decommissioning Part 50 reactor licensee). However, 10 CFR Part 26 continues to
apply to holders of COLs issued under 10 CFR Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals
for Nuclear Power Plants,” throughout decommissioning. Therefore, 10 CFR Part 52 licensees
are required to maintain a full fitness for duty (FFD) program during decommissioning, but 10
CFR Part 50 licensees are not subject to the same requirement. The NRC intends to resolve
this inconsistency in the application of FFD requirements to Part 50 and Part 52 licensees
during decommissioning by clarifying that 10 CFR Part 26 does not apply to 10 CFR Part 52
licensees once the NRC has docketed their 10 CFR 52.110(a) certifications.
Under 10 CFR 73.55(b)(9), nuclear power reactor licensees must implement an insider
mitigation program (IMP) that incorporates elements of a 10 CFR Part 26 FFD program.
However, 10 CFR 73.55(b)(9) does not specify what those elements are. The purpose of a
licensee’s IMP is to help ensure that individuals granted unescorted access authorization (UAA)
or unescorted access (UA) to the licensee’s protected area (PA) or vital area (VA) remain
trustworthy and reliable and do not pose a threat to the facility. The NRC recognizes that the
IMP requirements, including the appropriate elements of the 10 CFR Part 26 program, apply to
all personnel granted UAA or UA to the PA or VA equally. This construct makes sense for
operating facilities that contain many target sets of potential interest to an adversary. However,
the risk associated with decommissioning facilities have significantly decreased in comparison
to those associated with the operating facilities. The spent fuel pool and its safety systems
become the primary focus of the licensee’s security mission to protect against the DBT as most
(if not all) of the other target sets are no longer relevant when a nuclear power reactor is no
longer operational. Therefore, the NRC intends to clarify the 10 CFR Part 73(b)(9) IMP rule
language by establishing an appropriate set of FFD provisions to be incorporated into the IMP to
provide reasonable assurance that individuals granted UAA or UA to the PA or VA are
trustworthy and reliable (as demonstrated, in part, by the avoidance of substance abuse).
The NRC also notes that 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B (section I.B.1.b.(4)) contains
requirements addressing drug or alcohol addiction issues for security personnel. Section I.B.2.a
of the same appendix requires that security personnel “demonstrate mental alertness and the
capability to exercise good judgement.” Although not specifically used as the basis for this
rulemaking, continuation of drug and alcohol testing will support the licensee’s continued
adherence to these provisions of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B.
Alternative DA-1 (No-action alternative)
The no-action alternative would not address the inconsistency in the scope of 10 CFR Part 26
and its application to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52 licensees during decommissioning.
Therefore, 10 CFR Part 26 would not apply to 10 CFR Part 50 licensees during
decommissioning, but would continue to apply to 10 CFR Part 52 licensees during
decommissioning. This alternative would also not clarify the appropriate 10 CFR Part 26 FFD
32

elements to be incorporated into a licensee’s IMP. Licensees would continue to determine
which elements of their 10 CFR Part 26 program to include in their IMPs, as required by
10 CFR 73.55(b)(9)(ii)(B). The NRC has observed that recently decommissioned reactor
licensees generally continue to implement all of the elements of 10 CFR Part 26, with the
exception of Subparts I and K.
Alternative DA-2 (Rulemaking to require Fitness for Duty program elements that
support IMP for power reactors)
Alternative DA-2 would propose rulemaking to amend 10 CFR 26.3 to correct the inconsistency
in the application of 10 CFR Part 26 to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52 during
decommissioning. This would ensure that similarly situated nuclear power reactor facilities are
treated the same. The rulemaking would also clarify the FFD program elements under
10 CFR Part 26 that support a licensee’s IMP. This clarification would apply to both 10 CFR Part 50
and 10 CFR Part 52 facilities, but becomes particularly important during decommissioning of
10 CFR Part 50 reactor facilities, as the 10 CFR Part 26 FFD program requirements are currently no
longer applicable to these facilities.
Under this alternative, the inconsistency regarding application of 10 CFR Part 26 between
10 CFR Part 50 and Part 52 licensees during decommissioning would be corrected. In addition,
the NRC would require that all nuclear power reactor licensees implement the same FFD
program elements to support their IMP under the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55(b)(9)(ii)(B). The
proposed rule would focus the applicability of the 10 CFR Part 26 elements on individuals who
have security-related responsibilities or regular SFP area unescorted access at licensee sites.
This approach reflects the reduced potential for insiders to affect radiological sabotage at
decommissioning sites and the reduced hazard presented by the spent fuel. These changes
would ensure that FFD program elements that are necessary to maintain reasonable assurance
that individuals at reactor sites, particularly at decommissioning sites, remain trustworthy and
reliable are implemented consistently throughout the industry. These changes will also reduce
the number of individuals that are subjected to the FFD elements that satisfy the IMP
requirements over the decommissioning time frame.
Assumptions
In the status quo, the regulatory analysis assumes that at decommissioning, licensees, will
continue to implement a full FFD program, with the exception of Subparts I and K, in order to
meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(b)(9).
For Alternative DA-2, the NRC assumes that the staffing level at a nuclear power plant in the
beginning of decommissioning is 25% of its full staffing level when fully operating. This is based
on the fact that the decommissioning Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant has had 150
workers after the start of decommissioning (Ref. 27), whereas the Ginna nuclear power plant
has had a peak staff level of 600 workers (Ref. 28).
For Alternative DA-2, the regulatory analysis assumes that 10 percent of the staffing level at a
decommissioned nuclear power plant will have access to vital area.
For Alternative DA-2, the regulatory analysis assumes that 30 percent of the staffing level at a
decommissioned nuclear power plant will have access to a protected area.
Affected Attributes
33

Industry Implementation: To implement Alternative DA-2, industry would incur a one-time cost
in making minor changes in their drug and alcohol testing procedures to account for the IMP
requirements during decommissioning. Under Alternative DA-2, the industry would commit
additional resources to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed
rule.
Industry Operation: Alternative DA-2 will rework the structure of the IMP requirements to allow
for an approach commensurate with the hazard and potential event consequences associated
with a facility’s decommissioning status. As a result, the number of individuals subject to
random drug and alcohol testing under 10 CFR 26.31(c)(5) for an operating reactor will be
reduced for certain segments of the site’s decommissioning population. This will result in in the
industry’s drug and alcohol testing program costs being reduced during decommissioning.
NRC Implementation: To implement Alternative DA-2, the NRC incurs a one-time cost relative
to the status quo for the rulemaking process. These costs include the preparation of the
proposed and final rule.
NRC Operation: Clarifying the regulations will reduce the burden on the NRC in the
administration of reporting requirements for drug and alcohol testing under Alternative DA-2.
Other Government: Under Alternative DA-2, the state and local governments would commit
additional resources to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed
rule.
General Public: Under Alternative DA-2, the general public would commit additional resources
to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed rule.

Certified Fuel Handler Definition and Elimination of Shift Technical Advisor
The current regulations for operating reactors require specific staffing levels for licensed
operators for each shift, as well as control room staffing requirements and commensurate
training requirements for licensed operators. They do not address training requirements for a
facility undergoing decommissioning. Licensees have been requesting amendments to their
technical specifications to eliminate the need to maintain licensed operators on the staff during
decommissioning. In place of the licensed operators, decommissioning plant licensees have
required the presence of a CFH, a non-licensed operator (NLO) who has been qualified in
accordance with a fuel handler training program approved by the Commission, and an additional
NLO as the necessary staff for each shift. Furthermore, decommissioning plants are
discontinuing the associated licensed operator training programs.
A CFH at a permanently shutdown and defueled nuclear power reactor undergoing
decommissioning is an individual who has the requisite knowledge and experience to evaluate
plant conditions and make judgments about what actions are necessary to protect the public
health and safety. Because the CFH is defined as an NLO, the NRC has evaluated the CFH
training program in accordance with 10 CFR 50.120, “Training and qualification of nuclear
power plant personnel,” which includes a requirement in 10 CFR 50.120(b)(2) that the training
program must be derived from a systems approach to training, as defined in 10 CFR 55.4, and
must provide for the training and qualification of certain categories of nuclear power plant
personnel, including the NLO category. The NRC notes that, although the definition for a CFH
in 10 CFR 50.2 indicates that a fuel handler training program requires Commission approval, the
34

regulations do not have specific requirements that describe what constitutes an acceptable
program besides those requirements in 10 CFR 50.120, which apply to all NLOs. Because a
training program for an NLO subject to 10 CFR 50.120 does not require Commission approval,
unless that NLO is a CFH, the NRC has determined that an acceptable fuel handler training
program suitable to qualify a CFH should ensure that the trained individual: (1) has requisite
knowledge and experience in the safe conduct of decommissioning activities, (2) has requisite
knowledge and experience in the safe handling and storage of spent fuel, and (3) is capable of
evaluating plant conditions and exercising prudent judgment for emergency action decisions.
Hence the NRC proposes revising the definition of a CFH in 10 CFR 50.2 to establish these
three criteria for an acceptable fuel handler training program. This would eliminate the need for
licensees to seek Commission approval of their training programs. Use of the criteria would be
optional; licensees could still seek Commission approval for fuel handler training programs
suitable to qualify a CFH. The NRC can inspect the implementation of training programs
suitable to qualify NLOs and CFHs using existing inspection procedures, such as IP 41501
(Ref. 29).
Alternative CFH/STA-1 (No-action alternative)
This alternative would retain the current wording of CFH-related regulations. The regulations
state, in part, that, “[t]he training program must be periodically evaluated and revised as
appropriate to reflect … changes to the facility, procedures and regulations.” The no-action
alternative would not result in any significant additional cost or benefit and the NRC would
continue to review, on a case-by-case basis, the training requirements proposed in the requests
for approval submitted by the licensees. Additionally, the NRC would make no changes to the
regulations regarding the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) position.
Alternative CFH/STA-2 (Rulemaking regarding CFH definition and Shift Technical
Advisor)
Under this alternative, the NRC would propose rulemaking to clarify the requirements for the
training of CFHs at decommissioning power reactors. This rulemaking would revise the
definition of “certified fuel handler” in 10 CFR 50.2, which would retain the existing definition of
the CFH and add an alternative to revise the definition of “certified fuel handler” that would
eliminate the need for licensees to seek the Commission’s approval for fuel handler training
programs.
Specifically, the NRC would codify current licensing practices by amending § 50.2 to add an
alternative definition with three broad-scope objectives as responsibilities for which a CFH must
be trained: (1) safe conduct of decommissioning activities; (2) safe handling and storage of
spent fuel; and (3) appropriate response to plant emergencies. In addition, the CFH would have
to qualify in accordance with a fuel handler training program that meets the same requirements
as training programs for non-licensed operators required by § 50.120. Should a licensee not
exercise the alternative definition, it would need to submit a request for approval of a fuel
handler training program.
The NRC proposes to revise a footnote to the table titled “Minimum Requirements Per Shift for
On-Site Staffing of Nuclear Power Units by Operators and Senior Operators Licensed Under 10
CFR Part 55” in § 50.54(m)(2)(i) to state that a STA is not required upon the NRC’s docketing of
the license holder’s certifications required under §§ 50.82(a)(1) or 52.110(a). Additionally, the

35

NRC will update RG 1.184, “Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors” to provide guidance
for the staffing requirements at a decommissioning power reactor site.
Assumptions
The regulatory analysis has made the following assumptions for the cost benefit analysis of
CFH definition and elimination of the STA:
•

The development of voluntary industry initiatives would require the same amount of time
as the NRC would take to develop a new Regulatory Guide.

•

The NRC would take one-half the time to review the industry initiatives as the industry
would take to develop them.

•

All licenses would choose to use the definition of a CFH that the proposed rulemaking
alternative would provide when they establish their fuel handler training programs.
Affected Attributes

Industry Implementation: Under Alternative CFH/STA-2, licensees would still need to submit
license amendment requests that would replace licensed operators with shift staffing consisting
of CFHs and NLOs, for managing the spent fuel at a nuclear power site and conducting
decommissioning activities. However, Alternative CFH/STA-2 would eliminate the need for a
licensee to seek the Commission’s approval for fuel handler training programs suitable to qualify
a CFH. The elimination of this approval process would result in a one-time benefit (i.e., averted
cost) for industry. Additionally, a licensee would not need to submit an amendment to remove
the Shift Technical Advisor. Under Alternative CFH/STA-2, the industry would commit additional
resources to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed rule.
NRC Implementation: To implement Alternative CFH/STA-2, the NRC incurs a one-time cost
relative to the status quo for developing the rule. In addition, under Alternative CFH/STA-2, the
NRC would no longer have to review fuel handler training programs for their suitability to qualify
CFHs. However, the NRC will continue to review license amendment requests for changes to
the section of licensees’ technical specifications titled, “Administrative Controls.”
Regulatory Efficiency: Under Alternative CFH/STA-2, licensees in decommissioning would not
need to submit fuel handler training programs suitable to qualify CFHs for the Commission’s
approval. This would provide licensees with flexibility to complete their decommissioning
operations, in that resources will not be expended to process these types of licensing actions.
Other Government: Under Alternative CFH/STA-2, the State and local governments would
commit additional resources to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the
proposed rule.
General Public: Under Alternatives CFH/STA-2, the general public would commit additional
resources to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed rule.

36

Decommissioning Funding Assurance
The NRC requires nuclear power plant licensees to provide reasonable assurance that funds
will be available for plant radiological decommissioning. An element of this assurance is the
requirement for licensees to provide a minimum decommissioning fund per the formula defined
in 10 CFR 50.75(c). The table of minimum amounts formula (NRC minimum formula) was
established in 1988 as a means to assure the bulk of funds needed for radiological
decommissioning would be available. The requirement in 10 CFR 50.75(c) also defines a
process for adjusting the formula to current-year dollars. The NRC uses the formula and
adjustment factors to assess the adequacy of the decommissioning trust funds (DTFs)
established by the nuclear power plant licensees every two years.
The NRC is proposing changes to address the use of DTFs. The changes would clarify that the
DTF can be used to pay for both radiological decommissioning expenses under 10 CFR 50.2
and spent fuel management and 10 CFR Part 72 specific license ISFSI decommissioning, so
long as sufficient funding remains for radiological decommissioning. The primary intent of these
changes would be to reduce the need for regulatory exemptions with respect to use of the DTF
by licensees while ensuring that sufficient funding is available for NRC-required radiological
decommissioning. Overall, the NRC anticipates that the recommended changes would
minimize the need for licensees to request exemptions from decommissioning funding
regulations and that the changes would provide licensees with a greater degree of flexibility in
the use of their DTFs.
Currently, DTF regulations do not address the costs associated with the unavailability of
permanent spent fuel repositories. However, the lack of permanent spent fuel repositories
requires licensees to provide long-term onsite storage of spent fuel in an ISFSI, incur spent fuel
management expenses and, ultimately, decommission the ISFSIs. Pursuant to 10 CFR 72.6,
licenses for the receipt, handling, storage, and transfer of spent fuel are of two types: general
and specific. Licensees may provide financial assurance for the decommissioning of general
license ISFSIs with funds in their 10 CFR Part 50 DTFs because general license ISFSI
decommissioning falls under the definition of decommission in 10 CFR 50.2. However,
licensees may not provide financial assurance for the decommissioning of specific license
ISFSIs, as addressed in 10 CFR 72.30, with funds in their 10 CFR Part 50 DTFs without the
NRC approval of a regulatory exemption.
When funds are commingled in the DTF and are not distinctly identified, the NRC does not have
a mechanism to allow for the use of those funds for non-decommissioning purposes such as
spent fuel management or for 10 CFR Part 72 specific license ISFSI decommissioning outside
of the exemption process. Because of these issues, licensees have sought and been granted
exemptions from 10 CFR 50.75, “Reporting and recordkeeping for decommissioning planning,”
requirements to allow the use of excess monies from the DTFs that are not needed for
radiological decommissioning to pay for expenses associated with spent fuel management. The
reliance on exemptions creates regulatory uncertainties as well as burdens on licensees and the
NRC. A licensee must expend resources to prepare the documentation and analysis that is
required to obtain approval of the exemption request. The NRC must also divert resources from
other agency activities to evaluate each request in order to determine whether the exemption
request should be granted.

37

Alternative DTF-1 (No-action alternative)
Under the no-action alternative, the regulations to establish and use the DTF would remain
unchanged. The regulation would not be amended to address commingling of funds in the DTF
for spent fuel management, ISFSI decommissioning, or site restoration. In addition, DTF
regulations would not be amended to address costs associated with the long-term onsite
storage of spent fuel in an ISFSI, costs which stem from the unavailability of permanent spent
fuel repositories. This being the case, licensees are likely to continue to request exemptions in
order to address spent fuel management expenses and may also request exemptions to pay for
ISFSI decommissioning and site restoration expenses on a case-by-case basis. For example,
licensees could choose to submit an exemption request to allow the use of DTF funds for spent
fuel management. The NRC would review the exemption request and grant the exemption on a
finding of reasonable assurance that sufficient funding will remain available in the DTF to
complete radiological decommissioning and upon a determination that the licensee meets the
requirements in 10 CFR 50.12, “Specific exemptions.”
Alternative DTF-2 (Rulemaking to amend regulations to minimize exemptions and
reduce the ambiguity in the decommissioning trust fund regulations)
Under this alternative, the NRC proposes the following changes to current DTF regulations to
minimize exemption requests and address the ambiguity in the DTF regulations:
•

Amend the regulations at 10 CFR 50.82 to allow decommissioning funds collected and
kept in an external trust as required in 10 CFR 50.75, to be used for spent fuel
management as well as Part 50 and Part 72 specific license ISFSI decommissioning, so
long as sufficient funding remains for radiological decommissioning. Specifically, the
NRC proposes to add a new § 50.82(a)(8)(viii) to provide a licensee the option to use its
DTF for spent fuel management and specific license ISFSI decommissioning costs only
if: (1) the licensee has submitted, and the NRC has docketed, the certifications required
under § 50.82(a)(1) or § 52.110(a) to permanently cease reactor operations and defuel
the reactor; (2) 90 days have elapsed since the NRC received the licensee’s PSDAR
under § 50.82; and (3) the licensee has identified excess funds in the DTF. Such excess
funds are funds in the DTF that are greater than those funds reasonably needed to
maintain compliance with § 50.82(a)(8)(i)(B)-(C), complete radiological
decommissioning, and terminate the license. Regardless of whether this option is
exercised, a licensee would be required to continue with a series of steps, as specified in
§ 50.75(a), to comply with all decommissioning funding assurance regulations. A
licensee would not be relieved of the responsibility to certify that there is reasonable
assurance that decommissioning funding will be available.

•

Amend the regulations to modify the reporting requirements in 10 CFR 50.75(f)(1) to be
consistent with the reporting frequency for decommissioning funding assurance for
ISFSIs in 10 CFR 72.30(c). Licensees would report the status of decommissioning
funding on a triennial basis (every 3 years) instead of on a biennial frequency.

•

Amend the regulation at 10 CFR 50.75(b) to further clarify that licensees shall maintain
decommissioning funding assurance. Licensees would have to correct shortfalls in a
timely manner and provide evidence to the NRC during the next reporting cycle under
10 CFR 50.75(f). Current guidance provides that licensees may remedy shortfalls by
utilizing the methods described in 10 CFR 50.75(e)(1). Language would be added to
address instances when the amount in the DTF falls below the regulatory amount
38

required either by the NRC minimum formula as set forth in 10 CFR 50.75(c) or a
licensee’s site-specific cost estimate, thereby creating a “shortfall.”2 Conforming
changes would be made to 10 CFR 50.82 as part of this rulemaking.
•

Amend 10 CFR 50.75 (h)(1)(B)(iv) to be consistent with 10 CFR 50.4, “Written
communications,” with respect to written notice of intent to make a disbursement or
payment from the DTF. This change would require all notice materials be sent to the
Document Control Desk instead of the Office Director NRR, as licensees are now
directed.

•

Eliminate 10 CFR 50.75(f)(2) as it is duplicative of the language of 10 CFR 50.75(f)(1).

•

The NRC is proposing to amend the regulations at 10 CFR 50.82(a)(8)(i)(A) and 10 CFR
52.110(h)(1)(i) to remove the term “legitimate.” This term does not add any substance to
the regulations and is potentially confusing. The intent of the regulation is to ensure that
expenses fall within the NRC definition of decommission in 10 CFR 50.2. Whether an
expense falls within the definition of decommission would continue to be determined on
a case-by-case basis by the licensee when considering whether to make a withdrawal
from the DTF. Since this term is non-substantive, its removal will not change any of the
existing requirements regarding the use of decommissioning funds.

•

The NRC proposes to revise § 52.110 to make the same changes proposed in § 50.82
for consistency. In addition, the NRC proposes to add paragraphs (h)(5) – (h)(7) with
site-specific decommissioning cost estimate report requirements which are identical to
the requirements in § 50.82(a)(8)(v) – (vii). A report on irradiated fuel should only be
submitted if irradiated fuel is on site.

•

The NRC proposes to revise § 72.30 so that that the resubmittals subsequent to the
initial decommissioning funding plan for ISFSIs will no longer require NRC approval.
This change would make the processes under § 72.30(c) more efficient and less
burdensome to the licensee, while still maintaining reasonable assurance of adequate
funding for the decommissioning of an ISFSI.

The objectives of these proposed changes are to: (1) provide licensees with options for using
DTF monies and the flexibility to consider site-specific conditions in maintaining their DTF; (2)
create consistent standards for NRC’s use in determining whether licensees are compliant with
the appropriate use of the DTF; and (3) minimize the need for licensees to submit exemption
requests from decommissioning funding regulations.
Assumptions
The assumptions used in the regulatory analysis for this decommissioning area are:
•

2

For Alternative DTF-1, the regulatory analysis assumes that all operating nuclear power
plant sites will submit exemption requests to use a portion of their DTFs for spent fuel
management.

Shortfall is defined as the difference between the amount of financial assurance provided by the licensee
and the amount of financial assurance required.

39

Affected Attributes
Industry Implementation: Under Alternative DTF-2, the industry would commit additional
resources to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed rule.
Industry Operation: Under Alternative DTF-2, licensees would report assurances for
decommissioning against the funding in the DTF every 3 years instead every 2 years. This
would result in costs averted from the lower frequency of reporting. In addition, licensees who
report a shortfall pursuant to 10 CFR 50.75(f) would have to correct the shortfall in a timely
manner.
NRC Implementation: To implement Alternative DTF-2, the NRC incurs a one-time cost relative
to the status quo for developing the rule.
NRC Operation: Under Alternative DTF-2, the NRC would evaluate the submitted report of
assurances for decommissioning against the funding in the DTF on a triennial basis instead of
on a biennial basis. This would result in cost averted from the lower frequency of evaluating
these reports.
Regulatory Efficiency: Under Alternative DTF-2, licensees would have sufficient internal
controls, chart of accounts, and reporting tools to identify distinct funds in the DTF and the
licensees’ intention for their use would be identified and reflected in accounting practices.
These controls and reporting mechanism leads to transparency regarding the intended use of
decommissioning trust assets and establishes a clear and consistent regulatory structure.
Under Alternative DTF-2, licensees would have more flexibility concerning funding of spent fuel
management than currently exists with the status quo (Alternative DTF-1).
Other Government: Under Alternative DTF-2, the state and local governments would commit
additional resources to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed
rule.
General Public: Under Alternative DTF-2, the general public would commit additional resources
to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed rule.

Offsite and Onsite Financial Protection Requirements and Indemnity
Agreements
To implement the requirements under the Price-Anderson Act (PAA), codified in Section 170 of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA), the NRC requires nuclear power plant
licensees to comply with regulations for offsite financial protection and indemnity agreements.
All nuclear reactors are required to have and maintain offsite financial protection as set forth in
10 CFR 140.11, “Amounts of financial protection for certain reactors.” The amounts of
insurance required for each large operating reactor (i.e., has a rated capacity of 100,000
electrical kilowatts or more) are set forth in 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4), which are: (1) primary
financial protection in the amount of $450 million; and (2) secondary financial protection
consisting of funds from a nuclear industry retrospective rating plan. The Commission executes
and issues agreements of indemnity for large operating reactors pursuant to 10 CFR 140.20,
“Indemnity agreements and liens.” The general form of indemnity agreement to be entered into
by the Commission with large operating reactors is provided at 10 CFR 140.92, “Appendix
B-Form of indemnity agreement with licensees furnishing insurance policies as proof of financial

40

protection,” and 10 CFR 140.93, “Appendix C-Form of indemnity agreement with licensees
furnishing proof of financial protection in the form of licensee’s resources.”
Apart from the PAA requirements, the NRC also requires nuclear power reactor licensees to
maintain onsite property insurance. Specifically, 10 CFR 50.54(w) requires licensees to obtain
property insurance for each reactor site in the amount of $1.06 billion, or the maximum amount
of coverage generally available from private sources, whichever is less, to stabilize and
decontaminate the reactor and the reactor site in the event of an incident. Neither the PAA nor
NRC’s implementing regulations for large operating reactors explicitly addresses the concept of
decommissioning. Likewise, the NRC’s onsite insurance requirements do not address the
status of facilities during the period of decommissioning or the reduction in risk that is presented
by permanently shutdown reactors.
In SECY 93-127, “Financial Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants
during Decommissioning,” (Ref. 30), the NRC staff concluded, “In the interim, exemptions could
be granted for reductions in the amount of primary financial protection required to a level which
would not prejudice the outcome of rulemaking. The staff believes that a level of $100 million
would be adequate.” In the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) for SECY-93-127 (Ref.
31), the Commission authorized the staff to approve, through specific exemptions from the
requirements of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4), termination of participation in the retrospective rating plan
and reduction in primary financial protection from $450 million to $100 million, after a cooling
period adequate to support air cooling of the fuel in a completely drained pool. Similarly, under
status quo, and pursuant to the requirements provided in 10 CFR 50.54(w), licensees must
have and maintain a minimum coverage limit for each reactor site in the lesser amount of either:
$1.06 billion, or whatever amount of insurance is generally available from private sources. In
SECY-96-256, “Changes to Financial Protection Requirements for Permanently Shutdown
Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) and 10 CFR 140.11,” (Ref. 32), the NRC staff
recommended changes to the power reactor insurance regulations that would allow licensees to
lower onsite insurance levels to $50 million upon demonstration that the fuel stored in the SFP
can be air-cooled. In its SRM for SECY-96-256 (Ref. 33), the Commission supported the NRC’s
recommendation that, among other things, would allow permanently shutdown power reactor
licensees to reduce onsite financial protection coverage to $50 million when the licensee was
able to demonstrate that the spent fuel could be air-cooled if the spent fuel pool was drained of
water. The NRC has issued several exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w) on
the basis that the reduced onsite insurance coverage value of $50 million satisfies the
underlying purpose of the rule in funding stabilization of site conditions and cleanup costs
associated with decontamination following the hypothetical rupture of a large onsite liquid
radioactive waste tank. With the spent fuel adequately cooled by air in a drained spent fuel
pool, the potential for a significant release from the spent fuel was considered negligible.
Alternative FP-1 (No-action alternative)
Under the no-action alternative, licensees will continue to abide by regulations in
10 CFR 140.11(a)(4), which require each reactor that is licensed to operate and has a rated
capacity for electrical generation exceeding 100,000 electrical kilowatts to have $450 million in
primary financial protection to remedy a potential offsite release of nuclear material and to
participate in the industry retrospective rating plan. Under 10 CFR 50.54(w), licensees will also
continue to maintain a minimum coverage limit for each reactor site in the lesser amount of
either: $1.06 billion, or whatever amount of insurance is generally available from private
sources. Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, “Specific exemptions,” and 10 CFR 50.12, “Specific

41

exemptions,” the Commission may grant exemptions from this regulation that it determines are
authorized by law and otherwise are in the public interest.
Alternative FP-2 (Rulemaking to codify the current exemption process)
This rule change would allow the licensees of large operating reactors that have permanently
shut down a reduction in both offsite and onsite financial protection without the need for
licensees to submit requests for regulatory exemptions from financial protection requirements.
The objectives of this rulemaking would be to: (1) provide a process that maintains an adequate
level of financial protection during decommissioning, and (2) minimize the need for licensees to
request exemptions from financial protection requirements that are no longer needed.
This alternative proposes to amend the offsite and onsite financial protection requirements
based on the reduced risk of radiological release from the anticipated reactor configurations and
adopts reductions in financial protection based on two levels (level one and two) described
below. The amounts of financial protection provided in these two levels are consistent with
exemptions that have been granted to decommissioned reactors in the past. The insurance
amounts would be based on the estimated cost of recovery from limiting hypothetical events for
specific level one and two reactor configurations. The below table provides a summary of Level
1 and Level 2, which are described below:
Table 4
Level
1

2

Two-Step Graded Approach
Reactor Site Description
Operating or Permanently
Ceased Operations and
Permanently Defueled
Sufficiently Decayed Fuel;
≥1,000 gallons of radioactive
waste

Offsite Requirement

Onsite
Requirement

$450 million; participation in
the industry retrospective
rating plan

$1.06 billion

$100 million; withdrawal from
the rating plan

$50 million

Description of Level 1: Permanently Ceased Operations and Permanently Defueled
Licensees in Level 1 include operating reactors and decommissioning reactors that have
docketed certifications of permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel
from the reactor vessel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82 or 10 CFR 52.110. In this level, a
decommissioning reactor is defueled and permanently shut down, but the spent fuel in the SFP
is still susceptible to a zirconium fuel cladding fire if the SFP is unexpectedly drained, although a
very unlikely event. This configuration encompasses the period from immediately after the core
is removed from the reactor to just before the decay heat of the hottest assemblies is low
enough that no rapid zirconium oxidation will take place within 10 hours under adiabatic
conditions. Licensees in Level 1 must maintain the full amounts of offsite and onsite insurance
specified in 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4), and 10 CFR 50.54(w), respectively.
Description of Level 2: Sufficiently Decayed Fuel
In Level 2, the reactor is defueled and permanently shut down, and spent fuel in the SFP has
decayed and cooled sufficiently that it cannot heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10
hours under adiabatic conditions. In this configuration, the spent fuel can be stored long term in

42

the SFP. In addition, the site may possess a radioactive inventory of liquid radiological waste,
radioactive reactor components, and contaminated structural materials. The radioactive
inventory during this configuration may change, depending on the licensee’s proposed
shutdown activities and schedule. The transition to Level 2 financial protection amounts could
occur after a timeframe based on a site-specific analysis that demonstrates the fuel cannot heat
up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours under adiabatic conditions. In Level 2, the offsite
requirements would be reduced from $450 million in primary financial protection and
participation in the industry retrospective rating plan to $100 million and withdrawal from the
industry retrospective rating plan. The Commission determined that the $100 million was
sufficient to cover offsite liability claims such as those incurred as a result of Three Mile Island,
Unit 2.
If significant sources of radioactive material remain on site, such that it is greater than or equal
to 1,000 gallons of radioactive waste, licensees should be required to maintain an adequate
level of onsite insurance coverage. In Level 2, onsite financial protection requirements would be
reduced from $1.06 billion to $50 million. The $50 million reflects the potential for a radiological
incident resulting from the mobile sources of radioactivity at a permanently shutdown reactor
site. A scenario involving the rupture of a large liquid radioactive waste storage tank
(approximately 450,000 gallons) containing slightly radioactive water was selected as
conceivable and a bounding scenario. For estimating cleanup costs, the limiting event
considered costs associated with removal of soil contamination and potential contamination of
the ground water table. That postulated event was estimated to result in an onsite waste
cleanup cost of approximately $50 million with negligible radiological consequences off site. In
economic terms, it would surpass the cleanup costs associated with a fuel-handling incident,
which has been taken into account in determining the upper-bound level of onsite insurance
coverage required in Level 2.
Furthermore, the NRC proposes to amend its regulations at §140.81, “Scope and purpose,” to
clarify the applicability of the requirements for an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence (ENO) to
reactors in decommissioning. Under Sections 11, “Definition,” and 170 of the AEA, and NRC
regulations at Subpart E, “Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrences,” to 10 CFR Part 140, the
Commission is authorized to make a determination as to whether an event at a production or
utilization facility causing a discharge or dispersal of source, special nuclear, or byproduct
material that has resulted or will result in substantial damages to offsite members of the public
or property, is an ENO. An event will qualify as an ENO if the Commission determines that the
criteria set forth in §§ 140.84, “Criterion I – Substantial discharge of radioactive material or
substantial radiation levels offsite,” and 140.85, “Criterion II – Substantial damages to persons
offsite or property offsite,” have been met. The NRC recognizes that the consequences
resulting from an accident at a decommissioning reactor in Level 1 can be similar to an accident
at an operating reactor. As presented in NUREG-1738, in the window beginning immediately
after the reactor is defueled and the fuel placed in the SFP, the offsite consequences of a
zirconium fire may be comparable to those from operating reactor postulated severe accidents.
The existing potential consequences from a zirconium fire, until the fuel in the SFP has
sufficiently decayed, provides the basis for the NRC’s proposal to amend its regulations to
include plants in decommissioning within the scope of §140.81
The NRC also proposes to amend § 50.54(w) to include a prompt notification to the Commission
of any material change in proof of onsite property insurance filed with the Commission under
Part 50. Specifically, the transition to Level 2 as proposed by the NRC will prompt the licensee
to notify the NRC under § 50.54(w)(7) of a reduction in onsite property insurance from $1.06
billion to $50 million. This proposed amendment to § 50.54(w)(7) would be a conforming
43

change, for consistency, with the offsite financial protection requirements under 10 CFR
140.15(e).
Assumptions
The assumptions used in the regulatory analysis for this decommissioning area are:
•

For Alternative FP-1, all nuclear reactor licensees will submit exemption requests for
onsite and offsite financial protection should the rulemaking not go forward. These
exemptions requests will be consistent with the reduction of offsite and onsite financial
protection requirements described in levels one and two.

•

For Alternative FP-2, the regulatory analysis assumes that each decommissioning
licensee would not submit a site-specific analysis that demonstrates the spent fuel in a
SFP cannot heat up to clad ignition temperature under adiabatic conditions since they
would opt for a decay period of 10 or 16 months.

•

For Alternative FP-2 the regulatory analysis assumes that nuclear power reactor sites
that have decommissioned would reduce their onsite and offsite financial protection to
the minimum requirements of level 2 once they meet the description of this level.

•

For Alternative FP-2 the regulatory analysis assumes that the decommissioning financial
protection and indemnity regulations will no longer apply following the site passing its
confirmatory survey and the NRC terminates the plant license.
Affected Attributes

Industry Implementation: Under Alternatives FP-2, licensees would not need to apply for
exemptions from offsite and onsite financial protection regulations. This results in a one-time
benefit (i.e., averted cost) for each licensee. Licensees would be required to submit a prompt
notification to the Commission of any material change in proof of onsite or offsite property
insurance filed with the Commission under proposed § 50.54(w)(6) or current § 140.15(e). The
industry would commit additional resources to participate in the public meeting and comment
period for the proposed rule.
NRC Implementation: To implement Alternatives FP-2, the NRC incurs a one-time cost relative
to the status quo for developing the rule. Under these alternatives, exemptions would no longer
be needed for licensees to receive approval for reduced financial protection. This results in the
elimination of staff reviews for these exemption requests and leads to a benefit (i.e., averted
cost) for the NRC.
Other Government: Under Alternatives FP-2, the state and local governments would commit
additional resources to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed
rule.
General Public: Under Alternatives FP-2, the general public would commit additional resources
to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed rule.

44

Environmental Considerations
In certain circumstances, licensees may be unable to satisfy the requirement that licensees
conclude in the PSDAR that all environmental impacts associated with site-specific
decommissioning activities will be bounded by previous environmental impact statements.
NUREG-0586, Supplement 1, Volumes 1 and 2, “Generic Environmental Impact Statement on
Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities: Regarding the Decommissioning of Nuclear Power
Reactors” (Decommissioning GEIS) (Ref. 34) identified two resource areas that were not
generically resolved and thus require a site-specific analysis. Four other resource areas were
also identified that may require a site-specific analysis. Therefore, if a licensee were unable to
reach the conclusion in the PSDAR that all impacts will be bounded, the licensee would have to
either change its planned decommissioning activities so that their impacts would be bounded or
submit and have approved a license amendment request or an exemption request to satisfy
§ 50.82(a)(4)(i) or § 52.110(d)(1).
Alternative ENV-1 (No Action)
The no-action alternative would retain the current decommissioning regulations regarding that
licensees conclude in the PSDAR that all environmental impacts associated with site-specific
decommissioning activities will be bounded by previous environmental impact statements.
Alternative ENV-2 (Rulemaking)
In this alternative, the NRC proposes to change the PSDAR requirements in § 50.82(a)(4)(i) and
§ 52.110(d)(1) to require that licensees provide the basis for whether or not the environmental
impacts from site-specific decommissioning activities are bounded by previous environmental
reviews. This rulemaking change would clarify that licensees, at the PSDAR stage, are required
to evaluate the environmental impacts and provide in the PSDAR the basis for whether or not
the proposed decommissioning activities are bounded by appropriate federally issued
environmental review documents. Licensees would no longer be required to make the definitive
conclusion that impacts will be bounded. Instead, they would have the flexibility to address any
unbounded environmental impacts closer to, but prior to, the decommissioning activity being
undertaken that could cause the unbounded impact. If a licensee were to consider a proposed
decommissioning activity that would otherwise be prohibited by § 50.82(a)(6)(ii) or
§ 52.110(f)(2), then prior to undertaking such activity, the licensee could submit a request for a
license amendment or a regulatory exemption, decide not to perform the proposed activity, or
modify the proposed activity so that the significant environmental impact does not occur. If the
licensee chose to submit a license amendment or an exemption request, then the request would
trigger NRC responsibilities under the applicable environmental statutes.
The NRC also proposes to change the § 50.82(a)(4)(i) and § 52.110(d)(1) regulations to allow
licensees to use appropriate federally issued environmental review documents prepared in
compliance with NEPA, ESA, NHPA, or other environmental statutes instead of only
environmental impact statements. This change allows licensees to use a wider range of sitespecific documents that address various resources. The NRC is also proposing to change the
§ 50.82(a)(6)(ii) and § 52.110(f)(2) regulations to clarify that the previous review of any potential
significant environmental impact must be bounded by appropriate federally issued
environmental review documents prepared in compliance with NEPA, ESA, NHPA, or other
environmental statutes.

45

Assumptions
The regulatory analysis has made the following assumption:
•

For Alternative ENV-2, assume that industry will no longer make the effort that they
would have taken in status quo to conclude in the PSDAR that all environmental impacts
associated with site-specific decommissioning activities will be bounded by previous
environmental impact statements.

•

Assume that industry would spend three hours per page to conclude in the PSDAR that
all environmental impacts associated with site-specific decommissioning activities will be
bounded by previous environmental impact statements.
Affected Attributes

Industry Implementation: For Alternative ENV-2, industry would avert time that they would take
to conclude in the PSDAR that all environmental impacts associated with site-specific
decommissioning activities will be bounded by previous environmental impact statements. For
Alternative ENV-2 the industry would commit additional resources to participate in the public
meeting and comment period for the proposed rule.
NRC Implementation: For Alternative ENV-2, the NRC would expend resources to implement
the proposed and final rulemaking.
Other Government: For Alternative ENV-2, the state and local governments would commit
additional resources to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed
rule.
General Public: For Alternative ENV-2, the general public would commit additional resources to
participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed rule.
Environmental: Under Alternative ENV-2, one of the suggested changes would amend the rule
language to state that at the PSDAR stage, licensees must evaluate the environmental impacts
associated with site-specific decommissioning activities and determine whether they are
bounded by previously issued federal environmental documents. This change would clarify the
requirement that ensure that the licensee does not perform decommissioning activities that
would result in significant impacts not previously reviewed. This regulatory change would have
no impact on the NRC, and licensees could continue to resolve any unbounded impacts before
the performance of the associated decommissioning activity by requesting a license amendment
or an exemption, by not performing the activity, or by modifying the activity to avoid causing the
significant environmental impact. Further, this change would more closely align the licensee’s
environmental analysis to the occurrence of the impact. This would reduce the burden on
decommissioning licensees at the time of PSDAR submittal because they would no longer need
to develop a statement concluding that all of the environmental impacts associated with sitespecific decommissioning activities will be bounded by appropriate previously issued
environmental impact statements.

Record Retention Requirements
The following regulations contain the existing requirements for recordkeeping and record
retention at operating nuclear power plants and ISFSIs:
46

•

General Design Criterion 1 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, “Quality Standards and
Records,” requires licensees to retain certain records throughout the life of the unit.

•

Criterion XVII, “Quality Assurance Records,” of Appendix B, “Quality Assurance Criteria
for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants,” to 10 CFR Part 50, requires
licensees to retain certain records consistent with regulatory requirements for a duration
established by the licensees.

•

10 CFR 50.59(d)(3) and 52.63(b)(2) require licensees to maintain certain records until
termination of a license issued under 10 CFR Part 50 or 10 CFR Part 52.

•

10 CFR 50.71(c) requires licensees to maintain certain records consistent with various
elements of the NRC regulations, facility technical specifications, and other licensing
bases documents.

•

10 CFR 72.72(d) requires licensees to duplicate certain records of spent fuel and
high-level radioactive waste and store them in a separate location sufficiently remote
from the original records so that a single event would not destroy both sets.

Licensees that are transitioning to decommissioning frequently request exemptions from certain
parts of these recordkeeping regulations that require the retention of records until termination of
the license. Licensees that have previously been granted these exemptions used the
justification that, when the associated structures, systems, and components (SSCs) are
removed from the licensing basis documents, the SSCs will no longer serve any NRC-regulated
function. Therefore, the need to retain the records will be eliminated.
In addition, several licensees have requested an exemption from the requirements of
10 CFR 72.72(d), which mandates that certain records of spent fuel and high-level radioactive
waste in storage be kept in duplicate in a separate location sufficiently remote from the original
records that a single event would not destroy both sets of records. Licensees seeking this
exemption use the justification that they will store the ISFSI spent fuel records using the same
procedures and processes used for the facility spent fuel (and other) records, which are typically
stored in accordance with the NRC-approved quality assurance program (QAP).
Alternative R-1 (No-Action)
The no-action alternative would retain the status quo and all provisions of the current
recordkeeping and record retention regulations found in 10 CFR 50.71(c); 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix A, General Design Criterion 1; 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII;
10 CFR 50.59(d)(3), and 10 CFR 72.72(d). Under this alternative, decommissioning licensees
would still need to apply for exemptions under 10 CFR 50.12 and 10 CFR 72.7 to remove the
record retention requirements for SSCs that no longer serve any NRC-regulated function. The
NRC would continue to review and approve these exemptions on a case-by-case basis.
Alternative R-2 (Rulemaking to Decrease Record Retention Requirements during
Decommissioning)
Through this rulemaking effort, the NRC will seek to change the NRC regulations to minimize
the need for regulatory exemptions related to recordkeeping and record retention requirements

47

during decommissioning. Once the NRC receives notifications of permanent cessation of
operation and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i)
and 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii), it will allow decommissioning licensees to no longer retain records
associated with SSCs that no longer serve any NRC-regulated function. The NRC will allow this
change as long as appropriate change mechanisms, such as the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation
process or NRC-approved technical specification changes, are used to assess the removal of
those records to determine that elimination of the records will have no adverse impact to public
health and safety.
Assumptions
The regulatory analysis assumes that a licensee will request exemptions from certain parts of
record keeping regulations at the time it certifies under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) or 10 CFR 52.110(a)
that it has: (1) permanently ceased operation and (2) permanently removed fuel from the
reactor vessel. The NRC also assumes that in the future, the industry, the states and the
general public will provide comments on Alternative R-2 during the proposed rulemaking stage.
Affected Attributes
Industry Implementation: Under Alternative R-2, the exemptions that licensees typically submit
from record keeping requirements would be reduced, resulting in a one-time benefit
(i.e., averted cost) to industry for licensees that enter decommissioning after issuance of the
rule. For Alternative R-2, the industry would commit additional resources to participate in the
public meeting and comment period for the proposed rule.
NRC Implementation: For Alternative R-2, the NRC would incur a one-time cost in order to
develop the rule. For Alternative R-2, the exemptions from record keeping requirements would
be reduced, which would result in a benefit (i.e., averted cost) to the NRC due to lack of
reviewing these exemption requests.
Other Government: Under Alternative R-2, the state and local governments would commit
additional resources to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed
rule.
General Public: Under Alternative R-2, the general public would commit additional resources to
participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed rule.

Low-Level Waste Transportation
10 CFR Part 20, “Standards for Protection Against Radiation,” Appendix G, “Requirements for
Transfers of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Intended for Disposal at Licensed Land Disposal
Facilities and Manifests,” Section III.E, contains requirements for investigating rail shipments of
low-level radioactive wastes (LLW) if the shipper has not received notification of receipt within
20 days after transfer. In addition, Section III.E requires licensees to report such missing
shipments to the NRC. Licensees that are involved in the decommissioning process frequently
request an exemption from certain parts of these requirements related to the 20-day receipt
notification window. Licensees that have previously been granted these exemptions typically
extended the investigation notification window to 45 days using the justification that operational
experience indicates that while the 20-day receipt notification window is adequate for waste
shipments by truck, rail shipments may take more than 20 days to reach their destination

48

resulting from delays in the route that are outside the licensee’s control (e.g., rail cars waiting in
switchyards waiting to be included in a train to the disposal facility).
The NRC is proposing this rulemaking to minimize the need for licensees to seek exemptions
from the investigation requirements for LLW by extending the receipt of notification period from
20 days to 45 days after transferring LLW from an operating or decommissioning facility by rail,
as required by 10 CFR Part 20.
Alternative TR-1 (No-Action)
The no-action alternative would retain the status quo and all provisions of the current
investigation requirements for LLW transportation in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix G, Section III.E.
Under this alternative, both operating and decommissioning licensees would still need to apply
for exemptions under 10 CFR 20.2301 in order to extend the receipt notification window to
45 days after transferring LLW from decommissioning nuclear plants by rail. The NRC would
continue to review and approve these exemptions on a case-by-case basis.
Alternative TR-2 (Rulemaking to Change Low Level Waste Transportation
Requirements)
Through this rulemaking effort, the NRC will seek to change its regulations to minimize the need
for regulatory exemptions related to investigation requirements for LLW transportation during
both operation and decommissioning at all nuclear facilities under 10 CFR Part 20. Specifically,
the NRC will allow these licensees to extend the receipt notification window to 45 days after
transferring LLW from the nuclear facility by rail. This change will continue to meet the
underlying purpose of 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix G, Section III.E, which requires licensees to
investigate, trace, and report radioactive shipments that have not reached their destination, for
unknown reasons.
Assumptions
The regulatory analysis assumes that a licensee will request exemptions from certain parts of
transportation investigation requirements at the time it certifies under 10 CFR 50.82 that it has:
(1) permanently ceased operation and (2) permanently removed fuel from the reactor vessel.
The regulatory analysis also assumes that in the future, the industry, the states and the general
public will provide comments on Alternative TR-2 during the proposed rulemaking stage.
Affected Attributes
Industry Implementation: Under Alternative TR-2, the exemptions that licensees typically submit
from transportation investigation requirements would be reduced, resulting in a one-time benefit
(i.e., averted cost) to industry for licensees that enter decommissioning after issuance of the
rule. For Alternative TR-2, the industry would commit additional resources to participate in the
public meeting and comment period for the proposed rule.
NRC Implementation: For Alternative TR-2, the NRC would incur a one-time cost in order to
develop the rule. For Alternative TR-2, the exemptions from transportation investigation
requirements would be reduced, which would result in a benefit (i.e., averted cost) to the NRC
due to lack of reviewing these exemption requests.

49

Other Government: Under Alternative TR-2, the state and local governments would commit
additional resources to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed
rule.
General Public: Under Alternative TR-2, the general public would commit additional resources
to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed rule.

Spent Fuel Management Planning
The regulation in § 72.218(a) states that the § 50.54(bb) spent fuel management program (i.e.,
the irradiated fuel management program or IFMP) must include a plan for removing from the
reactor site the spent fuel stored under the 10 CFR Part 72 general license. The IFMP must
show how the spent fuel will be managed before starting to decommission systems and
components needed for moving, unloading, and shipping this spent fuel. Section 72.218(b)
requires that an application for termination of a reactor operating license submitted under
§ 50.82 or § 52.110 must also describe how the spent fuel stored under the 10 CFR Part 72
general license will be removed from the reactor site. Although § 72.218 states what
information the § 50.54(bb) IFMP, the § 50.82 and § 52.110 application for termination of a
reactor operating license must include, the regulations in §§ 50.54(bb), 50.82, and 52.110 do
not contain this information.
As §§ 50.54(bb), 50.82, and 52.110 do not reflect the provisions in § 72.218, this causes
regulatory uncertainty. The NRC proposes to clarify and align the regulations in §§ 50.54(bb),
50.82, 52.110, and 72.218 to provide regulatory clarity and enhance overall regulatory
transparency and openness regarding decommissioning and spent fuel management planning.
Alternative SFM-1 (No-Action)
The no-action alternative would retain the provisions of the current decommissioning regulations
and guidance documents related to spent fuel management and handling capabilities during
decommissioning, and would make no changes or clarifications to the requirements in
10 CFR 50.82, 10 CFR 50.54(bb), 10 CFR 52.110, or 10 CFR 72.218.
Alternative SFM-2 (Rulemaking to clarify and update Spent Fuel Management
Planning)
In this alternative, the NRC would pursue rulemaking to clarify and update the regulations in
10 CFR 50.82, 10 CFR 50.54(bb), 10 CFR 52.110, and 10 CFR 72.218 as they relate to
requirements for a licensee to consider or plan how it is going to manage and remove spent fuel
at the site before it decommissions the SSCs that support moving, unloading, and shipping of
spent fuel. Specifically, 10 CFR 50.54(bb) would be modified to make it clear that the IFMP
must be submitted by the licensee and approved by the NRC before the licensee starts to
decommission systems and components needed for moving, unloading, and shipping the spent
fuel. In addition, the NRC would clarify the current IFMP approval process by requiring
submittal of the IFMP as a license amendment request. The NRC would also delete the current
notification requirement in 10 CFR 50.54(bb). The NRC would also delete the current
provisions from 10 CFR 72.218 when it adds these spent fuel management planning
requirements to 10 CFR Part 50. In addition, the NRC would revise 10 CFR 72.218 to address
requirements related to termination of the 10 CFR Part 72 general license and clarify that the
general license ISFSI is decommissioned consistent with the requirements in 50.82 or 52.110,
and the general license is terminated upon termination of the 10 CFR Part 50 or 10 CFR Part 52
50

license. The rulemaking changes would also include development of guidance documents per
Alternative SFM-2.
Assumptions
The regulatory analysis has made the following assumptions:
•

Assume that no new regulatory guidance would be developed and that only guidance
document RG 1.184 would be updated to account for spent fuel management
requirements.
Affected Attributes

Industry Implementation: Under Alternative SFM-2, licensees would commit additional
resources to respond to the updates to RG 1.184, ”Decommissioning of Nuclear Power
Reactors.” Under Alternative SFM-2, licensees would commit minor resources to include
additional details regarding spent fuel management in the IFMP. For Alternative SFM-2, the
industry would commit additional resources to participate in the public meeting and comment
period for the proposed rule.
Industry Operation: Under Alternative SFM-2, licensees would spend less time on conference
calls due to enhanced clarity in guidance and/or rulemaking.
NRC Implementation: Under Alternative SFM-2, the NRC would commit additional resources to
update RG 1.184. For Alternative SFM-2, the NRC would expend resources to implement the
rulemaking.
NRC Operation: Under Alternative SFM-2, the NRC would spend less time on conference calls
due to enhanced clarity in guidance and/or rulemaking.
Other Government: Under Alternative SFM-2, the state and local governments would commit
additional resources to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed
rule.
General Public: Under Alternative SFM-2, the general public would commit additional resources
to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed rule.

Backfit Rule
The NRC uses its backfitting process to decide whether to impose new or revised regulatory
requirements or staff positions on nuclear power reactor licensees or certain nuclear materials
licensees. To ensure that these proposed changes are adequately defined and justified, the
NRC imposes the changes only after a formal and systematic assessment of the proposed
imposition. The intended result of the backfitting process is to prevent the NRC, after issuing a
license or other approval, from arbitrarily changing the terms and conditions for operating under
the approval and the regulations that existed at the time the NRC issued the approval.
For nuclear power reactor licensees, this process is set forth in 10 CFR 50.109, “Backfitting,”
and in the issue finality provisions in 10 CFR Part 52 (hereinafter collectively referred to as the
“Backfit Rule”). The language of the Backfit Rule clearly applies to a licensee designing,

51

constructing, or operating a nuclear power facility. For example, 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1) defines
“backfitting” as:
[T]he modification of or addition to systems, structures, components, or design of
a facility; or the design approval or manufacturing license for a facility; or the
procedures or organization required to design, construct or operate a facility; any
of which may result from a new or amended provision in the Commission’s
regulations or the imposition of a regulatory staff position interpreting the
Commission’s regulations that is either new or different from a previously
applicable staff position.
The application of the Backfit Rule to decommissioning plants is not as clear. In SECY-98-253,
“Applicability of Plant-Specific Backfit Requirements to Plants Undergoing Decommissioning”
(ADAMS Accession No. ML992870107), the NRC presented the Commission with a list of
reasons underlying this uncertainty:
•

The Backfit Rule has no end point when the rule no longer applies, “thereby implying
that backfit protection continues into decommissioning and up to the point of license
termination.”

•

The term “operate” could reasonably be interpreted as including activities to
decommission the reactor.

•

The Backfit Rule was developed when the decommissioning of plants was not an active
area of regulatory concern.

•

The Backfit Rule’s definition of “backfitting” uses terms associated with the design,
construction and operation of a facility, rather than its decommissioning, although the
staff noted in SECY-98-253 that “prior to the 1996 decommissioning rule, the
Commission regarded decommissioning as a phase of the plant’s life cycle which is
different from the operational phase.”

•

Two of the factors used in evaluating a backfit—costs of construction delay/facility
downtime, and changes in plant/operational complexity – are targeted to power
operation and “conceptually inappropriate in evaluating the impacts of a backfit on a
decommissioning plant.”

•

The statement of considerations for the 19703, 19854, and 19885 final Backfit Rules did
not discuss any aspect of decommissioning, focusing instead on construction and
operation.

•

Proposed changes to decommissioning requirements usually focused on relaxing
requirements or on whether a requirement applicable to an operating reactor continued
to be applicable to a decommissioning plant. Thus, “the notion of a ‘substantial increase’
in protection to public health and safety from a backfit does not appear to be particularly
useful [in decommissioning].”

3

35 FR 5317, March 31, 1970
50 FR 38097, September 20, 1985
53 FR 20603, June 6, 1988

4
5

52

•

The 1996 decommissioning final rule6 did not directly respond to questions from the
public on the applicability of the Backfit Rule to a decommissioning plant.

In SECY-98-253, the NRC staff requested Commission approval to amend, among other
regulations, 10 CFR 50.109, so that the Backfit Rule would clearly apply to licensees in
decommissioning. In this paper, the NRC staff also proposed that, until the rulemaking was
finished, the staff would apply the Backfit Rule to plants undergoing decommissioning “to the
extent practical.” In the February 12, 1999 SRM for SECY-98-253 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML003753746), the Commission approved development of a Backfit Rule for plants undergoing
decommissioning. The Commission directed the NRC staff to continue to apply the then-current
Backfit Rule to plants undergoing decommissioning until issuance of the final rule.
The NRC recognizes that certain provisions of the Backfit Rule do not apply to power reactor
licensees in decommissioning as discussed in the proposed rule Federal Register notice.
Currently, the Backfit Rule guidance in Management Directive 8.4, “Management of FacilitySpecific Backfitting and Information Collection,” (Ref. 35) provides only that the Backfit Rule
applies to decommissioning plants. However, because of the lack of clarity for backfitting in the
decommissioning phase of a power reactor, the NRC is proposing rulemaking.
Alternative B-1 (No-action alternative)
The NRC would continue to apply the Backfit Rule to licensees in decommissioning “to the
extent practical.” This means that the NRC would not use the provisions of the Backfit Rule that
concern reactors that are being designed, constructed, or operated because those provisions
cannot be applied to a licensee of a reactor that has already terminated the design,
construction, and operation phases of its reactor’s life. These provisions are, in part or in whole,
the following sections of 10 CFR 50.109:
•

10 CFR 50.109(c)(5): Installation and continuing costs associated with the backfit,
including the cost of facility downtime or the cost of construction delay;

•

10 CFR 50.109(c)(6): The potential safety impact of changes in plant or operational
complexity, including the relationship to proposed and existing regulatory requirements;
and

•

Other references to reactor design, construction, or operation in 10 CFR 50.109.

This approach would require the NRC to refrain from applying certain provisions of the Backfit
Rule to licensees in decommissioning if the NRC determines that the provisions cannot be
practically applied to those licensees. The NRC would employ this process on a case-by-case
basis, given the specific circumstances at a particular licensee’s site. This approach could
undermine the Backfit Rule’s predictability and stability policies because of its case-by-case
nature and resultant uncertainty in terms of applicability.

6

61 FR 39278, July 29, 1996

53

Alternative B-2 (Conduct rulemaking to clarify how the NRC applies the Backfit
Rule to licensees in decommissioning)
The NRC proposes to amend 10 CFR 50.109 so that power reactor licensees, which have had
their § 50.82(a)(1) or § 52.110(a) certifications docketed by the NRC, are the subject of similar
backfitting provisions as they were during their operating phase. A new backfitting provision for
licensees in decommissioning would eliminate any confusion with the meaning of the words,
“operate a facility,” in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1) as compared to other uses of the term “operate” in
10 CFR Chapter I. The current 10 CFR 50.109(a) would be limited to licensees operating
reactors, and the new provision would be limited to licensees in decommissioning.
Affected Attributes
Industry Implementation: To implement Alternative B-2, industry would participate in the
development of the rulemaking. These would result in a one-time cost to industry for time spent
on the reviews and participation in public meetings. For Alternative B-2, the industry would
commit additional resources to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the
proposed rule.
NRC Implementation: To implement Alternative B-3, the NRC incurs a one-time cost relative to
the status quo for developing and finalizing the rule.
Other Government: Under Alternative B-2, the state and local governments would commit
additional resources to participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed
rule.

Foreign Ownership, Control, or Domination (FOCD)
The NRC’s regulations in Parts 50 and 52 provide for the issuance of a Part 50 license for a
utilization or a production facility and a Part 52 license for a utilization facility, respectively. The
NRC is proposing to amend its regulations to address the circumstances when a facility licensed
under Part 50 or 52 no longer meets the definition of a utilization facility or a production facility,
yet the NRC still maintains its regulatory authority over the licensee. The AEA has certain
requirements specific to utilization or production facilities. By clarifying when a Part 50 or 52
licensed facility is no longer a utilization or a production facility, the NRC can then specify
whether these AEA requirements still apply to the licensee for that facility.
The NRC has identified that 10 CFR 50.38 should not apply to a facility that is no longer a
utilization or a production facility. Specifically, the AEA prohibits the issuance of a license for a
utilization or a production facility to an entity that the Commission knows or has reason to
believe is foreign owned, controlled, or dominated. However, the Commission’s regulations that
implement this prohibition in § 50.38 are unclear as to whether the prohibition also applies to the
acquisition of a Part 50 or 52 license for a facility that is no longer a utilization or a production
facility.
Alternative F-1 (No Action)
The no-action alternative would retain the NRC’s current regulations regarding utilization and
production facilities.

54

The no-action alternative would also retain the provisions of the current decommissioning
regulations with regard to the NRC’s prohibition on transferring a license to an entity that the
Commission knows or has reason to believe is owned, controlled, or dominated by an alien, a
foreign corporation, or a foreign government.
Alternative F-2 (Rulemaking to specify FOCD)
In this alternative, the NRC proposes to add to its regulations language to establish the criteria
for when a facility licensed under Part 50 or 52 no longer meets the statutory or regulatory
definition of a utilization or a production facility (i.e., is no longer capable of making use of
special nuclear material or of the production of special nuclear material, separation of the
isotopes of plutonium, or processing of irradiated materials containing special nuclear material,
respectively). The first criterion is that the facility must not be legally capable of operating. The
second criterion is the physical modification of the licensed facility to be incapable of making
use of special nuclear material or of the production of special nuclear material, separation of the
isotopes of plutonium, or processing of irradiated materials containing special nuclear material,
without significant facility alterations necessary to restore the capability to make use of special
nuclear material or produce special nuclear material, separate the isotopes of plutonium, or
process irradiated materials containing special nuclear material, respectively. When a utilization
facility is physically modified to be incapable of making use of special nuclear material, it is no
longer designed or used to sustain nuclear fission in a self-supporting chain reaction.
Sections 50.82(a)(2) and 52.110(b) already provide for the first criterion for power reactor
licensees. Sections 50.82(a)(2) and 52.110(b) state, respectively, that a Part 50 or 52 license
no longer authorize operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor
vessel once the NRC has docketed the certifications for permanent cessation of operations and
permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, or when a final legally effective order to
permanently cease operations has come into effect. The NRC would amend these regulations
to add the second criterion that the facility licensed under Part 50 or 52 is no longer a utilization
facility once the licensee modifies the facility to be incapable of making use of special nuclear
material without significant facility alterations.
Because the NRC’s regulations do not state when a non-power production or utilization facility
(NPUF) licensee is no longer authorized to operate (other than at license termination), the NRC
proposes to amend § 50.82(b) to add the criteria for when an NPUF is no longer a production or
utilization facility. The NRC would renumber current paragraph (b)(6) in 10 CFR 50.82 as
paragraph (b)(8) and add new paragraphs (b)(6) and (b)(7). Paragraph (b)(6) would provide
that an NPUF or fuel reprocessing plant is not legally capable of operating when the NRC
removes the licensee’s authority to operate the facility through a license amendment.
Licensees typically request a possession-only license amendment first and then submit a
decommissioning plan (via a second license amendment request). This proposed rule would
offer licensees the option to request only one licensing action—the decommissioning plan
license amendment—that also would address the licensee’s operating authority, rendering a
“possession-only license amendment” unnecessary. The NRC would add new § 50.82(b)(7)
and amend § 50.82(a)(2) and § 52.110(b) to affirm the continuation of the NRC’s statutory
authority over the existing Part 50 or 52 license after the performance of decommissioning
activities that lead to the licensed facility no longer meeting the definition of a utilization or a
production facility.
The NRC is also proposing to amend § 50.38, “Ineligibility of certain applicants,” such that its
prohibition on transferring a license to an entity that the Commission knows or has reason to
55

believe is owned, controlled, or dominated by an alien, a foreign corporation, or a foreign
government, is not applicable if the license is a Part 50 or 52 license for a facility that no longer
meets the definition of a utilization or a production facility.
Assumptions
For Alternative F-2 (Rulemaking to specify FOCD) the NRC assumes in this regulatory analysis
that one-third of all future nuclear power reactor sites that decommission will submit an
exemption from § 50.38 if the proposed rule does not go forward. This assumption is based on
historical data on past decommissioning sites that did submit an exemption from § 50.38 (Ref.
36).
Affected Attributes
Industry Implementation: Under Alternative F-2, the exemptions that licensees submit from §
50.38 would be eliminated, resulting in a one-time benefit (i.e., averted cost) to industry for
licensees that enter decommissioning after issuance of the rule. Also, under Alternative F-2, the
proposed rule would offer an NPUF the option to request only one licensing action—the
decommissioning plan license amendment—that also would address the licensee’s operating
authority, rendering a “possession-only license amendment” unnecessary, resulting in a onetime cost benefit for not having to prepare this amendment.
NRC Implementation: For Alternative F-2, the NRC would incur a one-time cost in order to
develop the rule. For Alternative F-2, the exemptions from § 50.38 would be eliminated, which
would result in a benefit (i.e., averted cost) to the NRC due to lack of reviewing these exemption
requests. Under Alternative F-2, the proposed rule would offer the NPUFs the option to request
only one licensing action—the decommissioning plan license amendment—that also would
address the licensee’s operating authority, rendering a “possession-only license amendment”
unnecessary, resulting in a one-time cost benefit to the NRC for not having to review these
amendments.

Clarification of Scope of License Termination Plan Requirement
The Commission’s “Policy Statement on Deferred Plants” (Ref. 37) addresses holders of
construction permits who defer or terminate plant construction. Certain COL holders have cited
the Policy Statement for authority to request NRC approval to withdraw their combined licenses.
The Policy Statement provides that a permit holder can request to withdraw its permit and does
not cite to the license termination provisions in 10 CFR Part 50. The Policy Statement was
issued prior to the promulgation of 10 CFR Part 52 and has not been updated since, but there is
nothing to prevent holders of a combined license from following the applicable parts of the
Policy Statement while continuing to comply with the Commission’s regulations and the terms
and conditions of the combined license. The requirement for a license termination plan in
§ 52.110(i) does not apply to plants that have not begun operating. While § 52.110(i) does refer
to “[a]ll power reactor licensees,” the regulatory history and context indicates that § 52.110 as a
whole applies only to plants that have started operation
Alternative T-1 (No-Action)
The no-action alternative would retain the provisions of the current decommissioning regulations
with regard to the requirement for a license termination plan in § 50.82(a)(9) and § 52.110(i).

56

Alternative T-2 (Rulemaking to clarify license termination plan)
The NRC is proposing to amend its regulations to clarify that the requirement for a license
termination plan in § 50.82(a)(9) and § 52.110(i) applies only to power reactor licensees that
commenced operation. This clarification is being proposed in response to apparent confusion
among combined license holders who seek to surrender their licenses before operation.
However, to avoid confusion over the license termination plan requirement, the NRC proposes
to amend § 52.110(i) so that it explicitly applies only to “power reactor licensees that
commenced operation.” As stated in the “Final Procedures for Conducting Hearings on
Conformance With the Acceptance Criteria in Combined Licenses” (Ref. 38), the NRC has
historically understood operation as beginning with the loading of fuel into the reactor.
Therefore, § 52.110(i) would apply to 10 CFR Part 52 power reactor licensees that have, at a
minimum, begun to load fuel into the reactor. Section 50.82(a)(9 would apply to 10 CFR Part 50
power reactor licensees that, at a minimum, have begun to load fuel into the reactor.
Assumptions
For Alternative T-2 (Rulemaking to clarify license termination plan) this clarification is
administrative and does not present a significant change in the costs and benefits for the
industry, NRC, State and local governments and the general public.

5

EVALUATION OF COSTS AND BENEFITS FOR AREAS OF
DECOMMISSIONING CONSIDERED FOR RULEMAKING

This section examines the costs and benefits expected to result from the alternatives of the
decommissioning areas relative to the regulatory baseline (i.e., the no-action alternative). All
costs and benefits are monetized, when possible. The total of costs and benefits are then
summed to determine whether the difference between the costs and benefits results in a
positive net benefit. Costs and benefits, which are not monetized because of the lack of data,
are qualitatively described.

Analytical Methodology
This section describes the process used to evaluate costs and benefits associated with the
alternatives, consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG/BR-0058, “Regulatory Analysis
Guidelines of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,” Revision 5 (Ref. 39). The benefits
include desirable changes in affected attributes (e.g., monetary savings, reduced burden on
licensees, streamlined process), while the costs include any undesirable changes in affected
attributes (e.g., monetary costs).
This regulatory analysis evaluates eight attributes on a quantitative basis: industry
implementation, industry operation, NRC implementation, NRC operation, other government,
general public, environmental considerations and regulatory efficiency. Quantitative analysis
requires a baseline characterization of the affected universe, including characterization of
factors such as the number of affected entities, the areas of decommissioning, and the
administrative processes and procedures that licensees or applicants would implement, or no
longer implement, because of the alternatives under consideration. Costs to complete and
process exemptions and amendments for decommissioning proceeding to preparing the
proposed rule in 2018 are sunk costs and are not considered in this regulatory analysis.

57

Regulatory Baseline
This regulatory analysis measures the incremental impacts of the recommended rulemaking
relative to a baseline that reflects anticipated behavior in the event NRC undertakes no
additional regulatory actions (the no-action alternatives). As part of the regulatory baseline used
in this analysis, the staff assumes full licensee compliance with existing NRC regulations.
Discount Rates
In accordance with guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular
No. A-4, “Regulatory Analysis” (Ref. 40), and NUREG/BR-0058, Revision 5, net present worth
calculations are used to determine how much society would need to invest today to ensure that
the designated dollar amount is available in a given year in the future. By using present worth
values, costs and benefits, regardless of when the cost or benefit is incurred in time, are valued
to a reference year for comparison. Based on OMB Circular No. A-4 and consistent with NRC
past practice and guidance, present worth calculations are presented using 3-percent and
7-percent real discount rates.7 A 3-percent discount rate approximates the real rate of return on
long-term government debt, which serves as a proxy for the real rate of return on savings to
reflect reliance on a social rate of time preference discounting concept. A 7-percent discount
rate approximates the marginal pretax real rate of return on an average investment in the
private sector, and is the appropriate discount rate whenever the main effect of a regulation is to
displace or alter the use of capital in the private sector. A 7-percent rate is consistent with an
opportunity cost of capital8 concept to reflect the time value of resources directed to meet
regulatory requirements.
Cost/Benefit Inflators
To evaluate the costs and benefits consistently, the analysis inputs are inflated into 2018
dollars. The most common inflator is the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers (CPIU), developed by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The formula
to determine the amount in 2018 dollars is as follows:
CPIU
CPIU

∗ Value

Value

Values of CPI-U used in this cost-benefit analysis are summarized in Table 5.

7

The rates presented in Appendix C to OMB Circular No. A-94 (Ref. 41) do not apply to regulatory analysis or
cost-benefit analysis of public investment. These rates are used for lease-purchase and cost-effectiveness
analysis, as specified in the Circular.

8

Opportunity cost is the value of the next best alternative to a particular activity or resource. An analyst does
not need to assess opportunity cost in monetary terms. Opportunity cost can be assessed in terms of
anything that is of value.

58

Table 5

a

b

Consumer Price Index—All Urban Consumers, U.S. City Average
Base
Year

CPI-U Annual
Averagea

2017
2018
2019

245.120
250.758
256.776

Forecast Percent
Change of CPI-U
from Previous
Yearb
2.30%
2.40%

United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Table 24, Historical Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers (CPI-U): U.S. City Average, All-Items,” https://www.bls.gov/cpi/tables/supplementalfiles/historical-cpi-u-201802.pdf (Ref. 42).
United States Congressional Budget Office, “The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2017 to 2027.”
Table 2-1, “CBO’s Economic Projections for Calendar Years 2017 to 2027,” January 2017,
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/52370 (Ref. 43).

Labor Rates
For regulatory analysis purposes, labor rates are developed, and this approach is consistent
with guidance set forth in NUREG/CR-4627, “Generic Cost Estimates” (Ref. 44), and general
cost-benefit methodology. The NRC labor rate for fiscal year 2018 is $131 per hour.9
The estimated mean industry labor rate is $141 per hour. The NRC derived these labor rates
according to data provided by BLS. The NRC used the 2016 occupational employment and
wages data, which provided labor categories and the mean hourly wage rate by job type and
used the inflator discussed in Section 5.1.3 to inflate these labor rate data to 2018 dollars. The
industry labor rates used in the analysis reflect total compensation, which includes health and
retirement benefits (using a burden factor of 2.0). The NRC used the BLS data tables to select
appropriate hourly labor rates for performing the estimated procedural, licensing, and utilityrelated work necessary during and following implementation of the proposed alternatives. In
establishing this labor rate, wages paid for the individuals performing the work plus the
associated fringe benefit component of labor cost (i.e., the time for plant management over and
above those directly expensed) are considered expenses and are included. The NRC also
verified that these labor rates are consistent with wage rates submitted by industry in recent
severe accident mitigation alternatives cost estimates. Appendix A of this regulatory analysis
provides a breakdown of the labor categories considered that may be required to implement
rulemaking. The NRC performed an uncertainty analysis, which is discussed in Section 6.10.
Affected Entities
The following describes the nuclear power reactors that are affected by the decommissioning
rule:

9

The NRC labor rates presented here differ from those developed under the NRC’s license fee recovery
program (10 CFR Part 170, “Fees for Facilities, Materials, Import and Export Licenses, and Other
Regulatory Services under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended”). The NRC labor rates for fee
recovery purposes are set for cost recovery of the services rendered and, as such, include non-incremental
costs (e.g., overhead, administrative, and logistical support costs).

59

Operating reactor sites: The NRC models 66 U.S. light-water nuclear power reactors
sites in this analysis.10 Note that in 2013 three of these sites had permanently shut
down without significant advance notice or preplanning. These sites are Crystal River
Nuclear Generation Plant, Kewaunee Nuclear Power Station and San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station. On December 29, 2014, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., shut
down Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. Furthermore, the Omaha Public Power
District board of directors shut down Fort Calhoun Station on October 24, 2016 (Ref. 45).
The following licensees have announced plans to shut down their operation power
reactor sites between 2018 and 2025:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Oyster Creek – by October 31, 2018 (originally by December 31, 2019)
Pilgrim – by June 1, 2019
Three Mile Island Unit 1 – on or about September 30, 2019
Davis-Besse – by May 31, 2020
Indian Point – by April 30, 2021
Perry – by May 31, 2021
Beaver Valley– by October 31, 2021
Palisades – by spring 2022 (originally planned to shut down in 2018)
Diablo Canyon – in 2025

These licensees who have identified their intention to permanently cease operations in
the near future have indicated that they plan to continue to use the current transition
process (i.e., establishing a decommissioning regulatory framework by requesting
exemptions, license amendments, and rescinding orders, as needed). The NRC
assumes that these licensees will not wait for the outcome of the decommissioning
rulemaking before formulating their decommissioning licensing activities.

10

11

•

Future operating reactor units: The NRC assumes that there are two future operating
light-water nuclear power reactors that would be affected by the recommended rule and
are considered in this analysis. The future nuclear power reactor units are Vogtle
Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4, assumed to begin operations in 2021 and 2022,
respectively.11

•

Non-power production or utilization facility (NPUF): The proposed rule will affect all
NPUFs with respect to the definition of a production or utilization facility. Here the NRC
would amend regulations to add the first criterion for NPUFs and fuel reprocessing
plants (i.e., the licensee is no longer authorized to operate) and the second criterion for
all production or utilization facilities that the facility licensed under Part 50 or 52 is no
longer a utilization facility once the licensee modifies the facility to be incapable of
making use of special nuclear material without significant facility alterations. The NRC is
also proposing to amend § 50.38 such that its prohibition on transferring a license to an
entity that the Commission knows or has reason to believe is owned, controlled, or
dominated by an alien, a foreign corporation, or a foreign government, is not applicable if
Based on information obtained from NUREG-1350, Volume 29, “Information Digest: 2017–2018,”
Appendix G, “U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Reactor Operating Licenses—Expiration by Year,
2013–2049,” issued August 2017.
Fermi Unit 3, Levy County Units 1 and 2, South Texas Project Units 3 and 4 and William State Lee III Units 1
and 2 are not included in this analysis because as of 11/1/2016, the NRC issued a COL for these proposed
new reactors, but the licensees have no immediate plans to begin construction. If the construction plans
change during this rulemaking, the regulatory analysis will be revised.

60

the license is a Part 50 or 52 license for a facility that no longer meets the definition of a
utilization or a production facility.
Other potential new reactors licensed under 10 CFR Part 52 and small modular reactors are not
included in this analysis. In the case that additional 10 CFR Part 52 applicants are issued
licenses and are under construction, the regulatory analysis for the final rule will reflect that
change.
Sign Conventions
The sign conventions used in this analysis for all favorable consequences for the alternatives
are positive and all adverse consequences for the alternatives are negative. For example,
additional costs above the regulatory baseline are shown as negative values, and benefits and
averted costs are shown as positive values. Negative values are shown using parentheses
(e.g., negative $500 is displayed as ($500)).
Base Year
The rulemaking is expected to be issued and effective in 2020. The monetized benefits and
costs in this analysis are expressed in year 2018 dollars. Rulemaking-related implementation
costs are assumed to be incurred in years 2018 and 2019. Non-rulemaking implementation
costs are assumed to be incurred in year 2020. Ongoing and annual costs of operation related
to the alternatives are assumed to begin in year 2021 unless otherwise stated and continue until
no additional costs or benefits are incurred. These monetized future costs and benefits are then
discounted back into year 2018 dollars.
Time Period of Analysis
To define the period of analysis covered by this regulatory analysis (i.e., the period over which
costs and benefits would be incurred), the NRC used the remaining license term for each
operating and COL licensees. These remaining license terms were obtained from
NUREG-1350 (Ref. 46). The license terms consist of an operating period and can be followed
by a 60-year period for SAFSTOR or a 12.5-year period for DECON decommissioning. The
NRC assumes that each operating site that has not renewed its license will apply for and
receives one 20-year license renewal beyond the original 40-year license term. At the end of
the operating period, the NRC assumes that each site would enter the decommissioning phase,
and would in turn incur decommissioning site costs. There are two new reactors included in the
analysis - Vogtle Units 3 and 4. The NRC assumes that both new reactors will apply for and
receive one 20-year license renewal in addition to the original 40-year license. Based on these
assumptions, the Vogtle nuclear site would incur costs associated with the final rule from 2020
through 2082.
Cost Estimation
In order to estimate the costs associated with the evaluated alternatives, the NRC used a work
breakdown structure approach to deconstruct each alternative into requirements that would
need to be met. These requirements include avoidance of exemptions and/or amendments,
additional processes that licensees would be required to complete (e.g., additional materials
and drug testing) and other additional penalties (e.g., spent fuel management fees).
Additionally, licensee input on reduced staffing during decommissioning and extrapolation

61

techniques (i.e., utilization of cost factors) was used to estimate the costs and benefits of each
alternative.
The NRC gathered data from several sources (e.g., BLS, internal databases, publications, and
periodicals) and professional opinion. This data was used to estimate activities such as the
levels of effort required to prepare and submit exemption requests and license amendments, to
review and process the exemptions and license amendments, to manage and track spent fuel
management costs, and to complete materials tests. NRC working group members were also
consulted to obtain expert opinion on the levels of effort (labor hours and staffing) to complete
decommissioning activities. This expert opinion is based on NRC experience with oversight of
operating and decommissioning power reactors and forms the basis for the many assumptions
used to derive the cost estimates. In addition, the NRC used historical cost data to estimate the
future cost of some requirements (e.g., drug and alcohol testing) using cost factors. For
instance, to calculate the estimated averted costs of requests for exemptions and amendments
and the preparation of the final rule, it was necessary for the NRC to extrapolate the labor hours
responsible for the work based on past data. For steps in the regulatory alternatives with no or
incomplete data, the staff based its cost estimates on similar steps for which data are available.
To incorporate uncertainty into the model, the staff employed a Monte Carlo simulation, which is
an approach to uncertainty analysis where input variables are expressed as distributions. The
simulation was run 10,000 times, and values used in simulations were chosen randomly from
the distributions of the input variables provided in Appendix B to this document. The result was
a distribution of values for the output variable of interest. Using Monte Carlo simulation, it is
also possible to determine the input variables that have the greatest effect on the value of the
output variable. Section 6.10 of this analysis provides a description of the Monte Carlo
simulation methods and a presentation of the uncertainty analysis.

6

PRESENTATION OF RESULTS FOR AREAS OF DECOMMISSIONING
CONSIDERED FOR RULEMAKING

This section presents the quantitative and qualitative results by attribute relative to the
regulatory baseline. As described in the previous sections, costs and benefits are quantified
where possible and can have either a positive or a negative algebraic sign, depending on
whether the alternative has a favorable or adverse effect relative to the regulatory baseline
(Alternative 1). A discussion is provided for those attributes that could not be represented in
monetary values. Although this ex-ante cost-benefit analysis12 provides useful information that
can be used when deciding whether to select an alternative, the analysis is based on estimates
of the future costs and benefits. Whether the estimates hold in the future, the process of
conducting regulatory analyses has value in that it helps decision makers think in depth about
specific alternatives and their associated results.

Industry Implementation
The NRC estimates that amending some of the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50 that were
mentioned previously (e.g., EP, physical security) would allow licensees to avert one-time costs
because they would submit fewer exemptions and license amendment requests. However, the
NRC had introduced new requirements for licensees which would result in additional costs.

12

An ex-ante cost-benefit analysis is prepared before a policy, program, or alternative is in place and can
assist in the decision about whether resources should be allocated to that alternative.

62

Discussion of both the averted and additional costs of each area of decommissioning is
presented in the next two sections.
Averted Industry Implementation Costs
The licensee submittal of an exemption or amendment request to the NRC can be expensive.
In order to be exempt from, or to change how a licensee complies with the NRC’s requirements
(e.g., maintaining offsite emergency preparedness, using DTFs for spent fuel management,
etc.) during its reactor’s decommissioning phase, the licensee must submit an exemption
request or a license amendment request to the NRC for review and approval. This analysis
evaluates the alternatives for proposed rulemaking in multiple areas of decommissioning, which
will eliminate the need for decommissioning-related exemption and license amendment
requests. These alternatives and areas of decommissioning are as follows:
•

Under Alternative EP-2, exemptions from EP requirements and amendments to
licensees regarding changes to the emergency plans would be reduced. This would
result in a one-time benefit (i.e., averted cost) to industry from writing fewer exemption
and amendment requests.

•

Under Alternative PS-2, licensees would not need to apply for exemptions from the
physical security requirements for suspension of security measures for the control room
and ISFSI. This would result in a one-time benefit to industry from writing fewer
exemptions.

•

Under Alternative CS-2, industry would not need to submit an amendment to remove
their cyber security plans once the spent fuel has sufficiently decayed.

•

Under Alternative CFH-3, licensees would not need to submit for Commission approval
fuel handler training programs suitable to qualify CFHs. This would result in a one-time
cost benefit to industry.

•

Under Alternatives FP-2, the exemptions for offsite and onsite financial protection
requirements would be fewer due to the reductions in financial protection based on the
level of decommissioning. This would result in a one-time benefit (i.e., averted cost) to
industry from writing fewer exemptions.

•

Under Alternative R-2, exemptions from the recordkeeping and record retention
requirements would be reduced. This would result in a one-time benefit (i.e., averted
cost) to industry for having to write fewer exemptions pertaining to these requirements.

•

Under Alternative TR-2, exemptions related to LLW transportation investigation
requirements during both operating and decommissioning at nuclear facilities covered by
the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 would be reduced. This would result in a one-time
benefit (i.e., averted cost) to industry for having to write fewer of these exemptions.

•

Under Alternative F-2, exemptions that licensees submit from § 50.38 would be
eliminated, resulting in a one-time benefit (i.e., averted cost) to industry for licensees that
enter decommissioning after issuance of the rule. The proposed rule would offer the
NPUFs the option to request only one licensing action—the decommissioning plan
license amendment—that also would address the licensee’s operating authority,

63

rendering a “possession-only license amendment” unnecessary, resulting in a one-time
benefit to NPUFs for not having to prepare these amendments.
Table 6 presents the averted implementation costs for all alternatives under proposed
rulemaking relative to the no-action alternatives (status quo). Note that the licensees that have
already entered decommissioning (i.e., Crystal River, Vermont Yankee, San Onofre, Kewaunee
and Fort Calhoun), and those that have submitted an intent to decommission before year 2020
(e.g., Oyster Creek) will not receive the full benefits from the avoidance of the exemption and
amendment process during the decommissioning transition phase. This is because these
licensees likely will have already submitted exemption or amendment requests to the NRC for
processing before the final rulemaking becomes effective in year 2020.
Table 6

Averted Industry Implementation Costs
Areas of Decommissioning

Emergency Preparedness
Physical Security
Cybersecurity
Certified Fuel Handler Training
Decommissioning Funding Assurance
Offsite & Onsite Financial Protection
Record Retention Requirements
Low Level Waste Transportation
Foreign Ownership, Control, or Domination

Alternatives
EP-2
PS-2
CS-2
CFH/STA-2
DTF-2
FP-2

Averted Industry Implementation Costs
Undiscounted
7% NPV
3% NPV
$
19,855,000 $
5,488,000 $
10,554,000
$
3,353,000 $
927,000 $
1,783,000
$
621,000 $
155,000 $
299,000
$
$
$

657,000 $
- $
1,718,000 $

159,000 $
- $
475,000 $

329,000
913,000

R-2

$

754,000

$

209,000

$

401,000

TR-2
F-2

$
$

567,000
204,000

$
$

157,000 $
56,000 $

302,000
109,000

* There may be discrepancies in calculations due to rounding.
** All values are in 2018 dollars.
*** NPV = net present value.

Additional Industry Implementation Costs
Additional one-time costs to the licensees would result for the following alternatives under
proposed rulemaking:
•

For Alternative EP-2, licensees would incur an additional one-time cost to participate in
the public meeting and comment period for the proposed rule.

•

For Alternative PS-2, licensees would incur an additional one-time cost to participate in
the public meeting and comment period for the proposed rule.

•

For Alternative CS-2, licensees would incur an additional one-time cost to participate in
the public meeting and comment period for the proposed rule.

•

For Alternative DA-2, licensees would incur an additional one-time cost because
licensees would have to modify the drug and alcohol testing procedures in order to
comply with the amended regulation. In addition, licensees would incur additional costs
by participating in the public meetings and submitting comments on proposed
alternatives.

•

For Alternative CFH/STA-2, licensees would incur an additional one-time cost to
participate in the public meeting and comment period for the proposed rule.

64

•

For Alternative DTF-2 may result in additional costs to those licensees not under ratesetting regulations who report a shortfall in its DTF and are required to report compliance
in the next decommissioning report. The cost impacts of the recommend change to
make up the shortfall within a timely manner was not modeled at this time. In addition,
licensees would incur additional costs by participating in the public meetings and
submitting comments on the proposed alternatives.

•

For Alternative FP-2, licensees would incur an additional one-time cost to participate in
the public meeting and comment period for the proposed rule. Licensees would also
incur an additional one-time cost to submit a prompt notification to the Commission of
any material change in proof of onsite property insurance filed with the Commission
under Part 50 and offsite insurance under Part 140.

•

For Alternative ENV-2, licensees would commit additional resources to participate in the
public meetings and write comments on the alternatives.

•

For Alternative SFM-2, licensees would incur additional costs by participating in the
public meetings and submitting comments on the proposed alternatives. Under
Alternative SFM-2, licensees would commit additional resources to include the spent fuel
management summary in the PSDAR.

Table 7 presents the additional implementation costs for all alternatives under proposed
rulemaking relative to the no-action alternatives (status quo). The costs for industry to write and
submit comments are included as well for each of the alternatives presented.
Table 7

Additional Industry Implementation Costs
Areas of Decommissioning

Emergency Preparedness
Physical Security
Cybersecurity
Drugs and Alcohol Testing
Certified Fuel Handler Training
Decommissioning Funding Assurance
Offsite & Onsite Financial Protection
Environmental Considerations
Spent Fuel Management Planning
Backfit Rule

Alternatives
EP-2
PS-2
CS-2
DA-2

$
$
$
$

CFH/STA-2
DTF-2
FP-2
ENV-2
SFM-2
B-2

$
$
$
$
$
$

Additional Industry Implementation Costs
Undiscounted
7% NPV
3% NPV
(25,000) $
(25,000) $
(25,000)
(13,000) $
(13,000) $
(13,000)
(4,000) $
(4,000) $
(4,000)
(4,000) $
(4,000) $
(4,000)
(5,000)
(20,000)
(13,000)
(11,000)
(12,000)
(13,000)

$
$
$
$
$
$

(5,000)
(20,000)
(8,000)
(11,000)
(6,000)
(13,000)

$
$
$
$
$
$

(5,000)
(20,000)
(10,000)
(11,000)
(8,000)
(13,000)

* There may be discrepancies in calculations due to rounding.
** All values are in 2018 dollars.

Industry Operation
This attribute accounts for the projected economic effect caused by routine and recurring
activities in the alternatives on affected licensees. The staff estimates that by amending some
of the NRC’s requirements that were mentioned previously (e.g., EP, physical security, etc.),
licensees would be able to avert costs on a recurring basis (annually) during the
decommissioning phase. However, the NRC has found that as a result of these changes to the
NRC’s regulations, licensees for power reactors would also be incurring costs annually during
the decommissioning phase. The averted and additional costs that result on a recurring basis,
annually or otherwise, are the operation costs. Discussion of the operation costs for each area
of decommissioning is presented in the next two sections.

65

Averted and Additional Industry Recurring Costs
Recurring averted costs would result for the following alternatives under proposed rulemaking:
•

Under Alternative DA-2, the licensee’s drug and alcohol testing program cost would be
reduced for the length of the program during decommissioning due to the reduction
individuals subject to the FFD elements necessary to satisfy IMP requirements.

•

Under Alternative DTF-2, licensees would expend fewer resources to process
decommissioning funding assurance reports because the annual reporting frequencies
would be extended from every two years to every three years. The licensees would also
avert costs because resubmittals subsequent to the initial decommissioning funding plan
for ISFSIs will no longer require NRC approval.

•

Under Alternative SFM-2, the proposed rule would result in reduced licensee time in
teleconference calls with the NRC due to the clarity in how licensees should manage the
spent fuel.

•

Under Alternative CS-2, the proposed rule would result in recurring costs to COL
licensees because they would be expending additional labor hours to implement the
cyber security requirements for 10 months for BWRs and 16 months for PWRs, after the
last reactor permanently defuels.

Table 8 presents the averted and additional industry operation costs for all affected areas of
decommissioning relative to the no-action alternatives (status quo). Note that only 57 nuclear
power plant sites are accounted for in this attribute, because five sites (i.e., Crystal River,
Kewaunee, San Onofre, Vermont Yankee and Ft. Calhoun) have already entered
decommissioning and three sites (i.e., Oyster Creek, Pilgrim, and Three Mile Island) will plan to
decommission before the rulemaking takes effect. The Bellefonte site is not accounted for in
this regulatory analysis due to the fact that construction of this site has ceased, and its future
remains uncertain.
Table 8

Averted and Additional Industry Operation Costs

Areas of Decommissioning
Drugs and Alcohol Testing
Decommissioning Funding
Assurance
Spent Fuel Management Planning

Alternatives
DA-2

$

DTF-2
SFM-2

$
$

Averted Industry Operation Costs
Undiscounted
7% NPV
3% NPV
26,214,000 $
6,531,000 $
13,211,000

2,020,000 $
1,044,000 $
1,493,000
52,000 $
14,000 $
28,000
Additional Industry Operation Costs
Areas of Decommissioning
Alternatives
Undiscounted
7% NPV
3% NPV
Cybersecurity
CS-2
$
(1,050,000) $
(18,000) $
(178,000)
* There may be discrepancies in calculations due to rounding.
** All values are in 2018 dollars

NRC Implementation
By amending the NRC’s requirements that were mentioned previously, the NRC believes that
licensees would be able to avert costs expended to apply for exemptions and amendments. As
a result, the NRC would avert the cost to process these exemption and amendment requests.
However, to achieve these savings, the NRC would incur a cost to develop the final rule and the

66

associated RGs. The following sections discuss the averted and incurred NRC implementation
costs for rulemaking and guidance development.
Averted NRC Implementation Costs
When the NRC processes an exemption or license amendment request, resources are
expended to perform the review, resolve technical issues, document the evaluation, and
respond to the licensee. As a result of this rulemaking, the licensees would submit fewer
exemption and license amendment requests and as a result the NRC would avert the time to
process these submittals. This would lead to averted costs for the NRC and result in a one-time
benefit. Exemption and license amendment requests that were submitted and processed (e.g.,
Crystal River, Vermont Yankee, San Onofre, and Kewaunee) and those that are expected to be
submitted and processed before the effective date of the rule are not included in this analysis.
Table 9 displays the NRC averted implementation costs for processing exemption and license
amendment requests.
Table 9

Averted NRC Implementation Costs
Areas of Decommissioning

Emergency Preparedness
Physical Security
Cybersecurity
Certified Fuel Handler Training
Decommissioning Funding Assurance
Offsite & Onsite Financial Protection
Record Retention Requirements
Low Level Waste Transportation
Foreign Ownership, Control, or Domination

Alternatives
EP-2
PS-2
CS-2

Averted NRC Implementation Costs
Undiscounted
7% NPV
3% NPV
$
10,726,000 $
2,965,000 $
5,702,000
$
2,256,000 $
624,000 $
1,199,000
$
328,000 $
82,000 $
158,000

CFH/STA-2
DTF-2
FP-2
R-2

$
$
$
$

TR-2
F-2

$
$

1,413,000 $
- $
977,000 $
406,000 $
305,000
110,000

$
$

341,000
270,000
112,000

$
$
$
$

708,000
519,000
216,000

84,000 $
30,000 $

162,000
58,000

* There may be discrepancies in calculations due to rounding.
** All values are in 2018 dollars.

Additional NRC Implementation Costs
The decommissioning final rule would impose implementation costs on the NRC. These costs
include procedural and administrative activities, responding to public comments, developing the
proposed rule and draft guidance documents, and developing and issuing the final rule and
guidance documents. These one-time costs include updating NUREG documents and begin in
2018 with the proposed rulemaking and are assumed to end in 2020 with the development and
issuance of the final rule. The regulatory analysis does not include estimates to perform
ongoing decommissioning licensing activities. Table 10 shows the estimated cost for
developing and issuing the proposed rule and associated RGs and NUREGs for each area of
decommissioning.

67

Table 10

Additional NRC Implementation Costs
Areas of Decommissioning

Alternatives

Emergency Preparedness
Physical Security
Cybersecurity
Drugs and Alcohol Testing
Certified Fuel Handler Training
Decommissioning Funding Assurance
Offsite & Onsite Financial Protection
Environmental Considerations
Record Retention Requirements
Low Level Waste Transportation
Spent Fuel Management Planning
Backfit Rule
Foreign Ownership, Control, or Domination

EP-2
PS-2
CS-2
DA-2

$
$
$
$

CFH/STA-2
DTF-2
FP-2
ENV-2
R-2
TR-2
SFM-2
B-2
F-2

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Additional NRC Implementation Costs
Undiscounted
7% NPV
3%
(679,000) $
(657,000) $
(679,000) $
(657,000) $
(137,000) $
(132,000) $
(116,000) $
(112,000) $
(126,000)
(525,000)
(174,000)
(82,000)
(82,000)
(82,000)
(338,000)
(46,000)
(11,000)

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

(122,000)
(508,000)
(169,000)
(79,000)
(79,000)
(79,000)
(311,000)
(45,000)
(11,000)

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

NPV
(669,000)
(669,000)
(135,000)
(114,000)
(124,000)
(518,000)
(172,000)
(81,000)
(81,000)
(81,000)
(326,000)
(46,000)
(11,000)

* There may be discrepancies in calculations due to rounding.
** All values are in 2018 dollars

NRC Operation
This attribute accounts for the projected economic effect caused by routine and recurring
activities in the proposed alternatives by the NRC. The NRC estimates that by improving the
regulations governing decommissioning power reactors, there would be additional and averted
costs on an annual basis. Costs that are incurred annually are due to the expense of NRC
resources to provide oversight. The following areas of decommissioning are affected under
proposed rulemaking, where the NRC could avert or save costs on a recurring basis.
•

Under Alternative DA-2, the NRC would avert costs for the administration of reporting
requirements due to the applicability of drug and alcohol testing on a reduced population
at a decommissioning plant.

•

Under Alternative DTF-2, the NRC would avert costs due to the review of the
decommissioning funding assurance reporting requirements being on a triennial
frequency (every 3 years) instead of on a biennial frequency. The NRC would also avert
costs because resubmittals subsequent to the initial decommissioning funding plan for
ISFSIs will no longer require NRC approval

•

Under Alternative SFM-2, the proposed rule would result in reduced NRC time in
teleconference calls with the licensees due to the clarity in how licensees should
manage the spent fuel.

Table 11

Averted NRC Operation Costs
Areas of Decommissioning

Drugs and Alcohol Testing
Decommissioning Funding Assurance
Spent Fuel Management Planning

Alternatives
DA-2
DTF-2
SFM-2

* There may be discrepancies in calculations due to rounding.
** All values are in 2018 dollars

68

Averted NRC Operation Costs
Undiscounted
7% NPV
3% NPV
$
509,000 $
127,000 $
257,000
$
1,324,000 $
677,000 $
973,000
$
28,000 $
8,000 $
15,000

Regulatory Efficiency
The proposed rulemaking alternatives relative to the regulatory baseline would increase
regulatory efficiency for the following areas of decommissioning: Emergency Preparedness,
Physical Security, Decommissioning Funding Assurance, and Offsite and Onsite Financial
Protection Requirements and Indemnity Agreements. This is because these changes would
significantly reduce the number of license amendment and exemption requests that the
licensees would need to prepare and submit during the decommissioning transition phase. This
would significantly reduce the labor hours required by the licensees to develop and submit the
amendment and/or exemption requests to the NRC and by the NRC to review these requests.
For all areas of decommissioning, the proposed rulemaking alternatives would add clarity to
what licensees can and cannot do during decommissioning and, as a result, would enable the
NRC to better maintain and administer regulatory activities over the decommissioning process.

Other Government
All areas of decommissioning considered in this analysis would result in additional burden to
other Federal, State and local government agencies because these agencies would commit
additional resources to participate in public meetings and submit comments on documents
published for public comment.
In Alternative EP-2, Rulemaking to amend regulations to provide a graded approach to
emergency preparedness, FEMA must establish a notification process that would replace the
existing NRC/FEMA process for terminating the assessment of FEMA user fees following the
receipt from the NRC of its approved exemptions from pertinent 10 CFR 50.47(b) and
Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 requirements. These exemptions would state that offsite
radiological emergency planning and preparedness are no longer required at a particular
commercial nuclear power plant site after the spent fuel has cooled for a period of 10 months for
BWRs or 16 months for PWRs. This change also requires FEMA to perform a rulemaking to
amend 44 CFR 354.4(e) to reflect this new process. The following table shows the estimates
costs to other government entities.
Table 12 Costs to Other Government Agencies
Areas of Decommissioning
Emergency Preparedness
Physical Security
Decommissioning Funding Assurance
Offsite & Onsite Financial Protection
Environmental Considerations
Spent Fuel Management Planning
Backfit Rule

Alternatives
EP-2
PS-2
DTF-2
FP-2
ENV-2
SFM-2
B-2

* There may be discrepancies in calculations due to rounding.
** All values are in 2018 dollars

69

Total Costs (Other Government)
Undiscounted
7% NPV
3% NPV
$
(30,000) $
(30,000) $
(30,000)
$
(5,000) $
(5,000) $
(5,000)
$
(12,000) $
(12,000) $
(12,000)
$
(4,000) $
(4,000) $
(4,000)
$
(11,000) $
(11,000) $
(11,000)
$
(3,000) $
(3,000) $
(3,000)
$
(3,000) $
(3,000) $
(3,000)

General Public
Some areas of decommissioning considered in this analysis will result in additional burden to
the general public because they would commit additional time to participate in public meetings
and provide comments during the commenting periods for the proposed rulemaking stage.
Table 13 Costs to the General Public
Areas of Decommissioning

Alternatives

Emergency Preparedness
Decommissioning Funding Assurance
Environmental Considerations
Spent Fuel Management Planning

EP-2
DTF-2
ENV-2
SFM-2

Total Costs (General Public)
Undiscounted
7% NPV
3% NPV
$
(2,000) $
(2,000) $
(2,000)
$
(3,000) $
(3,000) $
(3,000)
$
(3,000) $
(3,000) $
(3,000)
$
(1,000) $
(1,000) $
(1,000)

* There may be discrepancies in calculations due to rounding.
** All values are in 2018 dollars

Environmental Considerations
Under Alternative ENV-2, guidance related to PSDARs would be revised to recommend that
licensees provide information on how they would comply with all Federal, State, and local
regulations in effect during decommissioning, such as those on nonradiological effluent
releases, waste management, and environmental monitoring, in support of the PSDAR’s
discussion of environmental impacts. The environmental analyses that would bound the
environmental impacts associated with site specific decommissioning activities generally
assumed compliance with State and Federal regulations. Therefore, in determining if a
decommissioning activity is bounded by previous analyses that relied on compliance with State
and Federal regulations, the licensee should state whether it will continue to comply with
applicable State and Federal regulations, which would strengthen the basis for determining
whether environmental impacts are bounded. These updates to guidance documents under
Alternative ENV-2 will result in additional time spent by the NRC, Industry, Other Government
and the General Public to contribute to the updates.
Additionally, Alternative ENV-2 proposes to modify the rule language in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(4) to
clarify that licensees no longer must conclude in the PSDAR that the environmental impacts of
all planned decommissioning activities are bounded by appropriate previously issued
environmental impact statements, but rather must evaluate whether the planned
decommissioning activities will or will not be bounded by appropriate federally issued
environmental review documents. If unbounded impacts are identified, then, consistent with 10
CFR 50.82(a)(6)(ii) and 10 CFR 52.110(f)(2), the licensee can address those impacts before the
associated activity occurs instead of being required to address those impacts at the PSDAR
stage.

Disaggregation
The NRC completed a screening review in accordance with the guidance in Section 4.3.2,
“Criteria for the Treatment of Individual Requirements,” of NUREG/BR-0058, for the areas of
decommissioning containing an alternative that includes rulemaking:
•

Emergency Preparedness

70

•

Physical Security

•

Cyber Security

•

FFD – Drug & Alcohol

•

Certified Fuel Handler Definition and Elimination of the Shift Technical Advisor

•

Decommissioning Funding Assurance

•

Offsite and Onsite Financial Protection Requirements and Indemnity Agreements

•

Environmental Considerations

•

Record Retention Requirements

•

Low-Level Waste Transportation Time

•

Spent Fuel Management Requirements

•

Backfit Rule

•

Foreign Ownership, Control, or Domination (FOCD)

•

Clarification of Scope of License Termination Plan Requirement

In the screening review, the analysis evaluated each requirement of each area of
decommissioning and found that the requirements considered separately would not mask the
inclusion of other unnecessary requirements.

Uncertainty Analysis
To determine the robustness of the costs and net benefits contained within this document, the
NRC examined how the values estimated for benefits and costs change due to uncertainties
associated with the staff’s analytical assumptions and input data. The NRC used Monte Carlo
simulations to examine the impact of uncertainty on the estimated costs and benefits of each
area of decommissioning and performed the simulations using the @Risk software package by
Palisade Corporation.13
Monte Carlo simulations involve introducing uncertainty into the analysis by replacing the point
estimates of the variables used to estimate costs and benefits with probability distributions. By
defining input variables as probability distributions as opposed to point estimates, the effect of
uncertainty on the results of the analysis (i.e., the benefits and costs) can be modeled. The
probability distributions were chosen to represent the different variables in the analysis and are
defined by a bounded range of estimates. These bounded ranges of estimates were
determined from data collected via the Agencywide Documents Access and Management
System (ADAMS) and the NRC staff’s professional judgment.
13

Information about this software is available online at www.palisade.com.

71

The probability distributions are also defined by summary statistics. These summary statistics
include the minimum and maximum of program evaluation and review technique (PERT)14 and
uniform distributions. For these distributions, the NRC used collected input to set the minimum
and maximum values of the PERT and uniform distributions. Lastly, the NRC selected the
output variables for the Monte Carlo simulations, which are the estimated monetary costs and
benefits. The Monte Carlo simulations included 10,000 iterations and resulted in a monetary
range of costs and benefits for each alternative of each area of decommissioning under
consideration in proposed rulemaking. Additionally, @Risk was used to generate a tornado
chart via the Monte Carlo simulations. The tornado chart identifies the input factors (cost
drivers) that are ranked by effect on total cost. The results of the uncertainty analysis for the
costing of each area of decommissioning are presented.
Emergency Preparedness

Figure 1

14

Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the Emergency Preparedness
cost drivers (Alternative EP-2)

A PERT distribution is a special form of the beta distribution with a minimum and maximum value specified.
The shape parameter is calculated from the defined most likely value. The PERT distribution is similar to a
triangular distribution, in that it has the same set of three parameters. Technically, it is a special case of a
scaled beta (or beta general) distribution. It can generally be considered as superior to the triangular
distribution when the parameters result in a skewed distribution, as the smooth shape of the curve places
less emphasis in the direction of skew. Similar to the triangular distribution, the PERT distribution is
bounded on both sides, and therefore may not be adequate for some modelling purposes where it is desired
to capture tail or extreme events.

72

Figure 2

Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the Emergency Preparedness cost
drivers (Alternative EP-2)

Figure 3

Variation of total cost (industry, NRC, State and local governments and general
public) due to the uncertainty in the Emergency Preparedness cost drivers
(Alternative EP-2)

73

Figure 4

Tornado chart showing the variation of total cost due to each Emergency
Preparedness cost driver (Alternative EP-2)

The regulatory changes to the Emergency Preparedness area of decommissioning for EP-2
would result in averted costs to the industry, NRC, State and local governments and general
public over the decommissioning period in the range of $5.5 million to $40.6 million (7 percent
NPV). The cost drivers that have the greatest influence are the time at which the licensee
submits an exemption or amendment to the NRC for processing (i.e., 1 year before, during, or
1 year after decommissioning) and the time it takes the NRC to finalize the exemption or
amendment. Note that the time at which an exemption from offsite emergency preparedness is
submitted to the NRC may or may not lead to averted FEMA fees after Level 2. This depends
on whether or not the exemption is submitted at or before the starting time of decommissioning.
Nevertheless, this possible averted cost is represented by the uncertainty analysis.

74

Physical Security

Figure 5

Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the Physical Security cost
drivers (Alternative PS-2)

Figure 6

Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the Physical Security cost drivers
(Alternative PS-2)

75

Figure 7

Variation of total cost industry, NRC, State and local governments and general
public) due to the uncertainty in the Physical Security cost drivers (Alternative PS2)

Figure 8

Tornado chart showing the variation of total cost due to each Physical Security cost
driver (Alternative PS-2)

The regulatory changes to the Physical Security area of decommissioning will result in averted
costs to the industry, NRC, State and local governments and general public over the
decommissioning period in the range of $380,000 to $1.5 million (7 percent NPV). The cost
drivers that have the greatest influence are the number of NRC full-time equivalents (FTEs) to
implement rulemaking for this area of decommissioning and the nuclear power industry labor
rate for hours averted to process exemptions and amendments.

76

Cyber Security

Figure 9

Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the cyber security cost drivers
(Alternative CS-2)

Figure 10

Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the cyber security cost drivers
(Alternative CS-2)

77

Figure 11

Variation of total cost (industry, NRC, State and local governments and general
public) due to the uncertainty in the cyber security cost drivers (Alternative CS-2)

Figure 12

Tornado chart showing the variation of total cost due to each cyber security cost
driver (Alternative CS-2)

The recommended regulatory changes to the cyber security area of decommissioning
(Alternative CS-2) will result in additional or averted costs to industry, NRC, State and local
governments and general public over the decommissioning period in the range of ($84,000) to
16.2 million at 7 percent NPV. The cost drivers that have the greatest influence are the time at
which the licensee submits an exemption or amendment to the NRC for processing (i.e., 1 year
before, during, or 1 year after decommissioning) and the time it takes the NRC to finalize the
exemption or amendment.

78

Drug and Alcohol Testing

Figure 13

Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the Drug and Alcohol Testing
cost drivers (Alternative DA-2)

Figure 14

Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the Drug and Alcohol Testing cost
drivers (Alternative DA-2)

79

Figure 15

Variation of total cost (industry, NRC, State and local governments and general
public) due to the uncertainty in the Drug and Alcohol Testing cost drivers
(Alternative DA-2)

Figure 16

Tornado chart showing the variation of total cost due to each Drug and Alcohol
Testing cost driver (Alternative DA-2)

The regulatory changes to the FFD-Drug and Alcohol Testing area of decommissioning
(Alternative DA-2) will result in averted costs to the industry, NRC, State and local governments
and general public over the decommissioning period in the range of $2.7 million to $11.4 million
using a 7 percent NPV. The cost drivers that have the greatest influence on total cost are the
number of years to transfer all spent fuel to ISFSI and the random drug and alcohol testing.

80

Certified Fuel Handler Definition and Elimination of the Shift Technical Advisor

Figure 17

Figure 18

Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the Certified Fuel Handler
Definition and Elimination of the Shift Technical Advisor cost drivers
(Alternative CFH/STA-2)

Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the Certified Fuel Handler Definition
and Elimination of the Shift Technical Advisor cost drivers (Alternative CFH/STA-2)

81

Figure 19

Variation of total cost (industry, NRC, State and local governments and general
public) due to the uncertainty in the Certified Fuel Handler Definition and
Elimination of the Shift Technical Advisor cost drivers (Alternative CFH/STA-2)

Figure 20

Tornado chart showing the variation of total cost due to each Certified Fuel Handler
Definition and Elimination of the Shift Technical Advisor cost driver
(Alternative CFH/STA-2)

The regulatory changes to the training requirements for the Certified Fuel Handler Definition and
Elimination of the Shift Technical Advisor area of decommissioning (Alternative CFH/STA-2) will
result in averted costs to the industry, NRC, State and local governments and general public
over the decommissioning period in the range of $140,000 to $712,000 using a 7 percent NPV.

82

The cost driver that has the greatest influence on total cost for this area of decommissioning is
the number of hours for NRC to approve a CFH training program.
Decommissioning Funding Assurance

Figure 21

Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the Decommissioning Funding
Assurance cost drivers (Alternative DTF-2)

Figure 22

Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the Decommissioning Funding
Assurance cost drivers (Alternative DTF-2)

83

1.8

1.6

1.4

1.2

1.0

Tornado chart showing the variation of total cost due to each Decommissioning
Funding Assurance cost driver (Alternative DTF-2)

0.8

Figure 24

0.6

Variation of total cost (industry, NRC, State and local governments and general
public) due to the uncertainty in the Decommissioning Funding Assurance cost
drivers (Alternative DTF-2)

0.4

Figure 23

The regulatory changes to this area of decommissioning (Alternative DTF-2) will result in
averted costs to the industry, NRC, State and local governments and general public over the
decommissioning period in the range of $439,000 to $1.94 million using a 7 percent NPV at a 90
percent confidence interval. The cost drivers that have the greatest influence on total cost are
the number of hours the industry and the NRC would take to go through the approval process
for ISFSI reports under 72.30 (c).

84

Offsite and Onsite Financial Protection Requirements and Indemnity Agreements

Figure 25

Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the Financial Protection cost
drivers (Alternative FP-2)

Figure 26

Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the Financial Protection cost drivers
(Alternative FP-2)

85

Figure 27

Variation of total cost (industry, NRC, State and local governments and general
public) due to the uncertainty in the Financial Protection cost drivers
(Alternative FP-2)

Figure 28

Tornado Chart showing the variation of total cost due to each Financial Protection
cost driver (Alternative FP-2)

The regulatory changes to the Offsite and Onsite Financial Protection area of decommissioning
(Alternative FP-2) will result in averted costs to the industry, NRC, State and local governments
and general public over the decommissioning period in the range of $375,000 to $855,000 using
a 7 percent NPV. The cost drivers that have the greatest influence on total cost are the nuclear
power industry labor rate and the hours for a licensee to process an exemption for insurance.

86

Environmental Considerations

Figure 29

Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the cost input variables
(Alternative ENV-2)

Figure 30

Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the cost input variables
(Alternative ENV-2)

87

Figure 31

Variation of total cost (industry, NRC, State and local governments and general
public) due to the uncertainty in the cost input variables (Alternative ENV-2)

Figure 32

Tornado chart showing the variation of total cost due to each cost driver
(Alternative ENV-2)

The regulatory changes to the Environmental Considerations area of decommissioning
(Alternative ENV-2) will result in additional or averted costs to the industry, NRC, State and local
governments and general public over the decommissioning period in the range of ($149,000) to
$44,000 at 7 percent NPV. The cost driver that has the greatest influence on total cost for this
alternative is the number of NRC FTEs to implement the rulemaking.

88

Record Retention Requirements

Figure 33

Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the cost input variables
(Alternative R-2)

Figure 34

Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the cost input variables
(Alternative R-2)

89

Figure 35

Variation of total cost (industry, NRC, State and local governments and general
public) due to the uncertainty in the cost input variables (Alternative R-2)

Figure 36

Tornado chart showing the variation of total cost due to each cost driver
(Alternative R-2)

The regulatory changes to Alternative R-2 will result in cost savings to the industry and NRC
over the decommissioning period in the range of $34,000 to $515,000 at 7 percent NPV. The
cost drivers that have the greatest influence on total cost for this alternative are the number of
industry and NRC hours to process exemptions from record keeping.

90

Low-Level Waste Transportation

Figure 37

Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the cost input variables
(Alternative TR-2)

Figure 38

Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the cost input variables
(Alternative TR-2)

91

Figure 39

Variation of total cost (industry, NRC, State and local governments and general
public) due to the uncertainty in the cost input variables (Alternative TR-2)

Figure 40

Tornado chart showing the variation of total cost due to each cost driver
(Alternative TR-2)

The regulatory changes to Alternative TR-2 will result in cost savings to the industry and NRC
over the decommissioning period in the range of ($18,000) to $402,000 at 7 percent NPV. The
cost drivers that have the greatest influence on total cost for this alternative are the number of
industry hours to process exemptions for transportation of low-level waste and the number of
NRC FTEs to implement the rulemaking.

92

Spent Fuel Management Planning

Figure 41

Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the cost Input variables
(Alternative SFM-2)

Figure 42

Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the cost input variables
(Alternative SFM-2)

93

Figure 43

Figure 44

Variation of total cost (industry, NRC, State and local governments and general
public) due to the uncertainty in the cost input variables (Alternative SFM-2)

Tornado chart showing the variation of total cost due to each cost driver
(Alternative SFM-2)

The regulatory changes to Alternative SFM-2 will result in costs to the industry, NRC, State and
local governments and general public over the decommissioning period in the range of
($621,000) to ($62,000) at 7 percent NPV. The cost drivers that have the greatest influence on
total cost for this alternative are the number of NRC hours to update the regulatory guides
pertaining to this area and the NRC labor rate.

94

Backfit Rule

Figure 45

Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the Backfit Rule cost drivers
(Alternative B-2)
-62.2

-29.0

5.0%

90.0%

5.0%

B-2, NRC / 7% NPV
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
5%
95%

-100

Figure 46

-90

-80

-70

-60
Values in Thousands

-50

-40

-30

-20

Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the Backfit Rule cost drivers
(Alternative B-2)

95

-90,071
-25,210
-44,720
-62,218
-28,995

-79.6

-45.6

5.0%

90.0%

5.0%

B-2, Total / 7% NPV
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
5%
95%

-110

-100

Figure 47

-90

-80

-70
Values in Thousands

-60

-50

-40

-108,412
-39,325
-61,653
-79,624
-45,595

-30

Variation of total cost due to the uncertainty in the Backfit Rule cost drivers
(Alternative B-2)
Inputs Ranked By Effect on Output Mean

FTEs Backfit

-76,269.19

NRC hourly rate

-46,814.96

-71,547.61

Industry labor rate

-57,069.71

-65,160.33

-58,418.23

Backfit Comments (Industry)

-62,948.05

-60,507.47

Hourly rate for other government

-62,807.20

-60,687.89

Backfit Comments (Other Government)

-62,125.05

-61,189.31

Hourly rate for general public

-62,043.81

-61,331.09

Input High
Input Low

Baseline = -61,653.10

-80

-75

-70

-65

-60

-55

-50

-45

B-2, Total / 7% NPV
Values in Thousands

Figure 48

Tornado Chart showing the variation of total cost due to each Backfit Rule cost
driver (Alternative B-2)

96

The regulatory changes to the Backfit Rule area of decommissioning (Alternative B-2) will result
in costs to the industry, NRC, State and local governments and general public that is in the
range of ($315,000) to ($128,000) using a 7 percent NPV. The cost drivers that have the
greatest influence for Alternative B-2 are the number of hours it takes for the NRC to complete
the rule and the NRC hourly labor rate.
Foreign Ownership, Control, or Domination (FOCD)

Figure 49

Variation of industry cost due to the uncertainty in the FOCD cost drivers
(Alternative F-2)

97

Figure 50

Variation of NRC cost due to the uncertainty in the FOCD cost drivers (Alternative
F-2)

Figure 51

Variation of total cost due to the uncertainty in the FOCD cost drivers (Alternative
F-2)

98

Figure 52

Tornado Chart showing the variation of total cost due to each FOCD cost driver
(Alternative F-2)

The regulatory changes to the FOCD area of decommissioning (Alternative F-2) will result in
cost savings to the industry and NRC that is in the range of $31,000 to $132,000 using a 7
percent NPV. The cost driver that has the greatest influence for Alternative F-2 is the number of
hours it takes for the industry to process exemption requests.

Summary
This regulatory analysis identifies and integrates costs and benefits that will emerge from
implementing the areas of decommissioning that contain rulemaking and guidance alternatives.
Quantified Net Benefit
The following tables show the estimated total net cost for the alternatives relative to the
regulatory baseline (no-action alternatives) for each area of decommissioning.

99

Table 14

Cost and Benefits for Industry

Alternatives
EP-2
PS-2
CS-2
DA-2

$
$
$
$

CFH/STA-2
DTF-2
FP-2
ENV-2
R-2
TR-2
SFM-2
B-2
F-2

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Industry Costs and Benefits
Undiscounted
7% NPV
19,830,000 $
5,463,000 $
3,341,000 $
914,000 $
(433,000) $
133,000 $
27,926,000 $
7,010,000 $
652,000
2,000,000
1,705,000
216,000
754,000
567,000
40,000
(13,000)
204,000

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

153,000
1,024,000
467,000
51,000
209,000
157,000
9,000
(13,000)
56,000

3% NPV
10,530,000
1,770,000
116,000
14,135,000

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

324,000
1,472,000
903,000
110,000
401,000
302,000
20,000
(13,000)
109,000

NRC Costs and Benefits
Undiscounted
7% NPV
10,047,000 $
2,308,000 $
1,577,000 $
(33,000) $
192,000 $
(50,000) $
393,000 $
15,000 $
1,287,000 $
219,000 $
798,000 $
168,000 $
802,000 $
101,000 $
(82,000) $
(79,000) $
324,000 $
33,000 $
223,000 $
5,000 $
(311,000) $
(303,000) $
(46,000) $
(45,000) $
99,000 $
20,000 $

3% NPV
5,033,000
530,000
23,000
143,000
584,000
455,000
347,000
(81,000)
135,000
81,000
(311,000)
(46,000)
48,000

* There may be discrepancies in calculations due to rounding.
** All values are in 2018 dollars.

Table 15

Cost and Benefits for NRC

Alternatives
EP-2
PS-2
CS-2
DA-2
CFH/STA-2
DTF-2
FP-2
ENV-2
R-2
TR-2
SFM-2
B-2
F-2

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

* There may be discrepancies in calculations due to rounding.
** All values are in 2018 dollars.

Qualitative Costs and Benefits
In addition to regulatory efficiency the alternatives provide additional costs and benefits as
described below. These costs and benefits have not yet been quantified into monetary values:
Emergency Preparedness:

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Alternative EP-2: The NRC and FEMA would establish a notification process that would replace
the current NRC/FEMA process for terminating the assessment of FEMA user fees following the
receipt from the NRC of approved exemptions from pertinent 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E
to 10 CFR Part 50 requirements stating that offsite radiological emergency planning and
preparedness are no longer required at a particular commercial nuclear power plant site. The
FEMA would also incur one-time costs to develop and issue a final rule to amend
44 CFR 354.4(e) to reflect this new process.
Decommissioning Funding Assurance:
Under Alternative DTF-2, licensees who report a shortfall pursuant to 10 CFR 50.75(f) would be
required to make up the shortfall (from the minimum regulatory required amount as set forth in
10 CFR 50.75(c) or by the licensee’s site-specific decommissioning cost estimate) before the
next report is due. This requirement for making up DTF shortfalls would affect individual
licensees differently, depending on the amount and cause of the DTF shortfall and the time
period that the licensee would otherwise have had to make up the shortfall under the current
regulatory framework. The greater the amount of money that must be funded to overcome the
shortfall, the more significant the impact will be on the licensee. The combination of these two
requirements could aggravate the licensee’s financial condition if the licensee is unable to
recover decommissioning costs through electrical generation rates and fees or through
reductions in their operating plant budget. If the funding period were too short, licensees not
under rate-setting regulations who report a shortfall would be placed at a competitive
disadvantage, potentially leading to insolvency and premature shutdown of plants. The
premature shutdown of a plant could result in a dramatic shortfall between the funds needed to
decommission the plant and the funds that have been collected. Other possible effects of
accelerated shortfall funding are interference with licensees’ business planning or negative tax
consequences.

Safety Goal Evaluation
Safety goal evaluations are applicable to regulatory initiatives considered to be generic safety
enhancement backfits subject to the substantial additional protection standard in
10 CFR 50.109(a)(3). A safety goal evaluation is designed to determine whether a regulatory
requirement should not be imposed generically on nuclear power plants because the residual
risk is already acceptably low.
This proposed rule would amend certain regulations affecting decommissioning production and
utilization facilities. These amendments would reduce the number of exemption and license
amendment requests submitted by licensees during the transition to decommissioning. The
proposed rule would not enhance the safety of decommissioning facilities for the following areas
of decommissioning: emergency preparedness, physical security, drug and alcohol testing,
CFH/STA, decommissioning funding assurance, offsite and onsite financial protection and
indemnity agreements, environmental considerations, record retention, low-level waste
transportation, spent fuel management planning, backfit rule, FOCD, and clarification of the
scope of license termination. Hence, a safety goal evaluation is not applicable to these areas of
decommissioning.
Finally, as part of this proposed rule the NRC is proposing a modification to the cyber security
requirement in 10 CFR 73.54. Every 10 CFR Part 50 license for an operating nuclear power
reactor contains a license condition to have and maintain a Commission-approved cyber
security plan (CSP). This license condition remains effective until the license is amended or
101

terminated. The proposed rule provides a reduction in burden for these 10 CFR Part 50
licensees by removing the license condition after sufficient time has passed such that the spent
fuel cannot heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours under adiabatic conditions.
Because this proposed requirement results in a reduction in burden while maintaining an
equivalent level of adequate protection of the public health and safety and common defense and
security, a safety goal evaluation is not appropriate for this rule provision.
Holders of a 10 CFR Part 52 combined license are currently required to maintain a cyber
security program only as long as 10 CFR 73.54 is applicable to them. Because 10 CFR 73.54
no longer applies to the licensee once it is not authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor,
and a power reactor licensee is not authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor during
decommissioning, COL holders are not required to maintain their CSP during decommissioning.
This proposed rule would require licensees to maintain their cyber security program for 10
months (BWR) or 16 months (PWR) beyond the date of permanent cessation of operations and
permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, for burnups less than 72 GWd/MTHM and
zirconium-clad fuel, unless an alternative spent fuel decay period is proposed by the licensee
and approved by the NRC. For fuel with burnups greater than 72 GWd/MTHM or non-zirconium
cladding, an alternative spent fuel decay period would be proposed by the licensee for approval
by the NRC under § 50.54(q)(7)(ii). This could extend the duration over which a COL holder
would be required to maintain a cyber security program. That extension would constitute a new
or changed requirement for that licensee. Although the risk of a potential spent fuel radiological
release is not quantified, the NRC has identified two qualitative benefits to the common defense
and security and public health and safety that would be realized if the proposed violation of
issue finality is implemented. Specifically, the NRC finds that extending the duration over which
the licensee must maintain cyber security requirements would:
•

Constitute a substantial increase in protection to common defense and security by
ensuring that a compromise of digital systems cannot adversely impact the effective
operation of licensees’ physical security programs; and

•

Constitute a substantial increase in public health and safety by ensuring that a
compromise of digital systems cannot adversely impact the effective operation of
emergency preparedness systems in the event of a zirconium fire scenario.

These two qualitative arguments satisfy the intent of the safety goal evaluation for the proposed
changes to the cyber security requirements and demonstrate that the substantial additional
protection standard in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(3) is met.

7

DECISION RATIONALE FOR THE AREAS OF DECOMMISSIONING

This section discusses the proposed rulemaking alternative for each area of decommissioning
that would be the most cost beneficial to the nuclear power industry, local, state, and US
governments and general public. The NRC has established a decision rationale for each area
of decommissioning with respect to the proposed rulemaking and this section will present these
decision rationales, their costs, and their benefits.
For all areas that are being considered in the proposed decommissioning rulemaking, a
quantitative cost benefit analysis was completed to inform the staff of those alternatives that
provide the most cost-beneficial solutions. The following subsections present the decision
rationales for each of the areas that are being considered in the proposed rulemaking, along
with a quantitative and qualitative description of the alternatives.
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The regulatory analysis finds that there is a quantitative and qualitative basis for pursuing the
decommissioning rulemaking based on the following:
Emergency Preparedness:
– The proposed rule provides the opportunity for significant averted costs over
Alternative EP-1, the no-action alternative.
– Regulatory burden on nuclear power plant licensees would be reduced by eliminating
the need to submit requests for exemptions and license amendments for EP
requirements that pertain to operating reactors. This also reduces the need for the
NRC to review these exemption and amendment submittals.
Physical Security:
– The proposed rule provides the opportunity for significant averted costs over
Alternative PS-1, the no-action alternative.
– Regulatory burden on nuclear power plant licensees would be reduced by eliminating
the need to submit security-related exemption and license amendment requests for
nuclear power reactors during their transition period to a decommissioning status.
This also reduces the need for the NRC to review these exemptions and amendment
submittals.
Cyber Security:
– The proposed rule would clarify the cyber security requirements applicable to a
nuclear power reactor during each stage of the decommissioning process.
Additionally, fewer license amendment requests regarding reduction or elimination of
cyber security requirements in 10 CFR 73.54 would be submitted by the licensees as
a result of this proposed rule.
Fitness for Duty - Drug and Alcohol Testing:
– The proposed rule would clarify which elements of the FFD program defined in Part
26 would be applicable to an operating or decommissioning power reactor through
the licensee’s insider mitigation program. As a result, the number of personnel that
undergo drug and alcohol testing at a decommissioning site would be reduced,
resulting in cost savings to the nuclear power industry.
Certified Fuel Handler Definition and Elimination of the Shift Technical Advisor:
– The proposed rule would provide consistency in the regulatory treatment of the
training programs for NLOs (which do not require Commission approval) and training
programs to qualify a NLO as a CFH (which do require Commission approval). The
second change would clarify that an STA is not required for decommissioning
reactors. These changes would provide clarity to the CFH’s responsibilities and
functions and eliminate the role of an STA by codifying current licensing practices.
Decommissioning Funding Assurance:
– These changes to the regulatory framework would align with the current
decommissioning environment where commingling of funds in the DTF is allowed
under guidance but silent in regulation.
– Regulatory efficiency would be improved through minimizing uncertainty associated
with estimating decommissioning costs such that a licensee would be required to
plan for, and provide assurances for, funding decommissioning to a site-specific cost

103

–

estimate earlier in the facility’s lifecycle. Shortfalls would be addressed in a timely
manner by licensees with greater transparency on these actions.
Provides greater transparency of a licensee’s decommissioning costs and plans for
funding at licensing, and throughout operations and decommissioning, while also
providing a measure of flexibility for the use of funds in the DTF.

Offsite and Onsite Financial Protection Requirements and Indemnity Agreements:
– Regulatory burden on nuclear reactor licensees would be reduced by eliminating the
need to submit requests for exemptions for reductions in onsite and offsite financial
protection. This would also reduce the need for the NRC to review these exemption
submittals.
Environmental Considerations:
– The proposed rule would clarify that licensees, at the PSDAR stage, are required to
evaluate the environmental impacts and provide in the PSDAR the basis for whether
or not the proposed decommissioning activities are bounded by previously issued,
site-specific environmental reviews. Licensees would no longer be required to make
the definitive conclusion that impacts will be bounded. Instead, they would have the
flexibility to address any unbounded environmental impacts closer to, but prior to, the
decommissioning activity being undertaken that could cause the unbounded impact.
Record Retention Requirements:
– The proposed rule would decrease the burden associated with long term record
storage and increase the overall efficiency of the decommissioning process.
Low Level Waste Transportation:
– The proposed rule would eliminate the need for exemption requests pertaining to the
20-day receipt notification of transfer of low-level radioactive waste.
Spent Fuel Management Planning:
– The proposed rule would improve the efficiency of the NRC’s oversight of the
decommissioning process, by reducing the NRC staff’s time in engaging with the
licensee to clarify what reactor SSCs are needed for managing spent fuel and
responding to frequent stakeholder inquiries in this area.
Backfit Rule:
– The proposed rule would clarify how the Backfit Rule applies to licensees in
decommissioning. This would lead to less time spent on a generic or plant specific
backfit analysis that pertains to decommissioning.
Foreign Ownership, Control, or Domination (FOCD):
– The proposed rule would make it clear that the regulations in Part 50, and similar
regulations in Part 52, provide not only for the licensing of utilization and production
facilities, but also for decommissioning and the termination of their associated
licenses. The proposed rule would also identify those requirements needed for a
Part 50 or Part 52 licensed facility that does not meet the definition of a utilization or
production facility, such that it could be transferred to a foreign entity.
Clarification of Scope of License Termination Plan Requirement:
– The proposed rule would clarify that the requirement for a license termination plan in
§ 50.82(a)(9) and § 52.110(i) applies only to power reactor licensees that
104

commenced operation and eliminate the apparent confusion among combined
license holders who seek to surrender their licenses before operation.
Relative to the regulatory baseline, the NRC would realize additional costs to implement the
proposed rulemaking, however this regulatory analysis shows that the above areas will result in
quantitative and qualitative benefits as discussed below. In addition, the rulemaking alternatives
would help ensure that the NRC’s actions are effective, efficient, realistic, and timely by
eliminating the need for the NRC review of exemption and amendment requests that are
submitted for those licensees that are transitioning from operations to decommissioning.

Emergency Preparedness
The NRC is proposing rulemaking Alternative EP-2 over the no-action alternative (status quo)
because it would provide regulatory certainty for emergency preparedness requirements for
permanently shutdown and defueled facilities. Also, in status quo, decommissioning power
reactor licensees would need to submit exemption and amendment requests in order to reduce
their emergency preparedness requirements throughout the decommissioning process. This
would result in regulatory burden and costs to the licensees and the NRC during the
decommissioning process from resources being expended to process the exemption and
amendment requests. Additionally, Alternative EP-2 would provide a graded approach to
reduce emergency preparedness requirements at decommissioning sites. Finally, the cost
benefit analysis shows that this alternative is cost beneficial. The final recommendation,
however, will be informed by public comments received on the proposed rule. The NRC
proposes that an amendment of the regulations to provide a graded approach to EP, Alternative
EP-2 as the best course of action. This alternative would provide a regulatory process for
licensees to reduce their EP requirements corresponding to the licensee’s level of
decommissioning without the need to consider whether the change is a reduction in
effectiveness.

Physical Security
The NRC is proposing rulemaking Alternative PS-2 over the no-action alternative (status quo)
because the risk of offsite consequences due to accidents is reduced at a decommissioning
reactor when compared to that at an operating reactor. Given the reduced risk of offsite
consequences, the NRC has concluded that existing physical security requirements can be
stepped down commensurate with the reduced level of risk. Also, regulatory burden on nuclear
power plant licensees would be reduced by eliminating the need to submit requests for
exemptions and license amendments for reducing their physical security-related requirements
during decommissioning. This alternative will also reduce the need for the NRC to review these
exemptions and amendment requests and is shown to be cost beneficial.

Cyber Security
The NRC is proposing rulemaking Alternative CS-2. Under this alternative, the NRC would
undertake a rulemaking to only allow the removal of cyber security requirements from a power
reactor licensee’s license once spent fuel in the SFP has sufficiently decayed. This change to
existing regulation would provide clarity as to the degree of cyber security that needs to be
maintained during each stage of the decommissioning process, while ensuring that safety
concerns (e.g., a postulated zirconium fire scenario) are properly addressed in a manner that

105

provides reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety, and the
common defense and security.

Drug and Alcohol Testing
The NRC is proposing rulemaking Alternative DA-2. The cost benefit analysis shows that
rulemaking Alternative DA-2 results in cost savings to industry and NRC as detailed in Table 16.
The benefit derived from pursuing this alternative is regulatory clarity on which elements of the
FFD program defined in Part 26 would be applicable to a decommissioning power reactor
through the licensee’s insider mitigation program.

Certified Fuel Handler Definition and Elimination of the Shift Technical
Advisor
The NRC is proposing rulemaking Alternative CFH/STA-2. The cost-benefit analysis shows that
Alternative CFH/STA-2 results in a benefit to both industry and the NRC. The benefit derived
from pursuing rulemaking Alternative CFH/STA-2 is the elimination of the need for a licensee to
seek Commission approval for the CFH training program for a decommissioning reactor. This
rulemaking alternative would reduce resources expended by both the licensee and the NRC
regarding Commission approval of CFH training programs. Therefore, the NRC proposes
proceeding with the rulemaking Alternative CFH/STA-2. This is also consistent with feedback
received from the public on the regulatory basis.

Decommissioning Funding Assurance
The NRC is proposing rulemaking Alternative DTF-2. Alternative DTF-2 has the following
benefits over the no-action alternative (status quo):
•

The reporting requirements for decommissioning funding assurance under
10 CFR 50.75(f)(1) and (f)(2) would be changed from a biennial to a triennial reporting
period to be consistent with the reporting requirements for ISFSIs in 10 CFR 72.30(c).
This would reduce the burden on the licensees for reporting.

•

Rulemaking would allow for greater transparency of a licensee’s decommissioning costs
and plans for funding at licensing, and throughout operations and decommissioning,
while also providing a measure of flexibility for the use of funds in the DTF. This would
minimize the uncertainty associated with estimating decommissioning costs such that a
licensee would be able to plan for, and provide assurances for, funding
decommissioning earlier in the facility’s lifecycle. Shortfalls would be addressed in a
timely manner by licensees with greater transparency on these actions.

As detailed in Table 16, Alternative DTF-2 presents a cost benefit at 7 percent NPV and at 3
percent NPV. The NRC therefore proposes to proceed with the rulemaking Alternative DTF-2.

Offsite and Onsite Financial Protection Requirements and Indemnity
Agreements
The NRC is proposing rulemaking Alternative FP-2 over the no-action alternative (status quo)
because the risk of offsite and onsite consequences due to a potential nuclear occurrence is

106

reduced at a decommissioning reactor when compared to that at an operating reactor and the
amounts of financial protection provided in Levels 1 and 2 are consistent with exemptions that
have been granted to reactors that have decommissioned. Given the reduced risk of offsite and
onsite consequences, the NRC has concluded that existing insurance requirements can be
stepped down commensurate with the reduced level of risk and graded to emergency
preparedness. Also, regulatory burden on nuclear reactor licensees is reduced by eliminating
the need to submit exemptions for reduction to onsite and offsite financial protection. This will
also reduce the need for the NRC to review these exemption requests.

Environmental Considerations
The NRC is proposing rulemaking Alternative ENV-2, given the NRC’s desire to reduce
unnecessary regulatory burden and improve the regulatory process for decommissioning
nuclear power plants. Implementation of ENV-2 would allow the NRC and stakeholders to
access more detailed information in the PSDARs for those licensees choosing to follow the
enhanced guidance. This would not reduce the flexibility provided by the use of a PSDAR
instead of a decommissioning plan for decommissioning nuclear power plants or impose
unnecessary burdens on licensees and the NRC to create and review additional documents that
do not have any net positive impact on public health and safety.
Alternative ENV-2, would clarify, through rulemaking, that licensees must evaluate the
environmental impacts associated with site-specific decommissioning activities and determine
whether such impacts are bounded by appropriate previously issued environmental impact
statements, rather than being required to make a definitive conclusion that all such impacts are
bounded by appropriate previously issued environmental impact statements in the PSDAR. The
10 CFR 50.82(a)(6)(ii) and 10 CFR 52.110(f)(2) prohibitions against conducting a
decommissioning activity that would result in a significant environmental impact not previously
reviewed remains in place although clarifying language is added (under the proposed rule, the
prohibition applies to a decommissioning activity not bounded by federally issued environmental
review documents).

Record Retention Requirements
The NRC is proposing rulemaking Alternative R-2, based on the preliminary assessment of the
costs and benefits for changing decommissioning recordkeeping and record retention
requirements. Under this alternative, decommissioning licensees would have a decreased
burden resulting from not having to develop and submit exemptions and would achieve greater
record storage efficiency throughout the decommissioning process. While some NRC
resources would need to be expended in the near term to revise the regulations, the reduction in
recordkeeping and record retention exemption requests would reduce the NRC’s time
necessary to process and review these exemptions during decommissioning in the long term.
Although these changes would not directly affect public health and safety, the increased clarity
of the requirements associated with recordkeeping and record retention during
decommissioning would increase the overall transparency of the decommissioning process.

Low-Level Waste Transportation
The NRC is proposing rulemaking Alternative TR-2, given the NRC’s desire to maintain safety,
reduce unnecessary regulatory burden, and improve efficiency and effectiveness in the
regulatory process for decommissioning nuclear power plants. Under this alternative, licensees

107

would have a decreased burden resulting from not having to develop and submit the subject
exemption requests and would achieve greater efficiency throughout the LLW transportation
process. While some NRC resources would need to be expended in the near term to revise the
10 CFR Part 20, Appendix G regulation, the reduction in requests for exemptions from the LLW
transportation investigation, tracing, and reporting requirements would reduce the NRC’s time
necessary to process and review these exemptions. Although these changes would not directly
affect public health and safety, the reduction in administrative burden associated with the LLW
transportation investigation, tracing, and reporting requirements, during both facility operation
and decommissioning, would increase the overall efficiency of the regulatory process.

Spent Fuel Management Planning
The NRC is proposing rulemaking Alternative SFM-2, where the NRC would amend
10 CFR 50.82, 10 CFR 50.54(bb), 10 CFR 52.110, and 10 CFR 72.218 to clarify and update the
regulations as previously described, as well as to enhance overall regulatory transparency and
openness. The NRC estimates that this change would have a small impact on both licensees
and the NRC since it would only require the NRC to promulgate rule language that is already
present in other sections of 10 CFR Chapter I and simply move it into the appropriate portions of
10 CFR 50.82, 10 CFR 50.54(bb), and 10 CFR 52.110. In addition, decommissioning licensees
would need to expend a relatively small amount of time and effort to provide the additional level
of detail and information suggested under the adjusted requirements for spent fuel management
and handling capabilities during decommissioning since most of these considerations are
already being taken into account at decommissioning facilities.
With these regulation changes detailed in Alternative SFM-2 above, the NRC concludes that
both the NRC and licensees would save resources in the future since the clarified regulations
and additional detail in the guidance would reduce or potentially eliminate the NRC’s need to
engage in site-specific interactions with the licensee to clarify information regarding the
management of spent fuel during decommissioning. It would also improve the efficiency of NRC
communications with various stakeholders who have questions and concerns in this area.
Additionally, Alternative SFM-2 would enhance the opportunity for public involvement in the
decommissioning process, as well as expanding overall regulatory transparency and openness.
Furthermore, Alternative SFM-2 resolves the identified inconsistencies within the regulations.
Hence the NRC proposes Alternative SFM-2 to clarify the spent fuel management requirements.

Backfit Rule
The NRC is proposing rulemaking Alternative B-2 over Alternative B-1 (status quo). The cost
benefit analysis however shows that Alternative B-2 results in costs to both industry and the
NRC due solely to the development of the rule. The benefit derived from pursuing rulemaking
Alternative B-2 is regulatory clarity for how the backfit rule would apply to decommissioning
plants. This may lead to less time spent by industry and the NRC for determining what
regulatory action applied to a decommissioning licensee is or is not a backfit. Here the scope of
activities and approvals that would continue from the operations phase into a decommissioning
phase would be determined.

Foreign Ownership, Control, or Domination (FOCD)
The NRC is proposing rulemaking Alternative F-2 over Alternative F-1 (status quo) in order to
clarify that that the regulations in Part 50, and the similar regulations in Part 52, provide not only

108

for the licensing of utilization and production facilities, but also for their decommissioning and
the termination of their associated licenses. The proposed rule will also allow foreign entities to
directly invest in Part 50 and Part 52 licensees consistent with maintaining the common defense
and security and the public health and safety. This will reduce the number of exemptions from
§ 50.38 for facilities that no longer meet the definition of a utilization or production facility, thus
resulting in cost savings to the nuclear power industry and NRC. Additionally, the proposed rule
would offer the NPUFs the option to request only one licensing action—the decommissioning
plan license amendment—that also would address the licensee’s operating authority, rendering
a “possession-only license amendment” unnecessary and resulting in cost savings to NPUFs
and the NRC from lack of processing these amendments.

Clarification of Scope of License Termination Plan Requirement
The NRC is proposing rulemaking Alternative T-2 over Alternative T-1 (status quo) in order to
clarify that combined license holders who seek to surrender their licenses before operation do
not need to submit a license termination plan to the NRC for approval. Since the rulemaking
alternative is a clarification in the language of § 50.82(a)(9) and § 52.110(i), there would not be
a significant change in the costs and benefits to the industry, NRC, State and local governments
and the general public due to this rulemaking alternative.

8

NRC PROPOSED RULE

The following table summarizes the NRC alternatives for the proposed rule along with their
incremental costs. The total incremental cost for the alternatives under proposed rule is also
displayed. The following table provides the quantified and non-quantified costs and benefits for
each proposed alternative in each area of decommissioning for specific decommissioning
topics. These costs include burden to the Federal, State, local governments and the General
Public due to public commenting periods.

109

Table 16

Summary of Total Costs and Benefits for the Recommended Alternatives
Areas of Decommissioning

Emergency Preparedness
Physical Security
Cybersecurity
Drugs and Alcohol Testing
Certified Fuel Handler Training
Decommissioning Funding Assurance
Offsite & Onsite Financial Protection
Environmental Considerations
Record Retention Requirements
Low Level Waste Transportation
Spent Fuel Management Planning
Backfit Protection
Foreign Ownership, Control, or Domination
Total:

Alternatives
EP-2
PS-2
CS-2
DA-2
CFH/STA-2
DTF-2
FP-2
ENV-2
R-2
TR-2
SFM-2
B-2
F-2

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Total Costs and Benefits
7% NPV
3% NPV
7,740,000 $
15,530,000
877,000 $
2,296,000
83,000 $
140,000
7,025,000
370,000
1,177,000
564,000
(41,000)
241,000
162,000
(299,000)
(61,000)
76,000
17,914,000

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

14,278,000
906,000
1,912,000
1,247,000
15,000
536,000
383,000
(296,000)
(62,000)
156,000
37,041,000

Nonmonetary Benefits
Regulatory Efficiency: These alternatives would enable the NRC to better maintain and administer regulatory
activities over the decommissioning process and ensure that the requirements for decommissioning power reactors are
clear and appropriate.
Safety and Common Defense: These alternatives would continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate
protection of the public health, safety, and common defense and security at nuclear power reactor sites that have
started decommissioning.
* There may be discrepancies in calculations due to rounding.
** All values are in 2018 dollars.

Should the alternatives result in a final rule, the cost benefit analysis shows that these
alternatives are overall cost beneficial to the nuclear power industry, Federal, State and local
governments and the general public and that the revised requirements would result in a net
averted cost from $17.9 million (7-percent NPV) to $37.0 million (3-percent NPV). Most of the
cost savings are attributable to the relief of exemptions and amendments that licensees would
typically submit to the NRC for review and approval during decommissioning. The additional
costs would be primarily due to efforts to conduct the rulemaking, update documents associated
with the rulemaking (i.e., regulatory guidance and NUREGs) and to manage the response to
public comments.

9

GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS

The NRC is currently revising the following guidance documents for the proposed rule:
•

RG 1.159, “Assuring the Availability of Funds for Decommissioning Nuclear Reactors”

•

RG 1.184, “Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors”

•

RG 1.185, “Standard Format and Content for Post-Shutdown Decommissioning
Activities Report (PSDAR)”

During the course of the rulemaking, the NRC will draft a new regulatory guide, Draft Guide
(DG)-1346, “Emergency Planning for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Reactors.”
The NRC has identified that the following guidance documents are subject to revision based on
decisions made to pursue regulatory actions, including rulemaking:

110

•

RG 1.219, “Guidance on Making Changes to Emergency Plans for Nuclear Power
Reactors”

•

RG 1.179, “Standard Content and Format of License Termination Plans for Nuclear
Power Reactors”

•

RG 4.21, “Minimization of Contamination and Radioactive Waste Generation: Life-Cycle
Planning”

•

RG 4.22, “Decommissioning Planning During Operations”

•

RG 5.71, “Cyber Security Programs for Nuclear Facilities”

•

RG 5.66, “Access Authorization for Nuclear Power Plants”

•

RG 5.77, “Insider Mitigation Program”

•

NUREG-0586, “Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Decommissioning of
Nuclear Facilities”

•

NUREG-1022, “Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73”

•

NUREG-1496, “Generic Environmental Impact Statement in Support of Rulemaking on
Radiological Criteria for License Termination of NRC-Licensed Nuclear Facilities”

•

NUREG-1555, “Standard Review Plans for Environmental Reviews for Nuclear Power
Plants”

•

NUREG-1628, “Staff Responses to Frequently Asked Questions Concerning
Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants”

•

NUREG-1700, “Standard Review Plan for Evaluating Nuclear Power Reactor License
Termination Plans”

•

NUREG-1727, “NMSS Decommissioning Standard Review Plan”

•

NUREG-1757, “Consolidated Decommissioning Guidance”

•

NSIR/DPR-ISG-01, “Interim Staff Guidance: Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power
Plants”

•

Inspection Procedure 82501, “Decommissioning Emergency Preparedness Program
Evaluation”

•

Inspection Procedure 82401, “Decommissioning Emergency Preparedness Scenario
Review and Exercise Evaluation”

111

REFERENCES
1.

53 FR 24018; “General Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities: Final
Rule,” June 27, 1988.

2.

60 FR 37374, “Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors: Proposed Rule,” July 20,
1995.

3.

61 FR 39278, “Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors: Final Rule,” July 29, 1996.

4.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, SRM-SECY 99-168, “Staff Requirements—SECY
99 168—Improving Decommissioning Regulations for Nuclear Power Plants,” December
21, 1999, ADAMS Accession No. ML003752190.

5.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1738, “Technical Study of Spent Fuel
Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,” February 2001, ADAMS
Accession No. ML010430066.

6.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, SECY-00-0145, “Integrated Rulemaking Plan for
Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning,” June 28, 2000, ADAMS Accession No.
ML003721626.

7.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, SECY-01-0100, “Policy Issues Related to
Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning
Nuclear Power Plants Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools,” June 4, 2001, ADAMS
Accession No. ML011450420.

8.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, SRM-SECY-14-0118, “Staff Requirements—
SECY 14 0118—Request by Duke Energy Florida, Inc., for Exemptions from Certain
Emergency Planning Requirements,” December 30, 2014, ADAMS Accession No.
ML14364A111.

9.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, SECY-15-0014, “Anticipated Schedule and
Estimated Resources for a Power Reactor Decommissioning Rulemaking,” January 30,
2015, ADAMS Accession No. ML15082A089 (redacted).

10.

82 FR 13778, “Regulatory Improvements for Power Reactors Transitioning to
Decommissioning: Draft Regulatory Basis,” March 15, 2017.

11.

82 FR 21481, “Regulatory Improvements for Power Reactors Transitioning to
Decommissioning: Preliminary Draft Regulatory Analysis,” May 9, 2017.

12.

82 FR 55954, “Regulatory Improvements for Power Reactors Transitioning to
Decommissioning: Regulatory Basis,” November 27, 2017.

13.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Analysis Document, “Regulatory
Improvements for Power Reactors Transitioning to Decommissioning,” ADAMS
Accession No. ML17332A075.

112

14.

World Nuclear Association, “Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities,” Web page, updated
September 8, 2017, accessed at http://www.world-nuclear.org/informationlibrary/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-wastes/decommissioning-nuclear-facilities.aspx.

15.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/BR-0184, “Regulatory Analysis Technical
Evaluation Handbook,” January 1997, ADAMS Accession No. ML050190193.

16.

U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 44, Emergency Management and Assistance,
Part 350, “Review and Approval of State and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and
Preparedness,” Washington, DC.

17.

U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 44, Emergency Management and Assistance,
Part 354, “Fee for Services to Support FEMA’s Offsite Radiological Emergency
Preparedness Program,” Washington, DC.

18.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Kewaunee Power Station—Exemptions from
Certain Emergency Planning Requirements and Related Safety Evaluation,” October 27,
2014, ADAMS Accession No. ML14261A223.

19.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Crystal River Unit 3—Exemptions from Certain
Emergency Planning Requirements and Related Safety Evaluation,” March 30, 2015,
ADAMS Accession No. ML15058A906.

20.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1,
2, and 3 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation—Exemptions from Certain
Emergency Planning Requirements and Related Safety Evaluation,” June 4, 2015,
ADAMS Accession No. ML15082A204.

21.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station—
Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements and Related Safety
Evaluation,” December 10, 2015, ADAMS Accession No. ML15180A054

22.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency,
FEMA P-1028, “Program Manual: Radiological Emergency Preparedness,”
January 2016.

23.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NSIR/DPR-ISG-02, “Interim Staff Guidance:
Emergency Planning Exemption Requests for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,”
May 11, 2015.

24.

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, Table B-1.

25.

76 FR 72560, “Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations: Final Rule,”
November 23, 2011.

26.

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1.

27.

Presentation by NorthStar and Entergy for January 24, 2017 public meeting on the
proposed license transfer of Vermont Yankee for decommissioning, ADAMS Accession
No. ML17019A145.

113

28.

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (1993), Aging Nuclear Power Plants:
Managing Plant Life and Decommissioning, pg. 92.

29.

IP 41501, “Review of Training and Qualification Programs,” April 27, 2016

30.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, SECY 93-127, “Financial Protection Required of
Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants during Decommissioning,” May 10, 1993,
ADAMS Accession No. ML12257A628.

31.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, SRM-SECY 93-127, “Financial Protection
Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants during Decommissioning,” July
13, 1993, ADAMS Accession No. ML003760936.

32.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, SECY 96-256, “Changes to Financial Protection
Requirements for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1)
and 10 CFR 140.11,” December 17, 1996, ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A483.

33.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, SRM-SECY 96-256, “Changes to Financial
Protection Requirements for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) and 10 CFR 140.11,” January 28, 1997, ADAMS Accession No.
ML15062A454

34.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-0586, Supplement 1, Volumes 1 and 2,
“Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities:
Regarding the Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors,” November 30, 2002,
ADAMS Accession No. ML023470327

35.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Management Directive 8.4, “Management of
Facility-Specific Backfitting Information Collection,” October 9, 2013, ADAMS Accession
No. ML12059A460.

36.

78 FR 58571, “Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, Connecticut Yankee Atomic
Power Company, and The Yankee Atomic Electric Company: Exemption; Issuance,”
September 24, 2013

37.

52 FR 38077, “Commission Policy Statement on Deferred Plants,” October 14, 1987

38.

81 FR 43266, “Final Procedures for Conducting Hearings on Conformance With the
Acceptance Criteria in Combined Licenses,” July 1, 2016

39.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/BR 0058, “Regulatory Analysis
Guidelines of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,” Revision 5, Draft for Public
Comment, April 2017, ADAMS Accession No. ML17100A480.

40.

U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-4, “Regulatory Analysis,”
September 17, 2003, accessed at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4/.

41.

U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-94, “Guideline and Discount
Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs,” accessed at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A94/a094.pdf

114

42.

U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Table 24, Historical Consumer
Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U): U.S. City Average, All-Items,”
https://www.bls.gov/cpi/tables/supplemental-files/historical-cpi-u-201802.pdf.

43.

United States Congressional Budget Office, “The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2017
to 2027,” Table 2 1, “CBO’s Economic Projections for Calendar Years 2017 to 2027”
January 2017, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/52370.

44.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR 4627, Revision 2, “Generic Cost
Estimates,” February 1992, ADAMS Accession No. ML13137A259.

45.

Omaha Public Power District, “Certification of Permanent Cessation of Power
Operations,” June 24, 2016, ADAMS Accession No. ML16176A213.

46.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1350, Volume 29, “Information Digest
2017–2018,” Appendix G, “Commercial Nuclear Power Reactor Operating Licenses—
Expiration by Year, 2013–2049,” August 2017.

47.

NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2001-07, Revision 1, “10 CFR 50.75 Reporting and
Recordkeeping for Decommissioning Planning,” January 8, 2009, ADAMS Accession
No. ML083440158.

48.

U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “NAICS Code: North American
Industry Classification System Code,” accessed at http://www.bls.gov/bls/naics.htm.

49.

U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “SOC Code: Standard
Occupational Classification Code,” accessed at http://www.bls.gov/soc/home.htm.

115

APPENDIX A: INDUSTRY LABOR RATES
Utilities (Sector 22)—Industry: Electric Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution
(NAICS code 221100)
Position
Title

Hourly Mean
Wage
(2017 dollars)

Hourly 10th
Percentile Wage
(2017 dollars)

Hourly 90th
Percentile Wage
(2017 dollars)

$82.90

$55.33

$107.77

$107.38

$73.99

$139.59

$95.14

$64.66

$123.68

$44.49

$31.65

$64.36

http://www.bls.gov/oes/c
urrent/oes511011.htm

$43.89

$36.29

$60.57

http://www.bls.gov/oes/c
urrent/oes491011.htm

$61.67

$47.10

$90.44

http://www.bls.gov/oes/c
urrent/oes113051.htm

$68.24

$48.81

$88.71

http://www.bls.gov/oes/c
urrent/oes111021.htm

$54.57

$40.96

$76.02

$51.46

$42.46

$71.60

$33.54

$24.84

$50.12

$40.87

$32.38

$56.36

http://www.bls.gov/oes/c
urrent/oes194051.htm

$46.22

$39.45

$61.37

http://www.bls.gov/oes/c
urrent/oes518011.htm

Industrial Machinery
Mechanics (499041)

$33.94

$26.58

$47.61

http://www.bls.gov/oes/c
urrent/oes499041.htm

Average

$41.21

$33.14

$57.41

$25.35

$18.21

$38.85

http://www.bls.gov/oes/c
urrent/naics4_221100.ht
m#43-0000

$37.12

$28.45

$54.93

http://www.bls.gov/oes/c
urrent/oes431011.htm

$21.40

$15.29

$31.85

http://www.bls.gov/oes/c
urrent/oes439061.htm

$27.96

$20.65

$41.88

$33.00

$26.86

$46.75

Occupation
(SOC Code)
Top Executives
(111000)

Executive

Managers

Technical
Staff

Admin
Staff

Licensing
Staff

Chief Executives
(111011)
Average
First-Line
Supervisors of
Production and
Operating Workers
(511011)
First-Line
Supervisors of
Mechanics Installers
and Repairers
(491011)
Industrial Production
Managers (113051)
General and
Operations
Managers (111021)
Average
Nuclear Engineers
(172161)
Computer Support
Specialists (151150)
Nuclear Technicians
(194051)
Nuclear Power
Reactor Operators
(518011)

Office and
Administrative
Support
Occupations
(430000)
First-Line
Supervisors of Office
and Administrative
Support Workers
(431011)
Office Clerks
General (439061)
Average
Paralegals and
Legal Assistants
(232011)

A-1

Source
http://www.bls.gov/oes/c
urrent/oes111011.htm
http://www.bls.gov/oes/c
urrent/oes_nat.htm#110000

http://www.bls.gov/oes/c
urrent/oes172161.htm
http://www.bls.gov/oes/

http://www.bls.gov/oes/c
urrent/oes232011.htm

Position
Title

Occupation
(SOC Code)
Lawyers (231011)
Average

Hourly Mean
Wage
(2017 dollars)

Hourly 10th
Percentile Wage
(2017 dollars)

Hourly 90th
Percentile Wage
(2017 dollars)

Source

$81.86

$56.92

$106.42

http://www.bls.gov/oes/c
urrent/oes231011.htm

$57.43
$55.26

$41.89
$40.26

$76.58
$75.12

Average
Burdened labor
$132.63
$96.63
$180.28
Total
rate
Burdened labor
$135.68
$98.85
$184.42
rate (2018 Dollars)
(1) For this analysis, the NRC estimated that the 90th percentile is approximately 30 percent greater than the mean.
(2) The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) uses a production-oriented conceptual framework to group
establishments into industries based on the activity in which they are primarily engaged. Further details about the
NAICS framework are provided on the BLS web pages (Ref. 48).
(3) The Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) system is used by Federal agencies to classify workers into
occupational categories. Further details about the SOC system are provided on the BLS web pages (Ref. 49).
(4) Data was extracted using a custom query function accessible at https://www.bls.gov/oes/ . The query selected used
multiple occupations for one industry. The industry sector selected was Sector 22, utilities and the industry was
Industry 221100 - Electric Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution.

A-2

APPENDIX B: UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS VARIABLES
Values of low, most likely and high were derived from similar historical cost data and expert
opinion of the NRC staff.

$100.70
$80.63

Most
Likely
(Base)
$138.70
$98.80

$179.81
$117.76

PERT
PERT

$130.00
$24.50

$131.00
$79.91

$234.00
$127.57

$61.32

PERT

$27.53

$57.36

$110.96

Mean value

Distribution
Type

180.2
91.7
28.5
28.5
37.9

PERT
PERT
PERT
PERT
PERT

154.5
78.6
24.4
24.4
32.5

Most
Likely
(Base)
180.2
91.7
28.5
28.5
37.9

148.6

PERT

127.4

148.6

169.8

47.4

PERT

40.6

47.4

54.2

98.0

PERT

84.0

98.0

112.0

237.1

PERT

203.2

237.1

271.0

Mean value

Distribution
Type

378.3
57.6
5.0
2.5
27.6

PERT
PERT
PERT
PERT
PERT

324.2
49.4
4.3
2.1
23.6

Most
Likely
(Base)
378.3
57.6
5.0
2.5
27.6

147.8

PERT

126.7

147.8

168.9

45.1

PERT

38.6

45.1

51.5

37.6

PERT

32.2

37.6

42.9

390.8

PERT

335.0

390.8

446.6

Parameter

Mean value

Distribution
Type

Low

2018 Hourly Rate for industry
2018 Hourly Rate for industry (IT
Support)

$139.22
$98.93

PERT
PERT

2018 NRC Labor Rate
2018 Other Government Labor
Rate
2018 General Public Labor Rate

$148.00
$78.62

Industry Effort Comments
EP hours:
Physical security hours:
Cyber security hours:
Drug and alcohol testing hours:
CFH training hours:
Decommissioning financial
assurance hours:
Offsite and onsite financial
protection portion hours:
Backfit hours:
Environmental considerations,
record retention requirements,
and low-level waste
transportation hours:

Other Govt. Effort Comments
EP hours:
Physical security hours:
Cyber security hours:
Drug and alcohol testing hours:
CFH training hours:
Decommissioning financial
assurance hours:
Offsite and onsite financial
protection portion hours:
Backfit hours:
Environmental considerations,
record retention requirements,
and low-level waste
transportation hours:

B-1

Low

Low

High

High
205.9
104.8
32.5
32.5
43.4

High
432.3
65.8
5.7
2.9
31.5

Most
Likely
(Base)

Mean value

Distribution
Type

Mean value

Distribution
Type

Low

29.2
4.6
1.5
1.5
1.5

PERT
PERT
PERT
PERT
PERT

4.1
0.6
0.2
0.2
0.2

Most
Likely
(Base)
29.2
4.6
1.5
1.5
1.5

50.7

PERT

7.1

50.7

94.3

3.1

PERT

0.4

3.1

5.7

0.0

PERT

0.0

0.0

0.0

116.7

PERT

16.3

116.7

217.1

Number of years remaining to
implement rulemaking
NRC rulemaking contract
support

3
$(150,000)

NONE

NRC cost (rulemaking)

$(6,060,439)

NONE

NRC cost (rulemaking) per year

$(2,020,146)

NONE

Parameter

Gen Public Effort Comments
EP hours:
Physical security hours:
Cyber security hours:
Drug and alcohol testing hours:
CFH training hours:
Decommissioning financial
assurance hours:
Offsite and onsite financial
protection hours:
Backfit hours:
Environmental considerations,
record retention requirements,
and low-level waste
transportation hours:

Number of NRC hours per year
spent on this rulemaking effort
Number of NRC hours per year
spent on EP portion of
rulemaking
Number of NRC hours per year
spent on physical security
portion of rulemaking
Number of NRC hours per year
spent on cyber security portion
of rulemaking
Number of NRC hours per year
spent on drug and alcohol
testing portion of rulemaking
Number of NRC hours per year
spent on CFH training portion of
rulemaking
Number of NRC hours per year
spent on decommissioning

Low

High

High
54.3
8.6
2.9
2.9
2.9

NONE

13312
2293
2293
462
391
426
1775

RISK
UNIFORM
RISK
UNIFORM
RISK
UNIFORM
RISK
UNIFORM
RISK
UNIFORM
RISK
UNIFORM
RISK
UNIFORM

B-2

8606

18018

1420

3167

1420

3167

355

568

355

426

284

568

1420

2130

Parameter
financial assurance portion of
rulemaking
Number of NRC hours per year
spent on offsite and onsite
financial protection portion of
rulemaking
Number of NRC hours per year
spent on backfit portion of
rulemaking
Number of NRC hours per year
spent on environmental
considerations, record retention
requirements, and low-level
waste transportation portions of
rulemaking
Number of NRC hours per year
for others (PRMB, RES, OGC,
DORL (lessons learned)) spent
on this rulemaking
Number of nuclear power plant
(NPP) sites that will enter the
decommissioning transition
phase after the rulemaking
becomes effective
Number of years from start of
decommissioning, to transfer all
spent fuel to dry cask storage in
ISFSI
Number of years from start of
decommissioning when all SF is
transferred to DOE
Number of years from start of
decommissioning to site
dismantlement
(SAFSTOR/ENTOMB method)
Number of years for site to
decommission (DECON method)
Number of years for site to
decommission (DECON or
SAFSTOR/ENTOMB method)
Number of years for spent fuel
management
IT staff personnel required to
implement cyber security
protection
Cost Impact to develop site
specific cost estimate for DTF
Hours industry to process
exemption (EP)

Mean value

Distribution
Type

Low

Most
Likely
(Base)

High

RISK
UNIFORM
589
156

RISK
UNIFORM

469

710

99

213

710

3167

1710

3175

RISK
UNIFORM
1938
RISK
UNIFORM
2442

58

NONE

10

INTEGER
UNIFORM

5

10

16

26

INTEGER
UNIFORM

21

26

32

50

INTEGER
UNIFORM

40

50

60

12

INTEGER
UNIFORM

8

12

16

34

INTEGER
UNIFORM

8

34

60

21

INTEGER
UNIFORM

4

27

33

3.3

INTEGER
UNIFORM

3

3

4

$(333,333)

PERT

$(300,000)

$(300,000)

$(500,000)

1428.6

PERT

1246.8

1419.7

1646.2

B-3

Mean value

Distribution
Type

Low

Most
Likely
(Base)

High

714.3

PERT

623.4

709.8

823.1

1043.6

PERT

632.2

1039.0

1473.6

521.8

PERT

316.1

519.5

736.8

20.0

PERT

18.2

20.0

21.8

10.0

PERT

9.1

10.0

10.9

Hours industry to process
exemption (core damage)

20.0

PERT

18.2

20.0

21.8

Hours NRC to process
exemption (core damage)

10.0

PERT

9.1

10.0

10.9

40.0

PERT

36.4

40.0

43.6

16.0

PERT

14.6

16.0

17.4

100.0

PERT

93.0

100

107.0

40.0

PERT

37.2

40

42.8

300.0

PERT

279.0

300

321.0

150.0

PERT

139.5

150

160.5

70.5

PERT

24.0

68.3

126.0

34.7

PERT

12.0

33.3

63.0

Number of hours for NRC to
update a regulatory guide

866.7

PERT

600

700

1800

Hours for industry to respond to
RAI CFH training program

82.3

PERT

45.0

79.7

130.0

Parameter
Hours NRC to process
exemption (EP)
Hours industry to process
amendment (EP)
Hours NRC to process
amendment (EP)
Hours industry to process
exemption (suspension of
security)
Hours NRC to process
exemption (suspension of
security)

Hours industry to process
exemption (communications
with control room)
Hours NRC to process
exemption (communications
with control room)
Hours industry to process
amendment (reduction of
control room)
Hours NRC to process
amendment (reduction of
control room)
Hours industry to process
amendment (applying Part 72 to
ISFSI)
Hours NRC to process
amendment (applying Part 72 to
ISFSI)
Hours industry to process
amendment (cyber security)
Hours NRC to process
amendment (cyber security)

B-4

Parameter
Hours NRC to approve CFH
training program
Hours industry to process
exemption (DTF)
Hours NRC to process
exemption (DTF)
Hours for industry to update site
specific cost estimate
Hours for NRC to review update
to site specific cost estimate
Hours for industry to report
decommissioning funding
assurance per report
Hours for NRC to review single
report on decommissioning
funding assurance
Hours for industry to respond to
RAIs for the approval of ISFSI
reports under 72.30 ( c)
Hours for NRC to approve ISFSI
reports under 72.30 ( c)
Hours industry to process
exemption (Insurance)
Hours NRC to process
exemption (Insurance)
Hours for industry to submit
cover letter in compliance with
50.54 (w)(7)
Hours for industry to complete
site-specific analysis for the
adiabatic heatup of fuel
assembly
Hours for NRC to review site
specific analysis for the
adiabatic heatup of fuel
assembly

Hours for industry to update
PSDAR
Hours for NRC to review update
of the PSDAR

Hours for industry to complete
full environmental analysis for
decommissioning

Mean value

Distribution
Type

Low

Most
Likely
(Base)

High

164.6

PERT

90.0

159.4

260.0

260.6

PERT

107.0

243.7

482.2

130.3

PERT

53.5

121.8

241.1

7.0

PERT

4.0

7.0

10.0

7.0

PERT

4.0

7.0

10.0

6.7

PERT

4.0

7.0

8.0

6.7

PERT

4.0

7.0

8.0

14.4

PERT

0.0

14.4

28.8

8.2

PERT

0.0

8.2

16.4

200.7

PERT

171.8

199.4

234.6

100.3

PERT

85.9

99.7

117.3

0.8

PERT

0.5

0.8

1.0

14.5

PERT

8.7

13.9

22.3

7.2

PERT

4.4

7.0

11.1

160.0

PERT

80.0

160.0

240.0

80.0

PERT

40.0

80.0

120.0

1500.0

PERT

1000.0

1500.0

2000.0

B-5

Mean value

Distribution
Type

Low

Most
Likely
(Base)

High

Hours for NRC to complete
NEPA analysis

1500.0

PERT

1000.0

1500.0

2000.0

Hours for industry to prepare
and submit PSDAR amendment

4000.0

PERT

3000.0

4000.0

5000.0

Hours for NRC to review PSDAR
amendment

2000.0

PERT

1500.0

2000.0

2500.0

Hours for industry to summarize
the spent fuel management and
put this summary in the PSDAR

1.1

PERT

0.8

1.1

1.5

Hours industry to process
exemption (Records)

94.5

PERT

38.7

91.6

162.0

Hours NRC to process
exemption (Records)

47.2

PERT

19.4

45.8

81.0

Hours industry to process
exemption (Transportation)

77.5

PERT

35.0

77.5

120.0

Hours NRC to process
exemption (Transportation)

38.8

PERT

17.5

38.8

60.0

71.1

PERT

22.0

67.6

134.0

35.5

PERT

11.0

33.8

67.0

0.3

PERT

0.1

0.3

0.5

1.0

DUNIFORM

1.0

Parameter

Hours industry to process
exemption (FOCD)
Hours NRC to process
exemption (FOCD)
Averted time for teleconference
calls (environmental
considerations, record retention
requirements, and low-level
waste transportation areas) in
hours
Number of teleconference calls
per licensee per month for
status updates and to resolve
issues (environmental
considerations, record retention
requirements, and low-level
waste transportation areas)

B-6

3.0

Parameter
Number of industry people in
the teleconference calls
(environmental considerations,
record retention requirements,
and low-level waste
transportation areas)
Number of NRC people in the
teleconference calls
(environmental considerations,
record retention requirements,
and low-level waste
transportation areas)
Number of months for the
teleconference calls
FEMA fees averted
Average cost of business travel
per week:
Industry one-time cost (preaccess drug & alcohol testing)
per NPP
Industry annual cost (manage
drug & alcohol testing) per NPP
NRC annual cost
(administration drug & alcohol
Testing) per NPP
Time (in years) for NPP site to
submit
exemptions/amendments with
respect to shutdown date
Time (in years) for NRC to
finalize
exemptions/amendments with
respect to shutdown date

Most
Likely
(Base)

Mean value

Distribution
Type

Low

8.0

DUNIFORM

6.0

10.0

4.0

DUNIFORM

2.0

6.0

3.0

DUNIFORM

2.0

4.0

$1,036,815

PERT

$514,005

$946,665

$1,917,863

$950

PERT

$600

$950

$1,300

$(168,628)

PERT

$(202,353)

$(168,628)

$(134,902)

$(345,479)

PERT

$(414,575)

$(345,479)

$(276,383)

$(6,556)

PERT

$(7,867)

$(6,556)

$(5,245)

0

DISCRETE
UNIFORM

-1

0

1

1

DISCRETE
UNIFORM

1

2

B-7

High