No material or nonsubstantive change to a currently approved collection
No
Emergency
04/24/2025
Withdrawn and continue
07/30/2025
07/18/2025
Withdrawn at agency's request to make modifications to the scope of the request.
table that charts list comparision
Inventory as of this Action
Requested
Previously Approved
09/30/2025
09/30/2025
09/30/2025
5,811,000
0
5,811,000
2,001,567
0
2,001,567
0
0
0
To mitigate fraud concerns, in April 2025, SSA increased the level of identity proofing needed for customers to make payment method changes during phone interactions. While necessary to protect the public and the integrity of SSAâs programs, this limits the accessibility of the phone as a service channel for direct deposit requests (including post entitlement/post-eligibility direct deposit changes). To bridge this gap, SSA developed a hybrid identity proofing process called the Security Authentication PIN (SAP) that will provide identity proofing parity with our online modality, as well as in-person verification. Utilizing the SAP process provides the necessary identity verification to allow payment method changes to direct deposit records via phone or in person, while ensuring fraud protection through verification of the identity of the individual prior to accessing or revising their account. SSA is implementing the new hybrid Security Authentication PIN (SAP) to digitally verify the identity of a telephone or in person customer when requesting changes to their direct deposit information. This supports the agencyâs changes to its identity proofing policy for post-entitlement/ post-eligibility actions for direct deposit enrollments, updates or cancellations. To ease the burden on customers, SSA created a vanity URL that navigates customers directly to the Security Settings page within their online mySocial Security account, allowing them to quickly and easily generate the SAP after accessing their account. This feature reduces the burden on the customer to navigate within their online account to the Security Settings pages where they may generate the SAP. The code generates immediately once the customer selects the âGenerate PINâ button. To allow for continued security for respondentâs personal information, and to ensure SSA is able to accurately verify the callersâ identities prior to accessing any SSA number holdersâ sensitive information, we implemented this hybrid SAP process for telephone access to the direct deposit services. In this way, we continue to offer maximum flexibility and options to the public while ensuring the security of the publicâs social security number and benefits payments. We expect this new identity proofing will be a powerful fraud prevention tool. The respondents are individuals who wish to do business with SSA over the telephone or in person for the purposes of direct deposit enrollments, updates or cancellations.
We are submitting a Change Request to increase the scope of the SAP Process to include the following telephone services: (1) Generating a Benefit Verification Letter; (2) Obtaining a Tax Statement or replacement Form 1099, (3) Change of Address, and (4) Request for Claims Status. We will make no changes to the current SAP process; however, due to the sensitive nature of the information we need to divulge for these requests, we will now use the SAP process to conduct business with SSA over the phone for respondents requesting these additional 4 services. As we are planning to implement the SAP process for these four services by August 18, 2025, we are requesting approval of this Change Request by COB, August 15, 2025.
To allow for continued security for respondentâs personal information, and to ensure SSA is able to accurately verify the callersâ identities prior to accessing any SSA number holdersâ sensitive information, we are implementing this hybrid SAP process for telephone access to the direct deposit services. In this way, we continue to offer maximum flexibility and options to the public while ensuring the security of the publicâs social security number and benefits payments. We expect this new identity proofing will be a powerful fraud prevention tool. The respondents are individuals who wish to do business with SSA over the telephone or in person for the purposes of post-entitlement/post-eligibility actions for direct deposit enrollments, updates or cancellations, or to discuss flagged initial claims for all Title II non-disability benefits (Retirement, Survivors, Auxiliary Spouses, Lump Sum Death Payments (LSDP), and Children benefits applications).
We are updating the burden figures for this information collection to reflect the change in scope for the use of the SAP process, as we will continue to use the SAP process for direct deposit requests via telephone, but will also expand the use of the SAP process for four more sensitive telephone services. While we are making no changes to the SAP process, the increase in scope significantly increases the number of responses who will use the SAP process.
* Note: The total burden reflected in ROCIS is 2,808,175, while the burden cited in the Justification for the Changes is 990,072. This discrepancy is because the ROCIS burden reflects the average teleservice center and field office waiting times as well as the burden per response. In contrast, the chart in the Justification document reflects actual burden.
On behalf of this Federal agency, I certify that the collection of information encompassed by this request complies with 5 CFR 1320.9 and the related provisions of 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3).
The following is a summary of the topics, regarding the proposed collection of information, that the certification covers:
(i) Why the information is being collected;
(ii) Use of information;
(iii) Burden estimate;
(iv) Nature of response (voluntary, required for a benefit, or mandatory);
(v) Nature and extent of confidentiality; and
(vi) Need to display currently valid OMB control number;
If you are unable to certify compliance with any of these provisions, identify the item by leaving the box unchecked and explain the reason in the Supporting Statement.
Members of the public requesting changes for sensitive services who failed SAP over the phone