Pia

Privacy Impact Assessment
for the

Transportation Worker Identification Credential
Program
October 5, 2007
Contact Point
John Schwartz
TWIC Assistant Director
Transportation Security Administration
571-227-4545
Reviewing Officials
Peter Pietra
Director, Privacy Policy and Compliance
Transportation Security Administration
[email protected]
Hugo Teufel III
Chief Privacy Officer
Department of Homeland Security
[email protected]

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Abstract
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) published a joint Final Rule with the
United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) to implement a Transportation Worker Identification
Credential (TWIC) program to provide a biometric credential that can be used to confirm the
identity of workers in the national transportation system, and conducted a Privacy Impact
Assessment (PIA) associated with that Final Rule. TSA is amending the PIA to reflect the
development of TWIC contactless card capability in sections 1.4, 1.6, 9.2 and 9.3, and the
approval of the records schedule by NARA in section 3. This PIA replaces the one published
December 29, 2006.

Introduction
As set out in the Final Rule, the purpose of the TWIC program is to ensure that only
authorized personnel who have successfully completed a security threat assessment have
unescorted access to secure areas of maritime facilities and vessels. Commercial drivers licensed
in Mexico and Canada transporting hazardous materials in accordance with 49 CFR 1572.201
may also apply for a TWIC. The credential will include a reference fingerprint biometric that
positively links the credential holder to the identity of the individual who was issued the
credential. As designed and proposed in the NPRM, TWIC can be used in conjunction with
access control readers designed to recognize the credential and the information encrypted on it to
permit authorized individuals to enter secure areas of port facilities and vessels without escort.
However, many commenters raised questions about the durability of the readers in a commercial
and/or marine environment and the potential delays that might result from the proposed entrance
procedures. As a result, the Final Rule does not require the installation of card readers at this
time. Initially, TWIC will be visually inspected by owner/operators at access points rather than
read by an automated reader. In addition, the Coast Guard will conduct random and periodic
checks at access control points. The rule also permits personnel of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), National Transportation Safety Board, and law enforcement officers to conduct
audits to confirm that the credential is held by an authorized individual. It is expected that TWIC
will be used with access control systems in the future. TSA has designed the credential and
process to maintain strict privacy controls to prevent a TWIC holder’s biographic and biometric
information from being compromised.
Individuals must enroll for a TWIC at a designated enrollment center. However, to
reduce the time needed to complete the entire enrollment process at an enrollment center, an
individual may pre-enroll via the Internet by providing biographical data. The applicant can
access the TWIC website to provide personal information required for enrollment and select an
enrollment center at which to complete enrollment. All applicants, including those who pre-

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enroll, must appear at an enrollment center to verify their identity, confirm that the information
provided during pre-enrollment is correct, provide biometrics, and sign the enrollment
documents. TSA, or TSA’s agent operating under TSA’s direction, will conduct TWIC
enrollment. All enrollment personnel will successfully complete a TSA security threat
assessment before being authorized to access documents, systems, or secure areas.
Following enrollment, the TSA system sends pertinent parts of the record to the FBI, as
well as within DHS, so that appropriate terrorist threat, criminal history, and immigration checks
can be performed. TSA reviews the results of the checks to determine whether the individual
poses a security threat, and notifies the applicant of the result. When TSA has determined that
an applicant is qualified to receive a TWIC, the TSA system generates an order to produce a
credential. The credential is produced at a federally managed production facility and shipped to
the center where the applicant enrolled. The TSA system notifies the applicant that his or her
TWIC is ready for pick-up and the applicant must return to the enrollment center to retrieve and
activate the credential. At this time, applicants will select a personal identification number
(PIN), which is programmed into the card and serves as an added layer of security for the
biometric data embedded on the credential.
Commenters expressed the need to provide vessel and facility owners/operators with the
ability to put new, direct hires to work immediately if an urgent staffing requirement exists, after
new hires have applied for their TWIC. As a result of the comments, the Final Rule permits
new, direct hires to have limited access to secure areas for up to 30 consecutive days, provided
the conditions described in the rule are met. For these individuals, the operator’s Facility or
Vessel Security Officer will be required to re-enter their limited biographic information directly
into the U.S. Coast Guard’s Homeport web portal. The Homeport web portal is a Coast Guard
system designed for secure communications by the Coast Guard, maritime industry, Area
Maritime Security Committees, and other entities regulated under the Maritime Transportation
Security Act (MTSA) of 2002. TSA will be notified by Homeport of these individuals. New,
direct hires will not be permitted to access ports or facilities until the facility receives interim
clearance status from TSA.
Possession of a TWIC does not guarantee access to secure areas because the
owner/operator controls which individuals are given unescorted access to the facility or vessel.
Rather, TWIC is a secure, verified credential that can be used in conjunction with the
owner/operator’s risk-based security program that is required in security regulations issued by
the Coast Guard. TSA will make available only a list of invalid credential numbers to facility
and vessel operators for use in insuring that holders of revoked credentials are not able to access
secure areas without an escort.
This program entails a new collection of information about members of the public in an
identifiable form, thus the E-Government Act of 2002 and the Homeland Security Act of 2002

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require TSA to conduct a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA). The data collected and maintained
for this program and the details on uses of this information are outlined in this Privacy Impact
Assessment. This PIA replaces the one published December 29, 2006.

Section 1.0 Information Collected and Maintained
1.1

What information is to be collected?

TWIC applicants must provide full name and previous names used; address; email
address, if available; contact phone number; date of birth; place of birth; employer name and
address if working for the employer requires obtaining a TWIC (and, if the applicant’s current
employer is the U.S. military service, branch of the service); job title and description; gender;
height, weight, eye and hair color; immigration status; if applicable, alien registration number
and/or the number assigned on U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Arrival-Departure Record form
I-94; if applicable, visa number, type, expiration date, and country of citizenship. An applicant
who is a credentialed mariner or applying to become a credentialed mariner must include proof
of citizenship in the identity verification documents, as well as their merchant mariner
documentation or license), which TSA will scan into the enrollment record and transmit to the
Coast Guard. The Coast Guard requires proof of citizenship in order to obtain a merchant
mariner license. Applicants who are commercial drivers licensed in Canada or Mexico who are
applying for a TWIC in order to transport hazardous materials in accordance with 49 CFR
1572.201 and not to access secure areas of a facility or vessel, must explain this when applying
and present their hazardous materials endorsement (HME) license.
For new, direct hires who have not yet received a TWIC and to whom vessel and facility
owners/operators wish to grant limited access to secure areas of the facility in the meantime, the
Facility or Vessel Security Officer must enter the following information into the Coast Guard’s
Homeport web portal: 1) full name; 2) date of birth; 3) Social Security Number (optional); 4)
employer name and 24-hour contact information; and 5) date of TWIC enrollment.
Applicants will be asked to provide additional information that can shorten the time it
takes to complete adjudication. Applicants may provide their Social Security number (SSN);
failure to provide it may delay or prevent completion of the security threat assessment. Also,
applicants may provide their passport number, city of issuance, date of issuance and the
expiration date. If born abroad, applicants may provide the Department of State Record of
Foreign Birth. Applicants will be asked whether they 1) have previously completed a TSA threat
assessment, and if so the date and program for which it was completed; and 2) currently holds a
federal security clearance, and if so, the date of and agency for which the clearance was

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performed. This information is particularly important in the case of an applicant who seeks to
have TSA issue a comparability determination.
Applicants who pre-enroll online can provide the biographic data described above in
order to expedite the enrollment process, but all applicants must come to an enrollment center to
verify identity, sign the application, provide fingerprints (ten prints), and have a digital
photograph taken.
TSA also collects certain information as a result of the checks performed against terrorist
threat, criminal history, and immigration databases. If the individual has a criminal record, a
copy of that record will be collected. For other databases, the result of the check will be
collected. As discussed below in section 7, other information may be collected in connection
with the redress, appeal, or waiver process.

1.2

From whom is information collected?

The information will be collected from all credentialed merchant mariners and
individuals who wish to obtain unescorted access to secure areas of a regulated facility or vessel.
Also, information will collected from applicants who are commercial drivers licensed in Canada
or Mexico who are applying for a TWIC in order to transport hazardous materials in accordance
with 49 CFR 1572.201. Finally, if an owner/operator wishes to place a new employee in the
secured area immediately, the Facility or Vessel Security Officer must input the employee’s
biographic information described in Section 1.1 into the Coast Guard Homeport web portal.

1.3

Why is the information being collected?

The biographic and biometric information collected will be used to conduct a security
threat assessment that includes identity verification checks, criminal history records checks,
immigration status checks, and terrorist database checks on individuals who have unescorted
access to secure areas of ports and thereby require a TWIC as required by the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) (Pub.L. 107-295, Nov. 25, 2002). The additional
information provided voluntarily may expedite the adjudication process for applicants who are
born abroad or for applicants who have already completed a federal security threat assessment.
The fingerprints will be used to verify the identity of the holder of the credential and the
photograph will be collected so that it can be printed on the TWIC card as a means to identify the
cardholder. Fingerprints will also be stored in the U.S. VISIT IDENT system for use in
accordance with the system of records notices and PIAs applicable to TWIC and IDENT. The
IDENT PIA may be found at www.DHS.gov. The information collected via the Coast Guard
Homeport web portal will be used to assist the Coast Guard and TSA in identifying new, direct

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hires who are awaiting TWIC issuance. The TWIC, once issued, will be used by the cardholder
to access secure areas of maritime facilities and vessels.

1.4

How is the information collected?

Personal information is collected through the on-line pre-enrollment process, if used,
and/or the enrollment process at enrollment sites operated by personnel under contract to TSA.
TSA does not routinely gather information regarding TWIC usage, though if there were an
incident implicating transportation security, and if the facility used a card reader and maintained
records on card use, then TSA might seek card usage records for investigative or forensic
purposes. Facility and vessel operators may choose to use card readers to assist in managing
access to their facilities or vessels.

1.5

What specific legal authorities/arrangements/agreements
define the collection of information?

The program implements authorities set forth in the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act (ATSA) (Pub. L. 107-71; Nov. 19, 2002; sec. 106), the Maritime Transportation Security
Act of 2002 (MTSA) (Pub. L. 107-295; Nov. 25, 2002; sec. 102), and the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act—A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) (Pub. L.
109-59; Aug. 10, 2005; sec. 7105), codified at 49 U.S.C. 5103a(g). TSA and the Coast Guard
published an NPRM for the TWIC program on May 22, 2006. After consideration of public
comments received in response to the NPRM, TSA and the Coast Guard are issuing a joint Final
Rule that requires this information collection.

1.6

Privacy Impact Analysis: Given the amount and type of
data being collected, discuss what privacy risks were
identified and how they were mitigated.

TSA is collecting the personal data to conduct security threat assessments (or to
determine if a background check conducted by another governmental agency is comparable to
the standards in the Final Rule in order to minimize redundant background checks of workers), to
verify identity, to determine eligibility for a TWIC, and to issue a TWIC.
Data on the credential is encrypted and cannot be read or compromised unless there is
mutual authentication between the credential and the reader. When the credential is presented
for access, no data is transmitted to TSA or the Coast Guard.
Personal information can be obtained from a TWIC in three ways: 1) viewing
information printed on the card; 2) reading information from the card’s chip using a contact
reader; and, 3) reading information from the card’s chip using a contactless reader. The

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applicant’s name and photograph can be viewed whenever the TWIC is presented or displayed.
For contact readers, the individual’s name, digital photo, biometric data (fingerprint templates)
and personal identification number (PIN) is stored on the card’s chip. This information is
protected through the use of the individual’s PIN which must be entered before the information
is released to a contact reader. For contactless readers, only the individual’s biometric data can
be read. The biometric data is protected from unintended disclosure by both storing and
transmitting it in an encrypted format. A decryption key is needed to read or use the biometric
data. The decryption key, called the TWIC Privacy Key (TPK), is stored on the card’s magnetic
strip and contact chip interface. The TPK can only be provided to the contactless reader by
swiping the magnetic stripe or inserting the card into a contact reader (no PIN required) to
retrieve the TPK. The applicant’s biometric data is thus prevented from being gathered by
eavesdropping during the contactless transmission to a reader. In addition, the biometric is a
fingerprint template rather than a fingerprint image, and cannot be reversed to create a original
fingerprint.
For applicants who choose to pre-enroll, the data submitted via the Internet will be sent
using Internet security protocols. All information provided is then stored in the TSA system,
which encrypts or hashes all personally identifying information at very high standards before it is
transferred or stored, and protects the data from unauthorized access. If an enrollment center
temporarily loses its Internet connection, the enrollment data is encrypted and stored on the
enrollment workstation, but only until an Internet connection is restored. The Coast Guard
Homeport web portal, which owner/operators will use to submit personal information concerning
new, direct hires is designed for secure communications. Limiting the amount of personal data
TSA receives to what is necessary to conduct a security threat assessment and satisfy MTSA
serves the agency’s operational purposes and minimizes the privacy risks for TWIC applicants.

Section 2.0 Uses of the System and the Information
2.1

Describe all the uses of information.

Enrollment personnel review identity verification documents to prevent the use of
fraudulent identity documents. The TSA system sends pertinent parts of the enrollment record to
the FBI, as well as within DHS, so that appropriate terrorist threat, criminal history, and
immigration checks can be performed. TSA reviews the results of the checks to determine
whether the individual poses a security threat and is eligible to hold a TWIC, and then notifies
the applicant of the result. When applicable, TSA reviews pertinent information to determine
whether a comparable threat assessment was completed. Upon a TSA determination that a
comparable threat assessment was completed, the applicant may pay a reduced fee.

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When TSA has determined that an applicant is qualified to receive a TWIC and notifies
the applicant, the TSA system generates an order to produce a credential. A TWIC is produced
at a credential production facility and shipped to the center at which the applicant enrolled. Once
the enrollment center receives the credential, the applicant will be notified to return to the
enrollment center to retrieve and activate the credential.
In cases where TSA has determined an applicant is not qualified to receive a TWIC, the
applicant has the opportunity to appeal the decision, and in some cases may request a waiver.
See section 7.2 for a full discussion of the redress process. If the applicant does not pursue an
appeal or waiver, or if the adverse determination stands, TSA notifies the Federal Maritime
Security Coordinator (FMSC), who may be the Captain of the Port, that the individual was
denied a TWIC. In addition, TSA notifies the Coast Guard in the case of applicants who are
mariners and are denied a TWIC. Finally, TSA may notify an applicant’s employer of the denial
if TSA determines that the applicant poses an imminent threat. Generally, TSA will not disclose
the reason for the denial.
If an owner/operator wishes to have a new, direct hire work in the secure area before the
security threat assessment is complete and a TWIC is issued, the owner/operator must submit the
employee’s information (described in 1.1) to the Coast Guard’s Homeport. TSA will conduct an
interim check and will notify the owner/operator if the employee poses a security threat and
cannot be granted unescorted access to secure areas.
The TWIC credential is valid for five years, unless derogatory information is discovered
during the five years and TSA revokes the credential. TSA will routinely update the security
threat assessment on all credential holders. A list of invalid credential numbers is available to
facility operators in order to restrict access to those individuals that no longer qualify for a
TWIC.

2.2

Does the system analyze data to assist users in identifying
previously unknown areas of note, concern, or pattern
(Sometimes referred to as “datamining”)?

No.

2.3

How will the information collected from individuals or
derived from the system be checked for accuracy?

The information will be provided in person by the applicant to the enrollment
personnel, who will input the data in an electronic format. The applicant will review the data
entered for accuracy before it is transmitted. The identity verification documents are scanned

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into the TSA system. To the extent the information entered into the Coast Guard web portal
requires verification, TSA expects the facility or vessel owner/operator to check the information
for accuracy before it is submitted.

2.4

Privacy Impact Analysis: Given the amount and type of
information collected, describe any types of controls that
may be in place to ensure that information is used in
accordance with the above described uses.

The risk of compromise of personal information was considered throughout the design of
the TWIC system. For applicants who choose to pre-enroll, the data submitted via the Internet
will be sent using Internet security protocols. All information provided is then stored in the TSA
system, which encrypts or hashes all personally identifying information at very high standards
before it is transferred or stored, and protects the data from unauthorized access. If an
enrollment center temporarily loses its Internet connection, the enrollment data is encrypted and
stored on the enrollment workstation, but only until an Internet connection is restored. TWIC
enrollment stations were designed to provide privacy during the data collection by preventing
unauthorized individuals from viewing screens containing personal information.
All collected data will be electronically stored in secure locations, and no paper copies
will be maintained. The data collected during enrollment will be encrypted before transmission
and then transmitted to the TSA system over a secure internet connection. The data is then
automatically deleted from the Trusted Agent enrollment workstation. Once the information is
sent to TSA, the information will be forwarded to the various interfaces to conduct identity
verification and security threat assessments. After the card production facility produces the
credential, the data will be automatically deleted from the card production facility system.

Section 3.0 Retention
3.1

What is the retention period for the data in the system?

TSA will retain the data it receives in accordance with record schedules approved by the
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). TSA will retain records for individuals
who are not a match or potential match to a watchlist for one year after the individual no longer
has access. In addition, for those individuals who may originally have appeared to be a match to
a watch list, but subsequently cleared, TSA will retain the records for at least seven years, or one
year after access has been terminated. For individuals who are an actual match to a watch list or
otherwise determined to pose a threat to transportation security, TSA will retain the records for
99 years, or seven years after TSA learns that an individual is deceased.

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3.2

Has the retention schedule been approved by the National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA)?

Yes, on March 8, 2007.

3.3

Privacy Impact Analysis: Given the purpose of retaining
the information, explain why the information is needed for
the indicated period.

As explained in section 2.4, data collected at the enrollment center will be deleted at the
enrollment center when it is transmitted to TSA. Data will also be deleted from the card
production facility after the credential is produced. TSA has developed a record retention
schedule for Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing records, of which these records
are a part. The retention periods are designed to retain the information while the individual is an
active TWIC holder, or to permit review of records for individuals who may have been cleared
as a match to a watch list only after more extensive review. It is also designed to permit TSA to
detect fraudulent multiple applications.

Section 4.0 Internal Sharing and Disclosure
4.1

With which internal organizations is the information
shared?

TSA will routinely share information within TSA’s Office of Transportation Threat
Assessment and Credentialing (TTAC), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
and the Coast Guard. The information TSA receives from TWIC applicants also may be shared
with DHS employees and DHS contractors that have a need for the information in the
performance of their official duties, including but not limited to immigration, law enforcement or
intelligence operations. This information will be shared in accordance with the provisions of the
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.

4.2

For each organization, what information is shared and for
what purpose?

TSA will share biographic, biometric, and status information within TTAC and USCIS
for purposes of identity verification, criminal history checks, card production, port access, and
audit purposes. TSA will share biographic and biometric information with CBP, USCIS and ICE
for immigration checks. TSA will share biographic, biometric, and status information with the

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Coast Guard for purposes of port access and auditing. Biographic, biometric, and status
information also will be shared with those employees that have a need for the information in the
performance of their official duties, including but not limited to identity verification,
immigration, law enforcement or intelligence purposes. This information will be shared in
accordance with the provisions of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.

4.3

How is the information transmitted or disclosed?

TSA will transmit biographic and biometric data, applicant or credential status and other
information in person, via a secure or encrypted data network, via facsimile, on a passwordprotected CD or by telephone. The method of transmission may vary according to specific
circumstances, and will be in accordance with OMB guidance regarding the transmission and
storage of personal information.

4.4

Privacy Impact Analysis: Given the internal sharing,
discuss what privacy risks were identified and how they
were mitigated.

Information is shared within DHS with those individuals who have a need for the
information in the performance of their official duties in accordance with the Privacy Act.
Privacy protections include strict access controls, including security credentials, passwords, realtime auditing that tracks access to electronic information, and mandated training for all TSA
employees and contractors.

Section 5.0 External Sharing and Disclosure
5.1

With which external organizations is the information
shared?

TSA will share information with the FBI to conduct criminal history record checks. TSA
may also share information with the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and with other Federal,
state, or local law enforcement or intelligence agencies or other organizations in accordance with
the Privacy Act and the routine uses identified in the applicable Privacy Act system of records
notice (SORN), DHS/TSA 002, Transportation Security Threat Assessment System (TSTAS).
This SORN was last published in the Federal Register on November 8, 2005, and can be found at
70 FR 67731-67735. TSA may also share information with the applicant’s employer and port or
facility owner/operators.

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5.2

What information is shared and for what purpose?

TSA may share biographic information with the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) during
the security threat assessment process. Biographic and biometric data collected from TWIC
applicants will be sent to other Federal agencies for identity verification, criminal history records
checks, immigration and terrorism checks, and may be sent to other Federal databases as
necessary to complete the security threat assessment. When an individual is identified as a
threat, it is expected that individually identifying data and security threat assessment status about
that individual will be shared, as needed, with Federal, State, or local enforcement or intelligence
agencies to communicate the threat assessment results and to facilitate an operational response.
Further, pursuant to MTSA, TSA and the Coast Guard are not authorized to provide the reason
for the adverse determination to the individual’s employer.
Pursuant to MTSA, TSA may notify an applicant’s employer if TSA determines that the
applicant poses a security threat and disqualifies an applicant. However, pursuant to MTSA,
TSA will not provide any of the applicant’s biographical data (other than the applicant’s name
and other information as necessary to identify the individual) collected during enrollment or the
reason for the disqualification to the individual’s employer. TSA will provide owner/operators a
list of invalid credential numbers, not names or other identifying information, to enable them to
determine if a credential has been revoked or reported lost or stolen.
TSA will share the information accordance with the Privacy Act and the routine uses
identified in the applicable Privacy Act system of records notice (SORN), DHS/TSA 002,
Transportation Security Threat Assessment System (TSTAS).

5.3

How is the information transmitted or disclosed?

TSA will transmit biographic or biometric data, applicant or credential status and other
information in person, via a secure or encrypted data network, via facsimile, password-protected
CD, or by telephone. The method of transmission may vary according to specific circumstances
and will be in accordance with OMB guidance on the handling of personal information.

5.4

Is a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), contract, or
any agreement in place with any external organizations
with whom information is shared, and does the agreement
reflect the scope of the information currently shared?

Yes. TSA currently has an MOU with USCIS for immigration checks and an MOU with
the FBI and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), which reflects the scope of the information
shared. TSA also has entered into an MOU with USCIS in connection with card production

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prior to the exchange of any information, so that a USCIS facility can produce the cards. TSA
and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) entered into an MOU on May 12, 2006. Information
may be shared in accordance with the applicable SORN listed above, DHS/TSA 002
Transportation Security Threat Assessments, or in accordance with the provisions of the Privacy
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.

5.5

How is the shared information secured by the recipient?

Any Federal agency and their contractors receiving this information are expected to
handle it in accordance with the Privacy Act and that agency’s applicable SORNs. In addition,
Federal agencies and their contractors are subject to information security requirements of the
Federal Information Security Management Act, Title III of the E-Government Act, Pub. L. 107347 (FISMA).

5.6

What type of training is required for users from agencies
outside DHS prior to receiving access to the information?

None is required. However, any Federal agency receiving this information is expected to
handle it in accordance with the Privacy Act, that agency’s applicable SORNs, and FISMA.

5.7

Privacy Impact Analysis: Given the external sharing, what
privacy risks were identified and describe how they were
mitigated.

TSA will share this information under the applicable provisions of the Privacy Act. By
limiting the sharing of this information to DHS personnel and contractors who have a need to
know it in the performance of their official duties and by sharing only in accordance with
published routine uses or under the Privacy Act, TSA is mitigating any attendant privacy risks.
Further, TSA has entered into MOUs governing the conditions of sharing information as
discussed in section 5.4. TSA will not provide employers with the applicant’s biographic data
collected during enrollment (other than name and other information as necessary to identify the
individual) or the reason for the disqualification. Further, data will be deleted at the enrollment
center when transmitted to TSA. Data will be deleted from the card production facility after the
card is produced.

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Section 6.0 Notice
6.1

Was notice provided to the individual prior to collection of
information? If yes, please provide a copy of the notice as
an appendix. (A notice may include a posted privacy
policy, a Privacy Act notice on forms, or a system of
records notice published in the Federal Register Notice.) If
notice was not provided, why not?

Yes. At the enrollment center, applicants will receive a Privacy Act Statement and
consent form, by which they agree to provide personal information for the security threat
assessment and credential. For applicants who pre-enroll, the Privacy Act Statement is provided
with the application on-line, but the applicants must acknowledge receipt of the notice in writing
at the enrollment center. If an applicant fails to sign the consent form or does not have the
required documents to authenticate identity, enrollment will not proceed. All information
collected at the enrollment center or during the pre-enrollment process, including the signed
Privacy Act Statement and consent form and identity documents, is scanned into the TSA system
for storage. All personally identifying information is encrypted or hashed to protect the
information from unauthorized retrieval or use. Further, this PIA and the Final Rule serve to
provide notice. The applicable Privacy Act system of records notice (SORN), DHS/TSA 002,
Transportation Security Threat Assessment System (TSTAS) was last published in the Federal
Register on November 8, 2005, and can be found at 70 FR 67731-67735.

6.2

Do individuals have an opportunity and/or right to decline
to provide information?

Yes, applicants provide information voluntarily, but individuals who do not provide the
information will be ineligible to receive a TWIC, and therefore would not have unescorted
access authority to secure areas of facilities and vessels. SSN is a voluntary item of information.
For individuals who choose to refuse to provide a SSN, such refusal may result in delays in
processing their application and completing the security threat assessment.

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6.3

Do individuals have the right to consent to particular uses
of the information, and if so, how does the individual
exercise the right?

No. If TSA determines the individual poses a security threat, all uses of such information
by TSA will be consistent with the Privacy Act and the DHS/TSA 002, Transportation Security
Threat Assessment System SORN identified in paragraph 5.1 above.

6.4

Privacy Impact Analysis: Given the notice provided to
individuals above, describe what privacy risks were
identified and how you mitigated them.

TSA will be requiring the collection of information that is minimally required to verify
the applicant’s identity, determine eligibility for a TWIC, conduct the required security threat
assessment, and issue a TWIC. In response to public comment on the NPRM, TSA will permit
individuals to submit additional information that will assist in adjudicating their application.
TSA has weighed the privacy risks associated with collecting additional information against the
potential for delays in adjudicating the TWIC application. Given the significance of any delay in
granting the TWIC, and the security infrastructure associated with the enrollment process, TSA
has concluded that individuals should be permitted to submit additional information, such as
passport number and country and city of issuance. Individuals will be provided with meaningful
notice that enables them to exercise informed consent prior to disclosing any information to
TSA.

Section 7.0 Individual Access, Redress and Correction
7.1

What are the procedures which allow individuals to gain
access to their own information?

Individuals may request access to their information by submitting a Freedom of
Information Act/Privacy Act (FOIA/PA) request to TSA in writing by mail to the following
address:
Transportation Security Administration
Freedom of Information Act Office, TSA-20
11th Floor, East Tower
601 South 12th Street
Arlington, VA 22202-4220

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FOIA/PA requests may also be submitted by fax at 571-227-1406 or by email at
[email protected]. The FOIA/PA request must contain the following information: Full
Name, address and telephone number, and email address (optional). Please refer to the TSA
FOIA web site (http://www.tsa.gov/research/foia/index). In addition, individuals may amend
their records through the redress process as explained in paragraph 7.2 below.

7.2

What are the procedures for correcting erroneous
information?

If TSA determines that a TWIC applicant may pose a security threat, TSA will notify the
applicant by mailing an Initial Determination of Threat Assessment (IDTA) containing the
reason(s) for the determination and directions on how the applicant may appeal it. The applicant
may initiate an appeal by submitting a written reply to TSA, a written request for materials from
TSA, or by requesting an extension of time. If the applicant does not initiate an appeal within 60
days of receipt of the IDTA, it generally becomes final. Applicants may request an extension of
the deadline after it has passed by filing a motion describing the reasons why they were unable to
comply with the timeline. Individuals who may be out at sea or are otherwise unable to collect
mail in a timely fashion may request an extension of the deadline after the deadline has passed
by filing a motion describing the reasons why they were unable to comply with the timeline.
If the applicant requests documents, TSA will release as much information to the
applicant as permitted by law to provide for a meaningful appeal. No documents that are
classified or otherwise protected by law will be released.
The appeal process consists of a review of the IDTA, the materials upon which the
decision was based, the applicant’s appeal materials and any other relevant information or
material available to TSA. An appeal of an IDTA based on disqualifying criminal or
immigration information will be decided by the TSA Assistant Administrator or designee. When
an Initial Determination is made that an applicant does not qualify for a TWIC under section
1572.107 of the rule, and the applicant appeals the decision, the Assistant Secretary or designee
will review the case and make the Final Determination.
The Assistant Secretary or Assistant Administrator may overturn the IDTA and serve a
Withdrawal of the Initial Determination on the applicant, or uphold the IDTA and issue a Final
Determination of Threat Assessment to the applicant and when applicable, to the licensing State,
the Coast Guard, or the appropriate FMSC. Individuals who unsuccessfully appeal a
disqualification based on intelligence information may then appeal to an Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ).
Individuals believed to pose an imminent security threat will receive Initial
Determination of Threat Assessment and Immediate Revocation (hereinafter “Immediate
Revocation”). If appropriate, TSA will notify law enforcement, the Coast Guard, and the

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employer to minimize the risk that the applicant can access the secure area without escort.
Individuals wishing to appeal an Immediate Revocation will follow the appeal processes outlined
above.

7.3

How are individuals notified of the procedures for
correcting their information?

The IDTA includes the procedures for submitting an appeal.

7.4

If no redress is provided, are alternatives are available?

Applicants who are disqualified because of a disqualifying criminal offense or a past
declaration of mental incompetence, or are not eligible to apply for a TWIC because they are
aliens in Temporary Protected Status (TPS), may request a waiver. If disqualified by TSA, the
applicant must submit a waiver request within sixty days after service of the Final Determination
of Threat Assessment. Individuals who may be out at sea or are otherwise unable to collect mail
in a timely fashion may request an extension of the deadline after the deadline has passed by
filing a motion describing the reasons why they were unable to comply with the timeline. In
addition, applicants may re-apply for a waiver if TSA denies a waiver request any time.
Applicants who are associated with terrorists or terrorist activity or who are in the country
illegally are not eligible for a waiver. In addition, applicants convicted of certain particularly
serious felonies, such as treason, espionage, or sedition, or conspiracy to commit the foregoing,
are not eligible for a waiver.
The following factors are important in TSA’s consideration of a waiver request: (1) the
circumstances of the disqualifying act or offense; (2) restitution made by the individual; (3)
Federal or State mitigation remedies; (4) court records indicating that the individual has been
declared mentally competent; and (5) other factors TSA believes bear on the potential security
threat posed by an individual. Many of these factors are set forth in MTSA, at 46 U.S.C.
70105(c)(2).
Individuals who are denied a waiver may request review of the waiver denial by an ALJ
within 30 calendar days from the date of service of TSA’s decision. Applicants may request an
extension of the deadline after the deadline has passed by filing a motion describing the reasons
why they were unable to comply with the timeline. The ALJ who conducts the review will
possess the appropriate security clearance necessary to review classified or otherwise protected
information and evidence. The procedures for review are set out in the Final Rule. The ALJ’s
decision may be appealed by either party to the TSA Final Decision Maker (who is the TSA
Assistant Secretary, acting in the capacity of the decision maker on appeal, or any person to
whom the Assistant Secretary has delegated his or her decision-making authority) within 30
calendar days of service of the decision of the ALJ. A person may seek judicial review of a final

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order of the TSA Final Decision Maker as provided in 49 U.S.C. 46110. A party seeking judicial
review of a final order must file a petition for review not later than 60 days after the final order
has been served on the party.

7.5

Privacy Impact Analysis: Given the access and other
procedural rights provided for in the Privacy Act of 1974,
explain the procedural rights that are provided and, if
access, correction and redress rights are not provided
please explain why not.

TSA has incorporated processes for allowing individuals to access and correct their
records, and to allow for appeals and waivers.

Section 8.0 Technical Access and Security
8.1

Which user group(s) will have access to the system?

In order to perform their duties in managing, upgrading, and using the system, system
administrators, security administrators, IT specialists, adjudicators, enrollment personnel and
analysts have access to the system. Role-based access controls are employed to limit the access
of information by different users and administrators based on the need to know. TSA also
employs processes to enforce separation of duties to prevent unauthorized disclosure or
modification of information. No unauthorized users are permitted access to system resources.
Strict adherence to access control policies is enforced by the system in coordination with and
through oversight by TSA security officers.
For details concerning the technical access and security of the Homeport web portal,
please see the PIA for this Coast Guard system, which was published on May 9, 2006.

8.2

Will contractors to DHS have access to the system? If so,
please submit a copy of the contract describing their role
to the Privacy Office with this PIA.

Yes, DHS will hire contractors to perform many of the IT maintenance and security
monitoring tasks have access to the system in order to perform their official duties. Contractors
are under obligations to follow the privacy and security requirements of the Department.

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8.3

Does the system use “roles” to assign privileges to users
of the system?

Yes, role-based access controls are employed to limit the access of information by
different users and administrators based on the need to know.

8.4

What procedures are in place to determine which users
may access the system and are they documented?

The system will be secured against unauthorized use through the use of a layered,
defense-in-depth security approach involving procedural and information security safeguards.
These procedures are documented in Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and also referenced
in the System Security Plan, as mandated by the Federal Information Security Management Act
of 2002, Pub.L.107-347 (FISMA) following National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) guidance. The systems are also assessed and audited on an annual and ad hoc basis by
the TSA IT Security Office.

8.5

How are the actual assignments of roles and rules verified
according to established security and auditing
procedures?

Security Administrators for the TWIC system assigns roles and rules. Employees or
contractors are assigned roles for accessing the system based on their function. TSA ensures
personnel accessing the system have security training commensurate with their duties and
responsibilities.

8.6

What auditing measures and technical safeguards are in
place to prevent misuse of data?

Enrollment personnel and enrollment center equipment do not retain applicant data once
the information is transferred to the TSA system. The card production facility does not retain
applicant data once the card is produced and mailed. Transmission, receipt, and subsequent
deletion of data is performed on a recurring basis and governed by Quality Assurance
Procedures. The system also employs real-time auditing functions to track real-time users.
The system is secured against unauthorized use through the use of a layered defense, indepth security approach involving procedural and information security safeguards. The TWIC
program is currently developing the System Security Plan, which documents this. The System
Security Plan will be completed prior to implementation of the program.

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All TSA and DHS employees and assigned contractor staff receive DHS-mandatory
privacy training on the use and disclosure of personal data. They also receive appropriate
security training and have any necessary background investigations and/or security clearances
for access to sensitive information or secured facilities based on TSA security policies and
procedures.
All government and contractor personnel must be approved for access to the facility
where the system is housed, issued picture badges with embedded integrated proximity devices
and given specific access to areas necessary to perform their job function. A Rules of Behavior
document provides overall guidance on how employees are to protect their physical and
technical environment and the data that is handled and processed. All new employees are
required to read and sign a copy of the Rules of Behavior prior to getting access to any IT
system.

8.7

Describe what privacy training is provided to users either
generally or specifically relevant to the functionality of the
program or system?

All government personnel are required to complete the on-line TSA Privacy Training
Course. Contract personnel who are responsible for maintaining the TWIC system within TSA's
government facility will be badged by TSA and also complete the on-line TSA Privacy Training
Course. Compliance with this training requirement is audited monthly by the TSA Privacy
Officer, and failure to complete the training is reported to program management. TWIC Trusted
Agents, who are also contract personnel, will receive TSA Privacy Training as part of the
Trusted Agent Training Course.
In addition, security training is provided regularly, which helps to raise the level of
awareness for protecting personal information. All IT security training is reported as required by
FISMA.

8.8

Is the data secured in accordance with FISMA
requirements? If yes, when was Certification &
Accreditation last completed?

Yes. Information in this system will be safeguarded in accordance with FISMA. The
TWIC system will operate on legal authority of the Designated Accrediting Authority (DAA)
who manages personnel, operations, maintenance, and budgets for the system or field site. The
DAA will complete necessary security artifacts for this approval and required for Certification

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and Accreditation. The Coast Guard’s Homeport system has been accredited by the Coast Guard
DAA.
This system will be certified and accredited prior to achieving operational status. This
system will be reviewed for major changes and certification documentation will be updated to
reflect all technical security controls in alignment with the FIPS 199 categorization. The FIPS
199 categorization was completed November 17, 2006.

8.9

Privacy Impact Analysis: Given access and security
controls, what privacy risks were identified and describe
how they were mitigated.

TSA has implemented security controls and technology features that fully incorporate
protection of privacy. TSA has complied with FISMA, and mitigated privacy risks through the
following methods:
-- Access to the system is controlled through role based user accounts.
-- The system access through user accounts is auditable.
-- The system strictly controls the transmission and storage of data.
-- All government and contract personnel are required to complete privacy training (see
8.7 above).
-- The system is audited by TSA Security Personnel to ensure FISMA compliance.

Section 9.0 Technology
9.1

Was the system built from the ground up or purchased and
installed?

Commercially available programs were integrated with custom software code to create
the TWIC information technology system. All TWIC system hardware was commercially
purchased and installed.

9.2

Describe how data integrity, privacy, and security were
analyzed as part of the decisions made for your system.

For the contact interface of the card, the data stored in the various technologies used in
the credential, such as chip technologies, is protected in accordance with Federal Information

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Processing Standard (FIPS) 201-1. FIPS 201-1 provides detailed requirements for Personal
Identity Verification programs required to comply with Homeland Security Presidential
Directive (HSPD)-12. For the contactless interface of the card, the data is protected from access
through the use of the TWIC Privacy Key (TPK) developed in cooperation between TWIC and
the maritime and technology sectors. The TPK solution is based on the E-Passport Basic Access
Control protocol. The fingerprint data, which is the reference biometric, is used to match the
credential to the person who enrolled. TSA has determined to use biometrics to verify access
rights for the TWIC card system rather than storing extensive amounts of personal information
on the card.
The TWIC system contains many feedback mechanisms to validate the transmission and
receipt of data at key points in the process. Whenever data is transmitted to or from the TWIC
central information processing system the transmission is recorded within the system to provide
an audit trail.
Credentials are electronically locked during the production process so that the data cannot
be altered once the credential leaves the production facility. The TWIC is valid for five years,
unless derogatory information is discovered and TSA revokes the credential. TSA will routinely
update the security threat assessment on all credential holders.
All biographic and biometric data collected is electronically stored in secure locations.
Further, biometric data is segmented and stored separately from the biographic data to ensure
privacy.

9.3

What design choices were made to enhance privacy?

-- The enrollment stations are designed to prevent non-authorized individuals from seeing
an applicant’s personal information
--There is no paper record created or kept by TSA or its contractor that contains an
applicant’s personal information.
--The personally identifying information is stored electronically in segments and is
encrypted or hashed so that it would not be useful even if an individual with ill intent gained
access to it.
--The list of revoked cards does not include any personal information, only the credential
number.
--Completed credentials are ‘locked’ until activated at the enrollment center by a Trusted
Agent and the applicant.
--Biometric data available via the contactless interface is protected by an industry
recommended TWIC Privacy Key based on the E-Passport Basic Access Control protocol.

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In addition to the discussion in 9.2 above, the only personal identifying information
contained on the credential is a name and a photo of the individual. The fingerprint template
stored on the credential cannot be used to develop a fingerprint image—another privacy
protection. No other personal information is stored on the credential.

9.4

Privacy Impact Analysis

System data is segmented and segregated to limit access to biometric data. Access to a
single segment will not provide access to other segments. The TWIC program has served as a
model for the development of FIPS 201, which requires any personal identity verification
system, of which TWIC is one, to be implemented in strict accordance with the privacy laws and
policies of the Federal government.

Conclusion
Since its inception, the TWIC program’s three goals have been to improve security,
enhance commerce, and protect personal privacy. TSA has carefully chosen the methods of
collecting personal information from applicants, of transmitting it through various TWIC
modules, and of storing it to balance individual privacy rights with the Government’s need to
verify personal identity and assess one’s suitability for access to secure areas of the Nation’s
transportation system. The TWIC program has served as a model for the development of FIPS
201, which requires any Personal Identity Verification system for Federal employees or
contractors to be implemented in strict accordance with the privacy laws and policies of the
Federal government. TWIC has been developed to protect the privacy of those who seek
unescorted access to secure areas of transportation facilities and vessels.

Approval Signature Page
________________________________
Hugo Teufel III
Chief Privacy Officer
Department of Homeland Security