60-Day Public Comment Response Matrix

Social Media 60-day Public Comment Response Matrix.pdf

Generic Clearance for the Collection of Social Media Identifier(s) on Immigration Forms

60-Day Public Comment Response Matrix

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Generic Clearance for the Collection of Social Media Identifier(s) on Immigration Forms - Responses to 60-day Public
Comments
Public Comments (regulations.gov): USCIS-2025-0003
60-day FRN Citation (federalregister.gov): 90 FR 11324
Publish Dates: March 5, 2025 – May 5, 2025
Comment Topic
Comment Summary
Topic 1. Legal Authority to Collect
Violating EO’s
The commenters highlight several ways in which the
proposed collection of social media information may
violate President Trump’s Executive Order on
“Restoring Freedom of Speech and Ending Federal
Censorship.”
Section 2(a): The policy of the United States is to secure
the right of the American people to engage in
constitutionally protected speech. The broad scope of
social media data collection and the lack of clear
metrics for assessing content could create a chilling
effect on free speech, thereby violating this policy.
Section 2(b): Ensuring that no Federal Government
officer, employee, or agent engages in or facilitates any
conduct that would unconstitutionally abridge the free
speech of any American citizen. The proposed data
collection could lead to self-censorship among
individuals, infringing on their free speech rights.
Section 2(c): Ensuring that no taxpayer resources are
used to engage in or facilitate any conduct that would
unconstitutionally abridge the free speech of any
American citizen. The comments argue that the
proposed data collection could misuse taxpayer
resources by infringing on free speech rights.
Section 3(a): No Federal department, agency, entity,
officer, employee, or agent may act or use any Federal
resources in a manner contrary to section 2 of this
order. The proposed social media data collection could
be seen as acting contrary to the protections outlined
in Section 2, thereby violating this executive order.
Recommendations:
1. Implement Strict, Narrowly Tailored Criteria: Define
specific criteria for which applicants may be subject to
social media screening, including documented
reasonable suspicion requirements. This ensures that
the data collection is narrowly tailored and justified by
a compelling government interest, aligning with the
executive order's requirement to protect free speech.

USCIS Response
Response: DHS disagrees that collection of social
media information violates President Trump’s
Executive Order on “Restoring Freedom of Speech and
Ending Federal Censorship,” which reiterates
government commitment to the free speech rights
provided in the First Amendment of the Constitution.
The Department respects every individual’s right to
maintain an opinion without interference and to seek,
receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds.
The proposal to collect publicly available social media
information to assist in determining admissibility or
eligibility for immigration benefits is consistent with
this commitment.
However, DHS notes that this E.O. is stated to relate to
the American people and specific provisions relate
specifically to American citizens. Most individuals who
submit social media information will be aliens applying
for immigration benefits. Furthermore, Sec. 4 clarifies
that it does not impair nor affect the authority granted
to DHS to administer and enforce the United States'
immigration laws. Therefore, this proposed data
request does not relate to the above stated E.O., nor
does the E.O. alter DHS's authority.
DHS acknowledges that some of the individuals
impacted will be United States Citizens, but that social
media information collected from U.S. Citizen
petitioners is within the scope of the authority of DHS.
In many circumstances, the alien’s relationship to a
United States Citizen is material to the benefit sought.
The Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes USCIS
to collect information needed to assess eligibility for
an immigration benefit. USCIS notes that identity is
always material to the immigration benefit sought,
and the information collected will assist USCIS to
determine identity and evaluate other information key
to benefit eligibility. In many circumstances this will
involve information from a United States Citizen who
has filed an immigration benefit request on behalf of
an alien.
Federal laws, including the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) and Homeland Security Act of
2002, provide authority for this information collection.
For example, INA § 287(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(b), and 8
C.F.R. § 287.5(a)(2) empower officers and agents to
“take and consider evidence concerning the privilege

of any person to enter, reenter, pass through, or
reside in the United States.” Similarly, for
naturalization purposes, INA § 335, 8 U.S.C. § 1446,
empowers any employee of USCIS to conduct a
personal investigation of the person applying for
naturalization, take testimony concerning the
admissibility of the applicant for naturalization, and
require the production of relevant books, papers, and
documents.

3. Develop Comprehensive Privacy Protections:
Establish clear guidelines for the collection, storage,
use, and sharing of social media information.
Implement mandatory purging of data after decisions
are made to protect individuals' privacy. These
measures ensure that the data collection process
respects privacy rights and does not lead to
unnecessary or prolonged surveillance, in line with the
executive order's emphasis on protecting free speech
and preventing unconstitutional abridgment.

DHS will handle social media identifiers in the same
manner as other information collected through DHS
applications and is in the process of updating the
relevant System of Records Notices (SORN) and
Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA), available on the
DHS website (www.dhs.gov/privacy). To ensure
compliance with these policies, USCIS officers must
complete annual training on the operational use of
social media and sign a rules of behavior document.
Additionally, DHS will not request user passwords in
furtherance of this collection and will not violate or
attempt to subvert individual privacy settings or
controls the applicants may have implemented on
social media platforms.

4. Create Transparent, Publicly Available Guidelines:
Provide clear guidelines on how social media content
will be evaluated, including considerations for cultural
context. Transparency in the evaluation process helps
prevent arbitrary or biased decisions that could infringe
on free speech rights.
5. Implement a Clear Appeals Process: Develop a
process for individuals to appeal adverse findings based
on social media content, ensuring they have the
opportunity to address any concerns. This
recommendation ensures due process and protects
individuals' rights to challenge government actions that
may infringe on their free speech.

Consistent with the requirements of the Privacy Act (5
U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7)), DHS does not maintain records
“describing how any [citizen of the United States or
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence]
exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment,
unless expressly authorized by statute or by the
individual about whom the record is maintained or
unless pertinent to and within the scope of an
authorized law enforcement activity.” Furthermore,
DHS policy directs that “DHS personnel shall not
collect, maintain in DHS systems, or use information
protected by the First Amendment unless (a) an
individual has expressly granted their consent for DHS
to collect, maintain and use that information; (b)
maintaining the record is expressly authorized by a
federal statute; or (c) that information is relevant to a
criminal, civil or administrative activity relating to a
law DHS enforces or administers. In addition, DHS
personnel should not pursue by questioning, research,
or other means, information relating to how an
individual exercises his or her First Amendment rights
unless one or more of the same conditions applies.”
DHS components must also adhere to DHS Directive
110-01, “Privacy Policy for Operational Use of Social

Generic Clearance for the Collection of Social Media Identifier(s) on Immigration Forms - Responses to 60-day Public
Comments
Public Comments (regulations.gov): USCIS-2025-0003
60-day FRN Citation (federalregister.gov): 90 FR 11324
Publish Dates: March 5, 2025 – May 5, 2025
Media,” and DHS Instruction 110-01-001, “Privacy
Policy for Operational Use of Social Media,” which
define the authorized use of social media to collect
personally identifiable information for the purpose of
enhancing situational awareness; investigating an
individual in a criminal, civil, or administrative context;
making a benefit determination about a person;
making a personnel determination about a
Department employee; making a suitability
determination about a prospective Department
employee; or for any other official Department
purpose that has the potential to affect the rights,
privileges, or benefits of an individual.
This policy also requires DHS Operational Components
to receive approval from the DHS Privacy Office
regarding the privacy implications of any planned
operational use of social media to ensure that it is
compliant with Departmental privacy policies and
standards. 1 DHS employees, who are permitted and
trained to utilize social media for operational purposes
during the performance of their duties, must adhere
to DHS privacy policies, as established by the Chief
Privacy Officer.
DHS maintains a framework of safeguards, training,
and policies for use of social media in vetting
programs and to ensure preservation of privacy, civil
rights, and civil liberties. When adjudicating eligibility
to travel to or be admitted to the United States and
immigration benefits, the use of social media is
governed by strict privacy provisions, use limitations,
and in adherence with all constitutionally protected
rights and freedoms. 2 DHS Oversight Offices, including
the Office of the General Counsel, the Privacy Office,
and the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, each
review aspects of DHS policies regarding the use of
social media information. They regularly advise
programs on best practices and methods for ensuring
legal and policy compliance. In addition, the USCIS
Privacy Office reviews and must approve each office’s
operational use of social media and associated
activities. These offices are required to take
1

DHS authorities for the “Privacy Policy for Operational Use of Social Media” are as follows: Public Law 107-347, “E-Government Act of 2002” as
amended, Section 208, codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note; 5 U.S.C. § 552a, Records Maintained on Individuals, (The Privacy Act of 1974, as
amended); 6 U.S.C. § 142, Privacy Officer; 44 U.S.C., Chapter 35, Subchapter III, “Information Security” (The Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002, as amended); Delegation 13001, “Delegation to the Chief Privacy Officer.”
2 All access controls described in relevant Privacy Impact Assessments and System of Records Notices are available to the public on the DHS website
(www.dhs.gov/privacy).

Topic 2. Compliance with the PRA
Practical Utility
The commenters included several recommendations to
address the concerns regarding the collection of social
media information by USCIS, emphasizing its lack of
practical utility. Here are the key points:
1. Lack of Practical Utility: The comments consistently
state that social media information does not enhance
national security and that the existing vetting processes
are sufficient. They argue that social media screening
does not provide meaningful or actionable information.
2. Lack of Justification and Effectiveness: There is no
empirical evidence that social media surveillance

DHS disagrees that it should define specific criteria
under which applicants may be subject to social media
vetting and believes that social media screening is best
applied for all applicants that are submitting to a
background investigation as part of their request for
an immigration benefit from the United States. Social
media involves publicly available information that is
accessible to anyone without a warrant and DHS
would not be unique in reviewing it. Along with
checking against government systems and
information, DHS officers may use publicly available
information, social media included, as part of the
vetting and screening process to verify the information
submitted. Moreover, the content of the alien’s public
social media can be used to assess and identify
immigration fraud, bars to eligibility, and national
security and public safety threats, requiring vetting
procedures that are as broad as possible. Limiting
searches of social media, such as implementing
reasonable suspicion requirements, would hinder DHS
in its vetting efforts for these legitimate purposes.
Response: Social media is a prominent component of
modern society, and DHS’s efforts to protect the
homeland must evolve as society evolves. Given the
nature of DHS’s mission, it is important for DHS to ask
for and review this information. All information
provided by the applicant may be used to vet the
applicant. In addition to checking against government
information, DHS officers may use publicly available
information, including social media information, as
part of the existing vetting process to verify the
information submitted.
If an initial screening indicates possible information of
concern or a need to further validate information, a

Underestimation of
Burden

The comments highlight several ways in which the
collection of social media information increases the
burden on applicants:
1. Underestimated Time Burden: The estimate of 0.08
hours per form is seen as grossly inaccurate. Collecting
and listing all social media handles used over the past
five years can take significantly longer, especially for
those with multiple accounts.
2. Redundancy: Social media screening is viewed as
redundant for individuals who have already been
vetted through other means.

trained officer will have timely visibility of the publicly
available information on the platforms associated with
the social media identifier(s) provided by the
applicant, along with other information and tools
these officers regularly use in the performance of their
duties. The officer will review provided identifiers on
the relevant platforms in a manner consistent with the
privacy settings the applicant has chosen to adopt for
those platforms.
Social media may be used to support or corroborate
application information, which will help USCIS’ mission
to administer the nation’s lawful immigration system
by providing an additional means to adjudicate issues
related to relevant questions about identity,
occupation, previous travel, and other factors. It may
also be used to identify potential deception or fraud.
Further, it may help detect potential threats because
criminals and terrorists, whether intentionally or not,
have provided previously unavailable information via
social media that identified their true intentions.
Social media may therefore help distinguish
individuals of additional concern from those
individuals whose information substantiates their
eligibility for travel to or entry into the United States
or immigration benefits. In addition, generally other
than discretionary overseas denials, USCIS would not
deny a benefit based on social media information
without first confronting the applicant, petitioner, or
benefit requestor with the information and providing
an opportunity to explain it or rebut any negative
inferences USCIS may have drawn from it. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 103.2(b)(16)(i) and (ii).
Response: USCIS has increased the estimated hour
burden per response by adding an additional 0.59
hours for each impacted information collection to
more accurately reflect the burden imposed on the
public, with the exception of the Form I-131 where an
additional 1.09 hours were added and the Form I-751
where an additional 3.09 hours were added. Based on
the proposed collection of social media identifier(s),
the estimated hour burden per response to complete
these applications will have an overall increase by an
average of 1 hour on each application. USCIS has
closely reviewed the estimated average hour burden
per response based on where social media identifier(s)
are being added and instructional content added to

allow the respondent to provide the requested
information, as necessary, and is confident that this
increase in burden addresses the commenters’
concerns to more accurately reflect the burden
estimate.
It is projected that the proposed collection of social
media identifier(s) will have a minimal impact for
many respondents because most social media users
do not utilize multiple accounts within a given
platform or change usernames regularly. Applicants
are not expected to include accounts designed for use
by multiple users within a business or other
organization. If an applicant has multiple accounts on
multiple platforms, they must provide that
information to the best of their ability.
To provide clearer guidelines on the proposed
collection of information, USCIS updated the form
instructions for each affected information collection to
provide more detailed instructional content on the
social media identifier(s) question(s), including how
the Department defines social media and examples of
social media platforms.

3. Provide Clear Guidelines and Resources: Develop
clear definitions and guidelines for what constitutes a
social media account to minimize confusion. Offer
assistance and resources to help applicants navigate
the social media reporting requirements.
Appropriateness of
generic clearance

The comments highlight several concerns regarding the
appropriateness of using a generic clearance process to
collect social media information:
1.

Inappropriateness for Generic Clearance: The
proposed collections are not suitable for the
generic clearance process, which is meant for
voluntary, low-burden, and uncontroversial
collections. The extensive and invasive nature of
the information required makes it inappropriate
for expedited procedures.

Lack of Specificity and Transparency: The generic
clearance approach lacks specificity about what

44 U.S.C. chapter 35; 5 CFR Part 1320.

Response: The process used by DHS to obtain this
generic clearance is similar to, but no less demanding
than, the process to obtain approval of any new or
revised information collection as it still requires the
standard 60 and 30-day notice process. In addition, a
generic information collection clearance requires the
same level of justification, support, analysis, and level
of approval as any other information collection
approved by the Office of Management and Budget
under the Paperwork Reduction Act and implementing
regulations. 3 This generic clearance is being used to
propose the collection of social media identifier(s) on
the affected information collections. This method
provides a single docket for the public to provide

Potential for Abuse: A generic clearance could
allow agencies to collect a wide range of
information without specific authorization or
oversight, increasing the risk of misuse.

Overall, the comments suggest that the generic
clearance process is not appropriate for collecting social
media information due to its invasive nature, increased
burden on applicants, lack of specificity and
transparency, and potential for misuse.
Recommendations:
1. Use Specific Authorization: Instead of a generic
clearance, use a process that requires specific
authorization and oversight for collecting social
media information to ensure accountability and
prevent misuse.
2.

Provide Clear Justification: Clearly demonstrate
the necessity and practical utility of collecting
social media information, including how it will
improve security outcomes, before proceeding
with any data collection.

Increase Transparency: Provide detailed
information about what data will be collected, how
it will be used, and what safeguards will be in place
to protect privacy and prevent misuse.

comments on the proposed collection of social media
identifier(s) and affected information collections,
which reduces the burden on the public, rather than
the public having to identify and comment on a
separate notice and docket for nine separate
information collections. The use of a generic clearance
also reduces burden and cost to the Federal
government to publish separate Federal register
notices. USCIS agrees that a generic clearance is
usually used for information collections that are
voluntary, low-burden, and non-controversial. 4 As per
requirements under 44 U.S.C. 3501 et. seq. and 5 CFR
1320, USCIS believes that a generic clearance is
appropriate to use for this process in order to make
the proposed necessary changes to enable and help
inform identity verification, national security and
public safety screening, and vetting, and related
inspections.
USCIS is publishing a 30-day Federal Register Notice
for the Generic Clearance for the New Collection of
Social Media Identifier(s) on Immigration Forms. The
60-day notice included, and the 30-day notice will
include, each affected information collection
instrument with instructions which include the
proposed changes on the Federal eRulemaking Portal
site at: https://www.regulations.gov and entering
USCIS-2025-0003.

Topic 3. Compliance with the Privacy Act/Records Act/Information Security/Data Integrity
Response: DHS disagrees with commenters who
Privacy Violation
The comments regarding the collection of social media
believe collection of social media identifiers is a
information emphasize commenters’ concerns about
violation of privacy and leads to potential misuse of
how this practice is viewed as a violation of privacy:
information for vulnerable and other populations.
1. Invasion of Privacy: The requirement to disclose
Any information provided by an individual on a form is
social media identifiers is seen as an unwarranted
done so voluntarily by the individual. DHS does not
intrusion into personal lives, exposing sensitive
compel individuals to request immigration benefits
information that is not necessary for immigration
from USCIS. Details about collected data, including
purposes. Many commenters express that social media how USCIS uses information, shares information and
accounts are deeply personal, and individuals may
protects information are provided publicly via Privacy
4

8 CFR 1320.3(c)(1); Sunstein, Cass R., Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, and Independent Regulatory Agencies:
Paperwork Reduction Act – Generic Clearances (May 28, 2010).

Generic Clearance for the Collection of Social Media Identifier(s) on Immigration Forms - Responses to 60-day Public
Comments
Public Comments (regulations.gov): USCIS-2025-0003
60-day FRN Citation (federalregister.gov): 90 FR 11324
Publish Dates: March 5, 2025 – May 5, 2025
refuse to provide this information or provide
incomplete information, which could jeopardize their
applications. There is a significant concern about the
invasion of privacy for both applicants and their family
members, including U.S. citizens.
2. Government Overreach: The collection is viewed as a
form of government overreach, infringing on individual
liberties and creating a surveillance state under the
guise of security.
3. Potential for Misuse: There are fears that the
collected social media data could be misused or
accessed by unauthorized individuals, leading to
potential harassment or discrimination based on
personal beliefs or affiliations.
4. Impact on Vulnerable Populations: Vulnerable
groups, such as refugees and asylum seekers, may be
particularly affected by privacy invasions, as they often
use social media to connect with support networks and
express their experiences.
Recommendations:
1. Clear Guidelines and Oversight: It was suggested
that if social media information must be collected,
there should be clear guidelines and oversight to
prevent misuse and ensure that the data is used solely
for relevant immigration decisions. This includes
defining what constitutes "social media,” establishing
safeguards to protect personal information, and setting
standards for how the information will be evaluated.
2. Implement Robust Privacy Protections: Establish
comprehensive protections for the collection, storage,
use, and sharing of social media information to prevent
data breaches, unauthorized access, and misuse of
personal information.
3. Ensure Voluntariness: Make sure data collection is
truly voluntary.
4. Limit Scope of Data Collection: Limit the scope of
data collection to only what is necessary for specific,
justified purposes. Avoid broad and vague data
collection practices that could infringe on individuals'
privacy rights.

Impact Assessments (PIAs) and System of Records
Notices (SORNs) on the DHS website. Each USCIS form
also has a DHS Privacy Notice that details the authority
of DHS to collect information, its purpose, when it may
be disclosed, and applicable routine uses.
As previously explained, DHS components must also
adhere to additional guidelines and requirements
when engaging in the operational use of social media.
This policy requires DHS Operational Components to
receive approval from the DHS Privacy Office
regarding the privacy implications of any planned
operational use of social media to ensure that it is
compliant with Departmental privacy policies and
standards. DHS employees, who are permitted and
trained to utilize social media for operational purposes
during the performance of their duties, must adhere
to DHS privacy policies, as established by the Chief
Privacy Officer.
DHS Oversight Offices, including the Office of the
General Counsel, the Privacy Office, and the Office for
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, each review aspects of
DHS policies regarding the use of social media
information. They regularly advise programs on best
practices and methods for ensuring legal and policy
compliance. In addition, the USCIS Privacy Office
reviews and must approve each office’s operational
use of social media and associated activities. These
offices are required to take designated training,
complete a Rules of Behavior document, and obtain a
Privacy Impact Assessment governing the program’s
specific operational use of social media before
implementation.
DHS will only be viewing publicly available information
on the platforms associated with the social media
identifier(s). DHS will not be making requests of the
social media platforms to violate an individual’s
privacy settings to help establish the individual’s
eligibility for travel, entry, or benefits. Additionally,
DHS will not collect social media passwords from
applicants or petitioners.
DHS will make case-by-case determinations based on
the totality of the evidence. DHS has a layered
approach to security and any social media identifiers
collected would be only one piece of a large mixture of
information used in the analysis of the applicant’s

Connections Not Giving
Consent

The comments provided indicate concerns regarding
the lack of consent for collecting social media
information:
1. Lack of Consent: Commenters argue that applicants
may not feel comfortable providing their social media
information or may not fully understand the
implications of sharing this information. There is also a
risk that people could be discouraged from applying for
immigration benefits due to concerns about the privacy
of their online activities.
2. Impact on U.S. Citizens: The requirement to disclose
social media information could infringe on the privacy
and rights of U.S. citizens associated with visa
applicants. Commenters highlight that U.S. citizens,
including children, have a right to privacy from
government searches.
Recommendations:
1. Exclusion of Certain Applicants: It was
recommended that permanent resident immigrants
who are married with children born in the United States
and are completing their process by applying for
citizenship should be excluded from the social media
requirement. Alternatively, they should be allowed to
sign a request to not have their social media scanned
due to privacy concerns for their children.

eligibility. Though there may be the potential for an
applicant to provide false or inaccurate information,
the answers (or lack thereof) provided in conjunction
with the other information considered will help inform
our direction of inquiry.
Response: DHS regularly collects information about
aliens, U.S. citizens, and children in the course of
adjudicating an immigration request. As discussed
before, DHS provides appropriate notification to
individuals, including those covered by the Privacy Act,
by publicly issuing PIAs, SORNs, and publishing privacy
notices on individual forms.
Further, the information that DHS may access via
social media is publicly accessible and DHS may not
access information that is designated as private. DHS
does not specifically target children’s information, but
may collect it if relevant to a case. DHS does not
exclude any category of individual from its review of
publicly available information on social media sites.
Social media platforms provide opportunities to gain
valuable insights into aliens’ movements,
relationships, and behaviors. DHS can use the content
of aliens’ public social media to assess and identify
immigration fraud or other bars to eligibility for
particular immigration benefits, as well as potential
national security and public safety threats.

2. Respect for Privacy Rights: Commenters emphasized
the need to respect the privacy rights of U.S. citizens
and lawful permanent residents, particularly children,
who cannot consent to having their privacy violated.
They recommended that the government should not
have access to any information about individuals or
their children without explicit consent.
Data Integrity

The commenters raised several significant concerns
about data integrity with the collection of social media
information:

Response: DHS takes precautions to maintain the
security, confidentiality, and integrity of all
information collected about individuals. Safeguards
include controls that limit information access to only

Generic Clearance for the Collection of Social Media Identifier(s) on Immigration Forms - Responses to 60-day Public
Comments
Public Comments (regulations.gov): USCIS-2025-0003
60-day FRN Citation (federalregister.gov): 90 FR 11324
Publish Dates: March 5, 2025 – May 5, 2025
1. Manipulability and Inaccuracy: Social media data
can be easily manipulated, hacked, or falsified.
Commenters argue that individuals could provide fake
information or have multiple accounts, making it
difficult to verify the authenticity of the data. This
undermines the reliability and accuracy of using social
media information for vetting purposes.
2. Misinterpretation and Bias: The subjective nature of
social media content can lead to misinterpretation and
bias. Evaluators may not understand the context of
posts, cultural idioms, or sarcasm, leading to incorrect
conclusions. There is also a risk of evaluators being
unintentionally biased by the information they see,
which could impact their decisions.
Recommendations:
1. Verification and Authentication: To address
concerns about the authenticity of social media data,
some commenters recommended implementing robust
verification and authentication processes to ensure that
the information provided is accurate and belongs to the
applicant.
2. Focus on Reliable Methods: Instead of relying on
social media data, commenters recommended focusing
on more reliable and established methods for security
screening and identity verification. This includes
existing background checks and intelligence-sharing
mechanisms.
Topic 4. Impacts on Immigration Benefit Processing/Travel
Delay Benefit
The commenters express concern that the collection of
Processing
social media information will delay the processing of
immigration benefits.
1. Strain on USCIS Resources: The proposed collection
is expected to require additional time and resources for
USCIS officers to review and analyze the social media
information provided. This could lead to longer
processing times as adjudicators will need to spend
more time on each application.
2. Potential for Increased Backlogs: The additional
scrutiny and time required to process applications that
include social media information could exacerbate
existing backlogs within USCIS. Many comments

authorized users. These safeguards employ advanced
security technologies to protect the information
stored on our systems from unauthorized access. To
ensure compliance with these policies, USCIS
personnel complete training on the operational use of
social media and sign the Operational Use of Social
Media Rules of Behavior before any social media use
and annually thereafter, if operational use of social
media is a continuing requirement. The data collected
by USCIS will be safeguarded and stored in accordance
with DHS/USCIS-007 Benefits Information System, see
84 FR 54622 (October 10, 2019) and DHS/USCIS-010
Asylum Information and Pre-Screening System of
Records, see 80 FR 74781 (November 30, 2015).
DHS is aware that social media information can be
hacked, manipulated, or falsified. As stated before,
DHS will use information from social media as one of
several types of evidence that may be used to support
or corroborate information about an applicant. It may
also be used to identify potential deception or fraud.
In addition, generally other than discretionary
overseas denials, USCIS would not deny a benefit
based on social media information without first
confronting the applicant, petitioner, or benefit
requestor with the information and providing an
opportunity to explain it or rebut any negative
inferences USCIS may have drawn from it. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 103.2(b)(16)(i) and (ii).

Response: Any checks of an applicant’s publicly
available social media information will occur
concurrently with and not after the current processing
steps for a particular benefit request. DHS believes
adding the social media questions may reduce
processing times in many situations as it will allow
USCIS to timely use publicly available social media
information to support vetting and adjudication
programs, in addition to supplementing other
information and tools that trained USCIS personnel
regularly use in the performance of their duties.
DHS defines social media as the “sphere of websites,
applications, and web-based tools that connect users
to engage in dialogue, share information and media,

Generic Clearance for the Collection of Social Media Identifier(s) on Immigration Forms - Responses to 60-day Public
Comments
Public Comments (regulations.gov): USCIS-2025-0003
60-day FRN Citation (federalregister.gov): 90 FR 11324
Publish Dates: March 5, 2025 – May 5, 2025
highlight that the agency is already facing significant
delays, and this new requirement could further slow
down the adjudication process.
3. Administrative Complexity: The vague nature of
what constitutes "social media" and how the
information will be used could lead to confusion and
inconsistent application of the rules, resulting in more
appeals and further delays in processing.
Recommendations:
1. Limit Collection to Necessary Cases: Collect social
media information only in cases where there is a
specific reason to believe that an applicant poses a
security risk. This targeted approach would reduce the
overall burden on both applicants and USCIS officers.
2. Streamline the Process: Develop clear and concise
guidelines for what social media information needs to
be provided, ensuring that applicants can easily
understand and comply with the requirements without
extensive effort.
3. Automate and Standardize Review: Implement
automated tools and standardized procedures for
reviewing social media information to minimize the
time required for manual checks by USCIS officers.
However, ensure these tools are accurate and reliable
to avoid misinterpretations.
4. Provide Adequate Training: Ensure that USCIS
officers are adequately trained to efficiently review
social media information without causing unnecessary
delays. This includes understanding cultural and
linguistic nuances to prevent misinterpretations.
5. Increase Resources and Staffing: Allocate additional
resources and staffing to handle the increased
workload resulting from the new requirement. This
could help prevent backlogs and ensure timely
processing of applications.
6. Pilot Programs and Phased Implementation:
Consider implementing the social media collection
requirement as a pilot program or in phases to assess

collaborate, and interact.” Social media vetting, which
has added an overall negligible amount of time to
USCIS processing, has been in effect since 2017 and
performed only by trained officers. Officers who are
responsible for conducting social media vetting sign
agreements outlining Rules of Behavior and receive
several annual trainings on privacy requirements and
principles, and training specifically related to social
media vetting, including how to identify First
Amendment activity. These trainings must be
completed prior to accessing social media and trained
officers must use government-issued equipment to
access social media for government purposes. For
additional information on how USCIS uses social
media, please see the Privacy impact Assessment
found at
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
privacy-pia-uscis-013-01-fdns-august2019.pdf. USCIS
will continue to provide resources and training to
employees to ensure comprehensive, prudent, and
efficient social media screening in the future and
monitor resource allocation in order to meet the DHS
mission needs.
USCIS only accesses social media content that is
publicly available to all users of the social media
platform to fulfill the DHS mission of enhancing
national security and the integrity of the legal
immigration system. Officers do not communicate
with users of social media sites and only passively
review information that is publicly available to all
users of the social media platform. In addition,
generally other than discretionary overseas denials,
USCIS would not deny a benefit based on social media
information without first confronting the applicant,
petitioner, or benefit requestor with the information
and providing an opportunity to explain it or rebut any
negative inferences USCIS may have drawn from it.
See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(i) and (ii). USCIS requires
the ability to consider this information as it may
contradict or substantiate information provided by
applicants in connection with an immigration request
and for national security and public safety purposes.
DHS disagrees that it should define specific criteria
under which applicants may be subject to social media

Deter Travel or
Immigration

7. Regular Review and Adjustment: Regularly review
the impact of the social media collection requirement
on processing times and make adjustments as needed
to ensure it does not cause significant delays.
The commenters highlighted the following ways in
which the proposed collection of social media
identifiers could deter immigration or travel to the U.S.:
1. Chilling Effect on Applicants: Concerns about how
social media information might be interpreted could
discourage eligible individuals from applying for
benefits, potentially leading to fewer applications.
2. Chilling Effect on Free Speech: Immigrants and visa
applicants may self-censor their online activity, fearing
lawful expressions or that dissenting opinions could be
misinterpreted or penalized, discouraging them from
applying for immigration benefits or traveling to the
U.S.
3. Global Reputation: The policy contributes to a
perception of the U.S. as unwelcoming or hostile
toward immigrants, which could deter immigrants and
travelers from choosing the U.S. as a destination.
4. Disproportionate Impact on Marginalized Groups:
The policy is perceived as disproportionately targeting
certain groups, such as individuals from politically
sensitive regions or Muslim-majority countries,
discouraging them from seeking immigration benefits
or traveling to the U.S.

Government Burden

5. Deterrence of Talent and Innovation: Skilled
workers, students, and contributors to the U.S. may
may be discouraged from immigrating or traveling due
to privacy concerns or fears of surveillance, redirecting
talent to other countries and harming U.S.
competitiveness.
The comments express concerns about the proposed
collection of social media information by USCIS and
state that they believe it will burden the government:
1. Increased Administrative Burden and Costs:

vetting and believes that social media screening is best
applied for all applicants. The content of the alien’s
public social media can be used to assess and identify
immigration fraud, bars to eligibility, and national
security and public safety threats, requiring vetting
procedures that are as broad as possible.
Response: DHS seeks to balance its goals of securing
the U.S. border and immigration system while
facilitating legitimate travel and provision of
immigration benefits to eligible aliens. While we
recognize that this collection may influence the
decisions of a limited number of travelers or
immigration benefit seekers, DHS’s top priority is the
safety and security of the American people and
homeland. DHS does not seek to unnecessarily burden
applicants but rather seeks to obtain all information
necessary to maintain a robust and dynamic screening
system. Additionally, DHS does not anticipate that the
collection of this additional information will
significantly affect processing times for most
applicants.
This collection is not targeted at certain regions or
countries. Regardless of nationality or country of
origin, this collection will affect all applicants
completing relevant forms. USCIS does not deny
benefits based on the applicant’s race, color, age,
sexual orientation, religion, sex, national origin, or
disability.

Response: The addition of social media identifiers to
the nine impacted forms will add a negligible amount
of time to USCIS processing. The collection of
applicants’ social media identifiers and associated
platforms will assist DHS by reducing the time needed



The collection and review of social media
information will significantly increase the
workload for USCIS officers, leading to higher
administrative costs and potentially requiring
additional staff and resources.
This process will slow down the already
lengthy and backlogged immigration system,
causing delays in processing applications and
petitions.

2. Redundancy and Ineffectiveness: The proposal
duplicates existing screening efforts by other agencies,
such as the Department of State and Customs and
Border Protection, without clear evidence of additional
benefits.
3. Economic and Operational Impact:
 The proposed changes will increase the
economic burden on both USCIS and
applicants, potentially leading to higher fees
and longer processing times.
 The additional workload could strain USCIS'
budget and resources, potentially leading to
fiscal challenges similar to those experienced
in the past.
Recommendations:
1. Improve Existing Vetting Processes: Focus on
enhancing and streamlining current vetting processes,
such as background checks and document verification,
rather than adding new requirements.
2. Enhance Coordination with Other Agencies: Improve
coordination and information-sharing with other
agencies, such as the Department of State and Customs
and Border Protection, to avoid duplicative efforts and
ensure effective use of existing screening processes.
3. Use Technology Wisely: Consider using advanced
technology, such as artificial intelligence, to assist in the
initial review of social media information, but ensure
human oversight is in place to verify and contextualize
findings.
4. Conduct Economic Considerations:
 Perform a thorough cost-benefit analysis to
determine if the potential security benefits
justify the significant economic and
operational burdens on USCIS and taxpayers.

to validate the attribution of the publicly available
posted information to the applicant and prevent misassociations. It will provide trained DHS adjudication
personnel with more timely visibility of the publicly
available information on the platforms provided by
the applicant. While social media handles would be
only one piece of a large mixture of information used
in the analysis of the applicant’s eligibility, a more
robust screening process may reduce unnecessary
delays and costs by limiting the filing of applications
for immigration benefits by ineligible aliens or
reducing erroneous approvals that must later be
addressed through revocation, rescission, or similar
processes. DHS may consider any potential costs from
increased social media screenings when it conducts a
comprehensive fee review in the future.
USCIS will continue to provide resources and training
to employees to ensure comprehensive, prudent, and
efficient social media screening in the future and
monitor resource allocation in order to meet the DHS
mission.

Artificial Intelligence
(AI) Concerns

1. Unreliable and Biased Results: AI tools are prone to
errors and biases, leading to unreliable and inaccurate
assessments of social media content.
Misinterpretations by AI can result in false positives or
negatives, causing unwarranted denials of immigration
benefits.
For example, some commenters noted that the use of
keyword-based algorithms to comply with the
Executive Order on “Ending Radical and Wasteful
Government DEI Programs and Preferencing” has been
ineffective and has led to the unintended loss of key
historical figures on Department of Defense websites
and programs, raising concerns that a similar faulty
approach could be applied to social media screening.
2. Lack of Specific Parameters and Vague Criteria: The
proposal lacks clear definitions for terms like "threats
to public safety," "undermining national security," and
"harmful anti-American ideologies," leading to
potential misuse and arbitrary decisions by AI.
3. Privacy and Surveillance Concerns: Using AI for
social media monitoring involves submitting large
amounts of personal data to potentially insecure and
intrusive analysis. The proposal raises significant
privacy concerns, including the potential for continuous
monitoring and misuse of collected data.
4. Lack of Effectiveness: There is little evidence that AIdriven social media monitoring improves national
security or public safety.
5. Increased Resource Allocation: Implementing AI for
social media monitoring will require significant
resources, including training and oversight, adding to
the administrative burden on USCIS. The use of AI could
divert resources from more effective and efficient
measures for enhancing national security.

Response: Determinations for travel, entry, and
immigration benefits will be made by trained DHS
officers and not by computer systems or algorithms.
USCIS does not use artificial intelligence for social
media vetting. Trained DHS personnel may review
publicly available social media information accessed
via the social media identifier(s) provided by
applicants as additional data points to assist in its
vetting of an application. Immigration benefits will be
independently reviewed, and a case-by-case
determination will be made by DHS officers based on
the totality of the circumstances. In addition, generally
other than discretionary overseas denials, USCIS
would not deny a benefit based on social media
information without first confronting the applicant,
petitioner, or benefit requestor with the information
and providing an opportunity to explain it or rebut any
negative inferences USCIS may have drawn from it.
See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(i) and (ii).

Generic Clearance for the Collection of Social Media Identifier(s) on Immigration Forms - Responses to 60-day Public
Comments
Public Comments (regulations.gov): USCIS-2025-0003
60-day FRN Citation (federalregister.gov): 90 FR 11324
Publish Dates: March 5, 2025 – May 5, 2025
6. Potential for Abuse and Discrimination: AI tools may
exacerbate existing biases and lead to discriminatory
practices, particularly against vulnerable populations
such as refugees and asylees. The lack of human
oversight in AI-driven decisions increases the risk of
arbitrary and unjust outcomes.
Recommendations:
1. Avoid Using AI for Social Media Monitoring: Many
commenters suggest that USCIS should avoid using AI
for social media monitoring due to its unreliability and
potential for bias.
2. Ensure Human Oversight: If AI is used, it should be
accompanied by human oversight to verify and
contextualize the findings, ensuring that decisions are
not solely based on AI-generated results.
3. Focus on Targeted Investigations: Use AI for
targeted investigations based on credible threats rather
than blanket social media data collection, which can be
more effective and less intrusive.
4. Establish Clear Guidelines and Parameters: Develop
and implement clear guidelines and parameters for AI
to ensure consistency and fairness in the evaluation of
social media content.
5. Invest in Training and Resources: Invest in training
for USCIS officers to accurately interpret AI-generated
data and make informed decisions.
6. Conduct Thorough Testing and Validation: Conduct
thorough testing and validation of AI tools to ensure
their accuracy and reliability before deployment.
7. Protect Privacy and Data Security: Implement robust
privacy and data security measures to protect the
personal information collected and analyzed by AI
tools. Ensure that AI-driven data collection complies
with privacy laws and regulations.
8. Accountability: Provide mechanisms for applicants to
challenge and correct any AI-generated errors or
misinterpretations.

Generic Clearance for the Collection of Social Media Identifier(s) on Immigration Forms - Responses to 60-day Public
Comments
Public Comments (regulations.gov): USCIS-2025-0003
60-day FRN Citation (federalregister.gov): 90 FR 11324
Publish Dates: March 5, 2025 – May 5, 2025
9. Avoid Automated Tools: Given the potential for
errors and misinterpretations, commenters
recommended avoiding the use of automated tools for
analyzing social media data. Instead, they suggested
relying on human evaluators with proper training and
context-specific understanding.
Topic 5. Constitutional Issues
First Amendment/Free
The comments provided indicate the proposed
Speech/Chilling Effect
collection of social media information by USCIS violates
First Amendment rights.
1. Invasion of Privacy and Free Speech: Collecting
social media identifiers is seen as an invasion of privacy
and a violation of the First Amendment rights to free
speech and expression. The requirement could deter
individuals from expressing their views freely online
due to fear of government scrutiny.
2. Chilling Effect on Free Expression: The requirement
infringes on First Amendment rights, potentially chilling
lawful speech and associations. Applicants may feel
compelled to delete or avoid political or religious
speech online for fear of misinterpretation.
3. Potential for Misinterpretation and Misuse: Posts
made in jest, cultural idioms, or sarcastic remarks could
be misconstrued as threatening without context. Liking
or following certain posts or accounts does not signify
endorsement, yet may unjustly flag an applicant.
4. Discriminatory Impact: The policy risks introducing
systemic discrimination, as marginalized communities—
particularly immigrants—are more likely to be
misjudged or scrutinized for online expression that is
culturally nuanced, misunderstood, or taken out of
context.
5. Dangerous Precedent: The proposal sets a
dangerous precedent for expanding surveillance
practices to other sectors of society, threatening the
rights of all individuals.

Response: The Department respects every individual’s
right to maintain an opinion without interference and
to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of
all kinds. The proposal to collect publicly available
social media information to assist in determining
admissibility or eligibility for immigration benefits is
consistent with this commitment.
Consistent with the requirements of the Privacy Act (5
U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7)), DHS does not maintain records
“describing how any [citizen of the United States or
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence]
exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment,
unless expressly authorized by statute or by the
individual about whom the record is maintained or
unless pertinent to and within the scope of an
authorized law enforcement activity.” Furthermore,
DHS policy directs that “DHS personnel shall not
collect, maintain in DHS systems, or use information
protected by the First Amendment unless (a) an
individual has expressly granted their consent for DHS
to collect, maintain and use that information; (b)
maintaining the record is expressly authorized by a
federal statute; or (c) that information is relevant to a
criminal, civil or administrative activity relating to a
law DHS enforces or administers. In addition, DHS
personnel should not pursue by questioning, research,
or other means, information relating to how an
individual exercises his or her First Amendment rights
unless one or more of the same conditions applies.”
DHS will handle social media identifiers in the same
manner as other information collected through DHS
applications and is in the process of updating the
relevant System of Records Notices (SORN) and
Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA), available on the
DHS website (www.dhs.gov/privacy). To ensure
compliance with these policies, USCIS officers must
complete annual training on the operational use of
social media and sign a rules of behavior document.
Additionally, DHS will not request user passwords in

Fourth Amendment
i. Overreach

The comments provided in response to the USCIS
proposal mandating the collection of social media
identifiers highlight several key concerns regarding
potential violations of the Fourth Amendment. Here are
the main points raised:
1. Expectation of Privacy: The collection of social media
identifiers is seen as an intrusion into individuals'
private digital spaces. Many argue that social media
profiles, especially those set to private, should be
protected under the Fourth Amendment, which guards
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
2. Warrant Requirement: Critics emphasize that the
Fourth Amendment typically requires law enforcement
to obtain a warrant based on probable cause before
conducting searches. The proposal to collect social
media information without such judicial oversight is
viewed as a violation of this requirement.
3. Scope of Collection: The broad and indiscriminate
nature of the proposed data collection is a significant
concern. Commenters argue that it constitutes a
generalized search without specific suspicion, which the
Fourth Amendment explicitly forbids.
4. Presumption of Guilt: The policy is criticized for
presuming guilt by subjecting individuals to
unwarranted surveillance. This inversion of the
presumption of innocence is seen as a violation of due
process and an unconstitutional preemptive
punishment.
Recommendations:
1. Require Warrants for Social Media Data Collection:
Ensure that any collection of social media information is
conducted with a warrant based on probable cause.
This would align the process with traditional Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures.

furtherance of this collection and will not violate or
attempt to subvert individual privacy settings or
controls the applicants may have implemented on
social media platforms.
Response: DHS disagrees that the collection of social
media identifiers violates the Fourth Amendment,
individual expectations of privacy, prohibition on
unlawful or warrantless searches and seizures, and
otherwise presumes guilt of an individual.
This collection is also consistent with Supreme Court
rulings related to Fourth Amendment protections to
the extent such protections are applicable in this
context. It is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment
to ask questions of an individual who is not detained
and may choose whether or not to answer them. See,
e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (citing
cases). Individuals who choose to seek admission to
the United States or apply for immigration benefits do
so on a voluntary basis. DHS provides ample notice
that information provided by applicants may be
verified and additional background searches may be
conducted for the requested benefit eligibility.
Additionally, federal laws, including the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) and Homeland Security Act
of 2002, provide authority for this information
collection. For example, INA § 287(b), 8 U.S.C. §
1357(b), and 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(a)(2) empower officers
and agents to “take and consider evidence concerning
the privilege of any person to enter, reenter, pass
through, or reside in the United States.” Similarly, for
naturalization purposes, INA § 335, 8 U.S.C. § 1446,
empowers any employee of USCIS to conduct a
personal investigation of the person applying for
naturalization, take testimony concerning the
admissibility of the applicant for naturalization, and
require the production of relevant books, papers, and
documents.
USCIS personnel will only use social media identifiers
to locate and review publicly available social media
information, and as the Supreme Court has explained,
“What a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see, e.g.,
Palmieri v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 3d 191, 210

Generic Clearance for the Collection of Social Media Identifier(s) on Immigration Forms - Responses to 60-day Public
Comments
Public Comments (regulations.gov): USCIS-2025-0003
60-day FRN Citation (federalregister.gov): 90 FR 11324
Publish Dates: March 5, 2025 – May 5, 2025
2. Limit Data Collection to Specific, Justified Cases:
Restrict social media data collection to cases where
there is clear, individualized suspicion of wrongdoing or
a direct connection to national security concerns. This
would prevent broad, indiscriminate searches and
ensure that data collection is relevant and necessary.
3. Implement Judicial Oversight: Establish a system of
judicial oversight to review and approve requests for
social media data collection. This would provide an
additional layer of protection and ensure that searches
are conducted lawfully and with proper justification.
4. Define Clear and Narrow Criteria for Data
Collection: Clearly define the criteria and scope for
social media data collection to prevent overly broad or
vague searches. This would help ensure that only
relevant information is collected and that the process is
transparent and accountable.
5. Ensure Transparency and Accountability: Provide
clear guidelines and publicly available information on
how social media data will be used, stored, and
protected. This transparency would help build trust and
ensure that data collection practices are subject to
public scrutiny and accountability.
6. Minimize Data Retention and Access: Limit the
retention period for collected social media data and
restrict access to only those officials who need it for
specific, justified purposes. This would reduce the risk
of misuse or unauthorized access to personal
information.
7. Conduct Privacy Impact Assessments: Regularly
conduct privacy impact assessments to evaluate the
potential impact of social media data collection on
individuals' privacy rights. These assessments should be
used to inform and adjust policies and practices to
better protect Fourth Amendment rights.
8. Provide Opt-Out Options: Allow applicants to opt
out of providing social media identifiers without facing
negative consequences, unless there is a specific,
justified reason for requiring the information. This
would respect individuals' privacy and autonomy.

(D.D.C. 2014) (holding that a Plaintiff cannot claim a
Fourth Amendment violation because there is “no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information
[the Plaintiff] made available to ‘friends’ on his
Facebook page”); United States v. Meregildo, 883 F.
Supp. 2d 523, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“When a social
media user disseminates his postings and information
to the public, they are not protected by the Fourth
Amendment.”).
DHS disagrees that it should define specific criteria
under which applicants may be subject to social media
vetting and believes that social media screening is best
applied for all applicants. Social media involves
publicly available information that is accessible to
anyone without a warrant and DHS would not be
unique in reviewing it. Along with checking against
government systems and information, DHS officers
may use publicly available information, social media
included, as part of the vetting and screening process
to verify the information submitted. Moreover, the
content of the alien’s public social media can be used
to assess and identify immigration fraud, bars to
eligibility, and national security and public safety
threats, requiring vetting procedures that are as broad
as possible.

9. Implement Robust Data Security Measures: Ensure
that collected social media data is protected with
strong security measures to prevent unauthorized
access, breaches, or misuse. This would help safeguard
individuals' private information.

Due Process under the
Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments

10. Regularly Review and Update Policies: Establish a
process for regularly reviewing and updating social
media data collection policies to ensure they remain
compliant with Fourth Amendment protections and
adapt to evolving legal standards and technological
changes.
The comments provided raise several concerns about
how the collection of social media information could
violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which
guarantee due process.
Due Process Violations:
o Arbitrary Decisions: The lack of clear standards
for using social media information could lead to
arbitrary decision-making in immigration
proceedings. This undermines the due process
rights of applicants, as decisions may be made
without fair procedures or consistent criteria.
o Procedural Due Process: The policy raises
questions about how social media content will be
interpreted and whether petitioners will have a
meaningful opportunity to address adverse
findings based on such content. This could result
in decisions being made without giving individuals
a fair chance to defend themselves or correct
misunderstandings.
o Disproportionate Impact: The collection could
disproportionately affect certain groups,
potentially leading to unequal treatment and
further due process concerns. This selective
targeting could result in unfair and biased
decision-making processes.
Recommendations:
1. Clear and Specific Justification: Implement strict,
narrowly tailored criteria that specifically define which
applicants may be subject to social media screening,
with documented reasonable suspicion requirements.
This ensures that the collection of social media

Response: DHS disagrees that collection of social
media identifiers violates the individual’s right to due
process under both the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The Supreme Court has construed the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to
impose the same due process limitations on the states
as the Fifth Amendment does on the federal
government. As DHS is part of the Executive Branch,
and thus, the Federal Government, it is not clear how
the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable in this
instance.
Regarding the Fifth Amendment, the proposed
information collection does not impact the due
process rights of applicants, petitioners, or benefit
requestors. For example, in general other than
discretionary overseas denials, USCIS would not deny
a benefit based on social media information without
first confronting the applicant, petitioner, or benefit
requestor with the information and providing an
opportunity to explain it or rebut any negative
inferences USCIS may have drawn from it. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 103.2(b)(16)(i) and (ii). Additionally, if USCIS makes
an adverse finding on any request or application, the
individual may be entitled to additional immigration
processes which may include the right to appeal or
appear before an immigration judge.

Fifth Amendment – Self
Incrimination

5. Regular Audits and Oversight: Implement regular
third-party audits of the implementation patterns to
prevent discriminatory application and ensure
compliance with due process standards. This helps
maintain accountability and transparency in the
decision-making process.
The comments provided in response to the USCIS
proposal mandating the collection of social media
identifiers highlight concerns regarding potential selfincrimination.
Self-Incrimination:
o Compelled Disclosure: Requiring applicants to
disclose their social media identifiers could be
seen as a form of compelled speech, forcing
individuals to provide information that may be
used against them. This could violate the Fifth
Amendment's protection against selfincrimination, as individuals might be compelled
to reveal potentially incriminating information
through their social media activity.

Response: The Fifth amendment prohibition against
self-incrimination applies to proceedings in which the
Government seeks to compel testimony that a witness
reasonably believes could be used against him in a
state or federal criminal proceeding. A risk that the
testimony might subject the witness to deportation or
other civil consequences (such as, here, denial of an
immigration benefit) is not a sufficient ground for
asserting the privilege. See United States v. Balsys,
524 U.S. 666, 671–72 (1998). Additionally, here, the
Government does not seek to compel testimony, but
rather plans to collect publicly available social media
information already posted by the applicant. Despite
the inapplicability of the Fifth Amendment in this
situation, DHS is not requiring individuals to
incriminate themselves by providing social media

identifiers to USCIS on its forms. Filing for immigration
benefits and including requested information is a
voluntary action by an individual. Information about
the use of provided information by the government is
explained in SORNs, PIAs and the DHS Privacy Notice
provided on every USCIS form.

2. Transparency and Guidelines: Develop
comprehensive, transparent guidelines for how social
media content will be evaluated, including cultural
context considerations. This helps ensure that decisions
are made consistently and fairly, providing applicants
with a clear understanding of how their information will
be used.
3. Appeals Process: Create a clear appeals process for
adverse findings based on social media content. This
provides applicants with a meaningful opportunity to
challenge and address any negative decisions, ensuring
that they can defend themselves and correct
misunderstandings.
4. Case-by-Case Basis: Collect social media information
on a case-by-case basis as needed, rather than from all
applicants. This targeted approach reduces the risk of
arbitrary decision-making and ensures that only
relevant information is collected.

Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection

5. Regular Audits and Oversight: Implement regular
third-party audits of the implementation patterns to
prevent discriminatory application and ensure
compliance with due process standards. This helps
maintain accountability and transparency in the
decision-making process.
The comments express concerns that the collection of
social media information violates the Fourteenth
Amendment in several ways:
1. Equal Protection:
o Disproportionate Impact: The collection of social
media identifiers could disproportionately affect
certain groups, particularly those more active on
social media or those from specific backgrounds.
This could lead to unequal treatment and

Response: These commenters are referring to the
Equal Protection clause located at the end of Section 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States. That clause states, “All persons born
or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,

discrimination, violating the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Selective Enforcement: There is concern that the
regulation could be used to target specific
individuals or groups based on their immigration
status or other characteristics, leading to
unequal application of the law.

2. Privacy Rights: The comments highlight that social
media profiles often contain private and personal
information. Broad and vague data collection practices
without clear limitations could infringe on individuals'
privacy rights, which are protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause.
Recommendations:
1. Specific Justification: Ensure that any collection of
social media information is based on clear,
individualized reasons. This would help prevent
arbitrary decision-making and ensure that data
collection is necessary and relevant to specific cases.
2. Voluntary Disclosure: Allow individuals to provide
social media identifiers voluntarily, without facing
negative consequences for opting out. This respects
individuals' privacy and reduces the risk of coercion.
3. Clear Standards and Transparency: Develop and
publish clear standards for how social media
information will be used in immigration proceedings.
This would help ensure consistency and fairness in
decision-making. Provide transparency about what data
will be collected, how it will be used, and the criteria for
its use.
4. Privacy Protections: Implement strong safeguards to
protect the collected data from misuse. This includes
ensuring that data is securely stored and only
accessible to authorized personnel for legitimate
purposes. Avoid broad and vague data collection
practices that could infringe on individuals' privacy
rights.
5. Dispute Resolution Process: Establish a clear process
for individuals to assess the data collected about them
and to dispute any adverse actions taken as a result.

liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” As noted above, the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States, and not
the federal government, and thus it is inapplicable
here.
Although the Fourteenth Amendment is not
applicable, DHS strives to be fair and efficiently
execute the immigration laws established by Congress.
Social media identifiers will be provided by all
individuals requesting benefits under specified forms.
DHS has not exempted any group of people from
vetting or providing the information. Social media
identifiers and information will be handled in the same
manner by DHS, regardless of the applicant’s race,
color, age, sexual orientation, religion, sex, national
origin, or disability.

The comments express concern about how the
collection of social media information can be
discriminatory and pose public safety concerns.
Discriminatory Concerns:
1. Targeting Vulnerable Demographics:
o Bias Based on Race, Religion, and Identity: The
lack of specificity in the regulation about which
"certain populations" will be subject to social
media information collection creates
opportunities for bias based on race, religion,
and other identity factors. This could lead to
disproportionate targeting of specific groups,
such as Muslims, immigrants from certain
countries, or political activists.
o Disproportionate Impact on Marginalized
Communities: The policy could
disproportionately affect marginalized
communities, including immigrants, asylum
seekers, and refugees. These groups may already
face significant scrutiny and discrimination, and
the additional burden of social media
surveillance could exacerbate these issues.
o Cultural and Linguistic Misunderstandings:
Social media posts made in different languages
or cultural contexts could be misinterpreted,
leading to unfair treatment and discrimination.
2. Selective Enforcement:
o Without clear standards for how social media
information will be used, there is a risk of
arbitrary decision-making. This could lead to
selective enforcement against individuals based
on their political beliefs, religious affiliations, or
other personal characteristics.
Public Safety Concerns:

Response: DHS is steadfastly committed to the highest
standards of conduct, especially when it comes to the
fair, unbiased, and transparent enforcement of our
mission responsibilities. The collection of this
additional information will be used to help enforce our
immigration laws by assisting in the adjudication of
eligibility to travel to or be admitted to the United
States or be granted an immigration-related benefit.
Existing DHS policy prohibits the consideration of race
or ethnicity in our investigation, screening, and
enforcement activities in all but the most exceptional
instances. This policy is reaffirmed in manuals,
policies, directives, and guidelines. Existing DHS policy
also prohibits profiling, targeting, or discrimination
against any individual for exercising his or her First
Amendment rights.
We will not use the information in a discriminatory
manner that prevents entry into the United States or
denies benefits based on the applicant’s race, color,
age, sexual orientation, religion, sex, national origin, or
disability. DHS will handle social media identifiers in
the same manner as other information collected for
immigration benefit purposes. Social media
information is one data point for benefit requestors
and is intended to be considered along with other
information, including other application data provided
by applicants. DHS will make case-by-case
determinations based on the totality of the
circumstances. In addition, generally other than
discretionary overseas denials, USCIS would not deny
a benefit based on social media information without
first confronting the applicant, petitioner, or benefit
requestor with the information and providing an
opportunity to explain it or rebut any negative
inferences USCIS may have drawn from it. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 103.2(b)(16)(i) and (ii).

Generic Clearance for the Collection of Social Media Identifier(s) on Immigration Forms - Responses to 60-day Public
Comments
Public Comments (regulations.gov): USCIS-2025-0003
60-day FRN Citation (federalregister.gov): 90 FR 11324
Publish Dates: March 5, 2025 – May 5, 2025
1. Ineffectiveness in Enhancing Security:
o Lack of Evidence: There is little evidence to
suggest that collecting social media identifiers
meaningfully improves national security.
o False Positives and Misinterpretation: Social
media posts can be easily misinterpreted,
especially when taken out of context. This can
lead to false positives, where innocent
individuals are flagged as security threats based
on misunderstood or out-of-context posts.
2. Avoid Disproportionate Impact:
o Monitor and Evaluate Impact: Ensure that the
regulation does not disproportionately affect
certain groups or lead to unequal treatment.
This includes monitoring and evaluating the
impact of the regulation to prevent
discrimination.
o Cultural Sensitivity Training: Provide training
for officials to understand cultural and
linguistic nuances to avoid misinterpretation
and bias.
Topic 7. Unreliable Information
Imprecise/Confusing
The comments highlight concerns that applicants may
Social Media terms
be confused about what constitutes a “social media
platform” or “social media identifier,” leading to
inconsistent reporting by applicants.
Recommendations:
1. Define Social Media Clearly: There is a need for a
clear and precise definition of what constitutes a "social
media platform" or "social media identifier." This would
help applicants understand exactly what information
they need to provide.
2. Limit Scope to Relevant Platforms: Focus the
collection on mainstream social media platforms where
public posts are more likely to be relevant. Avoid
including platforms where social interactions are
incidental to the primary function (e.g., payment apps
like Venmo).
3. Improve Instructions and FAQs: Provide detailed
instructions and FAQs to help applicants understand
their obligations. This could include examples of what is
and isn't considered social media and what types of
identifiers need to be disclosed. This could include a list
of notable social media platforms (e.g., Facebook,

Response: DHS defines social media as the “sphere of
websites, applications, and web-based tools that
connect users to engage in dialogue, share
information and media, collaborate, and interact.”
Social media platforms include Facebook, X (formerly
Twitter), Instagram, among others, that are commonly
identified as “social media”. That definition has been
used by DHS previously. Please see the Privacy Impact
Assessment found at
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
privacy-pia-uscis-013-01-fdns-august2019.pdf. This
definition of “social media,” as well as a list of
examples of social media platforms, is specifically
included in the form instructions for each of the forms
collecting social media information, and DHS expects
the definition and examples to eliminate any
confusion concerning the definition of a “social media
platform.” DHS believes the term “social media
identifier” is sufficiently descriptive and will be
commonly understood by the public to signify one’s
“username”, “ID”, or “handle”. Based on our research,
we think the terms used and the additional
information in form instructions are sufficient, but we
welcome public comments on additional terms that

The comments provide several specific points about
how the collection of social media information may
lead to unreliable information due to the lack of social
media presence or the presence of false information.
1. Lack of Social Media Presence:
o

No Social Media Accounts: Some individuals
do not use social media, raising concerns
about how their applications will be handled
and whether they will be unfairly penalized.
Inactive or Forgotten Accounts: Applicants
may have old, inactive, or forgotten social
media accounts that they do not remember to
report, leading to potential penalties for nondisclosure.
Private Use: Some people use social media
only privately with friends and family, making
it difficult for USCIS to access and evaluate
their content.

2. Forgotten or Inactive Accounts: Applicants may have
forgotten about old accounts, lost access to them, or
the platforms may have been shut down. This adds to
the difficulty of accurately reporting all relevant social
media handles.
3. False or Misleading Information:
o

Fake Accounts: Social media accounts can be
easily faked, hacked, or manipulated, leading
to the potential for incorrect information
being attributed to an applicant.

Multiple Accounts: Individuals may have
multiple social media accounts, including some
that are not disclosed or are used for different
purposes, complicating the verification
process.

we should consider. If a social media platform does
not use a handle, the new form instructions request
that applicants provide the relevant associated
identifiable information used to access the platform,
such as an email address or phone number.
Response: DHS has a layered approach to security and
any social media identifiers collected would be only
one piece of information used in the analysis of the
applicant’s eligibility. Although the potential exists for
an applicant to provide false or inaccurate information
about their social media identifiers on a form, the
response (or lack thereof) the applicant provides in
the context of the larger picture will guide the line of
inquiry pursued by the DHS officer. The potential for
inaccurate/false social media or other application
information does not render the collection of this
information unnecessary. DHS makes case-by-case
determinations based on the totality of the
circumstances consistent with its authorities. In
addition, generally other than discretionary overseas
denials, USCIS would not deny a benefit based on
social media information without first confronting the
applicant, petitioner, or benefit requestor with the
information and providing an opportunity to explain it
or rebut any negative inferences USCIS may have
drawn from it. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(i) and (ii).
DHS is aware that some individuals may not have
social media accounts, therefore USCIS has updated
the proposed collection of information to include the
following question on each impacted information
collection: “Have you had or used a social media
account in the past five (5) years? Yes/No.” In
addition, to address the recommendation to provide
clarity on the time limits for reporting requirements,
the form instructions for each impacted form state
that applicants, petitioners, or benefit requestors
must provide all social media handles, identifiers, or
usernames used on social media over the past five (5)
years.
To address the recommendation to provide clarity on
specifying whether inactive or deleted accounts need
to be reported, USCIS updated the form instructions
for each impacted information collection to reflect

Impersonation: There is a risk of mistaken
identity or impersonation, where someone
else's actions or posts are wrongly attributed
to the applicant.

that responses should include both active social media
accounts and inactive or deleted accounts.

Recommendations:
1. Acknowledge Lack of Social Media Presence:
Provide clear guidelines for non-users by establishing
procedures for applicants without social media
accounts to ensure they are not unfairly penalized.
2. Clarify Reporting Requirements: Guidelines should
specify whether inactive, forgotten, or deleted
accounts need to be reported. There should also be
clarity on the time limits for reporting inactive
accounts.
3. Verification Mechanisms for False Information:
Develop robust methods to verify the authenticity and
ownership of social media accounts. Use crossreferencing techniques with other data sources to
validate social media information.
4. Avoid Overreliance on Automated Tools: Ensure
human oversight in social media vetting to verify
accuracy and context.
Language Concerns

Commenters expressed concerns around not being able
to recognize the English-language names of some of the
social media platforms.

Response: The platforms selected represent those
which are among the most popular on a global basis.
The platforms listed may be updated by the
Department by adding or removing platforms in order
to evolve the U.S. Government's uniform vetting with
emerging communication technologies and common
usage; therefore, the list will change over time. The
Department believes the social media platforms are
recognizable, but the form also offers the ability for
the user to enter their preferred social media
platform.
A person who does not speak English may prepare the
form with the assistance of an interpreter. The
interpreter must read each question to the applicant,
including the contents of any drop-down menu
choices for selection of the correct response. The
applicant must certify that the interpreter named on
the form has also read every question and instruction
on the application as well as his or her answer to every

Generic Clearance for the Collection of Social Media Identifier(s) on Immigration Forms - Responses to 60-day Public
Comments
Public Comments (regulations.gov): USCIS-2025-0003
60-day FRN Citation (federalregister.gov): 90 FR 11324
Publish Dates: March 5, 2025 – May 5, 2025
question, in a language in which he or she is fluent and
that they understand every question and instruction
on the form as translated.
DHS understands that the name of some social media
platforms may not translate completely or exactly to a
foreign language, but that is true for many English
language words and business trade names. We do not
think that most social media companies go by a
different name in different countries. To the extent
that they do, DHS believes that applicants will be able
to understand if one referenced in the options
provided is one that they have used. This is further
strengthened by social media platforms' use of
branding, a digital marketing strategy that uses unique
platform-specific versions of identity, visuals, content,
and formats. However, even if an applicant does not
understand that the platform they have used is one
referenced in the list provided, they can still provide
their social media information by selecting “other”
and entering the information under that category.
Topic 8. Public Concerns Expressed
General Opposition
The commenters expressed general opposition to the
collection of social media information. Overall, the
feedback reflects a significant apprehension that the
policy would undermine democratic values and civil
liberties.
Some commenters expressed that other Federal
government agencies should be sifting through social
media for bad actors and conducting the screening and
vetting, not DHS.

Response: Many commenters did not make clear
objections. Therefore, DHS cannot provide specific
responses to many of these general oppositions.
DHS’s role in reviewing publicly available social media
information accessed via social media identifier(s)
provided by applicants is appropriate given that DHS’s
mission to is to secure the Nation from threats. This
includes denying immigration benefits to inadmissible
or ineligible aliens, as appropriate and in accordance
with law, including criminals and terrorists.
USCIS officers make their decisions based on the
requirements of U.S. immigration law. Information
found on social media via the provision of social media
identifier(s) will enhance the vetting process and
identify potential threats. For example, social media
may be used to support or corroborate a benefit
seeker’s application by providing an additional means
to adjudicate issues related to relevant questions
about identity, occupation, previous travel, and other
factors. It may also be used to identify potential
deception or fraud. Social media may help distinguish
individuals of additional concern from those

Waste of taxpayer
dollars

The commenters argue that the initiative is a waste of
public resources and taxpayer dollars. They believe that
the funds could be better allocated to more effective
and necessary programs.
Recommendations:
1. Terminate the Initiative: Many comments
recommend that the policy be terminated immediately
due to its perceived ineffectiveness, ethical concerns,
and waste of taxpayer money.
2. Focus on Existing Vetting Processes: Several
comments recommend relying on the current rigorous
vetting processes that are already in place, rather than
adding an additional layer of social media surveillance.
3. Focus on Real Security Threats: Several comments
recommend focusing surveillance and security efforts
on real threats, such as violent criminals and terrorists,
rather than targeting individuals who are legally seeking
immigration benefits.

Police State/Excessive
Government Oversight

4. Utilize More Reliable Methods: Some comments
suggest using more reliable and effective methods for
security screening, rather than relying on potentially
unreliable and easily manipulated social media data.
The comments express strong opposition to the
proposal to collect social media information from
immigration applicants, arguing that it is fascist, leads
to a police state, and undermines democratic
principles. Here are the key points made in the
comments:
1. Authoritarian Tactics: The proposal is described as
authoritarian mirroring tactics.
2. Police State Concerns:
o The collection of social media information is
seen as a step towards mass surveillance and a
police state.
o There is fear that this policy will create an
environment where individuals are constantly
monitored and afraid to express their opinions
freely.

individuals whose information substantiates their
eligibility for immigration benefits.
Response: Unlike many other federal agencies, USCIS
is primarily (roughly 96%) fee funded, meaning its
operations are funded by fees charged to applicants
for immigration or naturalization benefits, rather than
taxpayer money, and this funding is used to adjudicate
immigration benefit requests and related services.
Generally, fees collected by USCIS are deposited into
the IEFA, which is a special fund used to cover the
costs of adjudicating immigration benefit requests.
Congress does provide a small portion (approximately
4%) of the agency's budget through appropriations,
typically for activities like employment verification and
civic integration.
DHS disagrees with commenters’ statements
indicating the addition of vetting social media
identifiers would not add value to security screenings.
DHS has a layered approach to security and any social
media identifiers collected would be only one piece of
various information used in the analysis of the
applicant’s eligibility.

Response: Individuals who present a threat to national
security or public safety are not eligible for certain
benefits and U.S. immigration laws preclude DHS from
granting immigration and naturalization benefits to
individuals with certain disqualifying characteristics
including association with terrorist organizations. See,
e.g., INA § 208(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)
(mandatory bars to asylum); INA § 245(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. §
1255(a)(2) (admissibility requirements for adjustment
of status applicants and agency discretion); and INA §
316(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3) (good moral character
requirement for naturalization). Investigation of social
media activity will assist USCIS in making sure that
these requirements are met.
As noted in prior responses, USCIS collects information
from individuals voluntarily applying for immigration
benefits. USCIS follows all applicable laws, regulations

3. Undemocratic Practices:
o The proposal is criticized for violating
fundamental democratic values, such as
freedom of speech and the right to privacy.
o It is seen as an attack on the First Amendment,
which protects free speech, and the Fourth
Amendment, which protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
o Commenters argue that this policy contradicts
the principles of liberty and justice that the
United States claims to uphold.

and policies to protect collected information and use it
for its designated purpose. Furthermore, as noted in a
prior response, Officers who are responsible for
conducting social media vetting are trained specifically
on how to identify First Amendment activity. USCIS
has extensively detailed the process for social media
vetting publicly via the Privacy Impact Assessment
(PIA) in 2019:
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
privacy-pia-uscis-013-01-fdns-august2019.pdf.

Recommendations:
1. Focus on Due Process and Evidence-Based
Investigations: Commenters recommend that the
government should only conduct investigations based
on legitimate evidence and due process, rather than
treating every applicant as a suspect from the start.
2. Protect Free Speech and Privacy: There are calls to
uphold the First Amendment rights to free speech and
the Fourth Amendment rights to privacy, ensuring that
individuals are not penalized for their opinions or
personal communications.
3. Safeguard Against Misuse and Abuse: Commenters
emphasize the need for strong safeguards to prevent
the misuse and abuse of collected data, ensuring that it
is not used to target individuals for their political views
or personal beliefs.

Embarrassing
(International)/Reprisal

4. Engage in Public Dialogue and Review: There are
recommendations for the government to engage in a
public dialogue and review process, allowing for input
from various stakeholders to ensure that any
implemented policies are fair and just.
The comments express concerns about the
international embarrassment and potential for reprisal
associated with the collection of social media
information by USCIS.
1. Damage to International Reputation:
o One comment mentions that implementing
this policy will draw further ire from the

Response: The United States is a beacon of admiration
across the world. Our economic, cultural, military, and
technological achievements remain unmatched. With
these proposed additions, DHS seeks to again lead the
world in responding to new and emerging
technologies to secure our homeland. If other nation
states harbor a desire to retaliate for steps DHS takes
to ensure proper screening and vetting, then the U.S.
government will address those parties. DHS will not

international community, making the USA look
like a "clown" on the global stage.
Another comment states that the policy
undermines the United States' commitment to
privacy and free speech, damaging its
international reputation as a defender of these
fundamental rights. It compares the policy to
actions taken by authoritarian regimes.

limit our proactive and protective actions due to fear
of reprisal.

2. Fear of Reprisal: The comments mention that the
collection of social media creates a system of fear
where individuals may fear reprisal for their online
activities or expressions of personal beliefs.
Topic 9. Administrative Procedure Act
The comments provided raise several concerns
regarding potential violations of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) by the USCIS proposal to collect
social media identifiers. Here are the key points related
to APA violations:
1. Lack of Reasoned Decision-Making: The comments
argue that USCIS’ claim of national security benefits is
unsupported by substantial justification, thus violating
the APA's requirement for reasoned decision-making.
The comments assert that the proposed collection is
not necessary for the proper performance of the
agency's functions and lacks practical utility.

Response: USCIS disagrees that this collection of
information violates the Administrative Procedure Act.
USCIS’ statutory and regulatory authorities permit the
agency to request information necessary for
determining eligibility for an immigration request.
Here, USCIS is asking for additional data points to
enhance vetting that it already lawfully conducts.

2. Failure to Provide a Legal Basis: The comments
highlight that the Federal Register notice does not
provide a specific legal requirement justifying the
collection of social media information for the nine
forms impacted. The notice only vaguely states that the
information is necessary for "vetting" without
explaining how this relates to any legal requirement for
the forms.
3. Violation of 5 CFR 1320.9(a): The comments state
that the proposed collection violates 5 CFR 1320.9(a)
because it lacks practical utility and is not necessary or
relevant to determining the eligibility of the requestor
for the benefits sought. The comments argue that
USCIS has not demonstrated any actual use of the
information that would justify its collection.
4. Violation of 5 CFR 1320.9(c): The comments argue
that the proposed information collection imposes an

Regarding the comments related to 5 CFR 1320.9,
please see responses in Topic 2. Compliance with the
PRA, Practical Utility, Underestimation of Burden, and
Appropriateness of Generic Clearance.

Generic Clearance for the Collection of Social Media Identifier(s) on Immigration Forms - Responses to 60-day Public
Comments
Public Comments (regulations.gov): USCIS-2025-0003
60-day FRN Citation (federalregister.gov): 90 FR 11324
Publish Dates: March 5, 2025 – May 5, 2025
unjustifiable burden on the public, violating the PRA
under 5 CFR 1320.9(c). The estimated burden increase
is seen as grossly underestimated and unverifiable, and
the comments suggest that the actual burden would be
significantly higher.
5. Failure to Aggregate Burden Estimates: The
comments criticize USCIS for announcing simultaneous
form revisions in separate Federal Register notices,
which confounds the public and makes it difficult to
ascertain the combined impact on the forms. This
approach is seen as subversive and disingenuous,
violating 5 CFR 1320.9(c) by creating an unjustifiable
burden on the public.
In summary, the comments argue that the USCIS
proposal to collect social media identifiers violates the
APA by failing to provide a reasonable justification,
imposing unjustifiable burdens, and lacking practical
utility. The comments call for the immediate
withdrawal of the proposal to protect constitutional
rights and ensure compliance with legal requirements.
Recommendations:
1. Provide Substantial Justification: USCIS should
provide a clear and substantial justification for the
collection of social media identifiers, demonstrating
how this information is necessary for the proper
performance of the agency's functions and has practical
utility.
2. Articulate Legal Basis: USCIS should articulate a
specific legal requirement that justifies the collection of
social media information for each of the nine forms
impacted. The agency should explain how the collection
relates to statutory or regulatory eligibility
requirements.
3. Demonstrate Practical Utility: USCIS should
demonstrate the practical utility of collecting social
media identifiers by showing how the information will
be used in a way that is relevant and necessary for
determining eligibility for the benefits sought. This
includes providing examples of how social media
information has been or will be used effectively in the
vetting process.
4. Accurate Burden Estimates: USCIS should provide
accurate and verifiable estimates of the burden

Topic 11. Out of Scope

There are 67 comments expressing support.

Response: DHS appreciates the positive feedback and
comments.

There are 16 comments that are out of scope.

Response: DHS did not address these comments
because they are outside the scope of the proposed
generic clearance.

File Type	application/pdf
Author	Stout, Samantha J
File Modified	2025-09-11
File Created	2025-09-11