Ats Pia

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ATS PIA

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Privacy Impact Assessment Update
for the

Automated Targeting System
DHS/CBP/PIA-006(e)
January 13, 2017
Contact Point
Executive Director
National Targeting Center
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(571) 468-1320
Reviewing Official
Jonathan R. Cantor
Acting Chief Privacy Officer
Department of Homeland Security
(202) 343-1717

Privacy Impact Assessment Update
DHS/CBP/PIA-006(e) Automated Targeting System
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Abstract
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
operates the Automated Targeting System (ATS). ATS is a decision support tool that compares
traveler, cargo, and conveyance information against law enforcement, intelligence, and other
enforcement data using risk-based scenarios and assessments. CBP is updating this Privacy Impact
Assessment (PIA) to notify the public about ATS user interface enhancements for passenger
vetting (known as Unified Passenger or UPAX), the use of ATS for vetting new populations,
vetting of master crew member list and master non-crew member list data collected under 19 CFR.
122.49c, and several new information sharing initiatives, including between the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) and CBP to enhance the identification of possible threats and to
assist in securing the border and transportation security.

Overview
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
operates the Automated Targeting System (ATS) to facilitate legitimate trade and travel while
managing the shared threat to the homeland posed by individuals and cargo that may require
additional scrutiny prior to entering or exiting the United States. ATS supports CBP in identifying
individuals and cargo that may require additional scrutiny across various transportation networks
using the following functionalities:1
• Comparison: ATS compares information about travelers and conveyances arriving in,
transiting through, or exiting the country against law enforcement and intelligence
databases. For example, ATS compares information about individuals (identified as
passengers, travelers, crewmembers, or persons appearing on documents supporting the
movement of cargo) against the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)2 as well as data
concerning outstanding wants and warrants.
• Rules: ATS compares existing information about individuals and cargo entering and
exiting the country with patterns identified as requiring additional scrutiny. The patterns
are based on CBP Officer experience, trend analysis of suspicious activity, law
enforcement cases, and raw intelligence.
• Federated Query: ATS allows users to search data across many different databases and
systems to provide a consolidated view of data about a person or entity.

For a complete overview of ATS, its modules, and the associated privacy risks, see DHS/CBP/PIA-006(b)
Automated Targeting System (ATS) Update (June 1, 2012), available at
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/automated-targeting-system-ats-update.
2
ATS ingests the TSDB via the DHS Watchlisting Service (WLS). Please see DHS/ALL/PIA-027 Watchlist Service
and subsequent updates for a full description of WLS, available at https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhs-all-pia027c-watchlist-service-update.

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In order to execute the above three functionalities, ATS uses data from many different
source systems. In some instances ATS is the official record for the information, while in other
instances ATS ingests and maintains the information as a copy or provides a pointer to the
information in the underlying system. Below is a summary; see Appendix A for referenced SORN
citations.

•

Official Record: ATS maintains the official record for Passenger Name Records (PNR)
collected by CBP pursuant to its statutory authority, 49 U.S.C. § 44909, as implemented
by 19 CFR 122.49d; for Importer Security Filing (10+2 documentation) and express
consignment manifest information, which provides advanced information about cargo
and related persons and entities for risk assessment and targeting purposes; for results
of Cargo Enforcement Exams; for the combination of license plate, Department of
Motor Vehicle (DMV) registration data, and biographical data associated with a border
crossing; for certain law enforcement and/or intelligence data, reports, and projects
developed by CBP analysts that may include public source information; and for certain
information obtained through memoranda of understanding or other arrangements
because the information is relevant to the border security mission of the Department.

•

Ingestion of Data: ATS maintains copies of key elements of certain databases in order
to minimize the impact of processing searches on the operational systems and to act as
a backup for certain operational systems, including, but not limited to: CBP’s
Automated Commercial Environment (ACE), Automated Commercial System (ACS),
Overstay Leads from Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS), Automated
Export System (AES), Advance Passenger Information System (APIS), Border
Crossing Information (BCI), Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA),
Electronic Visa Update System (EVUS), Global Enrollment System (GES), I-94 data,
Non-Immigrant Information System (NIIS), Seized Asset and Case Tracking System
(SEACATS), and TECS; the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (USCIS)
Central Index System (CIS) data received through TECS, and special protected classes3
data; the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Student Exchange and
Visitor Information System (SEVIS) and Enforcement Integrated Database (EID),
which includes Criminal Arrest Records and Immigration Enforcement Records
(CARIER); Secure Flight Passenger Data (SFPD) and Master Crew List/Master NonCrew List data from Transportation Security Administration (TSA); the Department of
Justice’s (DOJ) National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) Interstate Identification Index (III) hits for manifested travelers;
Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing (e-QIP); historical National
Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS); Flight Schedules and Flight Status

Special protected classes of individuals include nonimmigrant status for victims of human trafficking,
nonimmigrant status for victims of crimes, and relief for domestic violence victims.

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OAG data; Social Security Administration (SSA) Death Master File; TSDB (Terrorist
Screening Database), which ATS ingests from the WLS (Watchlist Service); and Nonimmigrant and Immigrant Visa data from Department of State (DOS) Consular
Consolidated Database (CCD), Refused Visa data from CCD, and the Consular
Electronic Application Center (CEAC).
•

Pointer System: ATS accesses and uses additional databases without ingesting the data,
including: CBP’s ADIS, Border Patrol Enforcement Tracking System (BPETS),
Enterprise Geospatial Information Services (eGIS), e3 Biometrics System, and U.S.
and Non-U.S. Passport Service through TECS; ICE’s Enforcement Integrated Database
(EID); DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT); USCIS’s Person
Centric Query System (PCQS); DOS CCD; commercial data aggregators; Nlets (not an
acronym), DOJ’s NCIC and the results of queries in the FBI’s III; Interpol; the National
Insurance Crime Bureau’s (NICB’s) private database of stolen vehicles.

•

Data Manually Processed: ATS is used to manually process certain datasets to identify
national security and public safety concerns and correlate records. Currently, DHS
conducts this process for those records in ADIS that have been identified as individuals
who may have overstayed their permitted time in the United States.

Reason for the PIA Update
ATS support for CBP’s mission is directed into five general areas: 1) export of cargo; 2)
import of cargo; 3) land borders; 4) air/sea borders; and 5) cross cutting view of risks across the
four previous areas. To support these mission areas, ATS is divided into sub-systems or modules
to support CBP Officers in determining whether or not a particular individual or cargo is higher
risk than other individuals or cargo. Each sub-system uses slightly different data to conduct its risk
assessment, but the basic purposes as described above remain the same. Previously issued PIAs
for ATS discuss each module in detail and continue to apply unless otherwise specified in this
document.4
Previously issued PIAs for ATS also discuss the scope of the targeting rules used by ATS.
This process has not changed.5 ATS continues to build risk-based assessments for cargo and
conveyances based on criteria and rules developed by CBP. ATS maintains the assessment results
from rules together with a record of which rules were used to develop the assessment results. With
regard to travelers, ATS identifies persons whose information matches criteria comprising a
targeting rule. This initial match and any subsequent matches are reviewed by CBP Officers to
confirm continued official interest in the identified person. It is worth clarifying, however, that
4

For a complete overview of ATS, its modules, and the associated privacy risks, see
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/automated-targeting-system-ats-update.
5
For a complete assessment of the rules process and procedures within ATS, please see the 2012 PIA for ATS:
DHS/CBP/PIA-006(b) Automated Targeting System (ATS) Update (June 1, 2012), available at
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/automated-targeting-system-ats-update.

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only the ATS components pertaining to cargo or conveyances rely on rules-based targeting to build
a score for the cargo or conveyance to subsequently identify cargo or conveyances of interest.
Persons associated with cargo shipments are screened against TECS lookouts and prior law
enforcement actions to permit any identified violations to be considered as part of the overall score.
Travelers identified by risk-based targeting scenarios are not assigned scores.
ATS rules and assessment results from rules are designed to signal to CBP Officers that
further inspection of a person, shipment, or conveyance may be warranted, even though an
individual may not have been previously associated with a law enforcement action or otherwise
be noted as a person of concern to law enforcement. ATS-Targeting Framework (TF) is a workflow
and reporting function that separately allows users to track assessment results from rules and create
various reports permitting a more comprehensive analysis of CBP’s enforcement efforts.
ATS risk assessments are always based on predicated and contextual information. As noted
above, unlike in the cargo and conveyance environments, ATS traveler risk assessments do not
use a score to determine an individual’s risk level; instead, they compare personally identifiable
information (PII) from the databases listed above against lookouts and patterns of suspicious
activity identified through past investigations and intelligence. This analysis is done in advance of
a traveler’s arrival in or departure from the United States and becomes one tool available to DHS
officers in identifying illegal activity.
ATS modules support CBP’s mission with the functionality summarized below, and
described in more detail in previously published PIAs.
•

Export Data: ATS evaluates export information, which includes information filed
electronically with CBP. The export data is sorted, compared to rules, and scored so that
CBP Officers can identify exports with transportation safety and security risks, such as
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) violations, smuggled currency, illegal narcotics,
and other contraband. ATS screens both commodity information on export documents and
individuals identified on those documents. Officers can input findings from outbound
exams of exports, generate multiple reports, and internally track shipments through custom
rule criteria, review marking, and watched entity list.

•

Inbound Cargo Screening: ATS evaluates all cargo to identify high risk inbound cargo for
examinations. ATS uses rule and weight sets to analyze information from manifest,
importer security filing, and entry data, to prioritize shipments for review and generate
targets by scoring each shipment. In some places, ATS automatically places shipments on
hold when they score above a specified risk threshold. ATS screens commodity
information on the manifest, importer security filing, and entry data, and also screens
individuals identified on these data sources against lookouts and prior violations.

•

Vehicle and Traveler Targeting: ATS evaluates historical crossing records against internal
and external data sources for targeting of vehicles and individuals at the border, as well as

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for the identification of potential terrorists, transnational criminals, and in some cases, other
persons who pose a higher risk of violating U.S. law. ATS is used within CBP by Passenger
Analytical Units at Ports of Entry, the National Targeting Center (NTC), Border Patrol
Agents, CBP headquarters intelligence analysts, and within DHS by DHS agents, analysts,
and officers in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), ICE, U.S. Coast Guard, and
the TSA. ATS enables users to focus efforts on potentially high-risk passengers using a set
of uniform and user-defined rules based on operational, tactical, intelligence, or local
enforcement efforts.
•

Non-Immigrant and Immigrant Visa and Visa Waiver Screening: ATS is used to vet nonimmigrant and immigrant visa applications for DOS. DOS sends online visa application
data to ATS-Passenger (ATS-P) for pre-adjudicative investigative screening, and ATS-P
screens the visa application and provides a response to DOS whether or not derogatory
information was identified by DHS about the individual. ATS also uses ESTA data to
identify potential high risk applicants for the visa waiver program, and EVUS data to
initially and recurrently vet applicants for 10-year multiple entry B1, B2, or B1/B2 visas.
In addition, ATS uses information received from ADIS to identify individuals who may
have overstayed the terms of their visas.
New ATS Privacy Impact Assessment Framework

CBP is conducting this PIA update to provide transparency and assess the privacy risks of
several operational or enforcement programs. Due to the continuously changing threat
environment in which CBP uses ATS, this PIA requires frequent, complex, and disparate updates.
Therefore, CBP will conduct privacy risk assessments for each update as a separate “Update
Addendum” to this PIA. As new changes or updates are required of ATS, CBP will issue additional
Update Addendums to this PIA. Unless otherwise indicated in this document or future Addendums,
the previously published ATS privacy compliance documentation continues to apply.

Responsible Officials
Executive Director, National Targeting Center
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Department of Homeland Security
Debra L. Danisek, CBP Privacy Officer, Privacy and Diversity Office
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Department of Homeland Security

Approval Signature
Original, signed copy on file at DHS Privacy.
________________________________

Privacy Impact Assessment Update
DHS/CBP/PIA-006(e) Automated Targeting System
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Jonathan R. Cantor
Acting Chief Privacy Officer
Department of Homeland Security

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ATS PIA Update Addendum Quick Reference Guide
1. ATS PIA Update Addendum 1: Automated Targeting System-Passenger (ATS-P)
– Module Updates
1.1 “Unified Passenger” (UPAX) Technology Update
1.2 Facial Recognition Technology Update
1.2.1 ATS Biometric Vetting Using Facial Recognition
1.3 Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Secure Flight Passenger
Data (SFPD) Vetting

2. ATS PIA Update Addendum 2: Updated Populations Subject to ATS Vetting
2.1 CBP Trusted Traveler and Trusted Worker Populations
2.2 Immigration Benefit Applicants and Petitioners
2.3 Retention of Information from Electronic Devices in the Automated
Targeting System
2.4 Continuous Immigration Vetting
2.5 FinCEN Bank Secrecy Act Data
2.6 U.S. Visa Validation Initiative
2.7 Commercial License Plate Reader Information

3. ATS PIA Update Addendum 3: New Populations Subject to ATS Vetting
3.1 International Aviation Crew Members
3.2 CBP Employees and Applicants
3.3 Private Sector Open Source Information Update

4. ATS PIA Update Addendum 4: International Information Sharing Initiatives

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ATS PIA Update Addendum 1:
Automated Targeting System-Passenger (ATS-P) – Module Updates
Last updated January 13, 2017 (back to top)
Automated Targeting System-Passenger (ATS-P) is a web-based enforcement and decision
support tool used to collect, analyze, and disseminate information for the identification of potential
terrorists, transnational criminals, and, in some cases, other persons who pose a higher risk of
violating U.S. law. ATS-P capabilities are used at ports of entry to augment the CBP Officer’s
decision-making about whether a passenger or crew member should receive additional scrutiny.
ATS-P is also used within CBP by Passenger Analytical Units (PAU) at ports of entry, the
National Targeting Center (NTC), Border Patrol Agents, CBP headquarters intelligence analysts,
and within DHS by DHS agents, analysts, and officers in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis
(I&A), ICE, U.S. Coast Guard, and TSA. ATS-P provides a hierarchical system that allows DHS
personnel to focus efforts on potentially high-risk passengers by eliminating labor-intensive
manual reviews of traveler information or interviews with every traveler. The assessment process
is based on a set of uniform and user-defined rules based on specific operational, tactical,
intelligence, or local enforcement efforts.
ATS-P is used to augment visa overstay leads received from Arrival and Departure
Information Systems (ADIS) based on supporting data available in ATS (e.g., border crossing
information, I-94 information, and Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS)
information). In addition to augmenting the list of overstay leads, ATS also develops priorities
based on associated risk patterns. This prioritized list of overstay leads is then passed on to the
LeadTrac case management system6 for ICE to generate case leads.
By logging into ATS-P, authorized CBP and DHS personnel can access information from
the various source systems on passengers who have arrived in and/or departed from the United
States. ATS-P allows users to query other available Federal Government systems as well as
publicly available information on the Internet through the user interface. In addition, ATS-P
maintains a copy of information from the following systems: Advance Passenger Information
System (APIS), I-94, Non-Immigrant Information System (NIIS), Electronic System for Travel
Authorization (ESTA), Border Crossing Information (BCI), TECS secondary processing, and
seizure and enforcement data, as well as Suspect and Violator Indices (SAVI), Central Index
System (CIS), Electronic Visa Update System (EVUS), Global Enrollment Systems (GES),
Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) via the Watchlist Service, and the Department of State’s
(DOS) Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) Visa and Consular Electronic Application Center

See DHS/ICE/PIA-044 LeadTrac System (July 22, 2016), available at https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsicepia044-leadtrac-system.

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(CEAC) data to identify individuals requiring additional scrutiny prior to entering or exiting the
country.
Through the ATS-P web interface, authorized CBP personnel can create ad hoc queries on
selected enforcement data, arrival and departure information, travel reservation information, visa
and ESTA applications, and secondary referrals. Additionally, the ATS-P web interface may be
displayed on approved mobile devices7 to support officer activities in the context of the
Immigration Advisory and Joint Security Programs (IAP/JSP) and at the ports of entry.

This application was previously referred to as the Enforcement Link Mobile Operations (ELMO) mobile
application, although now it is referred to as the “ATS Mobile application” following migration from the BlackBerry
to the Android platform.

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1.1 “Unified Passenger” (UPAX) Technology Update
January 13, 2017 (back to top)
ATS-P has traditionally served as a web-based enforcement and decision support tool used
to collect, analyze, and disseminate information for the identification of potential terrorists,
transnational criminals, and other persons who pose a higher risk of violating U.S. law. The CBP
National Targeting Center (NTC) and ports of entry use ATS-P capabilities to augment a CBP
Officer’s decision-making about whether a passenger or crew member should receive additional
inspection.
Unified Passenger (UPAX) is a technology refresh that updates and replaces the older
functionality of the legacy ATS-P interface. This update allows ATS to process traveler
information against other information available in ATS and apply risk-based rules centered around
CBP Officer experience, analysis of trends of suspicious activity, and raw intelligence from DHS
and other Government agencies. The end result is an improved process and system that assists
CBP Officers in identifying individuals who require additional inspection and making
admissibility decisions regarding individuals seeking admission to the United States. The updates
to ATS involve a modernized visual presentation of relevant information used in the risk
assessment process and a consolidation of multiple matched records and case management
functions to ensure consistency and promote more efficient evaluation of potential risks. The
enhanced presentation provided in the UPAX functionality provides direct access to crossreferenced files and information from partner agency databases through the use of hypertext links
and single sign-on protocols. The system now integrates risk assessment and case management
functionality with the presentation of query results across multiple source systems in a review of
a traveler.
Specifically, the UPAX functionality unifies multiple possible match results from multiple
source systems; reduces record duplication and streamlines the review process; standardizes the
backend components under the CBP Target Technical Architecture to ensure consistency and
improve maintainability and reusability; standardizes the entity resolution algorithms across all
match results, providing improved consistency and maintainability as algorithm improvements are
made and applied across the system; consolidates the front-end risk assessment components of
ATS-P with the case management capabilities of the ATS-Targeting Framework (ATS-TF) under
one user interface; and consolidates the query results across multiple source systems into an
integrated view, including ATS-TF,8 that eliminates the need for analysts to log into separate
systems as they conduct their research.

ATS-TF continues to exist as a separate module/sub-system within ATS, but UPAX provides the ability to create
and manage TF events via the UPAX interface, which can be opened through the ATS-TF application.

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Authorities and Other Requirements
All of the authorities previously identified for ATS remain in effect. ATS derives its
authority primarily from 19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 1461, 1496, 1581, 1582; 8 U.S.C. § 1357; 49 U.S.C. §
44909; the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002 (EBSVRA) (Pub. L. 107173); the Trade Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-210); the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 (IRTPA) (Pub. L. 108-458); and the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act
of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) (Pub. L. 109-347).
All previously identified SORNs remain in effect, or are noted under the “Notice” section
below.

Characterization of the Information
Previously only available under ATS-TF, the UPAX module allows ATS-P users to track
information of targeting interest regarding passengers and applicants for benefits or travel to the
United States. Similar to ATS-TF, UPAX permits a user to search across the data sources available
in the other modules of ATS based on role-based access for research and analysis purposes. If the
user does not have access to the data, the search will not return any data. UPAX provides users
with the ability to initiate research activities within the ATS-TF repository, fosters collaboration
among analysts, and allows all users to use past activity logs as additional intelligence sources by
tracking past research activity with respect to persons and entities of interest. UPAX includes
workflow functionality, which allows authorized users to assign activities to other users, operating
units, or ports of entry for additional processing. UPAX allows the creation of projects within the
ATS-TF repository, which track information intended for use over long periods of time, or
operational and analytical reports that may include public source information obtained by users
for reference or incorporation into the report or project. Through the UPAX web interface,
authorized CBP personnel can create ad hoc queries that allow users to find information related to
a specific activity or entity contained within each activity. UPAX allows users to integrate data
from multiple sources and show possible relationships between entities and data elements.
Users in UPAX may, subject to their access permissions, query the other four modules of
ATS and other systems, including those noted below, and save the results:
•

Border Patrol Enforcement Tracking System - Significant Incident Report (BPETSSIR) Module - managed by CBP

•

Enterprise Geospatial Information Services (eGIS) - managed by CBP

•

TECS - managed by CBP

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•

Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS) - managed by CBP

•

U.S. and Non-U.S. Passports - managed by DOS and CBP

•

Enforcement Integrated Database (EID) - managed by ICE

•

Person Centric Query Service (PCQS) - managed by USCIS

•

DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) - managed by the DHS
Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM)

•

Watchlist Service - managed by DHS

•

Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) - DOS

•

Social Security Administration (SSA) Death Master File - managed by SSA (a copy
of this file is kept in ATS-TF)

•

National Crime Information Center (NCIC) - managed by Department of Justice
(DOJ)

•

Interpol Lost/Stolen passports

•

Nlets

•

Commercial data aggregators

UPAX also allows authorized users to attach public source information, such as responsive
Internet links and related documents, to an assigned report and/or project and search for any text
contained within the system via full text search functionality. UPAX also includes sophisticated
ad hoc reporting features for both system data and workflow metrics as well as initial reporting
features through data warehouse capabilities.
There are no new privacy risks regarding characterization of information related to CBP’s
ATS-P UPAX enhancement. UPAX permits users to view a consolidated profile of a passenger by
displaying records from multiple systems as part of one UPAX record. This eliminates the need
for CBP Officers to view records from multiple systems with multiple log-on information. Because
UPAX does not permit users to access any new information, but rather displays existing
information in a more efficient manner, and because UPAX only permits a user to search across
the data sources available in the other modules of ATS based on role-based access for research
and analysis purposes, there are no new privacy risks.

Uses of the Information
The UPAX functionality unifies multiple possible match results from multiple source
systems; reduces record duplication and streamlines the review process; standardizes the backend
components under the CBP Target Technical Architecture to ensure consistency and improve
maintainability and reusability; standardizes the entity resolution algorithms across all match

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results, providing improved consistency and maintainability as algorithm improvements are made
and applied across the system; consolidates the front-end risk assessment components of ATS-P
with the case management capabilities of the ATS-TF under one user interface; and consolidates
the query results across multiple source systems into an integrated view, including ATS-TF, that
eliminates the need for analysts to log into separate systems as they conduct their research.
Privacy Risk: There is a privacy risk to use limitation due to the consolidation of multiple
datasets and query results in one system.
Mitigation: This risk is mitigated through role-based access controls. User roles are
restricted and audited, with access predicated on “need to know.” Through user access control
“entitlements,” all ATS users are only permitted to access information from the source systems to
which they have already been granted access through supervisory approval.
Privacy Risk: There is a privacy risk to data integrity because CBP analysts are relying on
aggregated information, which may become stale or inaccurate since pulled from source systems.
Mitigation: This risk cannot be fully mitigated. CBP relies upon the source systems to
ensure that data ingested by ATS is accurate and complete. Discrepancies may be identified in the
context of a CBP Officer’s review of the data, and CBP Officers are required by policy to take
action to correct the data if they become aware of inaccurate data, when appropriate. For Passenger
Name Records (PNR), CBP Officers may become aware of inaccuracies due to correction,
rectification, or redress procedures available to travelers, including non-U.S. persons. Although
ATS is not the system of record for most of the source data, ATS receives updates with any changes
to the source system databases. Continuous source system updates occur in real-time or near realtime. When corrections are made to data in source systems, ATS updates this information
immediately and only the latest data are used. In this way, ATS integrates all updated data
(including accuracy updates) in as close to real-time as possible.
To the extent information that is obtained from another government source (for example,
vehicle registration data that is obtained through Nlets) is determined to be inaccurate, this problem
would be communicated to the appropriate government source by the CBP Officer for remedial
action.

Notice
CBP is conducting this PIA update to provide notice of the ATS-P UPAX technology
refresh. There are no new privacy risks to notice identified with this enhancement.

Data Retention by the project
During this privacy impact assessment process, CBP determined that ATS is retaining
ingested information consistent with its own 15-year retention period, as opposed to the source
system records retention period. As described in previously published PIAs, to the extent
information is ingested from other systems, data should be retained in ATS in accordance with the

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record retention requirements of those systems, or the retention period for ATS, whichever is
shortest. The retention period for the official records maintained in ATS will not exceed 15 years,
after which time the records will be deleted, except as noted for PNR.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that ATS will retain all ingested records for targeting
purposes for 15 years, regardless of the source system data retention requirements.
Mitigation: CBP Privacy is developing a mitigation strategy for this risk. Understanding
that the justification for a 15-year retention period for the official records is based on CBP’s law
enforcement and security functions at the border, CBP must balance the need for historical data
for targeting purposes with the original purpose of collection and public notices already provided
about the ingested data. The ATS 15-year retention period is based on CBP’s historical encounters
with suspected terrorists and other criminals, as well as the broader expertise of the law
enforcement and intelligence communities. It is well known, for example, that potential terrorists
may make multiple visits to the United States in advance of performing an attack. It is over the
course of time and multiple visits that a potential risk becomes clear. Travel records, including
historical records, are essential in assisting CBP Officers with their risk-based assessments of
travel indicators and identifying potential links between known and previously unidentified
terrorist facilitators. Analyzing these records for these purposes allows CBP to continue to
effectively identify suspect travel patterns and irregularities.
CBP Privacy will conduct a CBP Privacy Evaluation (CPE) on the retention process and
data tagging for retention purposes within ATS for all source datasets within one year of
publication of this PIA. Following the CPE, CBP Privacy will make recommendations regarding
changing or modifying the underlying source system retention period to better align with CBP
operational needs, or will require a process by which ATS follows the underlying source system
retention periods. The results of the CPE will be shared with the DHS Privacy Office.

Information Sharing
As noted above, ATS does not consistently follow source system retention periods, but
instead relies on the ATS-specific retention period of 15 years. Due to the nature of many CBP
large, legacy, transactional databases, most information sharing is done via a connection to ATS.
Therefore, it is likely that information shared from ATS to other partners may also be retained in
a manner that is inconsistent with the original source systems.
Privacy Risk: There is a privacy risk to information sharing because ATS may retain
information longer than the source system data retention requirements, and therefore may pass
data to partners that should no longer be held by CBP.
Mitigation: This risk is partially mitigated. Bulk information sharing agreements are
covered by their own, specific information sharing access agreements (ISAA), such as a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which typically detail a records retention requirement
tailored to that specific agreement consistent with CBP retention requirements. As part of the CBP

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Privacy Evaluation regarding the retention issues in ATS, CBP Privacy will also conduct a review
of the ISAAs implicating CBP data to determine if: a) ATS is used as the conduit for transmission,
and b) if the transmission of information is consistent with the underlying source data retention
requirements.

Redress
There are no changes to redress from previously issued ATS PIAs.

Auditing and Accountability
The auditing and accountability procedures for UPAX are enhanced from previous
technology updates to ATS-P. UPAX performs more granular auditing in terms of vetting
performed by a user, in which each derogatory record is marked with individual vetting results.
ATS-P allowed the disposition to be set at the higher level, but not per individual. UPAX marks
the vetting results at a more granular level, which is more accurate, and retains records of all user
search and vetting results.

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1.2 Facial Recognition Technology Update
January 13, 2017 (back to top)
Currently, CBP checks all incoming passengers biographically against the FBI’s National
Crime Information Center (NCIC) and Criminal Master File for subjects who may have criminal
activity that would prohibit their admission or indicate they are wanted for suspected and/or actual
criminal activity. Additionally, those individuals subject to biometric capture are checked against
the DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT)9 and in some instances, the FBI’s
Next Generation Identification/Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(NGI/IAFIS)10 containing criminal history information using name and date of birth and/or
fingerprints to check for subjects who may have criminal activity that would prohibit their
admission or indicate they are wanted for suspected and/or actual criminal activity.
Under this initiative, CBP will use ATS to search the FBI’s NGI Interstate Photo System
(IPS), which contains all photos received by the FBI with ten print criminal booking transactions,
using photographs from:
1) TECS;11
2) Department of State’s (DOS) Consular Consolidated Database (CCD);12
3) USCIS’ Biometric Storage System (BSS) or Person Centric Query System (PCQS);13
4) IDENT; and
5) Global Enrollment System (GES)14 for travelers that are of national security interest to
CBP.
CBP is able to share DOS information with the FBI since DOS is a party to the 2008 DHSDOJ/FBI-DOS Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to share biographic and biometric
information and as reflected in relevant technical documents.

See DHS/USVISIT-004 DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), 72 FR 31080 (June 5, 2007),
available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2007-06-05/html/07-2781.htm.
10
See DOJ/FBI-009 Fingerprint Identification Records System (FIRS), 72 FR 3410 (January 25, 2007), available at
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2007-01-25/pdf/E7-1176.pdf.
11
See DHS/CBP-011 U.S. Customs and Border Protection TECS, 73 FR 77778 (December 19, 2008, available at
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2008-12-19/html/E8-29807.htm.
12
See Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) (July 17, 2015), available at
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/242316.pdf.
13
See DHS/USCIS-003 Biometric Storage System, 72 FR 17172 (April 6, 2007), available at
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2007-04-06/html/07-1643.htm.
14
See DHS/CBP-002 Global Enrollment System, 78 FR 3441 (January 16, 2013), available at
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-01-16/html/2013-00804.htm.

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Characterization of the Information
The photographs of individuals and/or associates that match information indicating a
national security concern and the associated personally identifiable information (PII) (including:
Place of Birth, Country of Citizenship, Date of Birth, Age Range, Sex, Race, Scars/Marks/Tattoos,
Height Range, Weight Range, Eye Color, Hair Color) will be passed via ATS to IDENT and
forwarded to the FBI’s NGI IPS for a search and a response of candidate photographs. IDENT will
serve as a pass-through only; therefore it will not store either the request message or the responses.
An individual’s photograph would be transmitted from ATS to IDENT and then to FBI’s NGI
because IDENT already has an interface to NGI, whereas ATS does not.
Search results are generated automatically by the FBI facial recognition software (no
human intervention by the FBI) and returned in a ranked candidate list of no more than three
candidates. There is no “match rate” because the FBI does not provide “matches” but rather
provides potential candidates and CBP will determine whether there is a match. The search will
only include the FBI NGI IPS and no information would be retained by the FBI. The candidate
photographs will then be returned to IDENT and passed back to ATS, at which point CBP Officers
and analysts will use the candidate images and all other available information to CBP for identity
resolution purposes to determine if there is a confirmed match as well as review, analyze, and
conduct further research on these individuals.
Privacy Risk: There is a privacy risk of over-collection since CBP will collect and retain
photographs of individuals who are potential matches to subjects of national security interest.
Mitigation: For possible matches returned by the FBI, CBP may retain these photographs
consistent with other law enforcement or national security leads in ATS. However, to ensure no

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needless collection while meeting law enforcement needs, CBP will only retain the possible
matches for 31 days to permit CBP time to conduct further analysis to make a determination, while
limiting the time possible matches (or candidates) may be stored to protect the privacy interests.
While most determinations could be made in a shorter period, the 31 days may be necessary to
collect additional information from other sources, such as Government agencies to complete final
identity determinations, if necessary and appropriate. CBP, through ATS, will document the
requirement for deletion of possible matches within 31 days in its internal requirements tracking
system and will set up a mechanism within ATS to delete the possible matches within this time
frame. Once a photograph has been determined a non-match, it will be deleted within the 31-day
period.
Privacy Risk: There is a privacy risk to data integrity due to the potential imprecision of
automated facial recognition technology.
Mitigation: CBP Officers and analysts will receive FBI training on facial recognition to
assist with the match determination. The confirmed matches, which are linked to a national
security concern, would be retained in ATS-TF consistent with the ATS retention schedule. The
confirmed match photos will be maintained in ATS-TF as an official record of ATS. CBP Officers
and analysts will also use all other information available to them to make a match determination,
so that a match is not solely based on the facial recognition technology.

Uses of the Information
CBP may use the FBI’s facial recognition software to assist in targeting and identity
resolution, consistent with the ATS System of Record Notice (SORN).15 The ATS SORN permits
CBP’s use of information to “perform targeting of individuals who may pose a risk to border
security or public safety, may be a terrorist or suspected terrorist, or may otherwise be engaged in
activity in violation of U.S. law” or “to otherwise assist in the enforcement of the laws enforced
or administered by DHS, including those related to counterterrorism.” All individuals whose
photographs are submitted to the FBI are already of national security concern to CBP.
Consistent with that purpose, CBP may collect information about any type of individual
identified under the ATS SORN for vetting purposes. CBP may collect and store the potential
matches from the FBI under the “G. Persons whose data was received by the Department as the
result of memoranda of understanding or other information sharing agreement or arrangement
because the information is relevant to the border security mission of the Department” and “I.
Persons who may pose a threat to the United States” categories of individuals.
Lastly, ATS is permitted to store biometrics, such as photographs, consistent with the ATS
SORN.

See DHS/CBP-006 Automated Targeting System, 77 FR 30297 (May 22, 2012), available at
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-05-22/html/2012-12396.htm.

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Privacy Risk: There is a privacy risk to use limitation that information sent to or returned
from the FBI based on the facial recognition technology will be stored or enrolled in IDENT and
then accessed by other Departments or agencies that have access to IDENT.
Mitigation: IDENT will be used only as a pass-through to FBI NGI; it will not store any
of the query data or returned results from NGI. CBP Privacy will conduct a CBP Privacy
Evaluation (CPE) within one year to verify that IDENT is not storing the query or retuned results.
The results of the CPE will be shared with the DHS Privacy Office.
Privacy Risk: There is a privacy risk that individuals who submit their photographs to
DOS for an immigration or non-immigrant benefit will be unaware that their photos will be shared
between the FBI and DHS for facial recognition purposes.
Mitigation: Consistent with the relevant DOS SORNs, DOS shares biometric and
biographic data with DHS for vetting as part of its standard adjudication process. Use of facial
recognition technology is another vetting technique. DHS is currently updating the existing MOU
with DOS to clarify the updated biometrics modalities used for vetting.

Notice
CBP is conducting this PIA update to provide notice of CBP’s use of FBI Facial
Recognition Technology.
Privacy Risk: There is a privacy risk to notice that individuals who submit photographs to
DOS will be unaware of DHS’s use of FBI facial recognition technology to conduct matches.
Mitigation: This PIA provides notice of the sharing of this data for the purposes outlined
above and consistent with restrictions and safeguarding of such data that is required by law and
DHS policies. In addition, the DOS PIA for CCD provides notice that CCD information is shared
with OBIM and CBP.16

Data Retention by the project
For CBP’s use of the FBI Facial Recognition Technology, CBP passes photographs and
certain PII via ATS to IDENT, which is then forwarded to the FBI’s NGI IPS for comparison.
When NGI IPS identifies three candidates for the photograph that was sent, FBI will pass back
photograph(s) and the associated Controlling Agency Identifier (referred to by the FBI as the
Universal Control Number, or UCN).
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that the FBI will retain information from CBP for its own
query purposes.

See Privacy Impact Assessment, Consular Consolidated Database (July 17, 2015), available at
https://foia.state.gov/_docs/PIA/ConsularConsolidatedDatabase_CCD.pdf.

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Mitigation: Pursuant to the requirements of the information sharing agreement, the FBI
will not retain the information that was queried.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that CBP will retain the potential matches or other gallery
images that have no nexus to national security.
Mitigation: The confirmed matches, which are linked to a national security concern, would
be retained in ATS-TF consistent with the ATS retention schedule. CBP may retain the possible
matches for up to but not longer than 31 days to conduct further analysis to make a determination.
However, once a determination is made, the photographs that do not match will be deleted.

Information Sharing
There are no changes to information sharing from previously issued ATS PIAs.

Redress
Although there are no changes to information sharing from previously issued ATS PIAs,
for this initiative, there is a risk that two types of individuals will be unable to achieve redress in
the event of an incorrect match: (a) individuals who submit photographs to DOS, and (b)
individuals who are false-positive potential matches.
Privacy Risk: Individuals whose information is submitted to CBP from DOS or the FBI
may be unable to achieve redress or determine which Government procedures are appropriate to
assist them.
Mitigation: This risk is mitigated, to extent possible consistent with law enforcement and
national security exemptions noted in the applicable SORNs. To the extent that a record is
exempted in a source system, the exemption will continue to apply.
A traveler, regardless of his or her citizenship or residence, may obtain access to his or her
PNR. However, records concerning the targeting rules, the responses to rules, case events, law
enforcement and/or intelligence data, reports, and projects developed by CBP analysts that may
include public source information, information obtained through memoranda of understanding or
other arrangements because the information is relevant to the border security mission of the
Department, or records exempted from access by the system from which ATS ingested or accessed
the information will not be accessible to the individual.
Notwithstanding the applicable exemptions, CBP reviews all such requests on a case-bycase basis. If compliance with a request would not interfere with or adversely affect the national
security of the United States or activities related to any investigatory material contained within
this system, the applicable exemption may be waived at the discretion of CBP in accordance with
procedures and points of contact published in the applicable SORN.
Procedures for individuals to gain access to data maintained in source systems that provide
data ingested into ATS are covered by the respective SORNs for the source systems. Individuals

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may follow the procedures outlined in the PIAs and SORNs of the source systems to gain access
to their information stored in those systems.
Individuals seeking notification of and access to any record contained in this system of
records, or seeking to contest its content, may submit a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or
Privacy Act request in writing to:
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Division
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Room 3.3D
Washington, D.C. 20229
FOIA requests must be in writing and include the requestor’s daytime phone number, email
address, and as much information as possible of the subject matter to expedite the search process.
Specific FOIA contact information can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/foia under contacts.
If a traveler believes that CBP actions are the result of incorrect or inaccurate information,
then inquiries may be directed to:
CBP INFO Center
OPA—Rosslyn
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20229
Travelers may also contact DHS TRIP, 601 South 12th Street, TSA-901, Arlington, VA
22202 or online at www.dhs.gov/trip. Individuals making inquiries may be asked to provide
additional identifying information to enable DHS to identify the record(s) at issue.

Auditing and Accountability
For possible matches, CBP may retain these photographs consistent with other law
enforcement or national security leads in ATS. However, to balance the privacy interests and law
enforcement needs, CBP will only retain the possible matches for 31 days to permit CBP time to
conduct further analysis to make a determination, while limiting the time possible matches (or
candidates) may be stored to protect the privacy interests. While most determinations could be
made in a shorter period, the 31 days may be necessary to collect additional information from other
sources, such as Government agencies to complete final identity determinations, if necessary and
appropriate. CBP, through ATS, will document the requirement for deletion of possible matches
within 31 days in its internal requirements tracking system and will set up a purge mechanism
within ATS to delete the possible matches within this time frame. Once a photograph has been
determined a non-match, it will be deleted within the 31-day period.

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1.2.1 ATS Biometric Vetting Using Facial Recognition
Last updated December 12, 2019 (back to top)

On January 13, 2017, CBP issued ATS Addendum 1.2 to assess its “Facial Recognition
Technology Update” that describes the process by which CBP will use ATS to search the FBI’s
NGI Interstate Photo System (IPS), which contains all photos received by the FBI with ten print
criminal booking transactions. That process required CBP to send photographs to the FBI for
matching, and the FBI then sent CBP possible matches for CBP to adjudicate.
CBP is conducting an update to ATS Addendum 1.2 because CBP has developed its own
in-house facial recognition matching technology, the Traveler Verification Service (TVS),17
currently used for identity verification and biometric entry and exit. This updated ATS Addendum
1.2.1 describes the process by which CBP will use the TVS technology to conduct facial
recognition biometric vetting checks against certain populations in the same manner as existing
biographic vetting checks.
Biometric Vetting using Facial Recognition and TVS Technology
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
operates the Automated Targeting System (ATS) to facilitate legitimate trade and travel while
managing the shared threat to the Homeland posed by individuals and cargo that may require
additional scrutiny prior to entering or exiting the United States. Currently, ATS uses biographic
identifiers and other selectors, such as name and date of birth, to assist in targeting and entity
resolution18 for individuals traveling or intending to travel to and from the United States. In
addition to the biographic entity resolution capabilities used to identify matches to derogatory
records, CBP intends to expand its analysis, targeting, and vetting capabilities by deploying
biometric matching using facial recognition technology. This capability will allow CBP to enhance
the identification of possible threats by leveraging facial recognition technology to identify
biometric matches to derogatory records that are not identified through existing biographic
targeting and entity resolution mechanisms.
Biometric Vetting v. Identity Verification
Biometric vetting using facial recognition is separate from the use of TVS for identity
verification, by which travelers present themselves to CBP or an airline representative for a
photograph immediately prior to entering or departing the United States. During biometric entry
and exit, TVS is currently used for identity verification purposes to confirm that the individual

See DHS/CBP/PIA-056 Traveler Verification Service, available at www.dhs.gov/privacy.
ATS uses entity resolution algorithms to connect disparate data sources under one view to understand possible
entity matches and non-obvious relationships across multiple source systems.
18

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who attempted to enter or exit the United States at that particular time and location matches the
travel document he or she is presenting for inspection.
Under the biometric vetting using facial recognition initiative, CBP will use the TVS
technology to match photographs already accessible from existing ATS holdings and ATS
interfaces and mirror the existing biographic vetting process. The types of photographs already
accessible from existing holdings are photographs captured by CBP during previous entry
inspections, photographs from U.S. passports and U.S. visas, immigration records, and
photographs from prior DHS apprehensions and encounters.19 As ATS performs its existing vetting
and analysis process using biographic identifiers, it will also match those available photographs
against available photographs associated with derogatory records, such as TECS lookout records,
Terrorist Screening Data Base (TSDB) records, and outstanding wants and warrants.20 CBP is not
matching the facial images already accessible from existing ATS holdings and ATS interfaces
against any state Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV) photographs. In instances in which
biographic identifiers alone do not match to derogatory records but there is a match to derogatory
photographs, CBP will conduct a manual review of the identified match to confirm whether the
derogatory record is a true match to the individual based on the facial recognition technology. As
part of the manual review, that individual then may be a subject of interest and the information
will be stored in ATS as a Targeting Framework (ATS-TF) “event” for manual Officer review.
This initiative will leverage TVS’s facial recognition service, which relies on biometric templates
also referred to as “galleries” generated from pre-existing photographs that ATS already maintains
or accesses through existing ATS interfaces.
CBP will deploy biometric vetting using facial recognition in ATS for the following
populations: (1) individuals seeking to enter or exit the United States whose names appear on a
flight or vessel manifests, or voluntary manifests submitted by bus or rail manifest (“manifested
travelers”); (2) individuals applying for CBP programs facilitating travel to the United States, and
(3) subjects of interest who require additional research and analysis. CBP will match photographs
for these three populations against a predetermined gallery of photographs associated with
derogatory information. The process for biometric vetting using facial recognition and a
description for all populations is outlined below.

U.S. passport and visa photos are available via the Department of State’s Consular Consolidated System. See
Privacy Impact Assessment: Consular Consolidated Database, available at
https://20012009.state.gov/documents/organization/93772.pdf. Other photos may include those from DHS
apprehensions or enforcement actions, previous border crossings, and immigration records.
20
See DHS/CBP/PIA-009(a) TECS System: CBP Primary and Secondary Processing, available at
www.dhs.gov/privacy.
19

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1. Manifested Travelers
ATS populates photographic galleries based on upcoming Advance Passenger Information
(API) and/or Passenger Name Record (PNR)21 information in the air and sea environments, which
identify who is scheduled to travel; in the land environment bus and rail manifests voluntarily
provided by carriers may be used to perform this function.22 ATS uses the biographic information
in the API or PNR to retrieve existing records in other ATS holdings and interfaces. If those
holdings in ATS have an associated photograph (i.e., travel documents or encounters), that
photograph will become part of the photographic gallery. The photographic gallery is then
biometrically compared using facial recognition against a separate gallery of photographs that are
associated with derogatory information, which include TECS Lookout Records, TSDB records
received via the Watch List Service (WLS), and outstanding wants and warrants. If a photograph
from a travel document or encounter gallery is positively matched to the gallery of derogatory
photographs, the associated derogatory information is presented to CBP personnel for further
review and analysis. The manual process to determine if a derogatory record is a match to a traveler
based on the facial recognition technology follows the same process as for biographic matches,
using the totality of information available to the analyst. CBP will build galleries up to 24 hours
prior to the scheduled departure for the manifested traveler population. These photo galleries for
manifested travelers are then retained for 14 days (except for photo galleries of U.S. citizen
travelers, which are purged upon the completion of arrival/departure processing) to permit CBP
time to conduct further analysis.23 While most determinations could be made in a shorter period,
the 14 days may be necessary to collect additional information from other sources, such as
Government agencies, to complete final vetting determinations, if necessary and appropriate. ATS
may not have access to facial images for some travelers or travel applicants, such as for some first
time Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) travelers or Canadian travelers. In such
instances ATS will continue to only use biographic identifiers for matching to derogatory records.
2. Travel Applicants
The same process described above will apply to vetting travel applications such as visas,
the Electronic Visa Update System (EVUS), ESTA, and trusted traveler programs.24 Biographics
from those applications will be matched against biographics in ATS holdings and interfaces that
also have an associated photograph. Those photographs will then be matched against the gallery
21

PNR information will only be used if there is no corresponding APIS record, and is limited to only retrieving the
biographic information of the PNR record in order to search for associated photographs in ATS holdings and
interfaces.
22
See DHS/CBP/PIA-001 Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) available at www.dhs.gov/privacy.
23
CBP uses the facial images collected in the TVS to continually test and evaluate the accuracy of the camera
technology and the algorithms. CBP retains the images of in-scope travelers for up to 14 days in order confirm
travelers’ identities, evaluation of the technology, assurance of accuracy of the algorithms, and system audits.
24
See DHS/CBP/PIA-002 Global Enrollment System (GES), DHS/CBP/PIA-007 Electronic System for Travel
Authorization (ESTA), and DHS/CBP/PIA-033 Electronic Visa Update System (EVUS) available at
www.dhs.gov/privacy.

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of photographs that are associated to derogatory information. The galleries of photographs for
vetting travel applications are built as new applications (such as visas, EVUS, ESTA, trusted
traveler programs) are received by ATS. Any photographs associated with the applications are
added to the associated photo galleries for those travel applications, to be compared against
photographs from derogatory records. The photographs will be maintained in the gallery for the
travel applications for the time period for which ATS is authorized to maintain the application data
and associated photographs.
3. Research and Analysis for Subjects of Interest
In addition to the expanded targeting capabilities, CBP intends to use facial recognition
technology to augment current search capabilities by allowing users of ATS to manually upload
the photograph of a subject of interest into the federated query function to search ATS data
holdings. This capability will aid ATS users in the identification of an individual who, for example,
presents invalid documentation, or with identification in other encounters where biographic
information alone cannot be easily matched. This capability is analogous to searching biographic
data in ATS with the Super Query function, only now a user can enter a photograph into the Super
Query function and the facial recognition technology will match that photograph to existing
photographs in ATS holdings and interfaces. Additionally, CBP may receive from foreign or U.S.
law enforcement partners photographs of individuals who are linked to possible illicit activity,
which will be matched against derogatory records available in ATS.
Gallery of Photographs Associated with Derogatory Information
ATS aggregates Lookout Records from information that is associated with individuals who
may be engaged in illicit activity, which may include photographs in addition to biographic
identifiers. This information creates a gallery of derogatory information in ATS that is continually
updated in real time. As ATS receives new derogatory records, if photographs are also part of the
derogatory record, they are also added to the photo gallery. If the source derogatory record is
updated to add or remove photographs, the associated photographs are also added to or removed
from the photo gallery.

Authorities and Other Requirements
ATS derives its authority primarily from 19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 1461, 1496, 1581, 1582; 8
U.S.C. § 1357; 49 U.S.C. § 44909; the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002
(EBSVRA) (Pub. L. 107-173); the Trade Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-210); the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) (Pub. L. 108-458); and the Security and
Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) (Pub. L. 109-347).

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All previously identified SORNs remain in effect or are noted under the “Notice” section
below.

Characterization of the Information
In order to properly evaluate travelers at the border, or those who intend to travel to the
United States, CBP receives travel or application data and conducts vetting at the time of
application submission, pre-departure or pre-arrival vetting for manifested travelers, or vetting at
the time of arrival in the United States. In addition, CBP conducts research and analysis on
available information to identify individuals who may need additional scrutiny. CBP uses this
information to conduct checks against various derogatory records, such as TSDB records received
via the WLS, TECS lookout records, wants and warrants entered by law enforcement officers, or
ATS rules. Additionally, CBP Officers and United States Border Patrol (USBP) agents encounter
and apprehend subjects who do not have valid travel documentation to enter the United States and
conduct research to complete an individual inspection. The original point of collection for the data
being used came directly from the traveler or from the traveler via the commercial carrier prior to
entry and departure from the United States. There is no new collection of information by deploying
facial recognition capabilities in ATS; rather, ATS targeting and entity resolution algorithms will
leverage existing photographic images to perform matching in addition to biographic identifiers
currently being used by ATS. Both biometric and biographic data located in ATS is derived from
the source system through existing processes and described in the previously published PIAs.
Privacy Risk: Although no new information is being collected, there is a risk that the new
technology being used for vetting may be inaccurate and generate false matches.
Mitigation: ATS will leverage the TVS facial recognition technology, for which CBP is
continually testing and evaluating the accuracy of the matching algorithms. DHS personnel are
also required to manually review and cross reference the records in ATS to improve the level of
confidence and reliability in matches made to derogatory information before any adjudication
decision is made. In addition, DHS personnel will use all available information when making a
decision and no adverse action will be taken from the results of facial recognition technology
alone.

Uses of the Information
ATS will leverage photographs available via existing ATS holdings and interfaces and will
provide a new method for identifying matches to derogatory records or other holdings during the
vetting process. The facial images available through ATS include images for which ATS is the
system of record (i.e., ATS-TF or Intelligence Records System-Next Generation (IRS-NG)),25 or
come from source systems of records that are either ingested into ATS or available via query
services using ATS interfaces with systems such as TECS, WLS, IDENT, NCIC, the Consular
25

See DHS/CBP/PIA-006(b) Automated Targeting System (ATS) Update, June 1, 2012.

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Consolidated Database (CCD), and the Central Index System (CIS).26 ATS will leverage facial
recognition algorithms from the TVS application that are continually evaluated for accuracy in
collaboration with DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), Office of Biometric Identity
Management (OBIM), and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
Once a facial image is available via ATS for both the subject of interest and the derogatory
records that are in scope for analysis, targeting, and vetting, matches can be identified based on
facial recognition technology. Additionally, during the analysis, targeting, and vetting process of
a subject of interest, the ATS federated query capabilities will be augmented to use the facial
recognition technology to match the photograph of a subject of interest with the photographs
available through ATS holdings or ATS interfaces. This technology helps identify additional
matching records that may assist CBP in identifying individuals or applicants who may need
additional scrutiny.
CBP will conduct the same vetting process for matches to derogatory records made using
facial recognition technology as matches made through existing entity resolution methods that
currently use biographic identifiers. All matches via facial recognition will still require manual
review and will follow the same process as the vetting of derogatory records identified through
existing targeting methods in ATS. For example, a traveler who matches a derogatory record via
facial recognition during pre-departure vetting may be sent to secondary inspection upon arrival
at a U.S. port of entry for additional examination by a CBP officer. Based on the officer’s
examination, this may result in having his/her ESTA, EVUS, or trusted traveler application denied.
Additionally, under certain scenarios during pre-departure vetting, CBP may recommend to the
airline to deny boarding to an individual because the person is likely to be found inadmissible upon
arrival at a U.S. port of entry. However, CBP will not deny entry or make a recommendation to
the airline to deny boarding based on facial recognition technology alone, but rather will make that
decision based on the totality of the information (such as previous encounters or Officer interview).
This technology will also assist CBP in determining that the derogatory photograph does not match
the traveler, thus facilitating travel or the granting of the travel application or trusted traveler
application. For example, if a traveler seeking admission to the United States is identified as
needing additional scrutiny based on facial recognition, CBP may send that traveler for a secondary
inspection, and would conduct additional research about the traveler, verify the traveler’s identity,

See DHS/ALL/PIA-009 TECS System: CBP Primary and Secondary Processing (TECS), DHS/ALL/PIA-027
Watchlist Service, DHS/NPPD/PIA-002 Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), and
DHS/USCIS/PIA-009 Central Index System: available at www.dhs.gov/privacy. Also see the Privacy Impact
Assessment for the National Crime information center: available at https://www.fbi.gov/services/informationmanagement/foipa/privacy-impact-assessments/ncic-identity-theft, and the Privacy Impact Assessment for the
Consular Consolidated Database: available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ConsularConsolidated-Database-CCD.pdf.

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interview the traveler, search the traveler’s luggage, and based on all available information, make
an admissibility determination.
CBP access controls will ensure ATS users will only be authorized to access the data they
are provisioned to view through the ATS entitlement roles. CBP will create biometric templates
of each photograph in order to secure the photographs for matching and storage. Biometric
templates are strings of multiple numbers that represent specified images and facilitate facial
recognition matching within a secure environment. These templates cannot be reverse engineered
for viewing by external parties so if an unauthorized user were to view the template, it would not
be visible as a facial image. The photographs that are sourced from ATS holdings and used to
generate the templates are stored securely in the CBP computer systems and databases in which
they originate, and are not transferred and hosted in the secure virtual cloud environment.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that the facial recognition technology generates an inaccurate
match on biometric data.
Mitigation: This risk is mitigated. If the facial recognition technology generates a match
on biometric data, but there is no match on any biographic data associated with these photographs,
CBP officers are trained to further analyze and review the totality of the data. If biometric data
shows a match to a derogatory record, but does not match to the biographic data associated to that
record, the CBP officer will manually review the records and conduct further analysis. No adverse
action is taken based on facial recognition technology alone.
Privacy Risk: Authorized users of ATS could use their access for unapproved or
inappropriate purposes, such as performing searches on themselves, friends, relatives, or neighbors
using facial images.
Mitigation: All ATS users must undergo privacy training and obtain approval from their
supervisor and the ATS system owner before gaining access to ATS. ATS performs extensive
auditing that records the search activities of all users. These audit logs may be reviewed, and any
inappropriate use will be referred to the appropriate internal investigations office (such as the
Office of Professional Responsibility, the Joint Intake Center, or others as required) for handling.
The detection of inappropriate use will also result in the suspension of the user’s access to ATS
until the use can be investigated. The entire breadth of ATS auditing capabilities (previously
discussed in detail in the ATS PIA) will be leveraged to monitor the usage of these capabilities.

Notice
There are no new collections associated with this program. ATS uses images available via
ATS holdings or interfaces that are derived from other source systems. For images collected by
CBP, the source system PIA and SORN provide notice of the original collection of the information,
and CBP provides additional notice when possible through signage, Privacy Act statements, and
with information on the CBP.gov website. Such information provides notice regarding CBP’s
authorities and purpose for the collection, but do not provide timely and specific notice with regard

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to this particular activity. The extent of notice given to individuals for the collection of the
photographs is addressed in each source system PIA.
Privacy Risk: There is risk that travelers will not be aware of the fact that CBP is using
facial recognition to vet them against derogatory information.
Mitigation: This risk is partially mitigated by this PIA, which provides public notice of
the way CBP will use facial recognition to improve identification of individuals who pose a
potential security concern or warrant additional scrutiny. However, due to the various sources and
methods associated with the original collection of the information, CBP cannot reasonably provide
timely notice regarding its use of facial recognition for biometric vetting.

Data Retention by the Project
To ensure data minimization while meeting law enforcement priorities, CBP will build
galleries up to 24 hours prior to the scheduled departure for the manifested traveler population.
These photo galleries for manifested travelers are then retained for 14 days (except for photo
galleries of U.S. citizen travelers, which are purged upon the completion of arrival/departure
processing) to permit CBP time to conduct further analysis to make a determination, while limiting
the time photo galleries for manifested travelers are maintained to protect the privacy interests.
While most determinations could be made in a shorter period, the 14 days may be necessary to
collect additional information from other sources, such as Government agencies, to complete final
vetting determinations, if necessary and appropriate. The original photos are still to be maintained
under the system of record, or the copy of the data propagated to ATS, and are accessible for
generating photo galleries for new manifests.
The photos associated with travel applications, photos associated with derogatory
information, photos of travelers that have matched the photo galleries associated with derogatory
information, and the photo galleries for travelers who are manually vetted through ATS are
maintained in the system in accordance with the source system retention policy. ATS collects some
photographs directly and derives other photographs from various source systems. To the extent
information is collected from other systems, data is retained in accordance with the records
retention requirements of those systems.
If CBP creates a record in ATS-TF or IRS-NG as part of any of the analysis, targeting, or
vetting processes, any images associated with the subject of interest will be maintained in the ATSTF or IRS-NG and may be available via the Analytical Framework for Intelligence. Records in
ATS follow the NARA retention schedule as outlined in the ATS SORN.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that CBP may retain facial images in the gallery for longer
than is necessary.
Mitigation: This risk is mitigated. All facial images used for this initiative is already stored
in ATS in accordance with the records retention requirements for the source system of that

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biometric. For images that are part of the gallery building process, U.S citizen images are deleted
once the individual arrives or departs a port of entry and all other images are deleted after 14 days.

Information Sharing
CBP may share information that originates from a system of record with federal, state,
local, and foreign authorities consistent with the Privacy Act and the relevant SORN, including for
law enforcement, judicial proceedings, and other lawful purposes. Since this technology will be
used to identify matches to derogatory records that may not be otherwise identified through current
methods, CBP may need to share the information with the record owner to enhance or correct the
source record and support better matching by other agencies. For example, if a traveler is matched
to a TSDB record using facial images, but not by the biographic information associated with
photograph, CBP would notify and enhance the source TSDB record with the new facial image
from the traveler.
Non-CBP owned records available in ATS are accessed in accordance with existing
information sharing agreements. Each agreement specifies the arrangement to use the data for inscope analysis, targeting, and vetting and does not place limitations on analysis, targeting and
vetting using facial recognition technology.
Privacy Risk: Information related to the matches generated by the facial recognition
capability may be shared under inappropriate circumstances.
Mitigation: Absent any legal prohibitions, CBP may share information from ATS with
other DHS or Component personnel who have an authorized purpose for accessing the information
in performance of their duties, possess the requisite security clearance, and assure adequate
safeguarding and protection of the information. In addition, CBP may share information external
to DHS consistent with the Privacy Act and routine uses published in the source system SORNs,
the ATS SORN, and consistent with DHS policy and existing MOUs, including setting forth the
restrictions on and conditions of use; securing, storing, handling, and safeguarding requirements;
and controls on further dissemination.

Redress
As with all the various ATS updates, redress methods remain unchanged from the original
ATS PIA. Most of the information within ATS is submitted from underlying source datasets.27 To
the extent that a record is exempted in a source system, the exemption will continue to apply.
Because of the law enforcement nature of ATS, DHS has exempted portions of this system from
the notification, access, amendment, and certain accounting provisions of the Privacy Act. These
exemptions also apply to the extent that information in this system of records is recompiled or is

DHS/CBP-006 Automated Targeting System, 77 Fed. Reg. 30297 (May 22, 2012).

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created from information contained in other systems of records with appropriate exemptions in
place.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that CBP will not provide adequate redress to an individual
who was improperly denied entry to the United States, referred for secondary inspection, or
otherwise impacted by a false match based on facial recognition.
Mitigation: This risk is mitigated. ATS is using this technology for photographs that are
already collected and stored in ATS. Procedures for individuals to gain access to data maintained
in source systems that provide data ingested into ATS are covered by the respective SORNs for
those source systems. Individuals may follow the procedures outlines in published PIAs and
SORNs to gain access to their information stored in those systems. Persons who believe they have
been adversely impacted by this technology may submit a redress request through the DHS
Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP). DHS TRIP is a single point of contact for persons who
have inquiries or seek resolution regarding difficulties they experienced during their travel
screening at transportation hubs – like airports, seaports, and train stations or at U.S. land borders.
Through DHS TRIP, a traveler can request correction of erroneous data stored in DHS databases
through one application. DHS TRIP redress requests can be made online at
http://www.dhs.gov/dhs-trip or by mail at:
DHS TRIP
601 South 12th Street, TSA-901
Arlington, VA 20598-6901

Auditing and Accountability
ATS has role-based access. Only the users who are provisioned to the appropriate role
based on need to know will be authorized to access the facial recognition capability. All user
groups will have access to the system defined by the specific user’s profile and limited through
reference to the determined rights and responsibilities of each user. Access by users, managers,
system administrators, developers, and others to the facial image data and facial recognition
capability is defined in the same manner and employs profiles to tailor access to mission or
operational functions similar to other ATS data and capability. ATS user roles are highly restricted
and audited. Access is restricted in the form of role-based access, which is based on a demonstrated
need to know. Facial image data may only be accessed using the CBP network with encrypted
passwords and user sign-on functionality. All ATS users with access to ATS are required to
complete security and data privacy training on an annual basis and their usage of the system is
audited to ensure compliance with all privacy and data security requirements. The same auditing
and accountability privacy risks and mitigations apply and have been addressed in previous PIAs.

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1.3 Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Secure Flight Passenger
Data (SFPD) Vetting
January 13, 2017 (back to top)
CBP will now ingest TSA Secure Flight Passenger Data (SFPD) in real time into ATS-P
for the following two types of flights:
(1) U.S. and foreign air carriers that fly over the United States (i.e., overflights), but never
touch down into the United States, such as flights from Mexico to Canada.
(2) U.S. carriers that fly from one international point to another international point (i.e.,
point-to-point flights), such as Berlin to Shanghai.
TSA’s Secure Flight program screens aviation passengers and certain non-travelers before
they access airport sterile areas or board aircraft. TSA has conducted several thorough PIAs28 and
a SORN29 regarding the Secure Flight program. Unless otherwise noted, the information provided
in previously published TSA Secure Flight PIAs remains in effect. Individuals are encouraged to
read all program PIAs to fully understand TSA’s privacy assessment of the Secure Flight program.
The Secure Flight regulation30 requires foreign and U.S. air carriers to submit SFPD for
covered flights for each travel reservation. SFPD includes: 1) full name, 2) date of birth, 3) gender,
and, if available, 4) Redress Number and Known Traveler number, 5) passport information (if
applicable), 5) reservation control number, 6) record sequence number, 7) record type, 8)
passenger update indicator, 9) traveler reference number, and 10) itinerary information.31 ATS will
ingest all of the data elements collected by TSA and authorized through the Secure Flight
regulation for the two types of flights mentioned above.
Background
Since inception, CBP and TSA have both played a role in pre-flight screening and risk
assessments. But there are some major differences between the TSA Secure Flight process and
CBP’s collection of advanced passenger information. Under the Secure Flight program, covered
aircraft operators must request passenger information at the time of reservation or prior to
transmitting the passenger’s SFPD; CBP requires the electronic transmission of manifest
information for passengers and crew members onboard commercial and private aircraft, in advance
of arrival in and departure from the United States, and for crew members and non-crew members
onboard commercial aircraft that overfly the United States in advance of the departure of those
28

See DHS/TSA/PIA-018 Secure Flight Program, and subsequent updates, available at
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhs-tsa-pia-018g-secure-flight-program-update.
29
See DHS/TSA-019 Secure Flight Records, 80 FR 233 (January 5, 2015), available at
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-01-05/html/2014-30856.htm.
30
49 CFR 1560.101(b).
31
49 CFR 1560.3. “Covered flights” are defined in the Secure Flight regulation at 49 CFR 1560.3 and include
overflights and international point-to-point flights by U.S. carriers.

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flights. TSA requires collection of different data elements under the Secure Flight program than
CBP collects under the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) regulations.32 Covered
aircraft operators can transmit both APIS data and SFPD in a single transmission to the DHS portal,
which will route information to TSA and CBP accordingly.33
Covered aircraft operators must submit this SFPD information approximately 72 hours
before departure of a covered flight, or if a passenger books after this 72-hour mark, as soon as
that information becomes available. Those that elect to transmit the SFPD and all manifest
information required under the APIS regulations at the same time would be able to send a single
transmission to DHS.
Pre-Screening Program
ATS provides a pre-screening service to TSA to enhance the security of international air
travel by identifying individuals who present security concerns. TSA provides risk-based,
intelligence-driven, scenario rules to CBP for use in ATS to identify international travelers
requiring enhanced screening. Individuals identified through this program are subjected to Selectee
screening prior to boarding an aircraft. While passenger data for international incoming flights
(flights from a foreign airport to a U.S. airport) are pre-screened, this program is not applied to
SFPD because ATS does not receive such data. However, TSA does receive this information.
To apply this program to these overflight and point-to-point flights, the SFPD will now be
ingested into ATS so that ATS is able to match the criteria in the rules against the SFPD. TSA
would then be able to identify individuals who, though not on a watch list, exhibit high risk
indicators or travel patterns, and thus should be subject to Selectee screening.34 Having CBP
perform a pre-screening service for these covered flights supports its border security mission and
could aid in tracking travel of individuals in situations such as those presented by a communicable
disease outbreak (such as the Ebola outbreak).

See Secure Flight Final Rule, 73 FR 64023 (October 28, 2008) for a table delineating SFPD and APIS PreDeparture data elements, available at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2008/10/28/E8-25432/secureflight-program.
33
Covered aircraft operators may also submit Passenger Name Record information to CBP through this DHS portal.
34
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) § 4012(a) (Pub. L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638,
December 17, 2004). Currently, the consolidated and integrated terrorist watch list is maintained by the FBI’s
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) in the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). The No Fly and Selectee List are
components of the TSDB.

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44909; the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002 (EBSVRA) (Pub. L. 107173); the Trade Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-210); the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 (IRTPA) (Pub. L. 108-458); and the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act
of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) (Pub. L. 109-347). See also, e.g., 6 U.S.C. §§ 111, 211; 8 U.S.C. §§
1103, 1182, 1225, 1225a, 1324, 1357; 19 U.S.C. §§ 1431, 1433, 1436, 1448, 1459, 1590, 1594,
1623, 1624, 1644, and 1644a.
All previously identified SORNs remain in effect, or are noted under the “Notice” section
below.

Characterization of the Information
CBP will now ingest SFPD in real time from the DHS Router into ATS-P for the following
two types of flights:
•

U.S. and foreign air carriers that fly over the United States (i.e., overflights), but never
touch down into the United States, such as flights from Mexico to Canada.

•

U.S. carriers that fly from one international point to another international point (i.e.,
point-to-point flights), such as Berlin to Shanghai.

CBP is ingesting the following data elements from TSA: 1) full name, 2) date of birth, 3)
gender, and, if available, 4) Redress Number and Known Traveler number, 5) passport information
(if applicable), 5) reservation control number, 6) record sequence number, 7) record type, 8)
passenger update indicator, 9) traveler reference number, and 10) itinerary information. These data
elements are currently collected under current TSA procedures and authorized through the TSA
Secure Flight regulation.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk of over-collection and a risk to purpose specification since
the SFPD is originally collected by TSA.
Mitigation: CBP has authority to receive SFPD overflight and point-to-point flight
information from TSA for purposes of assisting TSA and to enhance CBP’s mission pursuant to
the authorities mentioned above.
CBP’s systems will retain the above referenced SFPD of individuals for a period of time
consistent with (and in some cases, shorter than) the Secure Flight records retention schedule. For
individuals who do not match to information indicating a potential risk (i.e., non-matches), these
records will be held for 7 days to create, modify, and run rules, as well as to conduct additional
analysis on the data.35 After 7 days, the records will be deleted from ATS. This category should
be the majority of the SFPD records.
CBP relies on ATS to maintain records of individuals who were: 1) confirmed as watchlist
matches (15-year retention), 2) possible watchlist matches who are subsequently cleared (7-year
35

This retention period is consistent with the DHS/TSA-019 Secure Flight SORN.

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retention), and 3) rule hits (7-year retention). However, data that is linked to a border security,
national security, significant health risk, or counterterrorism matter will be retained in ATS for the
life of the matter to support that activity and other similar activities that may become related.
CBP relies on TECS36 to maintain records about those individuals who may need additional
scrutiny when entering the country. Possible matches and rule matches will be retained consistent
with the TSA retention schedule and confirmed Watchlist Lookouts will be retained for 75 years.
However, data that is linked to a border security, national security, significant health risk, or
counterterrorism matter will be retained in TECS for the life of the matter to support that activity
and other similar activities that may become related.

Uses of the Information
CBP will use the information to:
1) match the SFPD data against the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB);
2) display the data within ATS and on the TSA-CBP Common Operating Picture;
3) update the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) and the TSDB;
4) submit new watchlist nominations; or
5) other appropriate uses which enhance CBP’s border security mission.
These actions provide better information to appropriate U.S. authorities (including CBP
and TSA) receiving such information to assist in identifying individuals of potential concern.
Finally, the information is critical in case a flight overflying the United States has to make an
emergency landing in the United States. In such a situation, CBP needs information immediately
about who is on that flight.
Consistent with the purposes for which the Secure Flight program was created, TSA has
authorized CBP to use the SFPD for border security, counterterrorism, significant health threat
(e.g., pandemic), and national security purposes.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that CBP will use SFPD for purposes beyond border security,
national security, significant public health risk, and counterterrorism, such as for law enforcement
purposes.
Mitigation: TSA and CBP have worked together on processes and procedures in place to
ensure the data is properly being used. CBP Privacy will conduct a CBP Privacy Evaluation (CPE)
within 6 months of CBP beginning regular ingest of the SFPD to evaluate these risks and
mitigations. The results of the CPE will be shared with the DHS Privacy Office.

See DHS/CBP-011 TECS, 73 FR 77778 (December 19, 2008), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR2008-12-19/html/E8-29807.htm.

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Privacy Risk: There is a risk that CBP will use SFPD to generate new targeting rules
without appropriate oversight.
Mitigation: CBP will follow its current policy regarding the existing DHS oversight
mechanism to ensure that targeting rules align with DHS policies. In addition, CBP Privacy will
conduct a CPE within 6 months of CBP beginning regular ingest of the SFPD to evaluate these
risks and mitigations. The results of the CPE will be shared with the DHS Privacy Office.

Notice
TSA has provided extensive notice about the Secure Flight program in general, including
a Secure Flight Final Rule, and multiple PIA and SORN updates. TSA also publishes information
regarding Secure Flight on www.tsa.gov.37 Lastly, covered aircraft operators are required to
provide notice to individuals at the time they make a reservation.
While many of these notices allude to the relationship between CBP and TSA in the prescreening process, CBP is publishing this PIA update Addendum to ATS to give clearer notice
about the types of flights impacted, and specific notice of CBP’s use of the SFPD.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that CBP’s use of Secure Flight data does not align with
previously published notices and regulations regarding the Secure Flight program, and that the
changes will take place without adequate notice and comment from the public.
Mitigation: This use is consistent with TSA authorization for CBP to use the SFPD for
border security, counterterrorism, significant health threat (e.g., pandemic), and national security
purposes.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that passengers aboard U.S. and foreign air carriers that fly
over the United States (i.e., overflights), but never touch down into the United States, such as
flights from Mexico to Canada, and individuals aboard U.S. carriers that fly from one international
point to another international point (i.e., point-to-point flights), such as Berlin to Shanghai, will
not be aware that their information is being shared with CBP and may impact their future travel to
the United States.
Mitigation: This risk is partially mitigated. This PIA provides notice of the sharing of this
data within DHS for the purposes outlined above and consistent with restrictions and safeguarding
of such data that is required by law and DHS policies.

Data Retention by the project
CBP will retain SFPD in ATS and TECS consistent with the records retention schedules
for ATS and TECS, which are consistent with the Secure Flight records retention schedule.
Specifically, ATS will retain: 1) all confirmed watchlist matches for 15 years; 2) all possible but
subsequently cleared watchlist matches for 7 years; 3) rule hits for 7 years; and 4) non-matches for
37

See https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening for additional information.

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7 days to be able to create, modify, and run rules, as well as to conduct additional analysis on the
data. In addition, records created about an individual associated with a confirmed or possible match
to a watchlist or rule hit that require additional analysis in the ATS case management module ATSTF will be retained for 15 (confirmed match) and 7 (possible match and rule hit) years. However,
data that is linked to a border security, national security, significant health risk, or counterterrorism
matter, will be retained in ATS for the life of the matter to support that activity and other similar
activities that may become related.
TSA SFPD Records Retention Schedule
The TSA Secure Flight records schedule retains: 1) confirmed watch list hits for 99 years,
2) possible watch list hits for 7 years, and 3) rules-based hits for 7 years.
TECS Records
CBP may insert records in TECS on individuals who may need additional scrutiny when
entering the United States. If a record is inserted in TECS on such an individual, CBP will retain
SFPD in TECS consistent with the TSA retention schedule (i.e., 7 years – possible watchlist match;
7 years – rule hits; 7 days – no match; and 75 years – watchlist matches, consistent with the TECS
schedule). However, data that is linked to a specific border security, national security, significant
health risk, or counterterrorism matter, will be retained in TECS for the life of the matter to support
that activity and other similar activities that may become related.
Privacy Risk: There is a privacy risk that CBP will retain information beyond the existing,
narrow Secure Flight retention period.
Mitigation: CBP will adhere to the designated retention schedules for SFPD data, which
are consistent with the TSA retention schedules. To ensure compliance with these retention
schedules, CBP Privacy will conduct a CPE within 6 months of the NTC beginning regular ingest
of the SFPD to evaluate these risks and mitigations. The results of the CPE will be shared with the
DHS Privacy Office.

Information Sharing
Dissemination of overflight or international to international SFPD is prohibited except as
required to perform passenger screening operations or border security operations, except that
terrorism and national security information may be shared, as required by law.
Privacy Risk: There is a privacy risk that CBP will share SFPD information outside of
DHS without TSA’s authorization.
Mitigation: TSA and CBP have worked together on processes and procedures to ensure
proper coordination on the sharing of SFPD information outside of DHS. In addition, CBP Privacy
will conduct a CPE within 6 months of the NTC beginning regular ingest of the SFPD to evaluate
these risks and mitigations. The results of the CPE will be shared with the DHS Privacy Office.

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Redress
Redress methods remain unchanged from the original ATS PIA. Most of the information
within ATS is submitted from underlying source datasets. To the extent that a record is exempted
in a source system, the exemption will continue to apply. Because of the law enforcement nature
of ATS, DHS has exempted portions of this system from the notification, access, amendment, and
certain accounting provisions of the Privacy Act. These exemptions also apply to the extent that
information in this system of records is recompiled or is created from information contained in
other systems of records with appropriate exemptions in place.
Privacy Risk: Individuals may not receive the level of redress they desire.
Mitigation: This risk is mitigated, to extent possible consistent with law enforcement and
national security exemptions noted in the applicable SORNs. DHS has a robust redress process to
assist travelers who believe they are subject to improper scrutiny.
A traveler, regardless of his or her citizenship or residence, may obtain access to his or her
PNR. However, records concerning the targeting rules, the responses to rules, case events, law
enforcement and/or intelligence data, reports, and projects developed by CBP analysts that may
include public source information, information obtained through memoranda of understanding or
other arrangements because the information is relevant to the border security mission of the
Department, or records exempted from access by the system from which ATS ingested or accessed
the information will not be accessible to the individual.
Notwithstanding the applicable exemptions, CBP reviews all such requests on a case-bycase basis. If compliance with a request would not interfere with or adversely affect the national
security of the United States or activities related to any investigatory material contained within
this system, the applicable exemption may be waived at the discretion of CBP in accordance with
procedures and points of contact published in the applicable SORN.
If a traveler believes that CBP actions are the result of incorrect or inaccurate information,
then inquiries may be directed to:
CBP INFO Center
OPA—Rosslyn
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20229
Travelers may also contact DHS TRIP, 601 South 12th Street, TSA-901, Arlington, VA
22202 or online at www.dhs.gov/trip. Individuals making inquiries may be asked to provide
additional identifying information to enable DHS to identify the record(s) at issue.

Auditing and Accountability

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There are no changes to the auditing and accountability procedures for ATS as described
in the previously issued ATS PIAs. ATS has ability to track no matches, possible matches, rule
matches, and confirmed matches and will implement purge scripts per the stated retention policy.

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ATS PIA Update Addendum 2:
Updated Populations Subject to ATS Vetting
2.1 CBP Trusted Traveler and Trusted Worker Populations
January 13, 2017 (back to top)
The Global Enrollment System (GES) allows CBP Officers to facilitate enrollment of and
vetting processes for trusted traveler, trusted worker, and registered traveler programs38 in a
centralized environment. It serves as the primary repository for enrollment, application, and
background investigation data and supports over six million enrollees. Enrollment in these
programs enables CBP to expedite the inspection and security process for lower risk travelers and
workers and allows more scrutiny for individuals who present an unknown risk.39
Previously, CBP submitted a list of all GES enrollees on a nightly basis to the FBI and the
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) replied with a response for every enrollee. This
approach:
•
•
•
•

Used a large amount of system resources;
Raised bandwidth issues and delays during normal processing transmissions;
Prevented real-time responses (24-hour delays on occasions); and
Increased the privacy and IT security risks associated with transmission of the data.

The NCIC/Nlets Recurrent Vetting Service (NNVS) within the TECS Platform replaces
nightly trusted traveler vetting. The new process submits an initial batch containing millions of
GES traveler records (with periodic updates for additions/deletions) to the FBI and NCIC responds
in real time with information only pertaining to individuals that have experienced an update in
their records or vetting results. ATS will enable this recurrent vetting process for trusted travelers,
which is already being vetted through the ATS platform during initial submission. This new
process:
•
•
•

Alleviates the need to return the full dataset of trusted traveler records to CBP every
evening;
Provides a real-time response instead of a potential 24-hour delay;
Uses less processing/transmission resources; and

Trusted travelers and registered traveler programs typically require the same or similar types of PII to be
submitted by an individual; the difference between these programs is the level and frequency of vetting conducted
on individuals who apply to participate. For example, trusted traveler programs require recurrent vetting of
individuals for the full duration of the benefit; while registered travelers do not.
39
For a detailed description of trusted traveler and trusted worker programs, please see DHS/CBP/PIA-002 Global
Enrollment System and subsequent updates, available at https://www.dhs.gov/publication/global-enrollmentsystem-ges.

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•

Decreases privacy and IT security risks through reduced dataset transmissions and
exposure.

No new information is collected as part of this recurrent vetting process. This modification
does not alter the PII CBP obtains to perform background checks on trusted travelers or workers
or the privacy posture of TECS.40

Characterization of the Information
Historically, CBP has sent a nightly data extract directly to the FBI/NCIC for the vetting
of trusted traveler and trusted worker populations. In the new process, the same information will
be provided in bulk via TECS to the NNVS for recurrent vetting; only new or updated records will
be resubmitted. These data elements include all biographic elements described in the previously
issued GES PIAs, and photographs and fingerprints collected as part of the applicant interview
process.41
Privacy Risk: There are no new privacy risks regarding characterization of information
related to the recurrent vetting of trusted traveler and trusted worker populations. Recurrent vetting
relies upon the same information and sources as the previous nightly batch process. In addition,
the elimination of nightly transmission of batch data is privacy protective, reducing the amount of
sensitive information in transit thereby reducing the risk of loss or compromise.

For a more detailed description of the GES vetting process, please see DHS/CBP/PIA-002(c) Global Enrollment
System (GES) (November 1, 2016), available at https://www.dhs.gov/publication/global-enrollment-system-ges.
41
As part of the vetting process, CBP also conducts an interview with the applicant and may retain a photograph and
fingerprints of the applicant. Photographs and biometrics of trusted travelers are maintained in the DHS Automated
Biometric Identification System (IDENT). For more information about the system please see DHS/NPPD/PIA-002
Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) (December 7, 2012), available at
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsnppdpia-002-automated-biometric-identification-system.

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However, the previously identified risks in the GES PIA42 remain. There is a risk that
inaccurate data input into GES by either the individual applying for the trusted traveler, registered
traveler, or trusted worker program or by the CBP Officer may result in an erroneous decision to
approve or disapprove enrollment in a particular program.
Mitigation: CBP mitigates this risk by conducting personal interviews of applicants for
trusted traveler and registered traveler, and trusted worker programs. If there are doubts concerning
whether the individual applying for the program is the same individual of record in a law
enforcement database, or if that database record raised accuracy concerns, CBP may use the
personal interview and the application data to verify the information. CBP offers the applicant an
opportunity to reapply and clarify the potential inaccuracy.

Uses of the Information
Enrollment in trusted population programs enables CBP to expedite the inspection and
security process for lower risk travelers and workers and allows more scrutiny for individuals who
present an unknown risk. As described in detail above, the proposed changes to recurrent vetting
both increases operational efficiencies for CBP, and closes the security gaps posed by a potential
24-hour delay of relevant information.
Privacy Risk: There are no new risks regarding use of information posed by recurrent
vetting of trusted populations. Recurrent vetting limits the amount of information shared outside
of CBP for vetting, and decreases the risk of unauthorized access or mishandling.
However, the previously identified risks in the GES PIA remain. There remains a risk that
information used to enroll individuals in a trusted traveler, registered traveler, or trusted worker
program will be used for a purpose inconsistent with the original collection.
Mitigation: This risk is mitigated by the manner in which CBP collects and stores
information for trusted traveler, registered traveler, and trusted worker programs. CBP manages
the various programs in separate environments, which can interface when an applicant applies for
a separate GES-managed program. The data segregation also supports software management for
the various programs. Additionally, all system users are trained to use information strictly for
determining program eligibility. Access to GES is granted to users by a limited number of system
administrators and access level varies based on a need-to-know and the user’s role. Users are also
required to take annual privacy training to ensure that they know and understand the importance
of managing sensitive PII.

Notice
42

See DHS/CBP/PIA-002(c) Global Enrollment System (GES) (November 1, 2016), available at
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/global-enrollment-system-ges.

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CBP is conducting this PIA update to provide notice of changes to CBP’s vetting of trusted
traveler and trusted worker populations. In addition to this PIA update, CBP recently published an
update to the GES PIA to describe (a) the expansion of CBP’s trusted worker program(s) and (b)
the recurrent vetting process.
CBP collection of information for trusted traveler vetting purposes is covered by the Global
Enrollment System SORN.43 CBP collection of information for trusted worker populations is
covered by the Persons Engaged in International Trade in Customs and Border Protection
Licensed/Regulated Activities SORN.44
Privacy Risk: There is a risk to notice that applicants and enrollees may not know how
CBP may use their information submitted to the GES.
Mitigation: CBP mitigates this risk by publishing a series of GES PIAs and the applicable
SORNs, which provide transparency into GES information usage. This PIA also provides notice
on how the information submitted to CBP will be recurrently vetted through the ATS platform.

Data Retention by the project
There are no changes to the retention of data for vetting trusted traveler and trusted worker
populations. Global enrollment data continues to be retained for the duration of the individual’s
active membership (in increments of a 5-year term), plus 3 years after the membership is no longer
active. There are no new privacy risks related to retention.

Information Sharing
There are no changes to information sharing from previously issued GES PIAs related to
trusted traveler and trusted worker vetting.

See DHS/CBP-002 Global Enrollment System, 78 FR 3441 (January 16, 2013), available at
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-01-16/html/2013-00804.htm.
44
See DHS/CBP-010 Persons Engaged in International Trade in Customs and Border Protection Licensed/Regulated
Activities, 75 FR 77753 (December 19, 2008), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2008-1219/html/E8-29799.htm.

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There is no privacy risk to redress for this information. CBP provides applicants who are
denied acceptance into a trusted traveler, trusted worker, or registered traveler program with a
personal letter that provides a clear and concise statement of why it denied the application.
Individuals may also file for redress using the access, correction, and amendment process
described above.

Auditing and Accountability
There are no changes to the auditing and accountability procedures for ATS as described
in the previously issued ATS PIAs.

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2.2 Immigration Benefit Applicants and Petitioners
January 13, 2017 (back to top)
Visa Application Vetting
ATS-P is currently used to vet non-immigrant and immigrant visa applications for the
Department of State (DOS). DOS sends online visa application data to ATS-P for pre-adjudication
investigative screening. ATS-P vets the visa application and provides a response to the DOS
Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) indicating whether or not derogatory information was
identified by DHS about the visa applicant. Applications of individuals for whom derogatory
information is identified are referred for manual review to the appropriate agency conducting the
vetting. If, following manual review, an applicant is determined to be eligible for a visa, an updated
response is sent to CCD. If the manual review does not result in any change to the individual’s
eligibility, an additional processing occurs in the ICE Visa Security Program Tracking System
(VSPTS-Net)45 case management system, after which updated information (including relevant
case notes) regarding eligibility is provided to both CBP and CCD.
Refugee Vetting
Pursuant to various information sharing documents, DHS, DOS, and several vetting
agencies in the law enforcement and intelligence community have developed a process to share
refugee application data in DOS’s Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (WRAPS)
to enable vetting of DOS WRAPS data against each agency’s respective holdings to identify
possible derogatory information related to individuals seeking refugee status. ATS is used as a
vehicle to transmit application data to partner agencies in the law enforcement and intelligence
community. At present, CBP does not retain refugee application data nor does it conduct
independent vetting.

Authorities and Other Requirements
All of the authorities previously identified for ATS remain in effect. ATS derives its
authority primarily from 19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 1461, 1496, 1581, 1582; 8 U.S.C. § 1357; 49 U.S.C. §
44909; the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002 (EBSVRA) (Pub. L. 107173); the Trade Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-210); the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 (IRTPA) (Pub. L. 108-458); and the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act
of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) (Pub. L. 109-347). See also, e.g., 6 U.S.C. §§ 111, 211; 8 U.S.C. §§
45

See DHS/ICE/PIA-011(a) Visa Security Program Tracking System (VSPTS-Net) (January 17, 2013), available at
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsicepia-011-visa-security-program-tracking-system-vspts-net.

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1103, 1182, 1225, 1225a, 1324; 19 U.S.C. §§ 1431, 1433, 1436, 1448, 1459, 1590, 1594, 1623,
1624, 1644, 1644a.
USCIS collects, retains, and shares immigration benefit applicant and petitioner data in
accordance with a variety of SORNs, including: Alien File, Index, and National File Tracking
System of Records;46 Background Check Service;47 Inter-Country Adoptions Security;48 Benefits
Information System;49 Asylum Information and Pre-Screening System of Records;50 and Refugee
Case Processing and Security Screening Information System of Records.51
DOS maintains refugee applicant information in accordance with the Refugee Case
Records SORN.52
All previously identified CBP SORNs remain in effect, or are noted under the “Notice”
section below.

Characterization of the Information
DOS provides the applicant’s information via DOS WRAPS to USCIS through the
Enterprise Service Bus (ESB) and onward for ingestion into the Case and Activity Management
for International Operations (CAMINO).53 USCIS also passes the DOS WRAPS information to
ATS. ATS serves as a technical pass through, providing the information to vetting partners which
may result in a match to derogatory holdings, when it exists. Any information that is returned by
ATS is sent to CAMINO, which is then used by USCIS personnel to compile and provide a final
response to DOS WRAPS. The responses are considered by DOS for determination regarding
issuance of a visa and by USCIS for its determination on whether to grant the benefit.
ATS only retains audit information related to when CBP receives or transmits the refugee
application data. Once the data is sent to the law enforcement and intelligence community, CBP

See DHS/USCIS/ICE/CBP-001 Alien File, Index, and National File Tracking System of Records, 78 FR 69983
(November 22, 2013), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-11-21/html/2013-27895.htm.
47
See DHS/USCIS-002 Background Check Service, 72 FR 31082 (June 5, 2007), available at
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2007-06-05/html/07-2782.htm.
48
See DHS/USCIS-005 Inter-Country Adoptions Security, 81 FR 78614 (November 8, 2016), available at
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DHS-2016-0071-0001.
49
See DHS/USCIS-007 Benefits Information System, 81 FR 72069 (October 19, 2016), available at
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DHS_FRDOC_0001-1511.
50
See DHS/USCIS-010 Asylum Information and Pre-Screening System of Records, 80 FR 74781 (November 30,
2015), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-11-30/html/2015-30270.htm.
51
See DHS/USCIS–017 Refugee Case Processing and Security Screening Information System of Records, 81 FR
72075 (October 19, 2016), available at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DHS_FRDOC_0001-1512.
52
See State-59, Refugee Case Records, (February 6, 2012), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/242608.pdf.
53
CAMINO is a person-centric case management system used to administer, track, and adjudicate applications filed
with or processed by USCIS International Operations (IO) offices under IO jurisdiction with an international nexus.
For a full privacy risk analysis of CAMINO, please see DHS/USCIS/PIA-051 Case and Activity Management for
International Operations (CAMINO) (May 26, 2015), available at https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhs-uscis-pia051-case-and-activity-management-international-operations-camino.

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deletes the refugee application information in ATS except for an audit log, which includes: 1) a
request identification number, 2) the date/time the DOS WRAPS data was received from
CAMINO, and 3) the date/time responses were received and transmitted from the vetting agencies.

Uses of the Information
The upgraded functionality of ATS allows automation of the refugee process supporting
both CBP and USCIS missions of border security and immigration integrity respectively. ATS
facilitates the automated vetting of all refugee information against partner holdings. This
transactional approach to refugee processing provides expedited and more accurate vetting of
refugees, promotes earlier eligibility determinations, and enables recurrent review of refugees.

Notice
CBP is conducting this PIA update to provide notice of the use of ATS in the automation
of refugee and other immigration benefit application processing. There are no new privacy risks
to notice identified with this initiative. CBP already conducts these checks on a manual basis for
USCIS.

Data Retention by the project
CBP is only retaining an audit log of the information sharing. No PII is retained by CBP
in this process.

Information Sharing
The automation of refugee vetting using ATS entails automated sharing of information
between the DOS, CBP, USCIS, and other vetting agencies. As implemented, refugee information
from DOS is matched in an automated manner against vetting partners’ holdings. DOS provides
the applicant’s information to USCIS for ingestion, which is then transmitted to ATS. Vetting
agencies’ responses are returned through ATS, which then routes the information back to the DOS
via USCIS. There is no new privacy risk to information sharing because CBP already conducts
these checks on a manual basis for USCIS.

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For USCIS data specifically, an individual may gain access to his or her USCIS records by
filing a Privacy Act request. If an individual would like to file a Privacy Act request to view his or
her USCIS record, he or she may mail the request to the following address:
National Records Center
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)/Privacy Act Program
P.O. Box 648010
Lee’s Summit, MO 64064-8010
USCIS SORNs, including those specified in this PIA, provide specific information about
what information may be accessed and how. The information requested may be exempt from
disclosure under the Privacy Act because some USCIS systems of record may contain law
enforcement sensitive information, the release of which could possibly compromise ongoing
criminal investigations. Further information about Privacy Act and FOIA requests for USCIS
records is available at http://www.uscis.gov.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that individuals will not have redress from external partner
agencies with which USCIS and CBP share information.
Mitigation: USCIS and CBP have mitigated this risk to the best extent possible. USCIS
sends to and obtains information from external agencies. These external agencies are fully
responsible for any data that they provide to USCIS. They are responsible for maintaining accurate
records obtained from USCIS. The external agencies provide procedures for access and redress in
accordance with FOIA and the Privacy Act.

Auditing and Accountability
There are no changes to the auditing and accountability procedures for ATS as described
in the previously issued ATS PIAs. All ATS auditing, accountability, and access control features
will be applied to the refugee information as well. The Targeting and Analysis Systems Program
Directorate will implement purge scripts to comply with the retention requirements. ATS keeps an
audit trail of information into/out of/deleted from ATS. User roles to limit access to this data will
also be implemented.

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2.3 Retention of Information from Electronic Devices in the Automated
Targeting System
May 28, 2020 (back to top)
On April 28, 2017, CBP originally issued ATS Addendum 2.3 to provide transparency and
assess privacy risks regarding retention of information CBP extracts from electronic devices in the
Automated Targeting System. That addendum described the processes by which CBP conducts
searches of electronic devices consistent with CBP Directive 3340-049 Border Search of
Electronic Devices Containing Information,54 and how CBP uses ATS to further review, analyze,
and assess information CBP extracted from electronic devices associated with individuals who are
of a significant law enforcement, counterterrorism, or other national security concerns.
In addition to information from electronic devices collected pursuant to border search
authority as described in the April 2017 addendum, CBP is reissuing this addendum to clarify that
ATS includes information from electronic devices that may be collected pursuant to law
enforcement authorities other than border search authority. This includes information collected
from electronic devices by CBP pursuant to a court order, abandonment, consent of the
owner/possessor of the device, and information from electronic devices collected by other foreign
and domestic agencies, including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Maintaining
this additional information in ATS will permit ATS users to query the data or match it against
other ATS holdings to identify individuals or cargo that may need additional scrutiny when
crossing the border. Maintaining this information in ATS will also assist CBP’s investigative
partners in furthering their investigations by identifying previously unknown transnational illicit
actors or transnational links to illicit activity. This will, in turn, result in investigative partners
providing additional information regarding transnational illicit activity to CBP to assist with CBP’s
border mission. CBP is republishing Addendum 2.3 to encompass all of the information ATS is
retaining from electronic devices. In addition to this addendum, CBP’s collection of information
from electronic devices is also discussed in detail in other privacy compliance documentation.55
CBP primarily retains information from electronic devices within an ATS Electronic
Information Module. Information uploaded into this module is normalized,56 tagged to the owning
entity and authority used, and flagged as originating from an electronic device. CBP uses this
module to query the information collected from electronic devices. In addition, ATS matches the
information against CBP holdings, which results in a report confirming the process ran and that
54

Directive No. 3340-049 (August 20, 2009) has since been updated to Directive No. 3340-049A (2018), available
at https://www.cbp.gov/document/directives/cbp-directive-no-3340-049a-border-search-electronic-devices.
55
See DHS/CBP/PIA-008(a) CBP Border Searches of Electronic Devices (January 4, 2018), available at
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/privacy and DHS/CBP/PIA-053 USBP Digital Forensics Programs (April 2018),
available at https://www.dhs.gov/topic/privacy.
56
Normalization is the process of organizing data in a database to reduce redundancy and ensure that related items
are stored together.

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could include, depending on whether there was a match, data that may be linked to illicit activity
or actors. The information uploaded into ATS from the electronic device and the report are both
maintained in this module.
The ATS Targeting Framework (ATS-TF) module may also house information from
electronic devices that are added to ATS-TF events on a case-by-case basis if the subject is of
concern to law enforcement. ATS-TF allows users to perform research and analysis by integrating
data from multiple sources, including from electronic devices, and to show possible relationships
between entities and data elements.57
CBP Officers and Agents may search electronic devices in a variety of scenarios, including:

•

Border Search: Consistent with the CBP directive, Border Search of Electronic
Devices, these searches include any inbound or outbound search pursuant to
longstanding border search authority and conducted at the physical border, the
functional equivalent of the border, or the extended border. CBP is authorized to
conduct these searches to enforce immigration, customs, and other laws enforced or
administered by CBP. Border searches of electronic devices may include searches of
the information physically resident on the device58 when it is presented for inspection
or during its detention by CBP for an inbound or outbound border inspection. A CBP
Officer or Agent may detain electronic devices for a brief, reasonable period of time to
perform a thorough border search, subject to various requirements in the CBP directive.

•

Court Order: In certain circumstances outside the context of a border inspection, CBP
may conduct searches of electronic devices pursuant to court orders issued by a judge
or magistrate.

•

Consent-based Search:59 CBP may also search electronic devices pursuant to consent
provided by the owner/possessor of the device. These searches usually are undertaken
when CBP believes that the device may contain information relevant to a law enforced
or administered by CBP. The individual’s consent may provide CBP authority to
conduct the search in the absence of a warrant or other applicable authority, and the
search is limited to the areas for which consent is given. In this scenario, CBP generally
requires written consent from the owner or individual in possession of the device. All
consent must be voluntarily given. To the extent that CBP has encountered individuals
who do not speak English, CBP will follow all applicable policies. In the event that an
individual declines to provide his or her consent, CBP may determine if other legal

For a complete assessment of the rules process and procedures within ATS, see DHS/CBP/PIA-006(b) Automated
Targeting System (ATS) Update (June 1, 2012), available at https://www.dhs.gov/topic/privacy.
58
Information physically resident on the device is available when the device is not connected to the internet or any
network.
59
United States. v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 716-17 (10th Cir. 2007).

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options apply.
•

Abandonment search:60 CBP Officers and Agents regularly encounter abandoned
property, including electronic devices. In some cases, CBP may suspect that the
unclaimed property may be associated with a criminal act, whereas in others, CBP
Officers and Agents may find an abandoned device under unusual circumstances (such
as between POEs in close proximity to the border). CBP may retrieve and search
abandoned devices in such circumstances without any level of suspicion required.

CBP may also obtain information from electronic devices that was collected by foreign and
domestic agencies, including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.61

Privacy Impact Analysis
Authorities and Other Requirements
ATS derives its authority primarily from 19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 1461, 1496, 1581, 1582; 8
U.S.C. § 1357; 49 U.S.C. § 44909; the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002
(EBSVRA) (Pub. L. 107-173); the Trade Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-210); the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) (Pub. L. 108-458); and the Security and
Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) (Pub. L. 109-347).
CBP’s authorities to search and retain information obtained from travelers, including from
electronic devices, derives from various statutes, including the following: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1357,
and other pertinent provisions of the immigration laws and regulations; 19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 507,
1461, 1496, 1581, 1582, 1589a; 1595a, and other pertinent provisions of customs laws and
regulations; 31 U.S.C. § 5317; 22 U.S.C. § 401.
CBP retains copies of information from electronic devices and the report containing the
analytical results in ATS only when it relates to customs, immigration, or other enforcement
matters. Information from electronic devices is stored in ATS consistent with the records retention
schedule of the source system, which is described in more detail under the Data Retention section
below.

Characterization of the Information
CBP conducts searches of electronic devices at the border, both inbound and outbound,
pursuant to border search authority. In addition, CBP may search information from an electronic
60

United States v. Hernandez, 7 F.3d 944, 947 (10th Cir. 1993).
See DHS/ICE/PIA-042 Immigration and Customs Enforcement Forensic Analysis of Electronic Media
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/privacy.
61

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device pursuant to a court order, when the device has been abandoned, or when the
owner/possessor consented to a search of the device. These searches are essential to enforcing the
law at the U.S. border and to protecting border security, including to assist in detecting evidence
relating to terrorism and other national security matters, narcotics, human and bulk cash
smuggling, export, and immigration violations, as well as assisting in determinations of
admissibility under the immigration laws. Searches can be vital to risk assessments that otherwise
may be predicated on limited or no advance information about a given traveler or item, and they
can enhance critical information sharing with, and feedback from, elements of the Federal
Government responsible for analyzing terrorist threat information. CBP only copies or receives
information from electronic devices and retains that information in ATS when it relates to customs,
immigration, or other enforcement matters, for example terrorism or narcotics. CBP uses ATS to
further review, analyze, and assess the information on the electronic devices, or copies thereof,
that CBP collected or received.
ATS will retain information from both logical and physical extractions. A physical
extraction identifies and recovers data across the entire physical drive of a device, without regard
to the file system in which the data may appear. A logical extraction identifies and recovers files
and data from the operating system of the hardware, file systems, and applications residing on the
hardware. ATS may retain information of various types and from various devices, including, but
not limited to: computer-related evidence such as personal data assistants, computers, storage
devices, hard discs, memory cards, digital cameras, cellular phones, and digital video records.
Digital information extracted from electronic devices and saved in ATS may relate both to the
owner of the device, as well as his or her contacts.
Privacy Risk: There are privacy risks associated with the volume and breadth of
information from electronic devices stored in ATS.
Mitigation: This risk is partially mitigated. CBP may use ATS to further review, analyze,
and assess electronic information collected from individuals who may be of law enforcement,
counterterrorism, or other national security concerns, consistent with CBP’s border security
mission. In addition, for searches conducted by CBP under border search authority, CBP follows
all of the reporting, handling, and other requirements in the CBP Directive, Border Search of
Electronic Devices, including the requirements outlined in the section regarding the review and
handling of privileged or other sensitive material. For any collection obtained pursuant to other
authorities or court orders with judicial instructions, CBP will follow the instructions provided for
that collection’s use, handling, and retention. The CBP Directive, Border Search of Electronic
Devices, explicitly provides that officers conducting searches pursuant to border search authority
may not intentionally use the device to access information that is solely stored remotely. If the
search is conducted under other authorities, such as a court order62 or consent, or if information is

The court order would set forth the parameters of the search that CBP would adhere to in executing the search.

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disclosed to CBP by another agency, CBP may access information that may include information
from the cloud, depending on the circumstances.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that information from electronic devices in ATS is inaccurate.
Mitigation: This risk is not mitigated. While ATS contains information that is obtained
directly from an electronic device or the cloud, when permitted, it remains possible that data on
the device may not be accurate. In addition, it is possible that information from electronic devices
collected by other agencies or transferred from one system to ATS may not be accurate. CBP will
use this information to match against CBP holdings and will take action on information obtained
from an electronic device if, based on information available to CBP, the information is assessed to
be accurate and reliable. The information will be used for law enforcement and border security
related purposes, including to facilitate additional lines of inquiries, to corroborate existing
information, and to identify those travelers and cargo that need additional scrutiny.

Uses of the Information
CBP may use ATS to conduct an analytic review of the information collected from
electronic devices, and the resulting report is retained in ATS. In addition, users are able to query
the information in ATS and, as appropriate, include the results in ATS-TF. ATS and ATS-TF may
retain the information obtained from an electronic device and the report and results of a query,
which includes the information that may be linked to illicit activity or illicit actors and the
underlying information relating to immigration, customs, and/or other enforcement matters for the
purposes of ensuring compliance with laws CBP is authorized to enforce and administer and to
further CBP’s border security mission, including identifying individuals and cargo that need
additional scrutiny and other law enforcement, national security, and counterterrorism purposes.
For example, CBP may use ATS to link a common phone number to three separate known or
suspected narcotics smugglers, which may lead CBP to conduct additional research and, based on
all available information, further illuminate a narcotics smuggling operation. Information from the
electronic device may also be used for criminal prosecutions. Access to this information will be
restricted by technical security and user profiles.
Information from the electronic devices will also be available to authorized users in AFI
and Intelligence Reporting System – Next Generation (IRS-NG). CBP will use IRS-NG and AFI
analytical and query capabilities and tools to analyze the information. If CBP determines that
information from the electronic device or analytical results are useful to develop leads, identify
trends associated with illicit activity, or further law enforcement actions, CBP may include the
information in an intelligence product in IRS-NG and/or AFI for dissemination.
Privacy Risk: There are privacy risks associated with use limitation, given the breadth of
information collected from electronic devices, some of which may bear no relevance to any law
enforcement matter. There are additional risks that ATS may use information collected from

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electronic devices to link to individuals who were not subjects of the original collection of the
information.
Mitigation: This risk is partially mitigated. CBP limits the use of ATS for analysis of
information collected from the electronic devices of individuals who may be of law enforcement,
counterterrorism, or other national security concern.
When CBP conducts the search of the electronic device using border search authority, CBP
will retain the information of those who are of law enforcement, counterterrorism, or other national
security concern. In addition, to reduce privacy risks associated with the retention of sensitive
information, for border searches of electronic devices CBP follows all reporting, handling, and
other requirements in the CBP Directive, Border Search of Electronic Devices, including the
requirements outlined in the section on the review and handling of privileged or other sensitive
material.
When CBP conducts the search of the electronic device due to it being abandoned, the
search is typically done due to such factors as the location of the phone or how it was abandoned.
For example, CBP may search an electronic device that was found abandoned in between ports of
entry that either alone or along with other materials found in the area, indicate someone has
illegally crossed the border.
When CBP or other agency conducts the search of the electronic device pursuant to a court
order, CBP will follow any judicial instructions provided related to that collection’s use, handling,
and retention.
Some risk remains, however, that information linked to individuals who are not subjects of
the original collection may be retained.

Notice
CBP provides a variety of forms of notice to individuals related to searches of possessions,
including electronic devices in relation to border search authority. For example, signage posted at
ports of entry indicate that all belongings are subject to search. In addition, when a border search
of information is conducted on an electronic device, and when the fact of conducting this search
can be disclosed to the individual transporting the device without hampering national security, law
enforcement, or other operational considerations, the individual may be notified of the purpose
and authority for these types of searches, how the individual may obtain more information on
reporting concerns about the search, and how the individual may seek redress from the agency if
he or she feels aggrieved by a search.
As much as possible, CBP also provides notice to the individual at the time of search and
detention or seizure for incidents occurring between ports of entry. In cases where CBP requests
the owner’s consent to search the device, CBP provides notice via a signed consent form that

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notifies the individual of his or her right to refuse or revoke consent to search. If the owner
indicates he or she would like his or her device returned, a note is made on the consent form and
the device is returned after the search is completed. A search warrant may also be the source of
notice to an individual regarding the search of his or her electronic devices. With a warrant,
individual consent is not required and there is no option to opt out. In the case of an abandoned
device, CBP may not be able to identify the owner of the device, making consent to the search
impractical.
Despite these various forms of notice, CBP may opt not to provide notice in the event that
alerting the individual of the search may compromise an investigation, due to other operational
considerations, or if doing so raises national security or officer safety concerns. In addition, CBP
does not provide specific notice at time of collection that this information may be retained in ATS.
Accordingly, CBP is conducting this PIA addendum update to provide notice of the use of ATS to
analyze and retain information relating to immigration, customs, and/or other enforcement matters
from electronic devices for the purposes of ensuring compliance with laws CBP is authorized to
enforce.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that individuals whose information is obtained from
electronic devices will not be aware that some of this information may be retained in ATS.
Mitigation: This risk cannot be fully mitigated. However, CBP is publishing this PIA
update to provide specific notice that ATS may analyze and retain information collected from
electronic devices. Because CBP and/or other agencies may not provide specific notice at the time
of collection, however, some risk remains. This is a similar risk posed by other law enforcement
information collections, since the nature of law enforcement activities and operations does not
always enable specific, on-time notice.

Data Retention by the project
Retention of information from electronic devices that is stored in ATS will vary depending
on the authority to collect the information and the source system’s retention policies.
•

Border Search Retention: For information collected under border search authority,
the information will be retained in ATS consistent with the established NARA
schedule, as reflected in the ATS SORN. The retention period for the official
records maintained in ATS will not exceed 15 years, after which time the records
will be deleted.

•

Court Order Retention: For any collection obtained pursuant to court orders with
judicial instructions, such instructions provided to CBP will be followed related to
that collection’s use and retention. If judicial instructions are not provided to CBP,

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the information will be retained consistent with the CBP system’s NARA schedule,
unless the providing agency directs otherwise.
•

Consent and Abandonment Search Retention: For electronic device information
collected by CBP under consent or abandonment, CBP will retain this information
consistent with the source system NARA schedule as reflected in its SORN or the
ATS retention schedule, whichever is shortest. For example, when electronic
device information is collected by Border Patrol under consent or abandonment,
the data is covered by the Border Patrol Enforcement Records SORN.63 However,
since the retention schedule in the Border Patrol Enforcement Records SORN is
longer, CBP will follow the ATS retention schedule for electronic device
information obtained via the Border Patrol Enforcement Records System.

•

Retention of Electronic Information collected by foreign and other domestic
agencies: Information from electronic devices that is received from a foreign or
other domestic agency will be stored in ATS consistent with the ATS records
retention schedule, unless otherwise directed by the owning agency. For example,
the owning agency may provide specific retention requirements in an information
sharing arrangement with DHS/CBP.

In all circumstances, if information in ATS is found to be linked to active law enforcement
lookout records, CBP matches to enforcement activities, and/or investigations or cases (i.e.,
specific and credible threats; flights, individuals, and routes of concern; or other defined sets of
circumstances), the information will remain accessible in ATS for the life of the law enforcement
matter to support that activity and other enforcement activities that may become related.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk CBP will retain in ATS sensitive information obtained from
electronic devices that is unrelated to any law enforcement matter.
Mitigation: This risk is partially mitigated. CBP conducts its activities involving the
border search of electronic devices containing information consistent with the CBP Directive,
Border Search of Electronic Devices. Pursuant to the CBP Directive, without probable cause to
seize an electronic device or copy of information contained therein, CBP may retain only
information relating to immigration, customs, and/or other enforcement matters if such retention
is consistent with the privacy and data protection standards of the system of records in which such
information is retained. CBP may use ATS to further review, analyze, and assess the copy of the
electronic information collected from individuals who are of law enforcement, counterterrorism,
or other national security concerns. CBP may retain the information from the electronic device and
the report containing the analytical results, which are relevant to immigration, customs, and/or

See DHS/CBP-023 Border Patrol Enforcement Records, 81 FR 72601 (October 20, 2016).

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other enforcement matters, in ATS for CBP’s border security mission, including identifying
individuals and cargo needing additional scrutiny.
When CBP conducts the search of the electronic device due to it being abandoned, the
search is typically done due to such factors as the location of the phone or how it was abandoned.
For example, CBP may search an electronic device that was found abandoned in between ports of
entry that either alone or along with other materials found in the area, indicate someone has
illegally crossed the border.
When CBP receives information from its partners, it is typically through an information
sharing arrangement which would set forth the terms and provide for the sharing of information
that is relevant to the CBP mission. CBP may also receive information provided on a case-by-case
basis from its partners and typically the context of the collection is also provided to ensure it relates
to a CBP mission.

Information Sharing
Absent any legal prohibitions, CBP may share information from ATS with other DHS
Component personnel who have an authorized purpose for accessing the information in
performance of their duties, possess the requisite background investigation, and assure adequate
safeguarding and protection of the information. In addition, CBP may share information with
external agencies consistent with the routine uses published in the relevant CBP source system
SORNs. For example, CBP may share information from ATS:
•

To appropriate federal, state, tribal, local, or foreign governmental agencies or multilateral
government organizations responsible for investigating or prosecuting the violations of, or
for enforcing or implementing, a statute, rule, regulation, order, or license, where CBP
believes the information would assist enforcement of applicable civil or criminal laws; and

•

To federal or foreign government intelligence or counterterrorism agencies or components
where DHS becomes aware of an indication of a threat or potential threat to national or
international security, or to assist in anti-terrorism efforts.

DHS has published Policy Directive 045-04 Department Policy Regarding Investigative
Data and Event Deconfliction that strongly encourages DHS law enforcement Components to
integrate, as appropriate, the use of investigative deconfliction for significant DHS law
enforcement operations. CBP deconflicts information from electronic devices, when appropriate
and necessary, with law enforcement partners consistent with this policy in order to identify links
between ongoing criminal investigations, officer safety, and to facilitate greater law enforcement
collaboration.

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Information obtained from other agencies typically requires that agency’s authorization to
share outside of DHS. CBP will follow such requirements that are provided to CBP, for example
requirements in an information sharing agreement.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that CBP will share electronic device information from ATS
with outside agencies who do not have a specific need for that information.
Mitigation: This risk is mitigated. CBP mitigates this risk by following the relevant laws
and current DHS/CBP policies and procedures associated with the sharing of information and
consistent with the routine uses published in the relevant SORN. Any disclosure would comply
with DHS policy and set forth the restrictions on and conditions of use; securing, storing, handling,
and safeguarding requirements; and controls on further dissemination.

Redress
In all the ATS PIA updates, redress methods remain unchanged from the original ATS PIA.
Most of the information within ATS is submitted from underlying source datasets.64 To the extent
that a record is exempted in a source system, the exemption will continue to apply. Because of the
law enforcement nature of ATS, DHS has exempted portions of this system from the notification,
access, amendment, and certain accounting provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974. These
exemptions also apply to the extent that information in this system of records is recompiled or is
created from information contained in other systems of records with appropriate exemptions in
place.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that individuals are not aware of their ability to make record
access requests for records in ATS.
Mitigation: This risk is partially mitigated. Previous ATS PIAs and the ATS SORN
describe how individuals can make access requests under FOIA or the Privacy Act. In accordance
with Executive Order 13768, redress, in the form of seeking access or requesting amendment under
the Privacy Act, is now only available for U.S. Citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents (LPR), and
persons who are the subject of covered records under the Judicial Redress Act (JRA). For nonU.S. citizens, non-LPRs, and persons not covered by the JRA, access remains available through
FOIA. To ensure the accuracy of CBP’s records, CBP may accept requests for amendment,
regardless of citizenship, on a case-by-case basis, consistent with law.
In addition, providing individual access and/or correction of ATS records may be limited
for law enforcement reasons as expressly permitted by the Privacy Act. Permitting access to the
records contained in ATS, regardless of a subject’s citizenship, could inform the subject of an
64

For more information on ATS data sources, see DHS/CBP/PIA-006(b) Automated Targeting System (ATS)
Update (June 1, 2012), available at https://www.dhs.gov/topic/privacy, and DHS/CBP-006 Automated Targeting
System, 77 FR 30297 (May 22, 2012).

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actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation investigation or reveal investigative
interest on the part of DHS or another agency. Access to the records could also permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, or to avoid detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere with
ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and may impose an impossible
administrative burden on investigative agencies.

Auditing and Accountability
There are no changes to the auditing and accountability procedures for ATS as described
in the previously issued ATS PIAs.

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2.4 Continuous Immigration Vetting
Last updated October 3, 2018 (back to top)
Continuous Immigration Vetting
The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Fraud Detection and National
Security Directorate (FDNS) is working with the U.S. Custom and Border Protection (CBP)
National Targeting Center (NTC) and Targeting and Analysis Systems Program Directorate
(TASPD) to enhance and streamline background, identity, and security checks for certain USCIS
benefit types through an interagency effort: continuous immigration vetting (CIV).
CIV conducts checks on individuals connected to a USCIS immigration application benefit
request against CBP holdings. The process begins with an initial security check upon receipt by
USCIS and CBP and continues through the end of the adjudication process. USCIS will use the
information provided by CBP to support the adjudication of immigration benefits; specifically, the
information will assist in identifying individuals, who may have a connection to potential identity
or benefit fraud, national security or public safety concerns, and criminal activity. Trained USCIS
personnel review the information returned by CBP and take appropriate actions in accordance with
current agency-approved guidelines.
While USCIS already conducts background, identity, and security checks on individuals
connected to immigration applications and petitions, CIV enhances the current background check
processes by screening and vetting the information against additional CBP holdings. Moreover,
CIV would establish recurrent checks against these datasets, which would make benefit processing
more efficient.
USCIS is implementing CIV in a phased approach, beginning with automating screening
and vetting of immigration applications and petitions, using existing connections among USCIS
and CBP supporting other projects. Once fully implemented, ATS will check USCIS immigration
application data submitted by USCIS against additional CBP holdings.

Authorities and Other Requirements
All of the authorities previously identified for ATS remain in effect. ATS derives its
authority primarily from 19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 1461, 1496, 1581, and 1582; 8 U.S.C. § 1357; 49
U.S.C. § 44909; the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002 (EBSVRA) (Pub. L.
107-173); the Trade Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-210); the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) (Pub. L. 108-458); and the Security and Accountability for Every
Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) (Pub. L. 109-347). See also 6 U.S.C. §§ 111 and 211; 8 U.S.C.

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§§ 1103, 1182, 1225, 1225a, 1324, and 1357; 19 U.S.C. §§ 1431, 1433, 1436, 1448, 1459, 1590,
1594, 1623, 1624, 1644, and 1644a.
USCIS collects, retains, and shares immigration benefit applicant and petitioner data in
accordance with a variety of SORNs, including: Alien File, Index, and National File Tracking
System of Records;65 Background Check Service;66 Inter-Country Adoptions Security;67 Benefits
Information System;68 and Asylum Information and Pre-Screening System of Records.69 All
previously identified CBP SORNs remain in effect, or are noted under the “Notice” section below.
Characterization of the Information
USCIS and CBP will use ATS to vet applications. The data FDNS sends to CBP will be
derived from the applications. This data is outlined in the FDNS PIA (DHS/USCIS/PIA-013-01
Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate (December 16, 2014), available at
https://www.dhs.gov/privacy).
In addition to form submission information, USCIS will send to CBP information from the
Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM) Automated Biometric Identification System
(IDENT),70 which may include biographic information, biometric identifier information, and
encounter information. ATS is already able to retrieve these data elements through its existing
IDENT interface.
ATS will recurrently vet the information against various CBP holdings, including customs,
immigration, and terrorism-related information. ATS stops recurrent vetting when it receives a
message from USCIS based on administrative closure from an Immigration Judge’s calendar or
from the Board of Immigration Appeal’s docket, certificate of citizenship issue, denial, failure to
pay, or withdrawn adjudication activities. In the initial phase of this project, CBP will be required
to purge the records upon receipt of notification of an approved status unless that information is
linked to active law enforcement lookout records, enforcement activities, or investigations or
cases, in which case that data is maintained by CBP in ATS consistent with the ATS retention
schedule as reflected in the ATS SORN71 (i.e., for the life of the law enforcement matter to support
that activity and other enforcement activities that may become related). USCIS will also explore
expanding these checks to additional benefit types; USCIS and CBP will update compliance
documentation as appropriate to account for any expansion.

DHS/USCIS/ICE/CBP-001 Alien File, Index, and National File Tracking System of Records, 82 FR 43556
(September 18, 2017).
66
DHS/USCIS-002 Background Check Service, 72 FR 31082 (June 5, 2007).
67
DHS/USCIS-005 Inter-Country Adoptions Security, 81 FR 78614 (November 8, 2016).
68
DHS/USCIS-007 Benefits Information System, 81 FR 72069 (October 19, 2016).
69
DHS/USCIS-010 Asylum Information and Pre-Screening System of Records, 80 FR 74781 (November 30, 2015).
70
See DHS/NPPD/PIA-002 Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), available at
https://www.dhs.gov/privacy.
71
DHS/CBP-006 Automated Targeting System, System of Records, 77 FR 30297 (May 22, 2012).

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Privacy Risk: There is a risk of over-collection of information since CBP may use
immigrant application information from USCIS beyond immigration vetting purposes.
Mitigation: This risk is fully mitigated. CBP’s mission is to secure the borders while
facilitating legitimate trade and travel and includes the enforcement of various immigration laws.
CBP’s vetting of applications for immigration benefits is pursuant to its agreement with USCIS
and in support of the broader mission of DHS. Assisting USCIS benefits the CBP mission by
helping identify individuals who need additional scrutiny and ensuring that both agencies have the
relevant information needed to carry out their respective duties. CBP will not retain immigration
application information upon notice from USCIS of administrative closure from an Immigration
Judge’s calendar or from the Board of Immigration Appeal’s docket, certificate of citizenship
issue, denial, failure to pay, or withdrawn adjudication activities, unless that information is linked
to active law enforcement lookout records, enforcement activities, or investigations or cases, in
which case that data is maintained by CBP in ATS consistent with the ATS retention schedule as
reflected in the ATS SORN (i.e., for the life of the law enforcement matter to support that activity
and other enforcement activities that may become related).
Uses of the Information
USCIS FDNS and CBP will use ATS to enhance and streamline continuous security checks
for additional USCIS benefit/request types. ATS will facilitate the automated matching of all
application data against partner holdings. While USCIS already conducts background and security
checks on individuals connected to immigration applications and petitions, CIV would enhance
the current background check processes by matching against additional CBP holdings. Moreover,
CIV would establish continuous matching against these datasets, which would close existing
security gaps and make benefit/request processing more efficient.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that CBP will use information from the applications for
purposes beyond determining an individual’s eligibility.
Mitigation: This risk is mitigated. CBP will not recurrently vet individuals, and it will not
retain their information in ATS, once it receives a message from USCIS based on administrative
closure from an Immigration Judge’s calendar or from the Board of Immigration Appeal’s docket,
certificate of citizenship issue, denial, failure to pay, or withdrawn adjudication activities, unless
that information is linked to active law enforcement lookout records, enforcement activities, or
investigations or cases, in which case that data is maintained by CBP in ATS consistent with the
ATS retention schedule as reflected in the ATS SORN (i.e., for the life of the law enforcement
matter to support that activity and other enforcement activities that may become related).
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that USCIS may store derogatory information in systems that
are not authorized to retain law enforcement information.
Mitigation: This risk is mitigated by the fact that, under this program, information CBP
provides to USCIS is immediately referred to FDNS for investigation, and any subsequent

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derogatory information is retained in the appropriate systems of record authorized to retain
enforcement information.
Notice
CBP is conducting this PIA update to provide notice of the use of ATS in the automation
of immigration benefit application processing. CBP already conducts these checks on a manual
basis for USCIS. In addition, USCIS is updating the FDNS-DS/ATLAS PIA72 to provide
additional notice of this initiative.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that applicants will not know that their information is being
continuously vetted by CBP.
Mitigation: This risk is partially mitigated in that the results under CIV will be filtered
through the existing rules-based referral process outlined in the FDNS-DS/ATLAS PIA. Through
the PIA, USCIS has provided notice that the following events trigger rules-based referrals and
System Generated Notifications (SGNs): 1) when an individual presents him or herself to the
agency (e.g., when USCIS receives an individual’s benefit request form or while capturing an
individual’s 10-fingerprints at an authorized biometric capture site, for those forms that require
fingerprint checks); 2) when derogatory information is associated with the individual in one or
more DHS systems (i.e., ATS); or 3) when FDNS performs an administrative investigation. This
risk is further mitigated in that USCIS is updating Appendix A to the PIA to reflect the automated
connection to ATS so that individuals are aware that ATS is a new source added to the existing
event-based referral process. USCIS’s use of the information remains unchanged from the original
PIA.
Data Retention by the Project
ATS will continually vet the information against various CBP holdings, including customs
immigration, and terrorism-related information until it receives a message from USCIS based on
administrative closure from an Immigration Judge’s calendar or from the Board of Immigration
Appeal’s docket, certificate of citizenship issue, denial, failure to pay, or withdrawn adjudication
activities. CBP will only retain this information if it is linked to active law enforcement lookout
records, enforcement activities, or investigations or cases, in which case that data is maintained by
CBP in ATS consistent with the ATS retention schedule as reflected in the ATS SORN (i.e., for
the life of the law enforcement matter to support that activity and other enforcement activities that
may become related).
Privacy Risk: There is a risk CBP will retain information about individuals after USCIS
has made a benefits determination.

See DHS/USCIS/PIA-013(a) Fraud Detection and National Security Data System (FDNS-DS) (May 18, 2016),
available at https://www.dhs.gov/privacy.

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Mitigation: This risk is mitigated. ATS will delete the information upon receipt of
notification of an approved status unless that information is linked to active law enforcement
lookout records, enforcement activities, or investigations or cases, in which case that data is
maintained by CBP in ATS consistent with the ATS retention schedule as reflected in the ATS
SORN (i.e., for the life of the law enforcement matter to support that activity and other
enforcement activities that may become related).
Information Sharing
CBP is collaborating with USCIS to vet information on individuals seeking immigration
benefits using ATS. Except as mentioned in this PIA or in other privacy compliance
documentation, for external agencies requesting access to USCIS information maintained in ATS,
CBP will either refer the requestor to USCIS or seek USCIS’s authorization to release the
information. Outside of this, there are no changes to information sharing from previously issued
ATS PIAs.
Redress
For all of the various ATS updates, redress methods remain unchanged from the original
ATS PIA. Most of the information within ATS is submitted from underlying source datasets.73 To
the extent that a record is exempted in a source system, the exemption will continue to apply.
Because of the law enforcement nature of ATS, DHS has exempted portions of this system from
the notification, access, amendment, and certain accounting provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974.
These exemptions also apply to the extent that information in this system of records is recompiled
or is created from information contained in other systems of records with appropriate exemptions
in place.
For USCIS data specifically, an individual may gain access to his or her USCIS records by
filing a Privacy Act or Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. If an individual would like to
file a Privacy Act request to view his or her USCIS record, he or she may mail the request to the
following address:
National Records Center
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)/Privacy Act Program
P. O. Box 648010
Lee’s Summit, MO 64064-8010
USCIS Systems of Record Notices, including those specified in this PIA, provide specific
information about what information may be accessed and how.74 The information requested may
be exempt from disclosure under the Privacy Act because some USCIS systems of record may
contain investigatory materials compiled for law enforcement purposes, the release of which could
73

DHS/CBP-006 Automated Targeting System, 77 FR 30297 (May 22, 2012).
DHS/USCIS-017 Refugee Case Processing and Security Screening Information System of Records, 81 FR 72075
(October 19, 2016).
74

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possibly compromise ongoing criminal investigations.75 Further information about Privacy Act
and FOIA requests for USCIS records is available at http://www.uscis.gov.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that individuals will not have redress from external partner
agencies with which USCIS and CBP share information.
Mitigation: USCIS and CBP have mitigated this risk to the fullest extent possible. USCIS
sends to and obtains information from external agencies as described in the FDNS Fraud Detection
and National Security Data System PIA. These external agencies are fully responsible for any data
that they provide to USCIS. They are responsible for maintaining accurate records obtained from
USCIS. The external agencies provide procedures for access and redress in accordance with FOIA
and Privacy Act.
Auditing and Accountability
ATS auditing capabilities include: automated purge scripts to expunge records that have
reached their retention limits; audit trails of information that has been entered into, sent from, and
deleted from the system; and user roles that limit access to ATS data. These auditing tools will
apply to all USCIS data sets in ATS and will facilitate compliance with the retention and access
limitations described in this PIA.

DHS/USCIS-006 Fraud Detection and National Security Records (FDNS) System of Records Notice, 77 FR
47411 (August 8, 2012).

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2.5

FinCEN Bank Secrecy Act Data

Last updated October 3, 2018 (back to top)

Overview
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the U.S. Department of Treasury, Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) regularly exchange information in support of both
agencies’ missions. To further enhance those missions, CBP now ingests Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)
data from FinCEN into the Automated Targeting System (ATS). CBP is publishing this Privacy
Impact Assessment (PIA) appendix in accordance with the ATS System of Records Notice
(SORN), which requires a PIA update to document the ingestion of new data into ATS.
CBP Use of FinCEN Data
FinCEN’s mission is to safeguard the financial system from illicit use and combat money
laundering and promote national security through the collection, analysis, and dissemination of
financial intelligence and strategic use of financial authorities. The CBP mission includes the
border enforcement of the customs, immigration, and agriculture laws of the United States and the
enforcement of hundreds of laws on behalf of numerous federal agencies. FinCEN and CBP have
long exchanged data to enhance the missions of both agencies, including enabling CBP to facilitate
the investigation of financial crimes with a nexus to the border. While CBP already maintains
Currency and Monetary Instrument Reports (CMIRs), CBP began ingesting a broader subset of
BSA data into ATS in 2017. BSA data will be available to authorized users via ATS and in the
Analytical Framework for Intelligence (AFI).76 CBP may insert BSA data from ATS into TECS77
on a case by case basis.
CBP uses BSA data for traveler, cargo, and conveyance analysis and risk assessments in
order to identify individuals or entities needing additional scrutiny, including when there is a
potential nexus to illicit financing and terrorism related activities. CBP uses BSA data in ATS in
order to: (1) make connections among data in CBP holdings related to border security; (2) identify
entities, or persons who may need additional scrutiny due to a possible nexus between money,
drugs, weapons, and terrorism-related activities; and (3) enhance information available to CBP on
known subjects of interest. CBP may also use FinCEN BSA data in support of the ATS risk
assessment processes significantly enhancing CBP’s advance targeting capabilities.
For example, CBP may use FinCEN data in various algorithms to resolve entities, detect
anomalies, or predict patterns based on historical data. In addition, accessing FinCEN data allows
authorized ATS users to search data against CBP holdings in ATS or AFI, providing a more
comprehensive overview of the person or entity for additional research, analysis, targeting, and/or
examination when attempting to cross the border. CBP refreshes the FinCEN data on a daily basis
76
77

See DHS/CBP/PIA-010 Analytical Framework for Intelligence, available at www.dhs.gov/privacy.
See DHS/CBP/PIA-TECS System: Primary and Secondary Processing, available at www.dhs.gov/privacy.

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and tags the source data appropriately within ATS and AFI for auditing purposes.
Restrictions
The following restrictions apply to BSA data from FinCEN ingested into ATS:
•

The FinCEN data stored in ATS and access to the data will be maintained in accordance
with existing authorization and access control mechanisms in ATS.

•

Only authorized users who have been approved by supervisors as having a need to know
such information will be allowed to access the FinCEN data. Such access will primarily be
for those individuals performing intelligence, analytics, risk assessment, and enforcement
functions.

•

All requests made to access FinCEN data will be logged, consistent with the existing audit
mechanisms available in ATS.

•

CBP is required to obtain FinCEN approval before transferring any BSA information from
FinCEN to any other information systems.

•

Authorized CBP users may only use BSA information from FinCEN on behalf of CBP,
consistent with CBP’s legal authority, and solely for the purposes of identification,
investigation, or prosecution of possible or actual violations of criminal law that fall within
the authority of CBP, including related proceedings such as criminal or civil forfeiture
proceedings. This includes using BSA information in conjunction with other data sets for
traveler, cargo, and conveyance analysis and risk assessments to identify individuals or
entities needing additional scrutiny, including when there is a potential nexus to illicit
financing and terrorism related activities.

79 F.R. 20974 (April 14, 2014)

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reports (SARs) in accordance with the Treasury/FinCEN .002 - Suspicious Activity Report System
SORN.79
For information of law enforcement interest to CBP, CBP SORN coverage is provided by:
•

DHS/CBP-006 Automated Targeting System, which allows ATS to ingest data obtained
through memoranda of understanding or other arrangements because the information is
relevant to the border security mission of the Department;80

•

DHS/CBP-017 Analytical Framework for Intelligence, which allows for AFI ingest of data
from the Automated Targeting System (ATS) and other source systems;81

•

DHS/CBP-011 TECS, which covers the retention of records related to violators or
suspected violators of laws enforced or administered by DHS, and information from federal
sources pertaining to known or suspected violators;82 and

•

DHS/CBP-024 Intelligence Records System (CIRS), which contains information collected
by CBP to support CBP’s law enforcement intelligence mission.83

Characterization of the Information
ATS may ingest any other information identified by FinCEN and provided pursuant to its
authority under 31 U.S.C. § 310.
CBP already maintains Currency and Monetary Instrument Report (CMIR) data in TECS
and copies of key elements of TECS data, including CMIR data, are maintained in ATS.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk of overcollection due to the volume of personally identifiable
data maintained in FinCEN BSA reports.
Mitigation: This risk is partially mitigated. The BSA requires depository institutions and
other industries vulnerable to money laundering to take a number of precautions against financial
crime. This includes filing and reporting certain data about financial transactions possibly
indicative of money laundering, including cash transactions over $10,000 and suspicious
transactions. While the mere filing of these reports has significant value in deterring money
laundering, for these reports to be of value in detecting money laundering and other crimes,
including those related to terrorism, they must be accessible to law enforcement, counter-terrorism
agencies, financial regulators, and the intelligence community. CBP has authority to receive BSA
data for purposes of assisting FinCEN and to enhance CBP’s border security mission. While CBP

79 F.R. 20972 (April 14, 2014)
DHS/CBP-006 Automated Targeting System (May 22, 2012) 77 F.R. 30297.
81
DHS/CBP-017 Analytical Framework for Intelligence System (June 7, 2012) 77 F.R. 13813.
82
DHS/CBP-011 U.S. Customs and Border Protection TECS (December 19, 2008) 73 F.R. 77778.
83
DHS/CBP-024 Intelligence Records System (CIRS) System of Records (September 21, 2017) 82 F.R. 44198.
80

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may collect information through BSA reports that does not become part of an investigation or law
enforcement activity, CBP attempts to reduce the impacts of this collection by ensuring the data is
deleted consistent with ATS retention schedules.
Uses of the Information
CBP uses the BSA data contained in or accessed by ATS in order to: (1) make connections
among data in CBP holdings related to border security; (2) identify entities, or persons who may
need additional scrutiny due to a possible nexus between money, drugs, weapons, and terrorism
related activities; and (3) to enhance information available to CBP on known subjects of interest.
The ingestion of FinCEN BSA data for use with ATS risk assessment processes, significantly
enhancing CBP’s advance targeting capabilities.
For example, CBP uses FinCEN BSA data in various algorithms to resolve entities and
detect anomalies or predict patterns based on historical data. In addition, FinCEN BSA data allows
authorized ATS users to search data against CBP holdings in ATS, providing a more
comprehensive overview of the person or entity for additional research, analysis, targeting, and/or
examination when attempting to cross the border.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that CBP will use BSA data for purposes other than those
described in this PIA.
Mitigation: Only authorized users who have been approved by supervisors as having a
need to know such information will be allowed to access the BSA data. Such access will primarily
be for those individuals performing intelligence, analytics, risk assessment, and enforcement
functions. In addition, there is training that will be required for authorized users who access BSA
data.
Notice
CBP provides notice to the public of the ingestion of FinCEN BSA data through this PIA.
In addition, the FinCEN BSA SORN provides notice of FinCEN’s sharing of BSA data with other
federal agencies for law enforcement purposes.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that individuals will be unaware that FinCEN is sharing their
data with CBP.
Mitigation: This risk is partially mitigated. CBP provides notice to the public of the
ingestion of FinCEN BSA data through this PIA. In addition, the FinCEN BSA SORN provides
notice of FinCEN’s sharing of BSA data with other federal agencies for law enforcement purposes.
However, CBP and FinCEN cannot provide specific notice to individuals that their information is
exchanged pursuant to these processes, since this notice may be acknowledgement of, and may
interfere with, a criminal investigation.

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Data Retention by the project
BSA data will be retained in ATS, AFI, and TECS in accordance with the retention
schedules as reflected in the applicable SORNs:
ATS: CBP maintains records in ATS consistent with the retention schedule of the relevant
source system, or for no later than fifteen years, unless the record is linked to an active law
enforcement lookout record, CBP matches to enforcement activities, or investigations, in which
case it will remain accessible for the life of the law enforcement matter in support of that activity
and other related enforcement activities.
AFI: Data that has not been incorporated into a finished intelligence product, response to a
request for information, or project will follow the source system retention schedule. Projects
containing PII may be retained for 30 years and responses to requests for information (RFIs) are
retained for 10 years. Finished intelligence products may be retained permanently and transferred
to NARA after 20 years.
TECS: CBP retains records in TECS for 75 years or for the life of the law enforcement
matter to support that activity and other enforcement activities that may become related.
CBP Intelligence Records System (CIRS): To the extent that CBP accesses and
incorporates information from other DHS systems of records as sources of information for finished
intelligence products, CBP will abide by the safeguards, retention schedules, and dissemination
requirements of the underlying source systems of record. CBP retains information consistent with
DHS records schedule N1-563-07-016.84
Privacy Risk: There are risks associated with the fact that CBP will retain BSA data for
different periods of time, depending upon the system into which BSA data is incorporated.
Mitigation: This risk is mitigated. BSA data that does not become associated with another
law enforcement or intelligence activity will be retained in ATS for no longer than 15 years, after
which point it will be deleted. BSA data from ATS will only be associated with a record in AFI or
TECS if it becomes linked to a law enforcement activity, investigation, or intelligence report, in
which case the longer retention is appropriate and consistent with the receiving system’s purpose
and use.
Information Sharing
(FOUO/LES) Pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between CBP and FinCEN,
CBP may not disseminate BSA information to any person outside CBP, except consistent with the
provisions of the FinCEN re-dissemination guidelines which sets forth conditions, restrictions, and
reporting requirements for BSA Information. This restriction also applies to case-related
information, and to statistical or other information, referencing or revealing BSA information.
84

DHS/CBP-024 Intelligence Records System (CIRS) System of Records (September 21, 2017) 82 F.R. 44198.

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FinCEN may request from CBP reports containing a variety of information, including information
related to any dissemination of BSA information.
Redress
FinCEN maintains control of all BSA records in CBP’s custody for the purposes of (i) the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552; (ii) the Privacy Act, 5 USC § 552a; and (iii)
any other laws, regulations and policies applicable to the sources, use, disclosure, or dissemination
of BSA information in the custody of CBP. CBP must notify FinCEN’s Office of Chief Counsel
in the event it is served with a subpoena or other request for BSA information as soon as practicable
before responding.
For all of the various ATS updates, redress methods remain unchanged from the original
ATS PIA. Most of the information within ATS is submitted from underlying source datasets.85 To
the extent that a record is exempted in a source system, the exemption will continue to apply.
Because of the law enforcement nature of ATS, DHS has exempted portions of this system from
the notification, access, amendment, and certain accounting provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974.
These exemptions also apply to the extent that information in this system of records is recompiled
or is created from information contained in other systems of records with appropriate exemptions
in place.
Auditing and Accountability
FinCEN intends to train CBP personnel who are authorized to access BSA information
on the appropriate handling and safeguarding of BSA data. All CBP personnel accessing BSA
information are required to have undergone a satisfactory background investigation and are not
eligible to access BSA information until they have completed the required training. CBP intends
to notify FinCEN when it revokes an employee’s access to BSA data, and will notify FinCEN if
it discovers any unauthorized use of or access to the information. CBP will maintain an audit
trail of the user, time, and nature of each query of BSA data; CBP may make this audit trail
available to FinCEN upon request. FinCEN may also conduct onsite or electronic inspections of
CBP’s retrieval of BSA information ingested into ATS or accessed via AFI. CBP will refresh the
FinCEN data on a daily basis and will tag the source data appropriately within ATS and AFI for
auditing purposes. FinCEN may determine that CBP personnel must enter into individual user
agreements acknowledging the terms and conditions under which they can obtain access to BSA
information from FinCEN.

DHS/CBP-006 Automated Targeting System, 77 Fed. Reg. 30297 (May 22, 2012).

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2.6 U.S. Visa Validation Initiative
Last updated December 17, 2018 (back to top)

Overview
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the U.S. Department of State (DOS) are
working with participating foreign countries to develop a process to use information available
through the Automated Targeting System (ATS) to validate U.S. visas presented by third country
nationals seeking entry into that foreign country. Several foreign countries exempt certain
nationals who seek to enter that foreign country from their standard requirement to obtain a visa
from the foreign government if the individual presents a valid and unexpired U.S. visa. As such,
the U.S. Government has an agreement and/or arrangement in place with each participating foreign
country and developed a process to affirm whether a U.S. visa presented for entry into the foreign
country is valid. Specifically, the relevant border security agency of a participating foreign country
intends to collect information using the machine readable zone (MRZ) of the U.S. visa presented
by a third country national for purposes of applying for admission to the foreign country. The
foreign agency will transmit the U.S. visa information to ATS to compare the data provided by the
foreign agency against visa information accessed through ATS and provide an automated response
to the foreign agency to affirm whether the visa presented is consistent with what is on record. The
foreign agency retains responsibility for making all decisions regarding the traveler’s admissibility
for entry into the foreign country.
CBP seeks to enhance foreign countries’ abilities to readily identify individuals who seek
to circumvent visa requirements; facilitate the processing of legitimate international travelers;
obtain valuable information on the potential attempted use of expired or otherwise invalid U.S.
visas; and obtain and provide information that may assist in efforts to protect both countries’
borders. This information may also assist the foreign agency and CBP in identifying possible illicit
activities including smuggling operations and schemes involving fraudulent documents.
As part of the visa validation program, participating countries will permit CBP to retain
the U.S. visa information received from the foreign country, date, port name/port ID, the automated
response, and certain information regarding the reason a visa may be invalid. CBP will retain this
information consistent with the established National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA) schedule, as reflected in the ATS System of Records Notice (SORN). The retention
period for the official records maintained in ATS is not to exceed 15 years, after which time the
records are to be deleted. However, if the information maintained in ATS becomes “linked to
active law enforcement lookout records, CBP matches to enforcement activities, and/or
investigations or cases (i.e., specific and credible threats; flights, individuals, and routes of
concern; or other defined sets of circumstances),” it is to remain accessible for the life of the law
enforcement matter, or 15 years, whichever is longer, to support that activity and other enforcement
activities that may become related.

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Privacy Impact Analysis
In each of the below sections consider how the system has changed and what impact it has
on the below fair information principles. In some cases there may be no changes and indicate as
such.
Authorities and Other Requirements
ATS derives its authority from a variety of laws, such as 19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 1461, 1496,
1581, and 1582; 8 U.S.C. § 1357; 49 U.S.C. § 44909; the Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Reform Act of 2002 (EBSVRA) (Pub. L. 107-173); the Trade Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-210); the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) (Pub. L. 108-458); and the
Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) (Pub. L. 109-347).
In addition, this initiative is consistent with 6 U.S.C. § 211, 8 U.S.C. § 1202, and 19 U.S.C.
§ 1628.
The exchange of information under these initiatives is governed by various information
sharing agreements in place between the United States Government (CBP and DOS) and the
participating foreign country.
CBP retains information in ATS in accordance with the NARA-approved retention
schedule as reflected in the ATS SORN.86
Characterization of the Information
Border security agencies of participating foreign countries will scan the MRZ of a U.S.
visa presented by a traveler seeking entry and send the information to ATS for a validation
response. The MRZ of the visa includes the following data elements:
•

Name;

•

Date of birth;

•

Visa number;

•

Visa class;

•

Passport number;

•

Passport issuing country; and

•

Gender

CBP will use ATS to compare the data provided by the foreign country against visa
information accessed through ATS (through the DOS’s Consolidated Consular Database (CCD))
and provide an automated response to the relevant foreign agency indicating whether the visa data
86

See DHS/CBP-006 Automated Targeting System, 77 FR 30297 (May 22, 2012).

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provided is consistent with information in CCD and if not, certain information regarding the reason
a visa may be invalid may also be provided.
ATS will retain records associated with each query containing the data elements submitted
by the foreign agency as well as the automated response and certain information regarding the
reason a visa may be invalid.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that CBP may share more information with participating
foreign countries than is required for the purposes of visa validation.
Mitigation: This risk is partially mitigated. Under this initiative, CBP is sharing an
automated response from ATS specific to the status of the presented U.S. visa, which may include
certain information regarding the reason a visa may be invalid and not sharing any other
information through the automated process. However, as permitted by applicable law, policy, and
with the authorization of the owning agency, CBP may elect to share additional information on a
case-by-case basis (for example, if CBP believes the person is of significant law enforcement
concern). As a practice, CBP makes note of such sharing in the administrative record associated
with the exchange and response maintained in ATS.
Uses of the Information
CBP intends to use the ATS system to compare the data provided by the participating
foreign country against visa information accessed through ATS and provide an automated response
whether the visa is valid or not. CBP and participating foreign countries use this information to
facilitate the flow of legitimate travel while also improving the border security of both countries.
The initiative assists CBP’s law enforcement mission by preventing the flow of third country
nationals who seek to illicitly travel to the United States via foreign countries using fraudulent
U.S. documents. In addition, information may also assist the foreign countries and CBP in
identifying possible illicit activities including smuggling operations and schemes involving
fraudulent feeder documents.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that U.S. visa data to facilitate the individual’s entry into the
foreign country is beyond the scope and purpose of the original collection.
Mitigation: This risk is partially mitigated. The issuance of a U.S. visa is for travel to the
United States and not to any third countries. While admissibility into foreign countries is outside
the original scope of the U.S. visa issuance process, foreign countries may permit U.S. visa holders
to use the U.S. visa for entry into their own country. This determination is based on the individual
foreign country’s legal framework and migration laws, and the ultimate admissibility decision is
solely up to the foreign country. If a foreign country opts to recognize a U.S. visa as an acceptable
travel document for third country nationals, the U.S. Government may enter into an agreement to
conduct visa validation. There is no requirement for travelers to obtain a U.S. visa solely to visit
foreign countries, therefore all travelers may continue to apply for a visa to enter that foreign
country.

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Privacy Risk: There is a risk that the participating foreign country is making an
admissibility decision solely based on CBP’s response.
Mitigation: This risk is partially mitigated. CBP only provides information about the
validity of the U.S. visa. CBP is not providing a determination of admissibility or inadmissibility.
The foreign country’s migration agency makes the final determination.
Notice
The foreign country provides information to the public regarding the ability of a valid U.S.
visa to serve as an exemption to the requirement for obtaining a visa from the foreign country. In
addition, CBP is issuing this Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) to the public to provide additional
information about the visa validation initiative.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that individuals who provide their U.S. visa to a foreign
country have no notice their information is being shared with the United States.
Mitigation: This risk is partially mitigated. CBP is issuing this PIA to provide notice to
third country nationals, and the foreign countries may provide information to the public about
potentially using a U.S. visa to enter the foreign country.
Data Retention by the Project
As noted above, CBP intends to retain the U.S. visa information received from the foreign
agency country, date, port name/port ID, as well as a record of the ATS automated response and
certain information regarding the reason a visa may be invalid, for 15 years. However, if the record
is linked to active law enforcement lookout records, CBP matches to enforcement activities, or
investigations or cases, then the record is retained for the life of the law enforcement matter to
support that activity and other enforcement activities that may become related, or 15 years,
whichever is longer. There are no other changes to the data retention procedures for ATS as
described in the previously issued ATS PIAs.
Information Sharing
In general, information in ATS obtained from the foreign agencies may be used or
disclosed for purposes of the initiative, including assisting in the effective administration and
enforcement of immigration laws and furthering the prevention, detection, or investigation of acts
that would constitute a crime. Otherwise, use or disclosure of information provided by any of the
foreign agencies is subject to the prior written approval of that foreign agency.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that the foreign agency will inappropriately share visa data
provided by CBP.
Mitigation: This risk is mitigated because CBP through ATS is only sharing non-sensitive
automated responses that may include certain information regarding the reason a visa may be
invalid. As part of the automated process, CBP/ATS is not sharing any other specific details related

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to the traveler, the traveler’s immigration status, his or her border crossing history, or any law
enforcement information. However, as permitted by applicable law, policy, and with the
authorization of the owning agency, CBP may elect to share additional information on a case-bycase basis.
Redress
For all of the various ATS updates, redress methods remain unchanged from the original
ATS PIA. Most of the information within ATS is submitted from underlying source datasets.87 To
the extent that a record is exempted in a source system, the exemption will continue to apply. Due
to the law enforcement nature of ATS, DHS has exempted portions of this system from the
notification, access, amendment, and certain accounting provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974.
These exemptions also apply to the extent that information in this system of records is recompiled
or is created from information contained in other systems of records with appropriate exemptions
in place.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that an individual may be denied entry to a foreign country
based on information provided by CBP, but will not know to request redress from CBP.
Mitigation: This risk is not mitigated. Individuals are not informed whether the foreign
agency’s decision regarding admissibility of an individual into its country is based on information
provided under this initiative. In addition, foreign countries may decide not to notify the public
about this initiative, so an individual may not know to come to CBP for a redress request. However,
although the individual may never know to approach CBP for redress, he or she will likely know
to reach out to the DOS if the traveler has reason to believe there was an issue with his or her U.S.
visa. Any inaccurate information would be corrected by DOS and later updated in ATS, which
continuously ingests U.S. visa data.
Auditing and Accountability
The U.S. Government has an agreement and/or arrangement in place with each foreign
country participating in this initiative that requires the secure handling and protection of the
information, the correction of inaccurate information, and that the information is held in
confidence and only used for appropriate purposes. As noted above and under the
agreement/arrangement, CBP via ATS is only sharing non-sensitive automated responses that may
include certain information regarding the reason a visa may be invalid but is not sharing any other
specific details related to the traveler, the traveler’s immigration status, his or her border crossing
history, or any law enforcement information.

See DHS/CBP-006 Automated Targeting System, 77 FR 30297 (May 22, 2012).

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2.7 Commercial License Plate Reader Information
Last updated July 24, 2019 (back to top)
CBP plans to use the Automated Targeting System (ATS) to access commercially
available License Plate Reader (LPR) information from a vendor service in order to provide CBP
law enforcement personnel with a broader ability to search license plates of interest nationwide.
Because license plate readers constitute privacy sensitive technology and LPR information can
be combined with other data to identify individuals, CBP is conducting this Privacy Impact
Assessment (PIA) addendum to describe how it intends to use the commercial LPR service and
explain the measures that will be in place to mitigate concerns regarding the potential impact on
the privacy of the public as a result of the use of information obtained from LPR technology.
A number of commercial services collect and aggregate LPR data from both private and
public sources and make it available on a fee-for-service basis. Typically, LPR vendors collect
license plate image information from private businesses (e.g., parking garages), local
governments (e.g., toll booth cameras), law enforcement agencies, and financial institutions via
their contracted repossession companies. The LPR commercial aggregator services store, index,
and sell access to the images and time and location of collection.
CBP has identified a number of benefits from the use of commercially aggregated LPR
data for its law enforcement and border security mission. The data can: 1) identify individuals
and vehicles that may need additional scrutiny when attempting to cross the border; 2) enhance
both officer and public safety by enabling enforcement actions to occur in locations that minimize
the inherent dangers associated with border enforcement encounters; and 3) help resolve matters
that might otherwise be closed for lack of viable leads.
In support of these missions, CBP has acquired access to LPR data via an Application
Programing Interface (API) to query data aggregated and made available to CBP users by a
commercial LPR vendor. CBP accesses the commercial LPR database through the contract
provider providing on-demand federated queries through ATS. ATS will not ingest the data;
instead, similar to the other existing commercial data interfaces (such as LexisNexis), CBP will
create a web service through which authorized ATS users may create vehicle displays that present
vehicles of possible interest, query historical LPR data, and use advanced analytics for enhanced
review and analysis.
Results of queries via the API are stored in ATS, as well as other CBP systems, such as
TECS, Intelligence Reporting System Next Generation (IRS-NG), and Analytical Framework
for Intelligence (AFI), if the information is determined to be useful in connection with a legitimate
law enforcement or border security mission. This retention will be consistent with the National
88

LPR data may identify individuals that need additional scrutiny at the border, in which case the LPR information
will be used in TECS to create a lookout record.

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Archives and Records Administration (NARA) retention schedule as specified in the relevant
System of Records Notice89 (SORN).
Location-based commercially aggregated data creates a number of privacy risks. CBP has
taken steps to mitigate these concerns by ensuring that access to this sensitive information is
strictly limited and auditable, and by ensuring that all uses of commercially available LPR
information are consistent with CBP law enforcement and border security authorities. CBP has
limited access to the commercial LPR information through a newly created role within ATS that
requires a multi-level approval process. CBP will routinely audit queries of the commercial service
to ensure queries are only associated with ongoing enforcement or border security activities. CBP
users will utilize LPR data as a tool to further heightened suspicion and generate leads predicated
on a relevant CBP mission.
CBP users are permitted to query commercially available LPR information to identify
locations and movements of already identified subjects and associates believed to be involved in
illegal activity in connection with CBP’s law enforcement or border security mission. CBP may
also use this data to track vehicles suspected of carrying contraband, such as smuggled goods.
Users may also use LPR information in conjunction with other law enforcement and/or targeting
information to develop leads to further the enforcement matter, including identifying associates of
possible concern and eliminating other individuals from further consideration. In addition, CBP
may use this information to identify individuals or vehicles which may need additional scrutiny
when crossing the border.

Authorities and Other Requirements
CBP authority to search and maintain commercially available LPR information includes,
but is not limited to, 19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 1461, 1496, 1581, 1582; 8 U.S.C. § 1357; 49 U.S.C. §
44909; the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002 (EBSVRA) (Pub. L. 107173); the Trade Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-210); the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 (IRTPA) (Pub. L. 108-458); and the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act
of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) (Pub. L. 109-347).

See DHS/CBP-006 Automated Targeting System, 77 FR 30297 (May 22, 2012); DHS/CBP-011 U.S. Customs
and Border Protection TECS, 73 FR 77778 (December 19, 2008); DHS/CBP-017 Analytical Framework for
Intelligence, FR 13813 (June 7, 2012).

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CBP maintains LPR information in support of its of law enforcement and border security
mission under the DHS/CBP-006 Automated Targeting System SORN.90 As reflected in the
SORN, commercial data aggregators are a record source category and used for the purpose of law
enforcement and/or research information regarding an individual.
LPR records in support of CBP’s law enforcement and border security mission to record
information on individuals to whom CBP has issued detentions and warnings are covered under
the DHS/CBP-011 TECS SORN.91
LPR records collected by CBP to support CBP’s law enforcement and border security
mission are covered under the System of Records Notice, DHS/CBP-024 CBP Intelligence
Records System.92 This SORN notified the public that data is obtained from commercial data
providers, among other sources, in the course of intelligence research, analysis, and reporting.

Characterization of the Information
An LPR is a system consisting of one or more high-speed cameras and related equipment,
mounted on vehicles or in fixed locations that automatically and without direct human control
locate, focus on and photograph license plates and vehicles that come into range of the device.
The system then automatically converts the digital photographic images of license plates and
associated data into a computer-readable format. This computer-readable format (also known as
“a read”) contains some or all of the following information: (1) license plate number; (2) digital
image of the license plate as well as the vehicle’s make and model; (3) state of registration; (4)
camera identification (i.e., camera owner and type); (5) Global Positioning System (GPS)
coordinates or other location information taken at the time the information was captured; and (6)
date and time of observation. Some LPR systems also capture (within the image) the environment
surrounding a vehicle, which may include drivers and passengers. The system seeks to collect
information from all vehicles that pass the camera. There is no biographic information about a
vehicle owner contained in a license plate capture. However, using data from the commercial
LPR database, CBP may conduct additional research and link the license plate data to the VIN
and the registered vehicle’s information, which may then be linked to suspected vehicles in ATS
and/or TECS.
The commercial provider collects LPR data from private and public contributors
including law enforcement agencies, local governments, and financial institutions via their
contracted repossession companies. CBP will only use LPR data to identify locations and
movements of targets and associates believed to be involved in illegal activity in connection with
law enforcement or border security mission. For example, LPR data is particularly useful in
90

See DHS/CBP-006 Automated Targeting System, 77 FR 30297 (May 22, 2012).
See DHS/CBP-011 TECS, 73 FR 7778 (December 19, 2008).
92
See DHS/CBP-024 CBP Intelligence Records System, 82 FR 44198 (September 21, 2017).
91

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enforcement matters in which CBP is attempting to identify or locate members of criminal
organizations abetting the movement of terrorists, weapons, narcotics, or smuggled aliens. It is
also useful in the detection and identification of tactics, trends, and patterns used by those
organizations engaging in illicit activity at the border or attempting to harm the country. Users
query the commercial LPR database using a license plate number, address of reader, or make or
model of a vehicle the user wants to locate within ATS. The database returns any responsive
records, which may include any or all of the above data elements. The search results will contain
all LPR reads from the vendor, with a primary focus on reads occurring within the last 30 days.
The search results will be maintained temporarily in the cache. Caching of data eliminates the
need to repeat the same queries over a short period of time frame. Query results are typically
cached for a minimum of four hours, but not more than twenty-four hours, after which they are
automatically deleted from the system.
CBP users will create “events” in the ATS-Targeting Framework (TF) to store relevant
LPR query responses. ATS-Targeting Framework “events” show what open research projects
belong to each user. CBP users will determine whether the query responses are relevant to their
research, and if so, may save the query results to the relevant “event.” No query responses will
be automatically saved. If an LPR result is not relevant to law enforcement or border security
missions, users may not save the query result to an event with ATS-TF. All query results that are
not uploaded to “events” are automatically deleted from the cache within twenty-four hours.
Query responses that are stored in ATS-TF “events” contain only information that is relevant,
such as license plate number of a vehicle and the location of a vehicle. CBP users are required to
review and validate each item on a “display list” at least once yearly; however, users will be
required to update “display lists” as needed when matters are resolved or when the location of a
vehicle is no longer of value to law enforcement or border security mission. As stated below,
CBP management or oversight personnel will review displays on a quarterly basis and verify
those LPR reads that are still relevant to CBP’s law enforcement or border security mission.
CBP users will also be able to query LPR data through the AFI search functionality. If the
query results are relevant to CBP’s law enforcement or border security mission, the results will
be added to an AFI Project. An AFI Project will allow CBP users to expand their research, while
adding additional data sources to compile connections between a vehicle and an address know
for criminal activity. This information may help CBP to identify individuals, or vehicles, involved
in criminal activity who may need additional scrutiny when attempting to cross the border or to
identify and locate suspects involved in terrorist activities.
CBP users who also have access to IRS-NG will also have the capability to query LPR
data. If LPR data is relevant to CBP’s law enforcement or border security mission, CBP users
will have the capability to add the results to an IRS-NG Workspace where users are able to add
additional data while conducting research. IRS-NG Workspaces are limited on viewing to select
groups until a user decides to publish an Intelligence Product. IRS-NG users are able to produce

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Intelligence Products that could be then posted in AFI, where CBP users are able to use this
information to assist with CBP’s law enforcement or border security mission. A CBP user will
determine if LPR data is relevant to CBP’s law enforcement and border security mission and if
LPR data is determined to be not relevant, it will be automatically deleted from the system, after
no more than a twenty-four hour cache.
Privacy Risk: Data regarding a vehicle’s location (particularly when collected over an
extended period of time and retained) could potentially disclose information about an individual
that is sensitive because it reveals activities that might be constitutionally protected. There is also
a risk that LPR data, like other Personally Identifiable Information (PII), may be misused or
inappropriately accessed for a purpose not related to a specific law enforcement activity.
Mitigation: CBP is implementing a structure that will mitigate privacy and civil liberties
concerns raised by the commercial acquisition and CBP’s use, storage and maintenance of LPRrelated data, taking into account the growth in the availability of LPR data and the potentially
sensitive information it can reveal. This structure will encompass:
1. Limited Role-Based User Access Controls: Access to commercially available LPR
information will be provisioned through the CBP Entitlement System where a new
entitlement role has been specifically created for this access. CBP users who require
access to this sensitive dataset will proceed through a multi-level approval process.
If it is determined that commercially available LPR information access is
appropriate for the requestor’s targeting and analytical efforts the request may be
granted, or if deemed inappropriate, denied. Once LPR access is granted, CBP will
provide the user an email authorizing access to LPR data, reiterating that improper
use of this data may result in disciplinary action, and describing appropriate use of
accessing LPR data on CBP systems laid out within this ATS PIA addendum. CBP
management will ensure that requestors have met the training requirements,
described below.
2. Training: CBP will require all personnel permitted to access LPR data via
commercial subscription to take mandatory training for data security, privacy,
information assurance, and records management on an annual basis. ATS user roles
will be granted and used only for those who meet the training requirements. User
roles are restricted and audited, with access predicated on a “need to know.”
Through user access control “entitlements,” all ATS users are only permitted to
access information from the source systems to which they have already been granted
access. System access is managed by the ATS Entitlement System and reviewed
annually to ensure the users that have access to the LPR data are recertified by a
government lead.
3. Specified Purpose: When logging into ATS, AFI or IRS-NG, authorized CBP users

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will see a description of the permissible uses of the system and will require a user to
consent affirmatively to the requirements of accessing information on a U.S.
Government system with no reasonable expectation of privacy. Each time a CBP
user logs into ATS, the user must agree to the terms and conditions set forth in a
splash screen before performing any query. The splash screen describes the agency’s
permissible uses of the system and data, and requires the user to affirmatively
consent to these rules by selecting a button before proceeding. The following rules
apply to the splash screen:
•

The splash screen appears at each logon event; and

•

Users must affirm their understanding of the rules of behavior before they
are able to complete the login process and commence a query.

4. Timeframe for Query of Historical LPR Data and Retention of Results: Privacy and
civil liberties concerns associated with historical searches of LPR data increase the
longer the data is held by the vendor and made accessible for query. However,
operational necessity may require CBP to access information sufficient to establish
patterns of criminal activity over time as part of ongoing analysis or criminal
investigation or to identify the movement or location of priority organizations or
known associates. Therefore, CBP has determined that personnel may query up to
five years of historical commercial LPR data to allow CBP personnel to conduct
additional analysis and research regarding border security or law enforcement
matters and access to sufficient historical data to identify trends, patterns, and
potentially viable information. CBP will implement a cap within CBP systems to
only allow CBP users to access LPR data within a five year period from the date of
the query. CBP will only retain the results of its queries of the LPR data in ATS or
other appropriate CBP systems (i.e., TECS or AFI) if the information is determined
to be useful in connection with its legitimate law enforcement or border security
mission. This retention will be consistent with the NARA retention schedule as
specified in the relevant SORNs. CBP must manually retain the results of its queries
of the LPR data that is determined to be useful in connection with its legitimate law
enforcement or border security mission, while all other query results are
automatically removed from the cache within twenty-four hours.
5. Use of Displays: CBP will use the capability to store license plate queries in the
form of a “display” in ATS, whereby any new read of a plate on the display will
result in notification to CBP. This capability will assist in the identification of a
vehicle’s location in near real-time, which will contribute to law enforcement efforts
to apprehend individuals whose location may be connected to the vehicle’s location
or to know if a vehicle linked to illicit activity is approaching a port of entry. While
automatic notification that an individual subject is on the move could raise privacy

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and civil liberties concerns, such notification also serves an important law
enforcement interest. To help reduce the potential intrusiveness of this technique,
CBP policy will require displays to be updated once the enforcement matter is
resolved or the individual is no longer a subject of interest. Upon creation, users will
also receive notice on the importance of promptly removing license plate numbers
from displays to avoid gathering LPR data without adequate justification. Users will
be prompted via system notification to reexamine the entirety of their displays on a
regular basis and, at a minimum, annually. Should users fail to meet this
requirement, the displays will expire from the system. CBP management will review
displays on a quarterly basis and verify those that are still relevant to CBP’s law
enforcement and border security mission.
6. Audit: ATS will provide an audit trail of each query that is made and by whom it is
made. Specifically, the audit logs will capture: 1) the identity of the user initiating
the query; 2) the license plate number used to query the LPR data; 3) the date and
time of the inquiry; and 4) the results of the user’s query. The audit trail should be
generated electronically and will need to be available to, and reviewed by, CBP
management or oversight personnel quarterly or more frequently to ensure the data
is being used appropriately. For auditing purposes, ATS stores all query parameters,
but not the query results. The vendor does not have access to these audit trails.
7. Accountability: All ATS users must undergo privacy training and obtain approval
from CBP management and the ATS system owner before gaining access to ATS.
ATS performs extensive auditing that records the search activities for all users. ATS
has role-based access which is restricted based on a demonstrated “need to know.”
Data may only be accessed using the CBP network with encrypted passwords and
user sign-on functionality. CBP users with access to commercially available LPR
information are required to complete annual security and data privacy training and
their usage of the system is audited to ensure compliance with all privacy and data
security requirements. CBP management will be held accountable for ensuring
personnel with access to LPR data sets are properly trained and use LPR data
appropriately. Periodic reviews of audit logs will confirm this is occurring. CBP
management will review displays on a quarterly basis and verify those that are still
relevant to CBP’s law enforcement and border security mission. Auditing would be
the responsibility of CBP through ATS where detailed audit logging will be
implemented. DHS and/or CBP integrity offices will investigate any anomalous
activity uncovered in the audit logs and CBP management will impose appropriate
disciplinary action if misuse is discovered.
Privacy Risk: By accessing commercially available LPR data, CBP is now accessing
data on vehicles away from the interior of the country, outside of the border zone.

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Mitigation: Similar to its use of other commercially available information, CBP only
accesses this information relevant to its law enforcement and border security mission, and will
only retain information associated with those who cross the border and those who may be linked
or connected to a person of law enforcement interest, connected to potentially criminal or other
illicit activity, or for identifying individuals or entities of concern. Queries will only be associated
with ongoing enforcement or border security activities. Should a CBP user use LPR information
outside of these parameters, the auditing and accountability requirements will discover any
misuse.

Uses of the Information
CBP identified a number of benefits from the use of LPR data from a commercial provider
for its law enforcement and border security mission. Knowing the previous location(s) of a
vehicle can help determine the location of subjects of criminal investigations, illicit activity, or
aliens who illegally entered the United States, and thus facilitate their interdiction and
apprehension. In some cases, the availability of this data may be the only viable way to find a
subject. This LPR data can also show the previous movements of a subject, which may help CBP
law enforcement personnel plan to apprehend while maximizing safety to the public and the
officers. The vendor will provide daily updates to their data to ensure CBP has the most accurate
and reliable information. LPR data from a commercial provider also allows CBP to identify
connections between a vehicle and an address known for criminal activity, which may help
identify individuals involved in criminal activity, permit CBP to identify those individuals who,
or vehicles that, may need additional scrutiny when attempting to cross the border, or to identify
and locate suspects involved in terrorist activities.
Privacy Risk: DHS defines PII as any information that permits the identity of an individual
to be directly or indirectly inferred, including any information that is linked or linkable to that
individual. The use of LPR data received from a commercial provider and used within ATS is
considered PII because the license plate information is linkable to an individual. CBP recognizes
there are potential privacy risks and impacts on the individual rights associated with the collection,
use, and retention of LPR data. These risks include:
1) LPR data from third party sources may, in the aggregate, reveal information about an
individual’s travel over time, leading to privacy concerns.
2) LPR data from third party sources may, in the aggregate, provide details about an
individual’s private life, such as frequenting a place of worship or participating in
protests and meetings, potentially implicating constitutionally-protected freedoms.
3) A license plate image or read may be incomplete or inaccurate, because the license
plate is bent, dirty, or damaged or because the software reading the numbers makes an
error. This can result in the misidentification of a vehicle and its occupants.

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4) LPR data may accurately identify the location of a vehicle, but it may not accurately
identify the whereabouts of the person that CBP is seeking.
5) LPR data may be accessed routinely, even when it is not needed.
6) LPR data may be retained for periods longer than necessary for operational purposes.
7) LPR data may be inappropriately shared with other agencies or private entities.
8) New privacy risks and impacts on individual rights may arise as technological advances
create additional capabilities for LPR data collection and analysis.
Mitigation: In defining the need for this enterprise-wide solution, CBP identified
requirements that will minimize the potential impact of this tool’s use on individual rights and
privacy. These requirements included creating a new ATS entitlement role where a user will need
to demonstrate a clear “need to know” in order to be provisioned to commercially available LPR
information, retention of the data consistent with the retention schedules of ATS, TECS, IRS-NG,
and AFI as reflected in the relevant SORNs; internal policy controls that ensure queries are
conducted only for law enforcement or border security purposes; and strong auditing requirements.
CBP will require all personnel permitted to access LPR data to take mandatory training for data
security, privacy, information assurance, and records management on an annual basis. When access
to LPR data is granted, CBP will provide the user an email authorizing access to LPR data and
stating the appropriate use of accessing LPR data on CBP systems laid out within this ATS PIA
addendum. CBP recognizes the clear benefits from using LPR data to both the CBP mission and
the responsibilities of DHS overall. DHS privacy policies require CBP to assess privacy risks in
connection with the use of LPR technology and data, and follow the DHS Fair Information Practice
Principles (FIPPs) to the extent possible. DHS civil liberties policies support the evaluation of the
risks to individual rights and liberties as a result of the use of LPR technology. DHS and CBP are
committed to safeguarding PII, upholding civil liberties, and reducing potential risks posed by this
technology.

Notice
CBP is publishing this new ATS addendum to inform the public about LPR data CBP can
access through a commercial provider. This addendum is intended to give a detailed description
of what CBP is collecting, storing, and retaining, and the privacy risks that are associated with this
activity. In addition, CBP has published the ATS SORN that provides public notice that CBP
collects information from commercial data providers.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that an individual may not know that his or her license plate
information is accessible to CBP via a commercially available LPR information database.
Mitigation: This risk cannot be fully mitigated. While CBP is publishing this PIA to
provide the public with general notice of this project, there is no way for CBP to provide specific

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and timely notice to individuals that their information may become part of CBP’s holdings via
query of a commercial provider’s data. Members of the public may not be aware that an LPR has
captured their license plate information, and because CBP does not control the initial collection of
this information, it cannot mitigate this risk. CBP attempts to reduce the impacts of this risk by
ensuring that it only accesses information pursuant to a lead, and does not retain any information
not associated with a law enforcement event.

Data Retention by the Project
CBP will be able to query up to five years of historical data to allow CBP personnel to
conduct additional analysis and research regarding border security or law enforcement matters and
to access sufficient historical data to identify trends, patterns, and potentially viable information.
CBP will not retain in its records the results of its queries of LPR databases unless the information
is determined to be useful in connection with its legitimate law enforcement or border security
mission. These limitations and requirements will help to ensure CBP’s access to LPR data are
compatible with the purpose for which the data is sought and to minimize the risk of an overcollection of this data.
LPR data will be updated on a continuous basis from the commercial provider and
reflected when queried by ATS. CBP will retain the results of its queries of the LPR data in ATS
or other appropriate CBP system (e.g. TECS or AFI) if the information is determined to be useful
in connection with its legitimate law enforcement or border security mission. This retention will
be consistent with the NARA retention schedule as specified in the relevant SORN. The purpose
of these limits is to allow CBP users seeking to conduct additional analysis and research regarding
border security or law enforcement matters access to sufficient historical data to identify trends,
patterns and potentially viable information or leads, while not retaining data so long as to result
in the unnecessary or excessive acquisition of information. CBP will not retain in its records the
results of its queries of LPR databases unless the information is determined to be useful in
connection with its legitimate law enforcement or border security mission. These limitations and
requirements will help to ensure access to and retention of LPR data are compatible with the
purpose for which the data is sought and to minimize the risk of an over-collection of this data.
Privacy Risk: Individuals are unable to consent to the retention and use of their license
plate data obtained by a commercial provider and retained in ATS.
Mitigation: Allowing a subject of law enforcement scrutiny such as a fugitive, criminal
alien, or an associate of a criminal organization to be involved in whether his or her LPR
information should be accessed, collected, queried, or retained from a commercially-owned
repository of LPR data would significantly interfere with and undermine CBP’s law enforcement
mission. For this reason, CBP does not seek consent for the access to, collection, or use of LPR
data. CBP queries of the commercially and law enforcement collected data are associated to

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ongoing enforcement and border security activities and CBP would only retain information related
to those queries. Therefore, any data CBP retains would inherently be of law enforcement value.

Information Sharing
As a matter of policy, as reflected in this PIA addendum and in the applicable Privacy Act
SORNs that describe CBP’s purposes for collecting data, CBP retains license plate data for those
who cross the border and for those who may be linked or connected to a person of law
enforcement interest, connected to potentially criminal or other illicit activity, or used for
identifying individuals or entities of concern.
CBP only shares information with agencies outside of DHS consistent with the Privacy
Act, including the routine uses it has published in the relevant SORNs (e.g., TECS, ATS, and AFI).
Privacy Risk: LPR information collected by CBP from a commercial vendor may be
inappropriately accessed or disseminated.
Mitigation: To assist in securing LPR data against unauthorized access or use, CBP will
limit the number of individuals who can access LPR data via the commercial provider. ATS and
CBP intend to ensure only those who need LPR data for their mission-related purposes are able to
query the data via ATS. Once an authorized query occurs, the LPR data deemed relevant to the
enforcement activity will be added, as necessary, to a record or case file in the appropriate CBP
system (electronic or paper) that is secure.
ATS and the vendor will maintain an immutable log of queries of the LPR data and this
log will be reviewed quarterly or more frequently by CBP management or oversight personnel to
ensure LPR data has been accessed for authorized purposes only. Anomalies in the audit trail that
reveal inappropriate activity will be referred to the appropriate DHS or CBP integrity office for
further action. The vendor supplying LPR data via ATS is employing data security technologies
comparable to those required of CBP systems in order to protect the integrity of its data from
hacking and other risks.

DHS/CBP-006 Automated Targeting System, 77 Fed. Reg. 30297 (May 22, 2012).

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or is created from information contained in other systems of records with appropriate exemptions
in place.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that individuals cannot access or request correction of records
collected and maintain by commercial providers.
Mitigation: While CBP cannot provide access or correction rights to the commercial data
itself, it mitigates the redress risks posed with its collection and use of this data via the access and
correction provisions of the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). While
records may be exempt from certain provisions of these laws for law enforcement purposes, CBP
reviews all requests individually and takes all appropriate steps to correct its records as necessary.

Auditing and Accountability
ATS maintains robust audit trails and makes them available to appropriate CBP personnel
for review. ATS will record all transactions and queries of LPR data in immutable audit logs at the
individual authorized-user level and these logs are subject to review at any time by CBP oversight
offices and system managers as appropriate. Specifically, system audit logs must capture: 1) the
identity of the user initiating the query; 2) the license plate number used to query the LPR system;
and 3) the date and time of the inquiry. This data will also be captured, thereby enhancing the
usefulness of the audit trail data. The primary goal of maintaining audit logs is to deter and discover
any abuse or misuse of LPR data. Any abuse or misuse of LPR data will be reported and subject
to disciplinary action, as appropriate.
Before being granted access to LPR data, authorized CBP users must complete training
that describes all of the above policy requirements and associated privacy, civil rights and civil
liberties safeguards. This will supplement existing mandatory training required of all CBP
personnel on data security, data privacy, integrity awareness, and records management.
Privacy Risk: LPR data from a commercial provider is not subject to internal DHS
auditing and accountability controls; therefore, there is a risk these controls may not occur or be
as robust as they would be if the vendor’s system were internal to DHS. There is a risk that LPR
data may be accessed routinely (even when not needed) without appropriate controls and oversight.
Mitigation: This risk can be managed by preventing over-collection and retention of the
information. CBP will implement internal policies and training emphasizing the requirement to
query and use LPR data only when in support of a law enforcement or border security purpose.
Audit trails will capture sufficient usage data to allow the identification of CBP users who do not
comply with these policies. CBP users will be required to review and validate each item on an
display at least once yearly; however, employees will be required to update the displays as needed
when matters are resolved or when the location of a given vehicle is no longer of law enforcement
value. The fact that CBP users will have to associate queries with ongoing enforcement or border

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security purpose in order to perform the queries will provide an enforcement mechanism for these
requirements.
In addition, to ensure that LPR information is appropriately accessed, ATS and the vendor
will capture information about the query of a license plate number. The primary goal of
maintaining audit logs is to deter and discover any abuse or misuse of LPR data. Any abuse or
misuse of LPR data will be reported and subject to disciplinary action, as appropriate.

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ATS PIA Update Addendum 3:
New Populations Subject to ATS Vetting
3.1 International Aviation Crew Members
January 13, 2017 (back to top)
CBP will now retain active data and updates to the active data from the master crew
member list (MCL) and master non-crew member list (MNL) in ATS for recurrent vetting. All
crew members and non-crew members (e.g., air carrier employees, family members, or persons
traveling onboard for the safety of the flight for commercial all-cargo flights) who may be assigned
to flights operating to, from, or overflying the United States, are listed on the MCL and MNL. The
lists include individuals who may be on U.S. carriers who may fly from one international point to
another international point, without overflying the United States.
Existing Procedures
Per 19 CFR 122.49c, air carriers are required to submit MCL and MNL information
electronically to CBP. Currently, CBP receives the information and immediately sends this
information to TSA for transportation security vetting. This transmission must take place at least
48 hours in advance of the flight, with any changes being submitted at least 24 hours in advance.
TSA receives the MCL and MNL information from CBP and vets the crew and non-crew members
for aviation security concerns. TSA determines whether any crew or non-crew members pose
security threats and must be removed from the flight.
Despite a) having independent authority to collect this information and b) receiving the
information at least 24 hours prior to the flight via the Electronic Advance Passenger Information
System (eAPIS),94 CBP had opted not to retain the MCL and MNL information but instead serve
as a conduit to TSA. Therefore, CBP has identified a security and passenger processing gap by not
independently vetting the MCL and MNL for terrorism, border security, criminal, or immigration
violations (such as visa revocations) as far in advance of the flight as possible. Currently, CBP
conducts these pre-flight checks based on the standard APIS manifest transmission which occurs
no later than 60 minutes prior to flight.
This current process poses several challenges. CBP may have less than one hour to assess
any changes to the flight crew and non-crew members. A late determination by CBP that a crew
or non-crew member should not be permitted on a flight may result in the flight being delayed or
even canceled.

See DHS/CBP/PIA-001 Advance Passenger Information System (APIS), available at
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/advanced-passenger-information-system-apis-update-national-counterterrorismcenter-nctc.

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Proposed Change
Recognizing that the retention of this data may enhance vetting, strengthen security, and
reduce unnecessary flight delays, the CBP National Targeting Center (NTC) seeks to retain MCL
and MNL data in ATS for recurrent vetting. Specifically, the NTC seeks to:
1) Obtain a one-time transfer of active MCL and MNL data from TSA, and
2) Retain updates to the active MCL and MNL data obtained directly from air carriers
as submitted through eAPIS prior to 24 hours before flight.
The NTC will update the active records with ongoing MCL and MNL data feeds. In
addition, CBP’s retention of the data will enhance its vetting capabilities and better enable CBP to
notify operators of an issue in a timely manner, minimizing disruptions to or cancellations of flights
and enhancing the protection of the aircraft, those on board, and the public.
Privacy Risks
While CBP has the authority to collect the MCL and MNL, and has opted not to do so until
now, CBP Privacy has identified several privacy risks associated with this data collection that are
addressed below, and via oversight mechanisms.
•

Inadmissibility: If an individual appears to be inadmissible to the United States, CBP
should be in a position to inform the airline as soon as possible. TSA removes individuals
from the MCL or MNL on terrorism- or transportation security-related grounds only and
not for immigration violations (although an immigration decision may be based on
security-related grounds and thus be grounds for removal). CBP will coordinate with TSA
on procedures for CBP to provide information to TSA regarding individuals who need
additional review by TSA for purposes of TSA’s MCL or MNL determinations. TSA will
remain the authority for removing a name from the MCL or MNL.

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In addition, CBP also has independent authority to collect and store MCL and MNL
pursuant to 19 CFR 122.49c, which requires air carriers are required to submit MCL and MNL
information electronically to CBP.
All previously identified SORNs remain in effect, or are noted under the “Notice” section
below.

Characterization of the Information
CBP will obtain active information and updates to active MCL and MNL information for
vetting in ATS. Crew lists contain the following biographic information:
•

Full name

•

Gender

•

Date of birth

•

Place of birth

•

Citizenship

•

Country of residence

•

Address of permanent residence

•

Passport number, country of issuance, and expiration date (if required)

•

Pilot certificate number and country of issuance

•

Status onboard the aircraft (whether the individual is crew or non-crew)

Crew list data is received under the APIS SORN,95 which limits retention to one year.
However, CBP intends to, within one year, issue the appropriate privacy compliance
documentation that will outline: 1) retaining the active MCL and MNL information, as updated by
TSA and the airlines; 2) retaining for one year data concerning an individual who has been
removed from TSA’s MCL and MNL; 3) retaining for seven years data concerning an individual
who is a potential match to a record or other derogatory information; and 4) retaining for 99 years
data concerning an individual who is a confirmed match to a record or other derogatory
information. In addition, information that is linked to active law enforcement records, CBP
matches to enforcement activities, and/or investigations or cases may be maintained by CBP in
TECS or ATS consistent with the TECS or ATS SORNs.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that CBP’s retention of MCL and MNL data is inconsistent
with the terms of the original collection as specified in the APIS SORN.

See DHS/CBP-005 Advance Passenger Information System (APIS), 80 FR 13407 (March 13, 2015), available at
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-03-13/html/2015-05798.htm.

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Mitigation: The APIS SORN provides information about CBP collecting and maintaining
passenger, crew, and non-crew member data. Further, the MCL and MNL data is a subset of the
APIS data already provided to CBP, but APIS data actually contains additional data elements.
However, within one year, CBP intends to issue the appropriate privacy compliance
documentation to clarify and provide additional transparency to the public. The public is being
made aware of this initiative through this PIA.

Uses of the Information
CBP seeks to obtain from TSA a one-time transfer of active MCL and MNL data and MCL
and MNL data being retained by TSA, and retain updates to MCL and MNL data obtained directly
from air carriers as submitted through eAPIS as required by 19 CFR 122.49c. The MCL and MNL
data will be maintained in APIS. ATS will update the active records with ongoing MCL and MNL
data feeds. In addition, CBP’s retention of the data will enhance its vetting capabilities and better
enable CBP to notify operators of an issue in a timely manner, minimizing disruptions to or
cancellations of flights and enhancing the protection of the aircraft, those on board and the public.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that CBP will apply targeting rules designed to identify
individuals of national security concern to airline employees on the MCL.
Mitigation: This risk is partially mitigated by the fact that CBP will assess whether existing
targeting rules are appropriate for individuals on the MCL and MNL. CBP will follow its current
policy regarding the existing DHS oversight mechanism to ensure that targeting rules align with
DHS policies.

Notice
CBP is conducting this PIA update to provide notice of CBP retention and vetting of crew
member and non-crew member information. In addition, CBP will issue the appropriate privacy
compliance documentation to provide notice that it is now retaining the information it has the
authority to collect pursuant to 19 CFR 122.49c. There are no new privacy risks to notice identified
with this initiative as CBP is already allowed to collect the information.

Data Retention by the project
CBP will retain the active MCL and MNL information, as updated by TSA and the airlines,
according to the following guidelines: (1) one year for records on an individual who has been
removed from TSA’s MCL or MNL; (2) seven years for records on an individual who is a potential
match to a record or other derogatory information; (3) 99 years for records on an individual who
is a confirmed match to a record or other derogatory information. Information that is linked to
active law enforcement records, CBP enforcement activities, or investigations may be maintained
by CBP in TECS or ATS consistent with the TECS or ATS SORNs.
CBP will, within one year, issue the appropriate privacy compliance documentation to
provide notice of this retention.

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Privacy Risk: There is a risk that CBP will retain the MCL and MNL data for longer than
is allowed by the retention guidelines listed above.
Mitigation: This risk is partially mitigated. To ensure compliance with these retention
schedules, CBP Privacy will conduct a CPE within six months of the CBP beginning regular ingest
of the data to evaluate these risks and mitigations. The results of the CPE will be shared with the
DHS Privacy Office.

Information Sharing
There are no changes to information sharing from previously issued PIAs related to MCL
and MNL vetting activities. TSA and CBP continue to share MCL and MNL information as
mandated by law.

Redress
For all of the various ATS updates, redress methods remain unchanged from the original
ATS PIA. Most of the information within ATS is submitted from underlying source datasets. To
the extent that a record is exempted in a source system, the exemption will continue to apply.
Because of the law enforcement nature of ATS, DHS has exempted portions of this system from
the notification, access, amendment, and certain accounting provisions of the Privacy Act. These
exemptions also apply to the extent that information in this system of records is recompiled or is
created from information contained in other systems of records with appropriate exemptions in
place.
Privacy Risk: Individuals may not get the level of redress they desire.
Mitigation: This risk is mitigated, to the extent possible consistent with law enforcement
and national security exemptions noted in the applicable SORNs. To the extent that a record is
exempted in a source system, the exemption will continue to apply.
A traveler, regardless of his or her citizenship or residence, may obtain access to his or her
PNR. However, records concerning the targeting rules, the responses to rules, case events, law
enforcement and/or intelligence data, reports, and projects developed by CBP analysts that may
include public source information, information obtained through memoranda of understanding or
other arrangements because the information is relevant to the border security mission of the
Department, or records exempted from access by the system from which ATS ingested or accessed
the information will not be accessible to the individual.
Notwithstanding the applicable exemptions, CBP reviews all such requests on a case-bycase basis. If compliance with a request would not interfere with or adversely affect the national
security of the United States or activities related to any investigatory material contained within
this system, the applicable exemption may be waived at the discretion of CBP in accordance with
procedures and points of contact published in the applicable SORN.

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Procedures for individuals to gain access to data maintained in source systems that provide
data ingested into ATS would be covered by the respective SORNs for the source systems.
Individuals may follow the procedures outlined in the PIAs and SORNs of the source systems to
gain access to their information stored in those systems.
Individuals seeking notification of and access to any record contained in this system of
records, or seeking to contest its content, may submit a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or
Privacy Act request in writing to:
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Division
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Room 3.3D
Washington, D.C. 20229
FOIA requests must be in writing and include the requestor’s daytime phone number, email
address, and as much information as possible of the subject matter to expedite the search process.
Specific FOIA contact information can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/foia under contacts.
If a traveler believes that CBP actions are the result of incorrect or inaccurate information,
then inquiries may be directed to:
CBP INFO Center
OPA—Rosslyn
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20229
Travelers may also contact DHS TRIP, 601 South 12th Street, TSA-901, Arlington, VA
22202 or online at www.dhs.gov/trip. Individuals making inquiries may be asked to provide
additional identifying information to enable DHS to identify the record(s) at issue.

Auditing and Accountability
There are no changes to the auditing and accountability procedures for ATS as described
in the previously issued ATS PIAs.

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3.2 CBP Employees and Applicants
January 13, 2017 (back to top)
Consistent with its law enforcement and national security missions, CBP’s Office of
Professional Responsibility (OPR) conducts background investigations on CBP applicants,
employees and contractors to determine suitability for a position with the Federal Government or
for eligibility for a security clearance. OPR plans to leverage a module within ATS to perform preemployment vetting of CBP employee and contractor applicants to facilitate this process and
improve efficiencies in reviewing CBP employee applicants.
OPR’s Personnel Security Division (PSD) conducts employment background
investigations to support determinations of an individual’s suitability for employment or continued
employment, eligibility to occupy a national security position, eligibility for access to classified
information, eligibility for unescorted access to DHS/CBP facilities, or access to DHS/CBP
information technology systems. The initial (applicant) investigation is typically initiated preemployment (but after a tentative job offer has been extended) for individuals seeking employment
as a federal or contractor employee with CBP. Periodic reinvestigations are conducted every five
years to ensure continued suitability/eligibility. Recurrent vetting and continuous evaluation is
conducted between these investigations in an effort to identify derogatory information that may
adversely affect the individual’s suitability or eligibility for continued employment. Such vetting
may be conducted as frequently as determined appropriate (e.g., daily). As part of the applicant
investigation, any subsequent periodic reinvestigation, and for any recurrent vetting or continuous
evaluation efforts, PSD queries a variety of databases for information associated with the subject
of the investigation. As part of this data collection process, some limited queries may also be
conducted on the applicant’s spouse, immediate family, and/or associates. The variety and scope
of the queries currently conducted is limited by the databases available for query via CBP Vetting
(a CBP program that queries a variety of law enforcement databases for information based upon
user-defined parameters) and by manpower limitations within PSD to conduct manual queries via
TECS.
PSD uses a program called Cornerstone96 to conduct multiple automated checks/queries
via CBP Vetting. CBP Vetting provides information from the National Crime Information Center
(NCIC), Nlets, Currency or Monetary Instruments Report (CMIR), Search/Arrest/Seizure (S/A/S)
report, and TECS. Cornerstone also conducts automated checks of Selective Service records and
records from credit bureaus. PSD supplements the automated Cornerstone checks with manual
TECS queries to obtain additional information for which Cornerstone is not presently programmed
to query and from additional sources (USCIS’s Central Index System and DataFacts (credit
reports)) not available via CBP Vetting and to delve deeper into information developed during the
automated Cornerstone checks. Search parameters may include any/all of the following: name,
96

A PIA for Cornerstone will be published in 2017.

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Social Security number (SSN), date of birth (DOB), place of birth (POB), residence address,
immigration document numbers (e.g., “A” and “C” numbers), Fingerprint Identification Number
(FIN), and passport numbers. The following checks are currently conducted via manual checks or
Cornerstone:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Address Checks
Border Crossing Records
Citizenship/Immigration Checks
CBP OPR Background Investigations
Credit Bureau Reports (CBR)
Criminal Record/Law Enforcement Checks
Department of State Consular Consolidated Database (for passport status,
citizenship, and visas)
Selective Service (verification that subjects who are required to register for the
Selective Service have appropriately registered)

Cornerstone presents all relevant information (including a “No Result” indicator) resulting
from the automated queries/checks as a preformatted report. The CBR is presented as a separate
report based on current contract requirements. PSD adjudicators review all information developed
during these checks (vetting checks) to verify the information is correctly associated with the
subject of the investigation and they consider all relevant information when making the final
adjudicative determination as to the subject’s suitability for employment.
In lieu of the checks currently conducted via Cornerstone through CBP Vetting and other
manual checks conducted via TECS, PSD plans to use the Employee and Applicant Suitability and
Eligibility (EASE) module of ATS to support its background investigations (including National
Agency Checks (NAC)), periodic reinvestigations, and continuous evaluations. Like the query
portion of Cornerstone and CBP Vetting, ATS-EASE is a system designed to facilitate the query
of a variety of other systems for records/information that match user-defined parameters. ATSEASE is not designed as a record warehouse, but does retain information regarding search
parameters and queried records to meet disclosure tracking requirements and to facilitate recurrent
vetting. The use of ATS-EASE automates a number of manual checks, potentially providing the
PSD adjudicator with additional information associated with the subject of the background
investigation. ATS-EASE will only be accessible to PSD employees and certain Office of
Information and Technology (OIT) staff when needed. Data in ATS-EASE will not be searchable
or accessible to other ATS users.

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Authorities and Other Requirements
Executive Order (E.O.) 10450; E.O. 12968; E.O. 13467; E.O. 13488; 5 CFR § 731; 5 CFR
§ 732; 5 CFR § 736; 32 CFR § 147; Security Executive Agent Directive 5; and Director of Central
Intelligence Directive 6/4.
Note that these personnel security records are covered by the DHS/ALL-023 Department
of Homeland Security Personnel Security Management SORN,97 not the ATS SORN.

Characterization of the Information
OPR PSD will conduct automated queries in ATS against TECS holdings (including Watch
List records), NCIC, and Nlets via ATS-EASE queries and algorithms. In addition, PSD uses ATS
to query the following databases:
•

•

•
•

Arrival and Departure Information Systems (ADIS): provides information related
to subject overstays prior to obtaining citizenship based on subject provided name,
DOB, Passport number, Alien Registration number, or Student and Exchange
Visitor Information System (SEVIS) ID.
ICE Enforcement Integrated Database (EID): queries apprehension records created
by CBP and ICE on inadmissible aliens based on subject provided name, DOB, or
Alien Registration number.
LexisNexis: provides access to over 10,000 public record data sources on persons
and businesses based on subject provided name, DOB, address, or phone number.
OBIM Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT): queries based on
subject provided name, DOB, EID number, Passport number, or Visa number.
IDENT provides biographic data on each IDENT “encounter,” to include the
location of the encounter, travel documents associated with the encounter, photo of
subject, and whether the subject is on the biometric watch list.

Privacy Risk: There is a risk of over-collection of information since by using ATS-EASE
to supplement the background investigation and suitability process, CBP has the capability to
include more information than is required to determine an applicant or employee’s suitability for
employment.
Mitigation: CBP OPR will only use the ATS-EASE module to automate existing searches
of information and databases that OPR currently reviews as part of the suitability process. CBP
97

See DHS/ALL-023 Department of Homeland Security Personnel Security Management, 75 FR 8088 (February
23, 2010), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-02-23/html/2010-3362.htm.

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uses ATS-EASE to make the process more efficient and automated, but does not present a risk of
over-collection because there are no additional sources. In addition, to ensure compliance with this
process, CBP Privacy will conduct a CBP Privacy Evaluation (CPE) within 12 months of the
launch of ATS-EASE. The results of the CPE will be shared with the DHS Privacy Office.

Uses of the Information
In lieu of the checks currently conducted via Cornerstone through CBP Vetting and other
manual checks conducted via TECS, PSD seeks to initiate checks on all individuals undergoing a
CBP employment background investigation (including NAC) of applicants for CBP employment
that have received a tentative offer, individuals seeking unescorted access to DHS/CBP facilities
and/or access DHS information technology systems, and employees and contractors undergoing a
periodic reinvestigation and/or continuous evaluation via ATS-EASE. The use of the ATS-EASE
process permits additional “automated” checks to be performed thereby potentially providing the
PSD adjudicator with additional information associated with the subject of the background
investigation.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that CBP will conduct suitability checks using ATS-EASE
for applicants who have not been selected for employment by a hiring manager.
Mitigation: Checks related to suitability or eligibility are made utilizing information
obtained from the security forms completed by applicants. Security forms are only released to
applicants once they have been tentatively selected for a position and have accepted the offer. In
addition, to ensure compliance with this process, CBP Privacy will conduct a CPE within 12
months of the launch of ATS-EASE. The results of the CPE will be shared with the DHS Privacy
Office.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that CBP will use more data than is necessary to determine
employment suitability via the ATS-EASE module.
Mitigation: CBP OPR will only use the ATS-EASE module to automate existing searches
of information and databases that OPR currently reviews as part of the suitability process. CBP
uses ATS-EASE to make the process more efficient and automated, but does not present a risk of
over-collection because there are no additional sources. In addition, to ensure compliance with this
process, CBP Privacy will conduct a CPE within 12 months of the launch of ATS-EASE. The
results of the CPE will be shared with the DHS Privacy Office.

Data Retention by the project
CBP retains personnel security data for five years after the employee’s separation from the
agency consistent with the NARA approved retention schedule. All queries and the query results
will be retained within ATS-EASE for up to seven years to enable PSD adjudicators to review and
adjudicate the potential impact of the possible hits on the suitability of each applicant and to
facilitate recurrent vetting of subjects.

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Privacy Risk: There is a risk that CBP will retain information for longer than the required
retention period.
Mitigation: PSD will only retain information for as long as it is required for adjudicators
to review and adjudicate the potential impact of possible hits on the suitability of each applicant
and to facilitate recurrent vetting of subjects. PSD will retain data as per in accordance with the
DHS Instruction and other guidance on personnel security and suitability.

Information Sharing
CBP’s delegated investigative authority provides for the retention of investigative
materials related to applicant background investigations for the greater of 15 years, or five years
after the individual’s separation from CBP. Subject information that is used to establish the search
parameters is retained within Cornerstone for up to two years. Additionally, the raw data results
from the various queries are also retained for up to two years.
All information resulting from the vetting checks (including the CBR, Cornerstone report,
and screen-prints reflecting the results of all manual TECS queries (including “No Record”
results)) that matched the parameters of the queries is retained in the Integrated Security
Management System (ISMS).98 Such records may include information that matched the parameters
of the query but are not associated with the subject of the investigation (e.g., records for individuals
with same name but that are determined not to be associated with the subject of the investigation).
The actual data from the ATS-EASE queries will not be shared with any system external
to DHS.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that unauthorized access to ATS-EASE could inappropriately
expose information.
Mitigation: ATS-EASE will only be accessible to PSD employees and certain OIT staff
when needed to resolve technical issues. Data in ATS-EASE will not be searchable or accessible
to other ATS users. In addition, CBP OIT is constantly updating the CBP firewall to prevent
unauthorized access to all CBP systems including ATS-EASE

Redress
ATS-EASE stores PII, suitability, and security clearance process tracking information
related to an individual. The information is self-reported by the individual undergoing a
background investigation when he or she submits his or her completed SF-85/SF-86 or e-QIP
entry. Individuals are able to correct erroneous information in e-QIP before submission. Once that
data has been submitted to ISMS for suitability review and clearance processing, individuals must

ISMS is the DHS mandated system for tracking background investigations. For more information, please see
DHS/ALL/PIA-038 Integrated Security Management System and its subsequent updates, available at
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsallpia-038b-integrated-security-management-system-isms.

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contact either PSD directly, or submit a Privacy Act request via the CBP Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) Office to gain access to their records.
During the suitability determination process, each individual has the ability to address and
provide mitigating information related to any derogatory information that is identified as part of
his/her background investigation. Subjects are notified of any pending actions based on derogatory
information and are provided a mechanism to submit mitigating information. If a derogatory
finding is made, they may have appeal rights, and also the ability to request information regarding
their case via the CBP FOIA office.
As identified in the Personal Security Management SORN, requests for personnel security
information are made to the DHS FOIA Office, which maintains the accounting of what records
were disclosed and to whom. The DHS FOIA Office submits a request for information to the CBP
PSD. The PSD has the option of using the ISMS File Request module to track FOIA office
requests.
Privacy Risk: Individuals may not get the level of redress to which they are entitled.
Mitigation: This risk is mitigated, to the extent possible consistent with law enforcement
and national security exemptions noted in the applicable SORNs.
Notwithstanding the applicable exemptions, CBP reviews all such requests on a case-bycase basis. If compliance with a request would not interfere with or adversely affect the national
security of the United States or activities related to any investigatory material contained within
this system, the applicable exemption may be waived at the discretion of CBP in accordance with
procedures and points of contact published in the applicable SORN.
Procedures for individuals to gain access to data maintained in source systems that provide
data entered into ATS would be covered by the respective SORNs for the source systems.
Individuals may follow the procedures outlined in the PIAs and SORNs of the source systems to
gain access to their information stored in those systems.
Individuals seeking notification of and access to any record contained in this system of
records, or seeking to contest its content, may submit a FOIA or Privacy Act request in writing to:
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Division
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Room 3.3D
Washington, D.C. 20229
FOIA requests must be in writing and include the requestor’s daytime phone number, email
address, and as much information as possible of the subject matter to expedite the search process.
Specific FOIA contact information can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/foia under contacts.

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Auditing and Accountability
There are no changes to the auditing and accountability procedures for ATS as described
in the previously issued ATS PIAs. ATS-EASE will only be accessible to PSD employees and
certain OIT staff when needed to resolve technical issues. Data in ATS-EASE will not be
searchable or accessible to other ATS users.

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3.3

Private Sector Open Source Information Update
Last updated October 3, 2018 (back to top)

ATS has traditionally served as a web-based enforcement and decision support tool used
to collect, analyze, and disseminate information for the identification of potential terrorists,
transnational criminals, and other persons who pose a higher risk of violating U.S. law. CBP uses
ATS to augment a CBP Officer’s decision-making about whether a passenger or crew member
should receive additional inspection.
Social mediai has become a powerful source of communication and interaction in the past
decade and is likely to continue to evolve on a global scale as an integral component of individual
identity. Increases in social media usage and internet connectivity -- as well as in the prevalence
of mobile devices and their enabling of near-constant access to social media platforms -- have
created myriad of new opportunities for national security adversaries or border security threats to
use social media platforms for their recruitment, communications, strategy, and operations.
Open source social media content subsequently provides a wealth of information that, if
properly collected and analyzed, can offer insight and assist in guiding decision-making processes
to improve national security and public safety. CBP interacts on a daily basis with millions of
travelers who increasingly utilize social media through a variety of available platforms.
Accordingly, CBP recognizes that the effective operational use of social media can and should
play a vital role in the targeting and identification of those seeking entry into the United States for
the purpose of doing harm through acts of terrorism or transnational criminal activities, or those
intentionally attempting to restrict or exploit lawful trade and travel.
CBP has entered into a contract with a private database vendor to test and evaluate whether
ingestion of commercially available social media information into the Automated Targeting
System – Targeting Framework may assist CBP in its targeting, vetting, and analysis efforts.

Privacy Impact Analysis
Authorities and Other Requirements
All of the authorities previously identified for ATS remain in effect. ATS derives its
authority primarily from 19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 1461, 1496, 1581, 1582; 8 U.S.C. § 1357; 49 U.S.C. §
44909; the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002 (EBSVRA) (Pub. L. 107173); the Trade Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-210); the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 (IRTPA) (Pub. L. 108-458); and the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act
of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) (Pub. L. 109-347).
All previously identified SORNs remain in effect.

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Characterization of the Information
CBP will only ingest the Social Media Handle field as part of this effort. In the event of a
match, additional data fields may be uploaded into ATS.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that the private sector vendor may improperly identify an
individual as having links to terrorism, and that CBP may take action against this individual based
on erroneous information.
Mitigation: In the case of any potential “matches,” CBP personnel trained in open source
intelligence and research pursuant to CBP and DHS policy and guidelines would also enter the
database to conduct manual, directed queries on the subjects identified.
Uses of the Information
No information will be shared with the commercial provider during or after this proof-ofconcept. CBP will use the information to test the potential value of incorporating open source data
into CBP’s vetting processes in order to better identify potential connections to known terrorist
propaganda channels and actors, and may use the information to augment other data in support of
operational decisions as appropriate.
Notice
CBP provides general notice of its collection of social media handles on ESTA applications
in the ESTA PIA99 and SORN.100 In addition, ESTA applicants may review the Privacy Act
Statement available on the ESTA website and are aware of CBP’s collection of social media
handles through their voluntary provision of the information. In addition, this PIA provides notice
of ingestion of commercially sourced publicly available information into ATS.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk to notice since individuals are not provided specific, timely
notice of the collection of their social media information by a third party, and the retention and use
of that information by CBP.
Mitigation: This risk cannot be fully mitigated. Although CBP provides specific notice of
social media information to ESTA applicants, and general notice through this PIA, CBP cannot
provide specific and timely notice to individuals who are subject to CBP review as a result of
information obtained. Such notice would compromise the integrity of a law enforcement matter
and assist that individual in evading detection.
Data Retention by the project

DHS/CBP/PIA-007 Electronic System for Travel Authorization, available at www.dhs.gov/privacy.
DHS/CBP-009 Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) (September 2, 2016) 81 F.R. 60713.

100

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Retention will not exceed 15 years, unless linked to active law enforcement lookout
records, CBP matches to enforcement activities, and/or investigations or cases (i.e., specific and
credible threats; flights, individuals, and routes of concern; or other defined sets of circumstances).
Information Sharing
No information will be shared with the private sector vendor during or after this pilot. Once
CBP incorporates information into a record in TECS,101 ATS,102 or AFI,103 it may be viewable to
other users both internal and external to CBP. User access to this information is determined by the
relevant source system, and information from the private sector vendor database will not be tagged
as such, but will be incorporated along with other relevant subject information into the appropriate
record if CBP personnel are able to verify the findings.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk that non-CBP users of TECS, ATS or AFI might use
information derived from the private sector vendor in a manner inconsistent with the purpose of
collection.
Mitigation: This risk is partially mitigated. CBP assesses all partner agencies’ missions
for compatibility prior to granting access to CBP systems. Open Source information originally
identified for CBP by the private sector vendor and ingested into ATS and recorded in other
systems is of law enforcement concern and CBP needs to make the information available to other
agencies for law enforcement and counterterrorism purposes, as appropriate.
Redress
For all of the various ATS updates, redress methods remain unchanged from the original
ATS PIA. Because of the law enforcement nature of ATS, DHS has exempted portions of this
system from the notification, access, amendment, and certain accounting provisions of the Privacy
Act of 1974. These exemptions also apply to the extent that information in this system of records
is recompiled or is created from information contained in other systems of records with appropriate
exemptions in place.
Privacy Risk: There is a risk to redress because individuals may not be able to access
social media postings (particularly if dated and/or expired) or dispute the finding that they are
linked to terrorism or other suspicious activity.
Mitigation: This risk cannot be fully mitigated. CBP does not provide access to law
enforcement records, including information derived from this effort, since doing so could
jeopardize the law enforcement matter or enable the subject to evade detection. However, CBP
continues to provide redress as described in the original ATS PIA and may correct information in

101

See DHS/CBP/PIA-009 TECS System and DHS/CBP/PIA-021 TECS System: Platform, available at
www.dhs.gov/privacy.
102
See DHS/CBP/PIA-006 Automated Targeting System, available at www.dhs.gov/privacy.
103
See DHS/CBP/PIA-010 Analytical Framework for Intelligence, available at www.dhs.gov/privacy.

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its own records that are proven to be inaccurate or out of date. Furthermore, CBP personnel will
conduct manual research in case of any direct matches, in order to substantiate the information
identified.
Auditing and Accountability
Access to the database will be tightly controlled, and made available only to authorized
users. Any requests for additional research into potential matches to the private sector vendor’s
information the will be run through the appropriate CBP channels, and coordinated directly with
the vendor through a consistent Point of Contact within that team. In addition, any and all CBP
personnel and contractors supporting CBP missions with the need to leverage social media
information and research in their operations must complete the CBP Privacy and Diversity
Office’s Social Media Training and sign the Social Media Rules of Behavior.

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ATS PIA Update Addendum 4:
International Information Sharing Initiatives
May 5, 2021 (back to top)
Foreign Travel Data
Under bi-lateral arrangements with foreign governments, CBP has access to sets or
elements of Advance Passenger Information (API) and may have access to sets or elements of
other traveler data related to flights which do not have a direct nexus to the United States. The
National Targeting Center (NTC) reviews traveler data received pursuant to those arrangements
in order to identify travelers evidencing possible links to terrorism, wanted fugitives, missing
juveniles, and subjects under investigation for offences such as narcotics trafficking, currency
smuggling, and weapons smuggling. The NTC coordinates positive lookout matches with CBP
and other U.S. Government personnel posted in foreign locations.
International Targeting Center (ITC)
The Border Five countries (Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and the
United States) have established an International Targeting Center (ITC) at the NTC facility. The
ITC is designed to provide a co-located intelligence and joint targeting capability in support of
Border Five data sharing and cooperative interdiction efforts. This initiative improves the ability
of the Border Five countries to monitor the international movement of goods and people for
security threats and illicit activity. CBP (through the NTC) and the targeting centers for the
Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection/Australian Border Force
(DIBP/ABF), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the New Zealand Customs Service
(NZCS), and the U.K. Border Force (UKBF) maintain liaisons at the ITC, and actively participate
in its operations.
The most significant hurdle to their current collaboration and the greatest hindrance to
future efforts is the lack of an efficient means to securely communicate sensitive but unclassified
information – generally but not exclusively PII – between the centers. To address this challenge,
CBP is developing a platform to facilitate Requests for Information (RFI), responses to RFIs, and
the proactive sharing of information between partners.
Bi-Lateral Engagement with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom
The United States and its Border Five partners – Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the
United Kingdom – have long recognized the need to share information in an effort to enhance the
security of our borders while continuing to facilitate the flow of legitimate travelers and cargo. In
support of multiple border agreements and memorandums of understanding (MOUs), CBP and the
NTC have worked with their counterpart agencies and targeting centers for DIBP/ABF, CBSA,
NZCS, and UKBF. This work has covered numerous initiatives involving the exchange of traveler-

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related data, joint risk assessment targeting, and the sharing of lookouts based on certain types of
criminality or grounds of inadmissibility. The NTC also has an on-going liaison officer exchange
with the CBSA’s National Targeting Centre in Ottawa, Canada, and the UKBF’s National Border
Targeting Centre in Manchester, England.
Foreign Electronic Cargo Data Exchange Program (FECDEP)
The NTC’s Global Targeting Advisory Division (GTAD) started a program in 2018 to
negotiate non-binding cargo data exchange arrangements for the Foreign Electronic Cargo Data
Exchange Program (FECDEP) with international partners, often other customs services, to receive
their manifest cargo data electronically. The cargo manifest data being shared is a subset of the
Cargo and Conveyance Manifest Information collected by the foreign partner. This data includes
information on the goods transported on board a particular conveyance, including transportation
and cargo bill of lading/air waybill information received prior to arrival in the United States and
provided to a competent government authority by the involved parties. For FECDEP, under a cargo
data exchange arrangement, a foreign partner will agree to transfer its electronic cargo data to
CBP’s Automated Targeting System (ATS). The goal of the FECDEP program is to collect cargo
manifest data with no nexus to the United States and gain access to cargo data not normally
available to CBP for use in targeting and risk assessment. Currently, CBP has two active FECDEP
agreements in place (Panama and Peru) and thirteen FECDEP agreements in process.

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Appendix A: List of Relevant Systems and SORNs, as applicable, for data
available through ATS
ATS maintains copies of key elements of certain databases, including but not limited to:
•

DHS/CBP-001 Import Information System (published July 26, 2016, 81 FR 48826) –
which covers the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) and Automated
Commercial System (ACS)

•

DHS/CBP-005 Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) (published March 13,
2015, 80 FR 13407)

•

DHS/CBP-007 Border Crossing Information (BCI) (published December 13, 2016, 81 FR
89957)

•

DHS/CBP-009 Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) (published
September 2, 2016, 81 FR 60713)

•

DHS/CBP-022 Electronic Visa Update System (EVUS) (published September 1, 2016,
81 FR 60371)

•

DHS/CBP-002 Global Enrollment System (GES) (published January 16, 2013, 78 FR
3441)

•

DHS/CBP-016 Non-Immigrant Information System (NIIS) (published March 13, 2015 80
FR 13398)

•

DHS/CBP-013 Seized Asset and Case Tracking System (SEACATS) (published
December 19, 2008, 73 FR 77764)

•

DHS/CBP-010 TECS (published December 19, 2008, 73 FR 77778)

•

DHS/CBP-021 Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS) (published November
18, 2015, 80 FR 72081)

•

DHS/CBP-023 Border Patrol Enforcement Records (BPER) (published October 20, 2016,
81 FR 72601) - which covers the Border Patrol Enforcement Tracking System (BPETS)
and e3 Biometrics System

•

DHS/ICE-011 Criminal Arrest Records and Immigration Enforcement Records
(CARIER) (published October 19, 2016, 81 FR 72080) - which covers the Enforcement
Integrated Database

•

DHS/ICE-001 Student Exchange and Visitor Information System (SEVIS) (published
January 5, 2010, 75 FR 412)

•

DHS/ALL-030 Use of the Terrorist Screening Database System of Records (published
April 6, 2016, 81 FR 19988)

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•

Commerce/Census-012 Foreign Trade Statistics (published June 23, 2009, 74 FR 29676)
- which covers the Automated Export System (AES)

•

Department of State’s Consular Electronic Application Center (CEAC) (published
August 2, 1995, 60 FR 39469)

•

Social Security Administration (SSA) Death Master File

Pointer System: ATS accesses and uses the following additional databases:
•

CBP Border Patrol Enforcement Tracking System (BPETS)

•

CBP’s Enterprise Geospatial Information Services (eGIS)

•

DHS/USVISIT-012 DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) (June 5,
2007, 72 FR 31080)

•

USCIS’s Person Centric Query System (PCQS)

•

DOJ/FBI-001 National Crime Information Center (NCIC) (published January 25, 2007,
72 FR 3410)

•

DOJ’s NCIC and the results of queries in the FBI’s III

•

National Insurance Crime Bureau’s (NICB’s) private database of stolen vehicles

•

Department of State Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) PIA (published July 17,
2015)

•

Nlets

•

Commercial data aggregators

Manually Processed Data: ATS processes certain data in ATS and provides results back to
owner of the data:
•

ATS receives possible overstays from ADIS and processes them to identify additional
information on whether the individual has left the country as well as whether the
individual is a possible national security or public safety risk.

Defined hereafter as, “[the subset of Open Source Intelligence explicitly including] the sphere of websites,
applications, and web-based tools that connect users to engage in dialogue, share information and media,
collaborate, and interact. Social media take many forms, including but not limited to web-based communities and
hosted services, social networking sites, video and photo sharing sites, blogs, virtual worlds, social bookmarking,
and other emerging technologies. This definition does not apply to internal Department intranets or applications.” –
Derived in part from DHS Instruction 110-01-01, Privacy Policy for Operational Use of Social Media § IV(K) (June
8, 2012).
i

Per CBP Operational Use of Social Media Directive no. 5410-003, signed by Commissioner J. Gil Kerlikowske on

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January 2, 2015, the Operational Use of Social Media is defined as: “[the] use of social media to collect PII for the
purpose of enhancing general operational awareness, investigating an individual in a criminal, civil, or
administrative context, assist in making a benefit determination about a person, assist in making a personnel
determination about a CBP employee or contractor, assist in making a suitability determination about a prospective
CBP employee or contractor, or for any other official CBP purpose that has the potential to affect the rights,
privileges, or benefits of an individual or CBP employee or contractor. Operational use does not include the use of
search engines for general Internet research, the use of social media for professional development (e.g., training and
continuing education), or the use of social media for facilitating internal meetings, assigning or trading work shifts,
or other internal administrative efficiencies.”
The operational use of social media is broken down into the following five categories requiring differing degrees of
access and supervisor approval: Overt Engagement – logging in to social media using DHS/CBP-branded
credentials or otherwise indicating an official agency presence and engaging or interacting with individuals on or
through social media; Overt Research – collecting information from social media without logging in or otherwise
interacting with individuals through social media. Overt research does not include creating identities or credentials
on social media, nor does it include concealing a government affiliation to conduct research or general, operational
awareness (e.g., non-DHS affiliated IP address); Overt Monitoring – logging in to social media using DHS/CBPbranded credentials or otherwise indicating an official agency presence, but does not include engaging or interacting
with individuals on or through social media (which is defined as Overt Engagement, above); Masked Monitoring –
using identities or credentials on social media that do not identify a DHS/CBP affiliation, or otherwise concealing a
government affiliation, to conduct research or general, operational awareness. Masked monitoring includes logging
in to social media, but does not include engaging or interacting with individuals on or through social media (which
is defined as Undercover Engagement, below); and Undercover Engagement – using identities or credentials on
social media that do not identify a DHS/CBP affiliation, or otherwise concealing a government affiliation, to engage
or interact with individuals on or through social media.

File Type	application/pdf
File Title	DHS/CBP/PIA-006(e) Automated Targeting System
Author	CBP
File Modified	2021-05-05
File Created	2021-05-05