30-Day Public Comment Response Matrix

Generic Clearance for the Collection of Social Media Identifier(s) on Immigration Forms - Responses to 30-day Public
Comments
Public Comments (regulations.gov): USCIS-2025-0003
30-day FRN Citation (federalregister.gov): 90 FR 44693
Publish Dates: September 16, 2025 – October 16, 2025
Comment Comment Sub-Theme
ID
Topic 1. Legal Authority to Collect
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Violating EO’s
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Comment Summary

USCIS Response

The comments argue that the proposed Social
Media Collection rule violates executive orders,
constitutional rights, federal laws, and
international human rights obligations. Key
points include:

Response: For responses regarding
constitutional issues and human rights, please
see Topic 6., Constitutional Issues, below.

1. Violation of Executive Authority: The rule
exceeds the scope of the President's powers, as
executive orders must derive authority from the
Constitution or an act of Congress. EO 14161,
Protecting the United States From Foreign
Terrorists and Other National Security and Public
Safety Threats, is cited as insufficient to justify
the rule, and the rule allegedly encroaches on
Congress's lawmaking authority.
2. Conflict with EO 13107: The comments argue
that the proposed rule violates U.S. obligations
under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and EO 13107,
Implementation of Human Rights Treaties, by
failing to respect human rights, imposing
conditions on fundamental rights (e.g., freedom
of speech, assembly, and privacy) without
meeting strict scrutiny standards, and lacking
necessity and proportionality as required by both
U.S. law and international treaties.
Overall, the comments urge abandonment of the
rule due to its legal, constitutional, and
procedural deficiencies.

Federal laws, including the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) and Homeland Security Act
of 2002, provide authority for this information
collection. For example, INA § 287(b), 8 U.S.C. §
1357(b), and 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(a)(2) empower
officers and agents to “take and consider
evidence concerning the privilege of any person
to enter, reenter, pass through, or reside in the
United States.” Similarly, for naturalization
purposes, INA § 335, 8 U.S.C. § 1446, empowers
any employee of USCIS to conduct a personal
investigation of the person applying for
naturalization, take testimony concerning the
admissibility of the applicant for naturalization,
and require the production of relevant books,
papers, and documents.
Details about collected data, including how USCIS
uses information, shares information and
protects information are provided publicly via
Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) and System of
Records Notices (SORNs) on the DHS website.
Each USCIS form also has a DHS Privacy Notice
that details the authority of DHS to collect
information, its purpose, when it may be
disclosed, and applicable routine uses. To ensure
compliance with these policies, USCIS officers
must complete annual training on the
operational use of social media and sign a Rules
of Behavior document. Additionally, DHS will not
request user passwords in furtherance of this
collection and will not violate or attempt to
subvert individual privacy settings or controls
individuals may have implemented on social
media platforms.
Consistent with the requirements of the Privacy
Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7)), DHS does not
maintain records “describing how any [citizen of
the United States or alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence] exercises rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment, unless
expressly authorized by statute or by the
individual about whom the record is maintained

or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an
authorized law enforcement activity.”
Furthermore, DHS policy directs that “DHS
personnel shall not collect, maintain in DHS
systems, or use information protected by the
First Amendment unless (a) an individual has
expressly granted their consent for DHS to
collect, maintain and use that information; (b)
maintaining the record is expressly authorized by
a federal statute; or (c) that information is
relevant to a criminal, civil or administrative
activity relating to a law DHS enforces or
administers. In addition, DHS personnel should
not pursue by questioning, research, or other
means, information relating to how an individual
exercises his or her First Amendment rights
unless one or more of the same conditions
applies.”
DHS components must also adhere to DHS
Directive 110-01, “Privacy Policy for Operational
Use of Social Media,” and DHS Instruction 11001-001, “Privacy Policy for Operational Use of
Social Media,” which define the authorized use
of social media to collect personally identifiable
information for the purpose of enhancing
situational awareness; investigating an individual
in a criminal, civil, or administrative context;
assessing a person’s eligibility for a benefit;
making a personnel determination about a
Department employee; making a suitability
determination about a prospective Department
employee; or for any other official Department
purpose that has the potential to affect the
rights, privileges, or benefits of an individual.
This policy also requires DHS Operational
Components to receive approval from the DHS
Privacy Office regarding the privacy implications
of any planned operational use of social media to
ensure that it is compliant with Departmental
privacy policies and standards. 1 DHS employees,
who are permitted and trained to utilize social
media for operational purposes during the
performance of their duties, must adhere to DHS
privacy policies, as established by the Chief
Privacy Officer.
DHS maintains a framework of safeguards,
training, and policies for use of social media in
vetting programs and to ensure preservation of
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. When
adjudicating eligibility to travel to or be admitted
to the United States and for immigration
1

DHS authorities for the “Privacy Policy for Operational Use of Social Media” are as follows: Public Law 107-347, “E-Government Act of 2002” as
amended, Section 208, codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note; 5 U.S.C. § 552a, Records Maintained on Individuals, (The Privacy Act of 1974, as
amended); 6 U.S.C. § 142, Privacy Officer; 44 U.S.C., Chapter 35, Subchapter III, “Information Security” (The Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002, as amended); Delegation 13001, “Delegation to the Chief Privacy Officer.”

Topic 2. Compliance with the PRA
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Practical Utility
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benefits, the use of social media is governed by
strict privacy provisions, use limitations, and in
adherence with all constitutionally protected
rights and freedoms. 2 DHS Oversight Offices,
including the Office of the General Counsel, the
Privacy Office, and the Office for Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties, each review aspects of DHS
policies regarding the use of social media
information. They regularly advise programs on
best practices and methods for ensuring legal
and policy compliance. In addition, the USCIS
Privacy Office reviews and must approve each
office’s operational use of social media and
associated activities. Employees in these offices
are required to take designated training, sign a
Rules of Behavior document, and obtain a
Privacy Impact Assessment governing the
program’s specific operational use of social
media before implementation.
The comments collectively argue that the
proposed collection of social media identifiers
lacks practical utility for several reasons:
1. Failure to Demonstrate Necessity: DHS has
not provided evidence that collecting social
media identifiers is essential to its core functions
or that it enhances national security or public
safety. Existing vetting processes, such as
criminal background checks, are already
sufficient for assessing applicants' eligibility and
risks.
2. Unreliable and Ineffective Data: Past pilot
programs by DHS have shown that social media
screening has not provided actionable or reliable
information for vetting purposes. Social media
content is often difficult to verify for
authenticity, context, or relevance, making it an
unreliable tool for evaluating applicants.
3. Excessive Burden: Collection imposes
significant burdens on applicants, requiring them
to recall years of social media accounts. It also
creates inefficiencies for adjudicators, who must
manually review vast amounts of irrelevant or
unverifiable data, detracting from their ability to
focus on more effective vetting processes.
3. Irrelevant Time Frame: Proposed five-year
period for social media disclosure is excessive
and often unrelated to the specific immigration
benefit being sought. For example, requiring five
years of data for a two-year conditional green

Response: 5 CFR 1320.9 states, “As part of an
agency’s submission to OMB of a proposed
collection of information, the agency,” in this
case, USCIS, “… shall certify… that the proposed
collection of information” “(a) [i]s necessary for
the proper performance of the function of the
agency, including that the information to be
collected will have practical utility.” This
collection will have immediate practical utility to
determine an individual’s eligibility for the
immigration benefit(s) they seek.
Social media is a prominent component of
modern society and DHS’s efforts to protect the
homeland must evolve as society evolves. Given
the nature of DHS’s mission, it is important for
DHS to ask for and review this information. All
information provided by an individual may be
used to vet the parties to a benefit request,
including applicants, derivatives, and
beneficiaries. In addition to checking against
government information, DHS officers may use
publicly available information, including social
media information, as part of the existing vetting
process to verify the information submitted.
If an initial screening indicates possible
information of concern or a need to further
validate information, a trained officer will have
timely visibility of the publicly available
information on the platforms associated with the
social media identifier(s) provided by the
applicant, along with other information and tools
these officers regularly use in the performance of
their duties. The officer will review provided

All access controls described in relevant Privacy Impact Assessments and System of Records Notices are available to the public on the DHS website
(www.dhs.gov/privacy).
2

card is untethered to the purpose of the
application.
Recommendations for Improvement:
• Tailor the collection to specific forms and
types of immigration relief to ensure
relevance.
• Adopt a targeted, risk-based approach to
social media screening, reserving it for
cases with specific risk indicators rather
than blanket collection.
• Establish clear guidelines for adjudicators
to evaluate social media data objectively
and consistently.

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Underestimation of
Burden

The comments collectively highlight significant
concerns regarding the burden imposed by the
proposed collection of social media identifiers.
Key points include:

identifiers on the relevant platforms in a manner
consistent with the privacy settings the individual
has chosen to adopt for those platforms.
Social media may be used to support or
corroborate application information, which will
help USCIS’ mission to administer the nation’s
lawful immigration system by providing an
additional means to adjudicate issues related to
relevant questions about identity, occupation,
previous travel, and other factors. It may also be
used to identify potential deception or fraud.
Further, it may help detect potential threats
because criminals and terrorists, whether
intentionally or not, have provided previously
unavailable information via social media that
identified their true intentions. Social media
may therefore help distinguish individuals of
additional concern from those individuals whose
information substantiates their eligibility for
travel to or entry into the United States or
immigration benefits. In addition, generally other
than discretionary overseas denials, USCIS would
not deny a benefit based on social media
information without first confronting the
applicant, petitioner, or benefit requestor with
the information and providing an opportunity to
explain it or rebut any negative inferences USCIS
may have drawn from it. See 8 C.F.R. §
103.2(b)(16)(i) and (ii).
DHS disagrees that it should define specific
criteria under which individuals may be subject
to social media vetting and believes that social
media screening is best applied to requests for
an immigration benefit requiring a background
investigation. Social media involves publicly
available information that is accessible to anyone
without a warrant and DHS would not be unique
in reviewing it. Along with checking against
government systems and information, DHS
officers may use publicly available information,
social media included, as part of the vetting and
screening process to verify the information
submitted. Moreover, the content of an
individual’s public social media can be used to
assess and identify immigration fraud, bars to
eligibility, and national security and public safety
threats, requiring vetting procedures that are as
broad as possible. Limiting searches of social
media, such as implementing reasonable
suspicion requirements, would hinder DHS in its
vetting efforts for these legitimate purposes.
Response: In USCIS’ response to the public
comments from the 60-day notice, as published
in the Federal Register at 90 FR 11324 on March
5, 2025, the estimated hour burden per response
was increased by an additional 0.59 hours for

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1. Underestimated Time Burden: USCIS
significantly underestimates the time burden for
applicants to recall and provide social media
identifiers from the past five years. Many
individuals cannot realistically reconstruct all
accounts, usernames, or platforms, especially if
they were abandoned, forgotten, or created
under pseudonyms. The process may involve
contacting service providers, reviewing past
records, or reaching out to family members,
which is further complicated by language
barriers, unreliable internet access, and lost login
information.
2. Vagueness and Lack of Clarity: The definition
of "social media identifiers" is vague, and no
clear list of platforms is provided, leaving
applicants uncertain about what to disclose and
creating inconsistent reporting by applicants.
3. Impact on Vulnerable Populations: Victims of
abuse, trafficking, and asylum seekers face
unique challenges, such as having multiple
accounts created under coercion, loss of access
to accounts, fear of endangering loved ones, or
estrangement from their families, making
compliance challenging and risking unfair
denials.
4. Unrealistic Cost Estimates: Claim that the
collection imposes no financial cost is criticized
as implausible. The additional hours required for
applicants to comply with the proposal will result
in significant hidden costs in terms of time and
resources.
Recommendations:
• Reassess time and cost estimates for
applicants or significantly revise to
minimize the burden.
• Define "social media identifiers" and limit
the scope to current, verifiable accounts.
• Ensure collection process accounts for
difficulties vulnerable populations face in
providing this information.
• Implement grace period for applicants to
understand and comply with new
requirements.

each impacted information collection to more
accurately reflect the burden imposed on the
public, with the exception of the Form I-131
where an additional 1.09 hours were added and
the Form I-751 where an additional 3.09 hours
were added. Based on the proposed collection of
social media identifier(s), the estimated hour
burden per response to complete these forms
will have an overall increase by an average of 1
hour on each form. USCIS closely reviewed the
estimated average hour burden per response
based on where social media identifier(s) are
being added and instructional content added to
allow the respondent to provide the requested
information, as necessary, and is confident that
this increase in burden addressed the
commenters’ concerns to more accurately reflect
the burden estimate.
It is projected that the proposed collection of
social media identifier(s) will have a minimal
impact for many respondents because most
social media users do not utilize multiple
accounts within a given platform or change
usernames regularly. Individuals are not
expected to include accounts designed for use by
multiple users within a business or other
organization. If an individual has multiple
accounts on multiple platforms, they must
provide that information to the best of their
ability.
As addressed in USCIS’ response to the public
comments from the 60-day notice, as published
in the Federal Register at 90 FR 11324 on March
5, 2025, to provide clearer guidelines on the
proposed collection of information, USCIS
updated the form instructions for each affected
information collection to provide more detailed
instructional content on the social media
identifier(s) question(s), including how the
Department defines social media and examples
of social media platforms.
The estimated total annual cost burden
associated with a specific information collection
will be captured in those approved collections.
Any updates to the estimated annual cost
burden to respondents, which includes the
imposed out-of-pocket costs to respondents, will
be outlined in each Supporting Statement for the
affected information collection. Out-of-pocket
costs may include payments for document
translation and preparation services, attorney
and legal fees, postage, and costs associated
with gathering documentation. In addition, any
updates to the estimated cost to the federal
government will be outlined in each Supporting

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Duplication

The comments argue that the proposed
collection of social media identifiers
is duplicative for the following reasons:
1. Redundancy:
• DHS already has access to extensive
applicant data through existing systems,
including biometric data, travel records,
law enforcement databases, and even
social media data collected during prior
applications.
• Applicants often provide the same
information multiple times throughout the
immigration process. Requiring the same
information again for subsequent
applications (e.g., for permanent
residency or citizenship) is unnecessary.
2. Unnecessary Burden: Duplication of
information collection imposes an additional and
unnecessary burden on applicants, who must
recall and provide the same data multiple times.
Conclusion: The proposed collection is
duplicative of data DHS already possesses, offers
little additional value for screening purposes,
and imposes an unnecessary burden on
applicants by requiring redundant and often
irrelevant information.

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Appropriateness of
generic clearance

The comments argue that the use of generic
clearance for the proposed collection of social
media identifiers is inappropriate for the
following reasons:
1. Not Voluntary: Generic clearance is intended
for voluntary collections, but the proposed
collection is mandatory for applicants seeking
immigration benefits. Failure to comply could
result in adverse consequences, making it
unsuitable for generic clearance.
2. Not Low Burden: Collection imposes a
significant burden on applicants, requiring them
to recall years of social media activity, navigate
unclear requirements, and potentially obtain
information from third parties. DHS's estimate of
40 minutes per applicant is criticized as
unrealistically low, and the burden cannot
reasonably be characterized as "low."

3

44 U.S.C. chapter 35; 5 CFR Part 1320.

Statement for the affected information
collection.
Response: The proposed information collection
is not duplicative because social media identifier
information has not been consistently collected
in the past. Further, social media data may
provide information that is not available through
existing systems. Information found on social
media via the provision of social media
identifier(s) will enhance the vetting process and
identify potential threats. For example, social
media may be used to support or corroborate a
benefit seeker’s application by providing an
additional means to adjudicate issues related to
relevant questions about identity, occupation,
previous travel, and other factors. It may also be
used to identify potential deception or fraud.
Further, it may help detect potential threats
because criminals and terrorists, whether
intentionally or not, have provided previously
unavailable information via social media that
identified their true intentions. Social media
may therefore help distinguish individuals of
additional concern from those individuals whose
information substantiates their eligibility for
travel to or entry into the United States or
immigration benefits.
Additionally, DHS has taken into account the
burden involved in collecting this information
and has found this burden is reasonable and
justified given the security and fraud prevention
benefits from this collection. Please see further
responses addressing burden in Topic 2.
Compliance with the PRA, Underestimation of
Burden.
Response: The process used by DHS to obtain
this generic clearance is similar to, but no less
demanding than, the process to obtain approval
of any new or revised information collection as it
still requires the standard 60 and 30-day notice
process. In addition, a generic information
collection clearance requires the same level of
justification, support, analysis, and level of
approval as any other information collection
approved by the Office of Management and
Budget under the Paperwork Reduction Act and
implementing regulations. 3 This generic
clearance is being used to propose the collection
of social media identifier(s) on the affected
information collections. This method provides a
single docket for the public to provide comments
on the proposed collection of social media
identifier(s) and affected information collections,
which reduces the burden on the public, rather
than the public having to identify and comment

3. Highly Controversial: The proposed collection
is highly controversial and represents a
significant policy change. Unlike the
uncontroversial collections typically approved
under generic clearance (e.g., customer service
surveys), this proposal raises concerns about
constitutional rights, including free speech,
privacy, and due process. Similar proposals, such
as the State Department's collection of social
media identifiers, have faced widespread public
opposition. Additionally, the proposal affects
millions of people annually, including U.S.
citizens and their relatives, making it far more
substantive and impactful than the low-stakes
collections typically eligible for generic clearance.

on a separate notice and docket for nine
separate information collections. The use of a
generic clearance also reduces burden and cost
to the Federal government to publish separate
Federal register notices. USCIS agrees that a
generic clearance is usually used for information
collections that are voluntary, low-burden, and
non-controversial. 4 As per requirements under
44 U.S.C. 3501 et. seq. and 5 CFR 1320, USCIS
believes that a generic clearance is appropriate
to use for this process in order to make the
proposed necessary changes to enable and help
inform national security and public safety
screening, and vetting, and related inspections.

USCIS published a 60-day Federal Register Notice
and 30-day Federal Register Notice for the New
Overall, the comments assert that the proposed
Collection of Social Media Identifier(s) on
collection does not meet the criteria for generic
Immigration Forms. The 60-day notice and the
clearance due to its mandatory nature, high
30-day notice included each affected information
burden, controversial implications, and
collection instrument with instructions which
significant policy impact. Pursuing expedited
included the proposed changes on the Federal
approval under generic clearance is deemed
eRulemaking Portal site at:
wholly inappropriate and fails to account for the https://www.regulations.gov and entering
scope and significance of the proposal.
USCIS-2025-0003.
Topic 3. Compliance with the Privacy Act/Records Act/Information Security/Data Integrity
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Privacy Violation
The comments collectively raise significant
Response: DHS disagrees with commenters who
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concerns about privacy violations. Below is a
believe collection of social media identifiers is a
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summary of the key issues:
violation of privacy and leads to potential misuse
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of information for vulnerable and other
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1. Violation of Individual Privacy: Commenters
populations.
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assert that social media identifiers are
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Any information provided by an individual on a
categorized as Sensitive Personally Identifiable
Information (SPII), and their collection could lead form is done so voluntarily by the individual. In
this case, Information requested by DHS is used
to harm, embarrassment, or unfairness to
for purposes of adjudicating the requested
individuals.
immigration benefit. DHS does not compel
individuals to request immigration benefits from
2. Inconsistency with the Privacy Act of 1974
USCIS. Details about collected data, including
• Relevance and Necessity: Collection of
how USCIS uses information, shares information
social media identifiers fails to meet the
and protects information are provided publicly
Privacy Act’s requirement that federal
via Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) and
agencies collect only information proven
System of Records Notices (SORNs) on the DHS
to be relevant and necessary for lawful
purposes like immigration adjudication or website. Each USCIS form also has a DHS Privacy
Notice that details the authority of DHS to collect
national security.
information, its purpose, when it may be
• Transparency: Proposed collection lacks
disclosed, and applicable routine uses.
clear guidance on how the information
will be used, stored, or shared, which
As previously explained, DHS components must
violates the Privacy Act’s requirement to
also adhere to additional guidelines and
inform individuals about the routine uses
requirements when engaging in the operational
of their information and the
use of social media. This policy requires DHS
consequences of non-disclosure.
Operational Components to receive approval
from the DHS Privacy Office regarding the
3. Data Security Risks: The lack of robust
privacy implications of any planned operational
safeguards increases the risk of data breaches,
4

8 CFR 1320.3(c)(1); Sunstein, Cass R., Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, and Independent Regulatory Agencies:
Paperwork Reduction Act – Generic Clearances (May 28, 2010).

misuse, and retaliation, while DHS’s oversight
mechanisms are deemed inadequate to protect
sensitive information.
4. Legal and Ethical Concerns:
• Unlawful Surveillance: Comments argue
that the proposed collection amounts to
state-sponsored mass surveillance, which
infringes on constitutional rights and
privacy expectations.
• Lack of Privacy Assessment: DHS has not
conducted a sufficient Privacy Impact
Assessment (PIA) as required by the EGovernment Act of 2002, nor has it
provided adequate notice through a
System of Records Notice (SORN).
Recommendations:
1. Ensure Compliance with the Privacy Act: Limit
data collection to information that is
demonstrably relevant and necessary for lawful
purposes.
2. Conduct Privacy Assessments: Perform
thorough Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) and
update System of Records Notices (SORNs) to
identify risks and ensure compliance with privacy
laws.
3. Implement Robust Privacy Protections:
Establish comprehensive protections for the
collection, storage, use, and sharing of social
media information to prevent data breaches,
unauthorized access, and misuse of personal
information.
4. Limit Scope and Duration of Data Retention:
Limit the retention period for social media data
to prevent indefinite monitoring of individuals
and ensure sharing is restricted to entities
directly involved in immigration adjudication and
national security.
5. Increase Transparency: Inform individuals
about the routine uses of their social media data
and the consequences of non-disclosure.

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Connections Not
Giving Consent

6. Improve Oversight and Accountability:
Reestablish internal oversight mechanisms, such
as DHS’s Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties,
to safeguard privacy and civil liberties.
The comments provided raise several concerns
about the collection of social media identifiers,
particularly in the context of evaluating
immigration-related benefits. Below is a
summary of the key points made in the
comments regarding connections not giving

use of social media to ensure that it is compliant
with Departmental privacy policies and
standards. DHS employees, who are permitted
and trained to utilize social media for operational
purposes during the performance of their duties,
must adhere to DHS privacy policies, as
established by the Chief Privacy Officer.
DHS Oversight Offices, including the Office of the
General Counsel, the Privacy Office, and the
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, each
review aspects of DHS policies regarding the use
of social media information. They regularly
advise programs on best practices and methods
for ensuring legal and policy compliance. In
addition, the USCIS Privacy Office reviews and
must approve each office’s operational use of
social media and associated activities. Employees
in these offices are required to take designated
training, complete a Rules of Behavior document,
and obtain a Privacy Impact Assessment
governing the program’s specific operational use
of social media before implementation.
DHS will only be viewing publicly available
information on the platforms associated with the
social media identifier(s). DHS will not be making
requests of the social media platforms to violate
an individual’s privacy settings to help establish
the individual’s eligibility for travel, entry, or
benefits. Additionally, DHS will not collect social
media passwords from individuals.
DHS will make case-by-case determinations
based on the totality of the evidence. DHS has a
layered approach to security and any social
media identifiers collected would be only one
piece of a large mixture of information used in
the analysis of eligibility for the requested
immigration benefit. Though there may be the
potential for an individual to provide false or
inaccurate information, the answers (or lack
thereof) provided in conjunction with the other
information considered will help inform our
direction of inquiry.

Response: DHS regularly collects information
about aliens, U.S. citizens, and children in the
course of adjudicating an immigration request.
This also includes information about third parties
that may be associated with a subject individual.
As discussed before, DHS provides appropriate
notification to individuals, including those

consent for the collection of social media
information:
1. Lack of Consent: Collecting social media
identifiers not only impacts the individual
applicant but also infringes on the privacy of
their connections (e.g., friends, family members,
or others whose information or photos may
appear on the applicant's social media). These
individuals likely have not consented to their
information being accessed or reviewed by
government officials. Connections whose
information is indirectly collected may have no
control over how their data is stored, shared, or
used.
Recommendations:
1. Avoid Collecting Social Media Identifiers: Do
not collect social media identifiers for
immigration-related benefits, emphasizing that
this practice infringes on the privacy of both
applicants and their connections who have not
consented to their information being accessed.
2. Respect Privacy Rights: DHS should consider
the privacy rights of individuals and their
connections, ensuring that sensitive information
is not collected or retained without explicit
consent.

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Data Integrity

The comments specifically address data
integrity concerns in the following ways:
1. Accuracy and Misinterpretation Risks: Social
media data is often unreliable and does not
accurately represent an individual’s identity or
behavior. Posts can be misinterpreted as threats
or negative behavior due to lack of context,
cultural nuances, or officials’ limited
understanding of social media trends and
language. This undermines the reliability and
accuracy of using social media information for
vetting purposes.
2. Risk of Bias: Access to expansive social media
data raises concerns about bias in decisionmaking and the potential for abuse, particularly
if data is used beyond its intended purpose or
without proper checks.

covered by the Privacy Act, by publicly issuing
PIAs, SORNs, and publishing privacy notices on
individual forms.
Further, the information that DHS may access via
social media is publicly accessible and DHS may
not access information that is designated as
private. DHS does not specifically target
children’s information but may collect it if
relevant to a case. DHS does not exclude any
category of individual from its review of publicly
available information on social media sites.
Social media platforms provide opportunities to
gain valuable insights into individuals’
movements, relationships, and behaviors. DHS
can use the content of individuals’ public social
media to assess and identify immigration fraud
or other bars to eligibility for particular
immigration benefits, as well as potential
national security and public safety threats.
DHS acknowledges that some of the individuals
impacted will be United States citizens, however
collecting social media information from U.S.
citizen petitioners is within the scope of the
authority of DHS. In many circumstances, the
alien’s relationship to a United States citizen is
material to the benefit sought. The Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes DHS to
collect information needed to assess eligibility
for an immigration benefit. USCIS notes that the
information collected will assist USCIS to
evaluate information key to benefit eligibility. In
many circumstances, this will involve information
from a United States citizen who has filed an
immigration benefit request on behalf of an
alien.
Response: DHS takes precautions to maintain the
security, confidentiality, and integrity of all
information collected about individuals.
Safeguards include controls that limit
information access to only authorized users.
These safeguards employ advanced security
technologies to protect the information stored
on our systems from unauthorized access. To
ensure compliance with these policies, USCIS
personnel complete training on the operational
use of social media and sign the Operational Use
of Social Media Rules of Behavior before any
social media use and annually thereafter, if
operational use of social media is a continuing
requirement. The data collected by USCIS will be
safeguarded and stored in accordance with
DHS/USCIS-007 Benefits Information System, see
84 FR 54622 (October 10, 2019) and DHS/USCIS010 Asylum Information and Pre-Screening

3. Subjective Discretion: Reviewing officers may
have unfettered discretion to interpret social
media activity, increasing the risk of bias and
inconsistent decisions.
Recommendations:
1. Avoid Collecting Social Media Identifiers:
Withdraw the proposal to collect social media
identifiers entirely, as the data is unreliable,
prone to misinterpretation, and not suitable for
immigration-related determinations.
2. Establish Clear Guidelines: DHS should
provide explicit criteria for how social media data
will be collected, analyzed, and used to prevent
misinterpretation, bias, or misuse. This includes
defining what constitutes relevant information
and ensuring proper training for officials on
social media trends, language, and cultural
nuances to minimize misinterpretation of data,
risk of bias, and inconsistent decisions.
Topic 4. Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
1264
The comments argue that the proposed Social
1270
Media Collection violates the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) by being arbitrary,
capricious, and inadequately justified. Key
concerns include the lack of supporting data,
failure to consider burdens on applicants and
vulnerable populations, unrealistic cost
estimates, and the blanket application of
requirements across all immigration forms. The
rule lacks a clear connection between the data
collection and its stated goals, and fails to
provide a rational explanation or address public
concerns raised during the notice-and-comment
period. Recommendations include tailoring the
collection to specific forms, defining terms
clearly, limiting data collection to relevant cases,
and implementing a grace period. Without
addressing these issues, commenters assert that
the rule would likely fail judicial review under the
APA.
Topic 5. Impacts on Immigration Benefit Processing/Travel
1265
Delay Benefit
The comments suggest that collecting social
1268
Processing
media identifiers could delay benefit processing
1271
due to the following reasons:
1. Increased Workload: Adjudicators face an
increased workload to review and verify vast
amounts of potentially irrelevant or unverifiable
data, which could detract from their ability to
focus on more targeted and effective vetting
processes. Random and varied usage of social
media platforms (e.g., for personal connections,
business, or entertainment) makes them
unreliable tools for assessing security threats.
This could lead to unnecessary investigations and

System of Records, see 80 FR 74781 (November
30, 2015).
DHS is aware that social media information can
be hacked, manipulated, or falsified. As stated
before, DHS will use information from social
media as one of several types of evidence that
may be used to support or corroborate
information about an individual. It may also be
used to identify potential deception or fraud. In
addition, generally other than discretionary
overseas denials, USCIS would not deny a benefit
based on social media information without first
confronting the applicant, petitioner, or benefit
requestor with the information and providing an
opportunity to explain it or rebut any negative
inferences USCIS may have drawn from it. See 8
C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(i) and (ii).

Response: USCIS disagrees that this collection of
information violates the Administrative
Procedure Act. USCIS’ statutory and regulatory
authorities permit the agency to request
information necessary for determining eligibility
for an immigration benefit. Here, USCIS is asking
for additional data points to enhance vetting that
it already lawfully conducts.
For responses regarding burden and practical
utility, please see responses in Topic 2.
Compliance with the PRA, Practical Utility and
Underestimation of Burden.

Response: Any checks of an individual’s publicly
available social media information will occur
concurrently with and not after the current
processing steps for a particular benefit request.
While it may require some more time up front,
DHS believes adding social media questions may
reduce processing times overall in many
situations as it will allow USCIS to timely use
publicly available social media information to
support vetting and adjudication programs and
identify eligibility, national security, and public
safety issues early in the immigration process,
rather than later on when resolution of any
potential issues may require a greater

additional work for officials, further slowing
down the adjudication process.
2. Misinterpretation and Complexity: Social
media content is often misleading and may not
accurately represent an individual. Officials may
lack the training or expertise to interpret the
constantly changing trends, language, and
expressions on social media, further complicating
the review process and causing delays.
Recommendations:
1. Focus on Reliable and Relevant Information:
DHS should prioritize collecting and reviewing
information that is demonstrably relevant,
necessary, and efficient for determining eligibility
for immigration benefits, rather than relying on
complex and misleading social media data.
2. Streamline Processes: Avoid implementing
procedures, like social media reviews, that add
unnecessary complexity and increase the
workload for officials, thereby slowing down
benefit processing. Ensure adjudicators have
clear criteria for evaluating social media data,
minimizing the risk of misinterpretation or bias.

investment of DHS time and resources. This will
further supplement other information and tools
that trained USCIS personnel regularly use in the
performance of their duties to identify issues
quickly, early, and efficiently.
DHS defines social media as the “sphere of
websites, applications, and web-based tools that
connect users to engage in dialogue, share
information and media, collaborate, and
interact.” Social media vetting, which has added
an overall negligible amount of time to USCIS
processing, has been in effect on a smaller scale
since 2017 and performed only by trained
officers. Officers who are responsible for
conducting social media vetting sign agreements
outlining Rules of Behavior and receive several
annual trainings on privacy requirements and
principles, and training specifically related to
social media vetting, including how to identify
First Amendment activity. These trainings must
be completed prior to accessing social media and
trained officers must use government-issued
equipment to access social media for
government purposes. For additional
information on how USCIS uses social media,
please see the Privacy impact Assessment found
at
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publicat
ions/privacy-pia-uscis-013-01-fdnsaugust2019.pdf. USCIS will continue to provide
resources and training to employees to ensure
comprehensive, prudent, and efficient social
media screening in the future and monitor
resource allocation in order to meet the DHS
mission needs.
USCIS only accesses social media content that is
publicly available to all users of the social media
platform to fulfill the DHS mission of enhancing
national security and the integrity of the legal
immigration system. Officers do not
communicate with users of social media sites
and only passively review information that is
publicly available to all users of the social media
platform. In addition, generally other than
discretionary overseas denials, USCIS would not
deny a benefit based on social media information
without first confronting the applicant,
petitioner, or benefit requestor with the
information and providing an opportunity to
explain it or rebut any negative inferences USCIS
may have drawn from it. See 8 C.F.R. §
103.2(b)(16)(i) and (ii). USCIS requires the ability
to consider this information as it may contradict
or substantiate information provided by
applicants in connection with an immigration

1265
1271
1275
1276

Deter Travel or
Immigration

1. Chilling Effect on Expression: Fear of
government surveillance may lead applicants
and their associates to self-censor, limiting their
freedom of speech and association, especially
regarding political or personal expression. This
could deter individuals from applying for
immigration benefits.
2. Deterrence from Seeking Benefits: Fear of
surveillance and privacy violations may deter
crime victims, trafficking survivors, and those
with complex social media histories, from
applying for immigration benefits, undermining
programs designed to protect them.

1265
1270
1271

Government Burden

The comments collectively highlight several
concerns about the burden the proposed Social
Media Collection would impose on the
government. Key points include:
1. Administrative Burden: Collecting and
analyzing social media data is described as a
misuse of government time and resources, as
social media is unreliable for assessing security
risks or determining immigration eligibility.
Officials may spend excessive time reviewing
accounts, interpreting posts, and searching for
evidence, far exceeding the estimated time
required.
2. Staffing Challenges: The comments emphasize
that the government lacks sufficient staff to
handle the proposed collection, especially given
ongoing staff reductions. Hiring additional
personnel would incur significant costs,
contradicting claims that the proposal would
have no financial impact.
3. Redundant Information: DHS already collects
extensive data on applicants, including biometric
data, travel history, employment records, and
law enforcement information, which are more
reliable for screening purposes. Social media
data adds little value and duplicates information
already accessible to DHS.
Recommendations:
• Limit collection to relevant cases: Only
collect social media data for high-risk
cases with probable cause and judicial
oversight.
• Use existing data: Rely on current DHS
data sources instead of duplicating efforts.
• Restrict scope: Collect only essential social
media data tied to national security
concerns.

request and for national security and public
safety purposes.
Response: DHS seeks to balance its goals of
securing the U.S. border and immigration system
while facilitating legitimate travel and provision
of immigration benefits to eligible aliens. While
we recognize that this collection may influence
the decisions of a limited number of travelers or
immigration benefit seekers, DHS’s top priority is
the safety and security of the American people
and homeland. DHS does not seek to
unnecessarily burden individuals but rather seeks
to obtain all information necessary to maintain a
robust and dynamic screening system.
Comments about free speech are addressed in
Topic 6, Constitutional issues.
Response: The addition of social media
identifiers to the nine impacted forms will add a
negligible amount of time to USCIS processing.
The collection of social media identifiers and
associated platforms will assist DHS by reducing
the time needed to validate the attribution of
the publicly available posted information to the
individual and prevent mis-associations. It will
provide trained DHS adjudication personnel with
more timely visibility of the publicly available
information on the platforms provided by the
individual. While social media handles would be
only one piece of a large mixture of information
used in the analysis of eligibility for an
immigration benefit, a more robust screening
process may reduce unnecessary delays and
costs by limiting the filing of requests for
immigration benefits for or by ineligible aliens or
reducing erroneous approvals that must later be
addressed through revocation, rescission, or
similar processes. DHS may consider any
potential costs from increased social media
screenings when it conducts a comprehensive
fee review in the future.
USCIS will continue to provide resources and
training to employees to ensure comprehensive,
prudent, and efficient social media screening in
the future and monitor resource allocation in
order to meet the DHS mission.

1271

Artificial Intelligence
(AI) Concerns

Concerns About AI Use:
1. Bias: AI tools may reflect biases in their
training data, leading to discriminatory
outcomes.
2. Context Misinterpretation: AI struggles with
slang, memes, sarcasm, and cultural nuances,
increasing the risk of false positives.
3. Non-English Language Issues: AI tools often
perform poorly with non-English languages,
disproportionately affecting non-citizen
applicants.
4. Lack of Oversight: DHS lacks adequate
governance to ensure AI compliance with
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
5. Chilling Effect: AI monitoring may pressure
individuals to self-censor or limit their online
activity, undermining free speech.
6. Risk to Anonymity: AI could expose
pseudonymous or anonymous users,
endangering those discussing sensitive topics.

Response: Determinations for travel, entry, and
immigration benefits will be made by trained
DHS officers and not by computer systems or
algorithms. USCIS does not use artificial
intelligence for social media vetting. Trained
DHS personnel may review publicly available
social media information accessed via the social
media identifier(s) provided by individuals as
additional data points to assist in vetting of an
application. Immigration benefits will be
independently reviewed, and a case-by-case
determination will be made by DHS officers
based on the totality of the circumstances. In
addition, generally other than discretionary
overseas denials, USCIS would not deny a benefit
based on social media information without first
confronting the applicant, petitioner, or benefit
requestor with the information and providing an
opportunity to explain it or rebut any negative
inferences USCIS may have drawn from it. See 8
C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(i) and (ii).

Recommendations:
1. Improve Oversight: Establish governance
processes to ensure AI tools comply with privacy
and civil rights standards.
2. Limit AI Use: Restrict AI to targeted cases with
clear security risks and avoid sole reliance on AI
for decisions.
3. Improve Training: Train officials to understand
social media norms, linguistic nuances, and
cultural contexts.

Topic 6. Constitutional Issues
1258
First
1259
Amendment/Free
1260
Speech/Chilling Effect
1261
1264
1267
1271
1273
1275
1276

4. Avoid Overreach: Reduce reliance on AI for
non-English or context-sensitive social media
analysis.
The comments raise the following concerns
about potential violations of the First
Amendment.
1. Freedom of Speech: The comments argue that
the proposed collection of social media
identifiers infringes on freedom of speech by
allowing the government to monitor and
potentially penalize individuals for their online
expression. This includes both citizens and
noncitizens, as the First Amendment protects
speech and expressive conduct on social media
platforms.
2. Viewpoint Discrimination: The proposed
collection is criticized for enabling immigration
officers to exercise discretion in ways that could
lead to viewpoint discrimination, where

Response: The Department respects every
individual’s right to maintain an opinion without
interference and to seek, receive, and impart
information and ideas of all kinds. The proposal
to collect publicly available social media
information to assist in determining admissibility
or eligibility for immigration benefits is
consistent with this commitment.
Consistent with the requirements of the Privacy
Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7)), DHS does not
maintain records “describing how any [citizen of
the United States or alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence] exercises rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment, unless
expressly authorized by statute or by the
individual about whom the record is maintained
or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an

applicants might be denied immigration benefits
based on speech that the government or
individual officers find unfavorable.
3. Anonymity: The comments emphasize the
importance of anonymous speech, which has
been historically protected under the First
Amendment (e.g., Talley v. California, McIntyre v.
Ohio). The proposed collection undermines this
right by requiring applicants to disclose
pseudonymous or anonymous social media
identifiers, which could harm individuals who
rely on anonymity for safety or to express
dissenting views.
4. Freedom of Association: The comments
highlight that social media platforms reveal
individuals’ associations, connections, and
affiliations, which could be subject to
government scrutiny under the proposed
collection.
5. Chilling Effect: The proposed rule is criticized
for creating a chilling effect on free speech, as
individuals may self-censor or limit their online
activity out of fear that their social media posts
could be misinterpreted or used against them in
immigration decisions. This fear extends to their
associates and family members, further inhibiting
speech and expression. The requirement to
disclose social media identifiers may also further
isolate vulnerable populations by discouraging
them from engaging in online communities or
expressing their views.
Recommendations:
1. Rescind the Proposal: Withdraw the proposed
collection entirely.
2. Protect Anonymity: Avoid requiring disclosure
of pseudonymous or anonymous social media
identifiers, which are essential for free speech,
privacy, and open discourse.
3. Limit Data Sharing: Restrict sharing of
collected social media data with foreign
governments, especially repressive regimes, to
protect individuals from persecution or
penalties.
4. Establish Clear Criteria: Define transparent
standards for what types of speech or
associations may lead to adverse immigration
decisions, preventing arbitrary or discriminatory
enforcement.
5. Minimize Chilling Effects: Implement
safeguards to prevent self-censorship, ensuring

authorized law enforcement activity.”
Furthermore, DHS policy directs that “DHS
personnel shall not collect, maintain in DHS
systems, or use information protected by the
First Amendment unless (a) an individual has
expressly granted their consent for DHS to
collect, maintain and use that information; (b)
maintaining the record is expressly authorized by
a federal statute; or (c) that information is
relevant to a criminal, civil or administrative
activity relating to a law DHS enforces or
administers. In addition, DHS personnel should
not pursue by questioning, research, or other
means, information relating to how an individual
exercises his or her First Amendment rights
unless one or more of the same conditions
applies.”
Details about collected data, including how USCIS
uses information, shares information and
protects information are provided publicly via
Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) and System of
Records Notices (SORNs) on the DHS website.
Each USCIS form also has a DHS Privacy Notice
that details the authority of DHS to collect
information, its purpose, when it may be
disclosed, and applicable routine uses. To ensure
compliance with these policies, USCIS officers
must complete annual training on the
operational use of social media and sign a Rules
of Behavior document. Additionally, DHS will not
request user passwords in furtherance of this
collection and will not violate or attempt to
subvert individual privacy settings or controls
individuals may have implemented on social
media platforms.

individuals do not feel compelled to limit their
speech or online activity out of fear of
government retaliation.
6. Narrow the Scope: Restrict the collection to
publicly available information and exclude
private or sensitive data irrelevant to
immigration adjudication.

1260
1264
1267
1273

Fourth Amendment
i. Overreach

7. Focus on True Threats: Limit categorization of
speech as a security or public safety threat to
unprotected speech, such as true threats,
incitement, or fighting words.
The comments raise the following concerns
about potential violations of the Fourth
Amendment. Key points are below:
1. Expectation of Privacy: The collection of social
media identifiers is seen as an intrusion into
individuals' private digital spaces. Many argue
that social media profiles, especially those set to
private, should be protected under the Fourth
Amendment, which guards against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
2. Applicability to Non-U.S. Citizens and U.S.
Citizens: The comments highlight that both nonU.S. citizens with substantial voluntary
connections to the U.S., such as permanent
residents, and U.S. citizens are entitled to Fourth
Amendment protections. The proposed rule fails
to account for these protections, subjecting nonU.S. citizens to potentially unconstitutional
searches and implicating the privacy rights of
U.S. citizens who interact with them online,
which are clearly protected and subject to strict
scrutiny.
3. Government Overreach: The comments argue
that the proposed collection of social media
identifiers represents significant government
overreach by normalizing invasive surveillance
practices in the immigration process. The rule’s
broad and vague standards grant immigration
officers excessive discretion, increasing the risk
of arbitrary enforcement and undermining
constitutional protections. Additionally, the
collection of sensitive social media data, which
reveals intimate details about individuals’ lives
and associations, is seen as disproportionately
intrusive and unnecessary for immigration
adjudication, failing to meet legal standards of
necessity and practical utility.
Recommendations:
1. Rescind the Proposal: Withdraw the proposed
collection entirely.

Response: DHS disagrees that the collection of
social media identifiers violates the Fourth
Amendment, individual expectations of privacy,
or the prohibition on unlawful or warrantless
searches and seizures.
This collection is consistent with Supreme Court
rulings related to Fourth Amendment protections
to the extent such protections are applicable in
this context. It is not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment to ask questions of an individual
who is not detained and may choose whether or
not to answer them. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (citing cases).
Individuals who choose to seek admission to the
United States or apply for immigration benefits
do so on a voluntary basis. DHS provides ample
notice that information provided by individuals
may be verified and additional background
checks may be conducted for the requested
benefit eligibility.
Additionally, federal laws, including the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and
Homeland Security Act of 2002, and regulation
provide authority for this information collection.
For example, INA § 287(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(b),
and 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(a)(2) empower officers and
agents to “take and consider evidence
concerning the privilege of any person to enter,
reenter, pass through, or reside in the United
States.” Similarly, for naturalization purposes,
INA § 335, 8 U.S.C. § 1446, empowers any
employee of USCIS to conduct a personal
investigation of the person applying for
naturalization, take testimony concerning the
admissibility of the applicant for naturalization,
and require the production of relevant books,
papers, and documents.
USCIS personnel will only use social media
identifiers to locate and review publicly available
social media information and, as the Supreme
Court has explained, “What a person knowingly
exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of

2. Require Reasonable Suspicion: Ensure that
the collection of social media data is based on
reasonable suspicion of involvement in a crime,
as required by Fourth Amendment precedents,
rather than allowing broad and arbitrary
surveillance.
3. Limit Intrusions: Restrict the scope of data
collection to avoid excessive and invasive
monitoring of individuals’ private lives, ensuring
that any intrusion is proportional and narrowly
tailored to its stated purpose.
4. Address Impacts on U.S. Citizens: Prevent the
collection of information about U.S. citizens’
speech, associations, and other activities on
social media, as this data is clearly protected by
the Fourth Amendment and First Amendment.
5. Ensure Transparency and Accountability:
Provide clear justification for the necessity of the
data collection and its practical utility, and
establish oversight mechanisms to prevent
misuse and ensure compliance with
constitutional and legal standards.

1258
1264
1271

Due Process under the
Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments

The comments raise the following concerns
about due process under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments:
1. Procedural Due Process Violations: Comments
argue that the proposed social media collection
violates procedural due process by failing to
provide clear, consistent, and fair standards for
applicants. The lack of precise guidance on what

Fourth Amendment protection.” Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see, e.g.,
Palmieri v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 3d 191, 210
(D.D.C. 2014) (holding that a Plaintiff cannot
claim a Fourth Amendment violation because
there is “no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the information [the Plaintiff] made available to
‘friends’ on his Facebook page”); United States v.
Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 525 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (“When a social media user disseminates
his postings and information to the public, they
are not protected by the Fourth Amendment.”).
DHS disagrees that it should define specific
criteria under which individuals may be subject
to social media vetting and believes that social
media screening is best applied to requests for
an immigration benefit requiring a background
investigation. Social media involves publicly
available information that is accessible to anyone
without a warrant and DHS would not be unique
in reviewing it. Along with checking against
government systems and information, DHS
officers may use publicly available information,
social media included, as part of the vetting and
screening process to verify the information
submitted. Moreover, the content of an
individual’s public social media can be used to
assess and identify immigration fraud, bars to
eligibility, and national security and public safety
threats, requiring vetting procedures that are as
broad as possible.
DHS acknowledges that some of the individuals
impacted will be United States citizens, however
collecting social media information from U.S.
citizen petitioners is within the scope of the
authority of DHS. In many circumstances, the
alien’s relationship to a United States citizen is
material to the benefit sought. The Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes DHS to
collect information needed to assess eligibility
for an immigration benefit. USCIS notes that the
information collected will assist USCIS to
evaluate other information key to benefit
eligibility. In many circumstances, this will
involve information from a United States citizen
who has filed an immigration benefit request on
behalf of an alien.
Response: DHS disagrees that collection of social
media identifiers violates the individual’s right to
due process under both the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The Supreme Court has construed
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause to impose the same due process
limitations on the states as the Fifth Amendment
does on the federal government. As DHS is part
of the Executive Branch, and thus, the Federal

constitutes "social media" and the broad, vague
requirements for disclosure create significant
barriers to compliance. Applicants may
inadvertently fail to meet the requirements due
to confusion or inability to recall all relevant
information, leading to unjust denials of
immigration benefits.
2. Discretionary Decision-Making: Comments
highlight the discretionary nature of immigration
decisions, which already result in inconsistent
outcomes for applicants with similar cases.
Adding social media data as a factor for review
exacerbates this issue, allowing immigration
officers to exercise broad discretion that could
lead to arbitrary or biased decisions, further
undermining fairness and due process.
3. Responsibility for Third-Party Compliance:
Imposes an undue burden on applicants by
requiring them to solicit sensitive social media
information from third parties, such as relatives
or minor children. This creates additional
challenges, as third parties may withhold
information, fail to recall identifiers, or
misunderstand the requirements. Such
dependency on third-party compliance could
result in unfair denials of immigration benefits,
violating due process protections.
4. Risk of Pretextual Denials: The vague and
sweeping language of the rule increases the risk
of pretextual denials, where applicants could be
rejected for minor or inadvertent errors, longforgotten identifiers, or subjective interpretations
of their social media activity. This undermines
the fairness and transparency required by due
process.
5. Substantive Due Process Violations:
Comments emphasize that due process protects
against the unfair deprivation of substantive
rights, such as free expression and access to nondiscretionary immigration relief (e.g.,
naturalization). The proposed collection could
lead to the denial of these rights based on
arbitrary or discriminatory factors, further
violating due process principles.
Recommendations:
1. Rescind the Proposal: Withdraw the proposed
collection entirely.
2. Provide Clear Standards and Definitions:
Establish precise definitions for terms like "social
media" and "social media identifiers" to
eliminate vagueness. Clearly define what
constitutes a security or public safety threat. DHS

Government, it is not clear how the Fourteenth
Amendment is applicable in this instance.
Regarding the Fifth Amendment, the proposed
information collection does not impact the due
process rights of applicants, petitioners, or
benefit requestors. For example, in general other
than discretionary overseas denials, USCIS would
not deny a benefit based on social media
information without first confronting the
applicant, petitioner, or benefit requestor with
the information and providing an opportunity to
explain it or rebut any negative inferences USCIS
may have drawn from it. See 8 C.F.R. §
103.2(b)(16)(i) and (ii). Additionally, if USCIS
makes an adverse finding on any request or
application, the individual may be entitled to
additional immigration processes which may
include the right to appeal or appear before an
immigration judge.
Regarding third-party compliance, DHS notes
that in most cases, we are only requesting social
media regarding about the applicant, beneficiary,
or petitioner. We will not request social media
information for every relative nor family
member. In some specific cases, social media
information will be requested only from family
members with direct ties to the petition itself
and/or the benefit requested.
For more information about the clear standards
and definitions that DHS has provided for social
media terms, please see Topic 8. Unreliable
Information, Imprecise/Confusing Social Media
Terms.

must provide detailed and transparent
instructions to ensure applicants can comply
with the proposed collection without inadvertent
errors or omissions.
3. Restrict Officer Discretion: Implement strict
guidelines to limit immigration officers'
discretion in interpreting social media
information.
4. Exclude Third-Party Information: Applicants
should not be required to disclose social media
identifiers for relatives, minor children, or other
third parties, as this places an undue burden on
applicants and risks violations of privacy and
fairness.

1264
1273

Fifth Amendment –
Self Incrimination

5. Prevent Pretextual Denials: Explicitly prohibit
the use of minor errors, omissions, or subjective
interpretations of social media activity as
grounds for denying immigration benefits or
stripping applicants of their status.
The comments raise the following concerns
about the Fifth Amendment and selfincrimination:
1. Compelled Disclosure of Private Information:
The proposed rule requiring applicants to
disclose social media identifiers, including
pseudonymous or anonymous accounts, is
described as a form of compelled disclosure that
could force individuals to reveal private
information. This compelled disclosure may lead
to self-incrimination, as applicants could be
required to provide information that might be
used against them in immigration decisions.
2. Risk of Pretextual Denials: The comments
highlight the risk of pretextual denials of
immigration benefits based on minor or
inadvertent omissions, forgotten social media
identifiers, or associations with disfavored
individuals or groups. Applicants could be
unfairly penalized for providing incomplete or
inaccurate information, raising concerns about
self-incrimination and the potential misuse of
their disclosures.
3. Guilt by Association: The rule’s focus on
collecting social media identifiers could result in
applicants being held accountable for their
associations or interactions with others online,
even if those associations are innocuous or
unrelated to the applicant’s eligibility. This raises
concerns about individuals being indirectly
incriminated through their social media
connections, violating the Fifth Amendment’s
protection against self-incrimination.

Response: The Fifth Amendment prohibition
against self-incrimination applies to proceedings
in which the Government seeks to compel
testimony that a witness reasonably believes
could be used against him in a state or federal
criminal proceeding. A risk that the testimony
might subject the witness to deportation or
other civil consequences (such as, here, denial of
an immigration benefit) is not a sufficient ground
for asserting the privilege. See United States v.
Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 671–72 (1998).
Additionally, here, the Government does not
seek to compel testimony, but rather plans to
collect publicly available social media
information already posted by an individual.
Despite the inapplicability of the Fifth
Amendment in this situation, DHS is not
requiring individuals to incriminate themselves
by providing social media identifiers to USCIS on
its forms. Filing for immigration benefits and
including requested information is a voluntary
action by an individual. Information about the
use of provided information by the government
is explained in SORNs, PIAs and the DHS Privacy
Notice provided on every USCIS form.

4. Chilling Effect on Speech and Associations:
The fear of being required to disclose social
media activity and associations may lead
applicants to self-censor, delete posts, or avoid
certain platforms altogether. This preemptive
self-censorship reflects the broader concern that
individuals may feel forced to alter their behavior
to avoid providing incriminating information.
Recommendations:
1. Establish Clear Standards: Define key terms
and provide strict guidelines to limit officer
discretion, ensure fair decision-making, and
prevent arbitrary enforcement.
2. Protect Privacy and Anonymity: Safeguard the
right to anonymous speech, implement strict
data retention and sharing protocols, and
conduct privacy impact assessments to mitigate
risks, especially for vulnerable populations.

Topic 7. Public Safety
1261
Discriminatory/Safety
1269
Risk
1274
1275
1276

3. Clarify Compliance Requirements: Provide
clear instructions to prevent inadvertent errors
and ensure applicants can meet the rule’s
requirements without undue burden.
The comments provided raise significant
concerns about discrimination and safety risks
associated with the proposed collection of social
media identifiers. Below are the key points:
Discrimination Concerns:
1. Bias in Decision-Making: The collection of
social media data risks introducing subjective
biases into immigration adjudications, as
reviewing officers may interpret social media
activity based on their personal views rather
than objective criteria.
2. Targeting Marginalized Groups: The collected
data could be misused to target individuals
based on their race, ethnicity, political views, or
associations, amplifying systemic inequities.
Historical examples of surveillance
disproportionately targeting Black and Latinx
communities, political activists, and immigrants
are cited to highlight how broad discretion in
data collection could perpetuate systemic
discrimination.
3. Guilt by Association: Comments emphasize
the risk of applicants being penalized for their
associations or interactions on social media,
even if they are tenuous or misinterpreted.
Safety Risks:

Response: DHS is steadfastly committed to the
highest standards of conduct, especially when it
comes to the fair, unbiased, and transparent
enforcement of our mission responsibilities. The
collection of this additional information will be
used to help enforce our immigration laws by
assisting in the adjudication of eligibility to be
admitted to the United States or be granted an
immigration-related benefit. Existing DHS policy
prohibits the consideration of race or ethnicity in
our investigation, screening, and enforcement
activities in all but the most exceptional
instances. This policy is reaffirmed in manuals,
policies, directives, and guidelines. Existing DHS
policy also prohibits profiling, targeting, or
discrimination against any individual for
exercising his or her First Amendment rights.
We will not use the information in a
discriminatory manner that prevents entry into
the United States or denies benefits based on an
individual’s race, color, age, sexual orientation,
religion, sex, national origin, or disability. DHS
will handle social media identifiers in the same
manner as other information collected for
immigration benefit purposes. Social media
information is one data point for benefit
requesters and is intended to be considered
along with other information, including other
application data provided by individuals. DHS will
make case-by-case determinations based on the

1. Victim Retraumatization: Requiring crime
victims and trafficking survivors to disclose social
media accounts risks retraumatizing them
echoing lack of privacy and enabling perpetrators
to further exploit or falsely accuse them.
2. Weaponization of Social Media by
Perpetrators: Traffickers and abusers often use
social media to manipulate, monitor, or harm
their victims. The proposed rule could
inadvertently amplify these risks by requiring
victims to disclose accounts that may have been
compromised or controlled by their abusers.
Conclusion: These concerns suggest that the rule
may harm vulnerable populations and fail to
achieve its stated objectives of improving
national security and public safety.

totality of the circumstances. In addition,
generally other than discretionary overseas
denials, USCIS would not deny a benefit based on
social media information without first
confronting the applicant, petitioner, or benefit
requestor with the information and providing an
opportunity to explain it or rebut any negative
inferences USCIS may have drawn from it. See 8
C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(i) and (ii).
DHS disagrees with commenters who believe
victims of crime and trafficking will be
traumatized by providing social media
information. The information is neither
substantive nor detailed, and does not contain
account content.
Any information provided by an individual on a
form is done so voluntarily by the individual. DHS
does not compel individuals to request
immigration benefits from USCIS.
Officers who conduct social media evaluations
are trained to identify accounts potentially
controlled by someone other than the applicant,
petitioner, or beneficiary. In the event that an
applicant, petitioner, or beneficiary’s account
had been compromised by another individual,
USCIS generally would not deny a benefit based
on any negative inference without first
confronting the applicant, petitioner, or
beneficiary with the information and providing
an opportunity to explain the circumstances
around any compromised social media account
or rebut any negative inferences USCIS may have
drawn from it. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(i) and
(ii).
USCIS complies with the Privacy Act and DHS
policy regarding collection and protection of
information as required. DHS understands that
information provided on its forms may be about
U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents who
are covered by the Privacy Act, and DHS
employees, who are permitted and trained to
utilize social media for operational purposes
during the performance of their duties, must
adhere to DHS privacy policies, as established by
the Chief Privacy Officer. Furthermore, USCIS
follows all applicable laws, regulations and
policies to protect collected information and use
it for its designated purpose.
DHS provides public notice about collection and
use of data under appropriate System of Records
Notices (SORNs) published online and in the
Federal Register, Privacy Impact Assessments
(PIAs) posted on the DHS website, and privacy

notices on DHS forms. DHS has evaluated
potential privacy risks and determined that
multiple published System of Record Notices
(SORNs) in the Federal Register and associated
Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) cover and
apply to information gathered in this collection.
Topic 8. Unreliable Information
1263
Imprecise/Confusing
1264
Social Media terms
1268
1273
1275

The comments highlight several issues regarding
the imprecision, confusion, and potential
unreliability of collecting social media
information. Key points include:
Imprecision and Vagueness
1. Undefined Terms: The lack of clear definitions
for terms like "social media identifier" or
"platform" creates confusion for applicants.
Without a concrete list of platforms or specific
guidance, applicants are left to guess what
information is required.
2. Overbroad Scope: The requirement to list all
social media accounts used over the past five
years is seen as excessively broad, encompassing
platforms that may not be relevant to
immigration adjudication.
Recommendations:
1. Withdraw the Proposal: Many commenters
recommend rescinding the proposed collection
entirely, as it is seen as unnecessary, overly
burdensome, and prone to generating unreliable
data.
2. Provide Clear Definitions: If implemented, the
proposed collection should narrowly define what
constitutes a "social media identifier" and limit
the scope to current, verifiable accounts. Offer a
definitive list of social media platforms that
applicants must disclose, reducing ambiguity
about what is expected.

1263
1264
1268
1273
1275

No Social Media
Presence/False
Information

3. Limit Scope: Avoid requiring identifiers for
platforms unrelated to immigration adjudication,
such as shopping sites, hobby forums, or niche
platforms.
The comments highlight several concerns about
how the collection of social media information
may lead to unreliable data due to a lack of
social media presence or the prevalence of false
information. Key points include:
1. Lack of Social Media Presence
• No Social Media Accounts: Not all
applicants have a social media presence,
and some may intentionally avoid using
social media platforms for privacy or
personal reasons. This could lead to

Response: DHS defines social media as the
“sphere of websites, applications, and webbased tools that connect users to engage in
dialogue, share information and media,
collaborate, and interact.” Social media
platforms include Facebook, X (formerly Twitter),
Instagram, among others, that are commonly
identified as “social media”. That definition has
been used by DHS previously. Please see the
Privacy Impact Assessment found at
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publicat
ions/privacy-pia-uscis-013-01-fdnsaugust2019.pdf. This definition of “social media,”
as well as a list of examples of social media
platforms, is specifically included in the form
instructions for each of the forms collecting
social media information, and DHS expects the
definition and examples to eliminate any
confusion concerning the definition of a “social
media platform.” DHS believes the term “social
media identifier” is sufficiently descriptive and
will be commonly understood by the public to
signify one’s “username”, “ID”, or “handle”.
Based on our research, we think the terms used
and the additional information in form
instructions are sufficient, but we welcome
public comments on additional terms that we
should consider. If a social media platform does
not use a handle, the new form instructions
request that individuals provide the relevant
associated identifiable information used to
access the platform, such as an email address or
phone number.

Response: DHS has a layered approach to
security and any social media identifiers
collected would be only one piece of information
used in the analysis of eligibility for the
requested immigration benefit. Although the
potential exists for an individual to provide false
or inaccurate information about their social
media identifiers on a form, the response (or lack
thereof) the individual provides in the context of
the larger picture will guide the line of inquiry
pursued by the DHS officer. The potential for
inaccurate/false social media or other

unfair assumptions about their eligibility
or intent.
2. Forgotten or Inactive Accounts:
• Forgotten Accounts: Many applicants
may struggle to recall all the accounts,
usernames, or pseudonyms they’ve used
over the past five years, especially for
inactive or forgotten accounts.
• Multiple Accounts: Applicants often have
multiple accounts on the same platform
due to forgotten passwords or different
purposes, making it challenging to
provide a complete and accurate list.
• Unintentional Omissions: Forgetting to
disclose an account, even
unintentionally, could lead to accusations
of misrepresentation, creating a "trap"
for applicants.
3. Prevalence of False Information
• Fake Accounts: Social media platforms
do not require identity verification,
making it easy for individuals to create
fake or spoofed accounts. This
undermines the reliability of social
media data for identity verification or
security screening.
• Manipulated Content: Social media
posts can be edited, fabricated, or taken
out of context, leading to false
conclusions about an applicant’s
character or intent.
• Unverifiable Data: Many social media
identifiers are pseudonymous or autogenerated, making it difficult for
adjudicators to verify the authenticity of
the information provided.
Recommendations:
1. Focus on Current Accounts: Focus on current,
verifiable accounts and exclude inactive or
irrelevant platforms to minimize the risk of
unreliable data.
2. Adopt a Targeted Approach: Reserve social
media reviews for cases with specific, articulable
risk indicators rather than applying the
requirement universally.
3. Cross-Check Data: Implement safeguards to
verify the authenticity of social media
information before using it as a basis for
decisions.
4. Avoid Penalizing Omissions: Ensure that
unintentional omissions or forgotten accounts do

application information does not render the
collection of this information unnecessary. DHS
makes case-by-case determinations based on the
totality of the circumstances consistent with its
authorities. In addition, generally other than
discretionary overseas denials, USCIS would not
deny a benefit based on social media information
without first confronting the applicant,
petitioner, or benefit requestor with the
information and providing an opportunity to
explain it or rebut any negative inferences USCIS
may have drawn from it. See 8 C.F.R. §
103.2(b)(16)(i) and (ii).
DHS is aware that some individuals may not have
social media accounts, therefore USCIS has
updated the proposed collection of information
to include the following question on each
impacted information collection: “Have you had
or used a social media account in the past five (5)
years? Yes/No.”
Collection of social media information will not be
used for identity verification. Social media may
be used to support or corroborate application
information, which will help USCIS’ mission to
administer the nation’s lawful immigration
system by providing an additional means to
adjudicate issues related to relevant questions
about identity, occupation, previous travel, and
other factors. It may also be used to identify
potential deception or fraud.

1264
1265
1273

Language Concerns

not result in accusations of misrepresentation or
denial of benefits.
The comments raise concerns about language
regarding the proposed collection of social
media identifiers.
•

Language Differences: Social media posts
in languages other than English may be
mistranslated or misunderstood, leading to
incorrect conclusions about an applicant’s
intent or character.

Recommendations:
• Cultural and Linguistic Training: Ensure
adjudicators are trained to interpret social
media posts in different languages and
cultural contexts to avoid
misinterpretation.

Response: DHS officers and personnel have
extensive background in reviewing
documentation in languages other than English,
and they are trained to consider linguistic and
cultural nuance. The addition of social media
vetting would not be unique to DHS investigative
and adjudicative practices with respect to
sources and documentation in foreign languages.
If derogatory information in a foreign language
were found in social media, USCIS generally
would not deny a benefit based on such
information without first confronting the
applicant, petitioner, or benefit requestor with
the information and providing an opportunity to
explain it or rebut any negative inferences USCIS
may have drawn from it. See 8 C.F.R. §
103.2(b)(16)(i) and (ii).
Individuals may also submit a full and complete
English language translation of foreign language
social media documentation in response to a
USCIS notice or request . The translator must
certify that the translation is accurate, and he or
she is competent to translate from that language
to English.

Topic 9. Public Concerns Expressed
1266
General Opposition
1269

The comments broadly oppose the proposed
collection of social media identifiers, arguing that
it infringes on free speech, fosters
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, and
perpetuates xenophobic policies. Commenters
expressed concern that the collection would limit
immigrants, tourists, and legal residents from
engaging in protected speech, particularly when
criticizing the government or discussing sensitive
topics like U.S. foreign policy. The policy is
described as part of a broader agenda to enable
mass deportations with reduced legal standards,
undermining constitutional protections.
Additionally, commenters highlight the
misallocation of government resources,
suggesting that time spent on social media
monitoring could be better used addressing
issues like unlawful detentions. The proposal is
seen as creating a chilling effect, where
individuals may self-censor to avoid adverse
immigration consequences, ultimately harming
democratic principles and open discourse.
Overall, the comments argue that the rule is
unnecessary, discriminatory, and
counterproductive to legitimate administrative
and national security goals.

Response: Two commenters did not make clear
objections. Therefore, DHS cannot provide
specific responses to these general oppositions.
DHS’s role in reviewing publicly available social
media information accessed via social media
identifier(s) provided by individuals is
appropriate given that DHS’s mission to is to
secure the Nation from threats. This includes
denying immigration benefits to inadmissible or
ineligible aliens, as appropriate and in
accordance with law, including criminals and
terrorists.
USCIS officers make their decisions based on the
requirements of U.S. immigration law and DHS
policies. Information found on social media via
the provision of social media identifier(s) will
enhance the vetting process and identify
potential threats. For example, social media may
be used to support or corroborate a benefit
seeker’s application by providing an additional
means to adjudicate issues related to relevant
questions about identity, occupation, previous
travel, and other factors. It may also be used to
identify potential deception or fraud. Social
media may help distinguish individuals of
additional concern from those individuals whose
information substantiates their eligibility for
immigration benefits.

1271
1273

Excessive Government
Oversight

Topic 10. Out of Scope
1262

The comments highlight that the proposed
collection of social media identifiers allows for
excessive government oversight by enabling
indefinite monitoring and broad data sharing
with minimal transparency or safeguards. DHS’s
retention and dissemination policies would
permit ongoing surveillance of individuals,
including U.S. citizens, and the sharing of
sensitive data with domestic and international
entities, potentially exposing individuals to harm
or persecution. Weak oversight mechanisms and
a lack of clear rules or privacy protections further
exacerbate the risks of civil liberties violations
and data breaches. This unchecked oversight is
seen as disproportionate, unnecessary, and
harmful to privacy and free expression.

Response: Individuals who present a threat to
national security or public safety are not eligible
for certain benefits and U.S. immigration laws
preclude DHS from granting immigration and
naturalization benefits to individuals with certain
disqualifying characteristics including association
with terrorist organizations. See, e.g., INA §
208(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A) (mandatory
bars to asylum); INA § 245(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. §
1255(a)(2) (admissibility requirements for
adjustment of status applicants and agency
discretion); and INA § 316(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. §
1427(a)(3) (good moral character requirement
for naturalization). Investigation of social media
activity will assist USCIS in making sure that
these requirements are met.
As noted in prior responses, USCIS collects
information from individuals voluntarily applying
for immigration benefits. USCIS follows all
applicable laws, regulations and policies to
protect collected information and use it for its
designated purpose. Furthermore, as noted in a
prior response, Officers who are responsible for
conducting social media vetting are trained
specifically on how to identify First Amendment
activity. USCIS has extensively detailed the
process for social media vetting publicly via the
Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) in 2019:
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publicat
ions/privacy-pia-uscis-013-01-fdnsaugust2019.pdf.

There was one comment received that is out of
scope.

Response: DHS did not address this comment
because it was outside the scope of the
proposed generic clearance.