Attach 3 - Supplemental Information (history)

Attach 3 - Supplemental Information (history).doc

Defense Biometric Identification System (DBIDS)

Attach 3 - Supplemental Information (history)

OMB: 0704-0455

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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION



DBIDS History


DBIDS, originally conceived to protect the Combined (USAF – Republic of Korea (ROK)) Command Center in 1995, addressed the need for high security as well as cultural issues in Korea. It was adapted to address identification and access issues on the entire Korean Peninsula as a joint project between United States Forces Korea (USFK), the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The following table provides key dates in the development of DBIDS since 1995.


DATE

ACTIVITY

September 2001

DBIDS fully implemented at FPCON Delta for USFK

May 2002

Remote wireless handheld scanner capability introduced; provides rapid access control at gates

2003

USAREUR launches DBIDS (known as IACS)

Regional inter-service DBIDS set up with DMDC, Presidio of Monterey and Naval Postgraduate School

September 2004

First stand-alone DBIDS Implementation in CONUS at
Ft. Hood

October 2004

First DBIDS implementation in Japan (Yokosuka)

November 2004

First DBIDS implementations in Kuwait and Qatar

December 2004

DBIDS Mobile Kit prototype finalized for future deployment in support of flexible NCR asset protection – joint effort with DHS and DOI

January 2007

Sent first Southwest Asia (SWA) Electronic Biometric Transmission Specification (EBTS) package to Biometrics Fusion Center matching against Automated Biometrics Identification System (ABIS)

2007

First DBIDS implementations in SWA: UAE, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain

April 2008

First DBIDS deployment in the Philippines

September 2008

Air Force DBIDS deployments at Peterson AFB and USAFA; first 2 of 13 AF sites in CONUS


The deployment of DBIDS to Air Force installations in CONUS was undertaken at the request of the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). NORTHCOM’s mission is to anticipate and conduct Homeland Defense and Civil Support operations within the assigned area of responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests. NORTHCOM’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) includes air, land and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. It also includes the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida.



DBIDS Authorization Categories


The rules surrounding entry to an access area are defined by regional or installation leadership and are based on authorization categories. In the case of a DoD ID cardholder, the authorization category from the ID card is used. For non-DoD ID cardholders who receive a DBIDS card, the list of authorization categories is also defined by regional and/or installation commanders. For example, Army Europe (AE) Regulation 190-16 is the governing directive for all personnel categories except for personnel employed under the provisions of CTA II. The following table lists Authorization Categories used within each of the DBIDS geographical areas.


PACIFIC COMMAND

SOUTHWEST ASIA (SWA)

EUROPEAN COMMAND

CONUS (AIR FORCE)

U.S. Embassy

CATI/TCN [non-U.S. citizen, non-screened (untrusted)]

Personal Service Employee [nanny, housekeeper, etc.]

Facilities Service

Family Member of U.S. Embassy

CATII/Foreign Military [non-U.S. citizen, screened (trusted; i.e., coalition forces)]

Visitor [immediate family member living in the USAREUR/
USAFE AOR – typically family members of local national spouse]

Maintenance

United Nations Command (Sponsor or Family Member)

CATIII/Contractors [U.S. citizen, non-screened]

Visitor [friend or family member not included above – typically family members on vacation from outside Europe]

Volunteer

Host Nation Military

CATIV/DoD ID [DoD ID – U.S. citizen, screened]

Official Guest [at local commander’s discretion]

Conveyance

Host Nation Defense Agency (JSDF)

CATV/Commander’s Exception [typically used for host country VIPs]

Other [often the unmarried or divorced mother of a sponsor’s child]

Personal Delivery

Family Member of JSDF


Host Nation Military Member

Personal Services

Host Nation Government Official


Delivery Personnel

Facility Use

Local National Employee


Foreign Student [Marshall Center]

Visitor

Long Term Visitor (1 yr)


Dept of State/U.S. Embassy Personnel

Emergency-Essential Civilian (non-CAC)


Local National Contractor


Contractor [U.S. citizen based in CONUS]

U.S. Government Civilian (non-CAC)

Local National Contractor - Awaiting Background Check)


Member of Privat Organization [e.g., Red Cross]

U.S. Government Contractor (non-CAC)

Local National Contractor – Escort Required


Local National Employee [do not require computer access]

Foreign Military (non-CAC)

Personal Services (e.g., Domestic labor workers)


NATO Member Assigned

Foreign Government Civilian

Taxi Driver


Host Nation Government Official [mayor, police chief, building inspectors, etc.]

Foreign Government Contractor

Third Nation Military Command Sponsored


IACS Gate Guard

Foreign Military Dependent

Third Nation Military Non-Command Sponsored


Contractor (living in host nation) [e.g.,U.S. citizens living in Europe and working as local nationals]

Foreign Military Retiree

Distinguished Visitor (CDR defined)


Vender/Commercial Solicitor [licensed salespeople]

Foreign Civilian Visitor

Short Term Visitor (less than 30 days)




Visitor – Escort Required




Family Member under 10 years of age




Non-SOFA Civilian Living in Japan (no DoD ID card)




JSOTF U.S. Contractor (no CAC) – Philippines Special Operations specific






Vetting of DBIDS Cardholders


In CONUS, applicants for a DBIDS card are required to provide appropriate identification (e.g., a government issued photo) and additional documentation as required based on their authorization category and regional/local requirements for each category. Some categories require an installation sponsor.


In foreign locations, the vetting requirements for receiving the DBIDS installation pass vary by location. In Europe, all background checks on local nationals are conducted by the host nation and, in most cases, the results are provided directly to the DBIDS staff. Background checks are most thorough in Germany where the bulk of U.S. forces are stationed. Fingerprint capture is problematic in the European Union, and governed by local and national laws. In Germany, the capture of a photo and fingerprints is allowed because they are stored locally in the DBIDS database. The data is used exclusively for individual identification in connection with access to and presence on U.S. Forces installations. The data is protected against unauthorized access by state of the art access control systems and accessible only by personnel responsible for installation protection. In many countries, such as Italy, Spain and Greece, the host country owns the base and controls access; U.S. forces are essentially tenants on those bases and must abide by host country laws.


Throughout Asia all foreign nationals are vetted with background checks. Some background checks are done by the host nation, some are done in coordination with the host nation. In Korea, Army Korea Regulation 190-7 governs installation access and specifies, among other things, when and what types of background checks are required for the issuance of a DBIDS card. Background checks in USFK consist of three parts: a local check through the local U.S. military law enforcement agency or USFK Joint Police Information Center (JPIC), a check conducted through the Korean National Police Agency (NPA) and, as required, an additional check through US Embassy-Korea.


Due to the heightened security requirements in SWA, individuals who fall into Category I (CATI/TCN) are vetted prior to receiving a DBIDS card. In addition to the frontal photograph and two fingerprints required of each registrant in other regions, other country nationals that have not been vetted by “trusted” sources, e.g., coalition military service members and U.S. contractor personnel, are required to provide iris scans, ten-print fingerprints, hand geometry, and five photographs for facial recognition. They must also provide additional demographic information including nationality, place of birth, aliases, race, tribe, blood type and marital status. In the next version of DBIDS for SWA, which is undergoing testing at the present time, the registrant will be required to provide more demographic information, including names of family members, identifying credential information, employer information, sponsor information, and requesting official information.


Collected biometric and demographic information is submitted to an element of the Biometrics Task Force (BTF), formerly known as the Biometrics Fusion Center. Upon receiving applicant data the BFF verifies the data using the Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS) against various authoritative sources such as the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and their own red force database. The BTF returns a message stating whether there is match for the individual in these authoritative sources, indicating a potential “person of interest”.


If there was no match, the message is referred to as a NONIDENT. If a match exists, the message is called an IDENT. The IDENT may be low in criticality – it may reflect the individual as already enrolled in another biometric system such as the Biometric Identification System for Access (BISA) or the Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT), in use elsewhere in the Area of Responsibility (AOR). The IDENT could be of higher criticality – the individual’s print matched a latent print associated with counter insurgency activities, i.e., a print on an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). In the second case, the screening official at the DBIDS registration site is directed to check the Biographical Intelligence Analysis Report (BIAR) from the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) website. After reviewing the BIAR, the screening official makes a decision to approve issuance of a DBIDS identification card, reject the application, or detain the individual.

This vetting process is consistent with the process at foreign locations described in the Office of Personnel Management Memorandum, dated July 31, 2008.



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File Typeapplication/msword
File TitleHistory of DBIDS
Authordouglalf
Last Modified BySessiPJ
File Modified2008-12-10
File Created2008-12-08

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